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Introduction

A growing number of scholars and pundits have declared that the twenty-first century will be the era of Islam. Such predictions, whether intended in a positive or negative light, err in failing to appreciate the spread and influence of Islam during the past millennium and a half, especially on the continents of Asia and Africa. Nonetheless, events during the first decade of the new millennium have underscored the importance of knowing about Islamic history and understanding the great diversity and richness of Muslim social, cultural, and religious practices. Suicide bomber attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, killed over three thousand persons. These tragic events and the media coverage of the aftermath as well as of the two wars subsequently fought in the Muslim countries of Afghanistan and Iraq have dramatically shown how little is known in the West about Islam and the Muslim world. Islam is, and has been for nearly fifteen centuries, a global religious and political phenomenon. Muslim networks of communication, from the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to the vast new power of the World Wide Web, have enabled Muslims to establish postmodern identities in a rapidly changing world, while at the same time preserving and reinvigorating a variety of time-honored traditions and practices. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World is a sourcebook of information about Islam, its past and present, addressed to students and general readers as the twenty-first century begins its first decade.

The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World presents in two volumes some 504 articles, alphabetically arranged, in incremental lengths generally of 200, 500, 1,000, 3,000, and 5,000 words. The work of some 500 scholars appears in these pages, carefully reviewed and edited in a common style for easy access by readers who may presently have limited or no knowledge of Islam. It has also been prepared as a teaching and learning resource for teachers and students, from the high school grades through university. The alphabetical ordering of articles that follow, in the List of Articles, will enable readers to locate topics of interest quickly. A synoptic outline of the contents of the Encyclopedia, found within the frontmatter on pages xxxi–xxxiv, provides readers with an overview by topic and subtopic of the range and kinds of information presented in the main body of the Encyclopedia. Approximately 170 photographs, drawings, maps, and charts appear throughout the two volumes. A glossary in the back matter of volume two, which lists commonly used Arabic and other Islamic terms, such as shari‘a, or “Islamic law,” will enable general readers to determine quickly the meaning of essential but perhaps less familiar terms in Islamic studies.

The Encyclopedia is truly an international work that reflects the diversity of ideas and practices that have characterize the Islamic world throughout its history. This diversity is reflected among the editors who organized and compiled this work and the scores of scholars who wrote the articles contained in it. The associate editors’ national origins are Canada, Iran, and South Africa; their religious affiliations or backgrounds include Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam; and their scholarly training has been in sociology, the history of religions, and Islamic studies. An even greater
diversity exists among the contributing scholars who live and teach in North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, including the Middle East. They represent the fields of history, philosophy, religious studies, anthropology, sociology, political science, and the fine arts, among others. In its totality, then, this work represents a broad expanse of scholarly knowledge about Islam, accessible in two volumes.

Islam increasingly is recognized as a vital force in the contemporary world, a source of collective social identity, and religious expression for over one billion people around the world, who comprise a fifth of the global population. Public interest in learning about Islam is a very recent phenomenon, however. Events of the past few decades have generated a demand for information about Islam on an unprecedented scale in the history of Islamic studies in the West. In negative terms, these events include violence: the colonial and postcolonial encounters between Europeans and Muslims in Asia and Africa, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hindu-Muslim clashes in South Asia, Serbian ethnic cleansing of Muslim populations in the Balkans, and the heavily televised American-led wars in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In positive terms, the recent years have seen productive Muslim diaspora communities emerge in Europe and the Americas, Islamic patterns of democracy and civil society develop in some countries in Africa and Asia, and venues of dialogue arise among Muslims, Jews, and Christians about their common moral and social concerns as well as their differences. That non-Muslims are learning more about Islam and their Muslim neighbors through tools like this encyclopedia must also be counted as a positive turn, and a much-needed one.

Scholars, journalists, and writers of all sorts have responded robustly to this newly recognized importance of Islam and the Muslim world, thus creating a wealth of information about Islam now available in bookstores, libraries, and newsstands around the world. More significant for readers of this work, the Internet hosts an expanding plethora of Web sites on Islamic teachings, practices, sectarian groups, and organizations. Many Web sites are sponsored by Muslim scholars, organizations, and institutions and provide authentic, and sometimes competing, information about Islamic beliefs and practices. Unfortunately, others offer hostile interpretations of Islam. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World is designed to help students and general readers cope with this growing demand and almost overwhelming supply of information.

The growing demand for accessible knowledge about Islam in recent decades has produced a number of histories, encyclopedias, and dictionaries that serve different purposes. In addition to Hodgson’s comprehensive historical essay on Islamic civilization, The Cambridge History of Islam (1970) brought together substantial treatments of historical periods and geographical regions of Islamic societies. Another important and even older work that is widely used by scholars is the ongoing project known as the Encyclopaedia of Islam. The first edition was published in four volumes in Leiden (1908–1938); the second and much larger edition recently reached its completion in twice as many volumes with a significantly expanded list of contributing scholars; and the third edition is now being planned. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World brings to general readers in accessible form the rich tradition of serious scholarship on Islam and Muslim peoples found in the Cambridge History and the Encyclopaedia of Islam, and it addresses information about Islam in the twenty-first century that is not discussed in the older sources. More recently,
the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) appeared in four volumes. The focus of this latter work is, as the title suggests, on Islam in the modern world, generally dated from the beginning the eighteenth century through the last decade of the twentieth. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World by contrast seeks to contextualize contemporary Islam within the longer history of Islam, and it includes discussion of significant world events involving the Islamic world over the past decade.

In preparing this new resource on Islam, the editors sought to frame some of the traditional as well as the more recent aspects of Islam in newer categories. Thus, for example, readers will find articles covering “Material Culture,” “Vernacular Islam,” “Identity, Muslim,” “Secularism,” “Disputation,” and “Expansion of Islam.” A major feature of the Encyclopedia is the large number of brief biographical sketches (nearly two hundred) of major figures in Islamic history, men and women, past and present. The editors also included articles on several important and sometimes contested ethical and social issues, including “Ethnicity,” “Gender,” “Homosexuality,” “Human Rights,” and “Masculinities,” along with the more traditional entries on gender (usually concentrating on the feminine roles) and marriage. The events of September 11, 2001, occurred after the Table of Contents was prepared and authors were commissioned to write the articles. Nonetheless, new articles on “Terrorism,” “Usama bin Ladin,” and “al-Qa’ida,” among others, were added.

History, of course, will continue to unfold for humankind worldwide, including Muslims. The Encyclopedia includes a number of interpretive articles, such as “Ethics and Social Issues,” which provide frameworks for understanding ongoing events in Islamic history.

Editorial style is a matter of great importance in a work such as the Encyclopedia. Readers can easily get lost in technical terms and diacritical marks on words borrowed from Arabic and Persian. Integrating work from a great number of scholars from around the world, each with differing practices in academic expression and in transliterating Islamic languages into Latin letters, presented some challenges to the academic editors and the editorial staff at Macmillan. To make things easier on readers, especially for those not initiated into the argots of Islamic technical terms, the editors decided to minimize the diacritical marks on loanwords from Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Turkish, and other Islamic languages. We encouraged authors and copy editors to romanize those Islamic terms that have made it into the English language, such as jihad, hajj, and Ramadan, as evidenced by their inclusion in modern dictionaries such as Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Where it seemed helpful, editors supplied brief parenthetical definitions and identifications, both in the text and in the Glossary.

The people who made this project possible brought great ideas to it, are extremely talented and competent, and were wonderful to work with. Hélène Potter, Macmillan’s Director of New Product Development, designed the project and brought to it a considerable knowledge about Islam. More than an industry leader, Hélène became first and foremost a friend and colleague. She is an accomplished professional with an uncanny understanding of the knowledge industry she serves. Corrina Moss, an Assistant Editor with Macmillan, worked on the project throughout and kept in touch daily on editorial matters large and small. To Corrina went the unpleasant task, pleasantly administered, of keeping the associate editors and especially me on task. Elly Dickason, who was the publisher in 2000 when this project was approved, and Jonathan Aretakis, chief copy editor, also deserve expressions of praise and gratitude—Elly for supporting the project from the moment she reviewed it, and Jonathan for making sure the articles are factually and stylistically appropriate.

My colleagues Saïd Arjomand, Marcia Hermansen, and Abdulkader Tayob served as Associate Editors. The associate editors brought broad vision and detailed knowledge to their tasks of helping to organize the contents of the Encyclopedia, and I am indebted to them for making my own knowledge limitations less problematic in producing it. Rochelle Davis, a specialist in Arabic and Islamic studies, served as Assistant Editor, responsible for reading page proofs and preparing the Glossary. However, she contributed much more to the Encyclopedia, with an eye for grammatical and content errors that greatly improved the penultimate draft. My friend and
colleague of many years, John Voll, Editorial Consultant, kindly advised Hélène Potter and me of matters we should consider in the formative stages of planning the *Encyclopedia*, and he contributed several important articles to it.

On behalf of Saïd, Marcia, Abdulkader, Rochelle, and John, I would like to dedicate this project to our many Muslim and non-Muslim colleagues around the world, with whom we share the task of teaching and writing about Islam in a high-tech, troubled world that needs to know more about itself. To that end we hope this work will help disseminate useful knowledge about one of the world’s great civilizations to those who have a desire and need to know.

_Richard C. Martin_
_Creston, North Carolina_
_August 15, 2003_
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Hassan Mwakimako

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Murat C. Mengüç

Young Turks
Murat C. Mengüç

Youth Movements
Ali Akbar Mahdi

Yusuf Ali, 'Abdullah
Abdulkader Tayob

Zand, Karim Khan
John R. Perry

Zanzibar, Sa'i'di Sultanate of
Abdin Chande

Zar
Adeline Masquelier

Zaytuna
Claudia Gazzini
List of Contributors

Rula Jurdi Abisaab
University at Akron, OH
Karaki, Shaykh ‘Ali
Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir

Khaled Abou El-Fadl
University of California, Los Angeles, Law School
‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri
Quran

Asma Afsaruddin
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN
Bukhari, al-
Ibn Maja
Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj
Nasa‘i, al-

Kamran Aghaie
University of Texas, Austin
Molla
Rawza-Khani
Ta’ziya (Ta’ziye)

Ahrar Ahmad
Black Hills State University, SD
Reform: South Asia

Ali Abdullatif Ahmida
University of New England
Qaddubafi, Mu‘ammār al-

Iqtidar Alam Khan
Aligarh Historians Society, Aligarh India
Empires: Mogul
Sultanates: Delhi

Kristian Alexander
University of Utah
Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran

Richard T. Antoun
State University of New York, Binghamton
Minbar (Mimbar)

Ghazala Anwar
University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Feminism
Veiling

Etn Anwar
Hamilton College, NY
Harem
Women, Public Roles of

Saïd Amir Arjomand
State University of New York, Stony Brook
Globalization
Majlis
Monarchy
Revolution: Classical Islam
Revolution: Modern
Sultanates: Seljuk

Jacqueline M. Armijo
Stanford University
East Asia, Islam in
East Asian Culture and Islam

Touraj Atabaki
University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
Khiva, Khanate of
Pan-Turkism

Khalil Athamina
Birzeit University, Palestine
Kunti, Mukhtar al-

Fakhreddin Azimi
University of Connecticut
Feda‘iyan-e Islam
Mosaddeq, Mohammad
Nationalism: Iranian

Ihsan Bagby
University of Kentucky
American Culture and Islam

Henning L. Bauer
University of California, Los Angeles, NELC
Empires: Sassanian

Munir Beken
University of Washington
Music

Jonathan Berkey
Davidson College
Education

Carel Bertram
University of Texas, Austin
Buraq

Anne H. Betteridge
University of Arizona
Imamzadah
Nawruz

Anna Bigelow
Loyola Marymount University
Hinduism and Islam
List of Contributors

Sheila S. Blair
Boston College
Art
Calligraphy
Dome of the Rock
Manar, Manara
Mihrab

Khalid Yahya Blankinship
Temple University, PA
Hospitality and Islam
‘Umar

Jonathan Bloom
Boston College
Art
Calligraphy
Dome of the Rock
Manar, Manara
Mihrab

Gert Borg
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Arabic Literature

Thyge C. Bro
Stillitisvej
Ibn Battuta
Kano
Travel and Travelers

Jonathan E. Brockopp
Bard College, Annandale, NY
Malik, Ibn Anas
Sharī‘a

Patrice C. Brodeur
Connecticut College
Christianity and Islam
Islam and Other Religions

Daniel W. Brown
Mount Holyoke College, MA
Martyrdom
Sunna

Arthur F. Buehler
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
Saint
Silsila
Sīrbandī, Shaykh Ahmad

Paul D. Buell
Western Washington University
Empires: Timurid

Richard C. Campany, Jr.
Senior Analyst, Harris Corporation
Communism

Sandra S. Campbell
Santa Barbara, CA
Fitna

Juan Eduardo Campo
University of California, Santa Barbara
Abūl-Bayt
Arab League
Death
Hinduism and Islam
Jabannam
Jannah
Mojabedin-e Khalq
Nar
Terrorism

Abdin Chande
Sidwell Friends School, Washington, D.C.
African Culture and Islam
Hajj ‘Umar al-Tal-al-Saleh bin Allawī (Jamaal al Layl)
Zanzibar, Sa‘īdi Sultanate of

William C. Chittick
State University of New York, Stony Brook
Ibn ‘Arabi
Wahdat al-Wujud

Peter B. Clarke
King’s College, University of London
Conversion
Moravcs

Frederick Colby
Duke University
Mi‘raj

Nora Ann Colton
Drew University
Economy and Economic Institutions

Miriam Cooke
Duke University
Internet

Rokia E. Cornell
University of Arkansas
Basrī, Hasan al-
Mubāsibī, al-
Rabī‘a of Basra

Stephen Cory
University of California, Santa Barbara
Abūl-Kītāb

Lucy Creevey
University of Connecticut, Torrington
Bamba, Abūmad
Touba

Stephanie Cronin
University College, Northampton, England
Muhammad Reza Shab Pahlavi
Reza Shab

Edward E. Curtis IV
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Jamīl al-Amin, Imam
Malcolm X
Muhammad, Elijah
Muhammad, Warith Deen
United States, Islam in the

Farhad Daftary
Institute of Ismaili Studies, London
Assassins
Shī‘a: Isma‘īli

Ahmad S. Dallal
Stanford University
Astrology
Astronomy
Hijri Calendar

Suleman Dangor
University of Durban, South Africa
Mu‘āwiyah

Elton L. Daniel
University of Hawaii
Manichaeism

Virginia Danielson
Harvard University
Unm Külthüm

Linda T. Darling
University of Arizona
Erbākan, Necmeddin
Fecdet Pasha
Kemal, Namek
Political Organization
Refah Partisi
Tanzimat
Islam and the Muslim World

Rochelle Davis
Stanford University
Bedouin

Devin DeWeese
Indiana University
Central Asia, Islam in Central Asian Culture and Islam

Sylviane Anna Diouf
New York University
Americas, Islam in the

Fred M. Donner
University of Chicago
Expansion

Nadia Maria El Cheikh
American University of Beirut, Lebanon
Empires: Byzantine

Caleb Elfebein
University of California, Santa Barbara
Terrorism

Farid el Khazen
American University of Beirut, Lebanon
Lebanon

Abdullahi Osman El-Tom
National University of Ireland Healing

Haggai Erlich
Tel Aviv University, Israel Ethiopia

Carl W. Ernst
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Tariqa Tanwuwuf

Farid Esack
Union Theological Seminary, NY Qur’an

Mohammad H. Faghtoory
Mary Washington College, Fredericksburg, VA
Abu ‘l-Qasem Kashani Na’ini, Mohammad Hosayn Nuri, Fazlallab

Rizwi Faizer
Independent Scholar, Canada
Abu Bakr Hijra Jabiliiya Marwan Military Raid Muhammad Sukayna Urman ibn ‘Affan

Muneer Goolam Fareed
Wayne State University, MI Adhan Dietary Laws Dua’ Ijtibad Jami’ Mufti

Aslam Farouk-Alli
University of Cape Town, South Africa Cairo Holy Cities Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform

R. Michael Feener
University of California, Riverside Makassar, Shaykh Yusuf

Leonor Fernandes
American University in Cairo, Egypt Khanaqa (Khanasra, Kbang)

Michael M. J. Fischer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hasan Husayn

Joyce Burkhalter Flueckiger
Emory University Vernacular Islam

Allen J. Frank
Independent Scholar Reform: Muslim Communities of the Russian Empire

Anne-Sophie Froehlich
Der Spiegel, Germany Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization

Osman M. Galal
University of California, Los Angeles, School of Public Health Medicine

Patrick Franke
Martin-Luther-Universitat, Germany Minorities: Dhimmis

Patrick D. Gaffney
University of Notre Dame Khotta Masjid

Gene Garthwaite
Dartmouth College Khan

F. Gregory Gause III
University of Vermont, Burlington Ba’tb Party Saudi Dynasty Socialism

Claudia Gazzini

Najib Ghadbian
University of Arkansas Islamic Jihad

Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi
Georgia State University ‘Abd al-Karim Sorusb Mojtaba-Shahbazi, Mohammad Motahhari, Mortaza Shar’ati, ‘Ali

Robert Gleave
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<td>University of Chicago</td>
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<td>Konrad Hirschler</td>
<td>University of London, England</td>
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<td>Qamar-ul Huda</td>
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<td>Amir Hussain</td>
<td>California State University, Northridge</td>
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<td>Villanova University, Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>Torsten Janson</td>
<td>Lund University, Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Rasool Ja’fariyyan</td>
<td>Independent Scholar</td>
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<td>R. Kevin Jaques</td>
<td>Indiana University, Bloomington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shamil Jeppie</td>
<td>University of Cape Town, South Africa</td>
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<td>Haron, Abdulla</td>
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<td>Mabdist State, Mabdiyya</td>
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<td>Charlotte Jirousek</td>
<td>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY</td>
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<td>David L. Johnston</td>
<td>Yale University</td>
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<td>Fasi, Muhammad ‘Allal al-</td>
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<td>Shalahudin Kafrawi</td>
<td>Binghamton University, NY</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Contributors

Hossein Kamaly
Columbia University
Reform: Iran

Ousmane Kane
Columbia University
Askiya Muhammad
Mansa Musa
Timbuktu

Nico J. G. Kaptein
Leiden University, The Netherlands
Bid' a

Zayn R. Kassam
Pomona College, CA
Gender

Santhi Kavuri-Bauer
San Francisco State University
Architecture

Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Malaysia
Usuliyya

John Kelsay
Florida State University, Tallahassee
Dar al-Harb
Dar al-Islam

Gregory C. Kozlowski
DePaul University, Chicago
Akbar
Waqf

Gudrun Krämer
Free University of Berlin, Germany
Ghannoushi, Rashid al-
Hukuma al-Islamiyya, al- (Islamic Government)
Pluralism: Political

Kathryn Kueny
Lawrence University, KY
Circumcision
Tafsir
Pilgrimage: Hajj

Scott A. Kugle
Swarthmore College, PA
South Asia, Islam in

Timur Kuran
University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Capitalism
Property
Riba

Charles Kurzman
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Liberalism
Modernism
Modern Thought
Secularism, Islamic

John C. Lamoreaux
Southern Methodist University, Dallas
Dreams

Bruce B. Lawrence
Duke University
Internet
Networks, Muslim

Oliver Leaman
University of Kentucky
Greek Civilization
Ibn Rusbd

David Leiyveld
William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ
Abmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid
Aligarb
Iqbal, Muhammad

Franklin D. Lewis
Emory University
Persian Language and Literature
Rumi, Jalaluddin

Roman Loimeier
University of Bayreuth, Germany
Abu Bakr Gumi
Abmad Ibn Ivrabim al-Ghazri
‘Utbman Dan Fodio

Mazyar Lotfalian
Berkeley
Abu ‘l-Hasan Bani-Sadr
Bazargan, Mebdi
Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn
Najaf

F. Ghislaine Lydon
University of California, Los Angeles
Sabara

Akbar Mahdi
Ohio Wesleyan University
Youth Movements

Mohamed Mahmoud
Tufts University, MA
Muhammad ‘Abmad Ibn Abdullab

Javed Majeed
English Scholar
Modernity

Margaret Malamud
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces
Khirya

Jamal Malik
University of Erfurt, Germany
Colonialism
Jamā‘at al-Islam
Jam‘iyyat-e Ulama-e Hind
Jam‘iyyat-e Ulama-e Islam
Jam‘iyyat-e Ulama-e Pakistan
Maududi, Abu l-A‘la

Louise Marlow
Wellesley College, MA
Political Thought

Richard C. Martin
Emory University
bin Ladin, Usama
Disputation
Maslaha
Pilgrimage: Ziyara
Qa‘ida, al-
Wazir

Herbert W. Mason
Boston University
Hallaj, al-

Adeline Masquelier
Tulane University, LA
Zar

Philip Mattar
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.
Husayni, Hajj Amin al-
Intifada

Rudi Matthee
University of Delaware
‘Abbas I, Shab
Empires: Safavid and Qajar
List of Contributors

William McCants
Princeton University
‘Abd al-Baha
Babiyya
Bab, Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad

Aminah Beverly McCloud
DePaul University, Chicago
Farrakhan, Louis
Muslim Student Association of North America
Nation of Islam

Kimberly McCloud
Monterey Institute for International Studies, CA
Taliban

Jon McGinnis
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Kindi, al-

Liz McKay
University of Canterbury, New Zealand
Veiling

Christopher Melchert
University of Oxford, England
Shafi‘i, al-
Tabari, al-
Thaqafi, Mukhtar al-

Charles Melville
Pembroke College, Cambridge
Empires: Mongol and Il-Khanid

Murat C. Mengüç
McGill University, Canada
Young Ottomans
Young Turks

Barbara D. Metcalf
University of California, Davis
Adab
Abl-e Hadis / Abl al-Hadith
Deoband
Khan, Reza of Bareilly
Tablighi Jama‘at

Gail Minault
University of Texas, Austin
Khilafat Movement
Purdah

Ziba Mir-Hosseini
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, England
Divorce
Mabr
Marriage
Nikab
Polygamy

Majid Mohammadi
State University of New York, Stony Brook
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, ‘Ali-Akbar
Hojjatiyya Society
Khamane‘i, Sayyed ‘Ali
Kho‘i, Abu ‘l Qasem
Komiteh
Pasdaran
Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Musa al-

Mahmood Monshipouri
Queenipiac University, CN
Secularization

Ebrahim Moosa
Duke University
Ethics and Social Issues
Ghadal, al-
Qadi (Kadi, Kazi)

Parviz Morewedge
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ
Falsafa
Kalam
Knowledge

Harald Motzki
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Hadith

Hassan Mwakimako
University of Nairobi, Kenya
Material Culture
Sultanate: Modern
Yahya bin Abdallah Ramiya (Shaykh)

Azim Nanji
Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, U.K.
Aga Khan
Akbash
Ikhrasan al-Safa
Khojas
Nizari

Seyyed Hossein Nasr
George Washington University
Ishraqi School
Mulla Sadra

Gordon D. Newby
Emory University
Arabia, Pre-Islam
Judaism and Islam

Andrew J. Newman
University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Sadr

Jorgen S. Nielsen
University of Birmingham, England
Europe, Islam in
European Culture and Islam

A. Rashied Omar
Notre Dame, IN
Conflict and Violence

Irfan A. Omar
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI
Humor

M. Sait Özervarlı
Center for Islamic Studies, Istanbul, Turkey
‘Abd al-Jabbar
Abu ‘l-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf
Ash‘arites, As‘airah
Bagillani, al-
Maturidî, al-
Nazzam, al-

James Pavlin
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ
Ibn Taymiyya

John R. Perry
University of Chicago
Nader Shab Afshar
Zand, Karim Khan

Daniel C. Peterson
Brigham Young University, UT
Allah
Fatwa
Identity, Muslim

David Pinault
Santa Clara University, CA
Mubarram
Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver)
Karen C. Pinto  
University of Alberta, Canada  
Cartography and Geography

Randall L. Pouwels  
University of Arkansas  
Mazru‘i

Avril A. Powell  
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, England  
Ahmadiyya  
Abmd, Mirza G bilingual

Donald Quataert  
Binghamton University, NY  
Empires: Ottoman

Sholeh A. Quinn  
Ohio University  
Imam I, Shab  
Tabmasl I, Shab

Rasul Bakhsh Rais  
Quaid-i Azam University, Pakistan  
Jinnah, Muhammad ‘Ali  
Pakistan, Islamic Republic of

Amal Rassam  
Queens College, City University of New York  
Ethnicity  
Tribe

David Robinson  
Michigan State University  
Africa, Islam in

Everett K. Rowson  
New York University  
Homosexuality

Uri Rubin  
Tel Aviv University, Israel  
Asnam

John Ruedy  
Georgetown University  
Bourghiba, Habib

Abdullah Saeed  
University of Melbourne, Australia  
Coinage  
Umma

Walid A. Saleh  
University of Toronto, Canada  
Sultanates: Ghaznavid

Lamin Sanneh  
Yale University Divinity School  
Translation

E. M. Sartain  
American University in Cairo, Egypt  
Suyuti, al-

Irene Schneider  
University of Halle, Germany  
Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious

Warren C. Schultz  
DePaul University, Chicago  
Crusades  
Nizam al-Mulk  
Saladin  
Sultanates: Mamluk

Florian Schwarz  
Ruhr University Bochum, Germany  
Bukhara, Khanate and Emirate of

Michael Sells  
Haverford College, PA  
Miraj

Mansur Sefatgol  
University of Tehran, Iran  
Mollaashedi  
Wazifa

Christopher Shackle  
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, England  
Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry

Saidiya Shaikh  
Temple University, PA  
‘A‘iba

William Shepard  
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand  
Khalid, Khalid Muhammad

Reeva Spector Simon  
Columbia University  
Fatwazaa

Tahir Fuzile Sitoto  
University of Natal, South Africa  
‘Ada

Tamara Sonn  
The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA  
HAMAS  
Hezb Allah

Susan A. Spectorsky  
City University of New York  
Ibn Hanbal

Diana Steigerwald  
California State University, Long Beach  
‘Ali  
Azhar, al-  
Karbalah

Devin J. Stewart  
Emory University  
Shi’a: Early

Paula Stiles  
University of St. Andrews, Scotland  
Marwa, Muhammad  
Sbar‘it Shangalajyi, Reza-Qoli  
Shaykhiyya  
Siba‘i, Mustafa al-

Nancy L. Stockdale  
University of Central Florida  
Iran, Islamic Republic of  
Khomeini, Rubollab  
Nationalism: Arab

Claudia Stodte  
Der Spiegel, Germany  
Liberation Movement of Iran  
Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization

Liyakatali Takim  
Independent Scholar  
Ja‘far al-Sadiq  
Muhammad al-Nafisi-Zakiyya

Amin Tarzi  
Monterey Institute of International Studies, CA  
Mujahidin  
Taliban

Osman Tastan  
Ankara University, Turkey  
Law  
Mazalim
Abdulkader Tayob  
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
Hajj Salim Swarz, al-
Religious Institutions  
Yusuf Ali, Abdullah

Alfons H. Teipen  
Furman University, SC  
Empires: Umayyad

Frances Trix  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
Balkans, Islam in the

Berna Turam  
McGill University, Canada  
Nur Movement

A. Uner Turgay  
McGill University, Canada  
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal  
Gasprinskii, Isma’il Bay  
Nationalism: Turkish  
Nursi, Said

Safia Uddin  
University of Vermont, Burlington  
Awami League

Nelly van Doorn-Harder  
Valparaiso University, IN  
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)  
Southeast Asia, Islam in  
Southeast Asian Culture and Islam

Kees Versteegh  
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
Arabic Language  
Grammar and Lexicography

Knut S. Vikør  
University at Bergen, Norway  
Abd al-Majid Ibn Idris

John O. Voll  
Georgetown University  
Islam and Islamic

Frances Trix  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
Balkans, Islam in the

Berna Turam  
McGill University, Canada  
Nur Movement

A. Uner Turgay  
McGill University, Canada  
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal  
Gasprinskii, Isma’il Bay  
Nationalism: Turkish  
Nursi, Said

Safia Uddin  
University of Vermont, Burlington  
Awami League

Nelly van Doorn-Harder  
Valparaiso University, IN  
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)  
Southeast Asia, Islam in  
Southeast Asian Culture and Islam

Kees Versteegh  
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
Arabic Language  
Grammar and Lexicography

Knut S. Vikør  
University at Bergen, Norway  
Abd al-Majid Ibn Idris

John O. Voll  
Georgetown University  
Islam and Islamic

Frances Trix  
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
Balkans, Islam in the

Berna Turam  
McGill University, Canada  
Nur Movement

A. Uner Turgay  
McGill University, Canada  
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal  
Gasprinskii, Isma’il Bay  
Nationalism: Turkish  
Nursi, Said

Safia Uddin  
University of Vermont, Burlington  
Awami League

Nelly van Doorn-Harder  
Valparaiso University, IN  
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)  
Southeast Asia, Islam in  
Southeast Asian Culture and Islam

Kees Versteegh  
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands  
Arabic Language  
Grammar and Lexicography

Brannon M. Wheeler  
University of Washington  
Abu Hanifa  
Body, Significance of  
Maddhab  
Prophets

Gerard Wiegers  
Leiden University, The Netherlands  
Devotional Life  
‘Ibadat  
Qibla  
Ritual

Quintan Wiktorowicz  
Rhodes College, TN  
Modernization, Political:  
Participation, Political Movements,  
and Parties

Peter Lamborn Wilson  
Independent Scholar  
Angels

Mark R. Woodward  
University of Arizona  
Reform: Southeast Asia

Neguin Yavari  
Columbia University  
‘Atabat

Muhammad Qasim Zaman  
Brown University  
Caliphate  
Imam  
Ma’mun, al-
Mihna  
Rashidun
Synoptic Outline of Entries

This outline provides a general overview of the conceptual structure of the Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. The outline is organized under nine major categories, which are further split into twenty-five subcategories. The entries are listed alphabetically within each category or subcategory. For ease of reference, the same entry may be listed under several categories.

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- 'Abbas I, Shah
- 'Abd al-Qadir, Amir
- 'Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi
- 'Abd al-Hamid Kishk (Shaykh)
- 'Abd al-Karim Sorush
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- 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri
- Abu l-Qasem Kashani
- Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi
- Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid Akbar
- Askiya Muhammad
- Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal
- Bourghiba, Habib
- Erbakan, Necmeddin
- Fasi, Muhammad ‘Allal al-
- Gasprinskii, Isma’il Bay
- Isma’il I, Shah
- Jedvet Pasha
- Kemal, Namik
- Khalid, Khalid Muhammad
- Mahdi, Sadiq al-
- Mansa Musa
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- Mosaddeq, Mohammad
- Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi
- Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj
- Nader Shah Afshar
- Nizam al-Mulk
- Nuri, Fazlallah
- Nursi, Said
- Qadhdhafi, Mu’ammar al-
- Reza Shah
- Rushdie, Salman
- Sadat, Anwar al-
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- Salih bin Allawi
- Shar‘it Shangalaji, Reza-Qoli
- Sirhind, Shaykh Ahmad
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- Yahya bin ‘Abdallah Ramiya
- Zand, Karim Khan
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- Fadilallah, Muhammad Husayn
- Farrakhan, Louis
- Fatima
- Ghannoushi, Rashid al-
- Ghazali, al-
- Ghazali, Muhammad al-
- Ghazali, Zaynab al-
- Hajj Salim Suwari, al-
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Malik, Ibn Anas
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Malcolm X
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Makassar, Shaykh Yusuf
Maturidi, al-
Maududí, Abu l-‘Ala’
Mojtaba-Shabestari, Mohammad
Motahhari, Mortaza
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Nā‘īni, Mohammad Hosayn
Nasa’i, al-
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Qubt, Sayyid
Rahi’i of Basra
Rahman, Fazlur
Rashid, Harun al-
Rida, Rashid
Rumi, Jalaluddin
Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-
Sadr, Musa al-
Shafi‘i, al-
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Sharī‘atī, ‘Ali
Siba‘i, Mustafa al-
Suhrawardi, al-
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Thaqlāfi, Mukhtar al-
Turabi, Hasan al-
Tusi, Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan
(Shaykh al-Ta‘īfa)
Tusi, Nasir al-Din
‘Umar
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Uthman ibn ‘Affan
Yusuf Ali, ‘Abdullāh

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Silsila
Sunna
Tafsir
Taqiyya
Taqlid
Tasawwuf
Ta’ziya (Ta’ziye)
Wahdat al-Wujud
Wajib al-Wujud
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Zar

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Hisba
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‘ABBAS I, SHAH (1571–1629)

Shah ‘Abbas I, the fifth ruler of the Safavid dynasty, ruled Iran from 1587 until 1629, the year of his death. Shah ‘Abbas came to power at a time when tribal unrest and foreign invasion had greatly reduced Iran’s territory. Once on the throne he set out to regain the lands and authority that had been lost by his immediate successors. His defeat of the Uzbeks in the northeast and the peace he made with the Ottoman Empire, Iran’s archenemy, enabled Shah ‘Abbas to reform Iran’s military and financial system. He diminished the military power of the tribes by creating a standing army composed of slave soldiers who were loyal only to him. These so-called ghulams (military slaves) were mostly Armenians and Georgians captured during raids in the Caucasus. In order to increase the revenue needed for these reforms the shah centralized state control, which included the appointment of ghulams to high administrative positions.

With the same intent he fostered trade by reestablishing road security and by building many caravan series throughout the country. Under Shah ‘Abbas, Isfahan became Iran’s capital and most important city, endowed with a new commercial and administrative center grouped around a splendid square that survives today. His genius further manifested itself in his military skills and his astute foreign policy. He halted the eastward expansion of the Ottomans, defeating them and taking Baghdad in 1623. To encourage trade and thus gain treasure, he welcomed European merchants to the Persian Gulf. He also allowed Christian missionaries to settle in his country, hoping that this might win him allies among European powers in his anti-Ottoman struggle. Famously down to earth, Shah ‘Abbas was a pragmatic ruler who could be cruel as well as generous. Rare among Iranian kings, he is today remembered as a ruler who was concerned about his own people.

See also Empires: Safavid and Qajar.

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Rudi Matthee

‘ABD AL-BAHA’ (1844–1921)

‘Abd al-Baha’ ‘Abbas, also known as ‘Abbas Effendi, was the son of Baha’ullah (Mirza Husayn ‘Ali, 1817–1892), the founder of the Baha’i religion. In his final will and testament, Baha’allah designated him as his successor and authoritative expounder of his teachings. Born in Tehran on 23 May 1844, he grew up in the household of a father committed to the teachings of the Babi movement and consequently shared his father’s fate of exile and intermittent imprisonment until the Young Turk revolution of 1909.

As a result, ‘Abd al-Baha’ received little formal education and had to manage the affairs of his father’s household at a very early age. Despite these setbacks, he demonstrated a natural capacity for leadership and a prodigious knowledge of human history and thought.

‘Abd al-Baha’ corresponded with and enjoyed the respect of a number of the luminaries of his day, including the Russian author Leo Tolstoy and the Muslim reformer Muhammad ‘Abdul. He left behind a small portion of what is a large corpus of still-unexplored writings that include social commentaries, interpretations, and elaborations of his father’s works, mystical treatises, and Qur’anic and biblical exegeses.

A detail from a miniature painting of ‘Abbás I (1571–1629) appears in the volume one color plates.
Upon his release from house imprisonment in 1909, ‘Abd al-Baha’ traveled to North Africa, Europe, and North America advocating a number of reforms for all countries, including the adoption of a universal auxiliary language, global collective security, mandatory education, and full legal and social equality for women and minorities. He also warned of a coming war in Europe and called for a just system of global government and international courts where disputes between nations could be resolved peacefully.

‘Abd al-Baha’ died on 28 November 1921. According to his will and testament, his eldest grandson, Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, became the head of the Baha’i community and the sole authorized interpreter of his grandfather and great-grandfather’s teachings.

See also Baha’allah; Baha’i Faith.

William McCants

‘ABD AL-HAMID IBN BADIS (1889–1940)

‘Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis was the leader of the Islamic reformist movement in Algeria and founder of the Association des Ulémas Musulmans Algériens (AUMA). He was born in 1889 in Constantine, where he also died in 1940. After receiving a traditional education in his hometown, Ibn Badis (locally referred to as Ben Badis) studied at the Islamic University of Zaytuna, in Tunis, from 1908 to 1912. In the following years he journeyed through the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where he came into contact with modernist and reformist currents of thought spreading within orthodox Sunni Islam.

Ibn Badis became the most prominent promoter of the Islamic reformist movement in Algeria, first through his preaching at the mosque of Sidi Lahdar in his hometown, and, after 1925, through his intensive journalistic activity. He founded a newspaper, Al-Muntazam (The critic), which closed after a few months. Immediately afterwards, however, he began a new and successful newspaper, Al-Shibah (The meteor), which soon became the platform of the reformist thinking in Algeria, until its closure in 1939. Through the pages of Al-Shibah, Ibn Badis spread the Salafiyya movement in Algeria, presented his Qur’anic exegesis, and argued the need for Islamic reform and a rebirth of religion and religious values within a society that, in his view, had been too influenced by French colonial rule. He further argued that the Algerian nation had to be founded on its Muslim culture and its Arab identity, and for this reason he is also considered a precursor of Algerian nationalism. He promoted the free teaching of Arabic language, which had been marginalized during the years of French rule, and the establishment of free schools for adults, where traditional Qur’anic studies could be taught.

In May 1931 he founded the AUMA (also Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema), which gathered the country’s leading Muslim thinkers, initially both reformist and conservative, and subsequently only reformist, and served as its president until his death. Whereas the reformist programs promoted through Al-Shibah had managed to reach an audience limited to the elite educated class of the country, the AUMA became the tool for a nationwide campaign to revive Islam, Arabic, and religious studies, as well as a center for direct social and political action. Throughout the country he founded a network of Islamic cultural centers that provided the means for the educational initiatives he advocated and the establishment of Islamic youth groups. He also spearheaded a campaign against Sufi brotherhoods, accusing them of introducing blameworthy innovations to religious practice, and also of cooperating with the colonial administration. He played an important political role in the formation of the Algerian Muslim Congress in 1936, which arose in reaction to the victory of the Popular Front in France, and was active politically in the country until his premature death in 1940. Thanks to his activities as leader of the AUMA and to his writing in Al-Shibah, Ibn Badis is considered by some to be the most important figure of the Arab-Islamic cultural revival in Algeria during the 1930s.

See also Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Salafiyya.

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‘ABD AL-HAMID KISHK (SHAYKH) (1933–1996)

A pioneering “cassette preacher” of the 1970s, ‘Abd al-Hamid Kishk was born in the Egyptian Delta village of Shubrakhut, the son of a small merchant. Early on he experienced vision impairment, and lost his sight entirely as a young teen. He memorized the Qur’an by age twelve, attended religious schools in Alexandria and Cairo, then enrolled at al-Azhar University. He graduated in 1962, first in his class, but rather than an expected nomination to the teaching faculty, he was appointed imam at a Cairo mosque.
Kishk ran afoul of the Nasser regime in 1965. He claimed he was instructed to denounce Sayyid Qutb, refused, and subsequently was arrested and tortured in prison. In the early 1970s, cassette recordings of his sermons and lessons began to proliferate throughout Egypt; by the late 1970s he was arguably the most popular preacher in the Arab world. Attendance at his mosque skyrocketed, reaching 100,000 for Friday sermons by the early 1980s. In September 1981 he was arrested as part of Anwar al-Sadat’s crackdown on political opponents, and was in prison when Sadat was assassinated. Upon his release he regained his following. He published his autobiography, *The Story of My Days*, in 1986. He died a decade later, in 1996.

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Joel Gordon


d’ABD AL-JABBAR (935–1025)

‘Abd al-Jabbar was a Mu’tazilite theologian and Shi’ite jurist, known as Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar b. Ahmad al-Hamadani. He was born in Asadabad in Iran about 935, studied *kalam* with Abu Ishaq al-‘Ayyash in Basra, and associated with the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar Abu ‘Abdullah al-Basri in Baghdad. ‘Abd al-Jabbar was appointed as chief judge of Rayy with a great authority over other regions in northern Iran by the Buyid wazir Sahib b. ‘Abbad in 977. Following his dismissal from the post after the death of Ibn ‘Abbad, he devoted his life to teaching. In 999 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca through Baghdad, where he spent some time. He taught briefly in Kazvin (1018–1019) and died in 1025 in Ray.

As the teacher of the well-known Mu’tazilites of the eleventh century, such as Abu Rashid al-Nisaburi, Ibn Mattawayh, Abu l-Husayn al-Basri, and as the master of Mu’tazilism in its late period, ‘Abd al-Jabbar elaborated and expanded the teachings of Bahshamiyya, the subgroup named after Abu Hashim al-Jubba’i. He synthesized some of the Mu’tazilite views with Sunni doctrine on the relation of reason and revelation, and came close to the Shi’ite position on the question of leadership (*imama*). He is also a significant source of information on ancient Iranian and other monotheistic religions.

‘Abd al-Jabbar wrote many works on *kalam*, especially on the defense of the Qur’an, and on the Prophet of Islam. Some of his books, including most of his twenty-volume work *al-Mughni*, have been published. Commentaries on two of his lost books, *Sharh al-usul al-khamsa* by Qiwam al-Din Mankdim and *al-Mubah bi’l-taklif* by Ibn Mattawayh, are also available.

See also Kalam; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila.

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M. Sait Özervarlı

‘Abd al-Karim Sorush is the pen-name of Hassan Haj-Faraj Dabagh. Born in 1945 in Tehran, Sorush attended Alavi High School, an alternative school that offered a rigorous curriculum of Islamic studies in addition to the state-mandated, standardized education in math and sciences. He studied Islamic law and exegesis with Reza Ruzbeh, one of the founders of the school. He attended Tehran University, and in 1969 graduated with a degree in pharmacology. He continued his postgraduate education in history and philosophy of science at Chelsea College in London. In 1979 he returned to Iran after the revolution, and soon thereafter was appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini to the Cultural Revolution Council. He resigned from this controversial post in 1983.

In his most celebrated book, *Qahv va Bast-i Teorik-i Shari’i at* (The theoretical constriction and expansion of the *shari’a*), Sorush developed a general critique of dogmatic interpretations of religion. He argued that, when turned into a dogma, religion becomes ideological and loses its universality. He held that religious knowledge is inevitably historical and culturally contingent, and that it is distinct from religion, the truth of which is solely possessed by God. He posited that culture, language, history, and human subjectivity mediate the comprehension of the revealed text. Therefore, human understandings of the physical world, through science, for instance, and the changing nature of the shared values of human societies (such as citizenship and social and political rights) inform and condition religious knowledge.

There was a contradiction between Sorush’s understanding of epistemological problems of human knowledge, which he saw as logical and methodical, and his emphasis on the
‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal

The Egyptian leader who dominated two decades of Arab history, Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser was born 15 January 1918, the son of a postal official. Raised in Alexandria and Cairo, he entered the military academy and was commissioned in 1938. Thereafter, he joined a secret Muslim Brotherhood cell, where he met fellow dissidents with whom he later founded the Free Officers. On 23 July 1952 the Free Officers seized power; within a year they outlawed political parties and established a republic. In 1954, they dismissed the figurehead president Muhammad Najib (Naguib) and repressed all opposition. Elected president in June 1956, Nasser ruled until his death. Under his leadership Egypt remained a one-party state. The ruling party changed names several times; the Arab Socialist Union, formed in 1962, survived until 1978 when Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, abolished it.

A charismatic leader, Nasser drew regional acclaim and international notoriety for his championship of pan-Arabism and his leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement. His popularity soared during the 1956 Suez Crisis, sparked by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The tripartite British-French-Israeli invasion failed to topple his regime and solidified his reputation. Frustrated with the pace of social and economic reform, in the early 1960s Nasser promoted a series of socialist decrees nationalizing key sectors of industry, agriculture, finance, and the arts. Egypt’s relations with the Soviet bloc improved, but Nasser never turned entirely away from the West. In regional affairs the years after Suez were marked by a series of setbacks. The United Arab Republic (1958–1961) ended with Syria’s cession, and the Yemeni civil war (1962–1967) entangled Egyptian troops in a quagmire.

Many contend that Nasser never recovered from the disastrous defeat by Israel in June 1967. Yet he changed the face of Egypt, erasing class privileges, narrowing social gaps, and ushering in an era of optimism. If Egyptians fault his failure to democratize and debate the wisdom of Arab socialism or the state’s secular orientation, many still recall his populist intentions. When he died suddenly of a heart attack on 28 September 1970, millions accompanied his coffin to the grave.

See also Nationalism: Arab; Pan-Arabism.

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Joel Gordon

‘ABD AL-QADIR, AMIR

(1807–1883)

During the early nineteenth century, ‘Abd al-Qadir governed a state in Algeria. His family, claiming descent from Muhammad, led a Qadiriyya brotherhood center (zawiya) in western Algeria. In 1831 the French conquered the port of Oran from the Ottomans. Fighting broke out in the Oranais among those tribes formerly subjected to Turkish taxes and those privileged to collect them. The Moroccan sultan, failing to pacify the tribes on his border, designated ‘Abd al-Qadir’s influential but aging father as his deputy. He, in turn, had tribal leaders proclaim his son commander of the faithful (amir al-mu’minin) in 1832.

The highly educated and well-traveled new amir negotiated two treaties with France (1834–1837). Happy to cede the job of tribal pacification to an indigenous leader, the French acknowledged him as the sovereign of western Algeria. ‘Abd al-Qadir received French money and arms with which he
organized an administration, diplomatic service, and supply services, including storage facilities, a foundry, and textile workshops, for a standing army of six thousand men. Unfortunately, frequent disputes, and even occasional battles, punctured the treaties. The final rupture came when 'Abd al-Qadir began expanding into eastern Algeria. In response, the French decided on a complete conquest of Algeria and destroyed 'Abd al-Qadir's state (1839–1847), exiling him to Damascus. During his exile, the amir immersed himself in religious studies. He reemerged briefly into the public eye when riots shook Damascus in July 1860. It was then that Muslim resentment against perceived advantages enjoyed by Christians under the Ottoman reform edict of 1839 exploded into widespread killings and lootings. Virtually alone among the notables of Damascus, 'Abd al-Qadir shielded Christians from Muslim attackers.

See also Tasawwuf.

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Peter von Sivers

‘ABD AL-RAZZAQ AL-SANHURI

(1895–1971)

'Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri was one of the most distinguished jurists and principal architects of modern Arab civil laws. Al-Sanhuri, a native of Alexandria, Egypt, obtained his law degree from what was then known as the Khedival School of Law of Cairo in 1917. He held different public posts including that of assistant prosecutor at the Mixed Courts of Mansura and as a lecturer at the Shari'î School for Judges. In 1921, he was awarded a scholarship to study law at the University of Lyon in France. In France, he wrote two doctoral dissertations, one on English law and the other on the subject of the caliphate in the modern age. In 1926, al-Sanhuri returned to Egypt where he became a law professor at the National University (now the Cairo University), and eventually became the dean of the law faculty. Because of his involvement in politics, and defense of the Egyptian Constitution, he was fired from his post in 1936, and left Egypt to become the dean of the Law College in Baghdad.

After one year, he returned to Egypt where he held several high-level cabinet posts before becoming the president of the Council of State in 1949. Initially, al-Sanhuri supported the movement of the Free Officers who overthrew the Egyptian monarch in 1952, but because of al-Sanhuri’s insistence on a return to civilian democratic rule and his defense of civil rights, he was ousted from his position and persecuted. After 1954, al-Sanhuri withdrew from politics and focused his efforts on scholarship and modernizing the civil codes of several Arab countries. Al-Sanhuri heavily influenced the drafting of the civil codes of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Kuwait. One year before his death in Egypt, al-Sanhuri completed a huge multivolume commentary on civil law, called al-Wasit fi sharh al-qanun al-madani, which is still from various Muslim countries aimed at charting the reform of Muslim peoples.

See also Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization; Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Modernization, Political: Participation, Political Movements, and Parties.

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‘ABD AL-RAHMAN KAWAKIBI

(1849–1902)

An Arab nationalist and reformer, 'Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi was born in Aleppo, Syria, where he was educated and worked as an official and journalist until being forced by Ottoman opposition to relocate to Cairo in 1898. He joined the circle of Arab intellectuals surrounding Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. Kawakibi’s ideas are elaborated in two books, Tabâ‘î al-‘istibdad (Characteristics of tyranny) and Umm al-qura (Mother of cities). In the first, he argues that the Muslims’s political decline is the result of their straying from original Islamic principles and the advent of mystical and fatalist interpretations. Such passivity, he argues, plays into the hands of despotic rulers, who historically have benefited from false interpretations of Islam. The book was a condemnation of the rule of the Ottoman Turks, and particularly of the sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II. A revival of Islamic civilization could come only after fresh interpretation of law (ijtibad), educational reforms, and sweeping political change, beginning with the institution of an Arab caliphate in the place of the Ottoman Turks. The theme of renewed Arab leadership in the Muslim umma is developed in the second book. The title is taken from a Qur’anic reference to Mecca, where Kawakibi places a fictional conference of representatives
considered authoritative in many parts of the Arab world. He also wrote several highly influential works on Islamic contractual law, the most famous of which are Masadir al-baqq fi al-fiqh al-Islami and Nazar-yayat al-aqqa fi al-fiqh al-Islami. One of al-Sanhuri’s most notable accomplishments was that he integrated and reconciled the civil law codes, which were French based, with classical Islamic legal doctrines. For instance, he is credited with making Egyptian civil law more consistent with Islamic law.

See also Law; Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism.

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Khaled Abou El-Fadl

‘ABD AL-WAHHAB, MUHAMMAD IBN (1703–1792)

Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was a religious scholar and conservative reformer whose teachings were elaborated by his followers into the doctrines of Wahhabism. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in the small town of ‘Uyayna located in the Najd territory of north central Arabia. He came from a family of Hanbali scholars and received his early education from his father, who served as judge (qadi) and taught hadith and law at the local mosque schools. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab left ‘Uyayna at an early age, and probably journeyed first to Mecca for the pilgrimage and then continued to Medina, where he remained for a longer period. Here he was influenced by the lectures of Shaykh Abdallah b. Ibrahim al-Najdi on the neo-Hanbali doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya.

From Medina, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab traveled to Basra, where he apparently remained for some time, and then to Isfahan. In Isfahan he was introduced directly to an array of mystical (Sufi) practices and to Shi’ite beliefs and rituals. This encounter undoubtedly reinforced his earlier beliefs that Islam had been corrupted by the infusion of extraneous and heretical influences. The beginning of his reformist activism may be traced to the time when he left Basra around 1739 to return to the Najd.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab rejoined his family in Huraymila, where his father had recently relocated. Here he composed the small treatise entitled Kitab al-tawhid (Book of unity), in which he most clearly outlines his religio-political mission. He castigates not only the doctrines and practices of Sufism and Shi’ism, but also more widespread popular customs common to Sunnis as well, such as performing pilgrimages to the graves of pious personages and beseeching the deceased for intercession with God. More generally, following a line of argument developed much earlier by Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab challenged the authority of the religious scholars (ulema), not only of his own time, but also the majority of those in preceding generations. These scholars had injected unlawful innovations (bid’a) into Islam, he argued. In order to restore the strict monotheism (ta`wīd) of true Islam, it was necessary to strip the pristine Islam of human additions and speculations and implement the laws contained in the Qur’an as interpreted by the Prophet and his immediate companions. Thus, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab called for the reopening of ijtihad (independent legal judgment) by qualified persons to reform Islam, but the end to which his ijtihad led was a conservative, literal reading of certain parts of the Qur’an.

Aspects of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings, including asceticism, simplicity of faith, and emphasis on an egalitarian community, quickly drew followers to his cause. But his condemnation of the alleged moral laxity of society, his challenge to the ulema, and to the political authority that supported them estranged him from his townspeople and, some claim, even from his own family. In 1740, he returned to his native village of ‘Uyayna, where the local ruler (amir) ‘Uthman b. Bishr adopted his teachings and began to act on some of them, such as destroying tombs in the area. When this activity caused a popular backlash, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab moved on to Dir’iyya, a small town in the Najd near present-day Riyadh. Here he forged an alliance with the amir Muhammad b. Sa’ud (d. 1765), who pledged military support on behalf of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s religious vocation. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab spent the remainder of his life in Dir’iyya, teaching in the local mosque, counseling first Muhammad b. Sa’ud and then his son ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1801), and spreading his teachings through followers in the Najd and Iraq.

See also Wahhabiyya.

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‘ABDUH, MUHAMMAD (1849–1905)

Muhammad ‘Abdul was one of the most influential Muslim reformers and jurists of the nineteenth century. ‘Abdul was born in the Nile River delta in northern Egypt and received a traditional Islamic education in Tanta. He graduated from al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1877, where he taught for the
next two years. It was during this period that he met Jamal al-Din Afghani, whose influence upon ‘Abdulh’s thought over the next decade would be profound. When Afghani was expelled from Egypt in 1879, ‘Abdulh was also briefly exiled from Cairo to his native village. He returned to Cairo the following year to become editor of the official government gazette, al-Waqā‘i‘ al-Misriyya (Egyptian events), and began publishing articles on the need for reform in the country. When the British occupied Egypt following the ‘Urabi revolt of 1882, ‘Abdulh was sentenced to three years’s exile for assisting the nationalists. He lived briefly in Beirut before joining Afghani in Paris, where the two would publish the short-lived but highly influential journal al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (“The firmest grip,” based on the Qur’anic references 2:256 and 31:22). ‘Abdulh returned to Beirut following the journal’s demise in 1884, and it was during this sojourn that he first met Rashid Rida, who would become his chief biographer and most distinguished disciple.

In 1888, following his increasing estrangement from Afghani and a consequent rethinking of his earlier revolutionary ideas, ‘Abdulh was allowed to return to Cairo. He soon began a rapid ascent in Egyptian judicial and political circles. Beginning as a judge in the new “native courts” created by the Egyptian government, ‘Abdulh became a member of the newly created administrative board for al-Azhar University in 1895. In 1899, he was appointed a member of the Legislative Council, an advisory body serving at the behest of the khedive, the ruler of Egypt, and more importantly became in the same year the grand mufti, or the chief Islamic jurist, of Egypt. As the head of Egypt’s religious law courts, ‘Abdulh championed reforms that he saw as necessary to make shari‘a relevant to modern problems. He argued that the early generations of Muslims (the salaf al-salihin, hence the name Salafiyya, which is given to ‘Abdulh and his disciples) had produced a vibrant civilization because they had creatively interpreted the Qur’an and hadith to answer the needs of their times. Such creative jurisprudence (ijtihad) was needed in the present, ‘Abdulh urged. In particular, modern jurists must consider public welfare (maslaha) over dogma when rendering judgments. The legal opinions (fiqh) he wrote for the government and private individuals on such issues as polygamy, divorce, and the status of non-Muslims bore the imprint of his reformist attitudes.

During the last years of his life, ‘Abdulh collaborated with Rashid Rida in publishing the journal al-Manar, founded by Rida in 1898. The journal became a forum for not only ‘Abdulh’s legal rulings and reformist essays, but also a Qur’anic commentary that had reached the middle of the fourth sura (chapter) when ‘Abdulh died in 1905. Rida would continue publishing the journal until his death in 1935.

The most systematic presentation of ‘Abdulh’s approach to Islamic reform is found in his essay Risālat al-tawḥid (The theology of unity). In opposition to European positivist philosophers, he argues that reason and revelation are separate but inextricably linked sources for ethics: “The ground of moral character is in beliefs and traditions and these can be built only on religion. The religious factor, is, therefore, the most powerful of all, in respect both of public and of private ethics. It exercises an authority over men’s souls superior to that of reason, despite man’s uniquely rational powers” (p. 106).

See also Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Rida, Rashid; Salafiyya.

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ABU BAKR (573–634)

Abu Bakr b. Abi Quhafa, the first caliph (r. 632–634), and a member of the clan of Taym of the tribe of the Quraysh, was the first adult male convert to Islam, and the Prophet’s close companion. A merchant and an expert on the genealogies of the Arab tribes, Abu Bakr came to be known as al-Siddiq, the truthful, or the one who trusts, a reference to the fact that he alone immediately believed the Prophet’s story of his night journey to Jerusalem. Recognized even in Mecca as the foremost member of the Muslim community after Muhammad, he is credited with the purchase and release of several slaves, including Bilal, renowned for proclaiming the first Muslim call to prayer. Abu Bakr was chosen by Muhammad to accompany him on his “flight” or hijra to Medina in 622 C.E. He became Muhammad’s father-in-law when his young daughter, ‘Aisha, married the Prophet.

Taking the title Khalifat rasul Allah, meaning Successor to the Messenger of God, Abu Bakr became the first caliph of Islam upon Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E. Just before his death, Abu Bakr refused to recall the expedition sent to Syria. At the same time, he was forced to battle the wars of Apostasy, or Ridda, against the Yemen, Yamama, and the tribes of Asad, Ghatafan, and Tamim, who refused to pay the tithe or zakat, which was considered an integral part of accepting Islam. It was because of the death of many leaders during these battles that Abu Bakr, on the advice of ‘Umar, ordered Zayd b. Thabit to compile a collection of the Qur’anic verses.

See also Caliphate; Succession.
ABU BAKR GUMI (1922–1992)

Abu Bakr Gumi, born in Gumi/Sokoto province, northern Nigeria, was a leading personality in the development of the Nigerian Islamic reform movement and author of a number of influential works, such as Al-'aqida as-sahiba bi-muwafaqat ash-shari'ah (The sound faith according to the prescriptions of the shari'a) and Raid al-adhban fi ma'ani al-qur'an (Reconsidering the meaning of the holy Qur’an).

Gumi was one of the first northern Nigerians to experience a dual education in the Islamic sciences as well as in the British colonial education system. After completing his Qur’anic as well as primary school education, Gumi attended the Sokoto Middle School from where he went to the Kano Law School to be trained as a qadi (Muslim judge) from 1942 to 1947. After graduation he worked briefly as scribe to Alkali Attahiru in Sokoto. In 1947 he became a teacher at the Kano Law School and was transferred to Maru, Sokoto Province, in 1949, where he had a confrontation with a local imam as well as the sultan of Sokoto over the question of tayammum, the ritual ablution with sand. In the context of this confrontation with the established authorities Gumi was supported by Ahmadu Bello, the future prime minister of northern Nigeria, who in 1955 called upon Gumi to act as his advisor in religious affairs and in 1956 appointed him deputy grand kadi of northern Nigeria. In this position, and later (from 1962) as grand kadi, Gumi was able to carry out a number of reforms in the judicial system of northern Nigeria and to fight effectively against the influence of the Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya. After Bello’s assassination in 1966, Gumi lost his institutional backing and started to develop a network of followers that became, in the 1970s, northern Nigeria’s first reformist Muslim organization, the Jama’at izalat al-bid’ah wa-iqamat as-sunna (Association for the removal of innovation and for the establishment of the sunna), 1978). Gumi remained influential in Nigerian religious politics in the 1980s when he acted as advisor to presidents Shehu Shagari (1979–1983) and Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993). From 1962, Gumi was also a member of the Rabitat al-‘alam al-Islami (Muslim World League), where he sat in the Legal Committee, and a member of the World Supreme Council for the Affairs of Mosques.

ABU HANIFA (699–767)

Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man b. Thabit b. Zurti was the eponymous founder of the Hanafi school (madhhab) of Islamic law. His birth dates are given variously but the year 699 is considered the most sound based on many biographical dictionaries. Abu Hanifa died and was buried in Baghdad, though sources differ concerning the month of his death. A shrine was built in 1066 over the site of his tomb, and the quarter of the city is called the al-A’zamiyyah after Abu Hanifa’s epithet al-Imam al-A’zam, the “Great Imam.”

In his Jawahir al-mudiyya, Ibn Abi al-Wafa’ provides a genealogy, on the authority of Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Sarifini (d. 1243), which links Abu Hanifa’s family with the Sassanian kings, the Kayaanid kings, and Judah, the eldest son of the prophet Jacob. Many sources mention that Abu Hanifa was of Persian descent, that his family were sellers of silk. Shams al-Din al-Dhahabi (d. 1374) reports that Abu Hanifa’s grandfather Zurti (also given as Zuta) is said to have been a slave brought from Kabul to Kufa where the family was attached to the Arab tribe of ‘Ta‘ym-Alah b. Tha’labah. Other sources claim that Abu Hanifa’s family was from Babylon, or the city of Anbar (on the Euphrates about forty miles from Baghdad).

Most Muslim biographical dictionaries focus on the relative authority of Abu Hanifa as a transmitter of hadith reports. It is said that a number of the younger ahaba (Companions) were still alive during the lifetime of Abu Hanifa but he only transmitted hadith from one of these, the well-known Anas b. Malik (d. 709 or 711). Among the tabi’un (Followers) from whom he transmitted hadith reports are ‘Ata’ b. Abi Rabah (d. 732 or 733), al-Sha’bi (d. 724) and Nafi’, the client of Ibn ‘Umar. Many authorities regard Abu Hanifa as a trustworthy transmitter but others question the authority of his sources. In his Mizan al-f tuld, al-Dhahabi cites opinions that Abu Hanifa should be considered weak as a transmitter of hadith, and that his legal opinions rely upon personal opinion (ru’uy). Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi (d. 1083) criticizes Abu Hanifa for having received most of his knowledge of hadith reports from Ibrahim al-Nakha’i rather than from the sahabah who were still reliable transmitters during his lifetime.
In terms of his reputation as a jurist, Abu Hanifa is credited with founding the Hanafi school of law, and is given the epithet “imam” because of this role. In his *Tadhbirat al-buffaz*, al-Dhahabi repeats a conversation in which Yazid b. Harun says that Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778) was more knowledgeable in hadith but Abu Hanifa was more knowledgeable in jurisprudence and law. Even Muhammad b. Idris al-Shaf’i (d. 820), whose legal opinions often rival those of the Hanafis, is reported to have attributed great learning in jurisprudence to Abu Hanifa. Many sources refer to Hammad b. Abi Sulayman (d. 738) as Abu Hanifa’s primary teacher in jurisprudence, and Joseph Schacht considers Abu Hanifa to have adapted the bulk of his legal opinions from him. Yazid b. Harun also states that he did not know anyone more pious and rational than Abu Hanifa. Bishr b. al-Walid reports that Abu Hanifa used to pray all night, and that he never learned or transmitted a hadith that he did not himself practice.

After Abu Hanifa’s death his legal opinions and the hadith reports that he transmitted were compiled into texts. There are no extant collections of works composed by Abu Hanifa himself. His legal opinions can be found in the *Ikbilatif Abi Hanifa wa Ibn Abi Layla wa al-Radda ‘ala syar’ al-Awsat*’, both attributed to Abu Yusuf (d. 798), one of Abu Hanifa’s closest disciples. To another of Abu Hanifa’s disciples, Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 805), is attributed the *al-Hujjah fi ikbitilaf abl Kufah wa abl al-Madinah* and the *Kitab al-asl fi al-furu’*, both containing the legal opinions of Abu Hanifa which later became the basis for Hanafi legal scholarship. Some of the hadith reports transmitted by Abu Hanifa can be found collected in the *Sharh ma’sanid Abi Hanifa* compiled by Abu al-Mu’ayyad Muhammad b. Mahmud al-Khwarizimi (d. 1257).

Classical Hanafi jurisprudence developed primarily as compendia and commentaries on the legal opinions of Abu Hanifa and their interpretation by his main students, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani. The *Mukhtasar fi al-fiqh Abi Hanifa al-Nu’man* by Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Quduri (d. 1037) contains a collection of the opinions of these three Hanafi authorities, as does the *Kitab al-mabsut* of Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Sarakhsi (d. 1090). The works of later Hanafi scholars such as Abu Bakr b. Mas’ud al-Kasani (d. 1191), ‘Ali b. Abi Bakr al-Marghinani (d. 1197), ‘Abdallah b. Ahmad al-Nasafi (d. 1310), ‘Uthman b. ‘Ali b. Al-Zayla’i (d. 1342), Ibn Nujaym (d. 1562), and ‘Abd al-Hakim al-Afghani (d. 1907) are largely based upon these earlier compilations of opinions going back to Abu Hanifa and his immediate disciples. These works, building upon the opinions of Abu Hanifa and his main students, show the influence of Abu Hanifa upon the development of Islamic legal theory and case law.

Abu Hanifa is also credited with a number of creedal and theological works, though some scholars assign the reaction of these to followers of Abu Hanifa. Two such works are the *al-‘Alim wa al-muta‘allim* and the *Fiqh al-absat*, which contain a series of questions and answers between Abu Hanifa and his disciple Abu Muti’ b. al-Balkhi (d. 799). Extant is a letter written by Abu Hanifa to ‘Uthman al-Batti, which resembles the perspective found in these other works. Also attributed to Abu Hanifa is the *Fiqh al-akbar*, the so-called *Fiqh al-akbar II*, and the *Wastiyat Abi Hanifa*. The ten creedal articles of the *Fiqh al-akbar* closely parallel the views found in the *Fiqh al-absat*, but scholars such as Arent Jan Wensinck have assigned later dates to the *Fiqh al-akbar II* and the *Wastiyat Abi Hanifa*, though they may have been influenced by the earlier works. The creedal works of later Hanafis such as Tahawi and Abu al-Layth al-Samarqandi (d. 993) may also show the influence of Abu Hanifa’s theology. Because of Abu Hanifa’s close association to these creedal statements, later scholars have emphasized the influence of Abu Hanifa on the development of widespread and officially sanctioned definitions of Muslim belief.

See also Law; Madhhab.

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**ABU ’L-HASAN BANI-SADR (1933– )**

Abu ’l-Hasan Bani-Sadr, born in 1933 to a clerical family from the city of Hamadan, became the first president-elect of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 revolution. He studied Islamic law and economics at the University of Tehran, then continued his studies at the Sorbonne, in Paris, where his focus was on economics and the role of Islam in
social change. Like many of his contemporaries, who combined western European training with an Islamic education, he developed a focus on interpreting Islam as a “unitarian” ideology (tawhid) for economic and cultural independence from the West, based on the notion of divine unity.

Bani-Sadr lived in exile in Europe from 1963 until 1979, as a result of his political activities at Tehran University. In Europe he became one of the most important activists of the National Front in Iran and abroad and a key organizer of Iranian students outside Iran. He came in contact with Ayatollah Khomeini first in 1972, in Najaf, and later in France where Khomeini spent his last days in exile. In 1980, Bani-Sadr became the first president-elect of the Islamic Republic of Iran with 75 percent of the vote. He did not represent any organization or political party. In contrast, his opponents in the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) were well-organized and made advances in the parliamentary election, and in the spring of 1980 they dominated the parliament. In 1980 and 1981 effective power shifted to the IRP parliamentary majority who named Prime Minister Raja’I ignoring Bani-Sadr’s candidates for the cabinet. He later lost his presidency to conservative rivals in the IRP, as a result of a parliamentary vote of incompetence and impeachment. Later he fled the country and once again joined the exiled opposition in Paris.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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ABU ’L-HUDHAYL AL-‘ALLAF (750–C. 850)

Muhammad b. al-Hudhayl b. ‘Ubaydallah al-‘Abdi was the first philosophically minded theologian of the Mu’tazilite school. Born in Basra around 750 C.E., he lived in the neighborhood of foragers (‘alifatun), where he spent the early part of his life. He was a student of ‘Uthman al-Tawil, who was one of the disciples of Wasil b. ‘Ata, the founder of the Mu’tazila. He moved to Baghdad in 818 and lived a long life, as various dates between 840 and 850 are given for his death. Abu ’l-Hudhayl opposed some views of his contemporary theologians, such as the skeptic dualism of Salih b. ‘Abd al-Quddus, the determinism of Dirar b. Amr, the physics of Abu Bakr al-Asamn, and the ethical theory of Bishr b. Ghiyas al-Marisi. He also engaged in polemical discussions with the followers of other religions, especially those of the ancient Iranian beliefs. His nephew and critic Abu Ishaq al-Nazzam as well as Yahya b. Bishr and Abu Ya’qub al-Shahham were among his closest students.

Abu ’l-Hudhayl’s numerous works are not extant, though some of his views are quoted in early kalam sources. His metaphysics of created beings, indivisible atoms, motion, and the cause-effect process of generation (tawallud) provoked intellectual discussions and controversies among Mu’tazilites. In order to protect the unity (tawhid) of God as the main principle, he denied the essential nature of things as well as the potentiality of being prior to its existence. He also rejected a division between the essence and attributes of God. Abu ’l-Hudhayl found no contradiction between the authority of God and His doing good actions with wisdom, since it is unthinkable that God does evil or injustice with a total absence of deficiency in Him. Therefore, He would only create the best and the most convenient (aslhab) circumstances for His creatures.

Abu ’l-Hudhayl’s atomistic ontology and highly philosophical terminology shaped the mind of later Mu’tazilites, and his systematic reflections on theological topics make him one of the most influential thinkers of Mu’tazilite thought at the beginning of its classical age.

See also Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila.

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ABU ’L-QASEM KASHANI (1882–1962)

Born in Tehran, Abu ’l-Qasem Kashani studied in Najaf and became a mujtahid (religious scholar) at the age of twenty-five. He began his political activities in Najaf against the British domination of Iraq. In 1916, Kashani’s father was
killed in an uprising and British authorities condemned Kashani to death in absentia. He fled to Iran in 1921 and began teaching and preaching in Tehran.

Kashani was imprisoned in the 1930s because of his pro-German activities. In 1949, after an attempt on the Shah’s life, he was exiled to Lebanon. In June 1950, he returned to Iran, was elected to the Majlis, and became its Speaker.

During the crisis over the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry and the ensuing conflict with the British (1950–1953), Kashani made and broke alliances with the Fedaiyin-e Islam and the National Front of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq. He was instrumental in the assassination of the prime ministers ‘Abd al-Husayn Hazhir and Husayn ‘Ali Razmara.

Kashani was an anti-British, anticolonialist, anticommunist, constitutionalist, nationalist, and pan-Islamist religious-political leader. Although Kashani’s opinions about Iranian nationalism, the role and function of the shari’ah, and attitude toward the West differed from his clerical predecessors and successors, political activities of the Shi’ite ulama after World War II were greatly inspired and influenced by his views and activities. Indeed, many of his ideas were elaborated by leaders of the revolution of 1978 and 1979, including Ayatollah Khomeini, and formed the foundation of the Islamic government.

See also Fedaiyin-e Islam; Iran, Islamic Republic of; Majlis; Mosaddeq, Mohammad.

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Mohammad H. Faghoory

‘ADA

Like all legal systems and theories, Islamic law and its legal theory are not free from ambiguity and tensions. Nowhere is such ambiguity more pronounced than in the treatment of ‘ada or custom (alternatively called ‘urf) in Islamic legal theory.

Generally, the term ‘ada is derived from Arabic, and means local customs, recurring habits, and social mores of the people. In the context of the epistemology of Islamic law, especially as it relates to what constitutes formal sources of law, classical Islamic jurisprudence does not recognize custom as a formal source. In the normative structure of Islamic law, it is the Qur’an as God’s revealed word that is rated as the first primary source. Prophet Muhammad’s sunna, that is, his conduct, authentic sayings, acts, and behavior that he approved is rated as the second primary source. In addition to these two sources there other sources (or legal principles) such as the consensus (ijma’) of Muslim jurists or scholars and analogical reasoning (qiyaṣ)—these combined then constitute what have become the normative formal sources of Islamic law.

However, notwithstanding the accepted normative hierarchy of what constitutes formal sources, Islam’s encounter with other host cultures has compelled Islamic legal theory to evaluate the status of custom. For example, through such encounters, ‘ada, that is, the hitherto ambiguous source, has throughout the history of Islamic legal theory served as a flexible legal principle that helps Islamic law to evolve and thus meet the challenge of changing circumstances and times. This assertion finds ample support in Muslim juristic thinking. For example, a reflection on the founding jurists of the two main Sunni schools of Islamic law, namely, the Maliki and Hanafi schools, shows how various legal rules that were passed by the founders of these schools were based on the strength of communal practice and norms. A good example here is the ruling passed by Imam Malik b. Anas (d. 795 C.E.) that a woman cannot contract herself in marriage. On the same question, the Hanafi jurist, Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 767 C.E.) gave a different ruling that allowed a mature woman to contract herself. What is crucial to note here, though, is not so much the question of which of the two opinions is better, but rather the fact that the basis of the two legal rulings is primarily informed by social reality and what is popular communal practice. Noel James Coulson in his seminal article titled “Muslim Case Law” has presented a cogent argument in which he demonstrates that the opinion of Malik reflects the dominant view of marriage and the position of women within a predominantly patriarchal tribal society of Medina. And by contrast, Abu Hanifa’s judgment mirrors the cosmopolitan nature of Kufa where women enjoyed a slightly more accommodating environment than in Medina.

Although often denied, the impact of ‘ada in Muslim legal theory is also evident in Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 819 C.E.), founder of the Shafi’i school. For instance, the force of communal praxis and the ethos of Egypt obliged al-Shafi’i to change a range of legal rulings that he sanctioned while in Baghdad before his migration to Egypt.

In addition to the aforementioned early jurists, the efficacy of ‘ada is also stressed by Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388) whom Wael Hallaq in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories regards as representing the “culmination” of maturity in Islamic legal theory. A critical reading of Shatibi’s legal philosophy illustrates that ‘ada, though often measured under the concept of maslaba (public good), does occupy a central position in his legal thought. For Shatibi, Islamic law in its early phase, that is, in the prophetic era of Muhammad,
simply confirmed most of the pre-Islamic Arabian customs practiced by the people before their acceptance of Islam. For example, Islamic laws like *diya* (blood money), rituals of hajj (pilgrimage), and interestingly even the *jum'a* (Muslim Friday congregational prayers), though taking a strict Islamic identity, were initially practices that were predominant in pre-Islamic Arabia. As habitual and popular customs these were rehabilitated by Islamic law and confirmed as Islamic practice.

Moving away from the formative classical period into the modern period, especially from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, examples gleaned from Africa and Asia also show that the predominance of custom not only shaped and influenced *shari'a*, but custom became a law operating on its own right independent of *shari'a*. What is discernible here is that custom in the modern context ceases to be merely a creative legal tool whose utility is only limited to make Islamic law adaptable to changing circumstances, but as “customary law” it becomes part of a dual legal system that is on par with *shari'a*. Again, Coulson provides a good example when he points out how in both Africa and Asia local practices, especially as they pertain to land tenure, were mostly “regulated by customary rules” (p. 261). These either complemented *shari'a* or simply subsumed it. For instance, in the Indian subcontinent this is illustrated in the popular “*shari'a* act of 1937” that was initially designed to cater to all Muslims in the region. However, as it turned out, a majority of Muslims preferred to be exempted from *shari'a* thus giving primacy to customary laws over the former.

Finally, it can be concluded that social exigencies, especially in the sociocommercial spheres, have compelled a majority of Muslim jurists, albeit reluctantly, to recognize ‘*adā*’ as a reliable legal tool. This recognition has come largely through what these jurists normally refer to as “creative legal devices.” In particular, it is through these creative legal tools, of which custom is one of the central principles, that popular religious practices that would otherwise be rejected by *shari'a* find acceptance. Thus maxims such as: “What is known through custom is legally binding” and “what is evident through custom is as authentic as the text or *shari'a*” became acceptable principles in Islamic legal theory.

**See also** Africa; Islam in; American Culture and Islam; Law; South Asia; Islam in; Southeast Asian Culture and Islam.

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Tabir Fuzile Sitoto

**ADAB**

The term *adab* fundamentally denotes a custom or norm of conduct. In the early centuries of Islam, the term came to convey either an ethical implication of proper personal qualities or the suggestion of the cultivation and knowledge of a range of sensibilities and skills. In its plural form, *adab* acquired the meaning of rules of conduct, often specified for a particular social or occupational group, like the *adadaab* (pl.) of the legist or the prince. In addition, *adab* specified the accomplishments that made one polished and urbane, an expert in the arts not subsumed under the category of religious learning. Often, in recent times, *adab* has meant simply literature in the narrow sense.

Underlying the concept of *adab* is a notion of discipline and training, indicating as well the good breeding and refinement that results from such self-control and training. In all its uses, *adab* reflects a high value placed on the employment of the will in proper discrimination of correct order, behavior, and taste. The term implicitly or explicitly distinguishes cultivated behavior from that deemed vulgar, for example, from pre-Islamic custom. The term’s root sense of proper conduct and discrimination, of discipline, and moral formation, especially fostered in the Sufi tradition, has been brought to the fore in many modern reform movements. In that sense, *adab* is often coupled with *akhlāq* (“manners,” “ethics”) and is now understood to be within the reach of ordinary people and not only educated or holy specialists.

**See also** Arabic Literature; Ethics and Social Issues.

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Barbara D. Metcalfe
ADHAN

The adhan along with its abridged accompaniment, the iqama, is an oral rite linked to mosques, daily prayer, sacred identity, and birth rites. The adhan and the iqamah are usually called outside and inside mosques, respectively: The former signals prayer times, and the latter the beginning of congregational prayer. The adhan given in public signals the presence of Islam, and gives members of a largely decentralized faith a sense of belonging. The adhan functions as a disjunction between the sacred and the profane, between the Friday prayer, for instance, and the world of trade. It also distinguishes Islam from other religions: When Muslims needed some means to announce the prayer, they asked for a horn, a Christian symbol, but were providentially directed to the adhan, instead. Finally, the adhan is chanted into the right ear of a newborn and the iqama into the left ear.

The adhan consists of invocations and attestations: Four glorify God, two attest to His Oneness, two attest to Muhammad being Messenger, two call to prayer, two call to success, two glorify God, and one declares His Oneness. The Shi’ites add: ‘Ali is the friend of God, and prayer is the best of deeds.

For a while some mosques in Europe replaced the muezzin who called the adhan with a tape recorder, while in Turkey, in 1948, the government decreed that the adhan be given in Turkish. Both these efforts ultimately failed.

See also Devotional Life; ‘Ibadat; Masjid.

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AFGHANI, JAMAL AL-DIN (1839–1897)

Jamal al-Din Afghani, one of the most influential Muslim reformers of the nineteenth century, was most likely born in Asadabad, Iran, into a Shi’ite family. Throughout his life, however, he emphasized his Afghan ancestry, perhaps to broaden his appeal to Sunni Muslims. Little concrete information is available about his early life, but he probably received a traditional Islamic education in Iran and Iraq. During a visit to India around 1855, he was exposed to Western scientific and political thought for the first time. His stay in India coincided with the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 (the Indian revolt against the East India Company), and his attitudes toward European and particularly British imperialism may have begun to form then. Around 1866, Afghani began his peripatetic career as a Muslim intellectual and political activist by accepting a post in the government of Afghanistan. Over the next thirty years he traveled to or resided in Istanbul, Cairo, Paris, London, Tehran, and St. Petersburg, frequently being forced to relocate because of his reformist views and political activities. Afghani is commonly viewed as the nineteenth century’s chief ideologue of pan-Islamism. But his ideas, many of them expressed through the journal al-Urwa al-wuthqa (The firmest grip; a reference to Qur’an 2:256, 31:22), which he copublished with Muhammad ‘Abdulh, never amounted to a coherent ideology. More than anything else, Afghani was driven by opposition to European imperialism in Muslim countries, which he argued could be fought only by a rejuvenation of Islamic culture.

See also Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Pan-Islam.

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Sohail H. Hashmi

AFRICA, ISLAM IN

Islam has an important past and present within Africa. It has been present in Africa since the very early days of the faith, and it constitutes the practice of roughly half the population of the continent, or some 250 million people. While most of the Muslims live in the northern half, important communities can be found in South Africa, Malawi, and other parts of southern Africa. This history and this importance are often misunderstood in the West and in the Mediterranean centers of the Islamic world. Scholars and the intelligent lay public do not naturally identify Africa with Islam.

Indeed, Africa is usually equated with sub-Saharan or “black” Africa in most definitions. Egypt and the Maghreb are lumped with the Middle East in the language of the World Bank, U.S. State Department, and most ministries of foreign affairs, as well as in this encyclopedia. The defining characteristic of Islam is often the Arabic language, as the first language of communication in the home, business, government, and the media, as well as identification with the Arab world and thus the origins of Islam. This is not a clear definition, however, since Berber languages are still widely spoken in the Maghrib and the Sahara, while Arabic is spoken by much of the Sudan and important minorities across sub-Saharan Africa.

This article focuses on sub-Saharan Africa and deals with Muslim societies rather than “Islam” in one area or another.
These societies, throughout history and to the present, demonstrate all of the varieties of the faith that one might expect: orthodox practice, radicalism, Sufism, and many creative combinations with local, non-Islamic practices. Muslims in Africa have practiced the jihad of the sword from time to time, but they have also demonstrated a great deal of tolerance of other practices—“pagan,” Christian, and other. The Maliki school of law has traditionally been dominant in north and west Africa, while the Shafi’ite pattern has prevailed along the Red Sea and the Swahili coast.

**Northeast Africa**

The earliest Muslim presence in Africa actually antedates the event known as the *hijra*, when Muhammad left Mecca for Medina in 622 C.E. At a time when the Prophet was already beginning to feel the hostility of his Meccan compatriots, he sent a large portion of his followers—about one hundred according to the principal hadith—to the Christian emperor of Aksum (ancient Abyssinia), an important state in northeast Africa, for safekeeping in 615 and 616 C.E. This is sometimes called the first *hijra*. Muhammad called for this community to return after he established himself in Medina, and there is little evidence of any ongoing Muslim group in Aksum or any other part of Ethiopia at this time. But the brief exile demonstrates the presence at that time of Ethiopians, including Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, in Mecca and other areas around the Red Sea, as well as the good relations between the early Arab Muslims and people in northeast Africa.

Reasonably good ties continued after Muslim communities emerged in northeast Africa close to the Red Sea. Most of these communities lived in the lowland and eastern areas, but some spread into the mountainous region called Abyssinia, which was dominated by Aksum and then a series of other states that privileged Christianity and the Orthodox Church. Relations between the two faith communities worsened when these states, with their Christian and Solomonic ideology, expanded to the east in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; they executed many Muslims and forced the conversion of others. Muslims responded to this in the movement led by Ahmad ibn Gran, a cleric and warrior from the coastal region in the sixteenth century. This conflict, often characterized by the terms “crusade” and “jihad” in the registers of the two faiths, has often been taken as characteristic of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Hostile confrontations have certainly occurred: for example, cases of forced conversion of Muslims by expansive Christian emperors in the late nineteenth century, or the conflict over the brief tenure of Lij Iyasu as Menilik’s successor as emperor of Ethiopia between 1913 and 1916. Lij Iyasu came from a family that included both Muslims and Christians, and he sought to bring some Muslims into positions in his brief government. He failed because of his own inexperience, the strong Christian and church predilections of the court, and the conflict between the Axis and Allies during World War I. But Ethiopia’s population today is close to 50 percent Muslim, and Muslims have been able to coexist with Christians and other non-Muslim communities most of the time.

**Gateways of Islam in Africa**

The History of Islam in Africa (2000) identifies two main “gateways” of Islamization in the continent. One is the East African coast, which became accessible to sailors and merchants coming down the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, just as it had been for previous centuries for Southeast Asians. The other is Egypt, and by extension the Maghreb and the Sahara.

The first Muslims on the East African coast followed in the wake of a lot of other maritime travelers from the Near East, South, and Southeast Asia. They used an old, well-tested technology of sailing close to the coast, down the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf, and then along the Indian Ocean. Primarily Arab, they were interested in acquiring ivory, gold, other metals, leather goods, and some slaves. They interacted with the fishing and agricultural peoples along the coast who spoke the language that today is called Swahili, which takes its name from the plural of *sabil*, and literally means “people of the coast.” Over time, roughly the last one thousand years, the Swahili language evolved to include a considerable Arabic vocabulary, in addition to some Malay and other infusions, within a basic Bantu lexicon and language structure.

The language was the basis for a culture, and both were built around small towns along the ocean, running about two thousand miles from Mogadishu in the north (today’s Somalia) to Sofala in the south (today’s Mozambique). Most of the towns were autonomous city-states, confined essentially to islands or the coast, with very small hinterlands devoted to farming. The inhabitants of these city-states were committed to the vocations of agriculture, fishing, shipbuilding, and trade. They lived in the cosmopolitan world built around the Indian Ocean and practiced Islam, but acknowledged local gods and customs. The more wealthy Swahili often claimed paternal origins among the Arabs or Persians. They used Islamic forms in the architecture of their homes, as well as for mosques and other public buildings. Many of them fulfilled the pilgrimage obligation, which was easier to perform than from other parts of the African continent.

The most prosperous period for the Swahili city-states ran roughly from 1250 to 1500 C.E. Lamu, located in an archipelago along the northern coast of modern Kenya, Mombasa, a larger city on the southern coast, and Zanzibar, the island which forms part of Tanzania, were among the best-known and most active cities. The most prosperous was probably Kilwa, an island off the southern coast of Tanzania. It was tied in to the interior trade, including the commerce in gold that tapped into the old Zimbabwe states.

The main location of the Swahili language, culture, and people, and of the practice of Islam, was concentrated on this East African littoral until very recent times. Most of the
Islam penetration routes into Africa. XNR PRODUCTIONS, INC./Gale

Muslims were Sunni, but some belonged to the Kharijite persuasion through their connections with Oman, a small state at the southeastern end of the Arabian peninsula. The literate elite, and especially the “professional” Muslims, understood and wrote Arabic, but Islam was typically taught orally through Swahili explanations. The recourse to explanation in the local language was common practice throughout Africa and many parts of the Islamic world. Beginning about three hundred years ago some scholars and writers began to adapt the Arabic alphabet to the language, and thereby create a written or ‘ajami literature alongside the older oral one. The written corpus contained the same stories, chronicles, and poetry as the one that had been transmitted orally down the generations.

The Swahili Muslims did not emphasize the spread of Islam into the interior, by preaching, colonization, or the military jihad. They were generally content to practice their faith, ply their trades, and interact with the people of the interior who were largely non-Muslim. The spread of Islam into the interior, and of the Swahili language and culture, did not begin until the late eighteenth century, under the impetus of Omani Arabs, who made Zanzibar their base. The Omani sultans controlled a significant portion of the Swahili region in what we could today call Tanzania and Kenya, primarily for commercial reasons. They continued to trade in ivory and gold, but now added a significant commerce in slaves. Some were sent to the Middle East and South Asia, while others were used at the coast to produce cloves and grain for export. The Zanzibari system resulted in more active contact between coast and hinterland, and the spread of Islam and the Swahili culture to the entrepôts and towns of the interior.

These networks laid the basis for the widespread practice of Islam in East Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The main agents of islamization were merchants and teachers, not the reform-minded scholars who became so prominent in West Africa. The Omanis themselves were
Kharijites, but most of the older Swahili communities as well as many of the slaves were Sunni. Relations across these doctrinal lines were not difficult. The jihadic tradition remained a minor theme, except when it came to resistance to European domination.

The “Egyptian” or North African gateway is usually emphasized in treatments of islamization in Africa. The Saharan region obviously marked the “entrance” to sub-Saharan Africa. It was not an obstacle to trading caravans, but it was to armies. Indeed, there is only one example—the Moroccan expedition of 1591—of a military force successfully crossing the desert and winning victories on the southern side. Arabs used the expression sabil or “coast” to apply to the two edges of the desert. The Arab and Berber Muslims of North Africa established networks of trade on both sides of the desert and rhythms of caravan trade that resembled the movement of ships along the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa. By 1000 it is possible to identify indigenous as well as North African Muslim communities in the towns of West Africa connected to the trans-saharan trading networks. In contrast to the pattern in East Africa, merchant capital became very important in the Saharan and sub-Saharan interior of West Africa from an early time, and for many centuries was the motor force of Islamic practice.

North Africans often called sub-Saharan Africa the Bilad al-Sudan, the “land of the blacks.” Geographers and historians have used this term and divided it into western, central and eastern portions. The eastern or Nile section corresponds to the modern nation of Sudan, while the western portion corresponds to most of the West African Sahel.

The greatest amount of literature about Islamic practice, generated by internal and external observers, deals with the West African region. Scholars have used this material to create a threefold pattern of islamization. Islam was first a minority religion, practiced essentially by traders; it then became the practice of Muslim courts; and finally, either by processes of military jihad or Sufi orders, or both, it became the practice of those living in the rural areas, farmers and pastoralists. It was at this point that it became the dominant religion, in the last two to three centuries. This formula can be useful, if it is applied selectively and discretely to the
different parts of the Sahel and to areas further south in the continent.

The eastern Sudan or Sahel, what is called the Sudan today, is something of an exception to this rule. Adjacent to the Nile River, it lay along a natural axis of advance from Egypt to the south. Egyptian travelers and armies, whether in ancient or Islamic times, had often advanced up the Nile, and communities in the region sometimes returned the favor. Once the Muslims had established control of Egypt, they confronted the Nubian kingdoms that had adopted Monophysite or Orthodox forms of Christianity as the state religion in earlier centuries. Muslims and Christians then worked out a pact, called 

\textit{kagg}, by which the weaker Christian states paid a small tribute and allowed trade through their areas in exchange for noninterference in their affairs. This arrangement endured for several centuries. It was endangered by the limited participation of some Nubian armies in the European-led Crusades of the twelfth century, and finally ended by the Mamluks in the fifteenth century. After this period Arabic became the dominant language of the northern Nile valley and the lingua franca of the wider region.

**West African Patterns**

In the western and central Sudan the process was different. The early Muslim communities were merchants who lived in good relations with and on the sufferance of non-Muslim courts. These early Muslims were Arab and Berber but they were soon joined by Soninke, Mandinka, and other communities of local origin. By the time of the empire of Mali (fl. 1200–1400), some ruling classes had adopted Islam, although not necessarily to the exclusion of local or “ethnic” religious practices. Mali in particular is remembered for the pilgrimage of Mansa Musa in 1324 and for the visit that Ibn Battuta paid to the court of his brother and successor, Mansa Sulayman, in 1352 and 1353. The court of the Songhay Empire (fl. c. 1450–1591) is also remembered for adherence to Islam. Indeed, Askiya Muhammad (1493–1528) is remembered not just for his pilgrimage but also for his discussions with the famous jurisconsult al-Maghili and for some serious efforts to spread the faith in the Niger Buckle (the area around Timbuktu and Gao) in the early years of his reign. The state of Bornu, in the area of Lake Chad in the central Sudan, is remembered for an early adoption of Islam at the court as well as for its longevity (about one thousand years, into the nineteenth century).

In the last 250 years Islam has spread much more widely throughout northern Africa thanks to Sufi orders and reform movements. The oldest order was the Qadiriyya, but its network for some time consisted principally of an elite group of scholars across the Sudan, the Sahara, and North Africa. A Qadiriyya revival and spread in the late eighteenth century was followed by rivalry with the Tijaniyya and other orders with strong bases in North Africa and the Holy Cities. The competition increased in the nineteenth century, all across this belt, along the Swahili coast, and in the East African interior. Sufi practice was not challenged by reform movements, akin to the Salafiyya or the Wahhabiyya, until the mid-twentieth century.

Indeed, Sufism was the principal vehicle by which Islamic practice spread from city to countryside in the Sudan or Sahel. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was accompanied by reform movements, led by scholars who increasingly complained of the lax, mixed, or corrupt practice of the faith in the cities, courts, and countryside. Increasingly these scholars, usually with Sufi affiliations of their own, resorted to the jihad of the sword and led military movements to replace the regimes that they criticized. The most successful of these movements, in terms of its breadth, depth, and literary heritage, was the one led by ‘Uthman dan Fodio in Hausaland in the early nineteenth century. It resulted in the Sokoto Caliphate, a regime that dominated most of the northern part of Nigeria as well as the southern fringe of today’s Niger. Many Muslims of northern Nigeria today see the caliphate as a kind of social charter for the present day and have pushed for the establishment of \textit{shari’ah} (Islamic law).

The strongest fusion of Sufi identity and militant reform came in the mid-nineteenth century with the mobilization led by Umar Tal, a scholar and pilgrim whose origins were in Senegal. Umar made the pilgrimage to Mecca, was initiated into the highest ranks of the Tijaniyya order by a Moroccan in Medina, and returned to West Africa in the 1830s to pursue a career of teaching and writing. In 1852, however, after some campaigns of recruitment, he launched a jihad of the sword against the non-Muslim states of the Upper and Middle Niger and the Upper Senegal Rivers. He particularly targeted the Bambara Kingdom of Segu, which he defeated in 1860 and 1861. He also had some encounters with the French and an expansive governor named Faidherbe in Senegal, and this has given him and his Tijaniyya affiliation an aura of resistance to European conquest. At the end of his life Umar attacked the Muslim state of Masina or Hamdullahi, principally because of their aid for the “pagan” Bambara of Segu. This conflict between two Muslim armies and communities, both of Pulaar or Fulbe culture, caused great consternation in the West African Islamic world. It also led to Umar’s death in 1864 and to the premature limitation of the ambitious movement that he launched.

The greatest expansion of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa took place in the colonial period, particularly under the overrule of the British in Nigeria and the Sudan and the French through most of the old western and central Sudan. In these instances Islam provided an alternative tradition to the secular or Christian identities of the rulers and the missionaries who typically accompanied them. It has often meant closer approximation to the styles of dress, architecture, and roles of women characteristic of the Middle East. Europeans rulers, on the other hand, sought to develop institutions and
practices for dealing with their Muslim subjects. They co-opted portions of the Islamic legal and educational systems, tried to control the pilgrimage, and sought to create "colonial" forms of Islam. The best-known creation was Islam noir, the "black Islam," which was supposed to characterize French West Africa. The European colonial authorities often styled themselves as "Muslim powers" and made comparisons with practices in India, Indonesia, and other areas.

By the time of independence in most sub-Saharan countries in the 1960s, Muslim communities had established closer ties with the faithful in the Middle East, and particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The centrality of these areas, combined with the pilgrimage and institutions such as Al-Azhar University, encouraged this process. At the same time the Arab Muslim communities made significant human and material investments in sub-Saharan Africa. This investment stimulated some criticism of Sufi and other African Muslim practices, particularly in the Sudan, Nigeria, and adjacent areas. In other regions the "Arab" and Saudi influence was not as pronounced, and patterns such as the "maraboutic" (a synonym for a cleric, derived from the term "almoravid") domination of Islam characteristic of Senegal were maintained.

The Suwarian Pattern

One of the most intriguing and original creations of Muslims in Africa is the Suwarian tradition. This term, coined by the historian Ivor Wilks, goes back to a certain Al-Hajj Salim Suwari, a learned cleric from the Middle Niger region who lived around 1500. The Suwarian tradition expresses the rationale used by Muslims who lived as minorities in "pagan" regions, particularly the communities of merchants who originally left the western Sudan for regions of woodland and forest to the south, in search of gold and other items of trade. This began in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Empire of Mali was at its height and sent out colonies of traders, juula, who retained their ties with the state, the Mandinka language, and their Muslim identity. It continued into the twentieth century.

Juula came to be an ethnic, linguistic, and religious designation for these people, who typically lived in demarcated neighborhoods within the main commercial towns and organized trade between the forest areas of the south and the Sahel to the north. They left the realm of "politics" to their local hosts. They constituted a Muslim minority within a non-Muslim majority, corresponding to the first "phase" of islamization mentioned above. They worshiped, educated their children, distributed their property, and in almost every respect conducted their lives as would Muslims anywhere in Africa or the rest of the world. They were no less learned nor pious than believers elsewhere, and they did not compromise their faith. But they could not afford to, and generally did not want to, change the religious identities of their hosts, who welcomed their presence and accorded them favors because of the prosperity they brought through trade. They were not about to try transforming the Dar al-kufr in which they lived into a Dar al-Islam.

Over time the juula colonies developed a theological rationale for their relations with non-Muslim ruling classes and subjects on the basis of the teachings of Suwari. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca several times and devoted his intellectual career to reflection upon the situation of Muslim minorities. Drawing upon Middle Eastern jurists and theologians, he reformulated the obligations of the faithful. Muslims must nurture their own learning and piety, and thereby furnish good examples to the non-Muslims who lived around them. They could accept the jurisdiction of non-Muslim authorities, as long as they had the necessary protection and conditions to practice the faith. In this position Suwari followed a strong predilection in Islamic thought for any government, albeit non-Muslim or tyrannical, as opposed to none. The military jihad was a resort only if the faithful were threatened. In essence, Suwari esteemed that God would bring non-Muslims to convert in His own time, and it was not the responsibility of the Muslim minorities to decide when ignorance or unbelief would give way to faith.

In practice, of course, the Muslims and non-Muslims did not function in isolation. Across the many times and places of the woodlands and forest, they were in constant contact with each other, and conceived of the relationship as two estates: the merchant estate, which was Muslim, and the ruling classes, which were "pagan" or at least "ignorant" from the standpoint of Islam. But the ruling classes typically esteemed the merchants and their religion, and sought the baraka or blessing that Muslims might bring to the political realm. This esteem was reflected in a number of ways, for example, in the demand for amulets produced by clerics for their "pagan" hosts. A British traveler in the early nineteenth century, Joseph Dupuis, gives an account of this demand in the Kingdom of Ashante (today’s Ghana) in his Journal of a Residence in Ashante:

The talismanic charms fabricated by the Muslims, it is well known, are esteemed efficacious according to the various powers they are supposed to possess, and here is a source of great emolument, as the article is in public demand from the palace to the slave’s hut; for every man (not by any means exempting the Muslims) wears them strung around the neck. . . . Some are accounted efficacious for the cure of gunshot wounds, others for the thrust or laceration of steel weapons, and the poisoned barbs of javelins, or arrows. Some, on the other hand, are esteemed to possess the virtue of rendering the wearer invulnerable in the field of battle, and hence are worn as a preservative against the casualties of war.

Besides this class of charms, they have other cabalistic scraps for averting the evil of natural life: These may
also be subdivided into separate classes; some, for instance, are specific nostrums in certain diseases of the human frame, some for their prevention, and some are calculated either to ward off any impending stroke of fortune, or to raise the proprietor to wealth, happiness and distinction. (London, 1824, 1966, appendix, page xi)

The relationship between leading merchants and rulers is captured well in another passage from the same author, in the same kingdom. Merchants, clerics, and rulers were all residents of the same city, Kumasi, the capital of Asante. The speaker here is the head of the local Muslim community, and he talks of his role with the Muslim estate, mainly through education, and his ties to the power structure:

“When I was a young man,” said the Bashaw (Pasha), “I worked for the good of my body. I traded on the face of God’s earth, and traveled much. As my beard grew strong [I became older] I settled at Salgha [a trading center] and lastly removed to this city. I was still but an indifferent student [of Islam] when, God be praised, a certain teacher from the north was sent to me by a special direction, and that learned saint taught me the truth. So that now my beard is white, and I cannot travel as before, [but] I am content to seek the good of my soul in a state of future reward. My avocations at Kumasi are several, but my chief employment is a school which I have endowed, and which I preside over myself. God has compassionated my labors [i.e., made them prosper], and I have about 70 pupils and converts at this time.

Besides this, the king’s heart is turned towards me, and I am a favored servant. Over the Muslims I rule as qadi, conformably to our law. I am also a member of the king’s council in affairs relating to the believers of Sarem and Dagomba [areas to the north with significant Muslim populations].” (Dupuis, p. 97)

The Suwarian tradition was a realistic rationale for Muslims living in the woodland and forest regions of West Africa in the last five or six centuries. It suggests the kinds of positions which many Muslims throughout the world have taken when they found themselves in situations of inferior numbers and force, took advantage of their networks for trade, and enjoyed generally good relations with the local authorities because of the goods and prosperity that they could attract.

Some Muslims have searched for wisdom and inspiration within African societies. They have established links with indigenous healing practices, divination systems, and cosmologies. They have created worlds of mediating spirits and possession cults, such as the bori of Hausaland or the gnawa of Morocco. These fused religious worlds have come under increasing criticism in the last two centuries from movements of reform and the closer integration of sub-Saharan Africa with the Middle East.

See also Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi; Ahmad Ibn Idris; Hajj Salim Suwari, al-; Suyut, al-; Tariqa; Zar.

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David Robinson

AFRICAN CULTURE AND ISLAM
Islam, an Afro-Asiatic faith, has long been known to be a religion of great synthesis that has interacted with local cultures, enriching them and being enriched by them. It has impacted on African society in various ways for almost a
millennium, if not longer, adding to the fabric of these cultures.

**Spread of Islam in Africa**

Islam made its presence felt in much of Africa (the East coast and Horn of Africa as well as West Africa) mainly through trade and migration. In West Africa, for instance, Islam was introduced from North Africa by the Berbers through the trans-Saharan trade as early as the ninth century. Later, trading networks developed among local African groups such as the Mande (Dyula/Wangara) whose area of operation spanned a wide area extending from as far west as Senegal to northern Nigeria in the east. This trade network, or diaspora, was closely associated with the diffusion of Islamic studies, including mysticism in the later centuries, and enabled Islam to penetrate peacefully beyond the Sahel—the semiarid region of African between the Sahara and the savannahs—into the savannah area. In the coastal trading communities of East Africa the process of interaction between the Middle Eastern immigrants, mainly south Arabians, and the dominant African groups created a new urban ethos in which Islam blended with the indigenous local culture to produce Swahili Islam. The cross-cultural trade in many parts of Africa, apart from reinforcing cultural self-identity and nurturing religious commitment, fostered a pluralist structure in which commerce, Islam, and the indigenous system supported the urban network. In this way a balance was established between local ritual prescriptions and those of universal Islam.

Islam in Africa therefore was primarily an urban religion (with an urban ethos) that fostered commitment to its religious system ranging from ethnic self-identity to Islamic self-identity, universal and transethnic in scope. Islamic penetration in the rural areas, on the other hand, made piecemeal infiltration over a long period of time with significant gains awaiting a much later period. The religion therefore entered much of Africa peacefully through the agency of trade and later gained status after the migrant community (purveyors of the written word and the visual symbols of Islam) was integrated into the political setup before finally the ruling elite embraced the faith and appropriated its symbols for political purposes.

The intensity of Islam varied from one region of Africa to another and was influenced by a number of factors, including the length of interaction between Islam and the traditional religion, the compatibility or incompatibility of the worldviews of the two religious systems, and the level of resilience of the indigenous integrative symbols to sustain traditional structures of the local religion. Islam has its written scripture, a prescribed ritual, a historical and systematized myth, and a supra-ethnic religious identity. Its interaction with African traditional religions is therefore governed by the tension between its supra-ethnic universality of its *umma* and the ethnocentrism of African traditional religion. As Dean Gilland put it, for the African, the ethnic group is the matrix in which his religion takes shape, the meaning of myth communicated, and a person’s sacramental relation to nature experienced. This means that when the symbols of the ethnic group are challenged by a new system, recombination of old and new forms may appear to reorganize the group and to compensate for any loss. More specifically, becoming a Muslim and joining this universal *umma* involves offering prayers in a mosque frequented by members of other ethnic groups, adoption of Muslim behavior patterns and dress code in some cases, and using a certain language (e.g., for quite a long time Kiswahili in the case of East Africa). The *Kano Chronicle*, a record of Hausa kings of sixteenth or seventeenth century inspiration first written down in the nineteenth century whose sources were largely oral, brings out clearly the struggle between the two religious systems, the Islamic and the traditional one, after the symbolic tree is cut down and a mosque built in its place.

**Indigenous Culture and Islam**

The old forms and symbols of the indigenous system are often not discarded but retrieved and reinforced and recast in a new form. In the artistic and architectural domains, for instance, there has been a unique blending of Islamic structure and African representation. Once a balance had been reached between the local religious practices and the universal ritual prescriptions of Islam the next step was to cast the imagery and iconography of African ancestral pillars, shrines, and so on into Islamized form. Where Islam was introduced such items as charms, amulets, certain types of clothing, and prestige goods were incorporated into local societies. More importantly, the local altar-shrine was transformed into the mosque in such a way that the physical configuration represented a qualitative leap into verticality. Thus, as Labelle Prussin notes, the single, towering pyramidal earthen cone became the *mihrab* (it also served as a minaret) with its system of projecting wooden pickets extending out of this massive structure. The ends of these wooden pickets served as a scaffold for workers to climb and repair the walls. The ancestral conical structure pillar (the Voltaic tradition) was now redirected to a new focal center, that of Mecca. In certain cases, as Prussin and Rene Bravmann have observed, some of the mosques that were built in Mali had *mihrabs* that evoked the image of an African mask (which traditionally represents powerful forces). This is how the mosques were constructed by the Mande of West Africa with Islam clearly inspiring the use of certain architectural features in the spatial configuration. The Islamic architectural tradition (mediated through the Maghrebian heritage) in turn inspired the architectural imagery or style represented by the thatched domes of the Senegal-Guinea area for mosques and maraboutic (referring to a Muslim scholar or saint in North Africa or parts of West Africa) shrines following the example of the domed cities of Tripoli and Cairo. Islamic-type designs were also emulated and led to the adoption of arabesque wall patterning instead of
of the attached African charms. This calligraphy allowed for a new system of spatial organization. More than this, Islamic script was used in decorative ways even in non-Muslim areas such as modern-day Ghana, where in the nineteenth century the Asantehene, head of the Asante confederacy, wore clothes with Arabic writing in various colors. Islam had clearly filtered through Asante politico-religious structure such that both in terms of ideas and in the realm of the arts it provided a medium through which the ideology of the Asante was communicated.

Islam, which for many centuries coexisted well with traditional African religion, gradually over time attempted to replace it as the dominant faith of some regions without major clashes. What made this possible was the fact that the Islamic faith was much more adaptable in Africa with very minimal requirements for new members who at the very least were expected to change their names after reciting the testimony of faith. The observance of Islamic duties along with the understanding of the faith were supposed to follow later. For the first generation of Muslims, introduction to Islamic cultural values was what came first whereas Islamization itself could take generations to realize. At this level there was accommodation to social and political structures of authority.

This was the period when the learned Muslims, as in West African kingdoms, played a key role in administration and diplomacy. Eventually, however, a number of these African rulers adopted Islam and in doing so may partly have undermined the basis of their legitimacy as guardians of African ancestral religious traditions. Nevertheless, they did not completely renounce ties with the African traditional religion, which continued to be the religion of many of their subjects. This arrangement assisted in maintaining order although it did not please some West African Sufi leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who launched their jihads (reform movements) of Islamic revivalism (some of which had mahdist/messianic overtones) to establish Islamic states. The theme of Islamic revivalism will be discussed later.

Colonialism
Colonialism facilitated the growth of Islam in areas of Africa as far apart as Tanzania (Tanganyika) in East Africa and Senegal in West Africa through the activities of Muslim brotherhoods (Sufi orders), traders, and others. For some African groups the loss of power with the onset of colonial rule made them gravitate toward Islam, which was seen as an alternative to the prevailing colonial order. The difficulties of a new life under the colonial system, which uprooted the African from his traditional universe, presented Islam with an opportunity to provide a new framework as meaningful and all-embracing as the old African one. This, for instance, happened with Amadou Bamba’s Murid brotherhood in Senegal, which converted thousands of people whose earthly kingdoms had been destroyed by colonialism. In 1888 Bamba established Touba/Tubaa as a great holy city (some say) to rival Mecca, and he was buried there in 1927. Every year hundreds of thousands of his followers visit his tomb on the anniversary of his death. For the uprooted African who joined the faith, the Muslim supra-ethnic umma provided a solidarity and a sense of belonging not very different from that of the African village/ethnic one. Moreover, while the Islamic prescriptions replaced the indigenous ones, in matters of worship, however, the Muslim ritual prayer did not completely dislodge the traditional rituals of seeking to appease the ancestors. In fact, the Muslim religious leaders and teachers came to perform the same kind of role as the African healers and medicine men in curving out the domain of popular religion.

Indigenization of Islam
Yet, despite Muslim efforts to purge African elements from their faith, their religion continued to display a level of “Africanness” that revealed the indigenization of Islam in these regions of West Africa. How else would one explain the continued presence of, for instance, the bori cult in northern Nigeria? There, women tend to follow the traditional cults even with the sustained impact of Islam in Hausaland for centuries, including producing such well-known major religious Fulani reformers of the nineteenth century such as
Shaykh Uthman dan Fodio? There must be a level of affinity between the two religious systems that allows this to happen. For instance, the belief in mystical powers (jinn/invisible supernatural creatures) allows Islam to be accommodated to the African spirit world that is so important to understanding the African religious universe. In fact, the ancestral beliefs have been recombined with Muslim practice to form a new “folk” religion with emphasis on, say, saint veneration (which popular Islam and Sufism reinforce) that approximates local ancestor veneration.

The practice of curing illnesses attributed to occult forces provided an opportunity for the Muslim healing system to flourish and allowed for the services of Muslim healers/holy men (who provided additional healing choices to local practitioners) to be in high demand. The appearance of new epidemic diseases such as smallpox and cholera, which arose in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in hinterland East Africa (and which the local people could not adequately deal with), led the people to turn increasingly to the Muslim healing system. Muslim prayers and amulets were more popular than Muslim secular remedies in this atmosphere of suspicion (which took the form of sorcery and witchcraft accusations). Apart from the fact that Muslim amulets were believed to embody the words of the Supreme Being and not that of the intermediary powers (making them therefore more potent, as the Asante believed), Muslim literacy played a role as a potential source of healing. Furthermore, Sufi masters who had attained a closeness to God through following the path of spiritual enlightenment were believed to have special powers that made their prayers efficacious. This baraka (blessing power that heals) was passed on in families and explains why the scholarly Sufi lineages of the Sahara have played a pivotal role in mediating Islam between North and West Africa.

While the influence of the tarīqa (Sufi orders) has been undermined to some extent in some parts of Africa such as Tanzania, the commitment to Sufistic engagement with faith nevertheless continues to be strong in West Africa and especially in Senegal, although even there it is facing the challenge of the Salafi reformers. Sufism, far from being a predominantly rural phenomenon that would fade away as Muslim societies became increasingly modernized, has continued to thrive and to engage African Muslims of the urban centers as well. Yet for some educated young African Muslims who are discomfited by magical practices, saint veneration, hierarchy, and the authoritarianism of some Sufi orders, the Salafi message has seemed attractive.

The Salafi reform is itself at some level quite conservative and traditional; to the extent that this is true, Salafi reform and Sufi traditionalism are constantly engaged in an overlapping movement of interaction. Will they creatively synthesize from the values of their common Islamic heritage while acknowledging the entanglements and creative encounters between and within cultures? It remains to be seen what the outcome of this clash will be. It is clear though that underlying the conflict between them are struggles for power and control of the Muslim community by these competing groups.

Gender and Islam in Africa
What type of cultural interface has taken place between Islam and Africa in the area of gender relations? More specifically, what has been the role of Islam with respect to the status of women in the regions of Africa where Islam has been introduced? Did Islam introduce patriarchy in Africa? Many African societies were patriarchal (polygamous as well) even before their encounter with Islam. Nevertheless, where Islam was introduced and its values incorporated in the socio-economic and political structures of these societies (especially those with a propensity for state/empire building) a hierarchical social organization resulted in which there were clear demarcations of male and female spheres of activity. This, of course, did vary from society to society. For instance, the Yoruba women of southwestern Nigeria continued to be market women even after the coming of Islam whereas their Hausa counterparts in northern Nigeria tended to lead more secluded lives. It is significant to note that the Mahdiyya movement, which was established in 1941 in Ijebul-Ode in southern Nigeria by the southern Muslim scholar, Muhammad Jumat Imam, emphasized the education of women, their attendance of mosques together with men, and their inclusion in public affairs (hence no Qur’anic basis for the practice of purdah, or female seclusion. By way of comparison, among the Tuareg-Berbers of the Sahara (who tend to be matriarchal) their unveiled women continued to enjoy far more freedom of movement than their Arab counterparts in North Africa.

The Sufi dhikr (chant) practices and the spirit possession cults (bori among Hausas in West Africa and sar in Ethiopia and Sudan) have offered women possibilities for autonomous spiritual expression and for creation of networks of mutual support. Mysticism in particular has opened the room for the acceptance of female authority (for instance, Sokna Magat Diop of the Murids) or religious leadership located within the female realm. Moreover, the Qadiriyya order accepted the female leadership of Shaykha Binti Mmuwra (a former slave or person of low status) who founded a branch of the order in Malawi and was successful in attracting many women. Therefore, both possession cults and Sufi brotherhoods have allowed women to establish a sphere of action in hierarchical societies where control of the state is a male domain. These orders have incorporated women in both East and West Africa, especially in the area of education, fund raising, and the like, although women have a much larger scope in Senegal than in Nigeria in leadership of brotherhoods.

During the period of economic hardships in the last several decades, issues of cultural authenticity have become
rooted in Islamic identity in opposition to what has been perceived as Western cultural domination. These women reject Western feminism, which they see as an extension of Western cultural domination worldwide, a domination that makes Western values and ideas be the normative values that everyone else should strive for. The role of these women has expanded as liberalization of the political process and the emergence of multiparty politics have led them to establish organizations and to embrace a particular agenda, including the Muslim dress code, and involvement in cultural politics. The Islamists and radical reformist activists are engaged in contesting existing gender relations and social justice. They use the text (scripture) as their framework whereas the secular activists’ frame of reference is based on certain abstract concepts such as egalitarianism, humanism, human rights, and pluralism, concepts that have emerged from Western discourses on the subject.

The roles of men and women are constantly changing due to urbanization, education, and cross-cultural contacts. For some women these changes have generated new freedom and opportunities for self-improvement.

Islamic Law and Politics
As a political force, Islam united much of Africa in the past and was willing to accommodate local (including legal) practices. Nevertheless, as the level of Islamization deepened the learned Muslim scholars began to call for a strict interpretation of the shari’ah (Islamic law), which they saw as different from the African legal or customary practices. Some obvious areas of difference included, for instance, Islamic emphasis on individual ownership of land (and property inheritance through the male side of the family) whereas in various African societies land belonged to the community. Also, the way Islamic law was interpreted (some have suggested) tended to give men considerably more power over property matters than perhaps was the case in some African societies. Scholars, however, need comparative data across a number of African societies to make a meaningful comparison.

Unlike African customary law, which is unwritten, Islamic law (which covers both public and private life) is written and provides an extensive framework within which Muslim qadis (judges) analyze legal issues and deduce new laws to handle new situations in the umma. Islamic law emphasizes the rights or obligations of individuals whereas African customary law (in which economic and social relations, especially in “stateless” societies, were regulated by customs maintained by social pressure and the authority of elders) is based on kinship ties in matters of marriage and property. It extends to commercial and criminal law and also has rules regarding the conduct of political leaders or those entrusted with authority. In their encounter with other legal systems European colonial powers left these systems functioning in some societies (for instance, Sudan and Nigeria as part of the Britain’s self-serving policy of indirect rule) while in others they allowed Muslim judges to apply Islamic civil and family law except in criminal matters, which were tried by European courts. In the postcolonial period the scope of Islamic law, where it is applied, is limited to religious issues and civil cases; the modern trend, with its emphasis on equal rights of citizens, is to have laws that apply across the board without recognizing any distinctions based on religion or gender.

Recognition of Islamic laws in many African states after independence has created tensions and political controversy especially when the secular elites have sought to forge a uniform system of law or at least have attempted to modify Muslim personal law (in aspects such as marriage for girls) to bring it in line with the inherited Western law and African customary practices. There has been a wide variety of responses to the dilemma of how much scope to give to religious laws. Mozambique, for instance, has made attempts to recognize traditional and religious marriages (thus doing the basic minimum) whereas Sudan has made shari’ah the law of the land. The call by Muslim groups in northern Nigeria for nationalization of Islamic law (to apply beyond northern Nigeria) has unleashed the shari’ah debate, a source of tension in national politics in a country where at the very least only half or slightly more than half the population is Muslim. In African Muslim societies in general, however, it has been noted that there is often an antistate discourse underlying the call for Islamic law by Muslim groups, which seek to foster their religious and cultural autonomy in societies (with failed political institutions and secular ideologies such as socialism) in which state and secular institutions have failed to respond to their needs.

Coexistence of Islam and African Religion
The coexistence of Islam and African traditional religion has cultural and linguistic implications as well. The Arabic language has provided abstract concepts, particularly religious ones, that reveal Islamic modes of thought and expression. Islamic influence is, in fact, revealed both at the explicit and suggestive levels in languages as different as the Berber dialects, Hausa, Swahili, and Somali to name just a few. These languages have absorbed the Islamic worldview (though at some level languages such as Swahili have been progressively secularized over time during and after the colonial period, making them more neutral).

Islamic culture has generally held the written word in such high esteem that wherever Islam has reached in Africa versions of its script have been adopted in those regions of sustained contact. Moreover, Islamic penetration of Africa introduced Arabic as the language of religious discourse among scholars, official correspondence between Islamized states, and historical writing during the period of the Muslim kingdoms. Good examples of important records that were produced by Timbuktu scholars were the monumental Tarikh al-Fatash and Tarikh al-Sudan. Both East and West Africa
have also produced Afro-Islamic literature (from the panegyrics of the Prophet to poetry) based on the local languages, which have absorbed a lot of Arabic loanwords in the spheres of religion, politics, and commerce. In some of these areas, however, the written word has competed with the oral literature especially among such clan-based people as the Somali.

In the linguistic dimension it is often assumed that when Arabic and an African language such as Swahili, Berber, Hausa, Fulani, Harari, Somali, and others come into contact the latter will invariably be influenced by the former. It is, of course, undeniable that as a result of contact with Arabic these languages (which are related in their ethos to Arabic) have absorbed many Arabic loanwords. In fact, some had in the past a written tradition in Arabic script. Nevertheless, there is an unstated assumption that these languages have borrowed from Arabic rather passively without contributing anything back. This may explain the fact that while there are a number of studies that trace Arabic loanwords in various African languages, fewer comparable studies, if any, have been undertaken to study, say, the influence of Swahili on the Arabic dialects spoken in Oman or south Yemen (Hadramaut). This influence should be expected given that the Red Sea separates the Arabian peninsula from Africa and this proximity resulted in a profound interaction in a number of spheres. The Arabs, by their own tradition, recognize African ancestry through Ishmael's mother Haggar, who was Egyptian. Also, Arabs recognize the active presence of Africans in the evolution of pre-Islamic Arabic culture and the important role that Ethiopia and Ethiopians played in the early history of Islam.

How will both Islam and African indigenous traditions fare in the twenty-first century in the era of globalization? Can both systems penetrate Western secular culture, whose secular institutions and ideologies have not functioned well in Africa? Are African religious traditions destined to die out as socioeconomic changes (not to mention the colonial experience) have disrupted the cultural nexus in which these traditions have thrived? This is rather unlikely as African indigenous cultures have demonstrated much resilience even as their followers enter the fold of either Islam or Christianity (Ali Mazrui’s triple heritage) and the African ancestors are poised to raise their heads once again in the synthetic and syncretic religious universe. With one quarter of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims living in Africa (making Muslims, half the continent’s population, the most numerous followers of any religion) the final chapter of the unfolding global resurgent Islam is yet to be written.

See also Africa, Islam in; Bamba, Ahmad; Timbuktu; Touba; Zar.

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AGA KHAN

Aga Khan is the title inherited by the modern imams of the Shi’a Nizari Isma’ili Muslims. The title was first granted by the Iranian ruler Fath ‘Ali Shah to Imam Hasan ‘Ali Shah (1804–1881), who also served as governor of Qum, Mahallat, and Kirman. Forced to leave Iran, he settled eventually in British-ruled India. His son, Shah Ali Shah, Aga Khan II (1830–1835), was imam for four years and was succeeded after his death by his eight-year-old son who became well known internationally as Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III (1877–1957). He guided the community into the twentieth century by locating social welfare, educational, economic, and religious institutions within the framework of a structured community constitution to promote better organization and governance. His leadership played a crucial role in enabling the community, some of whose members had migrated from India to Africa, to adapt successfully to historical change and modernity.

In addition to his responsibilities as imam and spiritual leader for the welfare of his followers, Aga Khan III played an
Sir Sultan Muhammed Shah Aga Khan, known as Aga Khan III, became the leader of the Shi’i Nizari Isma’ili Muslims of India in the late nineteenth century at the age of eight. As the Indian subcontinent evolved politically in the beginning of the twentieth century, Aga Khan spoke out for education, social change, and women’s rights. LibraRy of Congress, The

important role as a statesman in international and Muslim affairs. He was president of the League of Nations from 1937 to 1938 and also played an important role in the political evolution of the Indian subcontinent. Deeply committed to social reform and education among Muslims of Africa and Asia he assisted in the creation of several institutions such as schools, hospitals, and the East African Muslim Welfare Society. He was also an eloquent advocate for the education of women and the advancement of their social and public role. In addition to other writings and speeches, he wrote two books, India in Transition (1918) and his Memoirs (1954). He died in 1957 and is buried in Aswan, Egypt.

Aga Khan IV, Shah Karim al-Husayni, was born in 1936 and was educated in Europe and at Harvard University. During his leadership, a worldwide community emerged successfully through complex and turbulent changes. The Ismailis, who live in some thirty countries and represent cultural and geographical diversity, acknowledge the spiritual authority of the imam and have responded actively to his guidance. This has enabled them to build further on inherited institutions and to create common purpose in their endeavors through well-coordinated local, national, and international institutions.

Aga Khan IV also created the Aga Khan Development Network, to promote a humanitarian, intellectual, and social vision of Islam and tradition of service to society. Its international activities have earned an enviable reputation for their commitment to the development of societies, without bias to national or religious affiliation, and to the promotion of culture as a key resource and enabling factor in human and social development. The Award for Architecture and the Trust for Culture promote concern and awareness of the built environment, and cultural and historical preservation. Various institutions of higher education, such as the Aga Khan University, Central Asian University, and the Institute of Ismaili Studies promote scholarship and training in a wide variety of fields.

The Aga Khan’s leadership and vision continue to be reflected in the increasingly significant global impact that these community institutions and the network are having in the fields of social, educational, economic, and cultural development.

See also Khojas; Nizari.

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Azim Nanji

AHL AL-BAYT

Ahl al-bayt, or “people of the house,” is a phrase used with reference to the family of the prophet Muhammad, particularly by the Shi’a. In early Arabian tribal society, it was a designation for a noble clan. It occurs only twice in the Qur’an, once in regard to Ibrahim’s family (11:73), but more significantly in a verse that states, “God only wishes to keep uncleanness away from you, O people of the house, and to purify you completely” (33:33). The context suggests that this statement pertains to women in Muhammad’s household, a view held by Sunni commentators. Some authorities have applied it more widely to descendants of Muhammad’s clan (Banu Hashim), the Abbasids, and even the whole community of Muslims. Since the eighth century C.E., however, the Shi’a
and many Sunnis have maintained that Qur’an 33:33 refers specifically to five people: Muhammad, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (Muhammad’s cousin), ‘Ali’s wife Fatima (Muhammad’s daughter), and their two children, Hasan and Husayn. Ulema invoke hadiths in support of this view, as seen in Tabari’s *Fāmil al-bayan* (c. tenth century C.E.). Thus, in South Asia, they are called “the five pure ones” (panijnatan pak). They are also known as “people of the mantle” (kis’as) in remembrance of the occasion when the Prophet enveloped them with his mantle and recited this verse.

Belief in the supermundane qualities of the *ahl al-bayt* and the imams descended from them form the core of Shi’ite devotion. They are the ideal locus of authority and salvation in all things, both worldly and spiritual. As pure, sinless, and embodiments of divine wisdom, they are held to be the perfect leaders for the Muslim community, as well as models for moral action. Many believe that they possess a divine light through which God created the universe, and that it is only through their living presence that the world exists. Twelver Shi’ite doctrine has emphasized that the pain and martyrdom endured by *ahl al-bayt*, particularly by Husayn, hold redemptive power for those who have faith in them and empathize with their suffering. Moreover, they anticipate the messianic return of the Twelfth Imam at the end of time, and the intercession of the holy family on the day of judgment. During the middle ages, Nizari Isma’ili (Khojas) make pilgrimages to their living shrine. Even former President Saddam Husayn of Iraq (r. 1979–2003) has claimed descent from *ahl al-bayt*.

Contemporary heads of state in several Muslim countries have claimed blood-descent from the family of the Prophet to obtain religious legitimacy for their rule: the ‘Alawid dynasty of Morocco (1631–present), Hashemite dynasty of Iraq (1921–1958) and of Jordan (1923–present), and many of the ruling mullahs in Iran, including the Ayatollah Khomeini (r. 1979–1989), whose tomb has become a popular Iranian Shi’ite shrine. Even former President Saddam Husayn of Iraq (r. 1979–2003) has claimed descent from *ahl al-bayt*.

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*Juan Eduardo Campo*

**AHL-E HADIS/AHL-AL HADITH**

The Ahl-e Hadis emerged as a distinctive orientation among Indian ulema in the late-nineteenth-century milieu of reformist thought, publication, debate, and internal proselytizing. Like other reformers, they fostered devotion to the prophet Muhammad and fidelity to *shari’a*. Unlike them, they opposed jurisprudential *taqlid* (imitation) of the classic law schools in favor of direct use of hadith. They also opposed the entire institution of Sufism, a stance that further marginalized them. Like the Deobandis, they claimed to be heirs of Shah Wali Allah (d. 1763), and they encouraged simplification of ceremony and the practice of widow remarriage. Their practices in the canonical prayer (including uttering “amen” aloud and lifting their hands at the time of bowing) led to conflicts ultimately settled in British courts.

Core supporters of the Ahl-e Hadis came from educated and often well-born backgrounds. Cosmopolitan in orientation, they identified themselves with similar groups in Afghanistan and Arabia. Within India, they turned to princes for
support, most famously with the marriage of Maulana Siddiq Hasan Khan (1832–1890) to the ruling Begum of Bhopal. Siddiq Hasan supported the classic interpretations of jihad, without the apologetic glosses of the day. Despite his writing to the contrary, he was suspected of disloyalty, as was another major figure in the movement, Sayyid Nazir Husain (d. 1902), who was briefly arrested as a “Wahhabi,” as supporters of the Arab Muhammad Ahd al Wahhab (1703–1792) were called. Suspicion of the Ahl-e Hadis abated by 1889, marked by the success of a campaign to drop the word “Wahhabi” in official British colonial correspondence.

The armed Lashkar-e Tayyiba, affiliated with the Ahl-e Hadis in Pakistan, is alleged to have been active both within Pakistan and Kashmir since the 1990s.

See also Deoband; Fundamentalism.

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Barbara D. Metcalf

AHL AL-HADITH

The Ahl al-Hadith (people of the traditions) appear to have developed out of a pious reaction to the assassination of Caliph Yazid b. Walid (d. 744). Prior to Yazid’s assassination, scholars who emphasized hadith (traditions of the prophet Muhammad) as the primary source for interpreting the Will of God were disorganized and fairly removed from the widespread emphasis on applying varying levels of reason to the Qur’an. Yazid’s assassination was interpreted by more conservative groups as a revolution against the predestined plan of God. Whether or not the early Ahl al-Hadith were aligned with the Umayyad caliphate, as were many of the Jabriyya (advocates of predestination), it is clear that many understood Yazid’s assassination as a sign of the general decay of the Muslim community, the blame for which they assigned to the uncontrolled use of personal opinion by the Ahl al-Ra’y (people of considered opinion). After the Abbasid revolution (c. 720–750), the Ahl al-Hadith developed into the main group opposed to the dominance of the rationalist theology of the Mu’tazilites. During the religious inquisition or Mihna (833–850) many of the Ahl al-Hadith were imprisoned for refusing to agree to the doctrine of the Created Qur’an. Members of the Ahl al-Hadith, such as Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), became important religious and social leaders due to their refusal to recant their beliefs in the eternal nature of the Qur’an. After the Mihna, the Ahl al-Hadith led an anti-rationalist movement that forced advocates of rationalist thought underground. In the centuries following the initial triumph of the Ahl al-Hadith, a middle ground emerged that placed greater emphasis on a combination of reason and tradition. The Ahl al-Hadith formed a school of legal thought named after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal that continued to pursue legal methods that focused less on uses of reason and more on tradition. The Hanbali fixation on tradition led to a series of reform movements that have sought to “revive” the moral and ethical standards of the first generations of Muslims. The contemporary influence of Ahl al-Hadith ideology continues to be important for a number of diverse groups. Organizations such as the Indonesians Muhammadiyah and the Islamic Society of North America, as well as the violent al-Qa’ida and Islamic Jihad, each bases its ideologies on ideas that emerged out of the Ahl al-Hadith and Hanbali movement over the last eight centuries.

See also Ibn Hanbal; Kalam; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila; Traditionalism.

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AHL AL-KITAB

The term ahl al-kitab, or people of the book, refers to followers of scripture possessing religions that predate the Qur’an, most often Jews and Christians. In some situations other religious groups, such as Zoroastrians and Hindus, have been considered to be people of the book. Some Qur’anic verses also refer to the Sabean, who are usually understood to be one of several gnostic Judeo-Christian sects such as the Mandeans, the Elchasaites, or Archontics. Muslims recognize the holy books possessed by the Jews (al-Tawrah: Torah; al-Zabur: Psalms) and Christians (al-Injil: Gospel) as legitimate revelations. However, they believe that some portions of these scriptures were abrogated and superceded by the Qur’an and the Christians and Jews corrupted others.

The Qur’an provides an ambivalent picture of the people of the book, sometimes praising and sometimes condemning them. Muslims are said to worship the same God as the people of the book, who were likewise honored with divine revelations (Q 2:62). However, the people of the book are also criticized for certain faults and sometimes referred to as...
unbelievers (Q 5:18, 9:29–35). These differences in tone seem to be connected with the circumstances in which Qur’anic revelations were delivered. In Mecca the Prophet’s message was directed against the idolaters who opposed him, and Muhammad believed that the Jews and Christians, as fellow monotheists, would recognize him as a prophet. After his arrival in Medina, however, it became apparent that most Jews and Christians were not going to submit to Islam. As a result, the Meccan suras generally express more favorable opinions of the people of the book, and the Medinan suras more negative images.

Despite recognizing the privileged place of the Jews as having received multiple prophets, the Qur’an criticizes them for resisting God and corrupting or hiding his Scriptures (Q 2:75, 3:78, 4:466, 5:13, 5:41). They are also charged with teaching falsehoods (Q 2:78, 3:79), and with immoral practices such as greed, theft, idolatry, persecuting the prophets, charging interest, and failing to honor the Sabbath (Q 2:49–61, 65, 3:75, 4:153–156, 160–161, 5:56–64, 7:163–166). Because of their sins, the Qur’an asserts that God cursed the Jews (Q 5:13). Those Jews who did not submit to Islam faced the same eternal punishment as polytheists and other unbelievers (Q 2:80f).

Christians are generally portrayed sympathetically in the early suras. They are described as being the closest friends to Muslims, while Jews and idolaters are said to be hostile to Islam (Q 5:82). However, the Qur’an disagrees with Christians over several doctrinal issues. Although the Muslim holy book recognizes Jesus’ prophethood (Q 3:45–53), it denies that he was divine or was crucified (Q 4:157–158, 5:116–117). It also rejects the Christians’ doctrine of the Trinity and their teaching that Jesus was the Son of God (Q 4:171–172, 19:35), accusing proponents of these doctrines of being unbelievers, in danger of hellfire (Q 5:76f). As with the Jews, Christians are also charged with distorting the Scriptures.

Muslim representations of abl al-kitab in hadith and early juristic literature demonstrate an increased familiarity with Jewish and Christian beliefs and practices, because the people of the book initially represented the majority population in the expanded Muslim empire. On the whole, this literature presents abl al-kitab in a negative light. Many hadiths seem concerned about their undue influence and warn Muslims not to imitate them. Hadith literature also lays the groundwork for the practice of assigning protected status (known as dhimmis status) to people of the book who submitted to Muslim political authority. This arrangement made it possible for Jews and Christians to practice their faiths while living in Muslim societies. Although treated as second-class citizens, non-Muslim communities were largely able to coexist peacefully with Muslims for centuries, without experiencing the active persecution that minority religious groups often encountered in Europe.

Islamic literature from the eleventh through eighteenth centuries generally deals with abl al-kitab within the context of their dhimmis status. Although dhimmis were understood to be inferior to Muslims, some Jews and Christians managed to attain high positions in Islamic states. A few, such as John of Damascus (d. c. 748), even engaged in theological discussions with Muslims. Islamic polemical literature associated with scholars such as Ibn Hazm of Córdoba (d. 1064), Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1148), and al-Ghazali (d. 1111) repeated earlier criticisms of Jews and Christians, posited different theories to explain the corruption of their scriptures, and assigned blame for this calamity to well-known figures such as the Old Testament prophet Ezra, the Christian apostle Paul, and the Byzantine emperor Constantine. The people of the book were also accused of concealing biblical prophecies foretelling the coming of Muhammad and the triumph of Islam. Sufi works, such as the poetry of Jalal al-Din Rumi, look to Jesus and other biblical saints as models but contain similar criticisms of Jews and Christians. All these texts reflect a belief in Muhammad as the bearer of God’s crowning revelation, supplanting the partial revelations of the biblical Scriptures.

During modern times, substantial changes in the relationship between the Islamic world and the West led to shifts in Muslim attitudes toward the people of the book. From the early 1800s, Islamic modernists acknowledged that Muslims could learn some things from the “Christian” West, but they continued to assert Islam’s superiority as a religious system. Colonizing European states attempted to impose Western values upon Islamic populations, but westernizing Muslim governments failed to achieve the promised prosperity. With the breakdown of the dhimmis system and the rise of nationalism, ethnic and religious violence has erupted throughout the Muslim world. This is most noticeable in the region of Palestine, where many Muslims see the establishment of Israel as a Western colonial project. During the late twentieth century, Islamic revivalists (or “Islamists”) increased their influence and largely rejected the “compromises” of the modernists. The Islamists advocate a return to the glorious Islamic civilization of the past, with its division of the world into dar al-islam and dar al-barb (“house of war”; i.e., that part of the world not ruled by Islamic government) and returning non-Muslim minorities to their former dhimmis status.

See also Christianity and Islam; Islam and Other Religions; Judaism and Islam; Minorities: Dhimmis.

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AHMAD IBN IBRAHIM AL-GHAZI (1506–1543)

Ahmad b. Ibrahim al-Ghazi is known in Ethiopian Christian literature as Ahmad Gran, “the left-handed,” political leader of an Islamic jihad movement in sixteenth-century Ethiopia. He rose to power in the context of a century-old struggle for domination in Ethiopia between the Christian emperors who reigned in Ethiopia’s central and northern highlands and the rulers of a number of Muslim emirates in that region’s eastern high- and lowlands. In the 1510s and 1520s, the emperor Libna Dingil (r. 1508–1540) had managed to overcome the resistance of the Amir of Adal, Garad Abun, as well as of Imam Mahfuz, the Amir of Zaila.

Ahmad b. Ibrahim al-Ghazi grew up in the province of Hubat south of Adal’s capital city of Harar and had married Bati Del Wanbara, a daughter of Imam Mahfuz. In the desperate situation of 1527, he was able to unite, under his leadership a number of Somali war bands as well as the forces of the Muslim emirates to defeat an Ethiopian army. With the support of Ottoman artillery, al-Ghazi’s army was subsequently able, in 1529, to inflict a crushing defeat upon Ethiopia’s united army. Thereupon, he decided to embark on a jihad with the aim to conquer Ethiopia as a whole.

Al-Ghazi led a number of campaigns, recorded by his companion, the Yemenite scholar Shihab al-Din Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Qadir, under the title Kitaab Futubat al-Habsha al-Musamma Babhat az-Zaman. Al-Ghazi’s Muslim armies were able to conquer, between 1529 and 1535, almost all the Ethiopian Christian territories, from Showa in the south to Tigray in the north. Ethiopia’s transformation into a Muslim imamate was, however, preempted by the intervention of the Portuguese in 1541. Also, Ethiopia’s new emperor, Galawdewos (r. 1540–1559), managed to reorganize the Christian forces and to stop al-Ghazi’s advance.

In a battle near Woyna Dega, in Dembya province, al-Ghazi was killed by a Portuguese fusilier. The Muslim empire of Ethiopia subsequently disintegrated as quickly as it had been conquered, and most Christians who had converted to Islam after 1529 converted back to Ethiopian Christianity. In the aftermath of al-Ghazi’s death, Emperor Galawdewos was able to advance as far as Harar, where he was stopped in 1559 by Imam Nur b. al-Mujahid, al-Ghazi’s nephew and successor. Al-Mujahid ruled Adal–Harar until his death in 1568.

See also Africa, Islam in; Ethiopia; Jihad.

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AHMAD IBN IDRIS (1750–1837)

Ahmad b. Idris was a Sufi teacher who influenced the formation of many reforming Sufi brotherhoods in the nineteenth century.

Although he never formed tariqa (brotherhood) of his own, Ibn Idris was a key figure in the development of Sufi thought in the nineteenth century. Being firmly based in traditional Sufism, in the line from Ibn ‘Arabi, Ibn Idris promoted the idea of tariqa Muhammadiyya—focusing the Sufi experience on following the example of and having mystical encounters with the Prophet—while vehemently rejecting blind imitation (taqlid) of earlier scholars. According to his teaching, it is the responsibility of each generation of Muslim scholars to discover the Muslim path by relying directly on the sources of divine revelation and not be restricted to what earlier and fallible human authorities have decreed.

Ibn Idris was born in Maysur, a village near Larache in Morocco, and received his basic training in the reformist scholarly milieu in Fez of the late eighteenth century, before moving through Egypt to Mecca in 1799. He stayed in Mecca during the Wahhabi occupation, unlike many colleagues, and had an ambivalent relationship to the Wahhabis; he shared some of their reformist views but rejected their recourse to anathema and violence against other Muslims. After a later disturbance in Mecca, he left in 1828 and settled in Sabya, the capital of ‘Asir, then a part of Yemen, where he stayed for the remainder of his life. Several of his students formed important Sufi brotherhoods to disseminate his ideas, among them the Sanusiyya of the Sahara, the Khatmiyya and Rashidiyya/Dandarawiyya of Sudan, Egypt, and the Indian Ocean regions, and the Salihyya of Somalia.

See also Africa, Islam in; Tariqa; Tasawwuf; Wahhabiyya.

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Ahmad Gran


Knut S. Vikør

AHMAD GRAN See Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi

AHMADIYYA

The Ahmadiyya movement was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the Punjab province of British India in 1889, at a time of competition for converts among new Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Christian reform and missionary movements. Divisions among Sunni Muslims on appropriate responses following the failure in 1857 of a widespread rebellion against the British were reflected in the growth of new religious movements in the north west, particularly at Deoband and Aligarh. Ghulam Ahmad’s claims to be the recipient of esoteric spiritual knowledge, transmitted to him through visions, attracted attention in such a setting. Doctrinally, he aroused hostility among Sunnis mainly because of his own claim to prophethood. His definition of jihad as concerned with “cleansing of souls,” rather than with military struggle, was less controversial at a stage when most Muslims had accepted the practical necessity of acquiescence to British rule. Some have viewed the insights that drew disciples to him as sufistic in essence, though his denunciation of rivals caused detractors to question the spirituality of the movement.

In 1889, shortly after publishing his first book Al-Barabin al-Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyya proofs; 4 vols, 1880–1884), Ghulam Ahmad began to initiate disciples. His claims two years later that he was both masib (messiah) and mahdi (rightly guided one), and subsequent claims to powers of prophethood, caused outrage among Muslims, which was expressed in tracts and newspapers and in fatawa condemning him for denying the doctrine of khatm al-nabwawa (finality of Muhammad’s prophethood). Public controversies also marked relations with his non-Muslim rivals, notably the Arya Samaj Hindu revivalist leaders with whom he clashed frequently, especially after he claimed to be an avatar of Krishna, and with Protestant Christian missionaries in the Punjab. Christians objected to his view that Jesus had died naturally in Kashmir, and that Ghulam Ahmad was the promised “second messiah.” He cultivated good relations, however, with the British colonial authorities who appreciated his advocacy of loyalty to the Raj. Although his personal dynamism, including the fear he inspired through the issuing of death prophecies, was responsible for his notoriety among his Punjab enemies, it also drew many initiates, mainly from Sunni Islam. On his death, a disciple, Maulvi Nur al-Din, became his khalifa (successor; 1908–1914).

The movement took stronger institutional form on 27 December 1891, when Ghulam Ahmad called the first annual gathering at Qadiyan, subsequently the center for all Ahmadi activities. Newspapers were soon established, including Al-Hukam (1897) and The Review of Religions (1902). Directed by Ghulam Ahmad that Ahmadis should demand separate categorization from Sunnis in the 1901 census, and that non-Ahmadi Muslims were kafirs (unbelievers), that intensified Sunni hostility. The community nevertheless prospered. Although scorned for their allegedly low social origins, many Ahmadis were of middle-class professional status (landowners, entrepreneurs, doctors, and lawyers). Those of lower origins took advantage of opportunities offered within the community to raise their educational level and hence status. Many Ahmadi women were well educated. Numbers rose to approximately nineteen thousand in Punjab by 1911, rising to about twenty-nine thousand by 1921. Careful marriage arrangements, as well as missionary activity, helped increase the membership, which then spread outside India, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, through well-organized overseas missionary programs.

A split in 1914 divided the movement in the Punjab but did not obstruct progress, for those who remained at Qadiyan, and the new, Lahore-based, secessionary branch, continued to use similar missionary and disciplinary methods to consolidate their communities. Differing mainly on understandings of Ghulam Ahmad’s status, the Qadiyanis retained the caliphal leadership, whose incumbents (since 1914 the sons and grandsons of Ghulam Ahmad) have reinforced belief in the founder’s prophetic claims. The Lahoris, organized as the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-e Isha ‘at-e Islam, regarded Ghulam Ahmad as the “mnjadid [reformer] of the fourteenth century,” and are less easily distinguishable from Sunni Muslims, except in holding Ghulam Ahmad to have been the “promised messiah.” The crucial difference over prophethood has maintained the separate identities of the branches wherever Ahmadiyya has since spread, although missionary work among non-Muslims, especially overseas, tends to stress common ground in Islam. While Ghulam Ahmad’s direct successors, notably his son, the second caliph, Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, together with Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, have contributed the most influential publications to Qadiyani proselytism, the Lahoris received notable intellectual and missionary leadership from Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali in the Punjab, and Khwaja Kamal al-Din in London.

During the period of overt nationalist struggle in India in the 1920s and 1930s some Lahoris began to support wider
Ahmadiyya
Islam and the Muslim World

Members of the Muslim Ahmadiyya group, including their leader, Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad Khalifatul Masih IV, left, begin the Initiation ceremony at an international Ahmadiyya convention in Germany in 2001. In the late nineteenth century, Ahmadiyya’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, started this branch of Islam after claiming to be a prophet who received spiritual visions. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Indian-Muslim agendas. Even though Zafrullah Khan was made president of the Muslim League conference in 1931, most Qadiyanis maintained their strong pro-British stance while clashing verbally and violently with some militant Sunni movements, notably the Ahrars. Yet both groups’ generally loyal stance ensured them considerable practical protection against possible recriminations from Muslims while colonial rule lasted.

Independence and Partition brought new problems for both groups. When the Gurdaspur district was allotted to India many Qadiyanis migrated to Pakistan, where they established a new headquarters at Rabwa. Pakistan has not proved congenial to the interests of either branch, although Zafrullah Khan was made Pakistan foreign minister and others initially gained important posts in the civil service, army, and air force. Latent antagonism escalated during the constitution-making controversies of the late 1940s, coming to a head in 1953 when anti-Ahmadiyya riots, encouraged by ulema seeking the constitutional declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims, resulted in many deaths. Although the government fell and a judicial inquiry condemned the attacks, continual pressure on the community culminated in the National Assembly’s declaration of the Ahmadis as non-Muslim in 1974. The military rule of Zia ul-Haq, which favored Islamization policies on a narrowly Sunni basis, proved disadvantageous to all minorities: His Ordinance XX of April 1984 prohibited Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslim. Subsequent prohibitions, notably on publishing, and on calling their places of worship mosques, have severely restricted Ahmadi religious life in Pakistan. The head of the Rabwa community, the fourth khalifa, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, migrated to London in the mid-1980s, after which many South Asian Ahmadis have settled outside the subcontinent, thereby strengthening the generally economically prosperous Ahmadi missionary communities, belonging to both branches, which were already established in many parts of Africa, in Fiji, and in Southeast Asia, as well as in North America and Europe. Although both branches report growth, there are no reliable statistics on numbers and distribution. Both branches continue to publish prolifically, but there has been little scholarly evaluation of academic and institutional developments, most accounts using the general term Ahmadi to describe both branches.
See also Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam; Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; South Asia, Islam in.

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Avril A. Powell

AHMAD KHAN, (SIR) SAYYID (1817–1898)

Sayyid Ahmad Khan was an educational and political leader of Muslims who were living under British rule in India. He developed concepts of religious modernism and community identity that mark the transition from Mogul India to the rise of representative government and the quest for self-determination. Born and educated in Delhi in the surviving remnant of the Mogul regime, Sayyid Ahmad embarked on a career in the British subordinate judicial service, the lower-level law courts where Indian judges presided and cases were conducted in Indian languages, and was posted in a series of north Indian towns and cities. During these years he published historical and religious texts and was one of the pioneers of the printing of Urdu prose. He remained loyal to the British during the 1857 revolt, and worked to reconcile Indian, Muslim, and British institutions and ideologies. In 1864, he founded the Scientific Society in Ghazipur (shifted the following year to Aligarh), which was devoted to translating practical and scientific works into Urdu. In 1869, he traveled to England to write a defense of the life of the Prophet and to examine British educational institutions. While in England, he conceived the idea of founding a residential college primarily for Muslims and devoted the rest of his life to the cause of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh, which was founded in 1875. During this period, he became a prolific writer on religious, social, and political issues. In 1887, he announced his opposition to the Indian National Congress on the grounds that representative government was not in the best interests of Muslims. Knighted by the British in 1888, he left a legacy of political separatism that future generations transformed into a movement for the creation of Pakistan as a separate state for South Asian Muslims.

See also Aligarh; Education; Liberalism, Islamic; Modernism; Modern Thought; Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; South Asia, Islam in; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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David Lelyveld

AHMAD, MIRZA GHULAM (LATE 1830s–1908)

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born into a landowning Sunni family at Qadiyan in Gurdaspur district, Punjab, northwest India. He initiated disciples into his Ahmadiyya movement in 1889, after announcing that messages received in visions designated him the mujaddid (renewer of Islam) for the age. He also claimed to be the masih-i maw/âyînud (promised Messiah), and the mahdi (rightly guided one), and to have powers of miracle and prophecy. Most Sunni Muslims deemed such a denial of khatm al-nubuwwa (finality of Muhammad’s prophethood) heretical, but his movement grew to nearly twenty thousand adherents in his lifetime. He was succeeded in 1908 by the first khalifa (leader) of the Ahmadiyya movement, Maulawi Nur al-Din.

See also Ahmadiyya.

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Avril A. Powell

‘A’ISHA (614–678 C.E.)

‘Âisha bint Abi Bakr was the favorite wife of the prophet Muhammad and a significant religious and political figure in
early Islam. The daughter of Umm Ruman and one of the Prophet’s companions, Abu Bakr (the first caliph of Islam after the death of the Prophet), she married Muhammad at a young age. Her intelligence, beauty, and spirited personality are well recorded in historical sources.

The hadith tradition records a unique level of intimacy shared by the Prophet and ‘A’isha. They bathed in the same water, he prayed while she lay stretched out in front of him, he received revelation when they were under the same blanket, and he expressed a desire to be moved to ‘A’isha’s chambers when he knew his death was approaching. Affection and playfulness also characterized their relationship. They raced with each other and enjoyed listening to the singing of Ethiopian musicians together. The Prophet related that when ‘A’isha was pleased with him, she would swear “By the God of Muhammad” and when she was annoyed with him she would swear “By the God of Abraham.” She regularly engaged the Prophet on issues of revelation and religion. Recognizing her intelligence and perceptiveness, he told the Muslims “Take two-thirds of your religion from al-Humayra,” the term of affection referring to the rosy-cheeked ‘A’isha.

A scandal once surrounded ‘A’isha, who was mistakenly left behind during a caravan rest stop on an expedition with the Prophet. She returned to Medina escorted by a young man who had found her waiting alone. Amid the ensuing gossip and speculation about ‘A’isha’s fidelity, one of the Prophet’s companions, ‘Ali, advised Muhammad to divorce her. This caused her to bear deep resentment against ‘Ali, which manifested itself in her later opposition to him as Muhammad’s successor. Finally a Qur’anic revelation exonerated her of all suspected wrongdoing, proclaiming her innocence. This same revelation established the punishment for false accusations of adultery.

In the lifetime of the Prophet she, together with Muhammad’s other wives, was referred to as “Mother of the Believers.” She is known to have transmitted approximately 1,210 traditions (hadiths), only 300 of which are included in the canonical hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim. She is said to have transmitted hadith to at least eighty-five Muslims, as well as to have corrected inaccuracies in the hadiths reported by some of the Prophet’s male companions.

After the death of the Prophet, she was critical of the third caliph, ‘Uthman, but also called his killers to accountability during the caliphate of ‘Ali. Together with the Companions Zubair and Talha, she mobilized opposition to ‘Ali, culminating in the Battle of the Camel (656 C.E.). The name of the battle reflects the centrality of ‘A’isha’s role in the conflict, seated on her camel in the middle of the battlefield. This struggle over succession marked the development of a major civil war (called fitna) in Islam, which ultimately contributed to one of the most significant religious and political divisions in the Muslim world. The representations of ‘A’isha in subsequent Shi’ite and Sunni polemics reflected some of the historical antagonisms between the two. Many Shi’ite Muslims reviled ‘A’isha, whereas Sunni Muslims embraced her as a revered wife of the Prophet. Tradition holds that she was consulted on theological, legal, and other religious issues, and was also known for her poetic skills. She is buried at al-Baqi in Medina.

See also ‘Ali; Bukhari, al-; Fitna; Muhammad; Shi’a: Early; Sunna.

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Sa’diya Shaikh

AKBAR (1542–1605)

Jalal al-Din Akbar was born in 1542 as his father Humayun fled India before the forces of the Afghan warlord Sher Shah Sur. After thirteen years of exile, his father returned to rule India, but died in a fall in a matter of months. Akbar came to the throne at the age thirteen in 1555. He ruled until his own death in 1605.

Akbar’s reputation as the true founder of the Mogul empire rests partly on his own reign of fifty years and partly on the writings of Abu ’l-Fazl, a loyal companion who was Akbar’s ardent supporter. Abu ’l-Fazl’s A’in-i Akbari and Akbarnamah presented the image of Akbar as a political genius. Abu ’l-Fazl saw Akbar as the “perfect man” (insan-i kamil) of Sufi lore: a master of both the temporal and spiritual realms. He, therefore, inflated Akbar’s reputation whenever possible.

In practical terms, Akbar adopted some of the administrative practices of the defeated Sher Shah. As the influence of his grandfather and father’s aging courtiers declined, Akbar was free to recruit a new corps of advisors, like Abu ’l-Fazl. These advisors depended on his patronage for their own status. During Akbar’s reign, India saw an influx of silver bullion as European traders began massive purchases of Indian cloth. Because of the cash nexus created by increased commerce, Akbar was able to manage a system in which officials received salaries either directly from the imperial treasury or through assignments of the government’s revenue...
Akhbariyya

allotment from the capitol of the province for specific districts. The central authority gained an unprecedented degree of control over state officials. Akbar’s reputation was further enhanced as the British came to rule India. They saw him as a model for their own style of rule: religiously neutral, but strict in his assertion of central power.

See also Empires: Mogul; South Asia, Islam in.

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Gregory C. Kozlowski

AKHBARIYYA

Akhbariyya was a movement in Twelver Shi’ism that emphasized a return to the sources of the law (Qur’an and hadith). Hadith in Twelver Shi’ism include accounts of the sayings and actions of the imams (normally termed akhbar). The Akhbariyya styled themselves as followers of the imams (through the akhbar) that record their rulings, rather than the interpretations of these texts by later scholars. The origins of the Akhbari movement are a debated point both within the Twelver tradition, and among Western commentators. The Akhbaris themselves, however, see their movement as the original Shi’ism, which was later corrupted by scholars who had imitated Sunni methods of jurisprudence. Their opponents, termed Usulis (or in some texts, mujtahids), considered the Akhbaris an innovative movement (bid’at), arising in the sixteenth century with the work of Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1626). There is evidence to support both interpretations of the movement’s origins. Early Muslim heresiographical works, such as Shahrastani’s Kitab al-milal wa al-nihal (c. 1127), talk of the division of the imamiyya into mu’taziliyya and akhbariyya. Whether these early Akhbaris can be linked to the later, better-defined, movement is unclear.

In biographical works, Astarabadi is normally described as the founder of the movement, though Astarabadi viewed himself as its “reviver.” He was followed by a number of scholars who explicitly identified themselves with the Akhbariyya. What united these scholars was a call for the return to the sources in a belief that the meaning of the imams’ words and actions was readily available, but had been lost by centuries of excessive interpretation. They identified this excessive interpretation with the introduction of the doctrine of ijtimad into Shi’ite legal thinking by al-‘Allama al-Hilli (d.1325). Akhbaris also criticized other juristic practices linked with the theory of ijtimad. In particular, they viewed the “canonical four books” of Twelver Shi’ite hadith as containing only “sound” (sahih) traditions. They believed that the hadith in these books should not be examined by the traditional means of establishing historical accuracy. Furthermore, the Akhbariyya maintained that these traditions were never ambiguous in meaning, and were in no need of interpretation. In this sense, the Akhbariyya can be viewed as literalist, or even fundamentalist.

The Akhbariyya drew on the diverse areas of Safavid Twelver intellectual life. There were Akhbaris who were influenced by mysticism and philosophy, such as Muhammad Taqi al-Majlisi (d. 1659/1660) and Muhsin Fayd al-Kashani (d. 1680), as well as the stricter, more legalistic manifestations of Shi’ism, such as Mulla Muhammad Tahir Qummi (d. 1686) and al-Hurr al-Amili (d. 1693). What they shared was a common attitude toward the manner in which the shari’a might be known. They were, then, in the main a movement of law, and often referred to themselves as a madhab (school of law). As an intellectual force, the Akhbariyya died out in Iran and Iraq in the early nineteenth century, though they continued for a short time thereafter to be influential in India. Even today, there continue to be scholars who follow a methodology similar to Akhbarism in the Shi’ite world, particularly in the Persian Gulf area and southern Iran.

See also Law; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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Robert Gleave

AKHLAQ

Akhlaq, the plural form of khuluq, refers to innate disposition or character and, by extension in Muslim thought, to ethics. In the Qur’an the term is used to refer to the prophet Muhammad’s exemplary ethical character (68:4). The Qur’an also emphasizes the significance of ethically guided action as the underpinning for a committed Muslim life. Qur’anic ethics emphasize in particular the dignity of the human being, accountability, justice, care and compassion, stewardship of society and the environment, and the obligation to family life and values. Faith and ethics are thus intertwined in the Qur’an and linked further to the Prophet as a moral exemplar.

In elaborating and further developing ethical thought, Muslims, throughout history, developed a diverse set of expressions: philosophical, theological, legal, and literary.
These expressions were framed within a context of vigorous intellectual debate and in interaction with the legacies of many ancient traditions, including the works attributed to Aristotle and Plato, and Iranian, Indian, Jewish, and Christian thought.

The Muslim philosophical tradition of ethics developed an intellectual framework for rationally grounded moral action. Some of the key thinkers who contributed to this were al-Farabi (d. 950), Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030), Ibn Sina (d. 1037), and Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1273/74). Their works in turn influenced other major figures, including the Sunni scholar al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who did not always agree with them. The philosophical tradition, in common with other early groups such as the Mu'tazila and the Shi'a, emphasized reason and logic in arguing for a universal ethical framework. Ethical action in their view did not oppose religiously grounded ethics, rather it sought to enhance their meaning and appreciation by philosophical reasoning and took account of personal and social, as well as political, virtues. Al-Farabi's classic al-Madinab al-Fadilah (The excellent city) explores the ideals of a political community that produces the greatest good for all its citizens.

Muslim legal tradition also developed a framework for guiding individual and social behavior. In Muslim law (shari'a) jurists classified acts according to their moral value, ranging from obligatory, meritorious, indifferent, disapproved, and the forbidden. All actions thus fell within these normatively and juristically defined categories and provided religiously defined prescriptions that could be enacted at a personal as well as a social level to followers by scholars trained in jurisprudence and religious sciences.

Mystically grounded ethics as developed in the Sufi tradition emphasized the necessity of an inner orientation and awareness for guiding human action, leading to greater intimacy, knowledge, and personal experience of the divine. Ethical acts were linked to spiritual development, and Sufi teachers wrote manuals, guides, and literary works to illustrate the way—tariqa—which represented, in their view, the inner dimension of outward acts.

In the modern period, as Muslims have come into greater contact with each other and with the rest of the world, their ethical legacy, while still continuing to be influential in its traditional forms, is also being challenged to address emerging issues, changing needs, and social transition. Muslim scholars are debating and formulating responses to a variety of issues, prominent among which are the ethical bases of political, social, and legal governance; the ethics of a just economic order; family life; war and peace; biomedical ethics; human rights and freedoms; the ethics of life; and the broader question raised by globalization, degradation of the environment, and the uses and abuses of technology.

See also Adab; Ethics and Social Issues; Falsafa.

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Azim Nanji

AKHUND See Molla

‘ALI (600–661)

‘Ali ibn Talib, born in Mecca about 600 C.E., was the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, father of the Prophet’s grandsons Hasan and Husayn, and fourth caliph (656–661) of the Muslim umma (community of believers).

At a very young age, ‘Ali was adopted by Muhammad, who brought him up like his own son. When Muhammad received the divine revelation, ‘Ali was still a very young boy. He was the first male to accept Islam, and to dedicate all his life to the cause of Islam. ‘Ali’s courage became legendary because he led several important missions.

At the Prophet’s death, the community split into two major groups contending for political succession. During a gathering of the ansar (helpers), Abu Bakr was elected first caliph. A group led by ‘Ali and his supporters (Zubayr, Talha, Miqdad, Salman al-Farsi, and Abu Dharr Ghifari, among others) held that ‘Ali was the legitimate heir of the Prophet. To preserve the unity of the Muslim umma, ‘Ali is said to have kept a low profile and concentrated his efforts on religious matters. The first version of the Qur’an was attributed to him by some of his contemporaries. In the period preceding his caliphate, ‘Ali, known for his learning in Qur’an and sunna, had given advice on secular and spiritual matters. On several occasions, he disagreed with Uthman (the third caliph) and criticized him on the application of certain Islamic principles.

Following Uthman’s murder, the ansar invited ‘Ali to accept the caliphate and he agreed only after a long hesitation. All through his brief governing period, ‘Ali faced strong opposition. First he was opposed by ‘A’isha, Muhammad’s wife, but the strongest opposition came from Mu’awiyah, who had his stronghold in Syria. Two companions of the Prophet, Talha and Zubayr, already frustrated in their political ambitions, were further disappointed by ‘Ali, in their efforts to secure for themselves the governorships of Basra and Kufa. Thus they broke with him and asked to bring Uthman’s

‘Ali opened negotiations with Mu‘awiyah, hoping to gain his allegiance. Mu‘awiyah insisted on Syrian autonomy under his own leadership. Thus he mobilized his Syrian supporters and refused to pay homage to ‘Ali, on the pretext that his people had not participated in his election. After a few months of confrontation, ‘Amr b. ‘As advised Mu‘awiyah to have his soldiers raise parchments inscribed with verses of the Qur’an on their spearheads; the goal was to bring about the cessation of hostilities between the people of Iraq, who formed the bulk of ‘Ali’s army, and the people of Syria. ‘Ali saw through the stratagem, but only a minority wanted to pursue the fight. Hence he ended the fight and sent Ash‘at b. Qays to find out Mu‘awiyah’s intentions. Mu‘awiyah suggested that each side should choose an arbiter; together, the two men would reach a decision based on the Qur’an. This decision would then be binding on both parties. ‘Amr b. ‘As, the Syrian representative, and Abu Musa Ash‘ari, the Iraqi representative, met to draft an agreement, but in the meantime ‘Ali’s coalition began to collapse. The arbiters and other eminent persons met at Adruh in January 659 to discuss the selection of the new caliph. Both parties agreed to the choice of ‘Ali and Mu‘awiyah and were willing to submit the selection of the new caliph to an electorate body (shura). In the public declaration that followed, Abu Musa kept his part of the agreement, but ‘Amr b. ‘As deposed ‘Ali and declared Mu‘awiyah caliph.

Meanwhile, Mu‘awiyah had followed an aggressive course of action by making incursions into the heart of Iraq and Arabia. By the end of 660 ‘Ali, who was regarded as caliph only by a diminishing number of partisans, lost control of Egypt and Hijaz. He was struck with a poisoned sword by a Kharijite named ‘Abd-al-Rahman b. Muljam while praying in a mosque at Kufa. ‘Ali died at the age of sixty-three and was buried near Kufa in late January 661. ‘Ali’s death brought to an end the era of Rashidun, the four “rightly-guided” caliphs.

The early Shi‘ite traditions regarded ‘Ali as the most judicious of the Companions and the Prophet nicknamed him “Ali.” Although many Muslims forbid representing the Prophet and his family in images, this fresco depicts ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, fourth caliph of Islam, and the cousin and brother-in-law of Muhammad. Muhammad raised ‘Ali like a son, and ‘Ali became the first male to accept Islam. Here, ‘Ali holds the body of an imam killed during political power struggles after Muhammad’s death. © SEF/Art Resource, NY

Several places are mentioned as ‘Ali’s shrine. But most Shi‘ite scholars are in agreement that ‘Ali was buried in Ghari, west of Kufa, at the site of present-day Najaf. These scholars explained the discrepancies among the various reports by maintaining that ‘Ali himself requested to be buried in a secret place so as to prevent his enemies from desecrating his grave. Under the Safavid Empire, his grave became the focus of much devoted attention, exemplified in the pilgrimage made by Shah Isma’il I (d. 1524) to Najaf and Karbala. Today a gold-plated dome rises above ‘Ali’s tomb. The interior is decorated with polished silver, mirror work, and ornamental tiles. A silver tomb rises over the grave itself, and the courtyard has two minarets. The recitation of special prayers over ‘Ali’s grave is considered particularly beneficial in view of ‘Ali’s role as intercessor on the Day of Judgment. Sunni polemicists have often accused the Shi‘ites of preferring pilgrimages to the tombs of ‘Ali and other imams over the pilgrimage to Mecca.

It is important to note that ‘Ali’s position became important to different groups of Muslims starting from the early period. For the Shi‘a, he is said to have participated in the Prophet’s ascension (mi‘raj) to heaven and acquired several honorific titles. The ‘Aya‘iyya believed in the divinity of Muhammad and ‘Ali, and gave preference in divine matters to ‘Ali. Among Sufis he is renowned as a great Sufi saint for his piety and poverty as well as the possessor of esoteric knowledge. The early Shi‘ite traditions regarded ‘Ali as the most judicious of the Companions and the Prophet nicknamed him

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Abu Turab (Father of Dust) because he saw him sleeping in the courtyard of the mosque. Some sources agree that ‘Ali was a profoundly religious man, devoted to the cause of Islam and the rule of justice in accordance with the Qur’an and the sunna.

One of the basic differences between Shi’ism and Sunnism concerns the question of the respective roles of ‘Ali (and the other imams) on the one hand, and Muhammad on the other. Shi’ism shares with Sunnism the belief that Muhammad, as seal of the prophets, was the last to have received revelation (wahi). Classical Shi’ite doctrine holds that ‘Ali and the other imams were the recipients of inspiration (ilham). But it is only the legislative prophecy that has come to an end, that is, the previous prophets such as Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, the last of the legislative prophets, introduced a new religious law while abrogating the previous one; the guidance of humanity must continue under the waliya (Institution of the Friends of God) of an esoteric prophecy (Nabiya batiniya). Thus ‘Ali, the first imam, is designated as the foundation (asas) of the imamate. He is the possessor of a divine light (nur) passed on from Muhammad to him, and later from him on to the other imams. The Sunnis believe that the Prophet did not explicitly name his successor after his death; the Shi‘ites, on the contrary, hold that he explicitly named his successor ‘Ali at Ghadir Khumm, an oasis between Mecca and Medina.

According to the Shi‘a, a passage in the Qur’an (2:118) shows that the imamate is a divine institution; the possessor thereof must be from the seed of Ibrahim: “And when his Lord tested Abraham with certain words, and he fulfilled them. He said, ‘Behold, I make you a leader [imam] for the people.’ Said he, ‘And of my seed?’” Even the Sunnis hold that the true caliph can only be one of the Quraysh tribe, but based on this verse the Shi‘a maintain that the divinely appointed leader must himself be impeccable (mdam). The primeval creation of ‘Ali is therefore a principle of the Shi‘ite faith. According to them, as expressed by Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1698), Muhammad explicitly designated (nass jali) ‘Ali as his successor by God’s command:

When the ceremonies of the pilgrimage were completed, the Prophet, attended by ‘Ali and the Muslims, left Mecca for Medina. On reaching Ghadir Khumm, he [the Prophet] halted, although that place had never before been a halting place for caravans. The reason for the halt was that verses of the Qur’an had come upon him, commanding him to establish ‘Ali in the Caliphate. Before this he had received similar messages, but had not been instructed explicitly as to the time for ‘Ali’s appointment. He had delayed because of opposition that might occur. But if the crowd of pilgrims had gone beyond Ghadir Khumm they would have separated and the different tribes would have gone in various directions. This is why Muhammad ordered them to assemble here, for he had things to say to ‘Ali which he wanted all to hear. The message that came from the Most High was this: “O Apostle, declare all that has been sent down to thee from thy Lord. No part of it is to be withheld. God will protect you against men, for he does not guide the unbelievers” (5:71). Because of this positive command to appoint ‘Ali as his successor, and perceiving that God would not countenance further delay, he and his company dismounted in this unusual stopping place. The day was hot and he told them to stand under shelter of some thorn trees . . . when the crowd had all gathered, Muhammad walked up on to the platform of saddles and called ‘Ali to stand at his right. After a prayer of thanks he spoke to the people, informing them that he had been forewarned of his death, and saying, “I have been summoned to the Gate of God, and I shall soon depart to God, to be concealed from you, and bidding farewell to this world. I am leaving you the Book of God [Qur’an], and if you follow this you will not go astray. And I am leaving you also the members of household [ahl al-bayt], who are not to be separated from the Book of God until they meet me at the drinking fountain of Kawthar.” He then called out, “Am I not, more precious to you than your own lives?” They said “Yes.” Then it was that he took ‘Ali’s hands and raised them so high that he showed the whites of his armpits, and said, “Whoever has me as his master (mawla) has ‘Ali as his master. Be friend to his friend, O Lord, and be an enemy to his enemies. Help those who assist him and frustrate those who oppose him.” (Donaldson, p. 5)

This sura concluded the revelation: “This day I have perfected your religion for you, and have filled up the measure of my favors upon you, and it is my pleasure that Islam be your religion” (5:5). The event of Ghadir Khumm is not denied by Sunnis but interpreted differently by them. For the Sunnis, Muhammad wanted only to honor ‘Ali. They understood the term mawla in the sense of friend, whereas the Shi‘a recognized ‘Ali as their master; the spiritual authority of ‘Ali was passed afterward to his direct descendants, the rightful guides (imams). The successor of the Prophet, for the Sunnis, is his khalifa (caliph), the guardian of religious law (shari‘a), while for the Shi‘ites, the successor is the inheritor (wasi) of his esoteric knowledge and the interpreter, par excellence, of the Qur’an. Since Muhammad was the last Prophet who closed the prophetic cycle, the Shi‘a believe that humanity still needs spiritual guidance: the cycle of imamate must succeed the cycle of prophecy. Another tradition gives us some insight into the key role of ‘Ali, based on the status of Aaron: “O people, know that what Aaron was to Moses, ‘Ali is to me, except that there shall be no prophet after me.” (Poonawala and Kohlberg, p. 842). The imamate is a cardinal principle of Shi‘ite faith. It is only through the imam that true knowledge can be obtained. ‘Ali, as the Wasi, assisted Muhammad in his task. The Prophet received the revelation (tanzil) and established the religious law (shari‘a), while ‘Ali, the repository of the Prophet’s knowledge, provided its
spiritual exegesis (ta’wil). Thus the imamate, the heart of Shi‘ism, is closely tied to ‘Ali’s spiritual mission. For Sunnis, the imamate is necessary because of the revelation and is considered a law among the laws of religion. For them, the imamate is not part of the principles of religion and belief, whereas for Shi‘ites, the imamate is a rational necessity and an obliged grace (lutf wajib).

From the beginning, Shi‘ite Islam has emphasized the importance of human intellect placed in the service of faith. The origins of the encouragement given to intellect goes back to ‘Ali the commander of the faithful (amir al-mu‘minin). According to a saying attributed to him, there is an intimate bond between intellect and faith: “Intellect [‘aql] in the heart is like a lamp in the center of the house” (Amir-Moezzi, p. 48). The heart’s eye of the faithful can see the divine light (nur) when there is no longer anyone between God and him; it is when God showed Himself to him, since ‘aql is the interior guide (imam) of the believer.

In early Sufi circles, ‘Ali was especially renowned for his piety and poverty. He is said to have dressed simply. His biographies abound in statements about his austerity, rigorous observance of religious duties, and detachment from worldly goods. He is also described as the most knowledgeable of the Companions, in terms of both theological questions and matters of positive law. Abu al-Qasim al-Junayd (d. 910) considered ‘Ali as his “master in the roots and branches [of religious knowledge] and in perseverance in the face of hardship” (Poonawala and Kohlberg, p. 846). With the growth of Sufi doctrine in the tenth and eleventh centuries, increasing emphasis was placed on ‘Ali’s possession of a knowledge imparted directly by God (‘ilm laduni). Most of the Sufis believe that each shaykh or pir (sage) inherited his knowledge directly from ‘Ali. The investment of the cloak as a symbol of the transmission of spiritual powers is closely associated to ‘Ali: the two precious things shown to Muhammad during the mystical ascent (mi‘raj) were spiritual poverty and a cloak that he had placed on ‘Ali and his family (Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn).

Sufi orders flourished particularly in Central Asia and Persia; Muslim scholars became imbued with Shi‘ite speculative theology and Sufism. One of the earliest representatives of this trend was ‘Ali b. Mitham Bahrami (d. 1281), who saw in ‘Ali the original shaykh and founder of the mystical tradition. For them ‘Ali’s mission is seen as the hidden and secret aspect of prophecy. This underlying idea is based on the Khutbat al-bayan: “I am the Sign of the All-Powerful. I am the Gnosis of mysteries. I am the companion of the radiance of the divine Majesty. I am the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden. I am the Face of God. I am the mirror of God, the supreme Pen, the Tabula secreta. I am he who in the Gospel is called Elijah. I am he who is in possession of the secret of God’s Messenger” (Corbin, p. 49). Or this next one: “I carried Noah in the ark, I am Jonah’s companion in the belly of the fish. I am Khadir, who taught Moses, I am the Teacher of David and Solomon, I am Dhu al-Qarnayn” (Poonawala and Kohlberg, p. 847). According to another tradition (Amir-Moezzi, p. 30), Muhammad and ‘Ali were created from the same divine light (nur) and remained united in the world of the spirits; only in this world did they separate into individual entities so that mankind might be shown the difference between Prophet and Wali. It is only through him that God may be known.

See also Caliphate; Imamate; Shi‘a: Early; Succession.

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Diana Steigerwald

ALIGARH

The north Indian city of Aligarh, site of Aligarh Muslim University, has played a leading role in the political life and intellectual history of South Asian Muslims since the middle of the nineteenth century. The importance of Aligarh arose initially under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). Through a series of organizations and institutions, the “Aligarh movement” (the social, cultural, and political movement founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan) sought to prepare Muslims for changes in technology, social life, and politics associated with British rule, the rise of nationalism, and the conditions of modernity. In 1865, Aligarh became the headquarters of the Aligarh Scientific Society, and, in 1875, the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College, the forerunner of...
the university established there in 1920. Aligarh was the first headquarters of the Muslim League, a party established in 1906 to secure recognition of Muslims as a separate political community within India, a concept that ultimately led in 1947 to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a separate nation-state for South Asian Muslims. After partition, the Aligarh Muslim University remained one of a small group of national universities in India.

In its early years, the Aligarh College attracted patronage and recruited students from Muslim communities throughout India, both Sunni and Shi’ia, as well as significant numbers of Hindus. Aside from some short-lived efforts to include Arabic studies and Urdu as a language of instruction, the college followed the standard British imperial curriculum. Official British patronage became more significant after 1887, when Sayyid Ahmad Khan called for Muslim opposition to the newly founded Indian National Congress. In the twentieth century, Aligarh became an arena for opposing political tendencies among Muslims, including supporters of Indian nationalism and international socialism, as well as of Muslim separatism. Aligarh graduates achieved prominence as writers, jurists, and political leaders. At the same time, Aligarh was the target of much opposition, particularly for its association with social reform and religious modernism. In 1906 the Aligarh Zenana Madrasa provided separate education for girls, and became the Aligarh Women’s College in 1925.

When Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan died in 1898, his successors initiated a campaign to establish an autonomous, all-India educational system for Muslims under the auspices of an affiliating university. The university established in 1920, however, was confined to Aligarh and remained under British control. In response, Mohandas K. Gandhi and two Aligarh graduates, the brothers Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali, led a noncooperation campaign that established an alternative nationalist institution, the Jami’a Milli’a Islamiya, outside the campus gates and subsequently relocated to Delhi. In the final years before independence and partition, Aligarh students toured India on behalf of the Pakistan cause, though others devoted themselves to the ideal of a united and secular India.

Zakir Hussain, the first postindependence vice chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University, and later president of India, succeeded in preserving the university’s Muslim identity as a way of preparing Muslims for full participation in national life. A center for Urdu writers and historians of Mughal India, many of them Marxists, the university has so far been able to fend off efforts to undermine its role as an national center for Indian Muslims.

See also Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Education; Modernism; Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; South Asia, Islam in; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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David Lelyveld

**ALLAH**

*Allah* is the Arabic equivalent of the English word *God*, and is the term employed not only among Arabic-speaking Muslims but by Christians and Jews and in Arabic translations of the Bible. A contraction of *al-ilah*, meaning “the god,” Allah is cognate with the generic pan-Semitic designation for “God” or “deity” (Israelite/Canaanite *El*, Akkadian *ilu*) and is particularly close to the common Hebrew term *Elah* and the less frequent *Elôab*. It is thus, strictly speaking, not a proper name but a title.

In the Islamic context, as in Jewish and Christian usage, Allah refers to the one true God of monotheism. This is how the term occurs in the *shabada* or “profession of faith,” the simplest, earliest, and most basic of Islamic creeds, in the first part of which the believer affirms that there is no “god” (*ilab*) but “God” or “the god” (Allah). However, the *shabada* itself seems to imply that Allah was already known to the first audience of the Islamic revelation, and that they were called upon to repudiate other deities. And this is precisely the picture given in the Qur’an. “If you ask them who created them,” the Qur’an informs the prophet Muhammad regarding his pagan critics, “they will certainly say ‘Allah.’” (43:87; compare 10:31; 39:38). Pagans swore oaths by Allah (as witnessed at 6:109; 16:38; 35:42).

Pre-Islamic Arabs believed in supernatural intercessors with God (10:18; 34:22), for whom they appeared to claim warrant from Allah. (See, for example, 6:148.) Indeed, Allah seems (in their view) to have headed a pantheon of pre-Islamic deities or supernatural beings, not altogether unlike El’s rule over the Canaanite pantheon, and, like El, he seems to have been rather distant and aloof. While the data are fragmentary and open to some question, pre-Islamic Arabs seem to have paid more attention to Allah’s daughters and to the *jinn* (or genies) than to him. Even the Qur’an seems to concede genuine existence to a divine retinue (as at 7:191–195; 10:28–29; 25:3). However, just as the Canaanite gods are
replaced by an angelic court in Israelite faith, Islam rejects the independent deities of pagan Arabia in favor of a very much subordinated “exalted assembly” (see 37:8; 38:69) that exists to carry out the decrees of the one true God, who is, says the Qur’an, nearer to the individual human than that person’s jugular vein (50:16). In this, as in other respects, Islam regards itself as a restoration of the religion taught by earlier prophets but marred by successive human apostasies (see 42:13).

The Qur’an identifies Allah as the creator, sustainer, and sovereign of the heavens and the earth. (See, for example, 13:16; 29:61, 63; 31:25; 39:38; 43:9, 87.) Following the scriptural text, Muslims characterize him by the ninety-nine “most beautiful names” (7:180; 17:110; 20:8), which serve to identify his attributes. (Eventually, repetition of and meditation upon these names became an important practice in the tradition of Sufi mysticism.) They portray a being who is self-sufficient, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, merciful yet just, benevolent but terrible in his wrath. The picture of Allah in the Qur’an employs distinctly anthropomorphic language (referring, for example, to the divine eyes, hands, and face), which, virtually all commentators have long agreed, are to be taken figuratively.

Allah has revealed himself throughout history via messages to various prophets by means of both the seemingly routine processes of nature and the periodic judgments and catastrophes directed against the rebellious. He will reveal himself even more spectacularly at the end of time when, as judge of humankind, he pronounces doom or blessing upon every individual who has ever lived. The faith of Muhammad and the Qur’an is centered on absolute “submission” (islam) to his will.

The Qur’an describes God as “Allah, one; Allah, the eternal refuge. He does not beget nor is He begotten, and there is none equal to Him” (112:1–4). In subsequent Islamic thought, such straightforward denial of divine family life (probably aimed at both the pre-Islamic pantheon and Christian concepts of God the Father and God the Son) was expanded into a much broader doctrine of the divine unity, denoted by the non-Qur’anic word tawhid (“unification” or “making one”). Philosophers and theologians debated such questions as whether God’s attributes were identical to God’s essence, or whether, being multiple, they must be additional and in a sense external in order not to compromise the utter and absolute simplicity of the divine essence. They debated how the undeniably manifold cosmos had emerged out of the pure oneness of God. The issue of whether God’s speech (i.e., the Qur’an) was coeternal with him, or subsidiary and created, rising to political prominence in the second and third centuries after Muhammad. The overwhelming personality depicted in the revelations of Muhammad became the Necessary Existent (wajib al-wujud), and the obvious dependence of life on his will (particularly apparent in the harsh desert environment of Arabia) was taken to point to the utter contingency of all creation upon a God who brought it into being out of nothing. Perhaps not unrelated was the rise to dominance in Islam of a doctrine of predestination or determinism, which had obvious roots in the Qur’an itself (as, for example, at 13:27; 16:93; 74:31). In the meantime, though,
while the philosophers were elaborating a view of Allah tending to extreme transcendence, Sufi theoreticians were emphasizing his immanence and experiential accessibility and, in practice, often breaking down the barrier between Creator and creatures—and occasionally shocking their fellow Muslims.

The famous “Throne Verse” (2:255) offers a fine summary of basic Islamic teaching regarding God: “Allah! There is no god but he, the Living, the Everlasting. Neither slumber nor sleep seizes him. His are all things in the heavens and the earth. Who is there who can intercede with him, except by his leave? He knows what is before them and what is behind them, while they comprehend nothing of his knowledge except as he wills. His throne extends over the heavens and the earth. Sustaining them does not burden him, for he is the Most High, the Supreme.” The depth of Muslim devotion to Allah is apparent virtually everywhere in Islamic life, including even the use of elaborate calligraphic renditions of the word as architectural and artistic ornamentation.

See also Asnam; Qur’an; Shirk.

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Daniel C. Peterson

ALMORAVIDS See Moravids

AMERICAN CULTURE AND ISLAM

The interface between American culture and Islamic culture in the American Muslim community is a multifaceted issue. Understanding this interface entails exploring the influence of American culture on the Muslim community and how American Muslims view American culture. Another aspect of this interface is the influence of Muslims and Islamic culture on American culture and the American public’s perception of Muslims and Islam.

The Muslim community itself is multilayered. A sizable portion of the Muslim community consists of those who do not attend a mosque, associate with other Muslim organizations, and do not practice Islam. This group has little interest in maintaining Islamic culture and, therefore, they are the most willing to assimilate into American culture. For many of them, their identity as American is paramount. This article does not focus on this group, but instead focuses on those Muslims who identify and associate with Muslim groups.

The Muslims who do associate with mosques and Muslim organizations are composed of immigrants (the majority being first generation), the children of immigrants (largely second generation) and converts (largely African American with significant numbers of Caucasian and Hispanic Americans). The dynamics of the interface of American and Islamic culture in these groups differ. First-generation immigrants bring to America a set of customs shaped by the Muslim world, and these customs are affected by the American environment. Converts, already acculturated when they adopt Islam, modify their American culture to fit into the new environment of Islam. The children of immigrants, raised in America, are acculturated to two cultures and they must decide how each one fits.

American Culture’s Impact on Muslims

In the early decades of the Muslim presence in America (1920–1970), Muslim immigrant groups, possibly pressured by the dominant paradigm of the melting pot, allowed for the inclusion of many American cultural practices (e.g. dancing the twist in the youth associations and Saturday night bingo in the mosque). Also, converts to the major heterodoxical Islamic groups, such as the Nation of Islam and the Moorish Science Temple, mixed freely Islamic and American practices (e.g. chairs in the mosque, hymns, and fasting during Christmas).

All of that changed beginning in the 1970s when large waves of newly-arrived, Islamically self-confident immigrants opposed the earlier immigrants’s “Americanized” mosques, and convert groups began trying to incorporate “authentic” Islam into their practice. The new paradigm of ethnic pride and multiculturalism gave greater acceptance and legitimacy to the “foreignness” of Muslim practice, and the new powerful trend of Islamic revivalism gave motivation to Muslims to retain their Islamic practice. The overtly American cultural practices disappeared in mosques and Muslim organizations.

Thirty years later, the Muslim community has aged and mellowed, and a new consensus is emerging that American Muslims should adhere to those aspects of Islam that are truly Islamic as opposed to old-world cultural practices, and then allow the adaptation of those aspects of American culture that
are not contradictory to Islam. This is a new paradigm that guards against changes in core religious practices while welcoming the assimilation of certain American cultural practices. The idea is to be fully Muslim and American. Overall, the impact of American culture on the Muslim community has been significant but it has not touched basic Islamic practice. In other words, Saturday night bingo has not returned to the mosque, but pizza is the favorite food at mosque dinners.

The mosque. The greatest impact of the American environment on the Muslim community has been the transformation of the role of the mosque and the imam. Muslims have adopted a congregational model for the mosque as a self-governed community center, which is unlike the Muslim world where the mosque is simply a place of prayer, and the family and other institutions perform key cultural tasks. In America the mosque is a center for educating children, socialization, and major cultural events like marriages and funerals. For example, celebrating the major Muslim holidays in the Muslim world is largely tied to the extended family while in America the mosque is a center of activities with community dinners and festivals with games and gifts for children. American marriages are often events for the entire mosque community, as opposed to the extended family.

The role of the imam in America has likewise changed dramatically. In the Muslim world the imam is simply the prayer leader, but the imam in America serves more as a pastor—much of his time spent in counseling, administering the mosque, and serving as spokesman for the mosque to the wider community.

Marriage. Muslim marriage customs in America have changed but not significantly. One major shift is that the signing of the marriage contract is sometimes a public event and not a private family affair as in the Muslim world. The public signing event resembles an American wedding ceremony with some differences—the bride and groom sit and often face the congregation. Signing the contract and the traditional wedding banquet (Walima) in America often occur on the same occasion, which is not always the case in the Muslim world. Marriage gifts are often brought to the wedding banquet, which is the American custom, as opposed to the Muslim world where gifts are more often brought before the banquet.

Arranged marriages among Muslim immigrants are still common but in many cases the marriage is only half arranged: the son/daughter picks a mate and then informs the parents who begin the process of arranging the marriage. Muslim youth in America are certainly more involved in choosing a mate than their counterparts in the Muslim countries. One of the results is that interethnic marriages are slowly increasing. One of the persistent legal questions in the immigrant community occurs when the son or daughter desires to marry a good Muslim of another ethnic group, and the parents prohibit the marriage. More and more imams are taking the side of the youth and pressuring the parents to relent. The traditional dowry (mahr) in America is usually a very reasonable amount whereas in the Muslim world the dowry is often high because of its role in reinforcing status and class. For many individuals, especially those who do not have a family in America, Muslim matchmaking services are very popular. The matrimonial sections in Muslim magazines are widely used and Internet services, such as MuslimMatch.com and Zawaj.com, offer an array of services.

Gender. The issue of gender equity has become one of the most controversial issues in the Muslim community. About one-quarter of regular mosque participants in America are women, and in African American mosques over one-third of participants are women. These percentages are extremely low for Christian churches but in comparison to the Muslim world, where women have no role in the mosque, this is a significant difference. Women are most active in administering the weekend school and other social events. Two-thirds of mosques allow women to sit on their governing board, but

Muslim men leave a mosque in Washington, D.C. Muslims who associate with mosques are composed of immigrants, second-generation Americans, and converts to Islam. © Catherine Karno/CORBIS
Mosques in the United States have developed as self-governed community centers, providing sites for educating children, socialization, and major cultural events. This is unlike the mosque's role in the Muslim world it is simply a place for prayer. © G. JOHN RINARD/CORBIS

only one-half have had women sit on their board in the last five years. Many Muslim women, who are unhappy with the progress of American mosques, have moved outside the mosque to organize. On the local level, women have established numerous study groups. On the national level Muslim women's groups have been established, such as Muslim Women's League, North American Council for Muslim Women, and Muslim Women Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (KARAMA). Some Muslim organizations have become more inclusive of women: In 2000 the Islamic Society of North America elected for the first time a female vice president, and there are a significant number of Muslim student associations, dominated by second-generation immigrants, that have female presidents. The clear trend is that women’s involvement is growing.

Youth. Youth bear the greatest pressure to assimilate American culture, and as a result many immigrants and African Americans have ceased to practice Islam. The issue of the assimilation of Muslim youth is, therefore, a major problem in the eyes of most Muslims. The Muslim youth who have maintained their association with the Muslim community evince outward aspects of American culture such as dress, sports, food, and entertainment—Muslim youth groups have their own “Islamic” rap music, and comedy shows—but they have fit it all within the boundaries of Islam. Dancing is still not present in Muslim youth groups, except that Imam Warith Deen Muhammad's organization provides limited occasions where dancing is permitted. Imam Muhammad is the son and successor to Elijah Muhammad, founder of the Nation of Islam. In 1975, when Imam Muhammad took the reins of the Nation of Islam, he transformed the organization into a “mainstream” Islamic group. The organization has gone through many name changes, and the present name since 2002 is American Society of Muslims. It is the largest African American Muslim group.

The loser in all this is not so much Muslim religious practice but ethnic cultural practice. Many youth are shedding their ethnic identity but maintaining a Muslim identity that supercedes all other identities. Muslim youth are, therefore, less interested in how Islam is practiced back in their parents’s home countries and more interested in identifying a legitimate Islamic tradition that is scripturally based and relevant to life in America. Muslim youth best exemplify the new paradigm of retaining core Islamic practices while adopting American culture.

Holidays and patriotism. The Muslim community in America does not practice any of the American holidays as a group. Thanksgiving probably receives the most recognition from Muslims as a holiday. Christmas and Easter are tied closely to
Christianity and therefore unacceptable. The national holidays such as the Fourth of July and Memorial Day have not had any official recognition except in the American Society of Muslims under the leadership of Imam Muhammad. Patriotic symbols such as the flag and patriotic rhetoric are largely absent from mosques and Muslim gatherings, except again for Imam Muhammad's organization. However, this is slowly changing, especially after the terrorism attacks of 11 September 2001. Many national Muslim advocacy groups have extended Fourth of July greetings, and the Islamic Society of North America displayed American flags on their platform during their annual conference. Individual Muslims do observe some of these holidays: Some have family dinners with turkey on Thanksgiving and even fewer have Christmas trees and let their children trick-or-treat on Halloween.

**Muslim perception of American culture.** The vast majority of Muslims recognize the good of American culture—political and religious freedom, self-reliance, and business practices—but they are critical of aspects of American culture, especially the moral laxity in sexual mores, and alcohol and drug consumption. In one study over one-third (37%) of Muslims agreed that America is immoral, while over half (54%) disagreed. Mosque leaders are even more disturbed: 67 percent agree that America is immoral compared to 33 percent who disagree (Bagby).

The Muslim community is virtually unanimous in believing that Muslims should be involved in the civic and political life of America—93 percent of Muslims (Zogby) and 89 percent of mosque leaders (Bagby) agree that Muslims should be involved in politics. Isolation from American society is firmly rejected. Yet a large portion of American Muslims feel that Muslims are unwelcome in the public sphere: 57 percent of Muslims believe that the attitude of America toward Muslims is unfavorable since 11 September 2001 (Zogby); 56 percent of mosque leaders feel that American society is hostile to Islam (Bagby).

**Influences of Islam on American Culture**

Muslims and Islam are no longer invisible in America—they have been given recognition and, in some respects, acceptance by major shapers of culture.

**Presence of Islam.** President Ronald Reagan was one of the first U.S. presidents to mention mosques alongside churches and synagogues as part of the religious fabric of America. Mention of Muslims with the other religions is commonplace now, especially after President George W. Bush visited a mosque and pronounced Islam a religion of peace soon after the terrorism attacks of 11 September. *Iftar* (meal at the end of the fasting day) dinners at the White House during Ramadan have become regular occasions since the mid-1990s.

**Perception of Muslims in the media.** Movies have been less kind to Muslims and Islam. Ugly stereotyping of Muslims and Arabs in particular has a long history in Hollywood. Jack Shaheen has estimated that only 5 percent of movies that include Muslims or Arabs show a human image of them. Since the late 1970s the image has been that of terrorists—from *Black Sunday* (1977) to *Iron Eagles* (1986) to *The Siege* (1998). Nevertheless signs of change have appeared as some of the more positive images of Muslims and Islam in movies have appeared in the 1990s—*Robin Hood Prince of Thieves* (1991), *13th Warrior* (1999), and *Three Kings* (1999).

Negative stereotyping is reflected in the poor approval rating for Muslims in the American public, although significant changes have occurred since 11 September 2001. Before 11 September 2001 the public’s approval of Muslims hovered around 25 percent, but ironically with President George W. Bush’s strong endorsement of mainstream Islam, approval ratings shot up to a high of 47 percent in October 2001 but have since begun to dip (Waldman and Caldwell).

**Sufism.** The most popular Muslim poet in America is Rumi and with this popularity has come some appreciation for Sufism. Sufi groups starting with Hazrat Inayat Khan’s Sufi Order in the West in the early 1900s and more recently a group led by Shaykh Nazim al-Haqqani has had moderate success in attracting Americans, largely white. Although Sufi groups are a small percentage of the total Muslim population in America, their more positive image has translated into greater acceptance in certain circles of intellectuals and New Agers.

**African American community.** While Islam might have been invisible in Caucasian America, the impact of Islam on African American peoples has been substantial. The Nation of Islam (1930–1975), although a heterodoxical movement within Islam, still brought the idea of Islam to millions of African Americans. Malcolm X, who left the Nation of Islam to embrace a more mainstream understanding of Islam, is an icon in African-American history. The minister Louis Farrakhan, who resurrected the Nation of Islam in 1979, has maintained great popularity in the African-American community, especially among its youth. Imam W. Deen Muhammad has garnered much respect due to his interfaith efforts. In light of this history, Islam has signified black pride and militancy for African Americans.

Muslims have also played a key role in the 1990s effort to bring about a gang truce throughout the nation. Louis Farrakhan and Imam Jamil Al-Amin (former H. Rap Brown) were active in the gang summits that started in 1992 to broker a cease-fire between the rival gangs known as the Bloods and the Crips. The decline in gang violence through the 1990s can be linked to these gang truces.

**African American culture.** Islam has also impacted African American culture. One obvious manifestation is the adoption of Muslim names, undoubtedly an influence of the celebrities and sports figures who are Muslim or have Muslim parents—Muhammad Ali, Kareem Abdul Jabbar, Ahmad Rashad, Tupac...
From the 1970s to the present, the names Jamal, Kareem, Ali, and Rashad have become popular African American names. One of the top African American female names is now Aaliyah, obviously the result of the popularity of the singer by the same name.

Other cultural manifestations occur in the hats and garb of African Americans, especially when they want to express their black consciousness. Through the influence of the large number of Muslims in prisons, the impact of Islam might also be detected in popular African American culture in the baggy pants look and even in hugging among men, which is now a common form of greeting. The fact that major gangs call themselves “nations” can also be seen as an influence by the black nationalism of the Nation of Islam.

Hip-Hop. In entertainment Islam has had a tremendous impact on hip-hop culture. The ideology of the Nation of Islam and the Five Percenters, both heterodoxies within Islam, have had the greatest influence, but some rappers have been influenced by mainstream Muslim leaders such as Imam Muhammad and Imam Jamil Al-Amin. Public Enemy and Chuck D, Ice Cube, Queen Latifah, Big Daddy Kane, and Sister Souljah are just a few names that mention in their lyrics the Nation of Islam and the Five Percenters. Other rappers such as Mos Def, Q-Tip, Everlast, Styles of Beyond, Devine Styler, and Jurassic 5 have roots in the mainstream Muslim community. A few rap groups such as Native Deen market themselves exclusively to the Muslim community.

Communication. Muslim youth and certain Muslim groups have enthusiastically embraced the Internet. Major Web sites exist for news, information, books, and Islamic resources, such as IslamiCity.com, IslamOnline.com, Ummah.com, and SoundVision.com. Web sites of Muslim Student Associations are also numerous and full of useful information and resources. Muslims who are on the fringes of mosques and Muslim organizations are the most active in the use of the Web. Muslim women in particular have benefited immensely from the presence of a cyber-sisters community. Ideological groups are also quite active on the web. Many Muslims sometimes bemoan the proliferation of these sites and the emergence of the cyber mufti who have few links to the Muslim community. Many mosques, however, are far behind the curve—many do not have computers and others do not use them for communication.

See also Americas, Islam in the; Farrakhan, Louis; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Warith Deen; Nation of Islam.

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Ihsan Bagby

AMERICAS, ISLAM IN THE

The Islamic presence in pre-Columbian times is a point of contention, with some writers asserting that Arab and West African Muslims settled in the Americas between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries; others dispute these assertions, citing a lack of archaeological and other historical evidence.

The undisputed spread of Islam in the Americas started in the early sixteenth century with the arrival of a small number of Moriscos (Muslims forced to adopt Christianity who may have maintained their faith in secret) from Spain, and millions of enslaved West Africans. It is estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the twelve to fifteen million Africans deported through the Atlantic slave trade were Muslim. Their prayers, fasts, refusal of pork and alcohol, circumcision, collecting of zakat, mosques, Qur’anic schools, and importation of Qur’ans from Africa and Europe have been documented for countries as diverse as Peru, Brazil, the United States, Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, and Cuba. Manuscripts written in Arabic have been recovered in several countries, most notably in Bahia, Brazil, where Muslims from Nigeria led a series of revolts.
between 1807 and 1835. There is evidence that the African Muslims succeeded in converting both enslaved and free people to Islam, and accusations of Islamic proselytism among Native Americans surfaced in the sixteenth century. West Africans maintained Islam in America during four centuries of slavery, but could not transmit the religion to the generations who were born in the Americas. With the end of the international slave trade in the late 1860s, Islam disappeared as an overtly practiced religion among people of African descent. However, cultural and linguistic traces remain today.

In the nineteenth century, Islam emerged again in the Americas with the arrival of Asian and Arab Muslims. After the abolition of slavery in the British colonies in 1834, Muslim indentured laborers from India were introduced to Trinidad and Guyana, along with the much larger numbers of Hindus. Between 1890 and 1939 the Dutch brought indentured Muslim workers to Dutch Guiana (Surinam) from their colony in Indonesia. They now represent 75 percent of the Muslim population of Suriname, the country with the highest percentage of Muslims (about 25%) in the Americas.

By the end of the nineteenth century, religious and political unrest, along with economic transformations in the Ottoman Empire, led to the emigration of Syrians and Lebanese, who established themselves throughout North and South America. Among them was a minority of Muslim Lebanese and Syrians who migrated, concentrating their settlements in Brazil—which counts the largest Muslim population in Latin America—Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada. In South and Central America most were traders, while in Canada, the majority were farmers.

In the twentieth century new Muslim populations settled in the Americas. After World War I, a small number of followers of the Indian-founded Ahmadiyya sect settled in South America and the Caribbean; and Albanians and Yugoslavs migrated to the Canadian prairies. Palestinians started to arrive after 1948 and again, in successive waves, following the Middle Eastern wars of 1967 and 1973.

Today, Islam continues to spread throughout the Americas through the natural growth of the existing Muslim population, conversions, and continued immigration from Muslim nations. Statistics are unreliable, but there are an estimated 1.4 million Muslims living in Latin America and the Caribbean, 253,000 in Canada, and about 6 million in the United States.

See also American Culture and Islam; United States, Islam in the.

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Sylviane Anna Diouf

ANDALUS, AL-

Al-Andalus is the geographic term used to denote those areas of modern Spain that came under Muslim control in the Middle Ages. Today, the term (Spanish, Andalucía) refers to a particular territory located in southern Spain. Al-Andalus or Muslim Spain (both terms will be used interchangeably), with its famous mosques, irrigated gardens, developments in poetry, philosophy, and science, is often referred to as the cultural golden age of Islam. The actual Muslim presence there lasted 781 years (711–1492 C.E.) and its influence on everything from architecture to science is still palpable. For the sake of convenience, what follows is divided into three parts: history and main developments, cultural achievements, and the Jews of al-Andalus.

History and Main Developments
Prior to the arrival of the Muslims, Spain was under the control of the Visigoths, who maintained firm control of the region with the help of a rigid church hierarchy. In 711, Arab and Berber forces, under the leadership of Tariq b. Ziyad, defeated the Visigothic King Rodrigo at the River Barbate. The Arab armies tried to move as far as France but were eventually repelled in 732 by Charles Martel. During the first decades after 711, al-Andalus functioned as a frontier outpost with the Umayyad caliph in Damascus appointing its governor. Around the year 750, however, a dynastic struggle in the East led to change in rule from the Umayyads to the Abbasids. Significantly, in 756, an Umayyad prince by the name of `Abd al-Rahman I arrived in Spain. He was able to gain sufficient political support there, thereby creating an independent and sovereign state, referred to as the Marwanid dynasty, based in Cordoba.

The high point of the Marwanid dynasty occurred during the rule of Abd al-Rahman III, who reigned for fifty years (912–961). This coincided with a period of stability after he had subdued revolting factions and stopped the advances of the neighboring Christians—something his predecessors had been unable to accomplish. He was also responsible for the construction of the monumental royal city, Madinat al-Zahra’, just outside of Cordoba. Under his rule, Cordoba became a true cosmopolitan center, rivaling the great cities of the Islamic East and far surpassing the capitals of Western Europe. After the death of Abd al-Rahman III, the central caliphate gradually fragmented into a number of smaller kingdoms (tawā‘if, sing., ta‘if), ruled by various “party kings” (mulūk al-tawā‘if).
The history of al-Andalus in the eleventh–century is one of gradual diminishment as various Christian monarchs attempted to encroach upon the area held by the Muslims, an area that they felt compromised the national and religious unity of Spain. This reconquering (Spanish, Reconquista) became so vigorous that the various Muslim kingdoms had no choice but to seek help from the Almoravids, a dynasty based in North Africa. The result was that al-Andalus, for all intents and purposes, lost its independence, becoming little more than an annex of a government situated in North Africa.

In 1147, the puritanical Almohades, another dynasty based in North Africa, invaded Spain. This dynasty was determined to put an end to the religious laxity that they witnessed among the Andalusian intellectual and courtier classes. They demanded, inter alia, the conversion of all Christians and Jews to Islam. It was during this period that many Jews left Spain: the majority went north to Christian territories. According to some modern commentators, the Almohade invasion signaled the end of one of the most fascinating and eclectic eras of world history.

By the thirteenth century, al-Andalus was essentially comprised of Granada and its immediate environs. Here the Nasrid dynasty, with its royal palace in the al-Hamra’ (Alhambra), ruled as quasi-vassals of the Christian king. The Alhambra, with its open courts, fountains, and irrigated gardens, is today one of the best preserved medieval castles in Europe. In 1492, under the leadership of King Ferdinand of Aragon and Queen Isabella of Castile, the Reconquista was completed. All those who were not Christian (i.e., Muslims and Jews) were expelled from Spain.

Cultural Achievements
From a cultural and philosophical perspective, the achievements associated with the inhabitants of al-Andalus are unrivalled. The Marwanid capital, Cordoba, alone had over seventy libraries, which encouraged many great architects and scientists to settle there. The caliphs and rich patrons, in turn, established schools to translate classical philosophic and scientific texts into Arabic. Although the center at Cordoba gradually fragmented into a number of kingdoms, there nevertheless ensued a rich intellectual, cultural, and social landscape that was grounded on the notion of adab, the polite ideal of cultured living that developed in the courts of medieval Islam. The adab (pl., udaba’) was an individual defined by his social graces, literary tastes, and ingenuity in manipulating language.

One of the main developments within Andalusian literature was the muwashshah. The muwashshab, which seems to have originated in the ninth century, is a genre of stanzaic
poetry whose main body is composed in classical Arabic with its ending written in vernacular, often in the form of a quotation (kharja). The main themes were devoted to love, wine, and panegyric; eventually, this genre proved popular among Sufis (e.g., Ibn Arabi). The muwâshshâb was also a popular genre among non-Muslims, especially among Hebrew poets.

Al-Andalus is also associated with some of the most famous names of Islamic intellectual history. Unlike the great majority of philosophers in the Muslim East, the overarching concern of Andalusian Islamic thinkers was political science. Questions that they entertained were: What constitutes the perfect state? How can such a state be realized? What is the relationship between religion and the politics? And, what should the philosopher, who finds himself in an unjust state, do? Another important feature of Islamic philosophy in al-Andalus was an overwhelming interest in intellectual mysticism, which stressed that the true end of the individual was the contact (ittisâl) between the human intellect and the Divine Intellect.

Philosophy in al-Andalus reached a high-point with Ibn Bajja (d. 1139). His Tadbîr al-mutawahhid (Governance of the solitary) examines the fate of a lone individual who seeks truth in the midst of a city that is concerned primarily with financial gain and carnal pleasures. Such an individual must, according to Ibn Bajja, seek out other like-minded individuals and avoid discussing philosophy with non-philosophers. Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185) picks up this theme in his philosophical novel Hayy ibn Yaqzan. The goal of this work is to show that the unaided human intellect is capable of discovering Truth without the aid of divine revelation. Ibn Tufayl, according to tradition, was also responsible for encouraging the young Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) to write his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Within this context, Ibn Rushd wrote not one but three commentaries to virtually the entire Aristotelian corpus. These commentaries, in their Latin translations, were the staple of the European curriculum until relatively recently.

Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, was also a prominent feature of the intellectual and cultural life of al-Andalus. In fact, one of the most important Sufis, Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), was born in Murcia in southeastern Spain. After a mystical conversion as a teenager, he set out on a life of asceticism and wanderings. Ibn Arabi essentially interpreted the entire Islamic tradition (jurisprudence, the Qur’an, hadith, philosophy) through a mystical prism.

**The Jews of al-Andalus**

The culture of al-Andalus would also have a tremendous impact on non-Muslim communities living there. The _adab_ ideal (mentioned in the previous section) proved to be very attractive to the local population (both Jewish and Christian), who adopted the cosmopolitan ideals of Islamicate culture, including the use of Arabic. Within the history of Jewish civilization, al-Andalus (Hebrew, _ba-Sefarad_) holds a special place. Legend has it that the Jews not only welcomed, but also physically helped, the Muslims conquer the oppressive Visigoth rulers. The cooperativeness of the Jews and their ability to integrate into Andalusian Arab society subsequently created an environment in which Jews flourished. Arabic gradually replaced Aramaic as the language of communication among Jews: By adopting Arabic (although they would write it in Hebrew characters, and today this is called Judeo-Arabic), Jews inherited a rich cultural and scientific vocabulary. It was during the tenth century, for example, that Jews first began to write secular poetry (although written in Hebrew, it employed Arabic prosody, form, and style).

The names of famous Jews who lived in al-Andalus reads like a “who’s who” list of Jewish civilization. Shmuel ha-Nagid (993–1055), for example, became the prime minister (wazir) of Granada. His responsibilities included being in charge of the army (i.e., having control over Muslim soldiers), in effect becoming one of the most powerful Jews between Biblical times and the present day. His poetry recounting battles is among the most expressive of the tradition. The fact that a Jew could attain such a prominent position within Muslim society reveals much about Jewish-Muslim relations in Spain. Other famous Hebrew poets included Moshe ibn Ezra (d.1138) and Judah Halevi (d.1141), whose sacred poetry is still part of the Jewish liturgy. Al-Andalus was also the birthplace of the most famous Jewish philosopher: Moses Maimonides (d.1204), who attempted to show the compatibility between religion and philosophy by arguing that the former was based not on superstition, but rational principles.

In sum, al-Andalus was not only a region, but also represented a way of life that Muslims and Jews look back at with fondness. With its rich contributions to science, literature, architecture, and interfaith relations, al-Andalus played a prominent role in Islamic history.

See also European Culture and Islam; Judaism and Islam.

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Angels

The word “angel” appears frequently in the Qur’an, having entered the Arabic language (in pre-Islamic times) as a loan from Aramaic or Hebrew, possibly via Ethiopic, and so indicating Christian as well as Jewish cultural influences. In any case the word has always been accepted as an exact equivalent of the Greek ἄγγελος, angel or messenger, used in pre-Christian times to define the functions of certain “messengers of the gods” such as Hermes or Iris (the rainbow). The remarkable homogeneity of “Abrahamic” Jewish/Christian/Islamic angelology cannot convincingly be traced to a “Mosaic” source but derives very obviously from Zoroastrian influences on Judaism during the Babylonian Exile.

Despite the unanimity of the Qur’an, hadith, and sunna on the doctrine of belief in angels, a certain ambiguity arises when these beings are considered in both theology and metaphysics. How precisely does angelic nature situate itself between earth and heaven, between human and divine? It may be said that monotheism simply cannot do without a means of immanence, lest the gulf of God’s transcendence end by severing all possible relations between the two levels of reality. Put simply, the angels provide a third term, a metaphorical bridge or ladder between earth and heaven. Thus the Prophet spoke of each raindrop having its angel, and of the angels as messengers bearing God’s revelation to humans, and human prayers to God. The task of angelic theology consists in justifying this metaphysical “need” without detracting from God’s omnipotence and unity.

The standard Islamic angelology is based on both Qur’anic and extra-Qur’anic tradition; for instance “the Spirit” (al-ruh) is mentioned in the Qur’an, but is identified by tradition with Metatron, the Jewish angel “nearest to the Throne.” The angel of death is mentioned (Q. 32:12) but not named; tradition knows him as ‘Îaynîzra’îl (Jibrîl) (Gabriel) who will blow the trumpet at Resurrection, appears neither in the Qur’an nor hadith, but became very popular—and symbolically necessary to form a quaternity of great archangels, under the Spirit and above the countless ranks of the heavenly host. Munkar and Nakir, the angels who weigh or question the souls of the dead in their graves, are likewise absent from canonical sources but much discussed by established authorities and universally accepted by believers. The following might represent a traditional Islamic angelography:

From the soles of his feet to this head, Israfil, angel of the Day of Judgment, has hairs and tongues over which are stretched veils. He glorifies Allah with each tongue in a thousand languages, and Allah creates from his breath a million angels who glorify Him. Israfil looks each day and each night toward Hell, approaches without being seen, and weeps; he grows thin as a bowstring and weeps bitter tears. His trumpet or horn has the form of a beast’s horn and contains dwellings like the cells of a bee’s honeycomb; in these the souls of the dead repose.

Mika’il was created by God five thousand years after Israfil. He has hairs of saffron from his head to his feet, and his wings are of green topaz. On each hair he has a million faces and in each face a million eyes and tongues. Each tongue speaks a million languages and from each eye falls seventy thousand tears. These become the Kerubim who lean down over the rain and the flowers, the trees and fruit.

Jibrîl was created five hundred years after Mika’il. He has sixteen hundred wings and hair of saffron. The sun is between his eyes and each hair has the brightness of the moon and stars. Each day he enters the Ocean of Light 360 times. When he comes forth, a million drops fall from each wing to become angels who glorify God. When he appeared to the Prophet to reveal the Qur’an, his wings stretched from the East to the West. His feet were yellow, his wings green, and he wore a necklace of rubies or coral. His brow was light, his face luminous; his teeth were of a radiant brightness. Between his two eyes were written the words: “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God.”

The angel of death, ‘Îzra’îl, is veiled before the creatures of God with a million veils. His immensity is vaster than the heavens, and the East and West are between his hands like a dish on which all things have been set, or like a man who has been put between his hands that he might eat him, and he eats of him what he wishes; and thus the angel of death turns the world this way and that, just as men turn their money in their hands. He sits on a throne in the sixth heaven. He has four faces, one before him, one on his head, one behind him, and one beneath his feet. He has four wings, and his body is covered with innumerable eyes. When one of these eyes closes, a creature dies.

In part from Greek philosophy, especially neo-Platonism, Islamic tradition elaborated a cosmic angelology based on the celestial Spheres—as for instance in the many versions of the Prophet’s mir’âj or Night Ascension into the Heavens, where he learns the ritual of prayer from the angels in their ranks. He is at first carried by the Buraq, a strange hybrid of mule, angel, woman, peacock, and then accompanied by Jibrîl. Even this greatest angel, however, cannot accompany Muhammad to “the Lote Tree of the Farthest Limit” (that is, the beatific vision of theophany). This symbolizes the theological premise that angels, although more perfectly spiritual than humans, are in fact ontologically less central. God orders the
This Persian miniature depicts Adam among the angels. According to the Qur’an, God demands that the angels worship Adam, even though they are closer to the divine than Adam is. When the angel Iblis refuses to bow to Adam, Iblis falls from God’s grace and becomes Satan. © RéUNION DES MUSÉES NATIONAUX/ART RESOURCE, NY
angels to bow and worship Adam (in a legend probably adapted from the heretical Christian “Adam and Eve Books”) even though Adam is created of clay and the angels of light. The angel Iblis refuses to acknowledge the divine in the human, and thus falls from grace and becomes Satan. (The sufi al-Hallaj therefore praised Iblis as the only true monotheist!) As an angel Iblis should be “made of” light, but in some versions he is described as a great jinni and therefore of a fiery nature. The jinni constitute a different class of supernatural beings, also attested in the Qur’an; some of them were converted to true faith by Solomon or Muhammad himself.

‘Abd al-Karim al-Jili (a Sufi influenced by Ibn ‘Arabi) describes the angelic Spheres thus: The first heaven is that of the Moon. The Holy Spirit is here, “so that this heaven might have the same relation to earth as spirit to body.” Adam dwells here in silvery-white light. The second heaven is that of Mercury (identified with the Egyptian Hermes and the prophets Idris and Enoch). Here the angels of the arts and crafts reside bathed in a gray luminousness. The third heaven, that of Venus, is created from the imagination and is the locale of the World of Similitudes, the subtle forms of all earthly things, the source of dreams and visions. The prophet Joseph lives here in yellow light. The heaven of the Sun is created from the light of the heart; Israfil presides over a host of prophets in a golden glow. The heaven of Mars, of the death-angel ‘Iza’il, is blood-red with the light of judgment. That of Jupiter is blue with the light of spiritual power (bimna) and is lorded over by Mika’il. Here reside the angels of mercy and blessing, shaped as animals, birds, and men; others appear, in Jili’s words, “as substances and accidents which bring health to the sick, or as solids and liquids that supply created beings with food and drink. Some are made half of fire and half of ice. Here resides Moses, drunk on the wine of the revelation of lordship.” The seventh heaven (first to be created from the substance of the First Intelligence) is that of Saturn, and consists of Black Light, symbolic of fana’, annihilation in the divine Oneness.

The grandeur of this cosmic vision is given a metaphysical dimension by the Persian philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna) who, speaking of the angels, says, “The soul must grasp the beauty of the object that it loves; the image of that beauty increases the ardor of love; this ardor makes the soul look upward. Thus imagination of beauty causes ardor of love, love causes desire, and desire causes motion” on the level both of the Spheres (which are drawn in love toward their Archangel-Intellects) and of human souls (who are drawn in love toward their guardians or personal angels).

On the fringes of Islamic orthodoxy such mystical angelology shaded into occultism. Elaborate concordances of angelic correspondences, names, powers, symbols, and the like evolved out of the late classical synthesis (e.g., those described in the Egyptian Magical Papyri). Amulets were constructed, evocations and seances performed. Like their medieval and Renaissance counterparts in Europe, Islamic hermeticists sought and practiced the “angelic conversation.” At its highest level of sophistication this magical angelology aims at no benefit other than existential participation in the divine or angelic consciousness. “By philosophy man realizes the virtual characteristics of his race. He attains the form of humanity and progresses on the hierarchy of beings until in crossing the straight way (or ‘bridge’) and the correct path, he becomes an Angel” (Brethren of Purity [Risalat al-jami’ah]).

An artistic representation of Muhammad’s ascent to heaven appears in the volume one color plates.

See also Mi’raj; Religious Beliefs.

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Peter Lamborn Wilson

ARABIA, PRE-ISLAM

The term “Arabia” has been variously applied in both modern and ancient times to refer to a vast territory stretching from the borders of the Fertile Crescent in northern Syria to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula and from the borders of the Euphrates to the fertile regions of the Transjordan. For the ancients, this vague term, “Arabia,” referred to the dwelling places of the varieties of South Semitic speakers lumped together under the term “Arab.” For speakers of Hebrew and Aramaic, the term Arab (‘arab) carried the semantic notion of the desert or the wilderness (‘arabah), since the Arabs they encountered were primarily the nomadic and seminomadic desert dwellers engaged in long-distance commerce, animal husbandry, or supplying cavalry troops to imperial armies. The result is that ancient textual references to Arabia and its inhabitants, the Arabs, are both inconsistent and imprecise in terms of geographic boundaries, ethnic identity, and language use. The meager textual evidence available to us shows us that many of the northern Arabs used Aramaic and Hebrew as well as varieties of Arabic in pre-Islamic times. After the rise of Islam, however, the Arabic of northwest Arabia, the region of the Hijaz, became the dominant language of the Arabs, and it, along with its cognate dialects, formed the Arabic known today.
The geography and natural ecology of the Arabian peninsula has affected both the culture and the history of Arabia. It is bounded in the north by a desert of soft sand, the Nafud, as well as a desert in the south, the Rub‘ al-Khali, the so-called Empty Quarter. Both the Red Sea on the west and the Gulf on the east are barriers to entry with few natural ports. There are no permanent water-courses in Arabia and only scattered oases in the interior. The ancient geographers used the term natura maliına for Arabia, and even when using Arabia Felix, “Happy Arabia,” for the south, they intended some irony. Its average rainfall is less than three inches per year, and much of that falls within a period of just four or five days. Because of the forbidding landscape and the harsh climate, for much of Arabia’s history, it resisted successful invasion. Such harsh conditions, however, have provided refuge for those fleeing persecution and those seeking the economic opportunities of long-distance trading. Trade was assisted because Arabia was the home of the domestication of the West Asiatic camel, the dromedary, and the invention, around the beginning of the first millennium C.E., of the North Arabian camel saddle, which enabled camels to be used for cavalry warfare as well as for transporting trade goods.

**History**

Historical knowledge of Arabia goes back to the Greek historian Herodotus, to a few Akkadian texts, and to the Bible, but sound historical records only come from the period of Roman domination of the eastern Mediterranean. Much legendary material has influenced the writings of the early history of Arabia, particularly the biblical legends, which hold that the Amelikites were the first “Arabs.” This legend is adopted by Arabs themselves, who link themselves to the Israelite soldiers who annihilated the Amelikites and settled in the Hijaz in their stead. R. Dozy and D. S. Margoliouth elaborated a secularized version of the biblical legends to make Arabia the Semitic prototypical home and Arabic the prototypical Semitic language. Associated with this theory is the so-called desiccation theory of Arabia, which holds that Arabia was lush and verdant in prehistorical times, only becoming dry later, driving out the Semitic inhabitants into the Mediterranean basin. While modern geological exploration of Arabia has substantiated a shift in climate in the peninsula from more wet toward dry, there is no evidence to substantiate any of the theories that Arabia was the original home of the Semites or that all Semitic languages derive from Arabic.

According to a report that combines inscriptive evidence and legend, Arabia was the temporary capital of Nabonidus (556–539 B.C.E.), the last ruler of Babylon. In the third year of his reign, he invaded the Hijaz as far as Yathrib (Medina), and dominated the famous Arabian caravan cities in the northwest quadrant. Some scholars see his motives as economic, while others dismiss the historicity of the whole event as part of a Jewish midrashic invention.

**Inhabitants**

Among the important pre-Islamic peoples of Northwest Arabia were the Nabataeans, who, by the time of the arrival of Roman imperial presence in the eastern Mediterranean, dominated the region’s trade from around Damascus to the Hijaz. They had been pastoral nomads who had settled in their heartland around Petra. The Nabataeans plied their trade through the areas of Transjordan, across the Wadi ‘Arabah to Gaza and al-‘Arish (Rhinocolura). There is also evidence that they used the interior route of the Wadi Sirhan to carry goods to Bostra for distribution to Damascus and beyond. Nabataean wealth and influence attracted the Romans into an unsuccessful invasion of Arabia in 26 B.C.E. under the leadership of Caesar Augustus’s Egyptian prefect, Aelius Gallus. The Nabataeans were able to resist Roman domination until 106 C.E., when Arabia Nabataea became a Roman province. In later history, the name “Nabataean” became identified with irrigation and agriculture, because the Nabataeans are credited with the development of hydraulic technology in the region. In modern Arabic, “Nabataean” (nabati) refers to vernacular poetry in the ancient style.

Most modern historians regard the Nabataeans as Arabs, but the picture is more complex and illustrative of the problems of ethnic identification in the pre-Islamic period. The Nabataeans were philhellenes, using Greek art and culture,
and Aretas III issued coins with Greek legends after 82 B.C.E. They used a form of Arabic as their language for trade within the Arabian peninsula, writing it down in a modified Aramaic script that influenced the development of the North Arabian alphabetic script. They acted as a culture-bridge between the Arabian interior and the Roman Hellenized Mediterranean, and, depending on who was reporting, they could present a different face to different peoples, Greek, Aramaic, or Arabic.

Jews had been inhabitants of Arabia from biblical times, but the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E. sent larger numbers into Arabia. Around this time the apostle Paul spent time in Arabia after his conversion to Christianity, possibly to recruit converts, as did another Pharisee, Rabbi Akiba, who went to Arabia to obtain support for Simon Bar Kochba in the Second Roman War in 132 C.E. Some Jews formed independent communities in Arabia, such as the small enclaves of priests, who kept themselves isolated to avoid ritual contamination so that they would be ready under Levitical strictures to resume their duties if the Temple should be rebuilt. Most, however, seem to have joined existing communities comprised of Jews and non-Jews along the trade routes stretching from the Hijaz to Yemen. The most prominent of these settlements was the city of Yathrib, known in both Aramaic and Arabic as Medina.

**Roman Arabia**

By 106 C.E., the Romans dominated most of the former territories of the Nabataeans and the adjacent Syrian cities of Gerasa and Philadelphia (modern Jarash and Amman in Jordan), creating a province through the formal annexation of the Nabataean kingdom under the Roman emperor Trajan. This province, known as *Provincia Arabia*, was bounded by the western coast of the Sinai Peninsula, the present Syrian-Lebanese border to a line south of Damascus, and the eastern coast of the Red Sea as far as Egra (*Mada'in Salih* in the Hijaz). Gaza prospered as a major seaport and outlet for the province’s commerce. This trade continued under Roman domination, and the borders were fortified by semipermeable lines of fortifications and client states. Under the Romans, Bostra (Bozrah; now Busra ash-Sham) in the north became the capital around a legionary camp. Petra remained a religious center until the penetration of Christianity in the area. The construction of a highway, the *Via Traiana Nova*, linking Damascus, via Bostra, Gerasa, Philadelphia, and Petra, to Aelana on the Gulf of Aqaba, set the border of Arabia (*Limes Arabicus*) along the lines of an ancient biblical route. Paved by Claudius Severus, the first governor of *Provincia Arabia* in about 114 C.E., it improved communication and established a modicum of control over the influx of pastoral nomads into settled territory. More importantly, the road insured the increase in prosperity of the cities along the route.

At the end of the third century, the Roman emperor Diocletian divided Arabia into a northern province, enlarged by the Palestinian regions of Auranitis and Trachonitis, with Bostra as the capital, and a southern province, with Petra as capital. The southern province, united to Palestine by the emperor Constantine I “the Great,” became known as Palaestina Salutaris (or Tertia) when detached again in 357 and 358 C.E. The cities of both provinces enjoyed a marked revival of prosperity in the fifth and sixth centuries and fell into decay only after the Arab conquest after 632 C.E.

During the period in which the Judaean Desert finds were deposited in the caves, the area containing the discovery sites remained off the main conduits of trade and communication, and it is their remoteness that, for the most part, provided their value as retreats from the demands of the central settled world. The practice of using the Judaean Desert caves as *genizot*, religious treasuries, continued from the time of the Roman Wars through as late as the eleventh century C.E. The presence of Byzantine Greek and Arabic texts indicates that the local populations both knew of the existence of the caves and made use of them as depositories for important documents. This fact has had important implications in discussions about the presence of copies of the “Damascus Covenant” found in the Cairo Genizah. None of the texts found at the Judaean Desert discovery sites mentions *Provincia Arabia* or other geographic terms associated with Arabia. The texts, particularly the texts from the Byzantine and Islamic periods, indicate that the inhabitants of the region, who deposited the finds, were well connected not only with Palestine but also with Egypt and the larger world of the Mediterranean.
South Arabia

The southern portion of Arabia, known generically as the Yemen, had ancient connections with Africa, India, and the Far East, as well as the Mediterranean. It was culturally and linguistically connected with the Horn of Africa. Among the theories of the Arabian origin of the Semites, some have cited the presence of speakers of a Semitic language unlike Arabic in Yemeni highlands. Additionally, the relationship between South Arabian and Ethiopian languages points to continuous contacts between the two areas. Attempts, however, to devise a comprehensive ethnographic categorization of the inhabitants of Arabia have so far failed. This is in part due to problems with categorization itself (what is a Semite, for example) and in part due to the paucity of evidence. Relying on Arabian histories and indigenous theories of ethnography are problematic, because all were written after the rise of Islam, which advances the religious notions of the family relationship among all Arabs and promotes the elaboration of the explanation of that relationship through genealogy. The so-called Table of Nations from Genesis 10 was invoked by early Islamic scholars, and the figures of Joktan, Hazarmaveth, and Sheba are identified with Qahtan, Hadramawt, and the Sabaeans.

An increasing amount of archaeological and inscriptive evidence support the meager and legendary historical material surrounding the histories and influence of at least four major kingdoms in southern Arabia, the Sabaeans, or kingdom of Sheba; the Minaeans; the kingdom of Qataban; and the kingdom of Hadramawt. These kingdoms were supported by a combination of trade and agriculture. Elaborate aqueducts, dams, and terracing helped sustain these kingdoms as well as giving evidence of their ability to marshal considerable resources for their construction and maintenance. We do not know the reasons for the demise of these kingdoms. The Qur’an (3:15–16) attributes the breaking of the dam at Ma’rib in the kingdom of the Sabaeans as divine retribution for their sins. Secular theories attribute the demise of organized agriculture in the southern region to the combined factors of the repeated breaking of dams and waterworks and the rise of influence of Ethiopia in southern Arabia.

It is probably from the time of the breaking of the Ma’rib dam that some southern Arabian tribes migrated north, intermixing with the Arabs of the Hijaz in many places, including the city of Yathrib/Medina. This migration may also be linked with increasing economic opportunities in the northern part of Arabia resulting from the domestication of the camel, the invention of the North Arabian camel saddle, and the increasing use of camel cavalry forces in the armies of the Roman and Persian empires.

Premodern Arabia possessed little arable land, but southern Arabia was the habitat for frankincense and myrrh, the aromatic resins from conifers found in Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Because southern Arabia was the home of those much-sought-after aromatics and the trans-shipment point for Asian and African trade goods, including slaves, it was a much-desired location for colonies and extensions of empires. These products were sought as luxury trade-goods from as early as Old Kingdom Egypt, when this was known as the land of Punt. They were used for funerary and liturgical ceremonies, often in large quantities. The use of frankincense is attested in the biblical offerings mentioned in Leviticus 2:14–16 and 24:7, and also in the Talmud as a medicine and a painkiller. In Christian liturgy, incense was an important part of the celebration of the mass. Trade in aromatics, gold, and luxury items from Africa and India made the west coast of Arabia the conduit to the Mediterranean and linked southern Arabia with the settled areas of Syria.

Knowledge of Persian interest in Arabia begins with Darius I (r. 521–485 B.C.E.). He sent an exploratory expedition from India to the Red Sea, probably to increase trade. Greek interest was stimulated first by Alexander the Great and Nearchus of Crete, but Alexander died in 328 B.C.E., just before executing plans to conquer the peninsula. This interest prompted the Greek naturalist and philosopher Theophrastus (c. 372–287 B.C.E.) to describe South Arabia, providing one of the earliest historical accounts. The Ptolemies of Egypt, successors to Alexander’s rule, pursued ambitions in the Red Sea. The Syrian Seleucids promoted the use of the northern routes to India, probably in an attempt to diminish Egyptian and Arab domination of eastern luxury goods. The establishment of the Parthian state in the mid-third century B.C.E. weakened the Seleucids, but Antiochus III was still strong enough to conduct an expedition in 204 and 205 against Gerrha on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf.

In the second and first centuries B.C.E., major changes took place in the economy and power of the southern kingdoms of Arabia. The Mediterranean world learned the secret of the use of the monsoon trade winds to navigate to India, and mountain tribes began invading the settled kingdoms. By the end of the first century B.C.E., the Sabean kingdom was under the rule of the tribe of Hamdan, and the kingdoms of Ma’in and Qataban were destroyed. Roman attempts to conquer Arabia Felix failed, but Rome’s influence was extended first through the Nabataeans and later through Egyptian and Ethiopic Christianity.

Sometime around 50 C.E., an anonymous author wrote the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, an account in Greek of the ethnography and trade in the Red Sea. In the middle of the second century C.E., the geographer Claudius Ptolemy (fl. 127–151 C.E.) wrote a detailed description of Arabia from the perspective of Roman interests in the region. While some scholars identify some sites mentioned by Ptolemy with modern Arabian cities, like Macoraba as Mecca and Yathrippa as Yathrib/Medina, others discount this identification and claim that knowledge of ancient Arabia cannot be derived.
from from the Greco-Roman sources. In the case of the identification of Yathrippa as Yathrib, there is inscriptional support, however, from a Minaean inscription, where Yathrib is found. The general picture from these sources is that an active culture of trade and agriculture linked Arabia with Africa, South Asia, and the East Mediterranean world.

Arabia Between Two Empires
By the middle of the third century C.E., religious and political competition between the Roman empire and the new Persian Sassanian empire had intensified with Arabia as one of the centers of the conflict. Both sides were intent on political and economic domination through conversion. For the Romans, that meant Christianity, and sometime around 213 C.E., Origen visited Arabia, probably at Petra, to bring that area into religious and political orthodoxy. In 244 C.E., M. Julius Philippus, known as Philip the Arab, acceded to the Roman imperial throne, and there is strong evidence that he was a Christian. His predecessor, Gordianus III, had defeated the second Sassanian emperor, Shapur I (r. 241–272 C.E.), and, although he concluded a peace with the Persians, continued attempts to control Arabia. The Persians, whose official religion was the nonproselytizing Zoroastrianism, used Nestorian Christian and Jewish missionaries as their agents in Arabia.

Knowledge of Arabian history from the fourth through the beginning of the sixth centuries is meager because of the lack of written sources. In part, this is due to the decline of the urban centers in Arabia. While Arabia was no less strategically important to the two empires during this period, the creation of the buffer-states of the Lakhmids on the Sassanian side and the Ghassanids on the Roman/Byzantine side provided both empires indirect means of controlling the flow of goods and traffic into the settled areas. Because the buffer states were a main source of camel cavalry, some scholars have noted a process of Bedouinization corresponding to the decline of urban areas in this period as it became more profitable to raise and sell camels. The Ghassanids and the Lakhmids mirrored their sponsor-states by engaging in warfare, even when Rome and Persia were ostensibly at peace.

In the sixth century C.E., conflicts again arose, this time through the agency of the Persian-sponsored Jewish state in the Yemen under Yusuf Dhu Nuwas and Byzantium’s Monophysite ally, the kingdom of Aksum. When Dhu Nuwas attempted to return Najran to his control, he met resistance from armed Christian missionaries, whom he defeated. With Byzantine naval support, the Aksumites invaded Arabia, defeated Dhu Nuwas, and established an Abyssinian-ruled client state. Its ruler, Abraha, rebuilt the Ma’rib dam erected a cathedral in San’a’, and attempted to conquer Mecca. His defeat, traditionally in 570 C.E. and recorded in Qur’an 105, coupled with an invasion of the Yemen by the Sassanian ruler Khusrav I Anushirwan (r. 531–579 C.E.), drove the Abyssinians from Arabia. The southern portion of Arabia remained under Persian control until the rise of Islam.

Religions
Shortly before the birth of Muhammad in 570 C.E., Mecca and its environs in the Hijaz rose to historical prominence. In part, this view is in retrospect from the vantage of knowing that Islam came from there, but it is also in part because the dominant Meccan tribe seems to have been able to amass some political and economic hold over the region. The tribe of Qureish, whose name possibly means “dugong,” was likely a group of Arabs involved in the Red Sea trade and moved inland with the decline of Roman authority in that sea. Their rule was both economic and theocratic. Their major shrine was the Ka’ba at Mecca, one of several such Ka’ba in Arabia at the time. They managed to import the worship of many local Arabian deities to Mecca, so that polytheism under the Qureish became a kind of federal cult.

It is difficult to speak with any precision about the native polytheism of the Arabs, because almost all of what is known comes through hostile Islamic sources. Allah was worshipped as a creator deity and a “high god,” but the everyday cult seems to have been dominated by several astral deities, ancestors, and chthonic spirits, such as the jinn. Animal sacrifices seem to have been used to propitiate the more than three hundred deities mentioned by early Muslim historians. Circumambulation of the Ka’ba and other cultic objects was also a usual practice, often during “sacred” months of pilgrimage to religious sites. Little is known of the theological or moral nature of pre-Islamic polytheism in Arabia, and the Muslim critique of the pre-Islamic period portrays it as devoid of all redeeming features. From the scanty evidence available, the cult promoted loyalty to family, clan, and tribe, a sentiment that Arabs carried over into the Islamic period as Islam was characterized as a “super-tribe” uniting all Arabs under one common genealogy.

While Christianity was present from an early period in Arabia, and there is evidence of the political connections and dimensions of Arabian Christians to their coreligionists in the surrounding countries, little is known of Arabian Christian beliefs and practices except through Islamic sources. Qur’anic evidence indicates that, while the full range of Gospel narratives is not represented, the Qur’an represents particularly the Gospel of Luke quite accurately and with close readings. Recent scholarship in this area is challenging the earlier notions that the Qur’an portrayed only a heterodox form of Christianity and is pointing to a more mainstream pre-Islamic Christianity, albeit divided among the various Christological heresies of the day.

As seen from the above survey of Arabian history, religion among the pre-Islamic Arabs was closely tied to the political ambitions of several foreign powers that wished to dominate Arabia. At the time of the rise of Islam, converting to one of
the varieties of Judaism or Christianity in Arabia meant choosing not only a religion but also a political and social agenda dominated by a foreign power.

**Literary Legacy**

One of the major legacies of pre-Islamic Arabian culture to later Arab and Islamic culture was the development of the poetic and formal language often termed “classical” Arabic. In the century or century and a half before the birth of Muhammad in 570 C.E., the Arab tribes in the Hijaz developed a literary form of Arabic that stood alongside the various dialects. This was a composite, formal language with a highly inflected grammatical system. It also had a flexible system for generating new vocabulary based on extensive use of the Arabic verbal root system that allowed for easy adoption of new terms and concepts within the language itself. It was also open to the adoption of terms from the surrounding languages of Hebrew, Aramaic, Latin, Ethiopic, among others. As a “meta-language” it undoubtedly reflected the growing political expansion of the Qurish and their economic unification of the Hijaz, but it also seems to have grown from the common experiences of local religious practices, Bedouin travel songs, and the panegyrics of the courts of the Arab dynasties along the borders of the Roman and Persian empires.

There is also speculation that this language was used for formal prose in treaties, formal agreements, and in writing Jewish and Christian scripture, but, as mentioned above, there is little evidence of biblical translations into Arabic in the pre-Islamic period. Instead, there is more evidence that Jews and Christians had their own “dialects” of Arabic, with added vocabulary from the Jewish and Christian languages of the eastern Mediterranean. These dialects likely served as the conduits for much of the foreign religious vocabulary that found its way into Arabic.

The poetry that has survived from the pre-Islamic period was transmitted orally and only transcribed in the Islamic period. It was composed by a poet to be preserved and recited by a reciter, a rawi, who may also have been a poet or an apprentice. In this poetry, each poetic line had independent meaning, and the entire poem was comprised of thematic sections, which concentrated on travel, love, praise, and so on. The most famous of these “odes,” termed qasidas, are
known as the Mu'allaqat, or “suspended odes.” Various stories are given to explain the name, but the writers of these poems became known as the masters of Arabic poetic composition, and their style of poetry so influential that later Islamic poetry in Persian and other Islamic languages as well as Arabic survived until modern times.

The style of poetry known as sa'ī, rhymed prose, was another influential poetic form, apparently used by seers and holy men for prognosticative pronouncements. This form of poetic language is found in many places in the Qur'an, giving rise to the accusation that Muhammad was a poet or mantie seer.

A photo of an alabaster relief of a camel and its rider appears in the volume one color plates.

See also Arabic Language; Arabic Literature; Asabiyya; Empires: Sassanian; Muhammad.

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ARABIC LANGUAGE

A people with the name of Arabia is first mentioned in a cuneiform inscription from the eighth century B.C.E., where it denotes a nomadic tribe. In later centuries tribes named ‘rb are mentioned in several sources, for instance in the Torah (Jeremiah 25:24). It is not known what kind of language these people spoke but it is clear that they had some connection with the North Arabian desert, even though they did not dwell in the Arabian Peninsula itself. Probably their language belonged to the continuum of Semitic languages that was spoken all over the Middle East and that included Aramaic, Hebrew, Canaanite, and others.

The full penetration of the Arabian Peninsula dates from a later period. In the southern part of the peninsula the South Arabian kingdoms such as those of the Mineans and the Sabaean flourished from the thirteenth century B.C.E. onward. Their language was South Arabian, a language related to the Ethiopian languages. They had domesticated the camel, which was used for carrying loads but not yet as a riding animal. The South Arabs maintained frequent trade relations with the Middle East, usually by the sea route, and through these contacts the camel was introduced in the north as well. Around the beginning of the common era when a riding saddle was developed for the camel, it became possible to penetrate the desert and even live there permanently. Presumably, some of the tribes that wandered in the border area between sedentary land and the desert fringe eventually made the shift to a nomadic life in the desert and thus developed what may be called a Bedouin society.

In the northern part of the peninsula thousands of (usually short) inscriptions attest to the presence of a language that was very much akin to the Arabic language as it is known today. This language was characterized by the form of the article, b- or bn-, as distinct from the Arabic article al-, but related to the Hebrew form ba-. This language type is usually called Early North Arabic; it was divided into several varieties such as Thamudean and Libyanitic. The first inscription in a language that may be recognized as Arabic is the inscription from al-Namara in Syria (328 C.E.) erected by Imru’ al-Qays who calls himself “King of the Arabs.” The language shows some similarities with the South Arabian of the South Arabian kingdoms, while at the same time preserving the traces of its relatedness to the Northwest Semitic languages.

Around the fifth century Arabic-speaking tribes lived in large parts of the Arabian peninsula as well as in the areas to the north of the peninsula as far as the Syrian desert and the Sinai; some of them even settled in sedentary areas such as the city of Aleppo. These tribes were Christians. The Bedouin tribes in the peninsula were polytheists. They greatly increased their influence when they took over the caravan trade from the South Arabian kingdoms and settled themselves as middlemen in places like Mecca.

The al-Namara inscription is written in a language with a declensional system, similar to the language of the pre-Islamic poems. It was in this language that the Qur’an was revealed. According to the indigenous tradition all tribes at the eve of Islam used this language as their vernacular language, although later grammarians document a number of differences between the varieties of the various tribes (lagbat). Thus, for instance, the eastern tribes are said to have used a phoneme /h/ (hameza), which was absent in the dialect of the western tribes, but present in the language of poetry and the Qur’an. According to others the vernacular language of the tribes had already shifted to a different type of language, in which, for instance, case-endings had disappeared. In this view, the language of poetry and the Qur’an was a literary language that was no longer used as a spoken language but served as a kind of supra-tribal variety, based on the language of the eastern tribes (sometimes called poetico-Qur’anic koine).

The Spread of the Arabic Language

After the death of the prophet Muhammad the Islamic conquests brought the religion and the language of the Arab tribes into a large area stretching from Islamic Spain to Central Asia. The languages originally spoken in this area (Coptic, Persian, Syriac, Berber) gave way to the linguistic onslaught of Arabic, and even though some of the speakers remained bilingual, the entire area was Arabized within a century. The Arabic as spoken by the inhabitants of this vast empire differed considerably from the language of the Qur’an, especially in the sedentary centers that were established in the early years of the conquest, such as Basra, Kufa, Fustat, and Kairouan. There was a reduction of the phonemic inventory (loss of interdental, merger of the phonemes dad and za’), loss of case-endings and modal endings, reduction of grammatical categories, and emergence of a genitive exponent and aspirant particles. Syntactically speaking, the language had shifted from a synthetic to an analytic type, usually called New Arabic.

There are many theories about the reasons for this change, which affected all domains of grammar. Those who believe that even before Islam the vernacular language of the Bedouin already exhibited some New Arabic changes tend to minimize the role of the new learners of the language. They
believe the various vernaculars of the Bedouin were homogenized when members from different tribes were thrown together in the conquering armies. As a result, the vernacular varieties that emerged after the conquests became very different from the language of the Qur’an. Others look for the cause of the linguistic changes in the languages spoken by the inhabitants of the conquered territories. According to them, this substratal influence affected the structure of New Arabic by carrying over features of languages such as Coptic, Persian, Syriac, and Berber to the Arabic language, as spoken by its new speakers. Yet another factor to be taken into account is the process of language acquisition itself. In every language-learning process in an informal setting the native speakers tend to simplify their language and the new learners apply universal strategies of simplification to this input. The result is a drastic reduction of the phonemic inventory and of grammatical categories, a general disappearance of redundancy, and a restructuring of the language.

Whatever the causes of the linguistic changes, there can be no doubt that very early on in the conquests there was a marked difference between the language of the religious and literary heritage on one hand, and the colloquial speech of the Arab empire on the other. According to the classic description of this situation by Ibn Khaldun, the scholars of Arabic became concerned about this corruption of speech and started to codify the language in their grammar books lest the language of the holy scriptures become incomprehensible for later generations.

The original conquest was just the first stage in the Arabization process since it reached only the sedentary areas, in particular the new garrison towns established by the Arab armies. Later centuries brought successive waves of Bedouin migrants to the conquered territories. These were responsible for the Arabization of much larger areas. In some cases they re-Bedouinized the sedentary dialects of the cities. In Baghdad, for instance, the dialect of the Muslims became Bedouinized while the Christians and Jews retained the original sedentary dialect. In North Africa the second wave of migration is associated with the invasion of the Bedouin tribes of the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym in the tenth and eleventh centuries C.E., which brought Arabic to large parts of the countryside.

There is no consensus about the language these Bedouin spoke. Those who maintain that the vernacular of the Bedouin tribes in the pre-Islamic period had already changed in the direction of New Arabic believe that there was not much difference between the dialects of the first and the second invasion. Others believe that the Bedouin tribes continued to speak a type of Arabic that was basically identical with the
Arabic Language

pre-Islamic Arabic of poetry and Qur’an. In this view, the Bedouin did not lose their speech until the fourth century of the Hijra (Islamic calendar). This is corroborated by the grammarians who explain that the Bedouin dialects became corrupted through exposure to the sedentary way of speaking.

**Arabic in Islamic Society**

At the beginning of Islam, Arabic became the language of both private and public life in the Arab empire. During a transitional period the indigenous languages remained in use, for instance in Egypt where Greek and Coptic were used for administrative purposes along with Arabic. But at the end of the first century of the Hijra, Arabic was firmly established as the official language of the empire. The languages that used to be spoken in the conquered territories disappeared or remained in use in a restricted domain only, such as Coptic and Syriac. In the Arab West, Berber remained in use in the countryside and has indeed never been replaced completely by Arabic until the present day.

The codification of standard Arabic by the grammarians started during the second century of Islam, but even before that there must have existed some kind of norm in writing, possibly connected with the emergence of an epistolary style in the chancelleries. The earliest Arabic documents, the Egyptian papyri from the first century of the Hijra, already contain “mistakes” that show the existence of a standard as target in writing. Such mistakes are very common and with the growth of literacy they became even more frequent. In modern linguistic terminology texts containing deviations from the grammatical norms of the standard language are usually called “Middle Arabic.” This term does not denote a well-defined variety of the language but is used as a general label for all nonstandard texts. Some of the mistakes reflect the vernacular language, for instance, when people write *la yaktubu* “they do not write” rather than the more formal *la yaktubuna*, but very often one encounters pseudo-corrections, when people in their attempt to write standard Arabic overstep their target, for instance when they write *lam yaktubuna* “they did not write” instead of *lam yaktubu*. The introduction of vernacular features in written language could also serve to create a humorous effect. This occurs particularly in literature aiming at a popular audience, such as the stories in the *Arabian Nights* or in dialect poetry.

The acceptance of deviations from the norms was particularly strong in non-Muslim circles. Jewish and Christian writers, who did not have the same attachment to the language of the Qur’an, felt free to use a more popular kind of language. Thus we find Jewish writers using certain vernacular constructions when writing to fellow Jews, but studiously avoiding these when writing for a more general Muslim audience. One might even say that this kind of Arabic became an in-group language with a special status. This Judaeo-Arabic was written in Hebrew characters and contained a large number of Hebrew loanwords.

Arabic remained the language par excellence of the Islamic empire for well over five centuries, until the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258. Even in Mamluk Egypt, where the political and military elite consisted of Turkic-speaking people, Arabic continued to be regarded as a language of prestige. Mamluk intellectuals used it in writing, even though Qipcaq Turkic was their colloquial language. In the East the position of Arabic as a religious, cultural, and administrative language started to change from the tenth century onward. Middle Persian, the language of the Persian empire, had become marginalized after the conquests, but New Persian (Farsi) became popular as the language of poetry in the ninth century. The dynasty of the Safavids reintroduced it as the language of the court, and in the sixteenth century the Safavid dynasty started to use it as the new “national” language of Iran. As a result, the spreading of Islam in South and South-east Asia took place in Persian, particularly when the Moguls began to use it as their literary language. In the Islamic East, Arabic was retained solely as the language of the Qur’an, Persian having become the language of preaching, literature, and administration.

With the advent of the Turkic peoples Arabic gradually lost its position in the Islamic West as well. In the Seljuk Empire and later in the Ottoman Empire the language of administration became Ottoman Turkish, while Persian was the language used by the intellectual elite for cultural purposes. Arabic was relegated to the domain of religion, although it continued to serve as a source for thousands of loanwords in both Persian and Turkish, ranging from learned words such as *mā ilmā* “teacher” in Persian and *akide* “dogma” in Turkish to common words such as *ve-* and in both languages. Yet, when the Arab world became integrated in the Ottoman Empire, spoken Arabic was treated as a minor provincial language and its written variety was only used for religious purposes. Even though most inhabitants of the Arab provinces did not know Turkish, official contacts with the empire had to take place in that language.

The nineteenth-century Arab renaissance (*Nahda*) brought a change in the self-awareness of the Arabs and the position of Arabic. In Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali initiated a movement to translate European writings into Arabic. In its wake a new idiom was created to convey the new ideas, and the language was modernized through the introduction of a host of new terms in the fields of the technical sciences, economics, and politics. Once again, Arabic became a language in which political and administrative issues were discussed.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire signified a new beginning for Arabic but the simultaneous invasion of the colonial powers introduced a new danger to the language. Because of the military and cultural dominance of the English and the French the attitude toward Arabic was often a negative one. After the Arab countries gained their independence Arabic became the official language of most of these countries and
the symbol of Arab nationalism. In the Mashreq, it did not take long before English was replaced by Arabic, but in the formerly French-dominated countries it took decades before the French language had disappeared from the administrative, educational, and legal systems.

**Fusha and ‘Alamiyya**

The contemporary linguistic situation in the Arab world is characterized by diglossia, in which two varieties of the language have strictly separate roles or functions in the speech community. The so-called High variety, called *fusha* or *al-‘arabiyya*, is the language learned at school as the carrier of a rich religious and literary heritage; it is the language that is used in writing, both in the educational system and the media, and in formal speech. The Low variety, called *‘ammiyya* or in North Africa *darija*, is the colloquial language, which is the mother tongue of all speakers. It is the language of everyday communication, the language of friends and family, the language of informal speaking.

The coexistence of two varieties of the language is not without its problems. Since the standard language is learned at school, only those who are literate have access to the written production. For the vast majority of the population the formal language is not immediately comprehensible so that a large part of linguistic communication in the community is beyond their linguistic competence. The two varieties have quite different associations, the standard language being associated with education and therefore with social success and wealth, whereas the vernacular is associated with illiteracy and poverty. At the same time, its function as the language of informal talk makes it the symbol of in-group communication, whereas the standard language is seen as a stereotyped and distanced means of communication.

Language choice between standard and vernacular depends on a number of factors such as the person of the interlocutor, the topic being spoken about, and the setting of the speech act. By their language choice speakers express their attitude toward these factors, their evaluation of the situation and the interlocutor. Since language variation is not a matter of choice between two discrete varieties, but takes place on a continuum between the highest standard and the lowest vernacular, there are endless possibilities of language choice. Such linguistic behavior is often indicated with the term of code-mixing. Since the span of the continuum attainable for the individual speaker directly depends on the degree of literacy, most people may be said to have only a relatively small variation at their disposal. But even the best educated speakers are unable to extemporize in standard Arabic and inevitably mix vernacular elements in their speech.

Because of its symbolic value as a binding element for all Arabic-speaking peoples language choice is intimately connected with Arab nationalism. The *fusha* is the symbol of Arab unity, whereas the vernacular dialects stand for divisiveness and regionalism (*al-imiyya*). It is widely believed in the Arab world that during the colonial period the European powers intentionally propagated the study and the use of the dialect in order to divide the Arab world. Even today, Western interest in dialectology is still regarded as a manifestation of neo-imperialism. This creates a problem for Arab politicians who wish to show their adherence to the ideals of Arab nationalism but at the same time their strong ties with the population. Politicians like Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser made a skillful use of the language variation by mixing standard and vernacular in their political speeches. The connection with the standard language is especially strong in those countries that emphasize their role in the Arab nationalist movement. The different attitudes toward Arab nationalism correlate with the attitude toward the vernacular. In those countries where Arab nationalism is part of the dominant ideology the use of standard Arabic is emphasized and attempts to replace it with the vernacular are met with severe criticism.

The attitude toward the dialect is not wholly negative, however. In a country such as Egypt the *‘alamiyya* may be said to hold a special position. Because of the pride they take in their country Egyptians are also proud of the Egyptian dialect, and although they share with other Arab countries the mistrust toward the imperialists who used the dialect to further their own interests and although in Egypt, too, the *fusha* holds a special prestige position, the use of the dialect is widespread even in situations where in other countries it would be unthinkable to use dialect. Thus, Egyptian presidents are never averse to using partly Egyptian dialect in their political speeches—at least for internal use; in their contacts with other Arab countries they tend to switch to standard Arabic. Since the Egyptian film industry and more recently the television soaps have gained enormous popularity outside Egypt, knowledge of this dialect in other Arab countries is widespread and many speakers of other dialects are familiar with Egyptian.

In North Africa the linguistic policies of the French have left unmistakable traces. After independence there was a class of intellectuals who only knew French and could not communicate in Arabic. The first decades after gaining independence were therefore characterized by a movement toward Arabization, the replacement of French by Arabic in domains such as administration and education. Several school reforms were needed before at least primary and secondary schools adopted Arabic as the main medium of instruction. Even today French/Arabic bilingualism in North Africa is widespread and French has retained a special position of prestige. In particular among intellectuals the mixing of French and Arabic in *franco-arabe* has remained popular.

In the Levant, Syria, and Lebanon became independent from French colonial rule with a somewhat different outcome. In Syria, French never took hold the way it did in the
Maghreb. In Lebanon, however, bilingualism was connected with a widespread feeling, both among Muslims and Christians, that Lebanon was a bicultural country. The civil war has changed this situation in the sense that Arabic-French bilingualism has become associated more exclusively with the Christian community.

**Arabic as a World Language**

After the Arab conquest of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 C.E., the influence of the Arabic language spread beyond the borders of the Islamic world. Due to its role as the language in which Greek philosophy and science were transmitted, European scholars came to regard Arabic as the language of culture and scholarship. A large amount of translations of Arabic texts circulated in Western Europe, and through the contact with Arab culture in al-Andalus many loanwords, such as *algebra*, *zero*, *algorithm*, *alchemy*, *sugar*, *articoke*, *apricot*, and *admiral*, entered the European languages. This international role of Arabic ended with the Renaissance when Western Europe rediscovered the Greek sources and no longer needed Arabic as an intermediary.

Nowadays, Arabic is spoken as a mother tongue outside the Arab world in a number of linguistic enclaves, such as Anatolian Arabic in Turkey, and tiny pockets of speakers in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Cyprus. Malta is a different case altogether. Here, the Maltese language, written in Latin characters, has become the only Arabic dialect with the status of a national language. The Maltese, who are Christians, tend to deny the connection of their language with the Arabic-speaking world and prefer to regard the language as a remnant of the Phoenician language.

Apart from these enclaves, large numbers of Arabs have migrated outside the Arab world (*mahjub*). In the Americas, early immigrants came mostly from Lebanon and Syria. Most of them were merchants, who assimilated without difficulty to their new countries, especially in Latin America. Most of them retained Arabic and in countries such as Brazil and Argentina they even managed to establish a thriving literary tradition.

The immigration of speakers of Arabic to western Europe has a different background. In the early 1960s the western European countries started to hire unskilled laborers from the Mediterranean countries on a large scale. The original plan was to hire these people for a restricted period of time and then remigrate them to the countries of origin. Soon it became apparent that they were there to stay. As a result the western European countries suddenly realized that they had a sizable Arabic-speaking minority. In most of these countries the official policy of the government consisted in providing education in the home language of the immigrants' children. Nonetheless, many children of the second and third generation are losing their language of origin and shifting to the dominant language. In most cases they go through a lengthy period of code-switching in which they mix their home language and the language of the country they are living in.

The main role of Arabic outside the Arab world is that of being the language of the Qur’an, even though in many regions it was not the language of the Islamic spreading of the faith (Da’wah). This role was played in the East by Persian, and further east by Malay. In Africa, the language in which Islam was preached was Hausa or Swahili. Yet, for all Muslims Arabic has a special status as the language chosen by God for his last revelation. The reverence for this status does not lead, however, to intensive study of the language itself. Ordinary Muslims in countries such as Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Senegal do not know more Arabic than a few *ayabs* from the Qur’an, even though in some of these countries there is an extensive public or private network of Qur’an schools where the text of the Holy Book and the basic elements of Arabic are being taught.

Historically, Arabic functioned in Africa not only as a religious language but also as a language of trade. Even before West Africa was Islamicized, Arabic was used there as a lingua franca between the courts of different kingdoms. This is also clear from the loanwords in African languages, which are not restricted to the domain of religion but comprise also other semantic domains. In Hausa, for instance, such words as “book” (*littaafi*) and “news” (*laabattari*) derive from Arabic as do some conjunctions such as *saboo da* “because,” from Arabic *sabab* “reason.” In Swahili something like 30 percent of the lexicon is derived from Arabic. Most of these loans were introduced by a small class of so-called *mallams* (*Ar. mu’allim “teacher”) who maintained the ties with Arabic even after the trade connections had been severed.

In Asia, Islam was spread by Persian-speaking traders and missionaries. Here the Arabic language was known exclusively from the text of the Qur’an. Even though the ordinary believers did not know Arabic, they became used to some of the religious terms through the recitation of the Qur’an. Other Arabic words entered the Asian languages through Persian, as evidenced by their phonological shape, for instance, in Urdu *baziria* “audience,” with Persian *z* for Arabic *dad*. A further source of borrowing was the written medium. A small class of scholars used their pilgrimage to Mecca in order to study the Islamic sciences and through their books they introduced hundreds or even thousands of loanwords from Arabic. It has been estimated that in Malay more than three thousand words were borrowed in this way, for instance, the word *bukum* “judgment,” which gave rise to the derived verb *menghukumkan* “to pronounce judgment.”

The relatively low level of knowledge of Arabic may be changing with the increasing influence of Arabic sites on the Internet. In some countries, such as Mali, learning Arabic has become quite fashionable among young people. In other countries, international Islamic contacts may lead to an increase in Arabic as the primary language of Islam.
See also African Culture and Islam; Arabic Literature; Grammar and Lexicography; Identity, Muslim; Pan-Arabism; Persian Language and Literature; Qur'an; South Asian Culture and Islam; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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Kees Versteegh

ARABIC LITERATURE

Literature may be defined in numerous ways, but in Arabic literature some of the prominent phenomena that are associated with the modern concept of literature—individual creativity, authenticity of feeling, and fictionality—will not easily be detected by an unaware reader. Arabic literature as well as other non-Western literatures is firmly rooted in its own tradition and can hardly be appreciated otherwise.

Arabic Literature: Notions and Concepts

The modern Arabic equivalent for literature is adab, but in its traditional context this concept also refers to notions like “education,” “general knowledge,” and “decency.” It is derived from the pre-Islamic da‘b (pl. adab) that denotes “good, accepted practice.” In medieval Arab society adab can probably be best compared to the concept of “belles lettres.” It does not, however, include the most esteemed form of Arabic literature of shi‘r, or poetry, as a category.

To understand the status of shi‘r, its early development within pre-Islamic society has to be discussed. This society was divided along lines of families, tribes, and clans. Within the clan the prominent social characters were the sayyid (chief), the kabin (the soothsayer, expert of the supernatural), and the shi‘r, the keeper of earthly knowledge memorized in a nonscriptural society. This shi‘r—or “poet”—knew by heart the clan’s history, the affiliations with other clans, and the battle deeds of the clan in skirmishes with other clans. Battle cries, invectives of the enemy, and boasting of the hero were commonly uttered in poetical form and were memorized by the poet, in order to be handed down to the next generation.

In a development for which we have no record, another kind of poetry emerged in this pre-Islamic society called the qasida (or “ode”). These poems, too, were memorized by the poet. In the course of time he started to compose this kind of poetry himself. The practice of memorizing and composing poetry was a craft that was handed down from one generation to next, the poet’s apprentice being called rawi or “transmitter” (pl. rawat).

Pre-Islamic Arabic Poetry

An Arabic poem was composed on the basis of two form principles: meter and rhyme. Each poem had a fixed meter that could be chosen from the sixteen metrical patterns that Arabic prosodical tradition defined, although it has to be said that classical poets were mainly using only six of these. Contrary to Western metrical tradition, the Arabic meters were based on the length of syllables rather than on stress. This does not mean that Arabic poetic language knew no stress, but it was not the principle for metric scansion. The poet is expected to retain the same meter throughout each poem he composes, which may run into dozens of verses.

Apart from this feature, called monometer, the poet uses the same rhyme throughout the poem, which is called monorhyme. The rhyme cluster is always based on one specific consonant accompanied with long or short vowels. In the correct rhyme a limited variation of vowels is allowed. Each line of poetry is divided into two hemistichs, which deceptively makes the poem in print seem like two columns.

This elaborated form requires a high degree of craftsmanship and it suggests a long evolution, but no sources are available for this. It may also seem that in its form Arabic poetry is extremely monotonous, but it is often the subtle play
between the formal rules, the listeners expectation, and the poet’s elegant solutions that makes this poetry a vibrant art.

Pre-Islamic (or pre-classical) Arabic poetry can be divided thematically into two groups: short, monothematic poems, often “situational” poetry, and long, polythematic poems called *qasidas*.

**Qasida.** The *qasida* is the most prestigious poetical creation throughout Arab history. Even nowadays it is deemed the ultimate work of artistic achievement of Arab culture. It is a tripartite composition that follows a thematic sequence: In the *nasib* the poet—often in a dialogue with his companions—recalls his memory of a love affair. To give in to his grief meant that the poet broke his self-control (*sabr*). The immediate occasion he uses to legitimize this is his coming across the remnants of the camp left by the tribe to which his beloved belongs. This description is usually vivid and realistic, although to our modern taste the beloved is hardly portrayed as an actual person.

In the second part of the *qasida* the poet distances himself from this emotional reminiscence by dwelling on his travels through the desert, describing his mount and the desert environment with its specific fauna (*wasf*). These parts constitute the plethora of natural phenomena like an all-refreshing shower.

The traditional *qasida*, its form, and its content, have remained influential not only for Arabic literature, but also for later developments in Turkish and Persian literature.

**Marathiya.** Apart from the *qasida* another genre adopted this prestigious form. From a traditional wailing exclamation, probably common to the universal rituals of death, Arab women developed a kind of poetic dirge that kept the middle between “situational” poetry and the *qasida*. The *marathiya* was composed in remembrance of a deceased brother, husband, or father, but it followed the formal (not the thematic) requirements of the *qasida*. The reason for this is that *marathiya* was considered poetry of the public domain, inciting to blood vengeance in case of violent death and helping to reinvigorate social values and the ideal of knightly vigor on which women and children depended for their security. Contemporary to the early emergence of Islam the poetess al-Khansa’ (d. c. 645) produced a considerable number of such dirges on her brothers in which one might read a stance of opposition toward the social changes that the new religion brought with it against such pre-Islamic virtues as bravery, hospitality, generosity, and tribal loyalty.

**Shifting themes and forms.** Shortly before the emergence of Islam, Arabic poetry underwent a few thematic innovations: Love poetry gradually became an independent genre, introducing the beloved as taking part in a—probably fictitious—dialogue. In this period one also finds religious poetry reflecting a set of (popular) Christian and Jewish monotheistic concepts among the urban class of traders, as opposed to pagan worship of natural objects or polytheism that were still widespread on the Arabian Peninsula.

In cases where prestigious poetry was not deemed suitable, other literary forms were in use: The meter *rajaz* served all kinds of “situational” poetry like working songs, invectives, obscene poetry, and exhortations. Later this meter was used for lengthy didactic poems.

Rhymed prose (*saj*) was used for soothsayer predictions and enchantments, for folkloric sayings and proverbs, and, finally, for the text of the Qur’an.

**Poetry in Early Islam and the Umayyad Era.** The production of poetry subsided remarkably with the beginning of Islam. First, the prophet Muhammad’s attitude toward poetry was ambiguous. He denounced poetry and poets when he was accused of being a “poet” himself. A quote from the Qur’an runs, “And the poets—the perverse follow them; hast thou not seen how they wander in every valley and how they say that which they do not,” a reference to their baseless boasting (Arberry, trans., 26:224–226). On the other hand he realized that his status, comparable with that of a pre-Islamic chief, demanded the presence of a “court poet” as well, in his case the famous Hassan b. Thabit (d. 670). Another reason for the declining popularity of poetry may well have been the general preoccupation of the new Muslims with the expansion and stabilization of the new state. This decline in poetic production, however, was only temporary. The Umayyad era quickly gave an impetus for new developments in Arabic poetry.

Although the polythematic *qasida* as the masterpiece par excellence never ceased to exist, its parts developed into separate kinds of poetry in the Umayyad era. The *nasib* developed into love poetry and the *rajil* with its descriptions of nature into forms of bucolic poetry like descriptions of hunting parties and gardens. Together with older poetic kinds like wine poetry (*khamriyya*) and the general topic of description (*zasf*), these parts constituted the plethora of themes that a poet from this era could address.

The dichotomy of early Islamic society, its division into a Bedouin and a trader class, becomes clear in love poetry. In the *nasib*-part of the *qasida*, the beloved is mainly a nonpresent entity. She has left with her tribe and all that the poet can do is regret her departure and remember their past affair. Following this tradition the ‘*udbr* type of love poetry (named after the tribe ‘*Udhra*) creates an even greater division between the
poet and his beloved: She becomes the unreachable projection of the poet’s love from which he can only suffer and then whither away from passion. This kind of poetry might best be called “idealistic” and it provided Arabic literature with some almost mythical love pairs like Majnun and his Layla.

With the emergence of Islam and the continued ritualistic pilgrimage to Mecca, the population in the Hijaz cities like Mecca and Medina became gradually more affluent. Once a year they provided an intertribal and international forum where all Muslims could gather. The huge crowds involved in the hajj consisted of both men and women, offering many opportunities for both sexes to meet and have affairs. These paved the way for the so-called hijazi love poetry, in which the poet vividly describes his adventures, and cites extensively from (fictitious) dialogues between his beloved’s companions and her or between the protagonists themselves. As opposed to "ubdbr" love poetry, this new development can be called “realistic” love poetry.

In many ways the poetic developments of the Umayyad era reflect the development from a tribal society with nonhereditary succession to an urban society with dynastic power and an affluent court life in which the poet serves to embellish the environment of his maecenas.

**Poetry in the Abbasid Era**

The transition from the Umayyad to the Abbasid dynasty and the transfer of the seat of the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad can be considered the revolution of the mawali, or second- and third-generation converted Muslims who were not of Arab origin, but descendants of Persian or Byzantine families. Often these families had held high positions in the Sassanid kingdom in Persia.

In the early Abbasid era Arabic poetry consolidated its courtly functions. Most poets were in one way or another attached to the court, the highest-ranking poets being companions of the caliphs themselves.

The bond of Arabic literature with its pre-Islamic, Bedouin basis became more and more symbolic, although one of the greatest poets of this era, Abu Nuwas (d. c. 814), had had his poetic training through living with Arab tribes. His allegiance to the urban lifestyle motivated his utter contempt for those primitive conditions that he expressed in ridiculing Bedouin life. His most famous poems are the khawmriyat (about drinking scenes) and the mujan, more or less obscene poems about (pederastic) love.

In this poetry by Abu Nuwas and by the later Abu Tamam (d. 845), the hijazi tradition of realistic love poetry, of the self-confident individual, lives its triumph. The idealistic ‘ubdbr love poetry comes to an end with the late-eighth-century poet al-‘Abbas b. al-Ahnaf (b. c. 750). His courtly love poetry has often (but probably not rightly) been interpreted as the source of courtly love poetry in the “Toubadours et Trouvères” tradition in southern France through Arab-ruled al-Andalus (southern Spain).

The poetry of the Abbasid era provided a huge, sparkling collection of love poems, obscene poetry, repentance poetry for unbecomely behavior, semi-religious poetry pondering mortality, and detailed descriptions of gardens and gadgets in everyday life. In short every possible theme that an affluent class of intellectuals can think of was represented. The same period witnessed the emergence of literary theory and literary criticism. Inspired by the “philological” culture that Islamic society was (the Qur’an being the verbatim reproduction of God’s word), both poets and linguists set out to explore the possibilities of the Arabic language, a discipline that inevitably led to mannerism and far-fetched metaphors in poetry.

Abu Tamam and the ninth-century poet al-Buhturi (d. 897/898) opposed this tendency by presenting two collections of poetry (both called Hamasa: courage) for which they selected canonical poetry of the Umayyad and pre-Islamic periods.

During the tenth century the central authority in Baghdad started to lose its grip on some of the outer regions like Egypt and Syria. As a consequence local “kings” established their own courts and court cultures in which one or more poets were essential assets. By this time some poets had reached an independent status, so that they could allow themselves to be hired by the most bidding party, like the famous poet al-Mutanabbi (d. 965) who started his career with Sayf al-Dawla (d. 967), ruler of Aleppo, then moved to the court of Kafur in Cairo and finally joined the Buwayhid court of ‘Adud al-Dawla (d. 983) in Iraq. This mobility shows how poets had gained a role as spokesmen for the rulers of the time, voicing the king’s greatness and acting as the laureate poets on important occasions.

**Al-Andalus**

The downfall of the Umayyad caliphate had caused one of the members of the Umayyad family, ‘Abd al-Rahman I (d. 788), to flee westward to the Iberian Peninsula where he established the kingdom of Cordoba in 752. This marked the beginning of Andalusian history, an outstanding period in Islamic history. This period is still referred to by Arabs as the multicultural “state” par excellence because it meant the peaceful coexistence of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Al-Andalus soon disintegrated into petty kingdoms like Toledo, Sevilla, and Granada, but this never impeded cultural and intellectual progress. Only periods of foreign rule by orthodox Muslim forces from North Africa could temporarily infringe on it, until finally Granada fell to the Spanish Reconquesta in 1492, the formal end of Andalusian history.

At the various courts in the main cities of al-Andalus, literature reached a remarkable apogee. One of the contributions Andalusion poets made to Arabic literature was the
innovative form of the *muwashshab*, a poem with a strophical structure. It is unclear what the origin of this poem was. Certain types of strophic poetry were known in the East by the eighth century, but they never reached the level of prestigious poetry. The origin of the *muwashshab*, with its rhyme structure divided into stanzas and choruses and its idiosyncratic meter, should probably be sought in local Romance poetic traditions, probably in songs. This is at least suggested by the use of vernacular Arabic, Hebrew, and even the local Romance dialect, for instance, in the last verse of some *muwashshabs*, as a kind of humorous clue.

**The Centuries of Decline: Amateur Poetry**

In the classical period the poet was a respected craftsman, famous for composing his art in courtly circles. Meanwhile in urban society the high status of Arabic-Islamic education, with its emphasis on language and the ornate use of it, produced an even greater number of literati who were able to produce verse at any given occasion. A great number of these “occasional” poems concerning every possible aspect of life (but often, of course, on the theme of love) are still to be found scattered in many ‘*adab*-works on a wide range of subjects, often helping to embellish the context.

It was mainly this class of literati that composed poetry between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries (the *qurun al-inbitat*, or the centuries of decline in Arab culture). It is hard to name any famous poets of this period, but recent research has shown that poetry probably never stopped to be of high quality and originality. This is, however, a period that needs more attentive study than it has hitherto received.

**Arabic Prose**

The oldest fragments of Arabic prose are the accounts of intertribal skirmishes on the Arab peninsula. These accounts, interlaced with poetry, may not be very accurate as a reflection of reality, but on the other hand they cannot be regarded as fiction. A second prose collection was the Prophet’s biography, the *sira*, which by its nature cannot be considered fiction. The structure of these stories—chain of spokesmen, followed by the story itself, with short poems in between—remains the same in later prose collections. However, the context often became more frivolous like in al-Isfahani’s (d. 967) *Kitab al-Aghani* (Book of songs), a huge collection of stories about poets and singers. One should be careful to use these for historic purposes because they are of an anecdotal character, representing neither pure historical facts nor pure fiction.

Another development within Arabic prose is the abundant growth of ‘*adab*’ literature in the Abbasid era, probably best rendered as “belles lettres,” the well-wrought discourse for which any subject could serve as a topic. Al-Jahiz (d. 868), the *buno universalis* of his time, was the unrivaled champion of the genre.

Apart from these ‘*adab*-works, Arabic popular culture knew a strong storytelling tradition, but what remained of it is scarce: outlines of heroic adventures and etiologies of personal names.

Bringing the sub-literary storytelling and the ‘*adab*’ genre together was an innovation introduced from outside the Arab world, generating “mirrors of princes,” like *Kalila wa-Dimna*, an adaptation into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. c. 760) of the original Indian Pancatantra.

Among the class of the cultural elite in the later Abbasid era a unique genre emerged that used rhymed prose as its form and was composed following a more or less fixed structure with a story of two characters meeting in an urban environment without recognizing each other. After a humorous description of chaos and confusion, recognition occurs and all ends in a kind of comical clue. This *maqama* remained popular well into the nineteenth century. With time it became less bound to its original structure and could be used for didactic purposes as well.

Fiction in the modern sense of the word entered Arabic culture with the *Arabian Nights*, in which the frame story and a number of sub-stories are from an Indian-Persian origin and enlarged with a number of Egyptian popular stories.

**Modern Arabic Literature**

Normally the entering of the Arab world into modern times is identified with Napoleon Bonaparte’s temporary occupation of Egypt (1789–1801). The obvious difference in culture, scientific knowledge, and social structure between the two worlds caused Muhammad ‘Ali (1769–1849), an Albanian officer who freed Egypt from Ottoman rule, to direct his attention to the West, mainly France. He sent a mission of scholars to Paris to gather scientific knowledge that could be translated and applied in Egypt. The witness report of this mission, written by al-Tahtawi (d. 1873), is one of the earliest accounts of the new confrontation between East and West.

Another channel of communication between East and West had remained open for much longer: the contacts between the Maronite community in Syria and the Roman Catholic Church of Rome. This contact was paralleled by American-based Presbyterian missionary activities in Lebanon. This new phase in Middle Eastern history, known as the *Nabda* (sometimes translated as Renaissance), led to the establishment of printing presses and newspapers, to Western-style schooling, and to flourishing cultural activities. In the field of literature it proved to be less obvious to copy Western standards and genres. Arab authors initially tried to use old forms, like the *maqama*, as a substitute for the narrative genre. The theme of these regenerated *maquamas* often had something to do with the East-West opposition.

In poetry it was even more difficult to adopt Western standards, so that well in the twentieth century the old
monorhyme/monometer standard of the *gaida* remained undisputed. These poets could, however, not escape from expressing modern themes. So-called neo-Classicist poets could well be expected to eulogize the introduction of radio in the 1920s in the most lofty of ways.

**The Mahjar**

As a result of deteriorating economical, social, and political circumstances in the second half of the nineteenth century in the-then Ottoman province of Syria/Lebanon, a great number of Arabs from these regions migrated to the Americas. Literary aspirations emerged within these Arab communities, resulting in the establishment of Arabic newspapers, literary periodicals, and societies, the most prominent of which became al-Rabita al-Qalamiyya (The Pen Club) in the Boston/New York area (1920). Its most famous member (and its chairman) was Jibran Khalil Jibran (d. 1931).

Far from their homeland, confronted with an alien environment, and having lived through the aftermath of existential shocks like the First World War and the Titanic disaster, these young poets dared to experiment and address ideas, themes, and personal emotions that were hitherto unknown in Arabic literature. The thematical innovations of this Mahjar-generation only had their influence on literature in the homeland much later, if at all.

**The Romantic Poets and Apollo**

In Egypt the important poets of the 1920s and 1930s were deeply influenced by English romantic poets such as William Blake (d. 1827), Samuel Coleridge (d. 1834), Lord Byron (d.1824), and Percy Shelley (d. 1822). Love, subjectivism, inward concentration, and dreamy nationalism were among the ingredients of this poetry.

At first the young poets in the Diwan group, named after a study in literary criticism, advocated traditional forms, but later another group of poets gathered around the periodical *Apollo* promoted experiments in the use of form, partly as a consequence of their romantic inspiration, which sometimes came close to escapism.

**Arabic Poetry after World War II**

The Second World War hardly had a direct impact on the Arab world, but it was all the more influential in its consequences. The divide between capitalism and socialism split the Arab world as well as Europe, not to mention the beginning struggle in many countries for independence from the colonialist powers.

As a reaction to the Romanticism of the twenties and thirties post–World War II poetry became extremely political, the slogan being *iltizam*: political commitment. A number of these poets gathered around the periodical *al-Adab* that was published in Beirut. The members of this group became split by the choice between Marxism and Arab nationalism. *Iltizam* as a concept kept playing a significant role until the 1980s.

Another innovation came from Iraq: the Free Verse movement. It advocated the complete abolishment of all traditional forms like meter and rhyme, thereby producing blank verse or prose poetry.

Poetry that was so politically motivated could in the end only produce its counterpart, in this case the group of poets who were being identified with the periodical *Shir* in Beirut (1957–1969). Their poetry can be qualified as intellectual, highly sensitive, and open to the West. On the other hand symbols that referred to ancient times (Phoenician culture for the poets in Syria/Lebanon; Sumerian and Akkadian culture for those from Iraq) became popular as an expression of nationalist feelings. The most significant poet among this generation was the Syrian ‘Ali Ahmad Said (also known as Adunis (b. 1930), together with Nizar Qabbani (d. 1998), one of the most popular poets until the present period.

Meanwhile in Iraq, but even more so in Egypt, under the influence of socialist ideology, *iltizam* poetry developed to social realistic poetry, which in its turn paved the way for Palestinian resistance poetry with its strong political bias.

**The Arabic Novel**

Under the influence of Western fiction, especially by French romantic novelists, the first attempts to write novels can be considered emulations of Western models. The genre of the novel was almost entirely strange to Arabic tradition. Some early attempts were still shaped like the medieval Arabic *maqama*, but this rhymed prose structure was soon given up.

Just before the beginning of the twentieth century the historic novel emerged, inspired by the works of Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) and Alexandre Dumas (1802–1870). With the rise of nationalism around 1910 in Egypt, the scope of early novels changed to realistic stories placed in the vivid environment of the contemporary Egyptian countryside (e.g., *Zaynab* by Muhammad Husayn Haykal [d. 1956], considered as the first serious novel in the Arab world, and *al-Ayyam* by Taha Husayn [d. 1973]).

In the 1920s the influence of French realism and of Russian prose made itself felt in short-story writing, but Arabic prose really went its own way from the 1930s onward, when it obtained the psychological dimension of realistic autobiography, humor, and social criticism. This opened the way to the main directions of post-World War II prose: existentialism (Lebanon), social realism (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco), social criticism (Egypt, Palestine), neo-realism (Egypt), and feminism (throughout the Arab world). A modern generation that started to publish in the 1960s added a lyrical, ironic, and plainly realistic flavor as a result of which modern Arabic prose nowadays complies to international standards, without losing the local color that Arab novelists as real storytellers will never neglect. Nagib Mahfuz (b. 1911) is rightly considered to be one of the great international novelists of the twentieth century.
Novelist Nagib Mahfuz, pictured here, won the Nobel Prize in literature in 1988. The novel was a completely new genre in Arabic when, early in the twentieth century, writers in the Arab world began their attempts at long prose. Though these early works were heavily dictated by the style of French and Russian novels, by the 1930s writers of prose in Arabic began developing in many different directions. NEW YORK TIMES PICTURES

The main reason for the rapid development of prose should be sought in the fact that—as opposed to poetry—it was a relatively new form in Arabic literature, not burdened by age-old tradition.

In the West, Arabic literature is best known for two creations: the Arabian Nights and the novels of Nagib Mahfuz that earned him the Nobel prize for literature in 1988, although it is paradoxical that neither can be considered as representative of the Arabic literary tradition.

See also Arabic Language; Biography and Hagiography; Historical Writing; Persian Language and Literature; Qur’an.

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Gert Borg

ARAB LEAGUE

Also known as the League of Arab States (Jami’at al-Duwal al-‘Arabiyya), the Arab League was founded in 1945 as a grouping of Arab states. The Arab League’s objectives are to solidify cooperation among its members in the areas of defense, politics, communications, society, and culture. It has its roots in pan-Arab nationalism and anticolonialism, but it recognizes in principle the independence and sovereignty of the diverse nation-states that constitute its membership. Its founding members are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Permanently based in Cairo, the Arab League now has twenty-two members, the most recent to join being Djibouti (1977) and the Comoros Islands (1993). The Palestine Liberation Organization (now the Palestinian Authority) was launched and given observer status by the League in 1964; it won full member status in 1976.
The League houses a number of specialized agencies, including those dealing with communication, labor, Palestine, civil aviation, and cities. It also convenes the Arab Summit, a periodic gathering of Arab heads of state.

The Arab League has established ties of cooperation and mutual consultation with other international and regional organizations, including the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Islamic religion does not constitute either its core ideology, nor its primary purpose; Islam is notably absent from the League charter. Moreover, the overt secular influence that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser's Egypt exercised over the League was a major factor in the creation of the Muslim World League in 1962. Nonetheless, the Arab League does maintain formal relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Islam has also shaped its organizational style, as reflected in its flag, which has a crescent moon (hilal) on a green field.

The League’s effectiveness has often been called into question. Its efforts to forge a common front against Israel have been unsuccessful, as evidenced by the expulsion of Egypt for signing the Camp David peace accords with Israel in 1979 (Egypt was reinstated in 1987). In March 2002, however, it unanimously supported a Saudi-sponsored peace initiative that offered recognition of Israel in return for that state’s withdrawal from the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The League has also had mixed success in resolving conflicts among its own member states, as demonstrated by its failure to prevent Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and its inability to force Iraq’s withdrawal in the face of international intervention.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; Organization of the Islamic Conference.

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Juan Eduardo Campo

ARCHITECTURE

Islamic architecture is in part comprised of those buildings and built environments intended for use in Islamic worship, commemoration, and instruction. Among the architecture of this group are mosques, madrasas or schools, mausoleums, and shrines. Islamic architecture may also be considered as the creation of patrons and builders who profess Islam or those that live in a region ruled by Muslims. These buildings can generally be described as secular, and include suqs (marketplaces), hammams (public baths), khans (inns), caravanseries or roadside inns, palaces, and houses.

Defining Islamic Architecture

Although Islamic architecture is infinitely varied in plan, elevation, building material, and decorative programs, there are several recurring forms found in all types of buildings, be they religious, secular, public, or private. These basic components are the dome, the arch, and the vault (Fig. 1 a–c). Before describing the different aspects of Islamic architecture it is important to pause and ask if such a categorization is viable.

This question stems from three considerations. First is the fact that the forms and decorative practices of these buildings are largely adaptations of pre-Islamic models. Thus it is not improper to ask if Islamic architecture should in fact be labeled Classical, Sassanian, or Hindu. If all that was being considered were forms emptied of meaning and function then the answer to this question would be a resounding yes. The second consideration derives from the fact that many of the architectural forms considered as Islamic architecture were built for secular purposes. How, then, can a religious category designate houses, inns, baths, or even cities? Are there essential qualities of these secular spaces that give them meaning as Islamic architecture? Finally, there is a question of fit. If Christians, Jews, and Hindus living within an Islamic region build similar forms then would not the designation be too narrow? And, conversely is the designation too broad? For how can a Malaysian congregational mosque built in the twenty-first century be placed under the same analytic category as an Umayyad congregational mosque of the eighth century, when they are not built of the same materials and do not display common decorative practices or forms?

While such considerations are beyond the scope of this article, it is important to realize that contemporary historians of Islamic architectural history weigh these questions critically. Some have responded by introducing more specified categories of Islamic architecture, such as those based on regional, dynastic, and chronological designations. Others have introduced new analytic models, for example, by studying the development of certain architectural forms, such as the minaret, or a practice, such as the use of public inscriptions. Taken together, recent scholarship of Islamic architecture presents a more historically contingent and culturally varied approach to the study of Islamic architecture. Many of the problems associated with the category of Islamic architecture arise from what is taken as the meaning of architecture. If Islamic architecture is simply a material entity, composed of classical forms, then the notion of Islamic architecture as being distinct from Byzantine or Sassanian becomes questionable. However, if by architecture we mean a dynamic space that produces relationships between people and helps individuals understand and articulate their identity through their engagement (or disengagement) with that space then the meaningfulness of Islamic architecture can be seen as a distinct construction.
The Mosque

The mosque is the preeminent dynamic space that stands at the center of Islamic society and culture. It is both a spiritual site of worship and a social site of education, debate, and discussion of religion, politics, and current events. Arab caliphs and their governors were the first builders of architectural mosques. Emerging from a Bedouin culture that did not necessitate permanent architecture, these early Islamic rulers adopted and adapted the building traditions of the cultures they conquered to guide the formation and style of the new mosques. Two notable sources that contributed to the early mosques’s forms and styles were the Byzantine and Sassanian Empires. In the conquered regions previously dominated by these cultures Arabs established garrison cities and ordered the founded mosques to provide the Islamic community with a space to meet and pray. The mosques that appeared in the first centuries of Islamic history were either renovated structures, for example, Christian churches converted into mosques, or they were new buildings constructed from recycled parts of abandoned buildings, particularly columns of Roman ruins. Some Islamic rulers, such as the Umayyad builders of the Dome of the Rock (completed in 692 C.E.) and the Great Mosque of Damascus (706–714 C.E.), employed Byzantine artisans practiced in mosaic design to decorate their structures with dazzling images of vegetation, jewelry, and Qur’anic inscriptions. Over time, the practice of employing local building techniques, decorative practices, and architectural forms resulted in mosques of different regions and periods of the Islamic world appearing visually dissimilar. They are, however, all connected by their principal function: to provide a central space for the Islamic community to unite, pray, and exchange information.

The prophet Muhammad’s house was the first constructed mosque (Fig. 2). Established soon after his community moved to Medina in 622 C.E., it was a simple, unremarkable enclosure. The principal consideration of Muhammad’s mosque was to provide a large, open, and expandable courtyard so the ever-growing community could meet in one place. The walls of the courtyard were made of mud-brick and had three openings. The walls surrounded an open space of about 61 square yards (56 meters). On the east side of the courtyard were the modest living quarters of Muhammad and his family. Palm tree trunks were used for the columns and palm leaves for the roof of a covered area called the zulla, which was built to protect worshipers from the midday sun. The zulla
marked the direction Muslim prayer was originally oriented—north, toward the holy and venerated city of the Jews, Jerusalem. Later, Muhammad, while in prayer, received divine enlightenment that caused him to change the direction of prayer south to the Ka’ba in Mecca. The zulla was therefore moved to concur with the new qibla (direction of prayer). Besides the qibla, another architectural form introduced at the first mosque was the minbar (stepped platform or pulpit) from which Muhammad addressed the growing Islamic community.

The Prophet’s mosque, with its austere plan, large square enclosure, orientation toward the qibla, and minbar, provides the basic elements of subsequent mosque architecture. The first mosque type to emerge was the hypostyle plan (Fig. 3). Its basic unit, the bay (a covered area defined by four columns), could be expanded upon so the mosque could grow with the community. The hypostyle mosque typically has an inner courtyard, called the sahn, surrounded by colonnades or arcades (riwaqs) on three sides. Within the courtyard there is usually an ablutions fountain, where the wudu’ (minor ablution) is performed before the salat (prayer). There are three entrances into the sahn. The principal entrance can be a monumental portal as built in Cairo in the Fatimid Mosque of al-Hakim (1002 C.E.). Passing through the sahn, the worshiper walked into a covered sanctuary area or kahram. The kahram of the Great Mosque of Cordoba (786, 962–966 C.E.) is one of the most visually breathtaking. The arches of the double-arch arcades are composed of alternating red brick courses and pale stone voussoirs that when viewed from within the sanctuary produce a visually captivating labyrinthine configuration over one’s head. Once inside the sanctuary of a mosque the focus is the qibla, a directional wall that indicated which way to pray. In the center of the wall was often a semicircular niche with an arched top, known as the mihrab. In large mosques a minbar located to the right of the mihrab was also included. It was from atop the minbar that on Fridays the khutba (sermon) was delivered by the imam or prayer-leader. The minbar is based on the stepped platform that was used by Muhammad. It ranges from a simple three-step elevation to a highly decorated monumental stairway of many steps. The very top of the minbar is never occupied as it is symbolically reserved as the space of Muhammad, the original imam.

In large mosques another platform called the dikka is provided at the rear of the sanctuary, or in the courtyard, and along the same axis as the mihrab. A qadi repeats the sermon and prayer from the dikka for those standing too far from the minbar. Located outside of some mosques is a minaret that, along with the dome, has become the architectural symbol of Islam due to its ubiquitous presence and high visibility. Constructed as a tower, it either stands outside the mosque precinct or it is attached to the outer walls or portals of the mosque. The minaret varies in shape, ornamentation, and number depending on the region and building conventions of the patron. Besides visually broadcasting the presence of the mosque and Islam within a city or landscape the minaret also serves as an effective place for the mu’ adhdhin or "caller" (also muezzin) to perform the adhan (call to prayer) and be heard for a great distance. The masqurab is a later addition made to the hypostyle-plan mosque. It is a differentiated, protective space, adjacent to the qibla wall. The masqurab is found in mosques where the imam or ruler wanted either to be protected or ceremonially separated from the congregation. It was originally built as a raised platform separated with a wooden screen that allowed total to partial concealment of its occupants.

Types of Mosques. There are two general types of mosques. The first is the congregational mosque, known as the jami’ masjid. The jami’ (from the Arabic word for “to gather”) is built on a large scale to accommodate the entire Islamic community of a town or city. The second type is known simply as masjid (from the Arabic word meaning “to prostrate oneself”). Masjids are small community mosques used daily by members of a quarter, or an ethnic group within a city. Masjids were also constructed as subsidiary structures next to mausoleums, palaces, caravansaries, and madrasas. Early masjids and jami’ masjids, while different in size, shared the same architectural forms and style. However, as Islamic rulers grew in wealth and power starting in the late seventh century, they built monumental jami’ masjids in their cities to reflect the preeminence of Islam and the permanence of their dynasty. Adapting the basic building elements of vaults, arches, and domes, these rulers built mosques that from the exterior appeared to span large areas and soar to great heights. To create a stunning visual experience in the interior the jami’ masjids were ornamented with complex geometric and arabesque or vegetal decoration in mosaic and stucco. Quartered marble decorated the lower walls, or dados, and Qur’anic and historical inscriptions in stucco and mosaic Arabic script engaged the intellect.

Regional Variation of Mosques. Although there is no one style to unify the mosques of the Islamic world, they can be divided into broad regional variants. The mosque style of

![Figure 2.](image-url)
central Arabia was an early development influenced by church-building of the Syrian Byzantine Empire and palace-building of the Sassanian Persian Empire. In the east, the ground plans of the Great Mosques of Kufa (638 C.E.) and Basra (635 C.E.) were square like those of Zoroastrian temples. When the Great Mosque of Kufa was rebuilt in 670, its haram was based on the apadana or throne rooms of Achaemenian kings: five rows of tall stone columns supporting a teak ceiling. Similarly, the Great Mosque of Damascus, built by the Umayyad caliph al-Walid between 706–714, was based on indigenous building conventions. Architects used the preexisting enclosure of the temenos and church, but since the mosque had to be oriented to the south, the qibla wall was on the longer side of the rectangular space. Also, due to the constraints of the preexisting quadrangle, the courtyard was transversal in orientation rather than longitudinal. The haram contained a short, wide central nave with a gabled roof and a wooden dome in its center. Three aisles of double-tiered arches, parallel to the qibla wall, supported a gabled ceiling. Al-Walid, wanting to outdo the neighboring churches and temples, employed Syrian-Christian artisans to richly decorate the interior of the mosque with imported gold and colored mosaics and marble, and even used rock crystal for the mihrab.

The early Abbasid caliphate, ruling from Baghdad from 749 to 847, first built their mosques with square floor plans as the early Umayyads had done in the region. However, after the Abbasids moved their capital to Samarra, their mosques reflected the rectangular hypostyle form favored by the later Umayyads. The Great Mosque of Samarra, built by al-Mutawakkil from 848 to 852, was the largest hypostyle mosque of its time with nine rows of columns in the sanctuary that supported a thirty-five-foot-high ceiling. The mosque is most famous for Malwiyya, the colossal spiral minaret. Once faced with gold tiles, Malwiyya’s great size and unusual shape
made the Great Mosque of Samarra a highly visible presence in the surrounding landscape.

Sub-Saharan West African mosques are unique in their use of organic materials that are constantly replenished over time, such as tamped earth, timber, and vegetation. Due to seasonal deterioration during the wet and dry seasons, the mosques are constantly being repaired and resurfaced. The predominant quality of these structures is their rounded organic form, reinforced with projecting timber beams or torons, which also serve as supports for scaffolding when the mosque is being resurfaced. The Great Mosque of Djenné (thirteenth century) is the most representative of the West African mosques. Its tall rounded towers and engaged columns, which act as buttresses, easily flow into each other and give the structure its characteristic verticality and overwhelming majesty.

The central-planned, domed mosque of the Ottomans is yet another distinctive type. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in the fifteenth century they converted the Byzantine church of Hagia Sophia into a mosque by framing it with two pointed minarets. Later in the nineteenth century they added roundels inscribed with calligraphic writing of the names of Muhammad, Allah, and the early caliphs. Using the Hagia Sophia as their prototype, Ottoman rulers built mosques in the principal cities of their empire. The mosques were defined by large spherical domes, with smaller half-domes at the corners of the square, and four distinctively shaped minarets—tall, fluted, and needle-nosed—that were typically placed at the exterior corners of the mosque complex. The Selimiye Cami (Mosque of Selim) in Edirne, Turkey (1507–1574), best characterizes the central-plan Ottoman mosque.

Moving further east to Seljuk Iran, another type of mosque emerges known as the four-iwan mosque. The iwan is an open vaulted space with a rectangular portal or pishtaq. In a Seljuk mosque four of these iwans would be oriented around a central courtyard. The Great Mosque of Isfahan, built in this style in the twelfth century, is a monumental four-iwan mosque. Of these, the principal or qibla iwan is the largest, with a large domed maqsura and muqarnas vaulting. To lend it further visual impact, two minarets were added at the corners of the portal. The iwan that stood opposite the qibla iwan followed in size, and it was both smaller and shallower. The lateral iwans were the smallest. While the exterior of the mosque was undecorated, the inward-facing iwans were decorated with architectural ceramic tiles of turquoise, cobalt blue, white, deep yellow, and green. The decorative designs contained geometric and arabesque patterns as well as Kufic inscriptions. The layout of the Great Mosque of Isfahan influenced countless other mosques in Iran, Central Asia, and South Asia.

From their start, the mosques of South Asia were syncretic structures. They were the by-products of hired Hindu masons, indigenous architectural material taken from destroyed or decaying Hindu buildings, and necessary elements of mosque architecture such as the mihrab. The mosques were trabeated at first and decorated with popular Hindu motifs such as vegetal scrolls and lotuses. The plans of South Asian mosques ranged from traditional hypostyle, to Persian four- iwan types, and to single-aisle domed plans. The earliest mosques of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1451) were hypostyle and built out of reused materials from Hindu and Jain temples such as the Quwwat al-Islam in Delhi of the late twelfth century. The greatest achievement of this mosque is the monumental minaret, the Qutb Minar. Standing at 238 feet it was a victory tower that announced the power of the new religion to the surrounding landscape.

The next significant mosque type of South Asia is the single-aisle plan with five bays that used stucco and colored stones as surface decoration and squinch and muqarnas vaulting. These mosques had monumental central portals and domes. The Bara Gumbad mosque in Delhi, built by Sultan Sikandar Lodi in 1494, and the Qal’a-e-Kuhna mosque of Sher Shah (1540–1545) exemplify this style. It was this basic form of mosque architecture that was later adopted by the great Mogul dynasty (1426–1848). Two exemplary Mogul-style mosques are Akbar’s Great Mosque of Fatehpur Sikri (1571–1572) and Shah Jahan’s Great Mosque at Delhi (1650–1656). These mosques have large courtyards and are built from the local red sandstone combined with white marble to create decorative geometric and vegetal patterns. The distinctive feature of Akbar’s mosque at Fatehpur Sikri is the monumental portal on the south side called the Buland Darwaza. Its form is that of a colossal pishtaq (tall central portal), derived from Timurid origins. It is embellished with native Indian architectural elements as well such as small open pavilions called chattris and lotus-shaped medallions. Located on the west side of the great courtyard is the sanctuary, a three-domed prayer-hall with a central pishtaq. The Great Mosque of Delhi was based on the four-iwan plan. Three onion-shaped bulbous marble domes surmount the qibla iwan, the same shape used for the dome of the Taj Mahal. The minarets are divided into four parts and are capped with small pavilions. Smaller, private mosques built for the Mughal palaces of Lahore, Agra, and in Delhi reflect the fine marble carving skills of the Indian artisans. Faced with white marble, elegantly carved with vegetal patterns, these mosques were then topped with graceful onion-shaped domes with lotus molding and metallic finials. These private imperial mosques were the architectural counterparts of the elegant gems so highly prized by the Mughals.

**Shrines and Mausoleums**

Shrines and mausoleums that commemorate important places and people of the Islamic world comprise another important component of sacred Islamic architecture. The first great
The mausoleums of imams, rulers, the wealthy, and saints comprise the other part of Islamic commemorative architecture. Although the prophet Muhammad dictated that burials should be simple and without grave markers mausoleums are found throughout the Islamic world. Following the forms of the Dome of the Rock and the Byzantine martyrium, which the former was also inspired by, the Muslims founded their own funerary architecture. The basic form of the mausoleum was a square enclosure, derived from the shape of a house where the dead were traditionally buried, surmounted by a dome. In cities such as Mamluk Cairo (1250–1517), the domed square plan compelled builders to plan vertically instead of laterally due to spatial and structural constraints of preexisting streets. To deflect the admonitions of the Muslim orthodox that perceived tomb building as irreligious, Arab builders in North Africa, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant made the mausoleum part of larger religious complexes. The mausoleum is thus often one part of a complex composed of a mosque, madrasa, or religious school, and sometimes a hospital or khanqa (residence of a Sufi leader). Although the buildings had unique functions, they shared the same architectural elements. The architects unified the complex with geometric and arabesque designs to decorate the buildings, marble revetment, muqarnas or stalactite vaults (also called honeycomb vault), and ceramic tiles, among countless other regional variants and conventions.

While the mausoleum met with periodic waves of disapproval in the Arabian world it was a fully acceptable form in the Persianate world of Iran, Anatolia, Iraq, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and South Asia. The two basic forms of Persianate mausoleum are the yurt-inspired tomb tower such as the northern Iranian Gunbad-e Qabus (1007) and the domed square and later octagonal tombs, like the Tomb of the Samanids in Bukhara (tenth century), the Ilkhanid Sultan Ya’qub’s mausoleum of Iljeytu (early fourteenth century), and the famous Taj Mahal (1631–1643) of Shah Jahan in India. In seventeenth-century Egypt another type of mausoleum emerged called the canopy mausoleum, because it was open to the elements. An example of this type is the Fatimid funerary complex of Sab’a Banat in Fustat. A later Fatimid development of the mausoleum form is the masihhad, a large square domed tomb connected to a three-room unit entered through a portal and organized around a courtyard that served pilgrims. The mashhad of Sayyida Ruqayya, an ‘Alid saint, built in 1133, is an example of this type of mausoleum. The final type of mausoleum to be considered here makes skillful use of one of the most famous architectural forms: the muqarnas. A stalactite squinch usually found in the transitional zones between wall and dome, the muqarnas was used in all types of Islamic architecture. During the Ayyubid (1099–1250) and Mamluk (1250–1517) periods, the mausoleum was brought out of the cemetery and into the urban fabric. With their increased visibility these tombs became centers for transmitting political information and education of the Sunni religious schools of law. They were also gathering centers for the followers of Sufism. Building the mausoleum in the city of Cairo compelled a few changes in design. As there was little room to build laterally, the focus of the architecture was on the drum and dome of the building, built ever higher and with more richly textured transitional zones and domes.

Secular Architecture

One of the secular types of Islamic architecture is the palace, which matches the mosque in reflecting the rich variety of forms, ornamentation, and the sophisticated skills of artisans. Built as large complexes rather than singular units, Islamic palaces were generally self-sustaining, and most contained bastion walls, towers, gates, baths, stables, private quarters, public meeting spaces, workshops, offices, hospitals, barams or zenanas (reserved for the women of the palace), libraries, pavilions, fountains, and gardens. These palaces were built as the architectural embodiment of the ruler, the spatial metaphor of his dominion, and, if built in idyllic settings with surrounding gardens, were considered earthly paradises. The first palaces were built by the Umayyads and were modeled after Roman villas. Serving as hunting lodges or rural residences these include the Qasr al-Hayr, Khirbat al-Mafjar, and Khirbat al-Minya of the eighth century. Other well-known palaces are the Fatimid Palace of al-Qahirah (1087–1092), Umayyad Madinat al-Zahara of Cordoba (936–976), the Nasrid Alhambra in Granada, Spain (early fourteenth century), the Ottoman Topkapi complex, and Mogul Fatehpur Sikri and Red Fort, built in Delhi during the sixteenth century.

Islamic secular architecture is also public in nature. Among these buildings are the caravansaries and hammams. The caravanserai was a stopping place for travelers to rest and water and feed their animals. A typical caravanserai had a large open courtyard with a single large portal. Inside, along the walls, were covered arcades that contained identical stalls...
to accommodate a traveler, and his servants. Animals were usually kept in the courtyard or stables located in the corners. Caravansaries were usually fortified with bastions and turreted walls. As with mosques and palaces, caravansaries vary in ornamentation and form from region to region. Inside the city the khan housed the travelers and merchants. These structures were multistoried and overlooked a central courtyard. The animals and goods were kept on the ground floor and apartments were located above.

The public bath or hammam was another architectural form found in many Islamic cities. Along with the khan it was located in the suq or marketplace. Adopted from the Romans, the hammam was used for washing and purification before Friday prayer. It was composed of large rooms for steam baths as well as others for soaking in hot and cold water, all of which communicated through waiting halls. Utilizing marble covered floors and walls, arches, large ornamented domes that helped circulate hot air, muqarnas vaults, and stucco decoration, some public baths were highly luxurious environments. Men and women bathed separately either in their own hammam, if there were two in a town, or on different days or at designated times.

**Residential Architecture**

The final type of Islamic architecture to be considered is the domestic. The typical house built in Islamic societies is oriented inward. A bent entrance that turns at a sharp angle marks the transition from the outside world to the home. The entrances of homes do not usually align with those across the street, so the privacy of the interior is maintained. On the inside the rooms are arranged around a central courtyard and range from the private spaces of the family to semiprivate spaces where male guests, who were not members of the family, could enter. The open courtyard ventilates the house. A central basin or fountain, part of most courtyards, also provides a cooling effect and the soothing sound of falling water. In more prosperous households delicately carved wooden screens called mashraabiyyat were used to create private space, filter air from the outside, and allow light to enter the home. The exterior of an Islamic house is often left unadorned. Only upon entering the home will the visitor know the class status of the owner.

*See also Adhan; Art; Dome of the Rock; Holy Cities; Jami; Manar, Manara; Mashhad; Masjid; Mihrab; Minbar (Mimbar); Religious Institutions.*

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*Santhi Kavuri-Bauer*

**ART**

Islamic art is generally reckoned to cover all of the visual arts produced in the lands where Muslims were an important, if not the most important, segment of society. Islamic art differs, therefore, from such other terms as Buddhist or Christian art, for it refers not only to the arts produced by or for the religion of Islam but to the arts of all Islamic cultures. Islamic art was not necessarily created by or for Muslims, for some Islamic art was made by Christian, Jewish, or even Hindu artists working for Muslim patrons, and some Islamic art was created for non-Muslim patrons. The term does not refer to a particular style or period, but covers a broad purview, encompassing the arts produced over one-fifth of the globe in the traditional heartland of Islam (from Spain to India) during the last fourteen hundred years.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century Islam is the world’s fastest growing religion. It has spread beyond the traditional heartland of Islam in North Africa, the Near East, and west Asia to southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Muslims comprise nearly one-quarter of the world’s population; the largest Muslim populations are in southeast Asia, and there are sizable Muslim communities in Europe and North America. The term *Islamic art* is therefore becoming increasingly unwieldy, and in current usage concerning modern art, the adjective “Islamic” is often restricted to purely religious expressions such as calligraphy.

The idea of an Islamic art is a distinctly modern notion, developed not by the culture itself but by art historians in Europe and America trying to understand a relatively unfamiliar world and to place the arts created there into the newly developing field of art history. In light of the nationalism that developed during the early twentieth century, some scholars,
particularly those in the Islamic lands, questioned the use of the term, opting instead for nationalistic names, speaking of, say, Turkish or Persian art. But these terms are also misleading, for Islam has traditionally been a multiethnic and multicultural society, and it is impossible to distinguish the contribution of, for example, Persian-speaking artists in what is today Turkey. Other scholars, particularly in the late twentieth century, have questioned the term Islamic art as too general, since it refers neither to the art of a specific era nor to that of a particular place or people. Instead, they opt for regional or dynastic categories such as Maghribi (i.e., North African) or Mamluk (i.e., Egyptian and Syrian, thirteenth to sixteenth centuries) art. While these terms can be useful, they overlook the common features that run through much of the art created in the traditional lands of Islam and fragment the picture, particularly for those who are unfamiliar with this area and its rich cultural traditions. Without slighting the differences among the arts created in different regions in different periods, this entry focuses on the common features that run through many of the arts created within the broad rubric of Islamic art: the distinct hierarchy of forms and the themes of decoration.

**Forms**

Apart from architecture, the arts produced in the Islamic lands follow a different formal hierarchy than that of Western art, where painting and sculpture are the two most important forms and are used to make religious images for worship. These forms play a relatively minor role in Islamic art, where instead the major forms of artistic expression are the arts of the book, textiles, ceramics, woodwork, metalwares, and glass. In Western art, these are often called the “minor,” “decorative,” or “portable” arts, but such labels are pejorative, implying that these forms are secondary, less meaningful and less permanent than the more important, stable, and therefore “noble” arts of painting and sculpture. To use such terms is to view the world of art from the vantage point of the West, and one of the significant features of Islamic art is that it introduces the viewer to different ways of looking at art.

**Bookmaking.** Of all the arts created in the Islamic lands, the most revered was the art of the book, probably because of the veneration accorded to writing the revealed word of God. Calligraphers were deemed the most important type of artist and paid the most for their work. They penned many fine manuscripts, but the finest were exquisite copies of the Qur’an. Those made for use in a congregational mosque were large, multivolume sets, often divided into either seven or thirty parts so that the entire text could be read over the course of a week or a month. Personal copies of the Qur’an were generally smaller, but they, too, often had fine penmanship. The great reverence for writing spilled over into the production of other texts, particularly in Iran, India, and Turkey, and it was one of the reasons that printing with movable type only began to be adopted in the Islamic lands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Most fine manuscripts made in the Islamic lands also had fine decoration. In early times the calligrapher seems also to have been responsible for the illumination, which was usually added after the writing. For example, the famous scribe known as Ibn al-Bawwab (his nickname literally means “son of a doorman”) did both the writing and the decoration in a fine but small copy of the Qur’an made at Baghdad between 1000 and 1001. In early times calligraphers may have prepared all their own materials, but from the fourteenth century onward, the crafts became increasingly specialized, and we know of distinct calligraphers, illuminators, and binders. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were joined by a host of other specialists, ranging from draughtsmen to gold beaters, gold sprinklers, rubricators (those who drew the lines), and the like. All worked together in a team to produce some of the most sublime books ever created in which all the elements were carefully harmonized in a unified and balanced whole.

**Textiles.** A second major art form popular in the traditional Islamic lands is textiles. They were the most important economically and have often been likened to the heavy industries of modern times. The four main fibers used were wool, cotton, linen, and silk, but the making of fine textiles lay not only in producing the fibers, but even more in the expense of procuring the dyes, the mordants to fix the colors, the materials for the looms, and the transport of both fibers and finished goods. It is often hard for modern viewers to appreciate these textiles, since few have survived from medieval times intact. Most were literally worn to shreds, and, unlike in other cultures, only a handful were preserved as grave goods since Muslims traditionally wrap the body in a plain white sheet for burial. Nevertheless in their own times, these textiles were immensely valuable not only in the Muslim lands but also across the globe: Medieval Europeans commonly used imported Islamic textiles to wrap the bones of their saints, and hence, paradoxically, most medieval Islamic textiles have been preserved in Christian contexts.

Textiles were also important for the history of art. Until large sheets of paper to make patterns and cartoons became readily available in the fourteenth century, motifs and designs were often disseminated through the medium of textiles. Textiles are readily portable—they can be folded and carried on an animal’s back without fear of breaking—and were transported over vast distances between Spain and Central Asia. The mechanical nature of weaving on a loom also encouraged the production of multiples and the use of symmetrical, repeating, and geometric designs that are characteristic of much Islamic art.

Of all textiles, the one most identified with the traditional Islamic lands is the knotted carpet. Indeed the traditional heartland of Islam is often dubbed “the rug belt.” Technically the knotted carpet consists of a textile in which additional
threads, usually wool or silk, are knotted into a woven substratum to form a furry surface. The origins of the technique are obscure and controversial, with different ethnic groups claiming precedence. Carpet weaving was already practiced for a millennium before the advent of Islam and may well have been developed by nomads to take advantage of the materials at hand, namely the wool produced by the sheep they herded. Nomads typically used portable looms, which could be dismantled and carried on horseback when the camp moved, to weave small carpets with a limited repertory of geometric designs that were generated from the technique of weaving itself.

In the fourteenth century this individual or family craft was transformed into a cottage or village industry. Carpets became larger and were made in multiples, with some groups available for export. They were expensive items used by the rich and powerful as status symbols. Depictions of enthroned rulers ranging from Mongol manuscripts of the Persian national epic to Italian panel paintings of the Madonna and Child prominently display Islamic knotted carpets beneath the throne, testifying to their international status.

Carpet-weaving was transformed again in the sixteenth century into a national industry. Rulers of the Safavid and Ottoman dynasties set up state workshops with room-sized looms that required teams of weavers to produce carpets measuring over twenty feet across. Unlike the carpet-weaving of nomads, which could be put down or picked up at will, these large-scale enterprises required vast amounts of materials prepared and purchased before work began to insure a uniform product. Designers prepared paper patterns with elaborate floral designs that could only be executed successfully with hundreds of knots per square inch. Some designs even emulated the design of traditional Persian gardens, with depictions of water channels filled with fish, ducks, and geese crossing and dividing rectangular parterres planted with cypresses, fruit trees, and flowers. When the carpet was spread on the floor, the person sitting on it would have been surrounded by a verdant refreshing garden.

Metals, Ceramics, and Glasswares. Other common artforms created in the Muslim lands comprise metalwares, ceramics, and glasswares. These techniques have been dubbed the “arts of fire” as they are based on the use of fire to transform minerals extracted from the earth into works of art. The discovery of fire to transform humble materials into utensils was one of the hallmarks of the rise of civilization in West Asia, and the manufacture of shimmering metalwares, ceramics, and glass continued to be characteristic of the
Islamic lands until modern times. Iron and copper alloys were crafted into weapons, tools, and utensils, while silver and gold were made into jewelry and coins. Ceramics were used for storage, cooking, and serving food, and glass was used for lighting, keeping and serving foods, and storing perfumes and medicines. Unlike the Christian lands, where vessels of silver and gold were used in church liturgy, Islam required no such luxury objects in the mosque, and the finest bowls, plates, and pitchers are merely expensive versions of objects used in daily life.

Base metal, ceramic, and glass shapes were also made in such rare and costly materials as gold and silver, rock crystal, jade, and ivory. The pious disapproved of using gold vessels, and many items of precious metal were melted down for coin in times of need. A rare silver box made for the Spanish Umayyad heir-apparent Abu Walid Hisham in 976 is the same shape and dimensions as an ivory example made for the Spanish Umayyad chamberlain ‘Abd al-Malik in Spain between 1004 and 1005. The metal box even copies the details of the ivory box, including the strap over the top, which is hammered from the same sheet of silver as the rest of the lid. The strap is useless on the silver box, but imitates the metal strap that would have held the lid in place on a wooden or ivory box.

Another case of similar vessels in different media is the series of small jugs made for the Timurid rulers of Central Asia in the fifteenth century. Some gold ones are illustrated in contemporary manuscripts, and examples survive in several materials, including jade, metal, and ceramic. The jugs, which measure about 6 inches (15 centimeters) high, have a globular body and short cylindrical neck with a handle shaped like a dragon. The shape derives from Chinese porcelains. The inscriptions on the Timurid examples make it clear that they were wine jugs, and the various materials correspond to the rank of the patron. Jade, technically a type of white nephrite, became available after the Timurids seized the jade mines in Khotan in Chinese Turkestan. The use of jade was reserved for rulers, as it was not only rare and expensive but also thought to counteract poison. Timurid rulers and their courtiers also commissioned similar jugs made of brass, sometimes inlaid with gold and silver, but some anonymous examples were probably made for sale on the open market as were the cheaper ceramic ones.

Themes of Decoration

Unlike other artistic traditions, particularly the Chinese, where form alone can be considered sufficient to turn an object into a work of art, much Islamic art is highly decorated. Surfaces were elaborately adorned using a wide variety of techniques and motifs. While different styles of decoration were popular at different times and places, several themes of decoration occur everywhere. These include figural decoration, flowers, geometry, color, and writing.

Figural Imagery. Many people believe that images of people are forbidden in Islam, but this assumption is wrong. The Qur’an forbids idolatry, but it has little to say on the subject of figural representation, which was apparently not a subject of great importance in Arabia during the late sixth and early seventh centuries. Furthermore, Muslims have little need to depict images in their religious art. For Muslims, God is unique, without associate; therefore He cannot be represented, except by His word, the Qur’an. Muslims worship God directly without intercessors, so they have no need for images of saints, as Christians do. The prophet Muhammad was human, not divine, so Muslims do not worship him as Christians worship Jesus. Furthermore, the Qur’an is not a continuous narrative. Thus, Muslims do not need religious images to proselytize in the way that Christians use depictions of Christ or stories from the Bible to teach their faith.

Over time this lack of images hardened into law, and the absence of figures, technically known as aniconism, became a characteristic feature of Islamic religious art. Thus, mosques, mosque furnishings such as minbars (pulpits) and mihrabs (recesses in the wall facing Mecca), and other types of religious buildings such as madrasas do not usually contain pictures of people. But there is no reason that Muslims cannot depict people in other places and settings. Thus palaces could, and indeed often did, have images of people, particularly servants, guards, and other members of a ruler’s retinue. Similarly, bathhouses were often decorated with bathers, sometimes nude, and other scenes of relaxation and pleasure.
These types of secular building were often more architecturally inventive than religious structures, which tended to follow traditional lines. But secular structures have not survived as well as mosques and religious structures, which were continuously venerated and maintained, and so the historical record is spotty, and many of the best-known secular buildings to survive in the Islamic lands are those that have long been abandoned. Archaeological excavation and restoration of such sites as the bathhouse at Qusayr Amra, built in the Jordanian desert by the Umayyads in the early eighth century, and Samarra in Iraq, the sprawling capital built by the Abbasids upstream from Baghdad in the mid-ninth century, show that already in early Islamic times bathhouses and palaces were decorated with pictures of people engaging in activities inappropriate in religious situations.

Similarly, copies of the Qur’an do not have pictures of people, but many nonreligious books made in the Islamic lands do. These range from scientific treatises to histories, chronicles, and literary works, both prose and poetry. Sometimes, illustrations were needed to explain the text, as in copies of al-Sufi’s treatise on the fixed stars, al-Kawakib al-thabita. They show that the classical tradition of depicting the constellations as humans and animals was continued in Islamic times. Sometimes, however, illustrations were added even when the text did not demand them. One of the most frequently illustrated texts to survive from medieval Islamic times is al-Hariri’s Maqamat (Seances or Sessions). Eleven illustrated copies produced before 1350 have survived, and the number suggests that there were once many more. This work recounts the picaresque adventures of the cunning merchant Abu Zayd as he travels throughout the Muslim world, hoodwinking his rivals. The success of the text, which became very popular among the educated bourgeoisie of the Arab lands, depended on its verbal pyrotechnics, with triple puns, subtle allusions, and complex rhymes. The illustrations emphasize a different aspect of the text—the protagonist’s adventures in faraway lands—and provide rare glimpses of daily life in medieval times, including scenes of villages, markets, and libraries.

The tradition of figural imagery was particularly strong in the Persian world, which had a long history of figural representation stretching back to pre-Islamic times, and the illustrated books made there and in the nearby Persian-speaking lands such as India from the fourteenth century onward have some of the most stunning illustrations ever painted. Virtually all of them include people and animals, both real and imaginary. A few even include images of the prophet Muhammad, but these are not meant as religious icons but to illustrate historical or literary texts. The mi’raj, the Prophet’s mystical journey from Jerusalem to heaven and back mentioned in the Qur’an (17:1), was elaborated, particularly by Sufis or mystics, and scenes illustrating it commonly show the Prophet on his mystical steed Buraq. In some cases the Prophet’s face is visible, but by Ottoman times a conservative reaction had set in and artists often covered his face and even his body with a veil.

Since figural imagery was unnecessary in Islamic religious art, other themes of decoration became more important. Many of them had been subsidiary elements in the arts of pre-Islamic times. In Byzantine art, for example, depictions of people had been set off, framed, or linked by vegetal designs (that is, stylized fruits, flowers, and trees) and geometric elements (shapes and patterns). In Islamic times, these subsidiary elements were transformed into major artistic themes. At first artists used recognizable elements, such as trees or plants, as in the mosaics used in the Great Mosque of Damascus erected by the Umayyad caliph al-Walid in the early eighth century. With the growing reluctance to depict figures, such specific and realistic representations were replaced by more stylized, abstracted, and geometricized motifs.

**Geometry.** Such an abstract style was already popular by the ninth century and is found on carved plaster and woodwork made from North Africa to Central Asia. The extraordinary range of this style suggests a common origin in the Abbasid capitals of Iraq, and German excavations at the site of Samarra in the early twentieth century uncovered many examples in molded and carved stucco. The most distinct type uses a slanted, or beveled, cut, which allowed the plaster slab to be released quickly from the mold. In the beveled style, motifs are abstracted and geometricized and the distinction between foreground and background is blurred.

This type of design based on natural forms such as stems, tendrils, and leaves rearranged to form infinite geometric patterns became a hallmark of Islamic art produced between the tenth century and the fifteenth. To describe it, Europeans coined the word “arabesque,” literally meaning “in the Arab style,” in the fifteenth or sixteenth century when Renaissance artists incorporated Islamic designs in book ornament and decorative bookbindings. Over the centuries the word has been applied to a wide variety of winding, twining vegetal decoration in art and meandering themes in music.

The nineteenth-century Viennese art historian Alois Riegl laid out the principal features of the arabesque in Islamic art. In it, the tendrils of the vegetation do not branch off from a single continuous stem, as they do in nature, but rather grow unnaturally from one another to form a geometric pattern. He pointed out that the arabesque also has infinite correspondence, meaning that the design can be extended indefinitely in any direction. The structure of the arabesque gives the viewer sufficient information to extend the design in his or her imagination.

The popularity of the arabesque was due no doubt to its adaptability, for it was appropriate to virtually all situations and media, from paper to woodwork and ivory. It was used on
the illuminated pages that were added to decorate the beginning and end of fine manuscripts, particularly copies of the Qur’an. These decorated pages became increasingly elaborate and are often called carpet pages. The largest and finest were produced in Egypt and Syria during the period of rule by the Mamluks (r. 1250–1517). The frontispieces in these grand manuscripts of the Qur’an (some measure a whopping 30 inches, or 75 cm, high) are decorated with elaborate geometric designs of polygons radiating from central star shapes.

From the fourteenth century the arabesque was gradually displaced by more naturalistic designs of chrysanthemum, peony, and lotus flowers, motifs adopted from Chinese art during the period of Mongol rule in Iran. This floral style was disseminated westward to the Ottomans, rulers of the eastern Mediterranean region after 1453 from their capital at Istanbul. Artists working at the court of the longest-reigning and most powerful of the Ottoman sultans, Suleyman (r. 1520–1566), developed a distinct floral style with composite flowers and slender, tapering leaves with serrated edges. Designers working in the court studio drew up patterns in this style, which craftsmen then executed in various media, ranging from ceramics to textiles.

The pervasiveness of geometric designs throughout Islamic art has been traced to the importance of textiles, and Golombek coined the phrase “the draped universe of Islam.” The production of fibers and dyes formed the mainstay of the medieval Islamic economy. In addition to clothing, textiles were the main furnishings of dwellings and even, in the form of tents, the dwellings themselves. The central role of textiles is underscored by the Ka’aba in Mecca, which Muslims believe is the house that Ibrahim (Abraham) erected for God and which is the central shrine of Islam, a cubic stone building that has been veiled in cloth coverings since the dawn of the faith. The structure of weaving favors angular designs based on the intertwining of warp and weft, and interlaced designs, found even in writing, may be another example of the textile mentality that permeated Islamic society.

Color. Another theme that runs through much Islamic art is the exuberant use of color. Bright and vivid colors are found not only in illustrated manuscripts, but also in media where they might not be expected. For example, metalworkers in the Islamic lands developed the technique of inlay, in which a vessel made of one metal (typically bronze or brass) is inlaid with another (typically, silver, copper, or gold). Designs were further set off in a bituminous black that absorbs light, in contrast to the surrounding metallic surfaces that reflect it. In this way, metal workers could decorate their wares with elaborate scenes that resembled paintings or work out enormous inscriptions that seem to glow from the object and set off the patron’s name or Qur’anic text in lights, as it were.

Woodworkers achieved similar effects by combining ivory or bone with ebony, teak, and other precious woods. The most expensive pieces of woodwork were mosque furnishings such as masquras (screens to enclose an area in front of the mihrab), minbars (pulpits), and Qur’an stands. The designs on these pieces were usually geometric, with elaborate interlacing and strapwork patterns. Perhaps the most stunning is the stupendous minbar made in 1137 at Cordoba for the Almoravid mosque in Marrakesh, which has thousands of individual panels meticulously carved in a variety of rare and exotic woods with arabesque designs. These panels were fitted flawlessly into a complex geometric scheme, so that the decoration can be equally appreciated from near and far away.

Islamic ceramics are also notable for their wonderful colors. Potters constantly invented new and different techniques of over- and underglaze painting. Their finest effort was the development of the luster technique, in which vessels and tiles were painted with metallic oxides and then fired in a reducing atmosphere so that the oxygen burned away, leaving the shimmering metal on the surface. The technique may have been invented by glassmakers in Egypt and Syria in the eighth century, but soon passed to potters, who developed its full potential, first in ninth-century Iraq, then in Fatimid (969–1171), Egypt, and finally in Iran. Luster potters working there in the city of Kashan in the late twelfth and early
Ism in the Muslim World 81

The texts inscribed on works of Islamic art range in subject matter. Some contain verses from the Qur’an, Traditions of the Prophet (called hadith in Arabic), and other religious texts. Others are short pious phrases recalling God’s power and omnipotence (the most common is al-mulk illah, dominion belongs to God) or invoking the name of the Prophet, his family, and other significant religious figures such as the Four Orthodox caliphs who succeeded Muhammad as leaders of the Muslim community in the early seventh century. Probably the most common type of text inscribed on works of Islamic art comprises benedictions and good wishes, which can range from a single word (the most common is baraka, blessing) to long phrases with rhyming pairs of nouns and adjectives.

These inscriptions, particularly on expensive pieces, sometimes contain historical information, including the name of the patron, the date, the place the object was made, and even the name of the artist. Art historians always look for this type of information since it helps to localize a work of art, but it is important for other reasons as well. Historical information also implies that the work of art was a specific commission, made for a particular individual at a specific moment or to commemorate a specific event. The historical information also tells us in which direction to view a work of art, since this information is usually included at the end of the text. Signatures allow us to establish the biographies of artists, a type of person not generally recorded in histories and chronicles, and thereby fill out the artistic record.

Many different styles of script were used to decorate works of Islamic art. Historical information was often written in a more legible rounded hand, because the patron or artist wanted his name to be clear. In contrast, aphorisms and pious phrases were often written in a more stylized angular script. Some might have been intended as puzzles designed to amuse or even tease the user. For example, a group of slip-covered earthenware vessels made in northeastern Iran and Central Asia in the ninth and tenth centuries (when the area was under the domination of the Samanid dynasty) is inscribed with aphorisms in Arabic such as “Knowledge is bitter to the taste at first, but sweeter than honey in the end” or “He who is content with his own opinion runs into danger.” These aphorisms are written in brown or black against the cream slip in an extremely complex script in which the letters are stretched out or distorted and the strokes braided and intertwined. The texts are very difficult to read, and somewhat like a modern cryptic puzzle; decipherment was part of the enjoyment they engendered.

In other cases the difficulty in deciphering the inscriptions on a work of Islamic art may have been due to the artist’s illiteracy. The person who drew up the inscription was not necessarily the same person who executed it on the work of art, and some artists may not have been literate, particularly
those of lower status who worked with cheaper materials in repetitive forms. A group of overglaze-painted earthenware vessels made in the Abbasid lands in the ninth century is often decorated in the center with a few lines of text containing blessings and the name of the potter. The texts are formulaic and often unreadable, with words cut off, and the inscriptions show that the pieces were not a specific commission but made for sale on the open market. Nevertheless, they are eloquent testimony for a world in which writing and written sentiments were appreciated at all levels of society.

See also Architecture; Calligraphy; Mihrab.

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See also Ibn Khaldun.

ASH‘ARITES, ASH‘AIRA

The Ash‘arites, who were also known as al-Ash‘ariyya, were the largest Sunni theological school, and were named after the school’s founder, Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, who lived in the late ninth and early tenth centuries (873–935). Little is known of al-Ash‘ari’s personal and scholarly life. The most often repeated information in the sources is that at the age forty, after a series of visions, he changed his position in Islamic theology. He left his Mu‘tazilite teacher Abu ‘Ali al-Jubba‘i over a theological dispute on divine grace and human responsibility (exemplified by the famous example of three brothers with different eschatological fates), and accepted the authority of Ahmad b. Hanbal. Al-Ash‘ari thus adhered to the principles of the traditionalist Sunni majority (*Abi al-summa al-jama‘a*), although despite their opposition he defended the necessity of using rational argumentation, which was widely practiced by Mu‘tazilites, in justifying these principles. Following his conversion he even wrote a short treatise...
in favor of the argumentative method in Islamic theology. In combining Sunni doctrines with Mu'tazilite methodology he was regarded as the founder of the first and later dominant theological school among Sunnis. There were some other independent scholars who tried partly to apply rational methodology to Sunni doctrines before Al-Ash'ari, such as Ibn Kullab, Harith al-Muhasibi, and Abul-'Abbas al-Qalanisi, but they were not recognized as the masters of a school by later Sunni theologians. With the exception of the followers of the Hanafite theologian Abu Mansur al-Maturidi in Central Asia, almost all Sunni theologians were regarded as Ash'arite, although they departed from al-Ash'ari in some points.

Al-Ash'ari’s immediate students, Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Bahili, Ibn Mujahid al-Ta’i, and others, were not influential in the history of Ash’arism. However the following generation, among them Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 1013), Ibn Furak (d. 1015), Abu Ishaq al-Isfara’ini (d. 1027), and ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037), played a major role in the formation of the school. Al-Baqillani, for instance, was regarded as the second founder, due to his contributions in rationalizing the Ash’arite school through his doctrines of atomism, nonexistence, and so on.

Although Ash’arite scholars suffered for a while from the persecution of Buwayhid sultans and the Seljuk Wazir al-Kunduri in the eleventh century, their conditions rapidly changed shortly after gaining a wide support of the Seljuks during the time of the famous intellectual wazir Nizam al-Mulk. He established the Nizamiyya madrasa (school) in Nishapur, in which Ash’arite views were officially taught, and then spread to other parts of the Islamic world as far away as North Africa and Muslim Spain. At this time leading Ash’arite thinkers were Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 1085) and his student Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), both of whom taught at the Nizamiyya School. Al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali imported some philosophical terms and topics into Ash’arite kalam and legitimized the use of formal Aristotelian logic in both Islamic theological and legal theories.

In the twelfth century, a philosophical trend dominated among the so-called modern or later theologians (al-muta‘akkibbin). This trend gained in strength with the works of later independent-minded scholars of the school, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209), Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (d. 1233), and Qadi al-Baydawi (d. 1286). Ash’arite thought came under the influence of Avicennan Neoplatonist cosmology and mostly absorbed the Islamic philosophical tradition in Sunni theology after a major but ineffective stand by the well-known philosopher Averroes. Thinkers of genius from Central Asia, especially ‘Adud al-Din al-Iji (d. 1355) and his students Sa’d al-Din al-Taftazani (d. 1389) and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 1413), contributed to the interpretation and expansion of Ash’arite thought by producing large commentaries throughout the fourteenth century. Ottoman thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, though officially Maturidite, also contributed to this philosophical production by their commentaries and marginal notes on the works of the above-named Central Asian Ash’arites.

The Ash’arite school continued to exist in the seventeenth century in the works of the Egyptian al-Lakani and the Indian al-Sayyalkuti. After a continuous modernization process in the Muslim world that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Sunnis from both the Ash’arite and Maturidite traditions, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh of Egypt, Shibli Nu’mani of India, and Izmirli Ismail Hakki of Ottoman Turkey, attempted a methodological renovation within Islamic theological thought. During this period of modernity, sectarian concerns and identities weakened among Muslim intellectuals, since they took an eclectic and broader approach in order to satisfy the demands of their age. The contemporary Muslim modernists followed their predecessors in detaching themselves from a strict identification with a particular school of thought. However, Ash’arism still continues to maintain its existence in Sunni societies today.

Ash’arite thinkers, following al-Mu’tazila, dealt with the main theological issues of Islamic faith, including arguments for the existence of God, divine unity, revelation, prophecy, and eschatology. They aimed to refute the opposing views of other religions and philosophical schools in a rational dialectical method. But they also discussed the controversial theological issues first raised by the Mu’tazilites, such as the existence of attributes of God (sifat Allah), the nature of divine speech (kalâm Allah), the possibility of seeing God in the future life (ru‘yat Allah), the question of divine omnipotence and human free will (iradah), and the fate of a believing sinner (murtakib al-kabira). In Ash’arite theology God has eternal attributes such as knowledge, speech, and sight, which are, in their system, essential for His knowing, speaking, or seeing. Since it belongs to his eternal attribute of speech, the Qur’an as God’s word was uncreated. Unlike the traditionalist Sunni school and al-Ash’ari himself, later Ash’arites did not oppose the metaphorical interpretation of corporeal terms attributed to God in the Qur’an. As for the question of free will and predestination, Ash’arites took a middle position between the Mu’tazilites and Jabrites in emphasizing God’s creation of human acts, which each person freely chooses.

There are some differences between the Ash’arites and Maturidites, the second Sunni theological school, but they are usually regarded as methodological and nonessential. Ash’arites, for instance, rejected takwin (which means “to bring into existence”) as a divine attribute, the eternalness of God’s actions, unlike his attributes, and the necessity of believing in the existence and unity of God through rational arguments in the absence of divine revelation, which are among the Maturidite theses.

See also Kalam; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila.
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M. Sait Özervarlı

ASKIYA MUHAMMAD

(R. 1493–1529)

The ruler of the Songhai Empire between 1493 and 1529, Muhammad b. Abi Bakr Ture is also known as Askiya al-Hajj Muhammad, or Askiya Muhammad. His origins are debated. According to the two Tawarikh, or “histories” (Tarikh al-Sudan and Tarikh al-Fattash), he belonged either to the Ture or the Sylla clan of the Soninke. Because they were associated with trade, the Soninke were one of the earliest groups to convert to Islam south of the Sahara. Askiya al-Hajj Muhammad overthrew the dynasty of the Sunni in 1493, and established the dynasty known as the Askiya who ruled the Songhai Empire from 1493 until the Moroccan invasion of the Songhai in 1591. Unlike his predecessor, Sunni ‘Ali, Askiya Muhammad was said to be a pious Muslim, and very supportive of Muslim scholars in Timbuctu, and other parts of Songhai. In 1496, Askiya Muhammad set off for the pilgrimage to Mecca. On his way to Mecca, he visited Egypt, and was appointed by the Abbassid caliph al-Mutawakkil as his deputy to rule Songhai in his name. Askiya al-Hajj Muhammad consulted two major Muslim scholars on how to rule Songhai according to the shari‘a. One of them was ‘Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d. 1503 or 1504), and the other was Jalal al-din al-Suyuti (d. 1505). Askiya Muhammad extended the Songhai Empire to include tributary lands to the east, west, and north. No further expansion of the Songhai Empire occurred after his reign. He was deposed in 1528 by his son Musa.

See also Africa, Islam in; African Culture and Islam.

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Ousmane Kane

ASNAM

Asnam is the Arabic word for “idols” (sing., sanam). The origin of the term is found in the Semitic root S.L.M. (by a shift of i into n), which denotes “image.” Hence, the Arabic sanam is basically the corporeal image of the deity.

The term sanam occurs in the Qur’an, and in all instances but one it refers to the idols worshiped by Abraham’s pagan adversaries (6:74; 21:57; 26:71). Twice the idols worshiped by the latter are called awthan (sing., awtah; see 29:17, 25). Abraham’s contemporaries worship the asnam/awthan “apart from” (min duni) God, which means that belief in these idols represents what the Qur’an labels elsewhere as shirk (“association”), that is, worshiping deities that are considered God’s associates. Three of God’s “associates” are mentioned by name in another Qur’anic passage (53:19–23): Allat, Manat, and al-Uzza. The Qur’an sets out to deny that they were God’s daughters, a typical element of shirk, and denounces them as sheer names. In yet another Qur’anic passage (71:23), five “gods” (aliba) worshiped by Noah’s contemporaries are mentioned by name.

In extra-Qur’anic sources, the dichotomy between the worship of the asnam and the monotheistic legacy of Ibrahim, the founder of the Ka’ba in Mecca, is retained. The traditions say that when Mecca became too small for the descendants of Abraham and Ishmael, they looked for dwellings outside Mecca, taking with them stones from the homeland, which they cherished and turned into idols. Nevertheless, according to these sources even far away from Mecca they preserved many of Abraham’s values, such as the rites of the pilgrimage to Mecca, but they contaminated them with various elements of shirk. The shrines of some of these idols are said to have been built on the model of the Ka’ba, and sometimes were even called “Ka’ba.”

Conversely, idolatry is said to have been imported into Arabia from outside by one ‘Amr b. Luhayy of the tribe of Khuz’a, who ruled in Mecca before the advent of Quraish. He is said to have imported idols mainly from Syria. Among
them the five idols of Noah’s time are mentioned. The establishment of the worship of Hubal at the Ka’ba is also attributed to this ‘Amr. Names of numerous additional *asnam* are mentioned in the sources with details about the tribes who worshiped them.

Of the three “daughters” of God, Manat is said to have been the first to be introduced in Arabia, then Allat, then al-‘Uzza. Manat’s shrine was in Qudayd (near Mecca, on the Red Sea shore), Allat’s in al-Ta’if, and al-‘Uzza’s in Nakha. Pilgrims brought votive gifts to the shrines and sacrificial slaughter took place on special stones (*naula*) there.

Apart from the collective idols, some traditions speak about domestic *asnam* whose carved wooden images were held in each family household (*dar*) in Mecca. There are also reports about similar tribal and domestic idols in pre-Islamic Medina. The shrines of the main idols as well as the domestic images were reportedly destroyed in Muhammad’s days, following the spread of Islam in Arabia.

Modern scholars have doubted the historicity of the notion of Arabian idolatry being a deformed version of an initial Iblis monotheism centered on the Ka’ba, and have rejected it as reflecting Qur’anic and Islamic concepts projected back into remote pre-Islamic phases of history. On the other hand, other Islamicists noted the possibility that Iblis’s image as a monotheistic prototype could have been known already in pre-Islamic Arabia.

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See also Allah; Shirk.

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*Uri Rubin*  

**ASSASSINS**

Assassins was a name originally applied by the Crusaders and other medieval Europeans, starting in the twelfth century, to the Nizari Isma‘ilis of Syria. Under the initial leadership of Hasan Sabbah (d. 1124), the Nizaris founded a state centered at the stronghold of Alamut, in northern Iran, with a subsidiary in Syria. The Nizari state in Iran was destroyed by the Mongols in 1256. In Syria the Nizaris reached the peak of their power and glory under Rashid al-Din Sinan (d. 1193), the original “Old Man of the Mountain” of the Crusaders, who had extended dealings with the Crusaders and their Frankish ruling circles in the Near East. The Syrian Nizaris permanently lost their political prominence when they were subdued by the Mamluks in the early 1270s.

The Nizaris and the Crusaders had numerous military encounters in Syria from the opening decade of the twelfth century. But it was in Sinan’s time (1163–1193) that the Crusaders and their occidental observers became particularly impressed by the highly exaggerated reports and widespread rumors about the Nizari assassinations and the daring behavior of their *fida‘is*, or devotees, who carried out suicide missions against their community’s enemies in public places. The Nizari Isma‘ilis became infamous in Europe as “the Assassins.” This term, which appears in medieval European literature in a variety of forms (Assassini, Assissini, and Heyssini), was evidently based on variants of the Arabic word *hashishi* (plural, *hashishiyya* or *hashishin*), which was applied pejoratively to the Nizaris of Syria and Iran by other Muslims. The term was used in the sense of “low-class rabble” or “people of lax morality” without claiming any special connection between the Nizaris and hashish, a product of hemp. This term of abuse was picked up locally in Syria by the Crusaders as well as by other European travelers and emissaries and was adopted to designate the Nizari Isma‘ilis.

Medieval Europeans, and especially the Crusaders, who remained generally ignorant of Islam and its divisions, were also responsible for fabricating and disseminating, in the Latin Orient as well as in Europe, a number of interconnected legends about the secret practices of the Nizaris, including the “hashish legend.” It held that as part of their training this intoxicating drug was systematically administered to the *fida‘is* by their beguiling chief, the “Old Man of the Mountain.” The so-called Assassin legends revolved around the recruitment and training of the Nizari *fida‘is*, who had attracted the Europeans’ attention. These legends developed in stages and culminated in a synthesized version popularized by Marco Polo, who applied the legends to the Iranian Nizaris and created the “secret garden of paradise,” where the *fida‘is* supposedly received part of their indoctrination. Henceforth, the Nizari Isma‘ilis were portrayed in European sources as a sinister order of drugged assassins bent on senseless murder and mischief.

Subsequently, Westerners retained the name Assassin in general reference to the Nizari Isma‘ilis, even though the term had now become in European languages a new common noun meaning a professional murderer, although its etymology had been forgotten. Silvestre de Sacy (1758–1838) finally succeeded in solving the mystery of the name Assassin and its etymology, but he and other orientalists subscribed variously to the Assassin legends. Modern scholarship in Isma‘ili studies, based on genuine Isma‘ili sources, has now deconstructed the Assassin legends revealing their fanciful nature and also showing that the name Assassin is a misnomer rooted in a doubly pejorative appellation without basis in any communal
or organized use of hashish by the Nizari Isma’ilis or their fida’is, Shi’ite Muslims who were deeply devoted to their community.

See also Crusades; Shi’a: Isma’il.

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Farhad Daftary

ASTROLOGY

Despite consistent critiques of astrology by Muslim scientists and religious scholars, astrological prognostications required a fair amount of exact scientific knowledge, and thus gave partial incentive for the study and development of astronomy. In the early Arabic sources, the term ‘ilm al-nujum was used to refer to both astronomy and astrology. Soon after, however, astronomy was unambiguously differentiated from astrology, and a clear terminological and conceptual distinction was made between the two sciences. The titles ‘ilm al-falak (the science of the celestial orb) and ilm al-bay’a (the science of the configuration of heavens) were used to refer to the exact science of astronomy, while ‘ilm abkam al-nujum (judicial astrology), or simply ‘ilm al-nujum (the science of the stars), referred exclusively to astrology. Both fields were rooted in the Greek, Persian, and Indian traditions, and were cultivated for many centuries in Muslim societies. In all of these earlier traditions, interest in the science of astronomy has been closely connected to astrology.

The connection between astronomy and astrology in the inherited scientific legacies was founded on the idea of a correlation between stellar configurations and events in the sub-lunar world. Thus, for example, the same cosmology underlying Ptolemy’s Almagest—the most influential Greek astronomical work—provided the theoretical foundations of the Tetrabiblos, an influential astrological work by the same author. In Muslim societies, astrology continued to be practiced and to draw on and encourage astronomical knowledge, and a good portion of the funding for astronomical research was motivated by the desire to make astrological predictions. A number of observatories were funded and founded for the professed objective of conducting observations that could be used in astrological computation. Astrology was also commonly practiced in courts. In particular, one such form of court astrology was iktiyarat—a branch of astrology that aimed at determining the optimal astrological conditions for initiating large undertakings, such as the building of cities or the launching of military campaigns. Another popular form of astrological prediction was mawalid (nativities), which involves charting the horoscopes of the beginnings of both personal and collective occurrences, including the birth of individuals, as well as the birth of prophets, historical leaders, religions, and nations. The classic work of Arabic astrology is Abu Ma’shar al-Balkhi’s (d. 886) Kitab al-madkhal al-kabir (The great introduction).

Yet, although astrology continued to have appeal within the elite political culture and in popular practice, the larger, socially based religious culture vehemently opposed it. Moreover, while many astronomers served as court astrologers, many more condemned astrology and distanced themselves from it. Most of these astronomers did not treat astrology as a valid scientific discipline, and went out of their way to distance their exact science from it. Despite its continued practice, a clear line was drawn between astrology and astronomy. Thus, of the hundreds of Arabic works dealing with the sciences of the stars, the vast majority are on astronomy, while only a small portion of this legacy relates to astrological subjects.

See also Astronomy; Science, Islam and.

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ASTRONOMY

Before Islam, Arab knowledge of the stars was limited to the division of the year into precise periods on the basis of star risings and settings. This area of astronomical knowledge was known as anwa’, and it was largely overshadowed by the traditions of Arabic mathematical astronomy that emerged in the Islamic period. From its beginnings in the ninth and through the sixteenth centuries, astronomical activity in the Muslim world was widespread and intensive. The first astronomical texts that were translated into Arabic in the eighth century were of Indian and Persian origin. The earliest extant Arabic astronomical texts date to the second half of the eighth century and were influenced by the Indian and Persian traditions. However, the greatest formative influence on Arabic astronomy is undoubtedly Greek, on account of the use in Greek astronomy of effective geometrical representations. The Almagest of Ptolemy (second century C.E.), in
particular, exerted a disproportionate influence on all of medieval astronomy through the whole of the Arabic period and until the eventual demise of the geocentric astronomical system. However, at the same time the first Arabic translation of this text were prepared, original work of Arabic astronomy was also produced. Thus, original astronomical research went hand in hand with translation and, from its very beginnings in the ninth century, Arabic astronomy attempted to revise, refine, and complement Ptolemaic astronomy, rather than simply reproduce it.

In its earlier stages, Arabic astronomy reworked and critically examined the observations and the computational methods of Greek astronomy and, in a limited way, was able to explore problems outside its set frame. Arabic astronomy witnessed further developments in the tenth and eleventh centuries as a result of systematic astronomical research as well as developments in other branches of the mathematical sciences. In this period, steps were also taken toward the establishment of large-scale observatories. Subsequently, several programs of astronomical observations involved the establishment of observatories in institutional setups where collective programs of astronomical research were executed. Advances in trigonometry resulting from the full integration of the Indian achievements in the field, as well as from new discoveries in the tenth and eleventh centuries, played a central role in the further development of Arabic astronomy. As a great synthesis of the Greek, Indian, and Arabic astronomical traditions, the *al-Qanun al-Mas'udi* of the illustrious astronomer al-Biruni (973–c. 1048) represents the culmination of this first stage in the development of Arabic astronomy.

Following its systematic mathematization, the rethink of the theoretical framework of astronomy was further developed after the eleventh century, leading to a thorough evaluation of its physical and philosophical underpinnings. One of the main objectives of this reform tradition was to come up with models in which the motions of the planets could be generated as a result of combinations of uniform circular motions, while at the same time conforming to the accurate Ptolemaic observations. The Ptolemaic models were considered defective because they posited physically impossible models in which spheres rotate uniformly around axes that do not pass through their centers. The reform tradition continued well into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the list of astronomers working within it comprises some of the greatest and most original Muslim scientists. The work produced within this tradition had a formative influence on the work of Copernicus.

In addition to theoretical astronomy, practical astronomical problems occupied a great many astronomers who were responsible for significant advances in the field. Some of these problems had a specific Islamic character, whereas others had to do with the general practical needs of society. The general kind includes such problems as finding the direction of one locality with respect to another, a problem that requires determining the longitudes and latitudes of these localities as well as other aspects of mathematical geography. The “Islamic” problems, on the other hand, were problems related to Islamic worship such as determining the times of prayer, the time of sunrise and sunset in relation to fasting, the direction of the qibla (the direction of the Ka'ba in Mecca, which Muslims have to face during prayer), crescent visibility in connection with the determination of the beginning of the lunar month, and calendar computations. The methods employed to solve these problems varied from simple approximative techniques to complex mathematical ones.

Problems like the determination of the direction of the qibla and the times of prayer also gave a great impetus to the science and art of instrument building. Astrolabes, quadrants, compass boxes, and cartographic grids of varying degrees of sophistication were designed and introduced to solve some of these problems. Many of these same instruments were also used for other astronomical observations and computations; the most important of these is the astrolabe, which was a versatile medieval observational instrument and calculator. Extensive tables were also compiled in connection with time keeping, finding the direction of the qibla, and other astronomical functions.
1. **ATATABAT**

   *Atbat*, or exalted thresholds, are the Shi’ite shrine cities located in modern Iraq. The *atbat* contain the tombs of six of the Shi’ite imams as well as other pilgrimage sites. The *atbat* are located in Najaf, Karbala, Kazamayn, and Samarra. Najaf is the burial place of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, and first in the line of Shi’ite imams, who died in 661 C.E. Karbala is where Husayn, ‘Ali’s son and the third imam, was martyred in a battle against the Umayyads (r. 661–750 C.E.) in 680 C.E. It is a cornerstone of Shi’ite belief that Husayn, courageous and principled, went to battle against all odds, and his demise prefigures and embodies the fate of all those who take an active stand against oppression and injustice. The site of Husayn’s martyrdom had emerged as a Muslim holy site by the middle of the seventh century. Kazamayn entered the sacred landscape of Shi’ism in the ninth century, as the burial site of the seventh and ninth imams, Musa al-Kazim (d. 802 C.E.) and Mohammad al-Ta’qi (d. 834 C.E.). Kazamayn is also the burial site of many a medieval Shi’ite luminary. Samarra, which lies at a distance from the rest of the *atbat*, contains the tombs of the tenth and eleventh imams, Ali al-Naqi (d. 868 C.E.) and Hasan al-‘Askari (d. 873 C.E.). The twelfth imam entered occultation in Samarra in 941 C.E.

   The *atbat* are also significant as centers of Shi’ite learning. Najaf has housed, since the time of the Shaykh al-Ta’ifa Abu Ja’far Muhammad Tusi in the eleventh century, several educational institutions whose scholarly and financial networks have played an important role in determining intellectual and political trends in modern Shi’ism.

   Under Ottoman and later under Iraqi control, the *atbat* have served in recent history as havens against government persecution for those Iranian Shi’ite scholars of the Qajar and the early Pahlevi periods who have spoken out against the ruling establishment at home. Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, was exiled to the *atbat* (Najaf) by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi in 1963. In turn, after the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, those clerics opposed to the religious and political stance of the ruling hierarchy of the Islamic Republic have used the *atbat* as relatively secure bases from which to continue their doctrinal warfare against the religious establishment in Iran. However, it must also be borne in mind that since the 1980s, the Shi’ite community and religious leaders resident in the *atbat* were themselves targeted by the Ba’thist government of former President Saddam Husayn in Iraq. Minority leaders, the ulama of the *atbat*, especially of Najaf and Karbala, have been subjected to numerous incarcerations and assassinations, intensified in the wake of the first Gulf War (1991).

   Another important feature in the social fabric of the *atbat*, directly related to their centrality in settling doctrinal orthodoxy and implementing political agendas, is the vast network of patronage and the nature of finances in the shrine cities. These networks are comprised mainly of donations and religious dues provided by the Shi’ite communities worldwide, with significant portions from the merchant classes of northern India, to the maraji’ al-taqlid who reside there.

2. **ATATURK, MUSTAFA KEMAL (1881–1938)**

   Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) was born in 1881 into a family of modest means in Salonica, then an Ottoman port city in what is today a city in Greece. He died in Istanbul on 10 November 1938. His father, ‘Ali Riza Bey, was a progressive person and worked at the customs house. His mother, Zubeyde Hanim, was a devout Muslim who instilled Islamic values in young Mustafa. Only seven years old at the death of his father, he was raised by his mother and completed his early education at local schools. In 1893 he began his studies at a military secondary school where his teacher gave him his second name, Kemal (perfection), owing to Mustafa’s outstanding performance in mathematics. Two years later he attended the
military academy in Manastir and later entered the War Academy. He graduated in 1905 with the rank of staff captain, and in 1906 was assigned to the Fifth Army in Damascus. In 1907 his duties took him to Macedonia where he established connections with the Young Turks. He participated in the defense of Tripolitania at Tobruk and Derna against the Italian invasion (1911–1912), was appointed as a military attaché to Sophia, and returned to Istanbul to distinguish himself at the Dardanelles in 1915. During World War I, he served on various fronts such as the Caucasus, Palestine, and Aleppo.

Rejecting the Mudros Armistice (30 October 1918), which the Allied powers had imposed on the Ottomans, Mustafa Kemal moved on to Anatolia in May 1919 to begin his nationalist struggle against the invasion and partition of the country. That same year, at the congresses of Erzurum (23 July) and Sivas (4 September), he defined the nationalist demands and goals for independence. It was during this period that he molded various regional paramilitary defense associations into a nationalist army. On 23 April 1920, he established the Great National Assembly in Ankara, claiming exclusive legitimacy in representing the Turkish interests. He was unanimously elected the first president of the assembly. During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal served as the commander in chief of the armed forces.

The Armistice of Mudanya (11 October 1922) sealed the victory of the Turkish forces. Within days, the assembly abolished the sultanate (1 November 1922), though leaving the caliphate in the Ottoman House. The Lausanne Conference (November 1922–July 1923) recognized Turkey’s full independence and defined its borders. On 23 October 1923, the Second Grand National Assembly, controlled by Halk Fırkalılar (People’s Party, later Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—Republican People’s Party) proclaimed the republic and elected Mustafa Kemal its first president. Thus a six hundred-year-old political tradition was brushed aside, and sovereignty placed directly in the hands of the people.

The early years of the republic witnessed fundamental political and social changes. Determined to modernize and secularize his country, and intent upon breaking away from the past, the assembly, under Mustafa Kemal’s guidance, passed a number of laws that brought revolutionary changes. In 1924, the same year that the caliphate was abolished, the Ministry of Seriat (Islamic law) was dismantled and replaced by the Ministry of Justice. In 1925, the Gregorian Calendar replaced the Islamic one, and the fez, which had come to symbolize Islamic headgear, was banned. The wearing of the veil by women was strongly discouraged. The dervish (Sufi) orders were dissolved. The adoption of Swiss Civil Code in 1926 completely negated the Islamic laws of marriage, divorce, and inheritance that had been in practice for centuries. The replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin script in 1928 closed the door to the Ottoman past, and compelled the Turks to look to the future. The passage, in 1934, of a law requiring Turks to use family names further underscored this trend; indeed, Mustafa Kemal’s own surname of Atatürk (Atatürk—Father of Turks) was bestowed upon him by the National Assembly. In the same year, women were given the right to vote. In foreign policy, Turkey followed Mustafa Kemal’s dictum: “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.”

Mustafa Kemal’s reforms were revolutionary. The policies of his Republican People’s Party were expressed in six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and revolutionism. Within these principles Turkey was transformed from a traditional society into a modern nation state. Secularism received particular attention. The Kemalist regime relentlessly pursued secularist policies and dismantled the Islamic institutions. In view of the founder of the new Turkish Republic, centuries-old Islamic institutions and laws could not sufficiently serve the needs of a modern society. Mustafa Kemal believed that Islam would be best served if it were confined to belief and worship rather than brought into the affairs of the state. In his address to the nation on the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933, he promised further progress and asked Turks to “judge time not according to the lax mentality of past centuries, but in terms of the concepts of speed and movement of our century.”

Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal
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Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk (1880–1930), was elected as Turkey’s first president. He transformed Turkey from a traditional society into a modern one by secularizing previously Islamic institutions and laws. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS

Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal
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The Awami League was founded by Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy in June 1949 in the East Bengal (renamed East Pakistan in 1955) province of Pakistan. H. S. Suhrawardy gathered senior members of the Muslim League whose power had diminished in their own party and young, ambitious politicians who were opposed to communalism in Pakistan. Both groups, however, were united in the belief that the Muslim League, which spearheaded Pakistan’s independence movement, no longer represented the needs of the majority of the populace.

In 1949, though barely two years old, Pakistan was already plagued by economic, political, and social disparities between its two major regional wings. This strife was further complicated by the geographical complexity consisting of the four provinces in the west (Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Punjab, and Sindh) with East Bengal in the east, which was separated by approximately one thousand miles of India. Some of the first signs of hostilities between East and West Pakistan arose as early as 1948 when Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, the central architect of the creation of Pakistan, visited the eastern province and proceeded to criticize Bengalis for not learning Urdu, the lingua franca of West Pakistan. Tensions in the regions continued to escalate and in 1952 student efforts to make Bengali a recognized national language led to violent clashes with the police resulting in the deaths of four Dhaka University students. This tragic event further intensified the cultural divide that haunted this young nation.

The people of West Pakistan generally associated the Bengali language with a Hindu India and, therefore, believed that Bengalis should be obligated to learn Urdu, a language clearly associated with Islam. Furthermore, West Pakistani officials deemed Bengalis to be closely aligned with pro-Indian sentiment, which was highly unpopular in West Pakistan. This fear and suspicion of Bengali Muslims contributed to West Pakistan’s refusal to cede many of the demands of Bengali Muslims. They therefore resisted efforts to recognize Bengali as a national language until 1954.

The desperate economic situation plaguing East Pakistan fostered the belief among its inhabitants that their province was being treated as a colony instead of as an equal partner in the burgeoning nation. Although East Pakistan experienced significant economic growth, the province reaped little of the pecuniary benefits with most of the national expenditures directed toward West Pakistan. Furthermore, few Bengalis held important positions in the administration with even fewer represented in the military. These escalating tensions precipitated the unprecedented move of a splinter group, consisting of East Pakistani politicians, to create a new political party to achieve the common goals of the Bengali population.

In 1949 Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ataur Rahman, Maulana Bashani, Shamsul Huq, and Shaykh Mujibur Rahman co-founded the Awami Muslim league. It was the first party truly to provide alternate representation for the people of East Pakistan. In the late 1950s it changed its name to the Awami League, welcoming non-Muslims into its fold, thus marking a significant shift toward secularism. By 1956 the Awami League was the most popular party in East Pakistan and became the Muslim League’s main contender for power.

From 1958 to 1971 Pakistan was reduced to an administrative state with four years of martial law and a diminished role for its fledgling political parties. In February of 1966 Shaykh Mujibur Rahman, the dominant figure in the Awami League, presented the “Six Point Demand” to the other political parties desiring to work collectively to oust the West Pakistani government of Muhammad Ayub Khan. The demands called for separate but equal federation of powers between East and West Pakistan, governed by a parliament elected on the basis of one person/one vote throughout both parts of Pakistan. Gaining the support of the Awami League was equivalent to gaining the support of East Pakistan, but Mujib was only willing to put the Awami League’s support behind the coalition if the coalition from West Pakistan was willing to support his “Six Point Demand” (see Mujibur, Appendix 2, pp. 127–128).

For the Bengalis the “Six Point Demand” clearly and concisely reflected goals that would balance powers between the two regions and place Bengalis on an equal footing with their brethren in the western province. Consequently, this “Six Point Demand” consolidated Bengali support for the Awami League. However, it was simultaneously viewed by those in West Pakistan as a document that would work against the tenets laid out in the creation of a united Pakistan.

In Pakistan’s first general election in December 1970 the Awami League won 167 of the 169 National Assembly seats allotted to East Pakistan. This landslide victory was due in part to other parties boycotting the elections. In West Pakistan, Zulfiquar Ali Khan Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party won 83 of the 131 seats allotted to that province. With this Awami League victory, the National Assembly should have been able
In Dhaka, Bangladesh, activists for the Awami League, one of the country’s two dominant political parties, shout anti-government slogans, protesting the removal of portraits of Shaykh Mujib Rahman, Bangladesh’s independence hero and a founder of the Awami League. In addition to the Awami’s rival party, the BNP, there are more than twenty smaller political parties in Bangladesh.

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Shaykh Mujib, also known as Bangabandhu (“Friend of Bengal”), ruled Bangladesh as its first prime minister until his assassination on 15 August 1975. He is remembered as a great charismatic leader successful in creating the ideological base that united and defined a nation. The constitution of Bangladesh was framed upon Shaykh Mujib’s four principles of democracy, socialism, secularism, and nationalism. Yet after independence he was unable to move the country forward economically or democratically. Less than a year after independence, Shaykh Mujib was accused of being ineffectual—a criticism which further contributed to his decision to limit the Bangladeshi multiparty system. Further leading to Mujib’s downfall was the famine of 1974. In January 1975 the constitution was amended to make Mujib president for five years, giving him full executive authority. A few months later he created the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL, Bangladesh Farmers, Workers, and People’s League) while simultaneously outlawing all other political parties. He then created a paramilitary force called the Rakhi Bahini, which was known for its intimidation tactics.

Under Mujib’s rule, the Awami League faltered in meeting its goals and consequently lost its popularity with the people. However, after Mujib’s death, Bangladesh experienced a number of military coups and counter-coups, resulting in a resurgence of the Awami League’s popularity in the 1980s. Consequently, in June 1996 the League won an overall majority in the Parliament with Shaykh Hasina Wajid, daughter of Shaykh Mujib, sworn in as prime minister. During her tenure in office, Wajid had sought to prosecute her father’s killers and attempted to put forward a pro-democracy platform and pro-socialist economy that encouraged a private sector. Consequently, the League’s rivals often accused it of being too pro-India and secular.

In 1977 Ziaur Rahman, one of Bangladesh’s most-decorated major generals during the war for independence, became Chief Martial Law Administrator and president of Bangladesh from 1977 until his assassination in May 1981. He was also the founder of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). In his first year in office Ziaur Rahman amended the constitution, created by the Awami League government in 1972, to make Islam, and not secularism, one of its guiding principles, a move that ushered in an era of warmer relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Today, there are currently more than twenty political parties in Bangladesh with varying platforms emphasizing communism, secularism, and Islamic interests. However, the Awami League, and its main rival, the BNP, continue to dominate national politics. The BNP, led by Khaleda Zia, widow of Ziaur Rahman, runs on a platform that favors democracy and is more oriented toward Islam. As this young nation strives to develop its political system, the question of whether the state should be secular or Islamic continues to dictate political discourse.

See also Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; South Asia, Islam in.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


AYATOLLAH (AR. AYATULLAH)

The term *ayatollah* (Ar. *ayatullah*), literally “Sign of God,” refers to high-ranking scholars within the Twelver Shi’ite tradition. The term emerged in the early modern period (late 19th century) to describe the elite of the Shi’ite scholarly community. In modern works, many early Shi’ite scholars were anachronistically given the rank of ayatollah. Ayatollahs are nearly always experts in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and are normally required to have written extensively in this area. The requirements for qualification as an ayatollah are not entirely clear in traditional descriptions of the Shi’ite hierarchy, though the rank of *ijtihad* and associated qualifications of learning are often mentioned. *Ijtihad* is a condition, though not everyone who has attained it will be called “ayatollah.” The vagueness is due to absence of rigid ranks in the Shi’ite hierarchy. Before and since the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the term “grand ayatollah” was used for the “sources of imitation.” Since the revolution, there has been a tremendous increase in the use of the term for the Iranian clerical elite.

Ayatollahs are found at the apex of the scholarly structure, having studied in traditional seminaries (*madrasas*) and having passed through a number of intermediate ranks (among which is *Hojat al-Islam*). A scholar seems to be granted the rank of ayatollah through general agreement among the scholars. A person might be referred to as ayatollah by one writer and, when no one disputes the appellation, most scholars subsequently refer to him as ayatollah. An ayatollah, theoretically, holds this rank until he dies, though in recent times, ayatollahs (such as ayatollahs Shari’atmadari and Muntazeri in Iran) have lost their status after serious disputes with supposedly higher-ranking Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

See also *Hojjat al-Islam; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Marja‘ al-Taqlid; Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver)*.

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AZHAR, AL-

Al-Azhar is a mosque and a university founded in Cairo by the Fatimid Isma‘ili imam and caliph al-Mu‘izz li-Din Allah (d. 975). Today it is the most important religious university in the Muslim world, and it is one of the oldest universities ever founded for both religious and secular studies. After the conquest of Egypt (969), Jawhar al-Siqilli founded al-Qahira (Cairo), where he built the mosque that was first known as *jami‘ al-Qahirah* (the mosque of Cairo). The mosque was completed in nearly two years and first opened its doors in 972. It had one minaret and occupied half the area of the present day al-Azhar mosque. Since then, it has become one of the most well known mosques in the Muslim world. Its name is an allusion to Zahra‘ (The Radiant), a title given to Fatima, the daughter of prophet Muhammad. Al-Azhar began to acquire its academic and scholastic nature in 975, during the reign of al-Mu‘izz when the Qadi Abu ‘l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn al-Nu‘man al-Qayrawani sat in the court of al-Azhar and read the *Kitab al-iqtisar* (a work of Shi‘ite jurisprudence, or *fiqh*), written by his father, Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man. Al-Nu‘man’s family formed the intellectual elite of the Fatimidis and became the first teacher in al-Azhar.

In 998, al-Azhar moved a step further toward becoming an Islamic university. The Fatimid caliph al-‘Aziz Billah approved a proposal by his trusted minister Ya‘qub ibn Killis to establish an educational system. He assigned a number of regular teachers to carry out an educative mission. The teachers were trained by Ibn Killis and his system became the core of the academic education at al-Azhar. Furthermore, these teachers followed an organized curriculum and they received regular payments from the Fatimid government. The teaching was not limited to the religious sciences, but included discussions and free debates between scientists. Thus al-Azhar acquired the characteristics of an academic university. The diversified courses were a part of the teaching curriculum (the jurisprudence of four different schools of law, Arabic language, and literature). When the Ayyubid dynasty (1169–1252) took power, they wanted to erase every trace of the Fatimids. Al-Azhar’s reputation did not cease growing and the Shi’ite view was eclipsed by the Sunni interpretation.

Ayatollah


Sufia Uddin

Robert Gleave
of faith. Later, al-Azhar became the most important Sunni center of knowledge.

Under the reign of the Mamluks, between 1250 and 1517, many scientists sought refuge in al-Azhar, and were received with open arms. The arrival of these scientists undoubtedly contributed to the enrichment of its teaching; al-Azhar had its golden age during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Sciences such as medicine, mathematics, astronomy, geography, and history were studied there.

In 1822 the educational system was regulated and the highest diploma then delivered by al-Azhar was called al-`alamiyaa, which was equivalent to a doctorate. In 1950, al-Azhar’s educational system was divided into three faculties: Islamic law (al-shari`a), principles of the religion (usul al-din), and Arabic language. In 1961, besides its teaching of Islamic sciences, al-Azhar opened technical and practical faculties to teach medicine, engineering, agriculture, and other subjects. This widening of teaching was intended to make al-Azhar radiate not only in religious sciences but also in scientific disciplines. However, the addition of a modern, non-traditional curriculum was controversial among more conservative Muslim intellectuals.

See also Education; Madrasa; Zaytuna.

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Diana Steigerwald
The Babi movement began during a period of heightened chiliastic expectation for the return of the Twelfth Imam (or Hidden Imam), who Shi‘ite Muslims believe will fill the world with justice. As such, the movement attracted not only students of religion, but members from all strata of society who probably sought change in the existing order.

The initial converts to the Babi movement were mid- to low-level clerics from the Shaykhi school of Twelver Shi‘ite Islam. The school, founded upon the teachings of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa‘i, was mainstream with regard to Shi‘ite law, Akhbari in its veneration for the utterances ascribed to the twelve imams, and theosophical in its approach to metaphysical matters. Shaykh Ahmad’s successor, Sayyed Kazem, developed the eschatological teachings of his predecessor and taught that the advent of the “promised one” was imminent, although he did not specify if this figure was to be an intermediary of the hidden imam or the imam himself.

On 22 May 1844, ‘Ali Mohammad, a young merchant who had briefly attended the classes of Sayyed Kazem in Karbala, told a fellow Shaykhi disciple, Mulla Hosayn Boshru, that he was the “gate” (bab) of the Hidden Imam and wrote an extemporaneous commentary on the Qur’anic Sura of Joseph, the Qayyum al-asma‘, to substantiate his claim. So impressed was Molla Hosayn and other students of Sayyed Kazem with the eloquence and learning of ‘Ali Mohammad and his ability to produce verses (ayat) at great speed and with no apparent forethought that they publicly endorsed his claims to be the gate of the Hidden Imam, while privately they believed that his station was much higher. The exact nature of the Bab’s claims remained a matter of controversy during the first four years of his seven-year prophetic career. Although he initially made no explicit claim to prophethood, he implicitly claimed to receive revelation by emulating the style of the Qur’an in the Qayyum al-asma‘.

After the formation of the first core of believers, who, along with the Bab, were referred to as the first Vahed (Unity), the group dispersed at his instruction to proclaim the advent of the Bab, whose new theophany was to be initiated by his pilgrimage to Mecca, reaching a crescendo with his arrival in the holy cities of Iraq. The Bab instructed Molla Hosayn to disseminate his teachings in Iran and deliver the Qayyum al-asma‘ to the shah and his chief minister. Another disciple was sent to Azerbaijan, while others were instructed to return to their homes to spread the new message. The majority of the Bab’s first disciples departed for Iraq, including Molla ‘Ali Bastami, who was sent as a representative to the holy cities. There, he preached the new message in public. As a result, both the messenger and the author of the message were condemned as heretics in a joint fatwa by prominent Sunni and Shi‘ite ulama in Iraq.

Following this episode, the Bab decided not to meet with his followers in Karbala as he had planned so as not to further raise the ire of an already enraged clerical establishment. This led to the disaffection of some of his more militant followers, who were expecting the commencement of a holy war. It also emboldened the Bab’s critics, particularly the rival claimants for leadership of the Shaykhi community.

Persecution of the Babis in Iran began in 1845 and the Bab himself was confined to his home in June 1845. During this period he was forced to publicly deny certain claims that had been attributed to him, which he was willing to comply with since his actual claim was much more challenging, as witnessed in his later epistles and public statements, particularly from 1848 onward. By asserting that he was the recipient of revelation and divine authority, whether explicitly or implicitly by emulating the style of the Qur’an, the Bab challenged the right of the ulama to collect alms on behalf of the Hidden Imam and interpret scripture in his absence. Further, his claim to be the Qa‘im (the one who rises at the end of time), made explicit at his public trial in Tabriz, indirectly threatened the stability of the Qajar monarchy of Iran, which held
power as the Shadow of God on earth and depended upon the quiescent Shi‘ite clergy for legitimacy.

Despite the hostility of much of the high-ranking clergy, the Bab continued to win converts from among the ulema, including two very prominent personalities: Sayyed Yahya Darabi and Molla Mohammad ‘Ali Hojjat al-Islam Zanjani. In 1846, he managed to leave Shiraz and make his way to the home of the governor of Isfahan, Manuchehr Khan Mo‘tamad al-Dawla, a Georgian Christian convert to Islam who sympathized with the Bab’s cause. There, he enjoyed increasing popularity, which further roused the ulema, who incited the shah against the Bab. Following the death of his patron, he was placed under arrest. From this point on, the charismatic persona of the Bab was removed from the public arena, as he was transferred from prison to prison until his final execution at the hands of government troops on 9 July 1850.

Although the Bab continued to influence the movement from prison through the dissemination of thousands of pages of writing, leadership of the community devolved upon his chief lieutenants, notably Molla Hosayn, Molla Mohammad ‘Ali Barforush (also known as the Qoddus, “the Most Holy”), Qorrat al-‘Ayn, the well-known poetess (also known as Tahereh, “the Pure One”), Darabi, Zanjani, and Mirza Hosayn ‘Ali Nuri (later known as Baha‘allah). The latter, together with Qoddus and Tahereh, presided over a decisive meeting of Babis at Badar, where a formal break with Islamic law was initiated when Tahereh publicly removed her veil. She was later put to death in 1852 upon the orders of the government, ratified by leading doctors of law. Qoddus would also die at the instigation of some members of the ulema following his capture at the shrine of Shaykh Tabarsi, where he, Molla Hosayn, and an embattled group of Babis defended themselves against government troops in the province of Khurasan. Molla Hosayn and most of the fort’s defenders lost their lives there. Similarly, Darabi and Zanjani led large groups of Babis in armed resistance to government troops at Nayriz and Zanjan, but ultimately met the same fate as their fellow believers. In 1852, as a result of an assassination attempt on the life of Naser al-Din Shah by some Babis, several hundred to a few thousand of the Bab’s followers were brutally executed or imprisoned. Among them was Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nuri, the future Baha‘allah, who suffered a four-month captivity in a darkened pit (siyab chul), followed by exile to Iraq.

Although the demographic makeup of the Babi movement cannot be determined with precision, it is safe to say that it was largely an urban movement with significant concentrations of converts in rural areas. While it initially drew upon Shaykhi ulema, it later attracted followers from a range of social classes, particularly merchants and craftsmen. Finally, preaching and conversion were confined to predominantly Shi‘ite areas in Iraq and Iran.

As has been stressed by modern scholars, the Babi movement served as a vehicle of social protest, uniting a number of otherwise inimical heterodox and social classes in opposition to the established order. Despite this shared desire for social change (which still remains to be proven), the Bab’s charismatic personality and forceful writing also played a central role in attracting converts and admirers, even in the West. Rather than being an unwitting product of messianic expectation, content to remain within the bounds of traditional Shi‘ite notions of the function of the Hidden Imam as the Mahdi and reformer of Islam, the Bab enunciated a supra-Islamic message that included new laws and social teachings designed, by his own admission, to prepare the people for a second theophany: the coming of “Him Whom God will make manifest” (man yuzhiruhu ‘llab).

Although there were a number of claimants to this theophany in the 1850s, most Babis followed the Bab’s nominee, Baha‘allah’s half-brother Mirza Yahya (also known as Subh Azal). After Baha‘allah claimed this station in 1863, however, the majority of Babis recognized him as the fulfillment of the Bab’s prophecies concerning the second theophany and subsequently identified themselves as Baha’is. The Bab’s followers, who continued to owe their allegiance to Subh Azal, became known as Azalis and played an important role in Iran’s constitutional revolution in 1906.

See also Bab, Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad; Baha‘allah; Baha‘i Faith.

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William McCants

BAB, SAYYED ‘ALI MUHAMMAD (1819–1850)

Sayed ‘Ali Muhammad, later known as “the Bab,” was born on 20 October 1819 in Shiraz, the provincial capital of Fars. A descendent of the prophet Muhammad’s family, the Bab traced his lineage from the tribe of Quraysh to his father, Sayyed Muhammad Reza, a merchant in the bazaar of Shiraz. In his early childhood, the Bab’s father died and he came under the care of his maternal uncles. During his adolescence and young adulthood, the Bab’s uncle Hajji Mirza Sayyed ‘Ali was his most stalwart supporter, overseeing his limited education, guiding his early business ventures as a merchant, and later becoming one of the earliest adherents of his nephew’s new creed.
The Bab’s demure demeanor as a child matured into quiet, religious contemplation, as noted by his contemporaries. His personal piety led him to undertake a pilgrimage to the Shi’ite holy shrines in Iraq between 1840 and 1841. While there, the Bab, an adherent of the Shaykhi school of Twelver Shi’ite Islam, attended a few classes given by the Shaykhi leader Sayyed Kazem Rashti. On 22 May 1844, three years after his return to Shiraz, the Bab advanced his claim to divine authority from God to one of Kazem’s students, Mulla Hosayn, and soon after gained a large following among seminarians who in turn made many converts among merchants and even upper-class landowners, including Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nuri, who later founded the Baha’i religion.

Although the Bab couched his claims in abstruse language early in his career, the implications were not lost upon the Shi’ite ulema. In particular, they viewed his assertion to reveal verses in the same manner as Muhammad as a violation of a cardinal tenet of Shi’ite and Sunni Islam—that Muhammad was the last of God’s messengers. He was tried by religious judges and condemned to death for heresy. As a result of clerical agitation, he was soon arrested and suffered imprisonment until his execution on 9 July 1850, at the age of thirty.

During his prophetic career, the Bab composed numerous religious texts of varying genres. Some of the more notable titles include the Qayyum al-asma’ (his earliest, post-declaration doctrinal work), the Persian and Arabic Bayans (two separate books detailing the laws of his new religion), and Dala’il sab’a (an apologetic work).

See also Babiyya; Baha‘allah; Baha’i Faith.

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William McCants

BAGHDAD

“Have you seen in all the length and breadth of the earth

A city such as Baghdad? Indeed it is paradise on earth.”

(al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, in Lassner, Topography, p. 47)

Thus begins a poem attributed variously to ‘Umar b. ‘Aqil al-Khatafi and Mansur al-Namari in praise of Baghdad, the illustrious capital of the Abbasid caliphate in Iraq for close to five centuries. The city was founded by the second Abbasid caliph, Abu Ja’far al-Mansur, on the banks of the Tigris River where it most closely approaches the Euphrates. While officially called Dar al-Salam, or the Abode of Peace, which recalls Qur’anic descriptions of Paradise (6:127; 10:25), the name Baghdad itself is reminiscent of a pre-Islamic settlement in the vicinity. However, this metropolis is not to be confused erroneously with the ancient towns of Babylon, Seleucia, and Ctesiphon.

Following the turbulence and social upheavals of the Abbasid assumption of power from the Umayyads, al-Mansur sought to move his capital to a more secure location in the East. The proclamation of Abu l-‘Abbas as the first Abbasid caliph in 749 C.E. had irreversibly shifted the locus of imperial power away from Damascus, the Umayyad capital, to a series of successive sites in Iraq. Al-Mansur himself was initially based in al-Hashimiyyah, adjacent to Qasr Ibn Hubayra and close to Kufa. The Rawandiyya uprising of 758 C.E., however, soon exposed the location’s vulnerability, and al-Mansur began a thorough investigation of sites from which he could consolidate his rule.
In accordance with the information gathered from scouts, local inhabitants, and personal observation, the minor village of Baghdad was selected as an ideal location for the future Abbasid capital. The area had much to recommend itself in terms of its central location, fertile lands, temperate climate, ease of receiving provisions via the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the convening of caravan routes nearby, and the natural defenses provided by the surrounding canals. Construction of the imperial capital began in the year 762 C.E., though work was halted temporarily that same year while al-Mansur suppressed further uprisings emanating from Medina and Basra. Over one hundred thousand architects, artisans, and laborers from across the empire were employed in the creation of this city, at tremendous financial expense, over a period of four years.

An alternative name for Baghdad, al-Madina al-Mudawwara, or the Round City, reflects the circular layout of al-Mansur’s initial foundation. Baghdad was designed as a series of concentric rings, with the caliphal palace, known as Bab al-Dhahab, or the Golden Gate, and the attached grand congregational mosque located in the center, along with separate structures for the commander of the guard and the chief of police. The caliph was thereby equidistant from all points within the city, as well as surrounded by its considerable fortifications. Only the residences of his younger children, those of his servants and slaves, and various government offices shared access onto this inner circle. Four walkways radiated outward from the central courtyard in the directions of northeast, southeast, southwest, and northwest, passing through the inner circle of surrounding structures; then an enclosure wall followed by an interval of space; then a residential area followed by another interval; then a large wall of outer defense, a third interval, a second smaller wall; and finally a deep, wide moat surrounding the entire complex.

The Round City initially retained an austere administrative and military character. On the city’s outskirts, large land grants at varying distances from the capital were given to members of the Abbasid family, the army, and chiefs of the government agencies. In addition to the initial settlers, comprised of those loyal to the caliph and his new regime, large numbers of laborers, artisans, and merchants migrated to Baghdad in pursuit of the largesse showered upon those necessary to sustain the new imperial capital. What quickly grew to be a thriving market within the walls of the Round City was ultimately perceived to be a security threat and, in 773 C.E., was transferred southwest of Baghdad, to al-Karkh. There, the commercial activities of the Abbasid capital flourished, and Baghdad rapidly developed into an economically vibrant metropolis.

The main markets of Baghdad were subdivided according to their various specialties which included food, fruit, flowers, textiles, clothes, booksellers, goldsmiths, cobblers, reedweavers, soapmakers, and moneychangers that served the populace and government officials. Baghdad exported textiles and items made of cotton and silk, glazed-ware, oils, swords, leather, and paper, to mention only a few, through both local and international trade. The muhtasib, a government-appointed regulator, ensured the fair practices of the marketplace as well as supervised the public works of proliferating mosques and bathhouses. The opulence and luxury of court life in Baghdad were legendary, and reflected the vast political and economic power of the Abbasid Empire.

The magnanimity of the Abbasid caliphs and the well-placed inhabitants of Baghdad also extended into encouraging intellectual pursuits, thereby establishing the Abbasid capital as one of the world’s most sophisticated and prestigious centers of learning. Renowned Islamic scholars of diverse geographical and ethnic origins held sessions in the mosques and colleges of cosmopolitan Baghdad, attracting innumerable seekers of legal, philological, and spiritual knowledge. Bookshops and the private homes of individual scholars and high government officials, such as the wazir, also served as venues for intellectual discussion and debate. Inns located near the mosques provided lodging to those who had devoted themselves to scholarly pursuits, and accommodations were later made available within the institutions of the madrasa (legal college) and ribat (Sufi establishment), both of which also offered stipends to affiliated students.
Scientific research in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, medicine, optics, engineering, botany, and pharmacology also prospered within the Abbasid capital. Alongside experimentation and exploration, translation of Hellenic, Indic, and Persian texts received patronage from dignitaries, physicians, and scientists in response to the professional and intellectual demands of an expanding Islamic society. Public libraries, both attached to mosques and as separate institutions, contributed further to the dissemination of knowledge among the populace, while the establishment of hospitals as charitable endowments throughout the city ensured the provision of free medical care to anyone who so required it. Mobile clinics were even dispatched to remote villages on a regular basis, with the aims of offering comprehensive health coverage.

The political fragmentation of the sprawling Abbasid Empire ultimately contributed to a decline in the revenues and hence in the general fortunes of the capital in Baghdad. Increasing civil disturbances in the face of weakened central authority, as well as rife Sunni-Shi‘ite conflicts, resulted in the deterioration and destruction of vast segments of the waning metropolis. Nevertheless, Baghdad retained its prestige as the center of the Islamic caliphate and a symbol of Muslim cultural, material, and scholarly achievement. It was therefore with great consternation that news was received of the Mongols’s savage invasion and ravaging of the city in 1258 C.E. Hundreds of thousands of Baghdad’s inhabitants, including the caliph and his family, leading personalities, and scholars were mercilessly put to death, and the great scientific and literary treasures of Baghdad were burned or drowned in the waters of the Tigris.

Thereafter, Baghdad was transformed into a provincial center within the Mongol Empire, under the control of the Ilkhanids until 1339 C.E. and then the Jalayirids until 1410 C.E. The Karakoyunlu Turkomans and the Akkoyunlu Turkomans ruled Baghdad successively, until the city was conquered by Shah Ismail in 1508 C.E. and incorporated into the Safavid Empire. A subsequent Perso-Ottoman struggle for Baghdad and its symbolic sites resulted in Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent’s conquest of the city in 1534 C.E., only to be lost again to the Safavids, and then regained by the Ottoman Sultan Murad IV in 1638 C.E. Baghdad remained the capital of the region’s Ottoman province for nearly three centuries, and was occupied by the British in March 1917, during the course of World War I. In 1921, it became the seat of Faysal b. Husayn’s kingdom under British Mandate and remained the capital of Iraq throughout its successive developments into an independent constitutional monarchy (1930), federated Hashemite monarchy (1958), and then republic (1958).

See also Caliphate; Empires: Abbasid; Revolution: Classical Islam; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran; Revolution: Modern.

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*Mona Hasan*

**BAHA’ALLAH (1817–1892)**

“Baha’allah,” a title meaning “splendor of God,” was the name given to Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nuri, prophet and founder of the Baha’i faith.

Born in Tehran into an elite bureaucratic family, he was converted in 1844 to the Babi religion, the messianic movement begun that year by the Iranian prophet Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad, commonly known as the Bab (“Gate”). He played a significant role in the early Babi community. Imprisoned as a Babi in 1852, he was exiled to Iraq, where he became the de facto leader of the Babis. He was summoned to Istanbul by the Ottoman government in April 1863 and then arrested and exiled again to Edirne in European Turkey. There he made an open claim to prophethood that was eventually accepted by most Babis, though opposed by his younger brother, Subh-e Azal. Alarmed by disputes among the Babi exiles, the Turkish government imprisoned Baha’allah in Acre, Palestine, in 1868, where he lived under gradually improving conditions until his death. His eldest son, ‘Abd al-Baha’, was recognized by most Baha’is as his successor. His tomb near Acre is now a Baha’i shrine.

Baha’allah wrote extensively, mostly letters to the believers. His works included commentary on scripture, Baha’i law, comments on current affairs, prayers, and theological discussions of all sorts. Though his writings were grounded in the
esoteric Shi‘ite thought of the Bab, he was politically sophisticated, and his own religious thought is often best seen in the context of the Westernizing reformers of the nineteenth century Middle East. The social liberalism of the modern Baha‘i faith has its roots in Baha‘allah’s writings.

Baha‘allah is considered a “manifestation of God” by Baha‘is and is thus a prophet of the rank of Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad.

See also ‘Abd al-Baha‘; Bab, Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad; Baha‘i Faith.

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BAHA‘I FAITH

The Baha‘i faith was founded by Baha‘allah as an outgrowth of the Babi religion, the messianic movement begun in 1844 by the Iranian prophet Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad, commonly known as the Bab (“Gate”).

History
After the execution of the Bab in 1850 and the pogrom following a Babi attempt to assassinate the shah, the Babi movement suffered a crisis of leadership. Its titular leader was Mirza Yahya, known as Subh-e Azal, but from the mid-1860s the effective leader was Azal’s elder brother, Baha‘allah. Both were exiles in Baghdad. Baha‘allah later wrote that he had had mystical experiences while imprisoned in Tehran in 1852, and by the early 1860s he had begun hinting that he was “he whom God shall make manifest,” the Babi messiah. On 21 April 1863 he announced this claim to several close associates, an event that Baha‘is now consider the beginning of their religion. Baha‘allah nonetheless continued to recognize the nominal leadership of Azal. The final break came in 1867 when he wrote to Azal formally claiming prophethood. The Babis then split into three main groups. By the end of the 1870s those who had accepted the claim of Baha‘allah were the large majority and came to be known as Baha‘is. A smaller number, the Azalis, stayed loyal to Subh-e Azal and vociferously opposed Baha‘allah. A few accepted neither claim.

Through his extensive correspondence and meetings with pilgrims during his exile in Acre, Baha‘allah organized the new community. He rejected the militancy and esoteric Shi‘ite mysticism characteristic of the Babis, instead stressing political neutrality and progressive themes such as international peace, education, and the emancipation of women and slaves. By the time of the death of Baha‘allah in 1892, the Iranian community had recovered from the disasters of the Babi period, and small but growing communities, mainly consisting of Iranian émigrés, had been established in many countries of the Middle East, the Russian Empire, and India.

After Baha‘allah’s death most Baha‘is accepted the leadership of his eldest son, ‘Abd al-Baha‘. In the 1890s small but influential communities of Baha‘is converts from Christianity were established in Europe and North America. Despite the turmoil caused by World War I and by revolutions in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, ‘Abd al-Baha‘ was able to establish an institutional structure for most of the major Baha‘i communities, increasingly in the form of elected governing committees known as spiritual assemblies. The most important event of his ministry, however, was a series of journeys to Europe and America from 1911 to 1913. These trips were the occasion for an increasing stress on the liberal social teachings of the Baha‘i faith.

‘Abd al-Baha‘ was succeeded in 1921 by his grandson, Shoghi Effendi Rabbani, whose English education and Western orientation marked a final break with the religion’s Islamic roots. Shoghi Effendi was not a charismatic figure like his grandfather and preferred to focus on institution-building and consolidation. The most spectacular achievement of his ministry was a series of “teaching plans,” in which Baha‘i missionaries settled in scores of new countries and territories, notably in Latin America, Africa, and the Pacific. By the 1950s some of these communities were growing rapidly. Shoghi Effendi wrote extensively and systematically in Persian and English, standardizing Baha‘i theological self-understanding and practice. His translations of several volumes of Baha‘allah’s writings became the standard Baha‘i scriptures for Western Baha‘is. He also wrote a history of the Babi and Baha‘i Faiths and translated a history of the Babi religion. These works also became fundamental for the self-understanding of Western Baha‘is. Finally, through his construction of Baha‘i shrines and temples in Haifa, Acre, and several Western cities, he made the Baha‘i faith more visible and created a Baha‘i architectural idiom.

Shoghi Effendi died in 1957, leaving neither an heir nor a will. In 1963, after a six-year interregnum, the various Baha‘i national spiritual assemblies elected an international governing body, the Universal House of Justice, which has since been elected every five years. The Universal House of Justice continued Shoghi Effendi’s programs of teaching plans and construction. There are now several million Baha‘is in the world, most in the developing world, leaving only a small minority in Iran or Islamic countries.
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This garden leads to the $250 million Baha’i Shrine of the Bab in Haifa, Israel that was completed in 2001 after ten years of construction. Built by the great grandson of Baha’u’llah, founder of the Baha’i faith, it is one of many Baha’i shrines and temples throughout the Muslim world and the West. Baha’i is a religion that split from Islam. It emphasizes the unity among all religions, races, and nations. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Baha’i Theology, Beliefs, and Practices

The theological roots of the Baha’i faith are in the Babi religion, which was essentially an esoteric Shi’ite movement. The fundamental Baha’i theological conception is that of the logos figure of the manifestation of God: the prophet as the perfect mirror of God’s attributes. Human beings and all other creatures are lesser mirrors of God’s various attributes. The prophet is thus a model and a revealer of God’s knowledge and will. God’s full plan is revealed gradually by a series of prophets, who guide humanity’s emergence into a worldwide spiritual civilization. Baha’u’llah is of particular significance, since his ministry marks the beginning of human maturity and world unity. Thus, for Baha’is all religions are fundamentally true, having been based on prophecy, though the Baha’i faith is destined to supersede them. The differences among religions are due either to the differing circumstances of the time and place of their revelation or to gradual corruption of the original message.

The characteristic feature of Baha’u’llah’s revelation is its stress on unity, a theme expressed in Baha’i social teachings.

Thus, racism, nationalism, religious fanaticism, prejudice of any sort, and the degradation of women are condemned in Baha’i teachings. Likewise, there is no Baha’i clergy, and all believers are considered fundamentally equal. The theme of unity permeates Baha’i thought and practice, giving the community a decidedly egalitarian character.

The Baha’i faith is nominally a religion of law, but its religious law, though generally analogous to Islamic law and practice, is usually simpler and less demanding. There is a daily prayer, an annual nineteen-day fast, nine major holy days, and a “feast” every nineteen days on the first day of each month of the Baha’i calendar. Regulations governing marriage, divorce, and funerals are simple. Baha’is are monogamous, and marriage is conditioned on the consent both of the couple and of living parents. In practice, Baha’i communal life often is less concerned with worship than with community administration and particularly the goal of expanding the community.

Baha’i scripture consists of the authenticated writings of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha’. Shoghi Effendi’s works are authoritative as interpretation, and writings of the Universal House of Justice are authoritative in legislative and administrative matters. Writings of individuals are considered personal opinion and not binding on others. Because the authoritative writings are so voluminous, Baha’i writers have tended to focus on collection and collation. Most Baha’i theological writing has been polemical rather than speculative in character. There is no developed Baha’i legal tradition. Since the 1970s there has been increasingly vigorous academic and theological study of the Baha’i faith.

See also ‘Abdu’l-Baha’; Babiyya; Baha’u’llah.

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BALKANS, ISLAM IN THE

Since the late fourteenth century there have been Muslim communities in southeast Europe. For most of their history they were an important and integral part of the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when ethnic-based nation-states came to power in the Balkans, most of these Muslim communities lost prominence and some disappeared. Recent attempts by certain nationalist
forces to erase the history of Muslims in the Balkans have led to new interest in these Muslim peoples of Europe.

**Expansion of Islam into Southeast Europe**

Ottoman armies and Sufi missionaries brought Islam into southeast Europe in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Beginning with the conquest of eastern Thrace in the mid-1300s, the Ottomans soon took Macedonia. They fought Serbian prince Lazar and his Balkan army at Kosovo in 1389, and defeated Bulgaria soon after in 1393. Along with military conquest, the Ottomans brought Muslim settlers from Anatolia to occupy main march routes and river valleys. In 1456 Athens fell to the Ottomans, followed by Bosnian and Albanian lands, and finally Belgrade in 1521.

There was significant conversion of local people to Islam, principally among Bosnians and Albanians, but also across the Balkans. This conversion was gradual, continuing throughout the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, and even later among some Albanians. Except for the devşirme, the forced recruitment of Christian boys for special military and governmental service, this conversion to Islam was voluntary. The Balkans had been a region of contention between western, or Latin, and eastern, or Byzantine, forms of Christianity. In Bosnia and Albania neither form of Christianity had been well preached or well established. In contrast the Sufi missionaries brought a tolerant form of religion and the Ottoman state a system of order based broadly on religious affiliation. The advantages of being Muslim were economic and cultural and included exemption from the head tax, privileges in land owning, and opportunities in state administration and the military, as well as links with the vibrant culture and society of Istanbul.

**History and Main Developments**

During the Ottoman period, lasting from the fourteenth century to the early twentieth century, the history of Muslims in the Balkans largely parallels the history of the empire itself. When the Ottoman Empire was at its height in the sixteenth century, the Balkan cities of Edirne, Sarajevo, and Salonika (the latter with a significant Jewish population) were rich cosmopolitan centers of trade and learning, with impressive mosques, madrasas (schools), and bridges. Three of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent’s grand wazirs—Ibrahim the Greek, Rustem the Bulgarian, and Mehmet Sokullu, a Slav from Bosnia—were converted Muslims from the Balkans. At the end of the seventeenth century, Albanian Muslims from the Koprulu family (Mehmet, Ahmed, Mustafa, and Husein) served as grand wazirs and provided well-needed stability in a century of decline. For, as western European countries gained power in trade routes and military prowess, formerly the purview of the Ottomans, the Ottoman Empire weakened economically and the Austro-Hungarian Empire took territories from the Ottomans, including Hungary, part of present-day Croatia (1699), and later Bosnia (1878). The position of Muslim communities gradually declined as well until the breakup of Ottoman power in the Balkans left many of them vulnerable.

The following period in the history of Muslims in the Balkans, the time of growth of nation-states, began variably in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with southern Greece becoming independent in 1821, followed by Serbia (whose northern part had been autonomous since 1815), Romania, and Bulgaria, all in 1878, and later by Albania in 1912. During these times there were forced migrations, massacres, and expulsions of Muslims, especially from the eastern Balkans, for the new nation-states were largely conceived as ethnic units tied to language and a form of Christianity. In contrast, many Balkan Muslims, who did not fit in the new nation-state design, were seen as allied with the Ottomans who had been increasingly ineffective and oppressive in the last century of their rule. Thousands of Muslims were forced to flee to Turkey. This would continue throughout the twentieth century with Balkan Muslims from Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bulgaria emigrating to the safety of Muslim Turkey. The exceptions to this were Muslims from the western Balkan lands of Albania and Bosnia. Most stayed in the Balkans throughout these times, although some Bosnian Muslims did emigrate in and after 1878. The large part of Bosnian Muslims, themselves Slavs, continued as landowners and free
peasants under Austria-Hungary’s rule, and remained later as part of Yugoslavia. As for the Albanian Muslims, some led the Albanian nationalist movement for independence; overall, Muslims made up 70 percent of the new independent state of Albania. There were also smaller communities of Slavic Muslims, Albanian Muslims, and Roma Muslims who stayed where they were and thus became minorities in different Balkan lands.

Nationalism also came to the Turks. It is interesting that an Albanian Muslim from Struga in present-day Macedonia, İbrahim Temo, was one of the four founding members of what became known as the Young Turks. The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, was a Balkan Muslim from Salonika.

Later in the twentieth century, the Muslims in Bosnia came to be seen as an ethnic group as well. Before World War II they were considered a religious community. But after the war, with the secularization of the Communist Party and growing importance of “nationalities,” they officially became an ethnic group under the label “Muslim” in 1968. Just as “Jew” in the United States can have both ethnic and religious meaning, so “Muslim” had both meanings in Yugoslavia. With the warfare in the 1990s, this ambiguity became a problem so that today the ethnic term for Bosnian Muslim is “Bosnjak.”

Characteristics and Cultural Achievements
The Muslims of the Balkans are largely Sunni of the Hanafi school. There are also Sufi communities with more inclusive theologies, including the Sunni Naqshbandi, as well as the Halveti, Mevlevi, Qadiri, Rifa‘i, Sa‘di, Melami, and Bektashi orders. Of these, the Bektashi rose to special prominence in Albania in the twentieth century, only to become a target of Communist Enver Hoxha’s regime (1944–1991). Also in Bulgaria there are communities of Ali‘ids. As in other parts of the Ottoman world, religious poetry known as merthiyes and nefes stems from these orders, and mevluds and ghazels from the larger Muslim communities.

Better known to the broader world than religious poetry is the remarkable architecture of Muslims in the Balkans. This includes the older sections of cities with their bazaars, mosques, fountains, hamams (baths), tişöres (mausolea), medresa (schools), and old Ottoman homes. One of the masterpieces of Ottoman architecture is the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne (1575) by Sinan. Also well known were other remarkable mosques like the Ferhat Pasha Mosque of Banja Luka (1579), the Aladža Mosque in Foca (1550), and the Gazi Husrevbegova Mosque of Sarajevo (1530), all in Bosnia, as well as the famous Ottoman bridge at Mostar in Herzegovina (1566).

Contemporary Situation and Concerns
The war in Bosnia (1992–1995) between Serbian and Croatian nationalists and Muslim Bosnians led to the destruction of the famous mosques of Banja Luka and Foca and the severe damaging of the Gazi Husrevbegova Mosque in Sarajevo, as well as the destruction of many more Islamic sites throughout Bosnia. The famous bridge at Mostar, and the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, where important historical documents of the Ottoman period were housed, were both deliberately targeted and destroyed. The war in Kosovo (1999) led to the destruction of many Islamic monuments and documents there as well. One of the purposes of these civil wars was to erase the Islamic heritage of these regions of the Balkans. This is not new. There were once many mosques in Belgrade that were destroyed in the late nineteenth century. Such destruction was in marked contrast to the usual Ottoman policy that had promoted tolerance for Christian and Jewish institutions.

Nevertheless there remain Muslim communities in the Balkans. The greatest number of Muslims are still in Bosnia, although many were killed in the war and many more became refugees. The next largest population of Muslims in the Balkans is in Albania, but many were secularized during the long communist rule. Albanians in Kosovo are also mainly Muslim. But of all the Albanian Muslims in the Balkans, those in western Macedonia are among the most observant. They form at least one-third of the population, but have been kept out of most state jobs and universities. Bulgaria has three different Muslim populations: Turks, who are the largest group; Pomaks, who are Slavs living in the southern mountains; and Roma, who are largely Muslim. During communist rule in Bulgaria, there were at times direct policies to
“bulgarize” the Muslim peoples by forcing them to change their Muslim names to Slavic Bulgarian ones, and there were prohibitions against circumcision. In the 1980s over 300,000 Turks from Bulgaria went to Turkey rather than submit to these policies. Since then, some have returned and the policies in post-communist Bulgaria are not as restrictive. Romania has two small Muslim communities. In Greece, most Muslims left or were part of the population transfers in the early 1920s. There remain, however, the Turkish Muslims of western Thrace in northeast Greece.

An irony of the fighting in Bosnia at the end of the twentieth century is that the attempt of Serbian and Croatian nationalists to eradicate the Islamic history and the Muslim people of the region has resulted in a reinvigoration of Islamic practices there. The Bosnians, who were once among the most secularized of Muslims, now include those who are more observant. But the long tradition of tolerance and mutual respect of Balkan Islam, for which places like Sarajevo were justly famous, has been severely damaged.

See also Empires: Ottoman; Europe, Islam in.

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**BAMBA, AHMAD (1853–1927)**

Ahmad Bamba was the founder of the Muridiyya (Mouride) Brotherhood. Born in the Baol region in Senegal, Ahmad was initiated into the Qadiriyya Brotherhood (tariqa) by Shaykh Sidia in Mauritania. He founded his own brotherhood in 1886 and established the town of Touba (Senegal) as the capital of his order in 1887. Shaykh Ahmad Bamba was highly respected for his learning and piety but he also attracted followers who were struggling against the French occupation.

The new brotherhood spread rapidly and was associated with rumors of a possible uprising. In 1895, Ahmad Bamba was exiled to Gabon and was not permitted to return to Senegal until 1902. His return attracted a wave of new followers and more rumors of rebellion. The French exiled him again in 1903, this time to Mauritania. Ahmad returned to Senegal in 1907. Again large numbers of followers flocked to him and the French were concerned. After 1910, however, the French began to trust the Muslim leader somewhat more, even turning to him for help on occasion. Most notably, he recruited troops and raised money for French efforts in World War I. For this he was made a Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur in 1919. Ahmad Bamba, however, collaborated reluctantly. He was a religious man and a mystic, given to meditation and scholarship. His brotherhood was organized on a principle of total obedience, hard work, and self-denial and became the most powerful religious group in Senegal.

See also Africa, Islam in; Colonialism; Tariqa; Touba.

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Lucy Creevey

**BANNA, HASAN AL- (1906–1949)**

Hasan al-Banna was an Islamic reformer and the founder of Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood). Banna was born in Mahmudiyya, a town near Alexandria, Egypt. In addition to receiving the traditional education in Qur’an, hadith, elementary principles of law, and Arabic language, Banna became a member of the Hasafiyya Sufi order during his teen years. Although members of the Brotherhood would later attack Sufism, Banna always acknowledged the strong influence of Sufism in his religious outlook and social activism.

In 1923, Banna enrolled in Dar al-‘Ulm in Cairo, the national teachers’ training college, whose eclectic curriculum of traditional Islamic and modern Western subjects had been shaped by Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. In 1927, he was sent to his first teaching assignment in a primary school
in Isma‘iliya. Located in the Suez Canal zone, Isma‘iliya was home to large numbers of European civilians as well as British military personnel. Banna was exposed daily to foreign imperialism in a direct manner that he had not experienced in Cairo. He began to question the reasons for Egypt’s political subservience and the means for its revival. Only through a revival of Islamic consciousness among the masses, Banna concluded, could imperialism be combated.

In March 1928, Banna and six other men founded an organization attached to the Hasafiyya order to “command the right and forbid the wrong.” By the following year, the organization was already referred to as Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The organization began as an educational society, meant to instill or revive Islamic convictions among ordinary Egyptians. Its primary goal was to create an Islamic society based on the model of the earliest Muslim generations. Banna traveled throughout the canal zone, lecturing, collecting donations, organizing chapters, and building offices and mosques. The Brotherhood’s organization reflected Banna’s Sufi background. Chapters consisted of groups of young men organized hierarchically according to the level of commitment and knowledge demonstrated. Tying the various chapters together was Banna, the mursid (guide) of the movement, and a majlis al-shura (advisory council) composed officially of twelve members, though sometimes more.

By 1932 Banna had moved the headquarters of the Brotherhood to Cairo, reflecting his intention to play a much more active role in Egypt’s politics. The Brotherhood was also firmly entrenched in regional politics by the late 1940s through branches in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan. Banna’s ideological vision may be gleaned from his numerous writings, the two most important being his memoirs (Mudbakkirat) and a published collection of his letters (Majmu‘at al-rasa‘il). For him Islam was a holistic creed, providing Muslims guidelines for private piety, public morality, and social justice. The logical extension of this view was the establishment of an Islamic state. The leadership of such a state could only come from committed and informed Muslims, and the Brotherhood was to prepare itself for this role.

Banna could not quell dissension within the Brotherhood once it entered the turbulent Egyptian politics of the 1940s. His control over the “secret apparatus,” the armed wing of the organization that planned and carried out attacks on government officials and institutions, was particularly tenuous. More militant members refused to follow his agreement with the Egyptian government to merge the Brotherhood militia into the Egyptian army during the first Arab-Israeli war (1948–1949). Following a military decree banning the organization, Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi was assassinated in December 1948 by a student associated with the Brotherhood. In retaliation, the secret police assassinated Banna on 12 February 1949.

See also Ikhwan al-Muslimin.

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**BAQILLANI, AL- (?–1013)**

Qadi Abu Bakr Muhammad b. al-Tayyib b. Muhammad, also known as Ibn al-Baqillani, was an Ash‘arite theologian and Malikite jurisprudent. Al-Baqillani was regarded as the second founder of Ash‘arism for his contribution to the systematization of the school.

Born in Basra he lived mostly in Baghdad, and studied theology under al-Ash‘ari’s students Ibn Mujahid al-Ta‘i and Abu ʿI-Hasan al-Bahili, and *fiqh* (jurisprudence) under Abu ʿAbdallah al-Shirazi and Ibn Abu Zayd al-Qayrawani. He attended discussion meetings with representatives of other schools in Shiraz, was sent to Constantinople as a special envoy to Byzantine rulers, served as a judge (*qadi*) in Uqbara and Saqr towns, and taught in Baghdad until his death in 1013.

Well known for his disputational skills and polemical writings, al-Baqillani’s books are mainly on theology. A large work, *Hidayat al-mustashhidin wa al-maqua‘ fi usul al-din*, is preserved at al-Azhar library (ms. no. 342) in Cairo. His works, which largely collected and classified Ash‘arite views, played a major role in the establishment and spread of the school. He emphasized the existence of atoms in order to avoid the idea of pre-eternity of the universe and elaborated some concepts in Sunni kalam, such as empty space, the continuous creation of accidents due to their incapability of lasting more than one unit of time, and the rational possibility of miracles. However, he preserved the Salafi (Salafiyya) tendency of not interpreting Qur‘anic expressions attributed to God suggesting anthropomorphism. Most of his books include lengthy polemics against other monothetic religions. His skepticism toward the compatibility of ancient metaphysics with Islamic doctrines led him to oppose the use of formal logic in religious disciplines. In some issues of Islamic legal methodology, such as *ijtihad* and *ijma‘*, he influenced later jurists.

See also Ash‘arites, Ash‘aira; Kalam.
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See also Nationalism: Arab.

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BAZARGAN, MEHDI (1907–1995)

The son of a merchant from Tabriz, Mehdi Bazargan was born in Tehran, Iran. Educated both in traditional Islamic madrasa and modern schools, he completed his studies at École Polytechnique and École Normale in France. Muhammad Mosaddeq (b. 1882) admired Bazargan’s engineering approach to social organization, such as Tehran’s fresh water project (c. 1952), and commissioned him to fill the gap resulting from the departure of British experts after the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. He became a founder of the Engineering Association of Iran in 1945 and of the National Liberation Movement in 1961.

Bazargan was one of a group of Islamic thinkers who convened to discuss current issues in the early 1960s, and was especially interested in adapting Shi‘ite Islam to the technological world without importing its ideology. Most people in this group became prominent leaders of the Iranian Revolution. Bazargan was imprisoned along with other nationalist leaders in 1963. After the revolution of 1979, he became the prime minister of the provisional government. Bazargan was later ousted due to the occupation of the American embassy and hostage taking by students and his meeting with Brzezinski in Algiers.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Liberation Movement of Iran; Reform: Iran; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

M. Sait Özervarlı

BASRI, HASAN AL- (642–728)

Hasan al-Basri was one of the most famous early Sunni theologians and ascetics. Born in Medina, he lived in Basra, where he was renowned for his piety, learning, and eloquence. He produced sermons, short commentaries on the Qur’an, aphorisms, and statements on ethics. In theology, he occupied a middle position on the subjects of free will and predestination. He believed that humans choose their actions, but that God determines the outlines of fate. He criticized Umayyad caliphs and officials, but did not oppose them politically. His spiritual practice stressed self-reflective contemplation. He is considered a father of Sufism and appears as the source of many Sufi lineages.

See also Kalam; Tasawwuf.

Rkia E. Cornell

BA‘TH PARTY

The Ba‘th Party is the governing party in Iraq and Syria, and is theoretically committed to the cause of Arab nationalism and unity. The Ba‘th (Arabic for resurrection or renewal) Party was founded by two French-educated Syrian school teachers, Michel ‘Aflaq (Greek Orthodox Christian) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (Sunni Muslim), in 1943. “Regional commands” of the Ba‘th were founded in many Arab countries, all in principle subject to the “national command” of the founders. The party’s slogan, “unity, freedom and socialism,” rallied students, intellectuals, and army officers to its cause in many Arab states, and it played an important role in the tumultuous politics of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan in the 1950s. However, the party never achieved a strong mass following and had little electoral success anywhere. The Ba‘th came to power in Syria in 1963 and in Iraq in 1968 through military coups. In power, the party in both countries effectively centralized control of the economy in government hands and instituted distributionist policies that originally benefited both the urban and rural middle and lower classes, though over time at the cost of economic growth and efficiency. Both the Syrian and Iraqi Ba‘th came to rely on religious minorities to staff sensitive military and security positions—Alawis in Syria and Sunnis in Iraq—as the popularity of the governments waned. A bitter split developed within the party in 1966, reflected in the extremely hostile relations between Ba‘thist Syria and Ba‘thist Iraq. Like many ruling parties, the Ba‘th lost much of its ideological élan once in power, and became the vehicle for increasingly personalized rule in Syria and Iraq.
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Mazyar Lotfalian

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**BEDOUIN**

The Bedouin are nomadic peoples of Arabia known in Arabic as *bedu*, ‘*arah, and *a’*ra*ḥ*. They are especially known for keeping camels, whose domestication in the third millennium made trade and raiding—their main occupations—easier. In addition, they keep flocks of sheep and goats, and more recently, engage in seasonal agriculture and work in state armed forces. Living in long, low-lying black tents made of camel and goat hair and wooden poles, the Bedouin migrate on a seasonal basis in search of pasture for their animals. The tent and its contents are individual property, but water, pasture, and land are the common property of the tribe.

Every tent represents a family, and an encampment of tents—*bāyy*—constitutes a clan, or *qa’īm*. A group of kindred clans forms a tribe, or *qabila*, and *asabiyya* is the unconditional loyalty of a clansmember to his or her tribe. A weaker tribe buys protection by paying the stronger tribe a price—*khuwa*.

Bedouin have been characterized historically by urban Arab writers as vengeful and destructive, finding the agriculture and craft of sedentary life distasteful. In his *Muqadimma*, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the Tunisian philosopher-historian, hypothesized that civilizations have a predetermined life cycle; they fall prey to the nomads in the frontiers whose bonds of solidarity (*asabiyya*) are strong. However, others have described Bedouins by their well-known values of generosity and hospitality and high standards of poetic compositions.

As state power has infringed on Bedouin areas of control, moves to settle the Bedouin, to provide schools for children, and to employ adults in wage-labor have met with mixed success in Egypt, Jordan, Israel/Palestine, and the Arabian Gulf states. Bedouin strive to maintain their culture, social mores and traditions, while at the same time enjoying the benefits of technology, education, and health standards.

*See also Arabia, Pre-Islam; ‘Asabiyya; Ibn Khaldun.*

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Rochelle Davis

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**BID’A**

A *bid’a* (pl. *bid’as*) is an innovation in theology, ritual, or the customs of daily life, that did not exist in early Islam but came into existence in the course of history.

The term itself does not appear in the Qur’an, be it that the Holy Book includes other derivations of the root *bid‘*. In the hadith literature *bid‘a* is often used in contrast with the term *sunna*. In this sense sunna denotes the exemplary standard for Muslim life, as this was established by the prophet Muhammad and the pious Muslims of early Islam; for this reason, a *bid‘a*, being a deviation from the normative sunna, was almost exclusively regarded as negative. This idea can be found in the canonical collections of hadith literature and, for example, was put into words in the Prophetic saying: “The worst of all things are novelties (*mubahhat*); every novelty is an innovation (*bid‘a*), and every *bid‘a* is an error (*dalala*), and every error “leads to hell.”

Apart from this negative understanding of the concept of *bid‘a*, a positive interpretation also could be given to the term. This was done by using another saying from the hadith literature. These words are attributed to the second caliph ‘Umar who, after he had seen an innovation in the rite of the ritual prayer (*ṣalāt*), is reported to have said: “Truly, this is a good *bid‘a*.” On the basis of this saying the great jurist al-Shafī‘i (767–820) made a distinction between good and objectionable *bid‘as*. As a result of this, the possibility was created to introduce new ideas and practices into Islam for which there were no precedents in early Islam, but which could now be accepted as good innovations. Later scholars further manipulated the term *bid‘a* by adding various other, most often legal, adjectives to it. For example, the prolific Egyptian author Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445–1505) mentions the application of the five legal classifications (*al-ḥākams al-∗akhīms*) to the term, thus making a distinction between “forbidden,” “reprehensible,” “indifferent,” “recommended,” and “obligatory” *bid‘as*.

Although this flexible interpretation of the concept of *bid‘a* was thus known from an early period onward, various later scholars adhered to its negative interpretation exclusively. A well-known representative of this stream is the
Usama’s mother, one of four wives to Muhammad bin Ladin, was from Damascus, Syria. Usama has remained close to her throughout his life. He married one of his mother’s Syrian relatives, with whom he had a son. Usama attended school in Saudi Arabia where he came under the influence of the thought of Muhammad Qutb, the brother of an influential Islamist ideologue named Sayyid Qutb and a Jordanian activist, ‘Abdallah ‘Azam, who actively recruited Arab Muslim fighters to mount a jihad against the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. That Usama bin Ladin visited and lived for a while in Europe has been reported by some writers, but it is unclear when that might have been, where he actually lived in Europe, or what he did while he was there.

After the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in 1979, bin Ladin went to Pakistan. There he met several leaders of jihadi movements who were mounting resistance efforts against the Russians on behalf of the Afghani Muslims. He joined forces with ‘Abdallah ‘Azam to recruit non-Afghani Muslims, mainly Arabs, and to raise money and purchase weapons for an armed resistance against the Soviet military. After al-Qa’ida’s growth and success, the two men had a falling out that led to the assassination of ‘Azam. Usama’s considerable inherited wealth (estimated at between $270 and $500 million) from his father formed an important material contribution to this effort against the Soviets. According to several sources, another significant element in support of Arab milita resistance in Afghanistan (alleged and never denied) was money from the United States, channeled through the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.)

Usama bin Ladin will not be remembered as a religious scholar or intellectual in the Muslim world. He nonetheless has attracted a considerable following, first of mujahidin (guerrilla) fighters against real and perceived enemies of Islam, such as the Soviet military and the U.S. In addition he has gained passive approval and verbal support for his cause more widely among Muslims around the world—many of whom openly disavow the terrorism and violence that is attributed to his leadership even while providing such support. Bin Ladin’s writings include poetry and coauthored treatises and statements that use code words and symbols (such as references to Crusaders and Jews) to express opposition to the State of Israel, European Christendom, and the United States, especially their respective control of and military encroachment on the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina.

Bin Ladin’s theological worldview follows the Salafi and Wahhabi puritanical interpretation and expression of Islam, as well as the trenchant articulation of this strain of Islam provided by the Egyptian dissident intellectual, Sayyid Qutb. Some observers have argued that although the fallen Soviet Union, the United States, and the globalization of capitalism

BIN LADIN, USA (1957– )

Usama bin Ladin is a Saudi dissident and leader of the al-Qa’ida organization. He was born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia. His father, Muhammad bin Ladin, was a Yemeni commoner who became a successful building contractor. He moved his family to Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. Muhammad sired seventeen sons and established the Saudi Bin Ladin Group, a construction firm that eventually won large contracts from the Saudi royal family to renovate important icons of Saudi and Islamic religion and culture. These included several buildings in the cities of Mecca and Medina and many mosques, including the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Usama’s mother, one of four wives to Muhammad bin Ladin, was from Damascus, Syria. Usama has remained close to her throughout his life. He married one of his mother’s Syrian relatives, with whom he had a son. Usama attended school in Saudi Arabia where he came under the influence of the thought of Muhammad Qutb, the brother of an influential Islamist ideologue named Sayyid Qutb and a Jordanian activist, ‘Abdallah ‘Azam, who actively recruited Arab Muslim fighters to mount a jihad against the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in the early 1980s. That Usama bin Ladin visited and lived for a while in Europe has been reported by some writers, but it is unclear when that might have been, where he actually lived in Europe, or what he did while he was there.

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were the spectacular targets of bin Ladin’s active career, in fact it is accommodationist Muslim regimes (like his native Saudi Arabia) that rely on U.S. and Western support that have been the real targets of his criticism and activism.

See also Fundamentalism; Jihad; Qa’ida, al-; Qutb, Sayyid; Terrorism; Wahhabiyah.

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Richard C. Martin

BIOGRAPHY AND HAGIOGRAPHY

Islamic civilization from an early period gave importance to various biographical genres, for example, the life (sira) of the Prophet, works establishing priority in joining the Muslim community, and lives of saints, but rarely, until the modern period, autobiographies.

Particularly important is the relationship between early biography and the hadith collections. The ‘ilm al-rijal, or “science of the men,” was a branch of Islamic historiography verifying the reliability (ta’dil) of hadith transmitters according to criteria such as their direct acquaintance with the Prophet and their veracity and virtues. The qualities (fada’il) and special merits (khawas’is) of important persons constitute a subsection of most hadith collections and reveal early Muslim concepts of charisma, character, or religious authority. Another hadith topic that blossomed into a genre of biographical literature is asceticism (zuhd). Compilations on this subject provide insights into the early development of Sufism and how ascetic behaviors established rankings of merit and authority.

Muslim religious biography and hagiography were composed in specific genres. One of the most important biographical forms is the tabaqat (ranks or classes). This name refers to the system for the arrangement of biographical notices according to notions of contiguity, rank, or virtue. The earliest extant example is the Kitab al-tabaqat al-kabir of Ibn Sa’d (d. 845), which contains some 4,250 biographical notices of men and women of the first Islamic generations. The inclusion of ordinary persons in the classical biographical dictionaries indicates how the history of the Islamic community was understood in this period as being constituted, to a large extent, by the contribution of individuals to building up and transmitting its specific worldview and culture.

The telling of lives in traditional Islamic biographical forms does not present a series of events or cumulative reflections as contributing to character development. Rather, biographical notices serve to establish origins and display a person’s type or example through presenting his or her discrete actions and sayings. The tabaqat genre, which is most popular in Arabic, might focus on certain religious professions such as the biographies of jurists, judges, Qur’an reciters and memorizers, or Sufis. Other tabaqat works chronicle individuals from a particular city or region, and some represent “centennial” biographies that record all prominent Muslims who died in a particular Islamic century.

Tadhkira (memorial) works are collections of the lives of persons engaged in scholarly or religious activities. They are more common in later periods, especially in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and South Asia.

Malfuzat are records of audiences of notable scholars or Sufis. This genre is indigenous to South Asian Islam where the early Indian Sufis are known largely through records preserved in this form. Malfuzat as a biographical genre often provides a more spontaneous, authentic flavor of the person and his circle in contrast to the more idealized portrayals of the tadbirat. Individual biographies (tarjama, pl. tarajim) and autobiographies were less common in earlier periods although a small number may be found. Notable is al-Ghazali’s Deliverance from Error (d. 1111) a narrative of his spiritual search for truth. One should not neglect to mention the biographical significance of other related genres, for example, letters and travel accounts, such as those of the famous Ibn Battuta (1304–1369).

In the medieval period bio- or autobiographical notices were sometimes prefaced or appended to a scholar’s works and read like a curriculum vitae, that included the individual’s teachers, places visited, and works studied, transmitted, or composed. Medieval Muslim autobiography and biography often featured accounts of dreams or visionary experiences indicating that the tradition considered such events as important and meaningful.

More recently, Western literature has influenced biographical and autobiographical writing in many Islamic societies. In South Asia innovations in the tradition of religious biography were related to the development of Urdu as a modern prose language in the late nineteenth century and to efforts to combine Islamic and “modern” learning embodied in the Aligarh movement. Most significant among this trend are the writings of Shibli Nu’mani (1857–1914), who prepared a series of monographs on “Heroes of Islam” including studies of the caliph ‘Umar, the jurist Abu Hanifa, the poet Rumi, and the theologian al-Ghazali, as well as the Prophet. This new style of biography was marked by critical evaluation and a rationalist treatment of the subject.

As the forces of westernization have increasingly penetrated many Muslim societies, the canons of modern literature have tended to favor the novel, short story, and poetry.
written in free verse over traditional biographical forms. With the decline in the popularity of Sufism, the audience for collective memorials and devotional biographies has also decreased. In most regions the traditional Islamic biographical forms have declined in importance as secular, literary life stories take precedence and may provide inspiration for serialization as televised historical dramas.

Traditional genres of religious biography still persist in religious contexts and in more traditional segments of Muslim societies. In the modern period, however, a number of new developments have occurred. Among the most striking are: an increased use of religious biography for personal edification; its use in reinforcing symbols of national or regional identity; and its functioning to inspire or legitimate political action and Islamist identifications.

For example, in Iranian Shi’ism the lives of the imams have been a source of inspired poetry and performances of commemoration. A significant and instructive trend in their modern use is that during the prerevolutionary period in Iran, the focus of Husayn’s biography shifted from his role as tragic martyr to portraying him as an activist challenging the unjust social order.

The role of females also receives increased attention. Traditional Muslim scholars now present early Muslim heroic women in ways that honor their contributions to Islamic history while reinforcing traditional patterns of female behavior. In contrast, the Moroccan feminist historian Fatima Mernissi has presented a revisionist look at the lives of a number of prominent early Muslim women that attempts to recover their independence of action and defiance of supposed cultural norms. Zaynab al-Ghazali, a contemporary Egyptian activist in the Muslim Brotherhood, offered her prison memories in Hayati (My life) in the form of a heroic narrative with hagiographic undertones. Islamist autobiographies and convert narratives of American and European Muslims open up further possibilities for hybridization in biographical accounts.

See also Arabic Literature; Genealogy; Historical Writing.

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BIRUNI, AL- (C. 973–1050)

Al-Biruni was a polymath of the Islamic eleventh century who wrote in multiple scientific fields. Included among his subjects were astronomy, mathematics, pharmacology, and mineralogy, and he also contributed important works of history and cultural studies.

Al-Biruni originated from the region of Khwarazm, and his name refers to the fact that he was born in a suburb of the capital. Although Persian, he preferred to write in Arabic. When Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna conquered Khwarazm in 1017, al-Biruni was taken as a prisoner to his capital. He became the court astrologer and then accompanied Mahmud on his expeditions to northwestern India. This led al-Biruni to study Sanskrit and Indian religions and customs, which he recorded in Kitab ta’rikh al-Hind (Alberuni’s India). His writings include significant observations on the natural features, social structure, and religious practices of the non-Muslim Indians. He was a prolific author of some 180 works of varying lengths, including many important treatises on mathematical and astronomical topics.

See also Astronomy; Historical Writing; Science, Islam and.

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Marcia Hermansen

BODY, SIGNIFICANCE OF

The body is the locus of human existence and activity in Islam. Islamic law stipulates the regular purification of the body, requires the use of a body in performing rituals, and views the body as the site of both social continuity and punishment in the case of violating social norms.

Purification and renunciation of the body are required for both men and women in Islamic law. Ritual purification involves washing and wiping certain parts of the body, and is invalidated by natural bodily emissions (urine, feces, pus,
Though these Muslim women wear their veils in slightly different styles, all of the women are sufficiently covered. © Peter Turnley/CORBIS

blood, vomit), sleep, unconsciousness, insanity, and sexual contact. Most jurists also agree that touching one’s genitals (penis, vagina, anus) also invalidates purification. The ritual fast during the month of Ramadan requires keeping substances from entering the body (food, drink, medicine) and abstinence from sex.

The body is also of symbolic importance for the rites of the pilgrimage to Mecca. While in the sanctuary at Mecca pilgrims are not allowed to eat the meat of wild animals or plants. Pilgrims are not allowed to have sex, and marriages performed during the pilgrimage are invalid. Nor are pilgrims allowed to wear sewn clothing or apply perfume to their bodies. The hair and fingernails of pilgrims cannot be cut during the pilgrimage but are cut upon exiting from the sanctuary at the end of the pilgrimage. Many classical sources report that the prophet Muhammad distributed his hair and fingernails, cut at the end of his last pilgrimage, to his followers as relics.

Islamic law recognizes the body as the legal sphere of the individual. The “private area” (’urwah), the area which must be covered in public, is defined differently for men and women. For men it is the area between the waist and the knees, for women it is the area from the neck to the ankles, although some authorities also include in this the female voice. Crimes such as theft require the amputation of limbs (hands and feet), and other crimes such as fornication require death by stoning under certain circumstances.

See also Circumcision; Gender; ‘Ibadat.

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Brannon M. Wheeler

BOURGHIBA, HABIB (1901–2000)
Habib Bourghiba was the most prominent leader of Tunisia’s Neo-Destour movement, which led that country to independence from France in 1956. Born into a middle-class family of
limited resources at Monastir in 1901, Bourghiba was educated at the prestigious Sadiq College and at the Lycée Carnot in Tunis; subsequently he earned a law degree at the University of Paris. After returning to Tunisia in the mid-1920s, he became increasingly involved in the Destour (constitutionalist) movement, which was seeking Tunisia’s autonomy from France. By the 1930s he broke with its leadership, which he considered too socially and religiously conservative, and founded the Neo-Destour party, which tended toward secular and liberal nationalism.

Once independence came, however, he transformed the Neo-Destour party—later the Destourian Socialist Party—into a ruling single party. This action allowed him to gain and maintain a tight grip over the Tunisian political process for three decades. He was elected three times without opposition to the presidency, ultimately becoming president for life in 1974. In the meantime, the economy stagnated or declined and the gap between the ruling elites and the masses widened, not only materially, but also culturally. Various Islamist groups arose in a protest movement appealing to traditional religious values. In November 1987, with Bourghiba’s physical and mental health clearly deteriorating, he was deposed by the sitting Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. Habib Bourghiba died in his native city of Monastir.

See also Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Secularism, Islamic.

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John Ruedy

BUKHARA, KHANATE AND EMIRATE OF

Conventional terms for the political entities in Central Asia were ruled by the khanates of the Shibanid-Abulkhayrid (1500 to 1598), the Toqay-Timurid (1598 to the late 18th century) families, and the emirs of the Uzbek Manghit tribe (1785 to 1920). The core territories of the khanate and emirate were the string of oases along the course of the river Zarafshan with the cities Bukhara and Samarkand. During most of the sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, Tashkent and Balkh also belonged to the Bukharan dominions.

In 1500, Muhammad Shibani drove the Timurids from Transoxania and conquered a territory reaching from Tashkent to Khwarazm and Khurasan. Shibani, a descendant of Genghis Khan through his grandson Shiban, had served Timurid and Chaghatay rulers during the last decades of the fifteenth century. The principal source of Muhammad Shibani’s authority was his claim of descent from Genghis Khan. He derived additional authority from the fact that his grandfather, Abu ’l-Khayr, had ruled a large confederation of Turco-Mongol tribes in Western Siberia known as the Uzbeks. But Muhammad Shibani also propagated Islamic legitimacy by adopting the title of caliph.

Sovereignty in the extended Shibanid-Abulkhayrid family was corporate, embodied in the sultans (agnatic princes who traced their descent from Abu ’l-Khayr through their father’s lineage) under the overall khanship of Muhammad Shibani. The khan distributed the conquered territories as appanages (land grants) among the eligible Abulkhayrid princes. The crisis following the unexpected death of Muhammad Shibani Khan in battle against Safavid Qizilbash troops (1510) led to a major reorganization of rule. A short power struggle between the leaders of the major Abulkhayrid clans was resolved in a general meeting (quriltai) convened in 1512 in Samarkand. Supreme sovereignty as khan was from then on nominally assigned to the senior Abulkhayrid agnate.

The appanages became hereditary dominions. The principal appanages, each dominated by one of the Abulkhayrid cousin clans, were Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, and Miyankal (the region between Samarkand and Bukhara). In 1526 Balkh and the lands between the Hindu Kush and the River Amu were regained and allotted to the Jani-Beg clan. This appanage system remained relatively stable until the mid-century, when unclear succession in Bukhara triggered open interclan conflict. Abdallah II, a member of the Jani-Beg clan, eventually established himself in Bukhara in 1557 and gradually expanded his domination over the other Abulkhayrid appanages. Abdallah took residence in Bukhara and initiated large-scale urban development projects.

The political process of electing a supreme khan on the basis of seniority and distributing the territory as appanages to the eligible junior members of the royal clan was continued by the Toqay Timurids, another clan that claimed descent from Genghis Khan and took over in the secession crisis that followed the death of Abdallah’s son in 1598. The number of appanages was reduced to two: Bukhara, the residence of the supreme khan and capital of the northern and central territories of the khanate, and Balkh, the center of the areas south of the Amu.

The military backbone of Abulkhayrid and Toqay-Timurid rule were the Uzbek emirs, leaders of the Turco-Mongol nomadic tribal groups who had brought Muhammad Shibani to power. They gradually merged with the old ruling class of Timurid Central Asia. The hierarchy of the emirs symbolically followed a pattern of military-tribal organization that is thought to date back to the army of Genghis Khan. However,
The Kalyan Minaret, built circa 1127, in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. The emirate of Bukhara was abolished in 1920 when its last amir, 'Alim, went into exile during the occupation of the city by Russian revolutionary troops. © DIEGO LEZAMA OREZZO/Corbis

this does not mean that the Uzbek emirs were a closed group, nor that they were restricted to military duty. The borderline between military and civil administration was to some extent fluid. Service in the civil administration appears to have been an integral part of an emir’s career.

On the other hand, high civil officials of nontribal background could enter the ranks of the emirs. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the highest offices were the atalıq, the divanbegi, and the bakım. The atalıq (princely tutor) seems to have served as military-administrative counselor and a liaison between the khan and the sultans. Hakıms served as governors of territorial subunits of the appanages. The divanbegi was the head of the fiscal administration. However, to what extent this title (and others of lower rank) matched well-defined administrative duties or rather were nominal ranks is difficult to determine. The high ranks of religious offices were filled by members of a limited number of families of noble descent (sayyid, khwaja), the most noteworthy being the Juybari khwajas.

The emirs were compensated for their services by assignments of pastureland and the revenues from villages. Originally given to an individual and frequently redistributed, these grants tended to become hereditary, and as a result certain emirid clans and their tribal followings became closely linked to defined territories. The Manghit tribal group thus came to dominate the oasis of Bukhara and the pasturelands around Qarshi.

The growing imbalance between the authority of the khan and the tribal leaders resulted in a radical change in the crisis that followed the temporary surrender of the khan of Bukhara to Nadir Shah in 1740. The atalıq Muhammad Rahim, an emir of the Manghit clan, was able to assume power in Bukhara and even to adopt the title khan in 1756. His cousin Shah Murad (1785–1800) abolished the khanate and ruled with the caliphal title amir al-mu'imin (Commander of the Faithful), thus lending his nonregal status additional Islamic legitimacy.

The transition from the neo-Chinggisid khanate to the Manghit emirate can be characterized by two major developments: The legitimation of rule was now Islamic rather than based on descent from Genghis Khan, and the power of the non-Manghit Uzbek emirs was systematically reduced. The Manghit emirs of Bukhara created a small standing army and so were able to become largely independent of tribal military support. The connection of military resources and access to regional revenues that had always made the Uzbek emirs a potential threat to the rulers’s authority was gradually dissolved. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the emirate of Bukhara appears to have become a fairly centralized state. The emirate was governed through a complex military-civil bureaucracy headed by a chief minister called qoshbegi. The territory was divided into provinces (twenty-seven in 1915) which in turn consisted of fiscal-administrative units. The oasis of Bukhara was under direct administration, while the other provinces were governed by officials called beks.

Already during the reign of the emir Nasrallah (1826–1860) the emirate felt the incipient impact of the conflicting imperialistic interests of Russia and Britain. In 1868, the emir Muzaffar al-Din (1860–1885) had to accept the annexation of the eastern part of his dominions, including Samarkand, by tsarist Russia. The so-called friendship treaty between the governor general of Russian Turkestan and the emir of Bukhara in 1873 sealed the emirate’s loss of independence. Though nominally still a sovereign state, the emirate was gradually integrated into the sphere of influence of the Russian Empire. In 1920, Russian revolutionary troops occupied Bukhara. The last emir, ‘Alim (r. 1910–1920), went into exile and the emirate was abolished.

A photo of the arched entryway to the Miri-Arab Madrasa appears in the volume one color plates.
BUKHARI, AL- (810–870)

Muhammad b. Isma’il al-Bukhari, who was born in Bukhara in central Asia, compiled the most important hadith collection in Sunni Islam, called al-Jami’ al-sahih (The sound collection). Al-Bukhari is said to have started to learn hadiths (“the sayings” of the prophet Muhammad) at about ten years of age, having been blessed with a remarkably retentive memory and a sharp intellect. At the age of sixteen, he made the pilgrimage and traveled to Mecca and Medina to study with well-known hadith teachers there. He next went to Egypt, and spent the following sixteen years traveling through much of Asia in the pious pursuit of hadiths. On his return to Bukhara, he began to scrutinize the roughly 600,000 reports he had collected. He is said to have applied the most stringent standards in determining the reliability of these reports, which led him to record only about 7,397 of them. His painstaking efforts resulted in the Sahih, which by the tenth century had achieved near universal recognition among Muslims, who regarded al-Bukhari’s collection as including the most reliable and sound hadiths attributed to the Prophet, based particularly on analysis of their chains of transmission. The Sahih continues to enjoy an almost “canonical” status today, second only to the Qur’an in importance as the source for moral and legal prescriptions. The standard edition in use today was prepared by ‘Ali b. Muhammad al-Yunini (d. 1302). Numerous commentaries have been written on the Sahih; in recent times, partial and complete translations of this collection have been made in a number of languages. Al-Bukhari died in his hometown of Bukhara at age sixty.

See also Hadith.

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BURAQ

In sura 17:1 of the Qur’an, the prophet Muhammad, led by the angel Gabriel, journeys in one night (‘isra’) to “the Far Distant Place of Worship,” interpreted as Jerusalem. In the hadith, Muhammad continues on to the heavens (mi’raj), describing his mount as a small white steed, called al-Buraq. Later literary and art-historical traditions give al-Buraq a human face, wings, and dappled coloration. This miraculous steed is depicted in the fourteenth-century world history of Rashiduddin, the fifteenth-century Timurid Mi’rajname, and sixteenth-century Safavid Khamsas of Nizami. Buraq’s importance continues today, appearing in Sunni paintings commemorating a hajj to Mecca, or in Shi’ite popular art, which often shows al-Buraq alongside Husayn’s horse at Karbala.

See also Mi’raj; Tasawwuf.

Carel Bertram
CAIRO

The foundations of present-day Cairo rest upon the ancient capital of Memphis, one of the oldest urban settlements in the world, which flourished between 5000 and 2500 B.C.E. Memphis was finally surpassed by the seaport of Alexandria when Egypt became a Mediterranean colony of the Greeks, but its strategic position ensured continuous settlement. As a result, the city was still thriving at the time of the Roman conquest around 24 B.C.E. Although the region was contested by the Romans and Persians at the opening of the seventh century C.E., it was finally the Arabs who prevailed, thereby setting into motion the genesis of Cairo or al-Qahira, The Victorious City, as it is still referred to in Arabic. Cairo would in time grow into one of the most important religious, cultural, and political centers of the Muslim world.

The urban centers that sprouted under Islamic civilization surfaced from either army camps, that eventually developed into permanent cities, or princely towns established to commemorate new dynasties and to affirm their authority. Cairo was conceived out of an amalgamation of such regions, in which an army camp settlement fused with the princely centers established at its periphery. As such, the successive stages of Cairo’s genesis also capture the histories of her past masters.

In 640 C.E. the forces of the illustrious Arab general ‘Amr ibn al-‘As reached what is present-day Cairo. He set up camp there and established the first mosque in Africa, which still stands and is one of the most important religious icons of Cairo today. The settlement itself came to be known as Fustat, which simply means “entrenchment,” and eventually developed into a burgeoning city. The atmosphere of growing provincial autonomy in the period that followed fueled the ambitions of Ahmad ibn Tulun, a man of Turkish extraction appointed as deputy for the governor of Egypt. He founded his own princely city slightly to the north of al-‘Askar in 870 C.E., which was called al-Qata‘i’ (the Wards), reflecting its feudal base. The awesome mosque of Ibn Tulun, built between 876 and 878, is one of the most prominent legacies inherited from that era and still stands, surrounded by the crowded metropolis of today.

The most significant event in the genesis of Cairo is undoubtedly the rise of the Shi‘ite Fatimid dynasty in Tunisia at the beginning of the tenth century. The Fatimid caliphate reached its full expression on Egyptian soil and it was its fourth caliph, Mu‘izz al-Din, who gained sovereignty over the area in 969. His brilliant general Jawhar led the campaign and almost immediately began staking out the walls of a new palace city after his arrival. The city was initially called al-Mansuriyya but was renamed al-Qahira al-Mu‘izziyiya four years later, to commemorate and celebrate the arrival of the caliph. With the coming of Mu‘izz al-Din, Cairo or al-Qahirah was formally inducted into world history.

Al-Qahirah was developed into a city of lavish beauty and intellectual vitality under the Fatimids. But the city remained largely inaccessible to common people from areas like Fustat, who could only enter the royal enclosure by special permit. Ironically, the al-Azhar University, which is today recognized as one of the most important intellectual centers of Sunni Islam, was established by the Fatimids to promote their Shi‘ite doctrine.

The closing of the eleventh century marked the beginning of the first Crusade and also the decline of the Fatimid dynasty. In the period between 1164 and 1169 Cairo became a pawn in the power struggle between the Seljuks of Syria and the Christian forces in Jerusalem. Although still nominally ruled by the Fatimids, true control of the city eventually fell
into the hands of the young Sunni governor Saladin (Salah al-Din) al-Ayyubi, sent to defend Cairo against the Crusader campaigns. Saladin in time established the Ayyubid dynasty and even reconquered Jerusalem. His mercurial rise contributed once again to the further transformation of Cairo. Under him, the mosque of ‘Amr was restored and al-Azhar University was purged of its Shi’ite bias. A madrasa (school) was founded at the tomb of Imam al-Shafi’i soon after the Ayyubid conquest of Egypt and a mausoleum commemorating the great imam is still in existence today. But Saladin’s most important and long-lived addition to the city was the Citadel, built for him in 1176 as a place of refuge and continuously expanded upon by later generations.

By the fourteenth century Cairo was recognized as a world capital, reaching its zenith under the Mamluks. Cairo’s greatest growth and development took place in this period. In spite of constant forays against the Crusaders and Mongols, the Mamluk rulers still devoted energies to the development of the city. For example, Sultan Qalawun erected his famous hospital in the heart of the city during this era. Although the Cairo of the fifteenth century still surpassed any European city in terms of urban development and population, this period also marks the beginning of its decline. Cairo’s economic prosperity was reduced considerably due to Vasco da Gama’s successful circumnavigation of Africa and his arrival in India in 1498. The East-West Oriental spice trade with Europe, which passed through Egypt, was thereby severed, stranding Cairo in a backwater of the rapidly changing global map. Not even the Ottomans, who finally ousted the Mamluks in 1517, were able to hamper the city’s downward spiral.

The modernizing reforms instituted by Isma’il Pasha in the late nineteenth century ultimately breathed life back into Cairo. These reforms ironically were inspired by the urban developments of modern-day Europe. Cairo is today the largest metropolis in the Middle East and is now being stifled by overurbanization resulting from overcentralization. This is but the latest challenge facing the City Victorious. Having always been at the forefront of Arab and Islamic trends, it is a challenge to which Cairo will surely rise.

See also Sultanates: Ayyubids; Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Sultanates: Mamluk; Sultanates: Seljuk.

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Aslam Farouk-Alli

CALIPHATE

In classical and medieval Islamic history and juristic theory, the Arabic term khilafa, of which “caliphate” is the anglicized form, denotes the political headship of the Muslim community. The term khilafa—which is used in the Qur’an with reference to Adam (2:30) and David (38:26), besides seven other occurrences in the plural—is understood in Sunni
juristic theory as the successor of the prophet Muhammad. The position of the caliph is the most central of all political institutions in the history of classical Islam, and issues pertaining to the legitimacy of those occupying this office, the scope of its powers, and the theoretical and practical accommodations forced upon it during the course of its long career are central to the political and religious history of Islam.

**History of the Institution**

Sunni Muslims believe that Muhammad did not appoint anyone to succeed him on his death. According to this view, which has also been generally adopted by modern scholars of early Islamic history, a number of the companions of Muhammad congregated in Medina immediately after his death to deliberate on the question of his succession. At this meeting, Abu Bakr, a member of Muhammad’s tribe of Quraysh and one of the most influential of his companions, was elected as the first caliph. The succession was soon recognized by the other companions, including ‘Ali, the initially recalcitrant cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, who was later to become the focus of the legitimist claims of the Shi’a. The latter’s view of Muhammad’s succession is squarely at odds with that of the Sunnis. To them, Muhammad had, in fact, designated a successor in the person of ‘Ali, and most of the companions of the Prophet were culpable for subverting this explicit testament, as indeed were the successors of the first-generation Muslims for their continued denial of the claims of ‘Ali’s descendants, the imams, to the political and religious headship of Islam.

As the rival Shi’ite and Sunni perspectives on early Islam—and especially on the locus of legitimate authority after Muhammad—suggest, there are competing, often irreconcilable, narratives that comprise the history and historiography of the early caliphate. In the form that these and other narratives have come down to the present day, they are also relatively late (with the earliest extant sources on the caliphate dating from the 9th century), and their content and structure often reveal considerable instability in how they were transmitted or variously rearranged by different hands before, and even after, being committed to writing. Early Islamic historiography may provide rich clues to the controversies on questions of religious and political authority during the first centuries of Islam, but it does not serve well as a reliable guide to the history of the caliphate. Yet, if sources do not lend themselves to a detailed reconstruction of the careers of individual caliphs during Islam’s first two centuries or more, modern scholars generally agree that even the tendentiousness of the extant accounts does allow an overview of the caliphate’s history along something like the following lines.

The caliphate of Abu Bakr (632–634), which signified the beginnings of the administrative organization of the caliphate are credited to Abu Bakr’s immediate successor, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644). He created a military register (diwan) for the payment of the troops and for the disbursement of pensions to other members of the Muslim community. It was in his reign that the first garrison towns were established in the conquered lands, a system of taxation was put in place, and efforts were made to minimize the social and economic disruptions inherent in this rapid conquest. Yet it was not just the conquered people but also the new conquerors who had to cope with the changes set in motion by the expansion of the Medinan state. Entire tribes came to settle in the newly acquired territories, and, quite apart from such rivalries as they may have brought with them from their earlier environs, new grievances and conflicts were provoked by the competing claims of those who had converted to Islam early or late (which determined the share of one’s stipends), by the unfamiliar demands of the nascent state on its subjects, and by the conduct and policies of the caliph or his agents.

Such resentments came to the surface in the reign of ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (r. 644–656), the third successor of Muhammad, who was eventually murdered in Medina by disaffected Arab tribesmen from the garrisons of Kufa, Basra, and Egypt. The murder of ‘Uthman inaugurated the series of bitter conflicts within the Muslim community that are collectively known as the fitna—a highly evocative term suggesting a time of temptation and trial, dissension, and chaos. This civil war, Islam’s first, was to continue throughout the reign of ‘Uthman’s successor, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661), and it ended only with the latter’s assassination and the rise of the Umayyad dynasty (r. 661–750). The events of these years were debated by Muslims for centuries: It is to these events that later Muslims looked in explaining and arguing over their sectarian divisions, some of which were to prove permanent. Even in later centuries, it was never easy to explain how the first community of believers, formed by the Prophet’s own guidance, had fallen into such turmoil so soon after his death.
The Umayyads. Like their predecessors, the Umayyads too were members of the Quraysh tribe. Unlike their predecessors, all four of whom came, after much controversy, to be set apart from subsequent rulers and to be revered by Sunni Muslims as the Rashidun, the “rightly guided” caliphs, the rise of the Umayyads marked the establishment of a caliphal dynasty. Mu’awiya (r. 661–680), the founder of this dynasty, based his rule on careful cultivation and manipulation of ties with tribal notables (ashrāf), and it was through such ties that he was able not just to govern but also to have his son, Yazid I (r. 680–683), recognized as his heir. This system of rule through tribal intermediaries was short-lived, however. On Mu’awiya’s death, several disparate revolts—often characterized as the second civil war—erupted in different parts of the empire. Among these was the revolt of Husayn, the son of ‘Ali and the grandson of the Prophet, who was killed in Iraq in 680 along with a small band of his followers. Though hardly momentous at the time it occurred, this event was to acquire profound importance in the history of Shi’ite Islam as the symbolic focus of Shi’ite piety and religious identity. At the time, however, far more serious threats to the Umayyads were represented by the revolt of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubayr in the Hijaz, in Arabia, and by factional warfare between Arab tribes in Syria and Mesopotamia. In 684, with the civil war still in progress, Marwan ibn al-Hakam (r. 684–685) was elected caliph in Syria, marking the transfer of ruling authority from Mu’awiya’s descendants, the Sufyanid clan (of which ‘Uthman had been a member), to another clan of the Umayyad family. This clan, the Marwanids, was to rule as caliphs until the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty in 750.

The Marwanids governed their empire through powerful generals appointed from the capital, Damascus, and through increasingly elaborate administrative departments (diwan). Late antique administrative structures and traditions continued under the Umayyads even as they underwent sometimes rapid changes that expressed the evolving Arab and Islamic identity of the new empire. Around the turn of the eighth century, the language of the administration was itself changed from ancient Persian and Greek to Arabic and a new system of coinage, clearly asserting the Islamic identity of the new rulers, was instituted. This identity was expressed even more strikingly in monumental architecture, of which the two most famous extant examples are the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, built during the reign of the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705), and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, built under his successor al-Walid I (r. 705–715).

Though the Umayyads are often portrayed as worldly “kings” in Arabic historiography (an unfavorable image that owes much to the fact that early Islamic historiography is largely the work of those who were unfavorably disposed toward this dynasty), it was under their rule that Islamic religious, cultural, and political institutions began to take their distinctive shape. The caliphs, though far removed from the austere lifestyle of the Rashidun, were hardly the ungodly rulers that medieval Arab chroniclers and many modern scholars have often represented them to be. As Crone and Hinds have shown, their coins, their official pronouncements, and their panegyrists often characterized them as the “deputies of God,” a formulation frowned on by the religious scholars but one that suggests something of the scope and seriousness of Umayyad religious claims. The caliphs are known to have given decisions on matters involving Islamic law and ritual, and some of them are featured as authorities in early collections of hadith. Above all, the existence of a powerful centralized political authority provided the crucial context in which the early development of Islam and of Muslim communal and cultural identity took place.

Yet the growing community of Muslims also posed serious challenges to the Umayyads. Since the conquest of the Middle East, the economic well-being of the state was based on the principle that the non-Muslims paid the bulk of the taxes on the land, while the Muslims were responsible for only the religiously obligated taxes on their wealth. In theory, anyone who joined the ranks of the Muslims was entitled to the same concessions; in practice, a large influx of previously taxed non-Arabs threatened the revenues of the empire, with the result that the new Muslims (the mawali or “clients”) often continued to be taxed as if they had not converted to Islam. The Umayyads never satisfactorily resolved the problem of how to integrate the new non-Arab Muslims into the Muslim community, and they thereby created considerable resentment against their dynasty. This was compounded by the grievances of those Arabs who had given up their military careers and settled down in the conquered lands, but felt discriminated against or unfairly treated by the military generals and their (sometimes non-Muslim) tax-collecting agents. There was, moreover, increasingly destructive tribal factionalism within the Umayyad army that severely weakened the caliphate both through faction-based military revolts and the systematic persecution of members of a faction each time a rival came to power.

Shi’ite groups led a number of revolts against the Umayyads, as did the Kharjites, erstwhile followers of ‘Ali who had separated from him when he agreed to negotiate with what the Kharjites regarded as Mu’awiya’s iniquitous party. The revolt that brought the Umayyad dynasty to an end in 750 also began as a Shi’ite movement that called, as had many others before it, for returning the rule back to the rightful descendants of the Prophet and for rule according to the “word of God” and the sunna of His Prophet.” It was not, however, the descendants of ‘Ali but those of al-‘Abbas, an uncle of the Prophet, that came to power with what is often characterized by modern scholars as the “Abbasid revolution.”

The Abbasids. The new center of the empire was Iraq rather than Syria, and bureaucrats of Iranian origin were prominent in the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) from its inception. The new empire was, like its predecessor, also an “Arab kingdom,” and indeed there were important continuities between the
Umayyad Caliphs

Claimants to the caliphate or caliphs are set in bold type, and are sequentially numbered.


Genealogy of the early caliphs.

Umayyad and the early Abbassid caliphaties. Yet, the latter was much more inclusive in terms of the ethnic origins of its soldiers and bureaucrats and much more successful in assimilating its non-Arab subjects into the Islamic empire. Its ideological emphases were also different from its predecessor’s. Unlike the Umayyads but like the ‘Alids, the Abbasids emphasized from the outset their kinship with the Prophet as the justification for their claims to the caliphate. This was to remain a major basis of their legitimist claims, though it was scarcely the only one. The early Abbassid caliphaties also tried to invoke, especially in their regnal titles, the messianic expectations rife at the time; they sought, as had the Umayyads in their own ways, to bolster their authority with appeals to pre-Islamic royal traditions and symbolism, and they presided
over elaborate circles of patronage that involved a broad spectrum of the cultural and religious elite of the time. Baghdad, founded by al-Mansur (r. 754–775) as his new capital, had evocative imperial symbolism inscribed in its very design, but it soon also became the center of culture and learning, and of interaction not only between various Muslim groups and emerging schools and sects but also between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The first century of Abbasid rule was a time of extraordinary cultural and religious efflorescence, not just in Baghdad but also in the major provincial towns. It was during this time that the eponymous founders of the major schools of Sunni and Shi’ite law flourished. The systematic collection of the traditions of the Prophet, the hadith, began to take place during this time; some of the first extant works of hadith date to this period, as does the earliest major biography of the Prophet, the Sira of Ibn Ishaq (d. 767). Under royal patronage, systematic efforts were made to translate ancient philosophical and scientific works into Arabic, and this was the age that saw formative developments in Islamic theology, notably the rise of the rationalist Mu’tazila, as well as the beginnings of what later emerged as Sunni and Shi’ite Islam.

But this formative age was also a time of considerable political turmoil. A number of Shi’ite revolts, of which the most serious took place in Medina and Basra in 762, threatened Abbasid rule. The existence of the descendants of ‘Ali, the Shi’ite imams, and their followers in the midst of the community continued to challenge Abbasid legitimacy. Khurasan, where the Abbasid revolt had originated, saw many uprisings against the caliphal state in the early decades after the revolution. The empire was also shaken by a destructive civil war between two sons of Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), eventuating in the murder of the incumbent caliph, al-Amin (r. 809–813), and the succession of his brother and the governor of Khurasan, al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833). This murder, and the widespread uncertainty and disorder that accompanied and followed the civil war, considerably weakened the Abbasid state, necessitating extensive effort on the part of the caliph to reassert his authority. This effort took some unusual forms.

Unlike his Abbasid predecessors, al-Ma’mun made strong claims to religious authority, namely to an ability to lay down at least some of what his subjects must believe. Toward the end of his reign, he instituted the mibna, an inquisition to enforce conformity to the theological doctrine that the Qur’an ought to be regarded as the “created” word of God. Irrespective of the provenance of this idea or its theological merit, it allowed the caliph to assert his own authority as the arbiter of the community’s religious life. The inquisition was apparently intended not only to extend the scope of caliphal authority but also to humble many of those scholars of hadith and law whose growing influence in society the caliph resented and who consequently were among the principle victims of the mibna. But al-Ma’mun died shortly after the inquisition began, and though it continued in effect under two of his immediate successors, it did more, in the long run, to define the “uncreatedness” of the Qur’an as a Sunni creed and to solidify the ranks of the early Sunni scholars than it did to enhance the caliph’s religious authority. Later caliphs were usually happier to align themselves with the Sunni religious scholars in asserting their own roles in the community’s religious life than they were in confronting or challenging them.

Toward the end of the first century of Abbasid rule, the caliph was still in control of large parts of his realm, but his empire was not as extensive as it had been at the beginning of the dynasty, and it was rapidly shrinking. Some of the provinces were already becoming independent in all but name, and at the heart of the empire, the caliph had to cope with the increasing power of a new military force, Turkish “slave soldiers” drawn from the lands of the Central Asian steppe, a force that in later decades contributed substantially to the political and economic weakness of the Abbasid state. This pattern of a shrinking state and the caliph’s increasing dependence on military generals was to continue for much of subsequent Abbasid history. From the middle of the tenth century, the caliphs came under the sway of ruling families that controlled the Abbasid realm, and often the person of the caliph himself, in all but name. The Buyids, a family of Shi’ite military adventurers from Iran, ruled what was left of the Abbasid caliphate from the middle of the tenth to the middle of the eleventh century. They were supplanted by the staunchly Sunni Turkish Seljuks, who then oversaw the Abbasid caliphs until toward the end of the twelfth century. Even as the caliphate declined in effective political power, and for all the humiliations that individual caliphs were meted out at the hands of the warlords, the symbolic significance of the caliphal institution grew during these centuries. The Shi’ite Buyids not only maintained the caliphate but sought also to legitimate their own rule by seeking formal recognition from the caliphs. The Seljuk sultans and their wazirs were often far more powerful than the caliph or his officials, but they too continued to be formally subservient to the caliph.

Not all caliphs during this period were equally helpless, however. At times of political transition, when the warlords were weak, and depending on the personal abilities and initiative of individual caliphs, the latter could exercise a prominent role in the political and religious life of the realm. Notable among such caliphs were al-Qadir (r. 991–1031) and al-Qa’im (r. 1031–1075) in the Buyid period, and al-Nasir (r. 1180–1225), who reigned at a time when the Seljuk power had waned and who utilized his ties with Sufi and chivalric (futuwwa) groups, which he reorganized with himself at their head, to reassert his authority during a remarkably ambitious reign. But such revivals were sporadic and they did not do very much to seriously stem the effects of the long decline the
caliphate had already undergone. In the middle of the thirteenth century, the caliphate of Baghdad was terminated altogether at the hands of the Mongols, whose ravages included the destruction of large parts of the eastern Islamic world. The caliphate was revived—and the Mongol tide finally stemmed—by the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt, but the Abbasid caliphs of the Mamluk era never had the prestige or the symbolic capital possessed by many of their predecessors in Baghdad. The Mamluk era and, with it, the shadow Abbasid caliphate ended with the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517.

**Ideological Challenges to the Caliphate**

From the time of its inception, the caliphate faced challenges of varying degrees of gravity to its existence. Many of these challenges were political. Civil wars resulted in some of the major shifts in the caliphal office: the end of the Rashidun era and the emergence of the Umayyads; the transfer of the caliphate from the Sulaymids to the Marwanids; the Abbasid revolution; and the war between al-Amin and al-Ma'mun. There was secession of territories that had once been part of the caliphate, internal rebellions and warfare with external foes, and, eventually, the loss of effective caliphal control of the heartland of the empire itself and, indeed, even of the caliph’s own freedom of action. Some of the challenges to the caliphate were also ideological, in that they denied the legitimacy of those who occupied this office or contested the basic assumptions on which the Sunni institution of the caliphate was predicated. The Kharijites, for all the antagonism within their ranks, denied the legitimacy not only of ‘Uthman’s later years but also that of most of his successors. Their position that a ruler who was guilty of a grave sin ought to be deposed brought them into frequent and bloody conflict with the government. Indeed all but the most moderate of the Kharijites were eventually eliminated, but not before they had forcefully raised the question of what constituted a legitimate ruler, under what circumstances must an unjust and sinful ruler be deposed, and what were the terms of membership in the community of Muslims. As Crone has shown, some of the Kharijites as well as certain Mu’tazili theologians were not convinced that the position of a caliph was necessary at all, though this view did not attract much support from the Muslim community.

If the history of the caliphate is viewed from the perspective of the majoritarian Sunnis rather than from that of the Shi’a, then the latter must be seen as representing a more durable challenge to the legitimacy of the caliphate than had even the Kharijites. Divided into many different sects, the Shi’a agreed that the headship of the Muslim community belonged properly to a member of the “people of the house” (ahl al-bayt). What this phrase connoted was a matter of some uncertainty in early Islam, though the term came to be generally understood to refer to the family of the Prophet. As such the Abbasids, too, could and did claim to be the ahl al-bayt, and indeed their revolutionary propaganda had demanded the installation as caliph of the “acceptable one (al-rida) from the family of Muhammad.” The descendants of ‘Ali, however, denied that any but their own number was properly entitled to the caliphate, though there were sharp disagreements among them on the precise qualifications of the person who was to be the political-religious head of the community—the imam. Since the time of their sixth imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq (d. 765), the Imami Shi’a had found it prudent to hold largely quietist political views: The imam did not have to show his entitlement to this position by actually taking up arms against the iniquitous order, as certain other Shi’i’s thought he must. This meant that, despite tensions, the Imams could continue to live in peace under the caliphs. But the Isma’ili Shi’a, differing with the Imamis on the identity of those of Ja’far’s descendants who were to be recognized as imams, thought and acted differently. A state established by the Qarmati Isma’ili in northeastern Arabia gave much grief to the Abbasids during the tenth century. In the early tenth century, a stronger and more ambitious Isma’ili state, the caliphate of the Fatimids, was established in Ifriqiyya (modern-day Tunisia) from where it moved, in 969, to Egypt.

The Fatimids saw themselves as Isma’ili imams as well as caliphs, demanding absolute authority over their followers and challenging, with considerable might and a splendor to match, the legitimist claims of all other rival states and rulers. The pressure of these claims was felt widely, and not just by the Abbasids. Thus it was in response to them, and not primarily as an affront to the Abbasids, that the Umayyads who had been ruling Spain ever since the fall of the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus, began to also style themselves as caliphs in the tenth century. The Abbasids, however, outlived both of these claimants to the caliphate. And while the Fatimid caliphate was in existence, the Shi’ite Buyids of Iraq were happier to pay nominal allegiance to the Sunni Abbasids than they were to the Fatimids, and even the Qarmati Isma’ils remained opposed to the latter. As for the population of Egypt, most people preferred to remain Sunnis, and it was to the Sunni Abbasid caliphate that the celebrated Saladin looked when he terminated Fatimid rule in 1171.

**The Caliphate in Constitutional Theory**

Detailed formulations of Sunni public law are the product of times when the caliphate had largely ceased to be an effective political institution. The most influential of these, the Ahkam al-sultaniyya of the Shafi’i jurist al-Mawardi (d. 1058), was written in the later Buyid period, when the caliphs had for decades lived in often humiliating circumstances under the tutelage of their military overlords. Even so, the caliph occupies the center of al-Mawardi’s exposition, with all powers of appointment and dismissal concentrated in his person, to be “delegated” to others as needed. The principal functions of the caliph, as al-Mawardi saw them, were: the
preservation of religion according to its agreed-upon principles; implementation of the law, preservation of order, and the security of the realm against internal and external threats; undertaking jihad; the collection of the taxes as required by the sacred law, the *shari’a*, and the proper disbursement and use of the revenues; and the appointment of the appropriate officials for discharging the various functions of the state; and close personal supervision of public affairs. Al-Mawardi’s formulations were plainly idealistic; indeed, some of them would have been so even when the Abbasids presided over a large and powerful empire. Yet, in a milieu of political decline, they served important functions. They were simultaneously a way of protesting against the existing circumstances, through a rearticulation of caliphal privileges and his centrality to the life of the community, and a means of bringing juristic theory into some accord with changing circumstances. As for the former, it is noteworthy that the caliph al-Qadir, under whom al-Mawardi wrote his treatise, had himself made efforts to reassert some of his authority against the later Buyids and, as Gibb has suggested (“Al-Mawardi’s Theory”), this treatise may have been part of the same effort. But, the jurist also made important concessions to changing times: The person elevated to the caliphate ought to be the “best” of all those available, yet one who was not such could validly occupy the position; the caliph could hold his position even with his powers severely limited by a military usurper, provided the latter continued to abide by the *shari’a*; and independent rulers of outlying provinces could be recognized as legitimate and indeed integrated into the caliphal system if they formally submitted to the caliph and did not contravene the *shari’a*.

Jurists like al-Mawardi sought to tread a difficult path between trying to formalize and legitimize the status quo, to adapt the *shari’a* itself to the changing circumstances, and to encourage the existing authorities to conform in some manner to the *shari’a*. Later jurists went much beyond al-Mawardi in their concessions to realpolitik. For instance, al-Ghazali (d. 1111) argued that the interests of the community dictated that any military usurper be deemed legitimate, for the effort to remove him would inevitably result in political chaos and bloodshed; indeed, whoever was recognized as caliph by the military ruler was to be accepted as a legitimate caliph. Such juristic formulations meant the recognition of a reality the jurists (or the caliphs, for that matter) were powerless to change. They also signified efforts to safeguard the historical continuity of the Muslim community. For all the actual conduct of individual caliphs or the political fortunes of the institution, lies in what it symbolizes of the classical history of Islam and of the Muslim community. The early caliphate was not only the force behind the military expansion of the Arab Muslims immediately after the death of Muhammad, it was also the institution that kept the Muslims together as a religious and political entity. For all the adverse views that abound about the Umayyads in Arabic historiography, it was through their caliphate that the political survival of the Muslim community was assured. And it was in the framework of the caliphal state, under the Umayyads and then under the Abbasids, that the religious and cultural institutions of Islam evolved. The formation of Islam, its intellectual life, and culture in the first centuries, is, in short, not merely intertwined with but inconceivable without the caliphate.

Even as it declined, the caliphate continued to represent the historical continuity of the Muslim community. It also represented the ideal of the *shari’a*’s supremacy in the collective life of the community. The symbolic weight of the caliphal institution continued to be felt, as long as the caliphate lasted, in the investitures sought by many of the rulers who were independent of the caliphate in all but name. This symbolic power could be revived even long after the institution associated with it had become extinct. For much of their history, the Ottoman sultans had not claimed to be “caliphs,” yet even they began to do so from the late eighteenth century. This was largely meant to assert Ottoman authority over those who lived in territories now lost to the sultan, and thereby also to bolster his weakening standing vis-à-vis the European powers of the time. Such claims on the part of the sultans had resonance in several Muslim societies, especially as the latter came under colonial rule and began more anxiously to look for a visible symbol of the worldwide Muslim community. This sentiment found its most powerful expression in India, where what was in fact the Indian subcontinent’s very first mass-movement of the colonial period was
launched in defense of the Ottoman caliphate at the end of the First World War—a movement that came to an end only with the formal termination of the Ottoman caliphate by Republican Turkey in 1924. That was not the end of the symbolic significance of the caliphate, however. For it was in the debates surrounding the dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate that some of the first modern discussions on the “Islamic state” were to find their point of departure in the twentieth century.

See also Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Ottoman; Empires: Umayyad; Kharijites, Khawarij; Monarchy.

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Muslims have always deemed calligraphy, the art of beautiful writing, the noblest of the arts. The first chapters of the Qur’an revealed to the prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century (suras 96 and 68) mention the pen and writing. Writing in Arabic script soon became a hallmark of Islamic civilization, found on everything from buildings and coins to textiles and ceramics, and scribes and calligraphers became the most honored type of artist. We know the names, and even the biographies, of more calligraphers than any other type of artist. Probably because of the intrinsic link between writing and the revelation, Islamic calligraphy is meant to convey an aura of effortlessness and immutability, and the individual hand and personality are sublimated to the overall impression of stateliness and grandeur. In this way Islamic calligraphy differs markedly from other great calligraphic traditions, notably the Chinese, in which the written text is meant to impart the personality of the calligrapher and recall the moment of its creation. Islamic calligraphy, by contrast, is timeless.

The reed pen (qalam) was the writing implement par excellence in Islamic civilization. The brush, used for calligraphy in China and Japan, was reserved for painting in the Islamic lands. In earliest times Muslim calligraphers penned their works on parchment, generally made from the skins of sheep and goats, but from the eighth century parchment was gradually replaced by the cheaper and more flexible support of paper. From the fourteenth century virtually all calligraphy in the Muslim lands was written on paper. Papermakers developed elaborately decorated papers to complement the fine calligraphy, and the colored, marbled, and gold-sprinkled papers used by calligraphers in later periods are some of the finest ever made.

Almost all Islamic calligraphy is written in Arabic script. The Qur’an was revealed in that language, and the sanctity of the revelation meant that the script was adopted for many other languages, such as new Persian, Ottoman Turkish, and Urdu. Unlike many other scripts that have at least two distinct forms of writing—a monumental or printed form in which the letters are written separately and a cursive or handwritten form in which they are connected—Arabic has
Calligraphy

The Arabic alphabet. Arabic calligraphy is done with a qalam, a type of reed pen, rather than with a brush as in East Asia. Islam’s reverence for the written word contributes to calligraphy’s status as the religion’s most honorable art form. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS
only the cursive form, in which some, but not all, letters are connected and assume different forms depending on their position in the word (initial, medial, final, and independent).

The cursive nature of Arabic script allowed calligraphers to develop many different styles of writing, which are usually grouped under two main headings: rectilinear and rounded. Since the eighteenth century, scholars have often called the rectilinear styles “Kufic,” after the city of Kufa in southern Iraq, which was an intellectual center in early Islamic times. This name is something of a misnomer, for as yet we have no idea which particular rectilinear style this name denoted. Scholars have proposed various other names to replace kufic, including Old or Early Abbasid style, but these names are not universally accepted, in part because they carry implicit political meanings, and many scholars continue to use the term kufic.

Similarly, scholars often called the rounded styles naskh, from the verb nasakh (to copy). The naskh script is indeed the most common hand used for transcription and the one upon which modern styles of typography are based, but the name is also something of a misnomer, for it refers to only one of a group of six rounded hands that became prominent in later Islamic times. As with kufic, scholars have proposed several other names to replace naskh, such as new style (often abbreviated N.S.), or new Abbasid style, but these names, too, are not universally accepted.

Medieval sources mention the names of many other calligraphic hands, but so far it has been difficult, even impossible, to match many of these names with distinct styles of script. Very few sources describe the characteristics of a particular style or give illustrations of particular scripts. Furthermore, the same names may have been applied to different styles in different places and at different times. Hence it may never be possible to link the names of specific scripts given in the sources with the many, often fragmentary, manuscripts at hand, especially from the early period.

Both the rectilinear and the rounded styles were used for writing from early Islamic times, but in the early period the rounded style seems to have been a book hand used for ordinary correspondence, while the rectilinear style was reserved for calligraphy. Although no examples of early calligraphy on parchment can be definitively dated before the late ninth century, the importance of the rectilinear style in early Islamic times is clear from other media with inscriptions, such as coins, architecture, and monumental epigraphy. The Fihrist by Ibn al-Nadim (d. 995) records the names of calligraphers who worked in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, and both coins and the inscriptions on the first example of Islamic architecture, the Dome of the Rock erected in Jerusalem by the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik in 692, show that from earliest times Umayyad calligraphers applied such aesthetic principles as balance, symmetry, elongation, and stylization to transform ordinary writing into calligraphy. Calligraphers in early Islamic times regularly used the rectilinear styles to transcribe manuscripts of the Qur’an. Indeed, the rectilinear styles might be deemed Qur’anic hands, for we know only one other manuscript—an unidentified genealogical text in Berlin (Staatsbibliothek no. 379)—written in a rectilinear script. None of these early manuscripts of the Qur’an is signed or dated, and most survive only in fragmentary form, and so scholars are still refining other methods, both paleographic and codicological, to group and localize the scripts used in these early parchment manuscripts of the Qur’an.

The major change in later Islamic times was the gradual adoption and adaptation of round hands for calligraphy. From the ninth century calligraphers transformed the round hands into artistic scripts suitable for transcribing the Qur’an and other prestigious texts. The earliest surviving copy of the Qur’an written in a rounded hand is a small manuscript, now dispersed but with the largest section preserved in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin (ms. 1417). It bears a note in Persian saying that the manuscript was corrected by a certain Ahmad ibn ‘Ali ibn Abu ‘l-Qasim al-Khayqani in June 905, and it is tacitly accepted that the rounded hand was developed in Iran or nearby Iraq, heartland of the Abbasid caliphate. In the ensuing centuries calligraphers continued to develop and elaborate the rounded style, and from the fourteenth century virtually all manuscripts of the Qur’an were written in one of the six round scripts known as the Six Pens (Arabic, al-aqlam al-sitta, Persian, shish qalam). These comprise three pairs of majuscule-minuscule hands, t bulbub-naskh, muhakqah-rayhan, and tawqi’-riqa’, and calligraphers delighted in juxtaposing the different scripts, particularly the larger and smaller variants of the same pair.

Various explanations have been proposed for this transformation of rounded book hands into proportioned scripts suitable for calligraphy. These explanations range from the political (e.g., the spread of orthodox Sunni Islam) to the sociohistorical (e.g., the new role of the chancery scribe as copyist and calligrapher), but perhaps the most convincing are the practical. The change from rectilinear to rounded script coincided with the change from parchment to paper, and the new style of writing might well be connected with a new type of reed pen, a new method of sharpening the nib, or a new way that the pen was held, placed on the page, or moved across it. In the same way, the adoption of paper engendered the adoption of a new type of black soot ink (m idal) that replaced the dark brown, tannin-based ink (hibr) used on parchment.

From the fourteenth century calligraphers, especially those in the eastern Islamic lands, developed more stylized forms of rounded script. The most distinctive is the hanging script known as nasta’liq, which was particularly suitable for transcribing Persian, in which many words end in letters with
large bowls, such as ya’ or ta’. Persian calligraphers commonly used nasta’liq to pen poetic texts, in which the rounded bowls at the end of each hemistich form a visual chain down the right side of the columns on a page. They also used nasta’liq to pen poetic specimens (qit’a). These elaborately planned calligraphic compositions typically contain a Persian quatrain written in colored and gold-dusted inks on fine, brightly colored and highly polished paper and set in elaborately decorated borders. The swooping strokes of the letters and bowls provide internal rhythm and give structure to the composition. In contrast to the anonymous works of the early period, these calligraphic specimens are frequently signed and dated, and connoisseurs vied to assemble fine collections, which were often mounted in splendid albums.

Calligraphy continues to be an important art form in modern times, despite the adoption of the Latin alphabet in some countries such as Turkey. Some calligraphers are trying to revive the traditional styles, notably the Six Pens, and investigate and rediscover traditional techniques and materials. Societies teaching calligraphy flourish. The Anjuman-e Khushnvisan-e Iran (Society of Iranian Calligraphers), for example, has branches in all the main cities of the country, with thousands of students. Other artists are extending the calligraphic tradition to new media, adopting calligraphy in new forms, ranging from three-dimensional sculpture to oil painting on canvas. More than any other civilization, Islam values the written word.

See also Arabic Language; Arabic Literature; Art.

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Sheila S. Blair
Jonathan M. Bloom

CAPITALISM

Among the claims of the contemporary literature known as “Islamic economics” is that Islamic law provides an economic system conducive to free exchange. Where this system allegedly differs from capitalism, which also promotes economic freedoms, is that it avoids sharp inequalities, chronic corruption, and mass exploitation. If Muslims restructure their economic relations according to Islamic stipulations, say the proponents of Islamic economics, they can obtain all the benefits of capitalism without incurring its costs. Specifically, they can achieve prosperity, steady innovation, and material security—all traits associated with today’s advanced market economies—within a framework based on honesty and brotherly cooperation.

If this logic resonates with many Muslims, the reason is that the current economic performance of the Islamic world is generally disappointing. The predominantly Muslim countries included in the annual “Corruption Index” of Transparency International all rank as substantially “more corrupt” than the typical advanced economy. Except for the small oil-exporting countries of the Arabian peninsula, not a single Muslim-governed state is among the world’s wealthiest countries, and many Muslim countries are impoverished. The Islamic world’s participation in world trade is low in relation to its share of global population. Although the basic economic institutions of the Islamic world are formally similar to those of the successful market economies, there is a consensus that they do not perform as well.

Like many secular critics of capitalism, Islamists attribute this situation to Western imperialism. Starting in the eighteenth century, they argue, European traders and financiers, along with the states that supported them, destroyed local crafts, monopolized natural resources, secularized the judicial system, and gradually took over key aspects of economic governance. They also lowered the Islamic world’s standards of honesty and weakened its ethic of brotherly cooperation.

Institutional Sources of Underdevelopment

In fact, European imperialism was a result, rather than the leading cause, of the Islamic world’s economic shortcomings. Prior to embarking on the global colonization drive whose results included the economic subjugation of the world’s Muslim peoples, the West underwent a sustained institutional transformation that gave rise to modern capitalism. During this transformation, which began around the eleventh century, the institutions of the Islamic world also experienced changes, but these were relatively minor. As late as the nineteenth century, the contractual forms recognized by the Islamic court system were essentially those developed a millennium earlier. The concept of a juridical person had no place in Islamic law. Nor did Islamic law recognize joint-stock companies or corporations. Although money lending remained a flourishing profession among both Muslims and non-Muslims, there were no banks. For these reasons, among others, the Islamic world’s economic system was now inefficient in relation to the emerging capitalist system of the
West. It is this handicap that subjected the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world to Western economic domination.

As this domination was taking shape, the Islamic world experienced no general economic decline in the absolute sense. But it started showing clear signs of underdevelopment, as measured by the living standards, productivity levels, and institutional dynamism prevailing in the West.

In early stages of the West’s economic ascent, the Islamic world’s market institutions were at least as efficient as their Western counterparts, and in some respects more so. Its partnership laws, which were codified by jurists generally familiar with the needs of merchants and investors, gave traders a remarkable array of contractual options. Although interest was formally banned, financiers easily circumvented the prohibition, which, in any case, was often interpreted loosely, as disallowing only exploitative interest charges. Disputes between partners, and between buyers and sellers, were settled informally through arbitration or formally through the Islamic courts, whose jurisdiction covered all economic transactions. A wide range of social service organizations, including schools, charities, commercial centers, and rest stops for caravans, were established in a decentralized manner through *waqf*, or Islamic trusts. The typical *waqf* also served as a wealth shelter, for its assets were relatively safe from confiscation and its founder could shower himself, his relatives, and even his descendants with material benefits. To a degree, the privileges enjoyed by *waqf* founders compensated for the chronic weakness of private property rights. For several centuries—estimates of the end point range from the fourteenth century to the eighteenth century—this system afforded the Islamic world a standard of living that was equal, if not superior, to that of Europe.

**The Rise of Modern Capitalism**

Meanwhile, the West underwent the momentous structural transformation that resulted in capitalism. This transformation included the strengthening of individual property rights, the recognition of juridical persons in a growing number of sectors, and a sustained broadening of the menu of contractual forms available to investors, traders, workers, and consumers. By the eighteenth century, and unmistakably by the nineteenth century, the relative sophistication of Europe’s economic institutions allowed its financiers and merchants to dominate economies all across the globe. The main reason why the Islamic world fell into a state of underdevelopment is that changes taking place outside the Islamic world had the effect of reducing the efficiency of pre-capitalist economic institutions based on Islamic law.

Why Islamic law itself failed to generate the basic institutions of capitalism has long been a matter of controversy. One thing is certain. The explanation is not, as nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century thinkers were inclined to believe, that Islam is inherently hostile to commerce or prosperity. The classical sources of Islam are replete with provisions designed to facilitate exchange and production. Nor can the lag be attributed to policies aimed at retarding growth. The Islamic world’s structural transformation was delayed because certain institutions well suited to the economic conditions of classical Islam produced unintended consequences.

**Unintended Consequences**

One of these institutions was the Islamic inheritance system. Outlined in the Qur’an, the Islamic inheritance system requires two-thirds of a person’s estate to be apportioned among members of his or her extended family according to criteria dependent on the composition of the possibly numerous heirs and their relationships to the deceased. Prior to the modern era, this system raised the cost of keeping productive enterprises intact across generations. Equally important, because the death of even one partner resulted in termination of the enterprise, and in the dissolution of its assets, the prevailing inheritance rules created incentives for keeping partnerships small and ephemeral. Consequently, the growing complexity that characterized the productive, financial, and commercial enterprises of Europeans was not observed in territories under Islamic law. By contrast, the relative flexibility of European inheritance regimes allowed practices designed to keep estates intact, such as primogeniture. These practices facilitated the establishment of larger and longer-lasting enterprises, which then stimulated the development of increasingly sophisticated accounting systems, specialized markets, and contractual forms in order to minimize operating costs.

Until the Western-inspired economic reforms of the nineteenth century, Islamic civilization offered no corporate structures capable of serving as prototypes for durable financial or mercantile organizations. The one major Islamic institution that some consider an exception is the *waqf*. Established to provide a service in perpetuity, a *waqf*, like a corporation, was meant to outlive its founder and employees. Nevertheless, it lacked most of the freedoms associated with corporate status. Most significant, it was supposed to refrain from remaking its internal rules and modifying its objectives. Still another unintended effect of the *waqf* system was that, by enhancing material security, it dampened incentives for seeking stronger property rights. Economic historians generally believe that in the West the strengthening of individual property rights played a critical role in the rise of modern capitalism.

By the nineteenth century, it was clear that the traditional economic institutions of the Islamic world had become a liability. The institutional borrowings that followed included new forms of organization, including complex partnerships, joint-stock companies, and corporations. Another historical break that occurred at this time was the establishment of various secular courts to adjudicate commercial and financial disputes involving contractual forms alien to traditional Islamic law.
In January, 1998, this Indonesian money changer was busy working the phones after a day of panic buying at supermarkets that left the Indonesian rupiah volatile and led the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to send top officials to the country in an attempt to salvage a bailout effort. With the exception of a few oil-rich countries in the Middle East, no Muslim country is among the world’s wealthiest. The lingering effects of the transition from an older, Islamic economic order to Western capitalism has left many Muslim countries in poverty and has led some Islamists to blame the West for their countries’ suffering and social turmoil. AP/Wide World Photos

Weberian Thesis
The foregoing institutional explanation for the underdevelopment of the Middle East calls into question its most celebrated alternative: the Weberian thesis, which traces the origins of capitalism to the ideological creativity of the Protestant Reformation. Weber’s argument was challenged by R. H. Tawney, who showed that capitalist institutions preceded, even created, what Weber called the capitalist spirit. Tawney’s observation suggests that where capitalist institutions failed to evolve through locally driven processes, as in the Islamic Middle East, vigorous and successful entrepreneurship would be limited.

At the time that Weber wrote, bilateral trade between the Islamic world and western Europe was almost entirely under the control of Europeans, who provided much of the requisite financing, know-how, and transportation. It thus seemed that the Middle East lacked the entrepreneurship essential to modern capitalism. In fact, the infrastructure of capitalism was inadequate, and Middle Easterners, being latecomers to operating under modern economic institutions, lacked basic experiences and resources. Significantly, it was during the twilight of the traditional Islamic economic order and the transition to modern capitalism—the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century—that the Christians and Jews of the region by and large gained economic ground against its Muslims. Entitled since the early days of Islam to choice of law, which they had sometimes exercised in favor of indigenous non-Muslim contractual forms, the Christian and Jewish religious minorities began using modern contractual forms about a century before Muslims were able to do so. Equally important, many operated under the protection of European-operated courts, as opposed to local Islamic courts.

See also Communism; Economy and Economic Institutions; Globalization.

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Timur Kuran

CARTOGRAPHY AND GEOGRAPHY
There exist hundreds—if not thousands—of cartographic images of the world and various regions scattered throughout the medieval and early modern Arabic, Persian, and Turkish manuscript collections, worldwide. Yet most of these maps have lain virtually untouched and have often been deliberately ignored on the grounds that they were not accurate representations of the world. What many failed to see is that these schematic, geometric, and often perfectly symmetrical images of the world are iconographic representations of the way in which the medieval Muslims perceived it. Granted, these were stylized visions restricted to the literati—the
Readers, collectors, commissioners, writers, and copyists of the geographic texts within which these maps are found. However, the plethora of extant copies produced all over the Islamic world, including India, testifies to the enduring and widespread popularity of these medieval Islamic cartographic visions. For nothing less than six centuries (eight, if nineteenth-century South Asian examples are included), these cartographic visions were perpetuated primarily in one fossilized cartographic series: the Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik (Book of roads and kingdoms).

What all these extant maps say is that—at least from the thirteenth century onward, whence copies of these maps manuscripts begin to proliferate—the world was a very depicted place. It loomed large in the medieval Muslim imagination. It was pondered, discussed, and copied with minor and major variations again and again.

**Al-Idrisi and Piri Re’is**

The better-known examples of this Islamic mapping tradition, in contemporary Eastern as well as Western scholarship, is the work of the twelfth century North African geographical scholar al-Sharif al-Idrisi (d. 1165). The Norman king, Roger II (1097–1154), commissioned al-Idrisi to produce an illustrated geography of the world. This yielded al-Idrisi’s Naszbat al-mustaq fi ikb'itraq al-afaq (The book of pleasant journeys into faraway lands), also known as the *Book of Roger*. Al-Idrisi divided the world according to the Ptolemaic system of seven climes, with each clime broken down into ten sections. The most complete manuscript (1469) contains one world map and seventy detailed sectional maps.

The sixteenth-century Ottoman naval captain, Muhyiddin Piri Re’is (d. 1554), was another Muslim cartographer who has become famous worldwide. Renowned for the earliest extant map of the New World, Piri Re’is and his accurate early-sixteenth-century map of South America and Antarctica have been the subject of many a controversial study. Piri Re’is also produced detailed sectional maps but—like the Italian *isolarii*—he restricted himself to the coastal areas of the Mediterranean. The second version of his Kitab-i Babriye (Book of maritime matters) contains 210 unique topocartographic maps of important Mediterranean cities and islands.

The striking mimesis (geographical accuracy) of these two Muslim cartographic traditions has caused the work of al-Idrisi and Piri Re’is to be elevated above the rest of the Middle Eastern mapping corpus in contemporary scholarship. Aside from the problems of attribution that abound with these two cartographers (none of the extant al-Idrisi maps, for instance, date back to his time, while Piri Re’is’s map is thought to be a copy of one by Christopher Columbus), scholarly focus on this more mimetic end of the Islamic mapping tradition has occluded an enormous body of maps that were much more popular in the medieval and early modern Islamic world than the work of al-Idrisi or Piri Re’is.

The “Wondrous” Tradition

In actuality, maps occur in a wide variety of Islamic texts and contexts. A popular location for classical Islamic world and cosmographic maps is in the so-called ‘Aja’ib (“wondrous”) literary tradition, which includes descriptions of flora, fauna, architecture, and other wonders of the world. Best known of this genre is the work of the thirteenth century Iranian writer, Zakariyya’ ibn Muhammad al-Qazwini (d. 1283), whose work ‘Aja’ib al-makhlusqat wa ghbara’ib al-mawjudat (The wonders of creatures and the marvels of creation) focuses on the wonders of the world—real and fabulous. Copies from the late thirteenth century onward (during the lifetime of the author) began to incorporate illustrations of flora and fauna as well as world maps.

Copies of Siraj al-Din Abu Hafs ‘Umar Ibn al-Wardi’s (d. 1457) Khari'at al-‘aja’ib wa faridat al-ghara’ib (The unborn pearl of wonders and the precious gem of marvels) offer a variation of the ‘Aja’ib tradition that incorporates at least one world map along with other cartographics, such as a Qibla map (a way-finding diagram for locating Mecca), and inset maps of Qazwin and other cities. Judging by the plethora of pocket book-size copies that still abound in every Oriental manuscript collection, the Khari’at al-‘aja’ib must have been a bestseller in the late medieval and early modern Islamic world. Moreover, it is significant that this Arabic bestseller always incorporated, within the first four or five folios, a classical Islamic world map.

Eventually the classical Islamic world maps also crept into general geographical encyclopedias, such as Shihab al-Din Abu ‘Abdallah Yaqt’s (d. 1229) thirteenth century Kitab Mu’jam al-Buldan (Dictionary of countries). The earliest prototype of this type of map is found in a copy of Abu ‘l-Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni’s (d. after 1250) Kitab al-tabbim (Book of instruction). World maps are also used to open some of the classic histories. Copies of such well-known works as Ibn Khaldu’n’s (d. 1406) Muqaddimah (The preface) often begin with an al-Idrisi map, while copies of the historian Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari’s (d. 923) Ta’rikh al-ralul wa-al-muluk (History of prophets and kings) sometimes included a Ptolemaic “climatic” map of the world as a frontispiece. Similarly, classical Islamic maps of the world found their way into sixteenth-century Ottoman histories, such as the scroll containing Seyyid Lokman’s *Zubdetu’t-tevarih* (Cream of histories) produced in the reign of Suleyman I (1520–1566).

**New Maps for New Purposes**

From the fifteenth century until the late nineteenth century, hajj (pilgrimage) manuals containing map-like pictures of the holy sites proliferated. An excellent example of this prototype is the Futub al-Haramayn (The conquests of the holy sites) manuscript series. Around the same time, a tradition began in mosques of including a glazed tile containing a schematic representation of the Ka’ba adjacent to the mihrab (prayer
niches). If the definition of precisely what constitutes a map can be stretched, then even the map-like images found in Islamic miniature paintings can be incorporated into the Islamic cartographic repertoire.

Some scholars believe that the source of this rich and widespread medieval Islamic propensity to make maps lies in the earliest Arabic textual references to maps. For instance, the silver globe (al-Sura al-Ma’muniyah) that the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) is said to have commissioned from the scientists working in his Bayt al-Hikma (House of knowledge). The problem with the al-Ma’munid silver globe is that it is probably mythical. Other than an extremely vague passage cited in Abu’l-Hasan ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Mas’udi’s (d. 956) Kitab al-tanbih wa-al-‘ishraf (Book of instruction and revision), there are no descriptions of it. Al-Mas’udi’s description is very confused. It suggests an impossibly complicated celestial map superimposed upon a globe, an extremely sophisticated armillary sphere of which there are no extant example until the fourteenth century. At least one scholar, David King, has interpreted this description to suggest an astrolabe with world-map markings superimposed on it.

There also are a few references to maps from the end of the first century of Islam (c. 702). Apparently, al-Hallaj ibn Yusuf, the Umayyad governor of the eastern part of the Muslim empire, commissioned maps, for military purposes, of the region of Daylam (south of the Caspian Sea), as well as a plan of the city of Bukhara. Requests for maps for military purposes are highly unusual in Islamic history. Not until the time of the Ottoman sultan Mehmet II (r. 1444–1446; 1451–1481) are there similar requests for maps for military purposes. Unfortunately, none of the al-Hallaj requests are extant, and there are no detailed descriptions of these maps themselves.

In Kitab al-buldan (Book of countries) Ahmad ibn Abi Ya’qub al-Ya’qubi (d. c. late ninth century) reports that a plan of the round city of Baghdad was drawn up in 758 for the Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur (r. 754–775). The Egyptian chronicler al-Maqrizi mentions that a “magnificent” map on “fine blue” silk with “gold lettering” upon which was pictured “parts of the earth with all the cities and mountains, seas and rivers” was prepared for the Fatimid caliph al-Mu’izz (r. 953–975) and even entombed with him in his mausoleum in Cairo.

The only extant source containing maps prior to the Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik series is a ninth-century copy of Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwazimi’s (d. 847 C.E.) Kitab surat al-ard (Picture of the Earth). Composed primarily of a series of zij tables (tables containing longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates), it also includes four maps. Two are unidentifiable, one is a map of the Sea of Azov, and one is of the Nile. Of all the maps in this manuscript, only the map of the Nile appears to be directly related to maps of the Nile that one finds in later carto-geographical works.

The Start of the Mapping Phenomenon
In order to understand the mapping traditions that flowered in the Islamic world in the later middle ages and early modern period, one has to go back to the tradition that sired them all. It can be argued that the fons origo of the Islamic mapping tradition is none other than the so-called “Islamic Atlas.” This carto-geographical tradition is best known by the title of its most prolifically copied version: al-Istakhri’s Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik (Book of roads and kingdoms). For convenience, this may be referred to as the KMMS mapping tradition. The “S” at the end of this acronym is used to specify those versions of this manuscript series that contain cartographic images (standing for Sura, pl. Suwar).

Most of the KMMS maps occur in the context of geographical treatises devoted to an explication of the world, in general, and the lands of the Muslim world, in particular. These “map-manuscripts” generally carry the title of Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik, although they are sometimes named Sura al-ard (Picture of the earth) or Suwar al-aqalim (Pictures of the climes/climates). These manuscripts emanated from an early tradition of creating lists of pilgrim and post stages that were compiled for administrative purposes. They read like armchair travelogs of the Muslim world, with one author copying prolifically from another.

Beginning with a brief description of the world and theories about it—such as the inhabited versus the uninhabited parts, the reasons why people are darker in the south than in the north, and the like—these geographies methodically discuss details about the Muslim world, its cities, its people, its roads, its topography, and other such features. Sometimes the descriptions are interspersed with anecdotal matter, including tales of personal adventures, discussions with local inhabitants, or debates with sailors as to the exact shape of the earth and the number of seas. They have a rigid format that rarely varies: first the whole world, then the Arabian Peninsula, then the Persian Gulf, then the Maghreb (North Africa and Andalusia), Egypt, Syria, the Mediterranean, upper and lower Iraq, as well as twelve maps devoted to the Iranian provinces, beginning with Khuzistan and ending in Khurasan, including maps of Sind and Transoxiana. The maps, which usually number precisely twenty-one, follow exactly the same format as the text and are thus an integral part of the work.

The al-Balkhi Tradition and Controversy
Not all these geographical manuscripts contain maps, however. Rather, maps are found only in those referred to generally as part of the al-Balkhi/al-Istakhri tradition—the “Classical School” of geographers. This particular geographical genre is also referred to as the “Atlas of Islam.” A great deal of mystery surrounds the origins and the architects of this manuscript-bound cartographic tradition. This is primarily because not a single manuscript survives in the hand of its original author. Furthermore, it is not clear who initiated the tradition of accompanying geographical texts with maps.
Scholars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries hold that Abu Zayd Ahmad ibn Sahl al-Balkhi (d. 934), who—as his nisba (patronym) suggests—came from Balkh in Central Asia, initiated the series, and that his work and maps were later elaborated upon by Abu Ishaq ibn Muhammad al-Farisi al-Istakhri (fl. early tenth century) from Istakh in the province of Fars. Al-Istakhri’s work was, in turn, elaborated upon by Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn Hawqal (fl. second half of tenth century), who came from upper Iraq (the region known as the Jazira). Abu `Abdallah Muhammad al-Muqaddasi (d. c. 1000), from Jerusalem (Quds), is considered the last innovator in this series.

The problem is that virtually no biographical information exists on the authors other than al-Balkhi. One is forced to rely on scraps of information in the geographical texts themselves for information about their authors. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that, in all the forty-three titles that Ibn al-Nadim credits to al-Balkhi, not one even vaguely resembles the title of a geographical treatise. According to the biographers, al-Balkhi was famous as a philosopher and for his tafsir (commentaries on the Qur’an)—in particular one known as Na’m al-qur’an—which was praised by many judges. He is not, however, known in the biographical record for his geographical treatises. Yet stories of how al-Balkhi sired the Islamic mapping tradition endure. It is for this reason that the genre is generally referred to as the “Balkhi school of mapping.” The attribution of a whole school of mapping to a shadowy, mythical father who was anything but a specialist on geography or cartography is unfounded.

The confusion is further compounded by the fact that many of the surviving copies contain either incomplete colophons (inscriptions containing attribution of authorship) or no colophons at all. Additionally, the texts are sometimes so mixed up in the surviving manuscripts that it is often difficult to disentangle them. The numerous incomplete and anonymous manuscripts, sometimes abridged, along with the versions translated into Persian, only cloud the matter further.

**Images of Other Worlds**

Since none of the KMMS manuscripts date back to their original authors, the issue of authorship of the first cartographical manuscript and precisely what it looked like is immaterial. What is relevant is that these geographical manuscripts include some of the earliest pictographic images of the world in an Islamic context. Since all images are socially constructed, these iconic carto-ideographs contain valuable messages of the milieux in which they were produced. They are a rich source of new information that can be used as alternate gateways into the Islamic past. They can tell about the time period in which they were copied, and provide hints about the period in which they were originally conceived.

Since the extant examples stretch in time from the eleventh century to the nineteenth, and range from the heart of the Middle East to its peripheries, they provide us with insights from a broad range of time and space. The earliest extant set of Islamic maps comes from an Ibn Hawqal manuscript housed at the Topkapi Saray Museum Library firmly dated to the year 1086 by a clear colophon. Counterintuitively, this manuscript also contains the most mimetic maps of all the existing KMMS copies. This version of the KMMS even has an extraordinary triple folio fold-out map of the Mediterranean. Indeed, it is the world-map version of this manuscript that proliferates in a more embellished form via the Ibn al-Wardi manuscript copies from the fifteenth century. The striking mimesis of these maps stands in stark contrast to the maps of the later KMMS copies, which over the centuries abandon any pretense of mimesis entirely.

After the KMMS set, a series of more and more stylized maps emerges that move further into the realm of objects d’art and away from direct empirical inquiry. By the nineteenth century the KMMS maps become so stylized that, were it not for the earlier examples, it would be hard to recognize them as the maps at all. Between these two extremes there are a series of KMMS world maps that range from somber in form and color (some even contain grids) to outright gaudy and lacking in fine detail. In the crevices of these maps the real and the imaginary, the terrestrial and the cosmographical, and the empirical and the fictional dance confusingly in front of people of today.

An ancient map appears in the volume one color insert.

See also Biruni, al-; Ibn Battuta; Ibn Khaldun; Persian Language and Literature.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


CENTRAL ASIA, ISLAM IN

Central Asia is a modern geographical designation covering an area of considerable political, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, but marked by a distinctive cultural synthesis rooted in the meeting of the civilization of Inner Asia with that of the Middle East and the Islamic world. In terms of contemporary political boundaries, it comprises the newly independent post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as adjacent parts of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, of northern Afghanistan, of northeastern Iran, and of the Russian Federation.

The chief historical regions comprising Central Asia include Mawarannahr, often called Transoxiana or Transoxania, the traditional heartland; the Farghana valley; the Tarim basin, often called Chinese or East Turkistan and now forming the major part of the province of Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China; the Syr Darya valley, with its commercial oasis towns; the steppe regions to the north known since the eleventh century as the Dasht-e Qipchaq; the region of the Amu Darya delta to the south of the Aral Sea, known historically as Khwarazm; and Khurasan, typically regarded as the northeasternmost province of Iran, but more often closely linked with Transoxiana in political, ethnic, and economic terms.

From the Arab Conquest to the Mongol Invasion

The Arab conquest of Iran brought Muslim armies to Khurasan, and raids were conducted as far as Balkh and into Transoxania already during the 650s, as Arab governors based first in Basra in Iraq and later (from 667) in Marv began the dual policy of establishing garrison towns in some areas, with Arab families transplanted from Iraq, and elsewhere leaving local dynasts in power as tributary rulers. A new stage in the conquest of Central Asia began with the appointment, in 705, of Qutayba b. Muslim as the governor of Khurasan. Qutayba’s ten-year career brought the military conquest of Bukhara and Samarkand as well as of Khwarazm, and the initiation of campaigns into Farghana and as far beyond the Syr Darya as Isfijab; it also saw important institutional developments, as Arab garrisons were established in Bukhara and Samarkand, troops were levied from the local population to serve with the Muslim armies, mosques were built in these cities, and measures were undertaken to induce conversion to Islam.

These patterns of Arab rule established under Qutayba proved more enduring than his conquests. Following his murder by mutinous troops in the Farghana valley in 715, Arab control in Transoxania was soon rolled back, and nearly a quarter-century passed before the Muslim armies were able to take the initiative again. Local rulers such as the Sogdian king Ghurak regained their independence and successfully fought the Arabs, but a new force from the steppe—the Turgesh confederation—posed a more serious threat to Arab control. The Turgesh were able to raid deep into Transoxania and eventually into Khurasan as well. The death of the Turgesh ruler in 737, however, led to the collapse of his confederation; Ghurak died the same year, and soon afterward a new Umayyad governor of Khurasan, Nasr b. Sayyar, was able, during the 740s, to reconquer central Transoxania, the Farghana valley, and parts of eastern Khurasan that had reverted to local rulers, and to lead successful campaigns as far as Tashkent.

Soon, however, the Abbasid revolution, a movement that took shape militarily in Khurasan, swept the Umayyads from power; Abbasid agitation there began even before the arrival of the famous Abu Muslim in 747, and both the Arab colonists in Khurasan and Transoxania and local converts to Islam played significant roles in the success of the Abbasid cause. Disaffection with Umayyad rule was particularly strong among the local converts, resentful of policies that relegated them to a subordinate status vis-à-vis the Arabs. Nevertheless, the series of religiously tinged revolts that broke out in Transoxania and Khurasan beginning in the late Umayyad era continued through the first decades of Abbasid rule. Abbasid control in Central Asia in fact remained tenuous until the revolt of Rafi’s b. Layth beginning in 806. This revolt posed such a serious threat that the caliph himself, Harun al-Rashid, was compelled to set out to deal with it. Following his death in 809, his son al-Ma’mun, installed as governor in Marv, succeeded in suppressing it, and after his elevation as caliph in 813, al-Ma’mun—still based in Marv—conducted a series of decisive campaigns against independent local rulers that may be regarded as the culmination of the Arab conquest of Central Asia.

Almost as soon as it was solidified, Abbasid control in Central Asia devolved upon local governors loyal to the caliph and at least nominally dependent upon him. One of the participants in al-Ma’mun’s suppression of the revolt of Rafi’s b. Layth was one Tahir b. Husayn, whom the caliph appointed governor of Khurasan in 821. The Tahirid dynasty ruled Khurasan and Transoxania until its destruction in 873 by the Saffarids of Sistan. Members of the Samanid family also took part in al-Ma’mun’s campaigns, and served the Tahirids as governors in Samarkand, Farghana, and Tashkent.
Samanid dynasts expanded their power through campaigns deep into the steppe, and with the collapse of the Tahirids received caliphal recognition as the rightful governors of Transoxania. The real foundations of the dynasty’s power were laid by Isma’il Samani, who destroyed the Saffarids in 900 and established Bukhara as the center of his realm. The dramatic decline in the political importance of the Abbasid caliphs that preceded the Samanid era (900–999) left the Samanids the rulers of an essentially independent state based in Central Asia; their patronage of religious and cultural institutions made tenth-century Central Asia one of the most vibrant and influential parts of the Muslim world.

Well into the first half of the tenth century, the Samanids retained their ability to project their power into the steppe to the north and northeast of Transoxania, but the Samanid era also brought crucial developments in the political and cultural history of the Turks of Central Asia. The tenth century marks the beginning of the large-scale involvement of Turkic peoples in Islamic civilization. Before this time, Turks from Central Asia had already played an important role in Muslim history as military slaves active at the caliphal court in Baghdad as well as other, more westerly parts of the Muslim world. The institution of Turkic military slaves would remain an important avenue for the assimilation of Turkic (and other) peoples into Islamic civilization, and, beginning with the Ghaznavids, would yield a substantial number of ruling dynasties from India to Egypt. Ultimately more important for Central Asian history, however, was the large-scale conversion to Islam by Turkic peoples; this was happening along the frontiers of Samanid Central Asia, but the tenth century also saw the establishment of Islam in remote regions of Turkic Inner Asia, far beyond the limits reached by Muslim armies. During the middle of the tenth century, a member of a Turkic dynasty based in East Turkistan, in the city of Kashghar, adopted Islam, evidently in the course of a power struggle with a rival member of the same dynasty. The narrative of his conversion, which was elaborated and celebrated from at least the eleventh century to the twentieth, identified him as Satuq Bughra Khan. The convert was successful, and the dynasty, which has come to be known as that of the Qarakhanids, soon expanded its territories to the west, moving against the Samanid frontiers in the Syr Darya basin and, with the conquest of Bukhara in 999, effectively putting an end to the Samanid state. In this case, however, religious frontiers had shifted substantially; the Turks from the steppe who conquered sedentary Central Asia were already Muslims, and the ulema of Bukhara are famously reported to have counseled the city’s population that they were under no obligation to defend their Samanid rulers, insofar as the Qarakhanids were good Muslims.

The Qarakhanids are of tremendous importance as the initial custodians of the Turkic/Islamic cultural synthesis and sponsors of the first Islamic Turkic literature. Qarakhanid patronage yielded the Turkic Qutadghu bilig, a “mirror for princes” completed around 1070 by Yusuf of Balasaghun for a Qarakhanid ruler of Kashghar. The Qarakhanids are also important, however, simply as the holders of power in much of Central Asia, at the regional and local level, for over two centuries. Even as supreme power in Central Asia shifted to the Seljuks or the Qarakhitays or the Khwarazmshahs, local dynasties linked to the Qarakhanid tradition continued to rule in Samarkand, in parts of the Farghana valley, and in towns of the Syr Darya basin. The last known Qarakhanid dynasty was removed by the Khwarazmshah Muhammad (target of the Mongol invasion) only in 1209.

Of even greater significance for the Islamic world at large was the third Muslim Turkic dynasty to appear in Central Asia during the Samanid era, that of the Seljuks. The Seljuk royal house emerged, in the latter tenth century, as tribal leaders among the Oghuz Turks who nomadized near the lower course of the Syr Darya, northeast of the Aral Sea. The narrative of Seljuk origins links their adoption of Islam to a power struggle, again with conversion signaling a break with their former overlord as well as an alliance against him with the Muslim people of the Syr Darya town of Jand. By the early eleventh century the Seljuks were involved in the military and political turmoil that accompanied the division of the Samanid realm between the Ghaznavids, in Khurasan, and the Qarakhanids, in Transoxania, and quickly dominated both regions, leaving the Qarakhanid dynasts as vassals but effectively crushing the Ghaznavid presence in Khurasan with their defeat of Mahmud’s son and successor, Mas’ud, in 1040 at Dandanqan, near Marv. Thereafter the Seljuks began their phenomenal sweep through Iran and the Middle East, seizing Baghdad by 1055 and defeating the Byzantines in Anatolia in 1071.

Seljuk success in Central Asia itself was less overwhelming than further west. By the first half of the twelfth century, Seljuk dynasts were plagued by the devastating raids, deep into Khurasan, of other groups of Oghuz (“Ghuzz”) nomads who did not accept their rule, and the final blow to Seljuk power in the east came in 1141, when the sultan, Sanjar, was defeated in the Qatvan steppe, northeast of Samarkand, by the Qarakhitays. The latter, remnants of the Qitan people who had dominated northern China (as the Liao dynasty) since the early tenth century, had fled westward after their ouster from China in the 1120s and dominated the steppe regions of Central Asia down to the Mongol conquest. The non-Muslim Qarakhitays were for the most part absentee overlords with regard to Transoxania, and most regions remained in the hands of local elites, whether Qarakhanid dynasts or, as in the case of Bukhara, a prominent family of Hanafi jurists known as the Al-e Burhan.

The Qarakhitay defeat of the Seljuks provided an opportunity for expansion by a dynasty of local rulers based in
Khwarazm, whose ancestors had assumed control there in the service of the Seljuks. These Khwarazmshahs, under nominal Qarakhitay suzerainty, extended their power into Khurasan and into the lower Syr Darya valley, and by the beginning of the thirteenth century had become the most powerful rulers in the eastern Islamic world. The ambitions of the Khwarazmshah Muhammad (r. 1200–1218) led him to clash with the Ghurid dynasty based south of the Hindu Kush, with the Abbasid caliph al-Nasir (who was intent on restoring the caliphate’s political power), with his Qarakhitay overlords, and finally with the new Inner Asian power, the Mongols under Genghis Khan. Muhammad’s disastrous rebuff of the khan’s diplomatic and commercial overtures led to the Mongol invasion that, from 1216 to 1223, devastated much of Transoxania and Khurasan and destroyed the Khwarazmian state.

The Mongol and Timurid Periods, 1220–1500

Mongol rule was established in Central Asia well before the subsequent Mongol campaign of 1256–1258, which destroyed the Abbasid caliphate and brought all of Iraq and much of the Middle East under Mongol control. The impact of the Mongol conquest likewise endured much longer in Central Asia than elsewhere in the Muslim world, above all through the political principles established in the thirteenth century and maintained, in one form or another, down to the eighteenth. These principles made sovereignty a prerogative reserved solely for blood descendants of Genghis (Chinggis) Khan. They inaugurated a political tension—between Chinggisids with the theoretical right to rule, and powerful tribal chieftains with direct control over the nomadic military forces crucial to the Chinggisids’s power—that would shape Central Asian political history down to the Russian conquest. The descendants of Genghis Khan alone could bear the sovereign title khan, and were known by the Turkic term aghlan (the “sons,” par excellence). In the parts of the Mongol-ruled world that were Islamized, the princes of the blood who did not rise to supreme power (but always remained potential candidates for that role) were more often known by the Muslim term signaling sovereign authority, sultan. The tribal chieftains, by contrast, were known by the Turkic term bek or what came to be its Arabic equivalent, emir (with scions of the tribal elite referred to by the Arabo-Persian hybrid emir-zada, that is, “born of an emir,” typically shortened to mirzâ).

As the Mongol empire split along regional lines in the middle of the thirteenth century, different parts of Central Asia fell to different ruling lineages stemming from the four sons of Genghis Khan. Khwarazm, parts of the lower Syr Darya basin, and much of the Dasht-e Qipchaq came to be regarded as part of the realm (ulus) of the descendants of Jochi (the “Golden Horde”), centered in the lower Volga valley, while much of Iran was in the hands of the Ilkhanid realm centered in Azerbaijan, that was ruled by descendants of Genghis Khan’s grandson, Hulegu, who had led the campaign of 1256–1258. The heartland of Transoxania, as well as the Tarim basin, parts of Khurasan, and the eastern parts of the Dasht-i Qipchaq, were nominally part of the ulus of Genghis’s son Chaghatay, though in fact, through much of the second half of the thirteenth century, this region was dominated by Qaydu, a descendant of Genghis’s son and first successor Ogodey. Not until the early fourteenth century did the Chaghatayid lineage reassert itself, under the khans Esen Buqa and Kebek. In each of these western successor states of the Mongol empire, the process of Islamization was underway already in the thirteenth century, and by the second quarter of the fourteenth century khans from each of the Chinggisid dynasties ruling there—as well as members of the tribal aristocracy and ordinary nomads—had become Muslims.

By the 1330s, however, the Ilkhanid state was disintegrating, and real power in most of the Chaghatayid ulus had reverted to the tribal chieftains, who made and unmade khans to suit their own ends. It was in the western part of the Chaghatayid realm that Timur, an emir of the Barlas tribe based in southern Transoxania, rose to power during the 1360s; within a decade he had succeeded in consolidating his power over Transoxania and Khurasan and had begun the career of conquest that would make him master not only of Central Asia, but of Iran and much of the Middle East as well, culminating with campaigns as far east as Delhi and as far west as Ankara. Following Timur’s death in 1405, his descendants were able to maintain control only over his Central Asian domains, in Transoxania, Iran, and Khurasan (where Herat soon emerged as a cosmopolitan center of cultural patronage). The Timurid state in Central Asia fractured soon after the death of Timur’s son and successor Shahrukh in 1447, with separate branches of the Timurid lineage holding power in Khurasan and Transoxania.

The Uzbek Era, 1500–1865

Timur, though not a Chinggisid, clearly sought to evoke the legacy of Genghis Khan’s conquests during his lifetime, and his successors likewise cultivated their Inner Asian heritage alongside their patronage of Islamic institutions. Nevertheless, the Timurids were regarded as usurpers by real Chinggisids, and the principal challenges to his rule in Central Asia, and to that of his descendants, came from the nomads of the Dasht-i Qipchaq, ruled by Chinggisids from the lineage of Jochi. By the time of Timur, the Turkic nomads of the eastern half of the Dasht-i Qipchaq, who belonged to what remained of the Jochid ulus (i.e., the “Golden Horde”), had come to be known by the designation Uzbek (ozbek); the origin of this appellation is obscure, but is ascribed by indigenous tradition to the impact of the adoption of Islam by Ozbek Khan of the Golden Horde (r. 1313–1341).

Timur himself faced invasions into his domains by nomadic armies from the northern steppe led by various Jochid rulers.
and tribal chieftains. Timur’s efforts to secure stability and peace on his northern frontier were continued by his successors; Shahrukh succeeded in securing Khwarazm by 1413, but his son Ulugh Beg’s meddling in Jochid affairs led to his serious defeat by one would-be khan near Sighnaq in 1427. Shortly after this event, a young prince from the lineage of Shiban (the fifth son of Jochi), named Abu ’l-Khayr Khan, succeeded, with the aid of the powerful chieftains of the Manghit tribe, in establishing his power over most of the Uzbek tribes of the Dasht-e Qipchaq, and established a confederation strong enough to challenge the Timurids and influence internal Timurid politics.

The Qalmaqs. This first Uzbek confederation was shaken by attacks from the Qalmaqs (i.e., the Kalmyks or Oyrats, western Mongols) in the mid-fifteenth century, and collapsed after Abu ’l-Khayr Khan’s death (c. 1469), but the founder’s grandson, known as Muhammad Shibani Khan, succeeded in reformulating a substantial part of the coalition by the end of the fifteenth century. As internal dissension weakened the Timurid state in Transoxania, Shibani Khan succeeded in conquering Samarkand and Bukhara in 1500, consolidated his hold on Transoxania and seized Khwarazm by 1505. He moved across the Amu Darya to attack the Timurids in Khurasan soon after the death of the last powerful Timurid, Sultan Husayn Bayqara, seizing the Timurid capital, Herat, in 1507. His ambitions were cut short late in 1510 when he was defeated and killed in battle with the Safavid ruler Shah Isma’il near Marv. The Safavid victory led to a virtually total withdrawal of Uzbek forces from Transoxania. Within two years, however, the Uzbeks, led by Muhammad Shibani Khan’s nephew ’Ubaydullah and other descendants of Abu ’l-Khayr Khan, had expelled the Safavid forces and their Timurid supporters (including Babur, who would found the Mogul empire of India) from Transoxania. Khurasan became a battleground between the Safavids and the Uzbeks, with Herat changing hands several times during the sixteenth century.

The Qazaqs. The Qazaqs with whom Muhammad Shibani Khan fought were of precisely the same ethnic stock as his Uzbek followers; the name qazaq ("freebooter") had been applied pejoratively to the components of Abu ’l-Khayr Khan’s Uzbek confederation who broke with Abu ’l-Khayr and followed other Chinggisids out of his coalition. The essentially political, rather than ethnic, distinction between Qazaq and Uzbek remained somewhat fluid through the sixteenth century. After their Uzbek kinsmen moved with the Shibanids or other Chinggisids into Transoxania, Khwarazm, and Khurasan, the Qazaqs occupied the Dasht-e Qipchaq, and continued their large-scale, seasonal pastoral nomadic migrations. The Qazaqs too were ruled by Chinggisid sultans, and came to be divided into three loosely affiliated units (zhbits) known in the West as “hordes.” The middle Syr Darya valley became the focus of frequent wars between the Qazaq Chinggisids and the Uzbek khans of Transoxania, with towns such as Tashkent, Sayram, and Turkistan held by the Qazaqs through much of the seventeenth century.

The ‘Arabshahids. In Khwarazm, meanwhile, a separate Chinggisid dynasty supported by Uzbek nomads from the Dasht-e Qipchaq took power following the ouster of the Safavid forces that occupied the region after the defeat of Muhammad Shibani Khan. This dynasty, often referred to as the ‘Arabshahids, extended its control to the south, into Khurasan, during the middle of the sixteenth century, and maintained power in Khwarazm to the early eighteenth century. One of its members, Abu ’l-Ghazi Khan (r. 1643–1663), is known for his harsh measures against the Turkmen nomads inhabiting the frontiers of the Khwarazmian oasis, for his reorganization of the Uzbek tribes of Khwarazm, and for the two historical works he wrote in Chaghatay Turkic.

The polity in Transoxania and, later, in parts of Khurasan that was reformed by the kinsmen of Muhammad Shibani Khan following the defeat at Marv, was not a centralized state, much less an empire, but rather a collection of loosely linked appanages assigned to Chinggisid princes who took part in the conquest. There were thus separate and essentially co-equal Chinggisid sultans based in Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Balkh, and other appanages, with the senior member of the extended ruling clan recognized as khan. The equilibrium that maintained this decentralized system broke down in the 1550s, and gave way to bitter struggles among the princes that culminated in the gradual, and bloody, consolidation of power by ’Abdallah Khan. The latter’s success in eliminating rivals meant that when his son was murdered shortly after ’Abdallah’s own death in 1598, the tribal chieftains and urban elites of Transoxania were compelled to seek a Chinggisid khan from an altogether different Jochid lineage, one that had recently been dislodged from its hereditary realm along the lower Volga by the Russian conquest of the commercial emporium of Astrakhan. This dynasty, known variously as that of the Janids, the Ashtarkhanids, or the Toqay Timurids ruled Transoxania and Balkh until 1747.

Despite the stability seemingly implied by the long reigns of Ashtarkhanid rulers such as Imam Quli Khan (r. 1611–1642), ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Khan (r. 1645–1681), Subhan Quli Khan (r. 1681–1702), and Abu ’l-Fayz Khan (r. 1711–1747), this era saw the steady erosion of the khan’s authority in favor of powerful tribal chieftains, and the steady diminution of the state itself. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the power of the Chinggisid khans had been seriously weakened both in Khwarazm and in Transoxania, to the benefit of the tribal aristocracy, and political instability was exacerbated by economic dislocation and external military threats. In particular, the renewed success of the Mongol Junghars (Oyrats) in the Dasht-e Qipchaq sent waves of Qazaq refugees into Transoxania in the 1720s, devastating the region’s agricultural base and prompting in turn the flight of much of the
The khans of Qoqand were also closely involved in affairs of East Turkistan, where political structures had developed quite differently from those of western Central Asia in the Uzbek era. There, dynasts of the lineage of Chaghatay had withstood challenges from both the Timurids and the Uzbek Chinggisids to the west, and from the Mongol Junghars to the north, down to the late seventeenth century. Shifting political alignments involving rival branches of a family of Naqshbandi khwaja khowaja (descendants and Sufi successors of a sixteenth-century shaykh of Transoxania known as Makhdum-e A'zam), which had been established in the region from the late sixteenth century, contributed to the conquest of the region by the Junghars in 1681, putting an end to the Chaghatayid dynasty. The Junghars installed Afaq Khwaja (d. 1694), leader of the Aqtaghliq (“White Mountain”) khowaja faction, as their governor in Kashghar. Struggles between the khowaja factions continued after his death, leading the Junghars first to deport the leaders of both factions, and later to switch their support to the rival Qarataghiq (“Black Mountain”) faction.

The Manchus. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, khowaja contenders were seeking support against the Junghars through the growing power of the Manchu empire (the Qing dynasty of China). The climactic struggle between the Manchus and the Junghars for domination of the Inner Asian heartland culminated in the total destruction of the Junghar state in 1758. The khowaja state too was destroyed, as the Manchus incorporated both the Tarim basin and the Junghar homeland into their empire (it would become known as the “New Province,” Xinjiang, of China), but the khowaja lineages continued to stir up rebellions among the Muslims of the region, with the active support, beginning in the 1820s, of the khans of Qoqand based in the Farghana valley. A major uprising of Chinese Muslims from 1862 to 1876 kept the Qing dynasty occupied as the Qoqandian adventurer Ya‘qub Bek carved out his own state, with the support of an Aqtaghliq khowaja based in Kashghar. The suppression of the revolt led to the Qing reconquest of the Tarim basin by 1878. The Turkic Muslim population of East Turkistan was able to reassert its independence sporadically following the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, with several attempts to create an East Turkistan Republic during the 1930s and 1940s. The Chinese communist victory in 1949 led to the region’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The PRC’s colonization policy brought a massive influx of Han Chinese that has reduced the Muslim component to approximately 60 percent of the region’s population.

The Russian Conquest and the Soviet Era, 1865–1991

During the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, the rulers of the Uzbek tribal dynasties in the three khanates of western Central Asia—Bukhara, Khiva, and Qoqand—were succeeding where the Chinggisid khans had long failed: They crushed the power of the tribal chieftains,
instituted military reforms that lessened their dependence on the tribal forces, created a more centralized bureaucratic apparatus for state administration, and concentrated far more power in their own hands than any Chinggisid khan had held for centuries. Despite this period of relative revitalization, however, the three Central Asian khanates were hopelessly outmatched militarily by the expanding Russian empire.

Russian commercial ties with Central Asia had developed extensively from the latter sixteenth century, as the conquest of the last successor states of the Golden Horde opened Siberia to Russian conquest. By the latter eighteenth century, Russian encroachment from the Volga-Ural valley and Siberia had reduced the Qazaqs to vassal status. The suppression of Qazaq revolts in the 1830s and 1840s brought Russian forces into the Syr Darya valley, where they attacked Qoqandian outposts already in the 1850s.

The outright military conquest of southern Central Asia followed the freeing of Russian military resources by the end of the Crimean War, and by the suppression of Muslim resistance in the North Caucasus. Russian troops moved against the towns of the middle Syr Darya valley in 1864, and seized Tashkent in 1865. Operations southwest of Tashkent brought confrontations with Bukharan troops, culminating in the Russian capture of Samarkand in 1868 and the establishment of a Russian protectorate over the khanate of Bukhara. A Russian force marched on Khiva in 1873 and forced a similar arrangement on the Qongrat khan. Further defeats of Qoqandian forces brought the submission of that khanate as well, but repeated revolts and social unrest in the Farghana valley led Russian officials to dissolve the khanate of Qoqand in 1876 and bring its territories under direct Russian rule. The Turkmen nomads to the south of Khwarazm put up a stiffer resistance, surrendering to Russian control only after a massacre of Turkmen men, women, and children at Gok Tepe, near modern-day Ashgabat, in 1881. By 1895, negotiations between the Russian and British empires had defined the southern border of the Russian holdings in Central Asia, corresponding to the present-day borders of the Central Asian republics with Iran and Afghanistan.

Russian rule at first brought few changes to the daily lives of Central Asian Muslims, but growing contacts between Russians and Central Asians, as well as economic changes brought on by increased trade with Russia, led to the emergence of small native circles intent upon revitalizing local society through educational and cultural changes. Following the 1905 revolution in Russia, these groups—known as jadidists, a term applied to reformist Muslims throughout the Russian empire—became increasingly concerned with political issues, and it was from among them that the Russian Bolsheviks would find their first allies among the native population following the revolutions of 1917. These reformist circles were important for launching the reevaluation of communal identities and mores that would create the modern Soviet nations of Central Asia. The Bolshevik victory in the Civil War was followed, in Central Asia, by an administrative reorganization that reflected both practical concerns and Lenin’s rhetoric about national self-determination. This “national delimitation” drew borders for the new people’s republics, in part on the basis of older administrative units, but in part on the basis of ethnographic and linguistic surveys conducted by scholars and officials using a somewhat arbitrarily chosen set of ethnic and national designations. The basic work was done by 1924; changes in the hierarchical status of the units thus created, within the system of union republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous regions that comprised the ethnically defined structures of the USSR, continued until 1936, leaving five union republics—the Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, and Turkmen republics (using the Russianized names that were official through the Soviet period)—in western Central Asia.

Soviet policy demanded the strict subordination of national identities to the construction of socialist society. However, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s local elites were able to develop considerable autonomy in republican affairs, and, within limits, to give expression to Sovietized national cultures. In the 1980s Soviet reformers sought to rein in the entrenched national bureaucracies, citing corruption and abuses of power in the republics. Increasingly vocal nationalist movements demanded the assertion of cultural and political rights, culminating in declarations of sovereignty by all of the Central Asian republics. With the failed coup attempt of August 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR later that year, each of the republics declared independence. By that time, however, the local communist elites had co-opted the nationalist movements and ensured their hold on power, now as nationalists rather than communists. The 1990s saw, in all the Central Asian republics, a rollback of political rights asserted during the last years of the Soviet regime, the often brutal stifling of political dissent, and the total monopolization of power by the former republican communist parties, now appropriately renamed. At the same time, the republican elites appeared to be committed to the enterprise of nation-building, understanding their power to be rooted in existing political structures rather than in any revolutionary transformation of the prevailing conceptions of communal identity, which those structures served to reify.

See also Central Asian Culture and Islam; Communism; Reform: Muslim Communities of the Russian Empire.

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Devin DeWeese

**CENTRAL ASIAN CULTURE AND ISLAM**

Central Asia played a pivotal role in the early debates about what it meant to be a Muslim, as the early practical experience of negotiating relations with the local population on the Central Asian frontiers left its mark in the developing consensus about the conditions for membership in the Muslim community, and for enjoyment of the privileges it entailed.

**Islamization in Central Asia**

Already in the eighth century there were signs of the dominance of the inclusive approach toward membership in the Islamic community that would prevail throughout the history of Islamic Central Asia. Local resentment grew over the unequal treatment often accorded new converts by Umayyad governors who, in response to declining revenues, toughened requirements for conversion and even rescinded the remission of the jizya, the poll tax on non-Muslims, promised to prospective converts. This helped turn the region into the staging ground for the Abbasid revolution. In doctrinal terms it lent support to the view that formal affirmation of faith and of affiliation with the Muslim community was sufficient to be regarded as a member of the umma in good standing, even if the people thus brought into the fold were not proficient in practice or clear on details of doctrine. This principle, articulated in the movement of the Murji‘a that gained wide support in Khurasan and Transoxania (Mawarannah), was later enshrined in Hanafi juridical thought, which dominated Central Asian life from the ninth century to the twentieth century. It thereby shaped the process of Islamization in Central Asia, not only among the sedentary rural and urban population, but along the steppe frontiers as well, where the process of conversion appears to have begun in many cases with the establishment of social bonds between Muslim townspeople and nearby Turkic nomadic communities. This gave the latter a formal affiliation with the umma, with details of practice and belief to be worked out later.

There was considerable religious diversity in Central Asia at the time of the Arab conquest, and it persisted in later
times. Manichean communities were active in Samarkand until the tenth century, Christian groups can be traced into the fourteenth century, and Buddhism was not supplanted from the northeastern part of the Tarim basin until the fifteenth century. Despite the frequent setbacks to Islamization in Central Asia, the region became quite early on a major center of Islamic learning, literature, and art.

Cultural Patronage and Religious Scholarship

The full flowering of Islamic science and literature, in Persian and Arabic, came in the tenth century under Samanid patronage. The Samanid court at Bukhara sponsored the Persian poets Rudaki and Daqiqi, and the compilation of the Shabname (Book of kings) by Firdawsi (who later enjoyed Ghaznavid patronage as well); Arabic poetry was also cultivated, as were translations from Arabic and other languages into Persian. The Samanids also patronized scientific endeavors, building on traditions that had produced pivotal works instrumental in the development of astronomy and mathematics in the Islamic world at large, and later in western Europe as well. Whereas in the ninth century scholars of Central Asian origin, such as Muhammad b. Musa al-Khwarazmi, Abu Ma‘shar al-Balkhi, and Abu ‘Abbas Ahmad al-Farghani, were drawn west to Baghdad, Samanid patronage kept these figures’ successors at home, so to speak, and made tenth-century Bukhara the scene of a remarkable intellectual synthesis marked especially by scholars of encyclopedic breadth. The compendium of all branches of scholarship known as the Majastib al-‘ilm was produced for the Bukharan court by Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad al-Khwarazmi, and an important tradition of geographical study was sponsored by Samanid officials. The encyclopedic tradition shaped the work of the remarkable Khwarazmian al-Biruni (d. 1048), who distinguished himself in the natural sciences as well as in history and geography, and who later served the Ghaznavid sultans Mahmud and Mas‘ud as well. The illustrious polymath Ibn Sina (d. 1037), especially renowned in medicine and philosophy, spent his formative years in Samanid Bukhara.

Perhaps the most important contribution of pre-Mongol Central Asia to the religious culture of the larger Islamic world, however, lies in scholarship on hadith and in the juridical sciences and theology. Already in the ninth century, under the Tahirids, Central Asia produced several of the compilers of the major collections of hadiths regarded as authoritative throughout the Muslim world, above all the two pivotal traditionists, Muhammad b. Isma‘il al-Bukhari (d. 870), who lived much of his life near Samarkand, and Muslim b. Hajjaj of Nishapur (Ar. Nisabur) (d. 875). The growth and development of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which came to dominate interpretation and application of the shari‘a in much of the Ottoman-ruled world and in the Indian subcontinent, was largely the work of Central Asian scholars. Central Asia has been predominantly Hanafi in its juridical orientation throughout the Islamic period. There was a limited, but important, Shafi‘i presence in some areas. The region of Tashkent became a bastion of the Shafi‘i school (and produced the noted tenth-century jurist Abu Bakr Qaffal al-Shashi), as did the town of Taraz, while parts of Khwarazm were predominantly Shafi‘i until well after the Mongol conquest. Already before the Samanid era, however, the supremacy of the Hanafi school in Bukhara, and in the rest of Transoxania, was credited to the imam Abu Hafs al-Bukhari (d. 877), and from the tenth century to the fourteenth, Transoxania was by far the most productive region of the Muslim world in terms of the scholars and books that would define the Hanafi tradition.

The Samanid era saw the formulation of the theological school associated with the name of Abu Mansur Muhammad al-Maturidi (d. c. 944) of Samarkand. His theological elaborations, on a Hanafi foundation, defined the lines of religious thought that dominated the eastern Islamic world for centuries and, with the active support of Seljuk patronage, became firmly established in the Middle East beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was the era of Seljuk patronage, indeed, that produced many of the great classics of Hanafi jurisprudence in Transoxania. The central works include the Usul of Fakhr al-Islam ‘Ali b. Muhammad al-Pazdawi (d. 1089), the Mabsut and Usul al-fiqh of Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Sarakhsi (d. c. 1096), known as “Shams al-A’imma,” and the Hidarya of Burhan al-Din ‘Ali al-Marghinani (d. 1197). The activities of Hanafi jurists extended to juridical and civil administration as well, and hereditary transmission of the estates and power they were able to amass was common. The most famous case is the family known as the Al-e Burhan in Bukhara, whose members were recognized as the chief civil authorities in the city even by the non-Muslim Qarakhitays.

The Mongol conquest naturally meant a setback for the institutional foundations of Islamic religious culture, and for state involvement in the application and interpretation of the shari‘a, but its impact on religious life was not as far-reaching as is often supposed. If the transmission of juridical traditions in Central Asia is considered there is little evidence of any substantial discontinuity coinciding with the establishment of Mongol rule. With the conversion of the Mongol elites to Islam, patronage of Islamic scholarship, literature, art, and architecture expanded. During the fourteenth century a number of important Turkic religious works were produced and dedicated to khans and tribal chieftains of the Jochid and Chaghatayid realms. Timur patronized religious scholars as well as artisans and poets, often bringing prominent figures from the regions he conquered back to his capital in Samarkand, and scholars such as Sa‘d al-Din Taftazani (d. 1390) and ‘Ali Jurjani (d. 1413) thus worked for a time in Transoxania; on the other hand, some jurists found the cultivation of the Mongol heritage under Timur and his successors abhorrent and quit the Timurid realm for the Ottoman state or other
parts of the Muslim world. By the Timurid era, in any case, the Hanafi school’s dominance in Central Asia had become a virtual monopoly. Hanafi juridical scholarship continued in Transoxania into the twentieth century, until the closure of all madrasas by the Soviets in the late 1920s. Early in the Uzbek period, patronage of the religious sciences took on a new political importance in light of the emergence of the Shi’ite state of Safavid Iran. The ulema of Transoxania supported the Uzbek rulers by declaring the Qizilbash to be the equivalent of infidels, thereby justifying the constant raiding and open warfare in Khurasan through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The religious frontier thus established was rarely an insurmountable obstacle to commerce or intellectual exchange, but nevertheless set the further development of religious culture in Central Asia apart from its traditional connections to Iran.

**Sufism in Central Asia**

The most important religious development of the post-Mongol era was the rise of Sufi communities organized according to the principle of the silsila or chain of spiritual transmission, and their emergence as important factors in political and economic history. The history of Sufism (tasawwuf) in Central Asia down to the Mongol conquest remains poorly studied, but it appears that by the tenth century a number of originally independent mystical currents, some with local roots and some imported from outside Central Asia, had coalesced under the designation of tasawwuf. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries major new patterns of Sufi activity and organization appear with the career of Abu Sa’id b. Abil-Khayr (d. 1049) of Mayhana, in present-day Turkmenistan, who cultivated a high public profile in Ghaznavid Nishapur, and with the hereditary Sufi tradition of Ahmad-e Jam (d. 1141), whose natural descendants remained prominent well into the Uzbek era.

The Mongol and Timurid periods saw the crystallization of Sufi traditions that would dominate religious life in Central Asia down to the nineteenth century, in the form of organized orders that emerged around silsilas traced back to the prophet Muhammad through prominent saints of the thirteenth century. One was the Kubravi tradition, whose eponym, Najm al-Din Kuhi, died in 1221 during the Mongol attack on his native Kharazam. Another was the Yasavi tradition, named for Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi, whose center of activity was the middle Syr Darya valley. The Khwajagani tradition emerged in the thirteenth century as well, among the disciples of Khwaja ‘Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduvani, from a town near Bukhara. This tradition produced a lineage that became known as the Naqshbandiya, after Baha’ al-Din Naqshband of Bukhara (d. 1389). Representatives of these and other traditions were engaged in vigorous competition with one another, for court patronage and for popular support, in the context of the political and social turmoil of Transoxania and Khurasan in the fourteenth century. As part of that competition, many groups appear to have experimented with different ways of legitimizing the authority and efficacy of their specific ritual and devotional practices and their claims of spiritual preeminence, appealing to visionary sanctions of various sorts, hereditary transmission, demonstrated spiritual results, and other signs in addition to the silsila, which would become the normative mode of legitimation by the latter fifteenth century. Some of these Sufi communities, moreover, were actively engaged in Islamization, not in the sense of changing the beliefs of the Turkic nomads who became based in southern Central Asia through the Mongol invasion (though this may have happened as well), but in the sense of forging social and economic bonds with nomadic communities that were undergoing the profound dislocations of the Mongol era (i.e., tribal reorganization and adaptation to the enclosed nomadism of Transoxania and Khurasan).

By the late fifteenth century, the Naqshbandiya was emerging as the dominant Sufi tradition of Central Asia, largely through the efforts of Khwaja ‘Ubaydullah Ahrar, a native of Tashkent who spent much of his life in Timurid Samarkand, and who exemplified the political engagement and the cultivation of economic power that became the hallmark of the Naqshbandi order. At the same time, the Naqshbandiya was beginning its expansion beyond Central Asia, into the Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent. The decentralized polity of the early Uzbek era favored intensified competition among representatives of the Naqshbandi, Yasavi, and Kubravi orders, but Naqshbandi dominance was assured by the second half of the sixteenth century. From then until the early eighteenth century, the Naqshbandiya was a truly pervasive influence in all aspects of Central Asian political, economic, and cultural life.

The eighteenth century saw important changes in religious life, beginning with the introduction of the Mujaddidi (renewal) current of the Naqshbandi order, which had taken shape in seventeenth-century India, into Central Asia. The Mujaddidiyya offered an alternative source of legitimation for rulers seeking to counter the limitations on their power imposed by entrenched urban and tribal elites, and several Mujaddidi shaykhs were closely allied with khans of the Manghit and Ming dynasties in promoting religious “reform” in a way that undermined traditional Sufi groups and the popular practices associated with them. The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw several reform efforts of this type, which entailed the condemnation of many long-established religious practices that had diffused from Sufi circles into the larger society as un-Islamic innovations. Local Sufi traditions survived, however, as did the local customs fought by the reformers, and the real blow to Central Asia’s legacy of Sufism came only with the Soviet era.

**Pilgrimage and Shrine Culture**

One of the most characteristic features of Islamic religious practice in Central Asia, and one that linked the lower classes...
with the religious and social elites, was the widespread phenomenon of pilgrimage (ziyarat) to saints’ shrines (mazars). This phenomenon was closely linked, but never entirely coterminous, with the spread of Sufism. Shrine-centered religious practice is evidenced already in the tenth century, and by the twelfth century there is extensive information on the large numbers of shrines in Khurasan in the hagiographies focused on the life of Abu Sa’id b. Abu ‘l-Khayr. From the same century dates the incident of the discovery of the reputed grave of ‘Ali near Balkh, under the Seljuks, suggesting already the political ramifications of cultivating shrine traditions, as well as the compilation of the earliest guide to holy places in Central Asia, entitled Lata‘if al-azkar, by a member of the Al-e Burhan of Bukhara. By the Mongol era, shrine culture was well entrenched, and appears to have played some role in the acculturation of the Mongol elites and ordinary nomads to the Muslim environment. Ibn Battuta reported that even pagan Mongols brought offerings to the shrine of Qutham b. ‘Abbas, the famous martyred Shah-e zinda in Samarkand, and there is some evidence of shrines serving as portals, in effect, for passage from the world of Mongol administrative service to the devotional and contemplative life of Sufism. In the fifteenth century, a shrine guide for Bukhara included a defense of the practice of ziyarat, but the legitimacy and efficacy of pilgrimage to saints’ shrines were taken for granted through most of Central Asian history. The reform efforts of the early nineteenth century targeted some practices associated with shrines, and the Soviets directed intense, and destructive, antireligious measures against them, but in neither case were there permanent inroads into the public consciousness of shrines and their many roles. The collapse of Soviet antireligious efforts in the late 1980s led to a remarkable revival of ziyarat, including the reconstruction of numerous shrines as well as the “rediscovery,” by quite traditional methods (not unlike those that revealed ‘Ali’s burial place in the twelfth century), of long-forgotten sites.

The centrality of shrine-centered religious practice in the daily lives, and in connection with the most pressing human needs, of the majority of Central Asian Muslims is a major, and visible, part of the complex of normative religious customs that characterized traditional life in Islamic Central Asia. Other elements of this complex are more difficult to trace in literary sources from earlier centuries, but it seems clear that, during the Uzbek period at least, religious trends that were evident already in the Mongol and Timurid eras were solidified and became the standard features of traditional Islamic life down to the social and religious upheavals launched by the Soviet regime in Central Asia during the late 1920s. Some of these elements include the continuation of madrasa-based juridical education in such cities as Bukhara, which continued to attract students from among Muslim communities in the Russian empire as well as from India and Afghanistan; the expansion of Muslim education and literacy into the nomadic regions, especially among the Qazaqs; the incorporation of shrines and sacred lineages into the religious practice, social structure, and epic traditions of the nomads; the prominence of hereditary religious lineages into the religious practice, social structure, and epic traditions of the nomads; the permeation of kinship structures and communal life by elements of Sufi practice and thought; and the expansion of religiously defined and regulated occupational organizations in urban and rural environments, integrating the basic elements of craft production into a spiritual worldview that infused labor and its fruits with sacrality and religious meaning.

See also Central Asia, Islam in; Maturidi, al-; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Tasawwuf.

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Devin DeWeese

CHILDHOOD

Childhood in Islam, like childhood in any great religious tradition, is seen generally as a period of education and training, a time of socialization for the future adult. The child is seen as the crucial generational link in both the religious community and the family unit, the key to its continuation, the living person that ties the present to the past. The idea of childhood, the place of the child, the duties of the child are basic issues and have been since the beginning of Islam. Childhood ends in a formal sense at the age of puberty, when
performance of the religious duties (Five Pillars) marks the ritual passage into the early stages of adulthood.

Socialization of the child takes place primarily within the family unit, the home, and the father and mother are ultimately responsible for their offspring. However, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins are also expected to participate in a child’s rearing and usually did so in the past. Religious socialization also takes place in the home (for boys and girls) and in the mosque (for boys) but also in the Qur’anic school or kuttab (for boys and girls). A knowledge of the Qur’an is deemed necessary for a child’s religious development, and most parents, even the poorest, try to send their sons and daughters to the kuttab.

Socialization for values of the society begins even earlier, as soon as a child is conscious of others. These values vary somewhat according to geographical, historic, and economic differences within Muslim communities but in general they are designed to develop ‘aqf or reason in the child and to make the child mu’addab, one who is polite and disciplined. In the Arab world, a child is taught respect for food, for religion, for the kin group, hospitality to guests, and, above all, respect for and obedience to the authority of the father.

Most Muslim societies might be classified as patrilineal (the exception being parts of Southeast Asia, in which a matrilineal descent is observed). In the reckoning of one’s descent in patrilineal societies, one’s kin-group membership passes through the male line on the father’s side. This means that all children retain their father’s name throughout their lives, but a daughter, unlike a son, cannot pass membership on to her children. Male and female descendants inherit from the father, according to the specifics of Islamic legal codes. This hierarchical organization means that the oldest male, father or son, holds authority over his descendants, but is also the primary economic provider for the group, and thus controller of the group’s economic resources. In exchange, the male head of household is expected not only to provide for but to protect the group, including sons and daughters, throughout their lives.

The period of childhood socialization is marked by ritual events, both religious and secular: ceremonies surrounding birth and naming; circumcision, for all boys and some girls; graduation from Qur’anic school, particularly for boys; and finally marriage. Marriage is the crucial step in tying individual members to the group, and the birth of children confers on the newly united pair full membership in the family unit and in Islam. “When a man has children he has fulfilled half his religion, so let him fear God for the remaining half,” states one of the hadiths of the prophet Muhammad.

Further, throughout childhood, there is strong socialization for future roles in the family and the Muslim community; from a very early age, children are given responsibilities. Girls are expected to help in the home and care for siblings; boys may be asked to help in family business or on their father’s farm. This traditional picture, in practice, is changing, as people in the Muslim world become more mobile, and as the family group becomes more attenuated. The father is still seen as head of household, but the mother frequently shares economic responsibilities by working outside the home, and this places stress on family expectations for both sons and daughters. Free public education has supplemented, but not replaced, Qur’anic education for all children.

Still, the basic approach to childhood as a time of learning rather than as a carefree time for play remains. To become a full member of the Islamic community, a child is expected to learn the Qur’an, respect parents, and gradually assume responsibilities within the family and the religious community, so that the untutored child becomes the disciplined Muslim adult.

See also Circumcision; Education; Gender; Marriage.

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Elizabeth Warnock Fernea

CHINA See East Asia, Islam in

CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM

The history of Christian-Muslim or alternatively Muslim-Christian relations began at the inception of Islam in the first half of the sixth century of the Common Era. As Islam began to spread beyond the Arabian Peninsula soon after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E., the encounter between Muslims and Christians entered a new phase of military, political, and social interactions. A century later, while these kinds of interaction continued along the already far-flung borders of the new Islamic empire spreading from Spain to the Indus river, new patterns emerged within both majority Christian and majority Muslim polities. They reflected the weight of different theological and political contexts on daily social life, leading to a variety of mostly polemical and apologetic stances that Christians and Muslims
developed regarding each other. This religious and political mix came to a head during the period of the major Crusades (twelfth to thirteenth centuries C.E.), creating the subsequent dominant paradigm in Christian-Muslim relations, the repercussions of which are still felt to this day, and especially since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. But not all historical periods or geographical locations were the same; pockets of mutually beneficial encounters existed here and there on both sides of the transient political borders. Moreover, the history of Christian-Muslim relations has not unfolded in isolation from other religious and, more recently, nonreligious worldviews.

The Period of the Prophet Muhammad’s Life: Circa 570–632 C.E.

The history of the prophet Muhammad’s life is difficult to ascertain with precision. Through a careful examination of pre-Islamic poems, the Qur’an, early hadith, and biographies, all of which have entailed in the past century serious debates as to their validity as historical sources, it is nevertheless possible to suggest a likely course of events in this first period of Muslim-Christian encounters. Prior to 610 C.E., the year when the prophet Muhammad received the first Qur’anic revelation, his encounters with Christians probably took place during his caravan trips into greater Syria, as the tradition of his meeting with the Christian monk Bahira would indicate. There may also have been occasional encounters with Christians of unknown theological leanings passing through Mecca. The biography of the prophet Muhammad mentions other kinds of encounters, not all of which are historically verifiable. For instance, soon after 610 C.E., the Prophet met with Waraqa ibn Nawfal, who was a cousin of the Prophet’s wife Khadija. Waraqa ibn Nawfal was a Christian scholar who confirmed the Prophet’s mission. Another encounter is said to have occurred in 615 C.E., when early converts to Islam migrated for a short while to the Christian kingdom of Axum (Abyssinia). In 628 C.E., a delegation of Christians from the town of Najran in South Arabia came to visit the Prophet in Medina, and sometime before the Prophet died, in 632 C.E., he would have sent letters to existing rulers such as the Byzantine emperor Heraclius and the Negus of Axum, as well as the Sassanian emperor Chosroes. These five instances demonstrate a variety of possible or imagined encounters, all of which have been used for various goals in Muslim-Christian relations, both at the time of their production and in subsequent interpretations.

The varieties of Qur’anic passages addressing Christians directly or indirectly (as people of the book, together with Jews, for example) reflect the transforming nature of the prophet Muhammad’s encounters with them as his own status changed over time. The same applies to the other two religious systems he interacted with in Arabia: Judaism and Meccan polytheism. In all three cases, the variation in tone, from tolerance to polemics, seems to reflect the extent to which his prophetic message was being accepted or rejected at each moment of his reception of Qur’anic revelations, a process that lasted about twenty-three years. In terms of Christianity in particular, there is at best a conditional acceptance of Christians, and at worst a judgment associating them to both shirk (polytheism/idolatry) and kufr (unbelief). The various Christian voices referred to in the Qur’an are, for the most part, not reflective of the major Christian theologies that Muslims would come to encounter soon after the death of the prophet Muhammad, in 632 C.E. These misperceptions of mainstream, seventh-century Christian theologies, by being preserved in the Qur’an, negatively predisposed subsequent generations of Muslim interpreters of Christianity. A contextual sociopolitical reading of these various passages, harking back in part to the old Islamic hermeneutical principle of abrogation (in which later Qur’anic revelations must take precedence over prior ones), is one way to make sense of their variety and, at times, contradictory nature. This is especially important when the passages are juxtaposed ahistorically, either within the period of the Prophet’s life or for contemporary ideological purposes.

The First Islamic Conquests: 632–750 C.E.

During the Islamic empire’s first phase of rapid expansion, between 632 and 750 C.E., two numerically important religious systems become incorporated under Muslim political control: Eastern Christianity, both Chalcedonian (i.e., Byzantine) and non-Chalcedonian (especially Monophysite and Nestorian), and Zoroastrianism. By then, Jews constituted only a small minority of the population scattered across the newly conquered areas, and did not represent any political threat. The first to try to make sense of Islam as the religion of their new Muslim rulers were Eastern Christians, since Western (that is, Roman) Christians were not affected directly by the Muslim conquests until the later part of this period, and mostly in the Iberian Peninsula lying at the Western fringe of the new Islamic empire. In all cases, however, Christians perceived Islam within their own respective theological worldviews. As early as around 660 C.E., the arrival of Arab Muslims is interpreted by the Monophysite Armenian bishop Sebeos as a judgment of God in light of Genesis 21:12–13, according to which Muslims are identified as Arab descendants of Hagar and her son Ishmael, who were promised by God to become a great nation. This theological interpretation was linked to a political situation wherein most Monophysite and Nestorian Christians welcomed the arrival of Arab Muslims, for it put an end to their political subordination to the Byzantine Christians. As the new rulers took control over the course of the eighth century, new interpretations developed. For both Monophysites and Nestorians, Islam came to represent a judgment on the part of God against those who accepted the Christological definitions of the Council of Chalcedon (451 C.E.). As for those Eastern Christians under Muslim control who continued to support...
The Tomb of St. John the Baptist in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, which was built on an earlier church, is said to house the skull of John the Baptist, valued by both Muslims and Christians. Over the centuries, despite much polemical opposition and violence, Christianity and Islam maintain many important similarities and have shared many positive encounters. ART ARCHIVE/DAGLI ORTI

the Byzantine or Chalcedonian theology, such as the Melkite John of Damascus, they came to describe Islam as a Christian heresy.

The early Muslim conquerors followed the momentum built toward the end of the Prophet’s life: The first phase of interaction with Christians (and Jews) was confrontational, and all Jews and Christians were expelled from the Arabian Peninsula. It was not until the later seventh and eighth centuries, when Muslim political conquests began to take root in majority Christian and Zoroastrian areas, that more lenient attitudes and practices developed, legitimized by a retrieval of the earlier and more tolerant Qur’anic passages toward Christians in particular. These interpretations and legal elaborations were needed to formalize the relationship of Muslims to the Christians and Zoroastrians who formed a majority of the population in their respective western and eastern halves of the new (Islamic) Umayyad Empire (661–750 C.E.). This new political context also explains why, to the theological concept of the people of the book (ahl al-kitab), used by the prophet Muhammad to link the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic notions of divine revelation, was added a parallel and pragmatic concept of the people of the protective covenant (ahl al-dhimma), erroneously understood by some today as second-class citizenship. This concept was based on two Qur’anic references (9:8, 10) initially referring to idolaters in general. This covenantal concept helped regulate Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as political minorities who received protection from ruling Muslims in exchange for poll taxes. Yet, the situation and opportunities for advancement varied tremendously from one individual Christian to another, and from one geographical area or historical period to another. For example, many educated Christians reached high positions of power during the Umayyad and subsequent Abbasid dynasties, especially in the fields of medicine, philosophy, and administration.

The Stabilizing of Relations: 750–1085 C.E.

In the three centuries that followed the takeover of the central Islamic lands by the Abbasid dynasty in 750 C.E., the Islamic world rose to its apex of cultural, religious, and political efflorescence. This pax islamica resulted in much tolerance toward its internal religious minorities in general, albeit within an Islamic dhimmi paradigm of power. The translation of mostly Greek and Syriac philosophical and scientific works into Arabic during the middle of
the ninth century culminated in the establishment of Caliph Al-Ma'mun's (786–833 C.E.) bayt al-hikma (house of wisdom). It was later directed by the Nestorian Christian translator Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809–873 C.E.). As a positive example of Christian-Muslim relations at the center of the Abbasid Empire, the bayt al-hikma internally promoted intellectual pursuits of truth and resulted in a striking degree of interreligious tolerance and mutual influence, especially among the educated elite. Externally, as the empire’s borders continued to be disputed, a pronounced antagonism arose among both Western European and Byzantine Christians, who feared the power of the then-greatest empire on earth. Among Western Christians, the most obvious development was linked to the slow Reconquista efforts in Spain that culminated in the Christian takeover of Toledo in 1085. This movement was fueled by very negative anti-Islamic rhetoric. As for Byzantine Christians, the continuing warfare also helped sustain more polemical views of Islam, building on the earlier notion that Islam was a heresy with the difference that authors now had access to original Qur’anic and other Arabic writings (or translations of them) to sustain their polemical arguments. Yet, some Byzantine writers were more moderate, acknowledging some similarities between Christianity and Islam, such as the common basis in monotheism.

During the same period, an equally diverse spectrum of views on Christianity emerged among Muslims. While there was better access to mainstream Christian theologies, greater knowledge did not always result in greater tolerance and understanding. Many factors explain the rise in Muslim polemical attitudes toward Christianity: changing demographic realities, wherein Christians were still the majority in many central areas of Islamdom, but the balance of numerical power was gradually shifting in favor of Islam; changing theological realities within the Muslim community, including the search for Islamic legitimization in Biblical roots; social competition, especially in times of economic difficulties; and the need to defend Islam against other major worldviews. But not all Muslim perceptions of Christianity were polemical, and not all Muslim authors lived in situations where the above factors were equally present. As different Christian theologies produced different perceptions of Islam, so did different Islamic theologies (Mu’tazili, Ash’ari, Maturidi, traditionalist, Sufi, and so on) produce different perceptions of Christianity.

**The Period of the Crusades: 1085–1300 C.E.**

After the fall of Toledo in 1085, Western Christians became emboldened by the successes of what they have called the Reconquista. Their success was in sharp contrast to the Eastern Byzantine Christians, who had suffered great territorial losses at the hands of the Muslim Seljuk Turks in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert in 1071. A decade later, Byzantine emperor Alexius (r. 1081–1118) took power and later requested help from Western Christians to fight back the Muslims. Pope Urban II responded with the preaching of the first Crusades in Clermont, France, in 1095. By the fall of 1096, a people’s expedition was galvanized by Peter the Hermit. Numbering about twenty thousand, it ended up disintegrating before leaving Europe. In its wake, however, it left a trail of suffering. Many lives were lost, and whole Jewish communities were exterminated.

At the same time, an amalgamation of five armies from different parts of Western Europe responded to the call: they numbered between fifty and sixty thousand. They crossed over into Asia Minor in 1097, captured Antioch in 1098, and conquered Jerusalem on 15 July 1099. The Christian population of Jerusalem had been expelled from that city in fear of treachery just prior to the Crusader conquest. The Muslim governor, together with some of his military garrison, was allowed safe-conduct at the moment of the conquest, but the remaining Muslim and small Jewish civilian populations were massacred: More than forty thousand lives were taken. In contrast, when Saladin re-conquered Jerusalem in 1187, no blood was spilled upon entering the city. By 1302, the Crusaders had gradually lost control of all their small principalities on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

In contrast to this military approach to Muslim-Christian relations, smaller but significant rapprochements were taking place from the eleventh century onwards. They allowed for the transmission of knowledge from the Islamic world into Christian Europe, with the translation of Arabic works into Latin. This began primarily in Spain and Sicily with the rediscovery of the ancient Greek heritage, now greatly enriched by centuries of Muslim commentaries. This movement took place in both older monasteries and newer educational establishments such as language schools, colleges, and universities, first in Bologna, Salerno, Montpellier, Paris, and Oxford prior to 1200. With this rapid increase in efforts to understand the Muslim world, with key figures such as the Italian Francis of Assisi (1182–1226 C.E.) and the Spaniard Raymond Lull (c. 1232–1316 C.E.), important seeds of the later fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European Renaissance were sown in the very midst of an internal Christian resistance to the Crusades.

**The New Balance of Power: 1300–1500 C.E.**

The defeat of the first Crusades did not end the desires of European Christians for expansion, nor did it stop certain Muslims from continuing their own. The Reconquista gradually expanded to include the whole of the Iberian Peninsula, ending with the fall of the last Muslim kingdom in Grenada in 1492. At the other end of the Mediterranean, Ottoman expansion crossed over into southeastern Europe in 1354, eventually ending the Byzantine Empire with the capture of Constantinople in 1453. They won the battle of Kosovo in 1389 and Nicopolis in 1396, making them rulers of the Balkans. The expansion stopped at the gates of Vienna in 1529. A similar siege took place again in 1683, demonstrating...
the strong Ottoman pressures on Central and Eastern Europe for over a century and a half.

At the same time, by the end of the fifteenth century, the southwestern Europeans, especially the Spaniards and Portuguese, gained new strategic power through three combined discoveries. Christopher Columbus’s “discovery” of the Americas in 1492; Vasco de Gama’s navigation around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, which opened up a new spice trading route to Southeast Asia that avoided central Muslim lands; and Magellan and Pigafetta’s westward circumnavigation of the earth by 1522 C.E. These discoveries suddenly enlarged the predominantly Mediterranean geographical scope of the first eight centuries of Christian-Muslim interactions into the beginnings of a global one, adding new Christian missionary pressures, especially in West Africa as well as South and Southeast Asia, where Muslim rule had been gradually expanding for centuries.

The New European Christian Rise in Power: 1500–1800 C.E.

In the sixteenth century, the rapid take-over of ocean routes worldwide ushered in a new age of European Christian power. It resulted in a gradual encroachment on increasingly vast areas of inhabited lands through a forceful combination of military, political, economic, and missionary activities. While these new, long-term processes were unfolding on the peripheries, the Ottoman Empire continued to be a threat to the central and eastern European Christian powers and the Mughal Empire slowed down European incursions into South Asia.

In between the Ottoman and Mughal empires, the Safavid Empire (based primarily in Iran) vied for control of central Islamic lands. Dynamic internal Muslim transformations continued to flower along traditional lines, both within those three centralized empires and on many peripheries of Islamic expansion, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and in southeastern and northwestern Asia. However, few understood the significance of the new technologies that led to the magnitude of the European encroachment along many peripheries of the Islamic world and their disruption of traditional internal sources of economic revenues, such as the spice and silk roads, due to new ocean trade routes. These technological threats were also ideational and symbolic, as with the new missionary efforts to spread worldwide the already embattled forms of European Christianity, even when conducted with greater sensitivity to local customs, as exemplified in the efforts of the first Jesuits in the later half of the sixteenth century in India, China, and Japan. These combined processes would subsequently increase in speed and depth, leading to tension and confrontation between Muslims and Christians worldwide on a much wider scale.

The Period of European Colonialism and Western Imperialism: 1800 onward

With Napoleon’s brief conquest of Egypt in 1898, Europeans embarked on a political and military trajectory that would gradually make them colonial masters not only over majority Muslim countries, but over almost the entire planet. While this surge in European colonialism was particularly successful among the British, French, Dutch, and Russians, who divided up among themselves most of the Islamic world, it still remained strong among the older imperial powers of Spain and Portugal, while the newer national polities of Italy, Germany, and Belgium also vied for their share of the world. A few Muslim areas retained a degree of political independence, such as what later became Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and (to a lesser degree) Iran, which had to balance pressures from the British in the south and the Russians in the north, a prelude to the later pressures of the Cold War by their respective successors the United States and the Soviet Union. Thanks in part to large oil revenues, both Saudi Arabia and Iran would later become the launching pads for two distinct, transnational, and anti-Western Islamic political ideologies confronting Western imperialism: Khomeinism and Wahhabism. The first began with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the latter produced as one of its offshoots the extremist al-Qa’ida, with the resulting terrorist attacks on key symbols of American global hegemony on 11 September 2001.

Intertwined with the growing European colonialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Christian missionary movement continued unabated, although it was now linked to a civilizational project of modernity understood as democracy and the rule of law within new nation-state structures. This European colonial project legitimized in the eyes of most Europeans their own increased militarization at home and the interconnected colonial control of peoples worldwide. European colonialism eventually fragmented the world, including the Islamic parts of it, into unavoidable yet often unmanageable semblances of nation-states. This project had to do as much with older competing Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Christian identities as with newer, non-Christian philosophies (deism, atheism, utilitarianism, materialism, human rights, and the like), a point often misunderstood by many generations of Muslims who have reduced the modern West to Christianity. In turn, many Westerners, whether religious or not, have themselves simplicistically essentialized the complexities of the Islamic world, wanting to believe that it is quintessentially unmodernizable. They have forgotten how many centuries it took Western Catholic and Protestant Christianities to come to terms with modernity, and fail to consider the ongoing struggles of parts of the Orthodox Christian world, not to mention vast numbers of Christians in economically disadvantaged areas around the world.

Orientalism is a long-standing, scientific tradition of interpretation of the Other developed in Western universities especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to explain “Eastern” realities from Morocco to Japan. This tradition reinforced the stereotype of Islam as unmodernizable. Orientalists only too often contributed to the rationale for
colonial domination of the world, especially in Muslim areas. This explains why, since the late nineteenth century, many Muslims have become suspicious of efforts on the part of non-Muslim Westerners to interpret Islam. However, with increased migrations of Muslims from majority Muslim countries to the West and the increase in conversions to Islam among both European and U.S. citizens, especially among African Americans, together with the increased Westernization of important segments of majority Muslim countries, new Islamized Western and secularized Islamic identities have emerged in the last half century challenging the existence of a West/Islam dichotomy as was promulgated by orientalist thinking.

In addition to colonialisist and orientalist discourses, the already complex internal Western dynamic spawned new competing economic and political ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism, and communism, eventually spreading the Cold War (1950–1989) unto the rest of the non-Western world, into newly formed nations that were already struggling to define themselves in the new, postcolonial era. This resulted in various hybrid forms of political ideology, such as pan-Arabism, Indonesian Pancasila ideology, and the creation of Pakistan along ethnic rather than religious lines (even though Pakistani identity was initially the effort to transform a South Asian Muslim identity into a national/ethnic one). For every national case, the Islamic heritage in majority Muslim countries was problematized differently, resulting in a variety of Muslim and Islamic nationalisms that rivals the variety of secular and Christo-secular Western nationalisms.

The greatest force underlying the modernization (often reduced to Westernization) process ensuing from Western colonialism and post-colonial economic imperialism, most recently known under the concept of globalization, has come in the name of science and has been linked to a philosophy of positivism. These combined claims to truth have reinforced the various new technologies with which they are associated. While most Muslims have adopted Western scientific education as part of various nationalist educational projects, this ever-rapid increase in scientific knowledge has continued to provide a secularizing West its military and political superiority, undermining traditional faith-claims both at the center of power in the West and on the Muslim and other peripheries.

A resistance to positivist science and liberal Christianity first developed in the United States in the second decade of the twentieth century, taking the form of Christian Protestant fundamentalism. Fundamentalism later spread around the world under different names and varying forms, resulting in the ideologization of anticolonial and, later, anti-imperialist religious discourses. Eventually it fueled a few religious revolutions and coup d’etats, the most memorable being that of Iran in 1979. During the late 1980s and 1990s, another form of accommodation has led to the creation of a network of scholars engaged in the Islamization of Knowledge project.

But by the end of the Cold War in 1989, Westerners and Muslims had lost a common enemy in communism; they could now turn more directly onto each other, in what is still often reduced to a simplistic West versus Islam dichotomy.

In contrast, mostly among educated and cosmopolitan elites, the late twentieth century witnessed the emergence of a genuine Christian-Muslim or Muslim-Christian dialogue. This new movement stressed the importance of listening to one another and learning from each other’s tradition. This process, carefully attuned to ensuring a better power dynamic between its participants, has often led to common statements by Muslims and Christians on a variety of issues. Sponsored at times by international religious organizations, governments, or non-governmental organizations, these dialogues have opened up new avenues of understanding that aim to respect the differences and have built on the similarities that exist among Christians and Muslims. While participating in dialogue does not require a liberal theological point of view, it tends to attract religious people with such a perspective, often limiting the potential impact this approach could have on transforming the history of Christian-Muslim relations toward one of greater understanding and cooperation given the wealth of information now available on their shared history.

Conclusion
The history of Muslim-Christian relations includes a wide spectrum of interactions encompassing all aspects of human life. Two extreme interpretations need to be avoided because they are wrong historically. The first is reductionism. It is dangerous to reduce this complex history to one of endless confrontations between essentialized conceptualizations of Islam and Christianity, treating them as mutually exclusive realities that turn every Christian and Muslim into unavoidable enemies. The examples of constructive interactions between Muslims and Christians in both times of peace and war are too numerous to justify oversimplifying this history into one of military confrontations. The second danger is to deny the complex power dynamics that have always existed among Christians, Muslims, and others within Christian and post-Christian as well as Muslim and other societies. These dynamics reveal both destructive and constructive behaviors and patterns, as well as a spectrum of beliefs that range from inclusive to exclusive and are held by both sides in what have become the two numerically largest religious identities today. Knowing this history requires a sensitive understanding at the dawn of a yet insecure future for the human race.

See also Balkans, Islam in the; Crusades; European Culture and Islam; Islam and Other Religions; Judaism and Islam; Religious Beliefs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Circumcision

The role of circumcision (khitan) in Islamic society has shifted dramatically due to issues of gender, custom, and law. Nowhere mentioned in the Qur’an, circumcision was a common practice in Arabia that was incorporated into the Islamic legal system to varying degrees and for a variety of reasons. Both Josephus and Philo of Alexandria note its presence in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Arabia prior to the coming of Islam. Philo observes that Egyptian males and females were circumcised after the fourteenth year before marriage, while Josephus claims the Arabs performed it just after the thirteenth year, at the time Ishmael was circumcised.

Legally, Islamic scholars debate whether the practice is obligatory or sunna (customary), or whether its obligations be extended solely to males, or to males and females. Al-Shafi‘i considers the practice an equal duty for both sexes, while Malik and others consider it sunna for males. The disagreement over gender requirements continues in current cultural practice. Female circumcision is embraced in southern Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan, and West Africa, and a minor form is practiced by Southeast Asian Shafi‘i in Indonesia and Malaysia. It is condemned by many Muslims and non-Muslims who reside outside of these areas, mostly for humanitarian and health reasons. Many legal schools also deliberate the time a circumcision should be performed. Some recommend the seventh day following the birth of a male child, while others propose its performance after a child reaches his tenth birthday. Again, such legal variation is mirrored in contemporary practice. In the Middle East, circumcision occurs between the ages of two and seven, while in Europe and North Africa male Muslims are circumcised in hospitals immediately after birth. Suffice it to say that today there is no standard orthodox practice when it comes to circumcision.

Not all Muslims practice circumcision (specifically, those in China), and many who do adhere to vastly different cultural norms.

The justifications for circumcision also vary dramatically in Islamic sources and practice. Many hadith link circumcision with purification (tahara). It often appears in lists that include other acts of general hygiene, including the clipping
of nails, the use of the tooth-stick, the trimming of mustaches, and the depilation of both the armpits and the pubic region. Some hadith also link the practice back to Ibrahim, who circumcised himself at the age of eighty with a pickax. Unlike Judaism, Islam does not view circumcision as the sole signifier of the covenant between God and his people. Circumcision stands as just one of many tests Ibrahim performed to demonstrate his adherence to the true faith. Many Muslims bypass these exegetical intricacies and simply take the view that Muhammad mandated the practice. The legal and customary support for circumcising just prior to the onset of puberty also suggests the practice was performed as a rite of passage, one that would ready an individual for marriage. As a rite of passage, male circumcision ceremonies in places like Java and Morocco are accompanied with purificatory rites, sacrifices, and feasts. When conducted today, female circumcision is a much less celebratory act, rarely accompanied by such festivities. To interpret circumcision in Islam from a religious studies standpoint, the manipulation of the genitalia exemplifies ultimate divine control over one’s human, procreative instincts. Thus one cut symbolizes a total submission to God.

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Kathryn Kueny

**CLOTHING**

Islamic dress has for centuries been used to symbolize purity, mark status or formal roles, distinguish believer from nonbeliever, and identify gender. Traditionally Muslims were admonished to dress modestly in garments that did not reveal the body silhouette and extremities. Head coverings were also expected. However, dress forms vary in different periods and regions, as does interpretation of and adherence to Muslim dress codes. The most prominent forms of Near Eastern dress can be classified as Arab or Turkic/Iranian in form, with degrees of blending between the two modes occurring where interaction between these cultures has been greatest.

Arab dress can be seen from northern Syria to North Africa. The basic dress of both men and women is based on the simple tunic, an unfitted garment pulled on over the head, common in the region since Roman times (*gamis* or *thawb*). The earlier form of Arab dress, unseamed wrapped garments (*izar* and *rida*), have survived as the consecrated garments (*ibram*) worn by pilgrims to Mecca. The *thawb* is well suited to desert heat, providing both protection from the sun and ventilation. A wide unfitted mantle (*jallaba* or *aba*; hooded *burmula*) may also be worn. Typical materials are cotton or fine wool, with dense silk embroidery applied to necklines and borders. To this might be added shawls and shawls. Men’s head coverings might be a turban, or a simple shawl bound at the forehead, arranged on the head according to status, affiliation, local usage, or practical need. Turbans are the most well known of Muslim headgear, however. Hats or caps may also be worn either separately or under turbans. Women’s clothing is based on the same basic garment forms but differs in color, embellishment, materials, and accessories. In public, women’s garments were traditionally hidden by veils that covered all parts of the body to the ground or only head, shoulders, and face.

Turkic dress was widely influential throughout the Islamic world. The Seljuk Turks emerged from Central Asia, establishing dynasties in Iran and Asia Minor by the eleventh century. By the mid-sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire encompassed most of the lands surrounding the eastern Mediterranean.

The traditional Turkish ensemble for either men or women consisted of loose-fitting trousers (*salvar*, *don*) and a shirt (*gomelek*), topped by a variety of jackets (*cebben*, vests (*ylek*), and long coats (*entari*, *kaftan*, *uc etek*). The use of coats and trousers derived from their nomadic origins in Central Asia. Trousers protect a rider’s legs from chafing, and coats or jackets can be more readily donned or doffed than tunics while on horseback, as required in a variable climate. Layering of garments was an important aesthetic element. Garments were arranged to display the patterns and quality of fabrics on all layers and add bulk to the body image. The more formal the occasion or the higher the status of the wearer, the more layers worn, with richer materials further indicating wealth. Colorful shawls that added mass to the body image also served as a repository for weapons and personal articles. Ottoman Turkish headgear typically consisted of a brimless hat or cap in a variety of sizes and forms indicating official status, gender, and regional identity. Scarves were usually wrapped into a turban over the hat. The form of the turban indicated status, occupation, religious affiliation, or regional origin. Women’s scarves were wrapped and tied around the head, frequently in layers, with a larger veil worn over all in public.

Specific forms of dress were worn by Ottoman officials throughout the Ottoman Empire. The nearly five-hundred-year presence of Ottoman rule throughout much of the Arab world led to some blending of garment forms, particularly in northern Arab regions adjacent to Anatolia, and also in urban
Traditional male Arab dress is depicted in this 1936 postcard from the region. CORNELL COSTUME AND TEXTILE COLLECTION

Modesty in dress was enjoined in Islam for both men and women, although the particulars of pious modesty are not precisely defined in the Qur’an. The body of Islamic law and scholarship, however, has provided more specific directives that have nonetheless been applied differently in different times and places. Generally some sort of headcovering or veiling (hijab) is mandated for both men and women. In some countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia all women are required to veil, although the forms of veiling vary. In some other societies veils may be a matter of choice.

Throughout the Islamic world, dress has been used to manage distinctions of rank, gender, and religion. Under Ottoman law, for example, dress of the various religious communities within the empire was regulated, with specific colors and forms of headgear, shoes, and garments defined. Garments, particularly coats, were an important aspect of court ceremonial throughout the Muslim world. The court reception of emissaries, celebration of religious holidays, installation of officials, or honoring of heroes always called for the presentation of ceremonial robes and other textile gifts, with the richness of the fabrics or fur linings a mark of the degree of honor conferred upon the recipient. The wearing of luxurious materials such as silk and gold thread was often restricted, however, although such restrictions were often ignored. The wearing of silk, particularly next to the skin, was widely held to be an impious luxury for good Muslims. A colorful satin cloth that had a cotton weft and silk warp, and therefore a cotton inner surface and a silk outer face, allowed the wearer to conform to this religious admonition while enjoying the luxurious outer appearance of a silk garment. This textile was widely used in the Islamic world, known as *kutnu* in the Near East, and *mashru* in northern India and Pakistan. However, the most pious avoided luxurious materials and colors, and wore clothing of simple wool, cotton, or linen.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, westernization of dress occurred together with modernization of political, military, and educational institutions, since initially modernization was officially perceived as consonant with westernization. Also the emergence of a modern textile industry in many regions led to the disappearance of the more costly handmade textiles once used in traditional dress. Since dress had long been closely regulated under Muslim law, departures from traditional dress became highly charged political and social issues. The banning of the turban and the introduction of the fez by the Ottoman sultan Mahmut II in 1829 (as well as a westernized military uniform) caused great controversy as did similar decrees in Iran in 1873. These reforms were intended to symbolize modernization of military and administrative institutions, yet a century later the fez had become a symbol of Ottoman traditionalism. Following the founding of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) met resistance when he banned the fez in 1925, and even more so when he urged abandonment of the veil for women.
Since mandated ideas of proper dress had for centuries been the means of distinguishing Muslim from non-Muslim, these issues continue to have great emotional force throughout the Muslim world. In the 1980s and 1990s dress reemerged as a symbolic flashpoint between religious conservative and secularist elements in Islamic societies.

Examples of traditional clothing appear in the volume one color insert.

See also Art; Body, Significance of; Khirqa; Veiling.

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Charlotte Jirousek

COINAGE

When Islam emerged in 610 C.E., Mecca did not have its own coinage. Instead, it relied entirely on the coins of neighboring regions, particularly the Byzantine and Sassanid empires. Being both a trading town and a pilgrimage center, Mecca attracted a wide range of the coins in circulation at the time. Neither the prophet Muhammad nor his immediate political successors sought to change this. When the Muslims conquered much of the Byzantine and Sassanid empires after the death of the Prophet in 632 C.E., they left the administrative structures of these regions, including their mints and coinages, largely intact.

As a result of the Muslim conquests of the seventh century C.E., rapid economic expansion and currency circulation occurred in the Near East, along with Muslim migration from Arabia to the newly conquered regions. Regular cash stipends began to flow out to Muslims from the Central Treasury (bayt al-mud) in Medina during the caliphate of Umar I (r. 634–644), and there was substantial inflow of taxes and tributes from the conquered lands to the treasury, first located in Medina, then in Damascus during the Umayyad period. The monetization of the economy that resulted from this expansion required not only large amounts of cash (coins) but also a standard monetary unit for transactions and account keeping. In response, the silver dirham, modeled on the Sassanid drachma, was adopted, with the coins being provided by the former Sassanid mints.

Economic expansion continued with the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate, but the silver dirham remained the unit of currency. As mints did not generally issue gold coins, the market had to rely largely on the Byzantine solidi to meet its gold currency needs. The solidi themselves suffered wear and tear, which led at times to a less than uniform weight. Similarly, the silver dirhams in circulation, or those minted by the Muslims, showed discrepancies. Strong pressure therefore existed for a standard currency, including a unit based on gold, the production of which could be controlled by the Muslims.

Following minor attempts at currency reform by caliphs such as ’Umar I, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib and Mu’awiya, which went only as far as adding an Islamic inscription or date to existing Byzantine or Sassanid coins, ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwan (r. 685–705), the Umayyad caliph, took the initiative. Between 696 and 698, he changed the form as well as the weight of the dinar and dirham and regulated minting. The coins emphasized the emerging power of Muslims and of Islam as a religion, with Islamic inscriptions such as “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.” Unlike Byzantine and Sassanid coins, the reformed coins did not bear the Caliph’s image.

The pre-reform dinar had weighed approximately 4.55 grams, but ’Abd al-Malik reduced it to 4.25 grams. The fineness of the dinar was set at a minimum 96 percent gold alloy. The weight of the pre-reform dirham had been approximately 3.98 grams, but ’Abd al-Malik standardized it to 2.97 grams. This weight remained largely unchanged until the mid-ninth century C.E. The fineness of the silver dirham was also maintained at near 96 percent. Though the capital, Damascus, minted some coins, particularly gold dinars, ’Abd al-Malik did not centralize minting in that city. This function was given to provincial mints, and here the caliph relied heavily on his governor in Iraq, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf, to impose coinage reform on the eastern regions of the caliphate. Later, caliph Hisham b. Abd al-Malik (r. 724–743) also tightened control over the quality of both dinar and dirham.

’Abd al-Malik’s reformed coinage set a standard that continued in some respects well into the following Abbasid period. In order to standardize further the coinage of the powerful Abbasid caliphate, the caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) introduced new coinage in 821 and 822. He abolished inclusion of the caliph’s or the provincial governor’s name on coins, ordered that both gold and silver coins should follow
An 1877 banknote for fifty Kurush from the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the Muslim empire after Muhammad’s death, Muslim conquerers did not impose their own currency system on their subjects, because Mecca did not have its own coinage. Instead, it used the currency of nearby areas. Today, each Muslim nation has its own currency. THE ART ARCHIVE/DAGLI ORTI (A)

specific design guidelines and inscriptions, and appears to have centralized the production of coin dies. His successor, al-Mu‘tasim, however, reintroduced the addition of the caliph’s name. In the post-Mu‘tasim period, some Abbasid caliphs even added the name of the heir-apparent or would-be successor. From the early ninth century to the middle of the tenth century C.E., the vast Abbasid caliphate thus acquired a significantly uniform coinage, which vastly aided internal and external, and Muslim and non-Muslim, commerce and trade. These dinars and dirhams were imitated in Europe and elsewhere.

With the decline in Abbasid power, the disintegration of the caliphate, and the emergence of independent provinces and dynasties, central control of the coinage as well as its uniformity were lost. Independent provinces began minting their own dinars and dirhams and determining the fineness of their coins. Although the fineness of gold dinars was at times maintained and even excelled, for instance under the Fatimid caliph al-‘Amir (r. 1101–1130) and the Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil (r. 1218–1238), large variations did occur. For this reason, there is disagreement among scholars on the use of the terms “Islamic dinar” and “Islamic dirham” as a standard unit of currency in the Muslim world, particularly in respect of the post-tenth-century C.E. period, except insofar as it refers to the theoretical dinar and dirham of the Muslim jurists (fuqaha).

Despite the variation in the quality of the coinage under different dynasties, certain features introduced by reformers remained common. These included inscriptions symbolizing the religious basis of the coinage, an indication of the mint year, the mint name, and often the name of the caliph or ruler under whom the coin was issued. Coins from Islamic dynasties have therefore an important historical significance. Apart from their commercial role, they can tell us much about the political and economic condition and the artistic and aesthetic tendencies of the time.

In the modern period, each Muslim state has its own coinage and, like other countries, has abandoned the gold standard, even though Muslim jurists have not relinquished the concept of the gold dinar or the silver dirham in their legal texts. In many juristic discussions, money proper is still the dinar and the dirham of early Islam. However, as part of a wider Islamic revival, the idea of a specifically Islamic standard unit of currency, a dinar, has been revived, though not necessarily based on the earlier gold dinar. The most visible aspect of this was the adoption in 1975 of the Islamic Dinar as its unit of accounting by the Islamic Development Bank, an international Islamic financial institution whose shareholders are member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The value of the Islamic Dinar is equivalent to one SDR—Special Drawing Right—of the International Monetary Fund.

See also Economy and Economic Institutions; Law; Networks, Muslim.

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Abdallab Saeed

COLONIALISM

Modern colonialism goes back to the era of European discovery in the fifteenth century, connecting exploitation of raw
Colonialism

The colonialization of the Islamic world in the nineteenth century occurred over several decades. The process can be divided into three phases: from 1820, when colonial power was already firmly established, to 1856, when Muslim countries struggled for recognition in the changing geopolitical reality; and, from 1856 to 1880 nearly all Muslim countries lost their economic and financial independence and became dependent on the Europeans. During the period from 1880 to 1910 most of these countries—apart from those Muslim countries controlled by the Ottoman caliphate—were subject to direct colonial military and political control: economic colonialism had become political colonialism. In this situation of political subservience, the traditional urban divines, particularly theologians, were responsible for the traditional legitimization of the ruler. At the same time, in the colonial urban sector, Islamic repertory was gradually used as an ideology and a mobilizing force by those societal formations that had become partly integrated into this colonial sector. In contrast to this, in the traditional agrarian sector Islam prevailed in the form of egalitarian peasant culture, as can be seen from a number of Sufi and Mahdi movements.

The idea of universal caliphate, which had been used by the Ottomans since the middle of the eighteenth century, particularly for reasons of foreign policy, became a vehicle for pan-Islamic propaganda, notably by Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II. Though this propaganda was politically unsuccessful and led to the demise of the caliphate in 1924, the propaganda triggered a hefty discussion of the idea of a universal caliphate outside of Turkey: On the one hand the validity of the idea was questioned (‘Abd al-Raziq); on the other, Indian Muslims staged a khilafat movement. A colonial crackdown, however, put this movement down.

The Second World War accelerated the process of decolonization but left the former colonies with basic structural problems that were a result of colonialism, such as
insufficient societal integration, artificial boundaries, and narrowly based economies.

Beside these socio-historical and political developments, one needs to consider the normative aspect underlying the colonial process: A colonial collective image of Islam was created, going as far back as the Crusades and revived at a time when Europeans had started to project their own imaginations onto Muslim societies—a phenomenon that historian Edward Said has called “Orientalism.” In this view, the heterogeneous Islamic world was reduced to a monolithic, antimodern, and anti-intellectual world excluded from world history.

Nineteenth-century colonial politics was legitimized as evolutionary and modern, while the “Orient” was constructed as a cultural space, diametrically opposed to the values and norms of the West, which were considered to be inherently universal. This unidimensional social evolutionism proclaimed Europe as embodying hegemonic power. In doing so, various discourses about the Orient promulgated the societal decline, dogmatism, despotism, and irrationality of the region. Eventually this hegemonic claim produced new “Orientalist” sciences.

Against the backdrop of a postulated universal evolutionary history, the Orientalist sciences analyzed the object “Orient” in its historical development, making use of the Hegelian categories of alienation and reconciliation. In this way, colonial administrations were provided with a “scientifically proven” image about the stage of development attained by the Orient, which was seen to be alienated from its classical high culture. Cultural theories provided the colonial administration with this Orientalist image, which ran counter to the historical one of classical high culture. On the basis of this construction, colonial measures to “reconcile” the Orient with its alienated tradition were to be implemented as an export of progress. Thus terms like “modern” and “traditional” or “primitive” became scientific categories, establishing an epistemological supremacy of Europe that was firmly established politically.

In this way authority was created on the object “Orient” not only for the Europeans but also gradually, through reciprocal perceptions, for the “Orientals” themselves. Subsequently, authority was derived from the instrumentalization of the Weberian demand for “value-free” social sciences, that became “objective” insofar as they were considered to be not ideologically biased, but unquestionably “true.”

While the power relations cannot be ignored, it is important to note the cultural hybridization of the colonial process, for example, the reciprocity of colonizer and colonized. Indeed, the colonialized peoples had a function in the colonial process, for the establishment of European dominance was essentially based on the cooperation of local informants, colonial traders, and rulers. Therefore, contemporary debates became the starting point for the colonial reception of Oriental society. Naturally, the oscillating processes between Europeans and non-Europeans openly and latently shaped both societies. If projection is considered to be a cultural technique for self-affirmation and demarcation, then assigning a collective (negative) identity to the (colonialized) “other” implied the colonials’ generating their own identity in a specific colonial context. Indeed, some European enlightenment figures even had gone as far as to use the “Orient” as a didactic background to criticize their own urban societies, thereby setting out the frame of reference for their own identities.

The intrinsic impact of reciprocity and mutuality of the colonial process may have found one political manifestation in indirect rule, which was, however, not implemented in its totality, because the British administration got involved in internal affairs of these societies very quickly, at times resembling the French system of direct colonial administration. In India one manifestation of British indirect rule was the establishment of an honors system and the issuing of titles. The residency system provided for the cultural success of imperialism, a success that found its climax in the “invention of tradition” as it represented colonial authority in Victorian India through different devices, such as highly ritualistic events to mark Queen Victoria’s accession in 1876 to the title “Kaisar-e Hind” (Empress of India, combining the imperial titles of Roman “Caesar,” German “Kaiser,” and Russian “Czar.”)

The nineteenth-century Orientalist image and action not only cemented the dominant image of the Orient in the West but also affected the self-statement of the Orient. Consequently this image changed non-Western practices concretely—from blind imitation of modernization to a total rejection of Western society, thereby forming a “strange alliance” between western Orientalism and Muslim fundamentalism, whence one side satisfied the essentializing fantasies of the other.

Colonialism and the Emergence of Islamic Movements

The deep traces of colonialism that changed the whole landscape of the Muslim world brought about new social formations, and new Islamic movements:

- Reform Islam was prominent among pastoral and tribal societies, based on Wahhabiyyan and other ideas.
- Reform Sufism started off in urban, pastoral, and tribal areas, first against feudal rule and later opposing European intrusion. In doing so, the figure of prophet Muhammad became even more pivotal, hence the establishment of “Muhammadan Paths” (turuq Muhammadiyya) in the colonialized regions.
This kind of mystical approach found its climax in the movement of the Mahdi of Sudan.

- A third trend was Islamic modernism, represented primarily by intellectuals, bureaucrats, and the military, and manifested in creations of the colonial system, like the Aligarh Movement in India, the Young Ottomans, and the so-called pan-Islamic movement.

These movements adjusted to the new conditions and opted for the integration of the colonial system with Islamic theology. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Sayyid Ahmad Khan were two exponents of the modernizing trend, however different their motivations may have been. Precondition for the ideologization of Islam was a renewed call for the reintroduction of independent reasoning (ijtihad) at the cost of adherence to one’s school of law (taqlid). Timeless categories developed in the course of Western civilization were now regarded as immanently Islamic. The use of media in exile—mostly in the metropolises of their colonial motherlands—was part of that strategy.

As a result of colonialism a three-layered structure emerged: secularized urban (post-colonial) state regimes, traditional urban nonpolitical Muslim religious associations, and urban middle-class opposition movements that stood for some kind of a reconstruction of a Muslim state.

Subsequently, after political independence following the Second World War, the new Muslim states were mostly centralized and secularized, based on military or bureaucratic elites with state capitalism or socialism favoring the ruling elites. Islamic modernism was replaced by secular nationalism, co-opting Muslim leaders who would legitimize this centralism. To be sure, the identity-giving Islamic symbolism was used for the mobilization of wider strata of society.

The nonpolitical Muslim religious associations mostly stayed quietistic, while new movements among parts of the ulama played on their Islamicity. Some of them referred to concepts tuned to colonial society, basically so as not to fall behind completely in terms of political influence. The opposition movements stood for the reconstruction of a Muslim state and reorganized Islam in different ways, for example, the theory of the caliphate providing an extended interpretation to legitimize power, rendering Islam into a comprehensive system that was to counter Western ideologies.

One branch of this Muslim cultural manifestation is of quite some importance. For example, religious fundamentalism, which has to be seen as a reaction to colonial encroachment as well as a demarcation against folk-religious traditions, reevaluating Islam in terms of political ideology, was elaborated upon only during the 1930s.

Its carriers were integrated into the post-colonial system, due to which they adopted and adapted its major terms, giving them an Islamic garb. This normative replacement enabled these Islamic classicists to transcend traditional boundaries and legitimize modern developments within the Islamic semiotics. In this process of reinvention of tradition, code- or identity-switching is most important, providing this political Islam with its particular dynamics.

The latest development in the wake of colonialism is the emigration of large Muslim communities to Europe and North America. The migration pattern follows colonial and historical traditions, that is, Maghrebian Muslims in France, Southeast Asian Muslims in the Netherlands, South Asian Muslims in Britain, and Turkish Muslims in Germany.

See also Fundamentalism; Orientalism.

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*Jamal Malik*

**COMMUNISM**

Both communism and Islam pose solutions to social, moral, economic and political order. Their differences, however, are numerous and fundamental. Communist movements have developed throughout the Islamic world but they have been limited to a narrow social base, and have most often been composed of non-Muslims. Communist groups became deeply involved with debating the Marxist-Leninist theoretical reasons for this failure to obtain mass support. These debates further fragmented most communist movements in the Islamic world. Communism in the Middle East was never a serious contender for power, and the collapse of the Soviet Union further marginalized communism worldwide.

Islamic scholars critiqued communism in several areas. Foremost, communism denies the existence of God. In doing so, it is directly opposed to Islam and Islamic tenets of faith. Further, Islam views history in a different way than does communism. Rather than the communist dialectic, and the movement of history from capitalism to communism, Islam views history as a search for faith and truth. Historical development of society ends when Islam is accepted, not when capitalism is swept away by communism. Finally, in
seeking social justice, Islam does not seek to make all persons equal; it accepts that some will have more than others. Islam achieves social justice through acceptance of the obligation of those with more to provide for those with less, through processes such as zakat (alms giving).

Before the Second World War, communist movements in the Middle East consisted of small groups of intellectuals, drawn to its anticolonial stance. The post-war environment, with Soviet expansionism and the collapse of the colonial powers, was initially considered by most communists as an opportunity to reach the masses. Soviet support to these groups was not automatic. The Cold War saw the Soviet Union faced with often-contradictory policies of supporting communist revolutionary movements and supporting governments aligned with Soviet interests. For instance, support to the Egyptian government under Jamál 'Abd al-Nasser was valuable to Soviet interests, but conflicted with addressing the needs of the Egyptian Communist Party. In other cases, such as Iran, the Soviets provided clandestine support to the communists. Meanwhile, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States formalized its opposition to communist movements in the Middle East. Under this doctrine, the United States intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1958, and formed the Baghdad Pact against Soviet expansionism. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union fully understood the driving forces of the area, as was demonstrated to each in Iran and Afghanistan in the late 1970s.

In Egypt, Palestine, and Lebanon in the 1920s, well-to-do intellectuals founded communist or socialist political groups. After the Second World War, the Syrian Communist Party, which had attracted support from Kurds and other minorities, grew to some importance in the 1950s, but never became a serious contender for power. The Lebanese Communist Party, outlawed until 1970, never gained more than a few thousand members. The Egyptian Communist Party shared the anticolonial views of Nasser, but he banned the party and imprisoned its leaders following his 1952 coup. Since then, communism in Egypt has been represented by a number of peripheral splinter groups.

In Iran, after the First World War, a major communist movement developed in Iran, where contact with Russian communists in Azerbaijan resulted in the formation of the Adalat Party, in 1917. In 1920 this became the Ferqeh-ye Komunist-e Iran. Outlawed in 1929, it was reestablished as the Tudeh Party in 1941. This was outlawed in 1949, but continued to develop underground. Party membership consisted mainly of intellectuals, military officers, and other elites, and its leadership was heavily factionalized. Following the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1953), the Iranian government took firm action against the Tudeh, and decimated the Party. Splinter communist elements continued to be active in Iran through the late 1970s, playing a role in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. These groups were eliminated or driven out of Iran as the clerics consolidated their power.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP, founded in 1934) has played a role out of proportion to its size in Iraqi politics, beginning with its participation in the independence movement against the British. The overthrow of the Hashemite kingdom in 1958 brought the party to national importance. The ICP mobilized a quarter-million demonstrators against a conservative coup attempt in 1959, and had its own armed militia. Its rival, the Ba'ath Party, a secular, socialist movement espousing Arab unity and anticolonialism, immediately was plunged into conflict with the ICP after seizing power in 1963, and quickly outstripped it in influence. In 1974, all opposition parties, including the ICP, were consolidated into the Progressive National Front (PNF), which allowed the Ba'ath to firmly control the opposition movements. From 1978 to 1979, the government arrested and executed many ICP leaders, while others fled the country.

Only one Middle Eastern state, the People’s Republic of Yemen, has had a Marxist government. While a British colony, a violent independence movement developed with Soviet support. Following independence in 1967, the Soviet-funded National Liberation Front, a Marxist group, took and held power. The Front was convulsed by factionalism, and quickly became more ideological and repressive. To divert popular dissent, the Front fought skirmishes with neighboring Oman, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. When the Soviet Union collapsed, South Yemen no longer received Soviet aid, and the long-standing attempt to merge North and South Yemen under a single, noncommunist government, officially succeeded in 1990, although outbreaks of unrest still occur.

The late 1960s saw a resurgence of splinter communist movements among students and intellectuals, as Maoism and Guevarism became popular. These movements had no significant mass appeal, but because of the violent tendencies of the groups, they had some political impact as governments attempted to control them. Some Palestinian groups absorbed these ideologies and their emphasis on violence and revolution. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) all combined Marxist-Leninism with Palestinian nationalism. In most countries, there were no more than a few hundred adherents of these revolutionary communist ideologies, and these were often splintered into several groups with narrow ideological differences.

The model of communist revolt, involving mobilizing the proletariat, failed in the Middle East. Attempts by some communists to adapt their principles to local conditions failed due to the ideological rigidity of communist leadership.
Other factors included the suppression of communist movements by almost all regional governments, ideological in-fighting and factionalism among the communists, and the availability of alternative social and economic structures that satisfied most of the populations. The collapse of the Soviet Union left most communists further isolated from public opinion.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; Ba’th Party; Political Organization; Political Thought; Socialism.

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Richard C. Campany, Jr.

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

In the contemporary period, Islam is frequently depicted as predisposed to conflict and violence. The intractable Middle East conflict and recent events in which Muslim extremists have been implicated in acts of terror have only served to reinforce this widespread perception. To discern the veracity of the assertion that in some way Islam is related to deadly conflict, it is important to situate the discussion within a concrete sociohistorical context. Islam, conflict, and violence do not occur in a social vacuum. Moreover, in order to correctly understand the ethical norms of Islam represented in the Muslim sacred scripture, the Qur’an, and in the exemplary conduct of the prophet Muhammad, it is necessary to analyze the historical milieu within which such norms were negotiated.

When the prophet Muhammad (570–632 C.E.) brought the Qur’an to the Arabs in the early seventh century, pre-Islamic Arabia was steeped in oppressive social relations and caught up in a vicious cycle of violence. Muhammad’s egalitarian message quickly began to threaten the Meccan elite. They opposed his teachings with great vehemence. He was forced to send some of his early followers to seek refuge in Abyssinia and later, in 622 C.E., he himself fled to the nearby city of Medina. Throughout the Meccan period, the early Muslims responded to the mental anguish, physical abuse, and persistent threats to their lives with passive resistance. It was only thirteen years into his prophetic mission that Muhammad and the early Muslims were permitted to engage in armed resistance, but only under certain stringent conditions, as specified in the Qur’an.

Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged. God has indeed the power to succor them: those who have been driven from their homelands against all right for no other reason than their saying, “Our Lord and Sustainer is God! For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries and churches and synagogues and mosques—in which God’s name is abundantly extolled—would surely have been destroyed.” (22:39–40)

It is interesting to note that the above verses give precedence to the protection of monasteries, churches, and synagogues over that of mosques in order to underline their inviolability and the duty of the Muslim to safeguard them against any desecration or abuse, and protect freedom of belief. The aim of fighting according to this critical verse is the defense of not only Islam, but also of religious freedom in general.

In the succeeding decade (622–632 C.E.) Muhammad and his growing band of followers engaged in a series of battles to defend Islam against the military aggression of their adversaries, including the critical battles of Badr, Uhud, and Khandaq. Warfare was a desperate affair in seventh-century Arabia. A chieftain was not expected to display weakness to his enemies in a battle, and some of the Qur’anic injunctions seem to share this spirit (4:90). Because the Qur’an was revealed in the context of deadly conflict, several passages deal with the ethics of warfare. (5:49; 8:61; 11:118–119; 49:9; 49:13). The most contentious of these is the so-called sword verse (ayat al-sayf).

Once the sacred months have passed, you may kill the idolaters when you encounter them, and take them [captive], and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! God is Forgiving, Merciful. (9.5)

Some classical Muslim commentators have construed this verse to imply that Muslims are obligated to fight non-Muslims until they embrace Islam in the case of polytheists, or pay a special tax known as jizya, in the case of Jews and Christians who are referred to as the “people of the book.”

Yet other verses include exhortations to peace: “Thus, if they let you be, and do not make war on you, and offer you
peace, God does not allow you to harm them” (4:90). The Qur’an quotes the Torah, the Jewish scriptures, which permits people to retaliate eye for eye, tooth for tooth, but like the Gospels, the Qur’an suggests that it is meritorious to forgo revenge in a spirit of charity (5:45). Hostilities must be brought to an end as quickly as possible and must cease the minute the enemy sues for peace (2:192–193). The Qur’an, moreover, makes it emphatically clear that conflict can only be successfully ameliorated through the establishment of justice, which transcends sectarian self-interests. (4:135; 7:29)

O Believers! Stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for God, even it is means testifying against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it is against the rich or the poor, for God prevails upon all. Follow not the lusts of your hearts, lest you swerve, and if you distort justice or decline to do justice, verily God knows what you do. (4:135)

The just war is always evil, but sometimes one has to fight in order to avoid the kind of persecution that Mecca inflicted on the Muslims (2:191; 2:217), or to preserve decent values (4:75; 22:40). During his stay in Medina, Muhammad attempted to resolve the conflict with the Meccan leaders and their allies by entering into a peace treaty at a place called al-Hudaybiya. The treaty came to be known as sulh al-Hudaybiya. Sulh is an important term in Islamic law (sbar’ā). The purpose of sulh is to end conflict and hostility among adversaries so that they may conduct their relationships in peace and amity (49:9). The word itself has been used to refer both to the process of restorative justice and peacemaking and to the actual outcome of that process. Even though sulh al-Hudaybiya never actually achieved its aims because the Meccan tribesmen violated its conditions, it remains as an instructive conflict-intervention strategy.

In 630 C.E., the Muslims gained their most significant victory when they captured the city of Mecca, remarkably without bloodshed. This provided Muhammad with a second opportunity to institute a genuine sulh process. In a spirit of magnanimity, he forgave his enemies and enacted a process of reconciliation. A general amnesty was proclaimed in which all tribal claims to vengeance were abolished. Three years later Muhammad died in Medina at the age of sixty-three.

The Qur’anic term most often conflated with that of violence is jihad. The Arabic verb jahada from which the verbal noun jihad is derived literally means “to strive hard, to exert strenuous effort and to struggle.” As a multivalent Islamic concept, it denotes any effort in pursuit of a commendable aim. Jihad is a comprehensive concept embracing peaceful persuasion (16:125) and passive resistance (13:22; 23:96; 41:34), as well as armed struggle against oppression and injustice (2:193; 4:75; 8:39). The Islamic concept of jihad should not be confused with the medieval concept of holy war since the actual word al-barb al-muqaddasa is never used in the Qur’an. In Islam, a war is never holy; it is either justified or not. Moreover, jihad is not directed at other faiths. In a statement in which the Arabic is extremely emphatic, the Qur’an insists, “There must be no coercion in matters of faith!” (2:256). More than this, the protection of freedom of belief and worship for followers of other religions has been made a sacred duty of Muslims. This duty was fixed at the same time when the permission for armed struggle (jihad al-qital) was ordained (22:39–40).

In mystical (Sufi) traditions of Islam the greatest form of jihad, personal jihad, is to purify the soul and refine the disposition. This is regarded as the far more urgent and momentous struggle and it is based on a prophetic tradition (hadith). Muhammad is reported to have advised his companions as they return after a battle, “We are returning from the lesser jihad [physical fighting] to the greater jihad [jihad al-nafs].” Sufis have traditionally understood this greater form of jihad to be the spiritual struggle to discipline the lower impulses and base instincts in human nature. The renowned thirteenth-century Sufi scholar, Jalal al-Din Rumi, articulated such an understanding of jihad when he wrote: “The prophets and saints do not avoid spiritual struggle. The first spiritual struggle they undertake is the killing of the ego and the abandonment of personal wishes and sensual desires. This is the greater jihad” (Chittick, trans., p. 151).

After the demise of the Prophet and the completion of the textual guidance of the Qur’an, Muslims were faced with the challenge of interpreting and applying the Islamic normative principles on conflict and violence to their own peculiar sociohistorical contexts. Subsequent generations of Muslims have interpreted these normative values in such a way as to give Islam a paradoxical role in human history. In the first three centuries of Islam the classical doctrine of jihad was forged by Muslim jurists primarily in response to the imperial politics of the Abbasid caliphate on the one hand and the Byzantine Empire on the other. Abrogating the Meccan experience and predicating itself on selected verses of the Qur’an, one finds the following: “And fight them on until there is no more oppression and tumult (fitnah) and religion should be for God” (2:193). Classical scholars developed a doctrine of jihad in which the world is simply divided into a dichotomy of abodes: the territory of Islam (dar al-islam) and the territory of war (dar al-barb). In accordance with this belligerent paradigm, a permanent state of war (jihad) characterized relations between the two abodes. The only way a non-Muslim territory could avert a jihad was either to convert to Islam or to pay an annual tribute or poll tax (jizyah). The classical belief erroneously perceived of jihad as the instrument of the Islamic caliphate to expand Muslim territories.
Though most Muslim artists refrain from creating representations of the prophet Muhammad and his family, this 1368 Turkish book painting depicts the Prophet, with his face covered by a white cloth, leading his disciples on horseback to Badr to confront the pagan Meccan army. THE ART ARCHIVE/TOPKAPI MUSEUM ISTANBUL/HARPER COLLINS PUBLISHERS
This controversial interpretation of jihad failed to capture the full range of the term’s rich meaning. The reductionist interpretation of jihad, though not unanimous, came to dominate subsequent Muslim juristic thinking. One of the earliest scholars who represented an alternative perspective was Sufyan al-Thawri (b. 715). Al-Thawri believed that jihad was only justified in defense. The classical doctrine of jihad has and continues to be challenged by Muslim jurists. A number of modern Muslim reform movements have employed the classical doctrine of jihad to legitimate their struggles against colonial or postcolonial secular state rule. Other contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Muhammad Abu Zahra, Mahmud Shaltut, Muhammmad al-Ghunaimi, Louay M. Safi, and Ridwan al-Sayyid, have criticized the classical doctrine of jihad as being seriously flawed since it violates some of the essential Islamic principles on the ethics of war. Safi has written objecting to the classical doctrine: “Evidently, the classical doctrine of war and peace has not been predicated on a comprehensive theory. The doctrine describes the factual conditions that historically prevailed between the Islamic state, during the ‘AbydAbassid and Byzantium era, and thus, renders rules which respond to specific historical needs” (Safi, p. 44).

Safi and Al-Sayyid as well as a number of other contemporary scholars hold that the classical doctrine of hegemonic jihad is contingent on a historical context and thus has a limited application. They have argued for a recovery of the alternative interpretation of classical scholars, such as Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, who identified a third option, the territory of peaceful coexistence or (dar-al-sulh or ‘abd). He had in mind the long-standing cordial relationship that had existed between the early Muslims and the Abyssinian Christian state. He recalled that the prophet Muhammad himself had sent the earliest group of his followers from Mecca to seek refuge from persecution in Abyssinia. They lived there peacefully for many years, and some of them did not return, even after Muslims were in power in Mecca. Moreover, the Prophet had advised peaceful coexistence with the Abyssinians, reportedly saying: “Leave the Abyssinians in peace as long as they leave you in peace.” Safi contends that the fact that the early Muslims did not make any attempts to turn Abyssinia into an Islamic state is sufficient evidence that a third way, the “Abyssinian paradigm,” was an Islamically sanctioned alternative.

The alternative paradigm represented by the Abyssinian model was marginalized and ignored by the partisan interpretations of the classical Muslim jurists. Contemporary Muslims are currently reclaiming this third paradigm of peaceful coexistence. Others called on contemporary Muslims to reclaim the rich Sufi tradition on conflict transformation by relinking the lesser jihad to that of the greater jihad (p. 108). Both have profound implications for expanding Muslim resources for conflict transformation and peace-building efforts.

A candid photograph appears in the color insert.

See also Fitna; ‘Ibadat; Jihad; Political Islam.

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A. Rashied Omar

CONVERSION

In Islam conversion consists of the recitation of the shahada or profession of faith which is composed of two affirmations from the Qur’an that have been integrated to form a single declaration of faith in the uniqueness and oneness of God and the finality of His revelation to the prophet Muhammad. It reads “There is no god but God [Allah, the Arabic proper name for God used by both Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians], and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.” The Qur’an uses the terms “The Messenger of God” and “The Prophet” synonymously to refer to Muhammad, who is implicitly declared to be the last of God’s genuine prophets.

Some Muslim scholars, among them the renowned Persian mystic, philosopher, and theologian al-Ghazali (1058–1111 c.e.), are of the opinion that a declaration of intent (niya), made prior to the recitation of the shahada, is necessary for its validity and for the validity of such ritual acts as prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. On the other hand many Muslim lawyers are persuaded that niya is only necessary for the validity of prayer (salat).

In early Islam conversion was not a condition for membership of the umma or Muslim community. Prior to the surrender of Mecca in 629 c.e. the Jews of Medina had the same
rights and obligations as other members of the umma. After the fall of Mecca to Muhammad the zakat (alms tax) was levied on converts to Islam, benevolence being one of the chief virtues of the true believer, and the jizya (a personal poll-tax to be paid, where possible, in money) was imposed on all non-Muslims (with the exception of certain categories of persons including women, the poor, the enslaved, and impoverished monks) who wanted to join the umma.

Jihad and Conversion

While the spread of Islam is a religious duty, the Qur'an also instructs believers that there should be no compulsion in matters of religion (2:256), thus seemingly ruling out coercion as a means of conversion. There are many scholars of Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim, who are persuaded, largely on the basis of this text, that the obligation to perform jihad of the sword (al-jihad bi-il-sayf)—sometimes described as the lesser form of jihad, in contrast to jihad bi-il-nafi or moral and spiritual jihad, as the greater form—is only legitimate where the free practice of Islam is impeded.

Where jihad of the sword is contemplated there is the obligation of the summons, da'wa, which is based on Qur'an 17:15 and 16:25. The summons is meant to inform those to be attacked that Islam does not intend to pursue war for material gain such as property but for the purpose of defending or strengthening Islam. There are differences of opinion between the four principal Sunni schools of law (madhab) on the necessity of da'wa for people who have previously been summoned to Islam. The Malikites believe it to be obligatory in this case also, the Hanafites recommend it, and the Shafites and Hanbalites say it is a matter of indifference.

Islam has rarely spread, in the sense of converting large numbers of non-Muslims of a territory, through jihad of the sword. The fundamentalist eighteenth-century reform movement in Arabia, the Wahhabiyya, as it is called by its opponents and by Europeans—the members referred to themselves as the Muwahiddun or Unitarians—was essentially a reform movement, not a drive to convert non-Muslims. Where and when jihad of the sword has been used its effect has usually been to establish a Muslim as the ruler of a territory, an outcome that was by no means always followed by large-scale attempts to convert the local population. A partial explanation for this can be found in Islamic political theory according to which the imposition of Muslim rule over a territory is sufficient to make that territory part of dar al-islam (the abode of Islam). The principal carriers of Islam have been holy men, jurists, traders, and, in the case of the spread of Islam to the Western world in modern times, economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

In the time of the prophet Muhammad, conversion by conquest and political submission was basically limited to two societies, the Bedouins of Arabia and the Berbers of the Maghrib. After the prophet Muhammad's death in 632 C.E. the military conquest of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt was swift but did not account for the conversion of most of the population of these regions. This was to come about through a process of acculturation as the local people moved from the rural areas to the garrison towns (amsar) such as Qayrawan (Maghrib), Kufa (Iraq), and Basra (Iraq), as traders, craftsmen, laborers, and domestics who over time adopted the Arabic language and Islam.

Trade, Commerce, Sufism/Mysticism, and Conversion

The image non-Muslims in many parts of the world have had and continue to have of Islam is that of a progressive, modern religion offering literacy, a widely spoken language, numeracy, and the opportunity to participate in a wider commercial, political, and trading network. Islam often spread very slowly and even laboriously, its own progress greatly affected by the changing local economic, political, and religious situation in which it found itself. Islam’s development in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago is a case in point. Archaeology tells us that by the late eleventh century there was a Muslim presence in Indonesia, and it would not be surprising given the commercial attraction of the archipelago and its role as a natural staging post between the Middle East and India on one side and China, where there has been a Muslim presence in the South from the ninth century, if Islam did not in fact arrive even earlier. According to Marco Polo who visited North Sumatra in 1292 the kingdom of Ferlak (Perlak) in present-day Aceh was already Muslim. If the process of expansion was slow it was also peaceful. Only in the fourteenth century did Islam spread to Northeast Malaya and Brunei, to the court of east Java, and to the southern Philippines. And it was to take another two hundred years before it found its way in to other parts of the archipelago when Sufism or mysticism (tasawwuf), in institutionalized and noninstitutionalized forms, came to play a pivotal role in the widespread dissemination of Islam among the people of Java and elsewhere. According to tradition Islam was brought to Java by nine saints or walis, and over a long period of four hundred years more gradually penetrated the society at all levels, never, however, displacing entirely other religious traditions.

The importance of Sufism in the conversion of large numbers to Islam elsewhere can hardly be exaggerated. The conversion of Bengal, like that of Java, is also attributed to Sufis. Institutionalized forms of Sufism and principally the Sufi tariqas or brotherhoods, among them the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, and Sanusiyya orders, were crucial to the expansion of Islam in North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara, as were the Mevlevi and Bektashi Sufi brotherhoods in Anatolia.

The indispensable role performed by traders, scholars, and holy men in laying the foundations of Islam is evident almost everywhere from the medieval empires of Takrur,
Ghana, Mali, Kanem Bornu, and Songhay, to the Nile Valley, the Horn, and the East African coast, and across much of the Asian sub-continent, Central Asia, and as far as China. In all of these regions Islam first arrived with traders who were often clerics or were accompanied by clerics and/or holy men. We know from a variety of sources including the travel writings of the fourteenth-century Moroccan Ibn Battuta (1304–1366/77 C.E.) that the first Muslims in ancient Ghana, Mali, China, Indonesia, Somalia, and elsewhere lived separately and followed their own way of life, making little or no attempt to convert others. In places this period of seclusion was followed by one of engagement with the wider society that usually resulted in mixing or syncretism, a development that gave rise to conservative reaction, sometimes in the form of jihad of the sword.

**Exile, Slavery, Economic Migration, and Conversion**

Political exiles, convicts, and slaves have also been important vehicles for the dissemination of Islam as in the case of South Africa, where such people began to arrive from Southeast Asia in the mid-seventeenth century and formed the Cape Malay Muslim community. From the mid-nineteenth century Muslims arrived from India to form another distinct Islamic community, some coming as British-indentured labor to work on the sugar plantations, others as merchants and traders, and others as hawkers.

Economic migration has been the main vehicle for the spread of Islam to the Western world in modern times. No more than an exotic appendage to western European religion in the mid-twentieth century, largely through migration, the Muslim faith has become increasingly familiar across the European Union, and comprises an estimated fifteen million members, including relatively large numbers of converts from Christianity and other faiths. While there are no reliable statistics, the number of Muslims in North America would appear to be over four million and the number of mosques to serve them about two thousand.

**The Political, Cultural, and Religious Consequences of Conversion**

Thus, in the spread and development of Islam, military conquest has never been as important or effective as the creation of an Islamic environment, educational system, trading networks, and generally the building up of Muslim institutions. It was these initiatives that facilitated the development of Islam in Iran over several centuries from a small community of mainly Arab Muslims to one that included the majority of the population by the early years of the eleventh century. Sometimes conversion was an individual affair, sometimes it was collective in the sense that if the leader of a community or ethnic group converted the rest of the people would follow.

This notwithstanding, it is worth noting that the establishment of Muslim rule in a territory, whether by conquest or by peaceful means, did not necessarily constitute a challenge to the existing political order nor was it necessarily the prelude to a campaign by the new government to convert all of the inhabitants of that territory to Islam. Where jihad of the sword has been employed it needs to be remembered that the primary objective has not always been expansion but the reform of the Muslim community, as in the case of the Wahhabiyya movement and as was most likely the case with the Sokoto jihad in northern Nigeria in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

Examples abound where Muslim rule led to little or no immediate change for the majority of the population under it. In Egypt, Coptic Christians were given governmental posts until the fourteenth century when pressure from the ulama (scholars) forced a change. While the Muslim conquest of India eliminated the dominant Hindu political-military class, the Chhatari, it confirmed the privileged status of the Brahmins who remained the guardians of a cultural vision that was non-Muslim. Even at the height of its power the Muslim community consisted of only a quarter of the population of Delhi and Agra. And the Muslim conquest of Iran and the surrounding regions initially favored the spread of other faiths, among them Nestorianism and Manichaeism, rather than Islam. In Java the introduction of Islam offered a new dimension to existing traditional, Buddhist, and Hindu religious beliefs and practices, bringing few significant changes to the political life of society.

Where Muslims conquer non-Muslim territory Muslim canon law (shari‘a) guarantees to protect the life, liberty, and, in a modified way, the property of that section of the local population that has not been captured in arms. These people are known as abl-al-dhimma (people of the covenant) or simply as dhimmis. All free adults who enjoy dhimmi status must pay the above-mentioned jizya or poll-tax and pay a tax (khbaraj) on their real estate, over which they no longer enjoy the right of disposal. Strictly speaking, the status of dhimmis is open only to “people of scripture” (ahl-al-kitab), that is, Jews, Christians, and Sabaeans, a category that is interpreted to cover Zoroastrians. In practice most Muslim countries will tolerate all peoples regardless of whether they are “people of scripture” or not.

Where dhimmis status was granted it carried with it the obligation to contribute toward the maintenance of Muslim armies, to dress differently from Muslims, and to renounce such rights as the right to bear arms and to ride on horseback. Legal restrictions were also imposed in relation to testimony in law courts, protection under criminal law, and marriage. Apart from such restrictions, what in practice happens is that a non-Muslim community in a Muslim state virtually governs itself under its own responsible leader who acts as its link with the Muslim government. And where conversion to or from Islam is concerned it is expected that the leadership of the
community that has made the conversion will inform its counterpart of the event.

Conclusions
This account of the dynamics of conversion to Islam confines itself for the most part to the Muslim world. It is not exhaustive nor could it be given the great complexity and cultural diversity of that world. Appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not intentionally reductionist. If greater consideration has been given to what might be termed the human, material, observable aspects of the phenomenon of conversion, and little has been said of its intellectual, spiritual, and theological dimensions, this should not be taken to mean that these dimensions are not more important elements of the process of becoming a Muslim or being Muslim.

Conversion in Islam is a radical call to reject all that associates the human with the divine, and on this foundation engages the convert in the task of personal and social transformation. It is a dynamic and multifaceted process of transformation that in some cases is gradual and in others abrupt; in some cases total, in others partial.

The path to Islam is more varied than outlined above. As students of conversion to Islam are aware individuals and whole communities have come to Islam having been first influenced by the personal example of a practicing Muslim, or through a process of intellectual conversion in which scholarly literature has played an important part, or through guidance given in a dream or a vision in which a wali or holy person, and even the prophet Muhammad himself, have appeared as counselors and guides, through mystical experiences, as a result of a search for healing, protection, and security, and for order and discipline in one’s life. Either all or a combination of these triggers, and others, have activated the interest of individuals and communities in Islam and led to conversion.

See also Da’wa; Expansion; Minorities: Dhimmis; Tasawwuf.

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Peter B. Clarke

CRUSADES
Both the word “crusades” and its Arabic equivalent, al-hurub al-salibiyah, are modern terms. What these words refer to, however, can be quite different depending on who is using them. The dominant trend in secular academic research on the Crusades since the 1970s has been one of expansion of the topic in terms of activities and military campaigns included, of time span, and of geographic expanse. Despite this revisionism, there is little doubt that in the popular parlance of nonspecialists, the Crusades refers to the almost two-century-long presence (1097–1291 C.E.) of Latin Christians from central and western Europe in the Holy Land of the eastern Mediterranean coastal strip. Thus, while events after 1291—such as the Christian reconquest of Spain, campaigns against heretics in or on the borders of Latin Christendom, or the European conflicts with the Ottoman Empire—are now within the domain of current scholarship on the Crusades (particularly in Europe), they do not figure large in the discourse of the Crusades ongoing in the contemporary population of the Holy Land.

Overview of the Crusades
At the Council of Clermont in 1095, Pope Urban II delivered a sermon that set in motion the Crusades. Precisely what he said is unknown, nor is there agreement as to his motivations and goals, but in the aftermath of Clermont, clergy, nobles, and commoners mobilized for campaigns to reconquer Jerusalem, which had been in Muslim hands since 638 C.E. While what comes next follows the common shorthand of referring to major Crusade campaigns by numbers, it should be emphasized that this practice does not take into account the steady stream of armed pilgrims flowing into and out of the Holy Land nor the numerous smaller military campaigns that they undertook.

The First Crusade (1097–1101) resulted in the establishment of four Crusader states in lands of the eastern Mediterranean littoral: the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli (although the city itself was not captured until 1109), and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In light of the obstacles these first crusaders faced in their long journey east—shortages of supplies, uneasy relations with the Byzantine Empire, travel across rough and unfamiliar terrain inhabited by hostile populations, lack of organization, and internal rivalries, to name but a few—this initial success was remarkable. Indeed, the First Crusade almost ended at Antioch between 1097 and 1098, where the Crusaders first laid siege to the Muslims for several trying months, and upon victory were subsequently besieged themselves by numerically superior forces.

This Crusader victory is usually linked to the disunited opposition they faced. In the late eleventh century C.E., there
was no single powerful Muslim state to oppose the invasion of the ifranj (Franks), as the Muslims called the invaders. In many cities of the Seljuk confederation, military authorities known as atabegs were busy establishing their autonomy, and were often preoccupied by rivalries with other local Muslim rulers. The Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad was unable to directly influence military affairs. The Shi’ite Fatimid caliphate in Cairo, itself engaged in a struggle against the Seljuks for control of Jerusalem, did comparatively little to counter the Crusader incursion. In the words of the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir: “When the Franks—may God curse them—extended their control over what they had conquered of the lands of Islam, and it turned out well for them that the troops and the kings of Islam were preoccupied with fighting each other, at that time opinions were divided among the Muslims, desires differed and wealth was squandered” (Hillenbrand, 31). Over the next four decades the Crusaders entrenched themselves in the landscape of Outremer (literally, “across-the-sea”), skirmished with the Muslims, and began the construction of numerous castles, made necessary by their constant shortage of manpower.

The first major success of the Muslim counter-Crusade was achieved by the Turkish military leader Zangi, the atabeg of Mosul and Aleppo. After consolidating his control over northern Syria and the Jazira (northwestern Iraq), he launched a series of campaigns against the Crusaders, culminating in his capture of Edessa in 1144. Zangi’s elimination of this Crusader state gave added impetus to calls in Europe for another major Crusade. Forces of the Second Crusade subsequently arrived in Syria in 1147, and after heated discussion between the resident Crusaders and the new arrivals, decided to attack Damascus, ironically one of the Muslim cities whose ruler up to that point had coexisted with the Franks. This campaign ended in defeat for the Crusaders on the outskirts of Damascus in July 1148.

Zangi’s career as a counter-Crusader was cut short by his assassination in 1146, but was continued by his son Nur al-Din. Nur al-Din expanded the area under his control, occupying Damascus in 1154, and, utilizing the vocabulary of jihad, he launched attacks against the Franks. In response to numerous Crusader sorties against Egypt in the 1160s, Nur al-Din sent a contingent of his forces to aid the Fatimid state. This force was led by the Kurdish general Shirkuh, who had in his service his nephew Salah al-Din Yusuf b. Ayyub, subsequently known as Saladin to the Crusaders. Upon his uncle’s death, Saladin took command of this force, and by March 1169, took control of Egypt, subsequently bringing the Fatimid Caliphate to an end. Following the death of Nur al-Din in 1174, Saladin moved against his former overlord’s heirs and brought Damascus and eventually most of Syria (Aleppo submitted in 1183) and the Jazira (Mosul submitted in 1186) under his control. He then mounted a major campaign against the Franks, defeating the bulk of their forces at the battle of the Horns of Hattin near Tiberias on 4 July 1187. Jerusalem fell to him by October of that year, and the Crusader holdings were reduced to a few castles and coastal cities.

These victories made Saladin a hero. A contemporary poet wrote of him,

You took possession of Paradises palace by palace,
When you conquered Syria fortress by fortress.

Indeed, the religion of Islam has spread its blessings over created beings,

But it is you who have glorified it. (Hillenbrand 1999, p. 179)

The defeat of the Latin forces also sparked the Third Crusade (1189–1192), in which three European monarchs were personally involved: the German emperor Frederick I, King Philip II of France, and King Richard I (the Lionheart) of England. Frederick drowned in Anatolia on his way to Outremer, and Philip and Richard quarreled from the moment of their arrival in the Latin East. Nevertheless, their combined forces helped recapture Acre, henceforth the capital of the truncated Kingdom of Jerusalem. After Philip’s return to France, Richard led a series of campaigns against Saladin and, by his departure in 1192, had aided in the reestablishment of Latin control over most of the coastal cities and their immediate hinterlands.

Saladin’s death in 1193 provided a temporary respite to the Crusaders, as his successors (collectively known as the Ayyubids, from the name of Saladin’s father) engaged in struggles over preeminence in the lands that had been united by Saladin. In these struggles, some Ayyubid princes were not adverse to making temporary alliances with the Franks against their Ayyubid rivals. The diversion of the Fourth Crusade (1204) to Constantinople, which was sacked and subsequently occupied, did little to change this situation in Outremer. These divisions among the Ayyubids contributed to the complex narrative of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1229). Recognizing the strategic importance of Egypt, this crusade began with the Franks besieging and eventually occupying the Egyptian port city of Damietta. In the face of intra-Ayyubid rivalries, the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt, al-Malik al-Kamil, offered to give Jerusalem to the Franks if they would leave Egypt, but the Crusaders refused. By 1221, the Crusaders were forced out of Egypt. The Fifth Crusade came to an end in the bizarre events of 1228–1229, in which the emperor Frederick II, excommunicated for his delays in fulfilling his crusading vows, successfully negotiated a treaty with al-Malik al-Kamil allowing the Christians to take control of certain
sites in Jerusalem, yet was bombarded with offal by the residents of Acre as he left to return to Europe. The last Crusader presence in Jerusalem was eliminated in 1244, when the city was sacked by Kharazmian warriors, themselves displaced from their homelands by the Mongol invasions from Central Asia.

The final major crusade to the Latin East was that of King Louis IX of France (1248–1254). Louis and his forces succeeded in capturing Damietta in 1249, but were subsequently defeated at Mansura in 1250 by the forces of the late Ayyubid ruler of Egypt, al-Malik al-Salih. Upon surrender and payment of a large ransom, Louis went to Acre, where he spent four years strengthening fortifications before returning to France.

To understand the end of the Crusader presence in Outremer, one must return to events of 1249–1250. During the course of Louis’s Crusade in late 1249, the Ayyubid al-Malik al-Salih died. When his son Turanshah arrived from Syria in early 1250 to succeed his father, he took steps to limit the influence of key groups among his father’s supporters.
The main target of Turanshah’s punitive actions was the corps of his father’s mamluks, or military slaves. In his struggles against his Ayyubid rivals, al-Malik al-Salih had built up a sizable regiment of these military slaves, who while still youths had been purchased as slaves from regions outside the Islamic world and subsequently converted to Islam and trained in military techniques. His regiment was known as the Bahri mamluks, since their barracks were located on an island in the river (bahr) Nile. Faced with loss of influence and possibly life, these mamluks of al-Malik al-Salih turned against Turanshah, and murdered him shortly after the victory of Mansura.

After this regicide, the history of the subsequent decade of the history of Muslim Egypt and Syria is dominated by a complex struggle for power, further complicated by the Mongol invasions. The decade ended with the definitive establishment of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1260 by Baybars, one of those Bahri mamluks. After consolidating Mamluk control, Sultan Baybars launched his forces against the Crusaders, capturing Antioch (in 1268) and several major Crusader castles. After Baybars’ death in 1277 there was a brief lull, but attacks against the Crusaders resumed later in the reign of the Sultan Qalawun, who conquered Tripoli shortly before his death in 1289. Upon the capture of Acre in 1291 by the forces of Qalawun’s son, al-Ashraf Khalil, the few Crusaders left on the coastal strip abandoned their holdings and fled, thus bringing Frankish presence in Outremer to an end, although no one at the time realized it. In order to discourage Crusader attempts to reoccupy the Muslim coastal cities, the Mamluks razed their fortifications.

The Crusades in the Muslim World Today
A survey of scholarly literature and public discourse in the modern Muslim world reveals that the Crusades have great relevance and resonance today. They are commonly seen as the forerunner of the European colonial efforts of the first half of the twentieth century, placed in the context of perceived centuries of Western antagonism to the Islamic world, and often explicitly linked to the establishment of the modern state of Israel. (Crusade references appeared, for example, in a series of post-1956 Suez crisis Egyptian postage stamps celebrating Egypt as “Tomb of the Invader.” One stamp celebrates Saladin’s victory at Hattin; a second shows Louis IX in chains after his defeat at Mansura.) It is not uncommon to find references to Saladin and his victory at Hattin in political speeches or celebrated in books. In 1992, a larger-than-life statue of Saladin was unveiled in Damascus. The Crusades also figure in some modern Islamist writing, in which the failures of current leaders to resist Western incursions are compared to the successes of the heroes of the counter-Crusades. And while Hillenbrand (and others) have pointed out the pitfalls of the anachronistic use of nationalistic labels in the study of medieval history, the symbols and perceived lessons of the Crusades have been incorporated into the rhetoric of Arab nationalist movements in particular. Thus in the words of one Arab intellectual, the Crusades when viewed through Arab eyes are seen as an act of rape (Maalouf, 266).

See also Christianity and Islam; Saladin.

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*Warren C. Schultz*

**CUSTOM** See ‘Ada**
DAR AL-HARB

The term *dar al-barb*, which literally means “the house or abode of war,” came to signify in classical jurisprudence a geopolitical reality; hence, it may also be rendered the “territory” of war.

In the most basic sense the term indicates territory not governed by Islam, in contrast to territory under Islamic rule, *dar al-islam*. More precisely, these territories are geopolitical units within which Islam is not the established religion, where the ruler is not a Muslim, and where there exists no mechanism by which political or military leaders may seek the counsel of Islamic religious specialists. Use of the phrase *dar al-harb* further indicates the threat of war from the Muslim community. Muslim jurists differed on the mechanisms by which this threat of war could become a reality. For the majority, the leader of the Muslims must fulfill the obligation of “calling” the people of a non-Islamic territory to Islam. Once a people, through its rulers, refused the opportunity (1) to establish Islam as the state religion, or (2) to enter into a tributary arrangement with the leader of the Muslims, it was understood that war could follow. In accord with normative traditions, this war should be understood as an aspect of jihad, or the struggle to “make God’s cause succeed,” specifically by spreading Islamic government throughout the earth. It is important to note that the purpose of the war to expand the territory of Islam was not to make converts, but rather to establish Islamic government.

In modern times, the notion of *dar al-barb* has been employed by some Muslims to speak about territories lost to the forces of colonialism or, more generally, secularism. In this connection, the ruling of the Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1824) regarding the status of British India is of great interest. As he had it, given British dominance in the subcontinent, India should no longer be considered Islamic territory. It was rather part of *dar al-barb*. Mirroring subsequent discussions in Islamic political and juridical thought, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s followers drew differing conclusions from his ruling, some believing that cooperation with the British, particularly in the field of education, was a necessary prelude to a renewal of Islam and its cultural influence. Others were more inclined toward direct action with the goal of British withdrawal.

See also Dar al-Islam.

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John Kelsay

DAR AL-ISLAM

The term *dar al-islam*, which literally means “the house or abode of Islam,” came to signify Islamic territory in juridical discussions. For the majority, it is thus suggestive of a geopolitical unit, in which Islam is established as the religion of the state, in contrast to *dar al-barb*, territory not governed by Islam. The signs of legitimacy by which one could speak of a geopolitical unit as *dar al-islam* would include a ruler or ruling class whose self-identity is Islamic, some institutional mechanisms by which consultation between the political and religious elite is possible, and a commitment to engage in political and military struggle to extend the borders of the *dar al-islam*.

For others, the relationship between *dar al-islam* and existing political arrangements was not so easily negotiated. Thus, in one tradition the proto-Shi’a leader Ja’far al-Sadiq (d. 765) is presented as suggesting that the territory of Islam exists wherever people are free to practice Islam and to engage in calling others to faith—even if the leadership in such a place does not acknowledge or establish Islam as the
state religion. Correlatively, a territory in which the ruler or ruling class identifies with Islam, but where the (true) interpretation of Islamic sources is suppressed, is not dar al-islam, but something else.

In the modern period, one of the most vexing questions for jurists, and indeed for Muslims generally, has to do with the ongoing power of the symbol of dar al-islam. The experience of colonialism, the demise of the historic caliphate, and the formation of modern states present serious challenges to those who would follow classical precedent and utilize this symbol. One line of thought, expressed most succinctly by Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1824), held that the influx of British power meant that India was no longer dar al-islam. As such, the Muslim community was under an obligation to struggle and bring about the restoration of Islamic influence. Others, by contrast, understood the classical use of the term as connected with an outmoded and even non-Islamic emphasis on empire. For these, in ways analogous to the thinking of Ja’far al-Sadiq, Islam “abides” wherever Muslims practice their religion and call others to faith.

See also Dar al-Harb.

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DA'WA

Since the late nineteenth century, conceptions of da'wa have re-emerged as central in the formulation of Islam. Da'wa is increasingly associated with socially vital activities, such as edification, education, conversion, and charity. However, the term also alludes to the Qur'an and the normative Islamic history. Due to this combination, da'wa has become a functional tool in face of the challenges of modernity. Da'wa is sometimes equated with Christian ideas of mission and evangelization. Muslims themselves are, as a rule, wary of that comparison; and indeed, such translations tend to overlook the variations and socio-political specificity of da'wa. This term has been conceptualized, institutionalized, and applied for divergent purposes throughout the course of history. Furthermore, Muslim endeavors to convert non-Muslims to Islam have often been understood in terms other than da'wa. This is true, for instance, of the significant Sufi ventures of recruitment, which historically largely appear to have been disinterested in da'wa terminology. Thus, da'wa should be regarded as but one type of Islamic discourse of mobilization, sometimes in conflict with others.

This entry introduces the range of conceptions of da'wa, paying attention to scriptural occurrence, historical development, and, finally, modern understandings and organizations.

Scriptural Occurrence

The word da'wa is derived from an Arabic consonant-root, d-‘-w, with several meanings, such as call, invite, persuade, pray, invoke, bless, demand, and achieve. Consequently, the noun da'wa has a number of connotations too. In the Qur'an and the sunna, da'wa partly has a mundane meaning and refers to, for instance, the invitation to a wedding. Sometimes the mundane and spiritual meanings are interconnected. In one account of the sunna (Bukhari), the invitation to Islam is allegorically referred to as an invitation to a banquet. Spelled with a long final vowel, the word means lawsuit.

Theologically, da'wa refers to the call of God to Islam, conveyed by the prophets: “God summons to the Abode of Peace” (10:25). Like the previous prophets, Muhammad is referred to as “God’s caller” or “God’s inviter,” da'i Allah (46:31). God’s call has to be distinguished from the false da'wa of Satan (14:22). Conversely, da'wa refers to the human call directed to God in (mental) prayer or invocation. The One God answers the da'wa directed to Him, whereas the prayers of the unbelievers are futile. The human da'wa is the affirmative response to the da'wa of God. It is not to be confused with salat, ritual prayer. When referring to human prayer or invocation, the Qur'an makes no distinction between da'wa and d'wa, a related form of the same consonant-root. During the course of theological history, however, the term d'wa evolved into a particular, technical concept, described and regulated in philosophical and devotional works, not least in handbooks of prayer.

Apart from affirming God’s call in prayer, however, humankind is invited to live in accordance with the will of God: “Let there be one nation (umma) of you, calling to the good, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong” (3:104). Thus da'wa is intimately interconnected with shari’ah, the sacred law. As illustrated by verse 3:104, cited above, da'wa also has a social dimension in the Qur’an. The community of believers, the umma, who have received the invitation, shall convey the message to others. A commonly cited verse reads: “Call men to the way of the Lord with goodness and fair exhortation and have arguments with them in the best manner” (16:125). This verse, in turn, is commonly connected to the equally familiar verse: “Let there be no compulsion in religion” (2:256). Finally, there is an eschatological dimension of da'wa. At the end of time, the archangel Jibril (Gabriel) will call humans from their graves: “Then when He calls you by a single call from the earth, behold you come forth at once” (30:25).

All in all, the Qur’anic conceptualizations of da'wa conjoin a number of fundamental principles of Islamic theology. First of all, da'wa animates Islamic doctrine into an effective
vocation, by interconnecting and urging humans to recognize the two core principles of the creed, as rendered in the *sahabada*: “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” Acknowledging and responding to God’s *da’wa* further means recognizing the sacredness of the *ummah* and implementing *shari’ah*. Last but not least, *da’wa* refers to the invitation of humankind to afterlife. It is, thus, hardly surprising that *da’wa* sometimes is presented as interchangeable with the concept of Islam itself.

### Historical Development

After the death of Muhammad (632 C.E.), the leadership of the Muslim community became a controversial issue. A group called Shi’at ‘Ali, later to be known as Shi’a, argued that ‘Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, and his descendants were the rightful caliphs, that is, vicegerents of the Prophet. ‘Ali was eventually appointed caliph, and he is included as the fourth among the four caliphs who Sunnis generally celebrated as righteouse. In 661 he was killed, however, and the Umayyad dynasty, based in Damascus, established a hereditary rule. During the eighth century, the legitimacy of the Umayyads was increasingly put into question. Based in Baghdad, the Abbasids were accusing them for claiming kingship, *mulk*, thus vesting human leadership with an attribute and power that only God possesses. The lavish customs of the Damascus court underscored the anti-Umayyad *da’wa*.

In this sense, *da’wa* came to inherit a religio-political dimension, being the call to accept the rightful leadership of a certain individual or family. *Da’wa* in the religio-political sense aimed at establishing or restoring the ideal theocratic state, based on monotheism. Here *da’wa* can be understood as political propaganda inflated by Qur’anic terminology. In spite of variations in the use of the term throughout history, this has been a recurring tendency.

*Da’wa* thus became mainly an internal Muslim matter. However, the external aspect of *da’wa*, “calling mankind,” acquired increasing juridical importance in connection with the military expansion of Islam. According to the classical theory of jihad of the early Muslim conquests, warfare against non-Muslims could not be undertaken, nor could the protective tax of non-Muslims, *jizya*, be levied, had not a summons to Islam, *da’wa*, been issued. During the late eighth century four madhabahs (*madhhab*), schools of Sunni law (*fiqh*), developed. Here *da’wa* was formalized into a set of judicial principles and rules included in martial law.

An important example of the application of *da’wa* in history is the case of the Shi’ite Fatimids. Between 969 and 1171 they ruled a vast empire, with Cairo as the capital. For the Fatimids, who belong to the Isma’ili branch of Shi’a, *da’wa* meant the appeal to give allegiance to the seventh imam, Muhammad b. Isma’il. Initially, their propaganda was directed against followers of the main branch of Shi’a, the Imamis or Twelvers. As their power grew, the Fatimid *da’wa* turned against the Abbasid Sunnites, challenging their caliphal authority.

The Fatimids amplified the concept of *da’wa* in accordance with Shi’ite doctrines of permanent revelation through the imams. The *da’wa* of the imam was held to complete the *da’wa* of the prophet Muhammad. The Fatimid *da’wa* differed from the Abbasid *da’wa* in that it did not cease after the establishment of the dynasty. Rather, it became increasingly organized and extensive. *Da’wa* was thus institutionalized, integrating political claims with theological elaboration, centered around several educational institutions, most notably the al-Azhar University of Cairo. In areas controlled by the Fatimids, their *da’wa* propaganda was overt, while the message was transmitted more secretly in other regions.

In a functional perspective, the core of the Fatimid use of *da’wa* was similar to that of the Sunni Abbasids. The amplification of *da’wa* among these competing groups involved an understanding of political propaganda and aspirations based on theological criticism against other rulers. In both cases, thus, the core concern was the leadership issue. The Qur’anic term *da’wa* was rendered relevant primarily in the context of claims to political power. The Fatimid idea that propagation and acceptance of Islam should not be regarded as a singular event, but as a continuous process, forebears central themes in modern uses of *da’wa*.

From the time of the Fatimids to early modern times, that is the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there are surprisingly few references to the concept of *da’wa*. Paradoxically, *da’wa* discourses seem to have entered a phase of recession despite the significant expansion of Islam that occurred in both Asia and Africa. Two of the reasons for this recession may be the legal formalism and the development of Sufism. While the Abbasid and Fatimid regimes relied on an Islamic ambience in which *da’wa* held a politically central and strategic importance, Sufis were able to spread their message without such an ambience. Authority was vested in their leaders or shaykhs, who were often victims of state-centered persecution. Such a model of authority facilitated the transplantation of Islam to new regions, where mass conversions could take place. It is true that, with the exception of the earliest period, when Sufis were largely individualistic and ascetic, Sufism has frequently been politically important. However, the logic of Sufi expansion has usually been essentially different from state-centered or establishment Islam and, as a consequence, not in need of conceptions of *da’wa* in the religio-political sense.

Since *da’wa* as early as in the eighth century was a formal concept included in martial law, it became part of the Islamic jurisprudence, *fiqh*. From the tenth century onward, Sunni leaders held the apparatus of *fiqh* as finalized. Thus, the gates of *ijtihad*, (new interpretations based on the main sources of Islamic law), the Qur’an, and the sunna, were regarded by many jurists as closed. Legal matters were henceforth to be
guided by taqlid, imitation of previous rulings. With the rise of taqlid-oriented fiqh, the learned scholars, ulema and fiqaha, were installed as its lawful, if largely impotent, administrators. When the quest for authority through personal interpretation (ijtihad) and opinion (fatwa) was rendered impossible or at least heavily curtailed, there was little or no need for da'wa discourse. In this sense, the authority of institutional law appears to have contributed to circumventing the centrality of the concept of da'wa, which was primarily understood in terms of the connection between religious legitimacy and political power.

It should be noted, finally, that at least one example of da'wa activity since Fatimid times has been recorded by scholars, namely a correspondence between the rulers of the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires during the early sixteenth century. This controversy over religio-political authority carries many similarities with the struggle between Abbasids and Fatimids. There may well have been others too. Thus, one cannot rule out scholarly omission or lack of interest as partly responsible for the silence of da'wa after the early centuries of Islam.

**Modern Times**

European colonialism and Christian mission brought Muslims into intense encounters with non-Muslim ideas and practices. The processes of modernity (secularization, individualism, social reorganization, etc.) increasingly transformed Muslim societies. Technological, educational, and infrastructural changes made a lasting impact, and deeply rooted Islamic ideas and ways of life were put into question. Facing such challenges, many Muslims felt a need to reconsider or defend Islam, as well as to inform non-Muslims about Islamic principles and creeds. In this context, partly novel conceptualizations of da'wa claimed a core position in the Islamic debates and practices.

A precursor for the modern use of da'wa was the Ottoman sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, who ruled between 1876 and 1909. Claiming the title of caliph, he took on the responsibility for the umma. He included the concept of da'wa in his “imperial ideology” and intended to lead Muslims like the Pope leads the Catholics. Hence, this is an example of a modern use of da'wa discourse for the sake of religio-political authority.

Of more lasting impact with regard to the rethinking of da'wa was the Salafiyah movement, the leading figures of which were Jamal al-Din al-Alfghani (d. 1897), Muhammad 'Abdulh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida (d. 1935). Inspired particularly by Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 1329) early critique of taqlid and legal formalism, they called for the reform of Islamic law by reopening the gates of ijtihad. The movement also took a decisively critical stance to the influence of secular and Christian ideas. Both al-Alfghani and, later, Rida were connected to the pan-Islamic movement that aimed at uniting Muslim peoples under the Ottoman caliphate. Rida even attempted to launch his small organization, Jami'ah al-Da'wah wal-Irshad, as a cornerstone of pan-Islamism, indicating the constancy of the political dimension of da'wa conceptions. Of more lasting impact, however, were the Salafiyah efforts to strengthen Islamic awareness and solidarity in face of modernity. Thus, da'wa increasingly was understood in terms of edification and, most prominently, education, tarbiya.

The disruptive period of Islamic reformism around the turn of the nineteenth century also saw the birth of the Ahmadiyya, founded in 1889 in India by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908). Due to its deviant doctrines (such as the claims of Ahmad to have received new revelations from God and to be, among other things, an incarnation of Krishna), most Muslims do not accept Ahmadiyya as a part of Islam. Nonetheless, the movement has persisted as a very active da'wa organization, concentrating particularly on publication.

During the twentieth century, the Salafiyah ideal of tarbiya made a lasting impact on the understandings of da'wa. As of the 1930s, however, the political as well as the educational and devotional aspects of da'wa were understood and used in partly novel ways. A preceding event of paradigmatic importance was the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. Da'wa increasingly became an endeavor to reform the individual, rather than the public, institutions of society. Thus, society was to be Islamized “from below.” This vision can be ascribed mainly to Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Abu l-A'la Maududi (d. 1979), who were both of towering importance for the conception of da'wa among later generations of Islamists.

Founder in 1928 of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen), al-Banna spoke of da'wa as the call to “true Islam.” With an allegoric reference to bijra, Muhammad's emigration from Mecca to Medina, al-Banna urged Muslims to abandon the materialism and superficial pleasures of society. By living in accordance with Islamic rules, Muslims will restore an “Islamic Order” and, eventually, establish an Islamic state.

Maududi was more favorable to direct political action and mobilization. His organizational base, Jama'at-e Islami, was set up as a regular political party, although it has gained significance primarily as an informal network. Maududi agreed with al-Banna’s da’wa strategy of internal reform from below. However, instead of envisioning an Islamic order, he launched the popular concept of the “Islamic movement,” al-Haraka al-Islamiyya. Here da'wa is aimed at creating an Islamic state of mind and a matrix of life rather than an institutional order.

A different methodology of da'wa was suggested by Tablighi Jama'at, founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas in 1927. This movement of Sufi background turns its back on political activity and concentrates on the devotional life. Yet, it emphasizes the centrality of da'wa in terms of a missionary duty.
The Sufi background is highlighted by the centrality of the form of prayer called dhikr (remembrance). By repeating prayers many times each day, an Islamization of daily life is envisioned. Ilyas himself distinctly deviated from the character of al-Banna and Maududi and did not stand out as a religious scholar, either as a speaker or writer. This he compensated by missionary zeal and novel strategies of organization and education. In fact, the theological simplicity of the Tablighi’s da’wa appears as a key to popular success. The prerequisites for acting as a Tablighi dal’i are based on familiarity with basic Islamic doctrines and traditions, the practice of salat and dhikr, respect of other Muslims, and sincerity in actions. Da’wa is to be performed as voluntary preaching of the message in small groups. Instead of, for instance, publishing books or arranging publicly visible events and campaigns at university campuses, da’wa is performed from door to door. The Tablighi communities, not least among Muslim minorities around the world, are built on close, personal relations and social support.

Some years after the Second World War, when the large-scale process of decolonization started, modern da’wa activities increased in an even more rapid speed. Gradually, da’wa developed into a key concept for cultural identity and political change. Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, who ruled Egypt between 1952 and 1970, built up a da’wa network in the Middle East and Africa. He championed the cause of Islamic socialism and pan-Arabism, which influenced nationalist leaders in many predominantly Muslim countries, such as Algeria, Syria, and Iraq.

Other Muslim leaders challenged the socialist, nationalist, and secularist aspects of postcolonial development and took recourse to a more classic understanding of da’wa. Most notably, Saudi Arabia’s King Faysal challenged, and eventually took over, Nasser’s leading role, by stressing the ideal of a transnational, Muslim solidarity based on Islam, not Arabism. In 1962, Saudi Arabia founded the Muslim World League, Rabitat al-‘alam al-Islami, for promoting international da’wa efforts. This was one year after the establishment of an Islamic university in Medina for the training of da’wa workers. The activities of the Muslim World League increased in the 1970s when several councils, such as the World Council of Mosques, were formed. The idea of promoting international Islamic cooperation through the Council of Mosques was partly inspired by the previous establishment of the World Council of Churches. The Muslim World League cooperated with the governments of certain countries, such as Egypt, after Nasser had been followed by Anwar Sadat. As a result, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth was founded in 1972. Due to the the oil boom of the 1970s, enormous oil revenues allowed countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to lend most substantial support to the Islamic movement that worked for the (re)establishment of “true” Islam. Funds were used for, among other things, Islamic research projects, charities, distribution of Islamic literature, international conferences, and festivals, not least in Europe. Notably, this support predominantly favored Islamist-oriented movements, such as the Deobandi-inspired communities of Britain.

Previously, Muslims had been largely opposed to reliefwork and social-welfare concerns as part of da’wa endeavors, criticizing Christian missions for using such efforts in order to make proselytes. Increasingly, however, charity directed primarily to Muslims has become an integral part of much da’wa work. It may even be argued that the provision of social amenities is one of the main aspects of Islamism.

As a reaction to the Saudi influence on organizations like the Muslim World League, new da’wa instruments were formed in other countries. In Libya, for instance, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi established the Islamic Call Society, Jam’iyat al-Da’wah al-Islamiyya, in 1972, concentrating on da’wa efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. A decisive blow on Saudi Arabian hegemony was the Iranian revolution of 1979. The da’wa efforts of the Iranian Islamic Information Organization once again highlighted the question of political legitimacy. During the war against Iraq in the 1980s, Iran increasingly emphasized its Shi’ite foundation, thus loosening the slack on Saudi Arabia. The tensions between Saudi Arabia and the increasingly independent da’wa organizations have increased since the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s, when Saudi Arabia supported the military coalition led by the United States. Saudi Arabia was heavily criticized by Muslim organizations all over the world, and some lost the Saudi support of petrodollars.

In the late twentieth century, new da’wa organizations cropped up all over the Muslim world, including in Europe and North America. Moreover, many governments set up da’wa departments for education and propaganda, particularly in the universities. In Pakistan, for example, the University of Islamabad in 1985 created a Da’wah Academy for training da’wah workers, producing and distributing literature in several languages as well as organizing conferences, special courses, and other events. The academy has an extensive international network of cooperating da’wa organizations, including the Muslim World League. Another important da’wa organization, whose primary objective is to propagate Islam through missionary activities, is the Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI), which was started in 1982 by Ahmed Deedat in Durban. It was preceded by the Islamic Propagation Centre, founded in 1957. Particularly significant in Europe and North America, the IPCI has concentrated on polemics against Christianity. The increasing interest in social welfare as a part of da’wa work was reflected, for instance, in the formation in 1988 by the Muslim World League of the World Muslim Committee for Da’wah and Relief. Education and health care is on the program of many da’wa organizations, like the Indonesian Diwan Dawat al-Islam and the West African Ansar al-Islam.
Among Muslim intellectuals, not least in Europe and North America, *da‘wa* to a significant degree has been associated with interfaith dialogue. Thus, Qur‘anic injunctions such as “Invite all to the Way of thy Lord” (16: 125) have been reinterpreted in an ecumenical sense. Proponents of interfaith dialogue such as Mahmoud Ayoub, Hasan ‘Askari, Khurshid Ahmad, Mohammad Talbi, Isma‘il al-Faruqi, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr agree on the need for *ijtihad* and the contextualization of *shari‘a*, and they have excluded proselytism from the conceptions of *da‘wa*.

However, the visions of al-Banna and Maududi are continuously present, especially in European and North American organizations. Two examples are the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in the United States, founded by al-Faruqi, and the Islamic Foundation in United Kingdom, an offshoot of the Jama‘at-e Islami, headed for many years by Maududi’s disciple, Khurram Murad. The conception of *da‘wa* among such organizations combines ecumenical efforts with insistence on edification and mobilization among Muslims, predominantly by book publishing and, increasingly, by engagement in the political and educational systems of the Western societies.

See also Conversion; Expansion; Jama‘at-e Islami; *Shari‘a*.

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**DAWLA**

The Arabic word *dawla* is derived from the root D-W-L, meaning “to turn, alternate, or come around in a cyclical fashion.” The Qur‘an (59:7), for example, speaks of the Prophet’s distribution of the spoils of war to those in need, “so that it may not [merely] make the circuit (dulatan) among the wealthy of you.” Another Qur‘anic reference (3:140) speaks of the cyclical nature of human vicissitudes, so that triumph one day is replaced by defeat another day. This sense of alternating periods of fortune and misfortune led Arab writers to use the word *dawla* when speaking of dynastic succession, particularly in the period after the rise of Abbasid power. The Abbasid “turn” in power had come, just as earlier the Umayyads had had their turn before being overthrown.

As the Abbasid house became entrenched in power, however, the dynastic sense of *dawla* became conflated with notions of the empire or state that this family ruled. Premodern Muslim writers, like their Western contemporaries, did not generally speak in the abstract of the state apart from those who actually wielded power at any given time. For example, Ibn Khaldun’s use of *dawla* signifies, as Franz Rosenthal notes, that “a state exists only insofar as it is held together and ruled by individuals and the group which they constitute, that is, the dynasty. When the dynasty disappears, the state, being identical with it, also comes to an end.” (Ibn Khaldun, *Mugaddimah*).

With the advent of Turkish and Kurdish governors under the nominal authority of the later Abbasid caliphs, titles composed of the word *al-dawla* combined with an honorific adjective became commonplace. Such titles as *nasir al-dawla* or *sayf al-dawla* could be rendered equally as “helper” and “sword,” respectively, of the state, the body politic, the government, or the dynasty, all of which were identified (albeit theoretically) as a common entity.

In the nineteenth century, as Western distinctions between the state and the government began to filter into Muslim countries, *dawla* became increasingly disentangled from its more personalistic connotations and began to be
used almost exclusively in the sense of “state.” Thus, the 1861 Tunisian constitution, the first promulgated in a Muslim country, was known as *qanun al-dawla*. Framed under European pressure, the constitution consciously sought to differentiate the traditional powers of the bey, the ruler of Tunisia, from the new constitutional regime of the state under which even the bey was theoretically subordinate. To differentiate it from the state, which was relatively unchanging, the idea of the government and its personnel, which came and went, was connoted now by the term *bukuma*.

*Dawla* in contemporary Arabic (*devlet* in Turkish) is used in the sense of the nation-state, and encompasses the full range of meanings associated with that term in English, including a community of citizens residing within a given set of territorial boundaries as well as the political authority under which they live. The League of Arab States is thus rendered as *Jamiyat al-Dawlat al-'Arabiyah* (*dawal* being the plural of *dawla*) and anything “international” is rendered as *dawli* or *dawala*.

One also finds in contemporary Islamist writings the neologism *dawla Islamiyya*, or “Islamic state.” This concept is invariably not well defined, but it reflects the holistic approach to religion and state that is at the core of the fundamentalist project. The Islamic state, unlike secular national states, is one in which *shari'a*, or divine law, is fully applied as the only legal code in the state. Beyond this general aspiration, the specifics of what constitutes *shari'a*, how *shari'a* principles are to be discerned or interpreted, and how non-Muslims are to be accommodated within the Islamic state are all highly contested issues.

See also Hukuma al-Islamiyya, al- (Islamic Government); Ibn Khaldun; Political Organization; *Shari'a*.

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*Sohail H. Hashmi*

**DEATH**

The end of human life is a central concern of Muslim thought and occasions a variety of ritual practices connected to the dying process, burial, and mourning. The most widely held view is that death is the fate prescribed by God for all living things, and that the event itself marks a transition or journey of the soul from worldly existence in the body to bodily resurrection and immortal life in either paradise (*janna*) or hell (*nur* and *jahannam*). In Islamic eschatology, as in rabbinc Judaism, God delegated the power of death to an angel of awesome appearance who separates the soul from the body.

Death (*maut*) is a dominant theme in the Qur’an, where it is closely linked with the understanding of life (*hayya*) and belief in God. Thus, “God has possession of the heavens and the earth, he gives life and death” (9:116). Death is an eventuality that all living souls shall “taste” (3:185, 21:35), and precipitates their inevitable return to God (10:56). The Qur’an even speaks of human existence as being defined by two deaths and two births: nonexistence and entry into worldly life, then death and resurrection in the hereafter (2:28, 22:66). The return to God leads to the final reckoning and immortality for the blessed in paradise and for the damned in hell. Moreover, a special reward is promised those killed on God’s “path,” who are also said to be alive with God, not dead (3:157, 3:169, 22:58). In Qur’anic narratives of sacred history, death is depicted as affliction suffered by prophets at the hands of unbelievers (2:61, 3:21), and as a punishment meted out by God to unbelievers (25:35–40). Ethical and juridical passages place a high value on human life (4:29, 5:32, 6:151, 17:31), but call for death as a punishment for those who war against God and Muhammad (3:33). The schools of Muslim jurisprudence later delineated with more precision the kinds of offenses that required capital punishment, as well as mitigating factors (*budud*).

Burial and mourning are rites of passage that are codified in *fiqh* literature. They involve declaration of the *shahada* by or on behalf of the dying person, and a cleansing of the body (*ghusl*), followed by enshrouding. Within a few hours of the death, a party of men transport the body to the cemetery, where it is buried facing toward Mecca. Funerary prayers may be performed at the grave site itself, or at a mosque on the way to the cemetery. Jurists prohibit women from participating in funerals, even if the deceased is female. Burial at sea is permitted if landfall is not possible. If the body of the deceased is not recoverable, funerary prayers are still required. Martyrs’ bodies remain unwashed and are interred in their bloodstained garments without prescribed prayers, reflecting conditions of combat and a belief that they will immediately gain paradise. In all cases, the bereaved are urged to mourn in dignity for up to three days only, for excessive grieving is an affront to God, the giver of life and death. Grieving may also enhance the suffering of the soul of the deceased. Nonetheless, participation in funerals and visiting cemeteries are endorsed as occasions for cultivating piety and remembering the fate awaiting all creatures.

Ulema and indigenous cultural traditions in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and recently Europe and the Americas have
shaped Muslim beliefs and practices pertaining to death and immortality. A rich and diverse body of eschatological literature developed in medieval Islam that included narratives about the exemplary deaths of prophets and saints, visionary accounts of the tortments of the grave, the death angels, and the intermediate condition of the soul between death and resurrection (barzakh), as well as detailed descriptions of the pleasures of paradise and punishments of hell. The major kalam schools defended Islamic doctrines about resurrection and final judgment against the influence of various Christian, Jewish, sectarian, mystical, and philosophical teachings. The deaths of the imams, particularly Husayn, came to hold a dominant place in Twelver Shi‘ite doctrine and ritual practice. Sufis taught that death obliges seekers to engage in greater self-scrutiny, as the qualities of life after death reflect those of their worldly existence. Other mystics understood pain and death both as the experience of separation from God the Beloved and as metaphors for ecstatic annihilation (fana‘) of the self in him, as exemplified by al-Hallaj (d. 922). To achieve “death before dying,” was to attain spiritual union with the divine. A few mystics and philosophers, contrary to orthodox belief, advocated belief in metempsychosis (tanasukh) and denied the reality of personal death, resurrection, judgment, and heaven and hell.

In many Muslim communities, death has been seen as a contagious threat to domestic prosperity caused by the evil eye and malevolent spirits rather than a direct result of God’s will. Mourning practices vary widely, but they routinely entail expressions of profound grief, especially by women, and include prayer gatherings and meals for up to a year after the loss of a loved one. Moreover, most Muslims recount visions of the dead in their dreams and believe that the saintly dead, especially the prophet Muhammad and his descendants, have the power to intercede on their behalf both in this world and in the hereafter. Saints’ tombs, found in most Muslim communities, have consequently evolved into important pilgrimage and cultural centers. Since the nineteenth century, some Muslim writers have adapted European spiritualism to traditional Islamic understandings of death and the afterlife, while Islamic reformers have revived discourses about the tortures of the grave, the corporal punishments of hell, and the bodily pleasures of paradise to advance their radical political and moral agendas.

See also ‘Ibadat; Jahannam; Janna; Pilgrimage: Ziyara.

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DEOBAND

Deoband, a country town ninety miles northeast of Delhi, has given its name to ulama associated with the Indo-Pakistani reformist movement centered in the seminary founded there in 1867. A striking dimension of Islamic religious life in colonial India was the emergence of several apolitical, inward-looking movements, among them not only the Deobandis but the so-called “Barelwis,” the much smaller Ahl-e Hadis/Ahl-i Hadith, and the controversial Ahmadis. The Deobandi, Barelwi, and Ahl-e Hadis ulema not only responded to Hindu and Christian proselytizing, but engaged in public debate, polemical writings, and exchanges of fatwa among themselves. Each fostered devotion to the prophet Muhammad as well as fidelity to his practice; each thought itself the correct interpreter of hadith, the guide to that practice. All depended on means of communication, above all print, as well as on institutional changes that came with British colonial rule.

The Dar al-‘Ulam at Deoband utilized the organizational model of British colonial schools. Its goal was to hold Muslims to a standard of correct individual practice in a time of considerable social change, and, to that end, to create a class of formally trained and popularly supported ulama to serve as imams, guardians, and trustees of mosques and tombs, preachers, muftis, spiritual guides, writers, and publishers of religious works. At the end of its first centenary in 1967, Deoband counted almost ten thousand graduates, including several hundred from foreign countries. Hundreds of Deobandi schools, moreover, have been founded across the Indian subcontinent and now in the West as well.

The Deobandis followed Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi (1702–1763) in their shift from emphasis on the “rational sciences” to an emphasis on the “revealed sciences” of the Qur’an and, above all, hadith. Unlike him, however, they have been staunch Hanafis in jurisprudence. They have also been Sufi guides, bound together by shared spiritual networks, especially Chishti Sabiri. Among the most influential writers was Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (1864–1943), who published scholarly works on Qur’an, hadith, and Sufism. He also wrote an encyclopedic guide for Muslim women, Bibishti Zewar, disseminating correct practice, reform of custom, and practical knowledge.

After about 1910, individual Deobandis began to be involved in politics in opposition to British rule in India and
also to British intervention in the Ottoman lands. Many Deobandis supported the Khilafat movement after World War I in support of the Ottoman ruler as khalifa of all Muslims, and were also strong supporters of the Jam’iyat ‘Ulama-e Hind who was allied with the Indian National Congress and opposed to the creation of Pakistan. The apolitical strand within the school’s teaching has taken shape for many in the widespread, now transnational, pietist movement known since the 1920s as Tablighi Jama’at. The popular writings of Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhalavi (1897–1982), associated with the second major Deobandi school in India, the Mazahir-e ‘Ulum in Saharanpur, are utilized extensively in the movement. In Pakistan, the Jam’iyat ‘Ulama-e Islam party represents Deobandi ulema. In striking contrast, the Taliban movement, which emerged in Afghanistan in the 1990s, had its origins among refugees in Deobandi schools in Pakistan and also identifies itself as Deobandi.

See also Education; Jam’iyat ‘Ulama-e Islam; Law; South Asia, Islam in; Tablighi Jama’at.

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DEVOOTIONAL LIFE

The meaning and analytical value of the phrase “devotional life” needs clarification in the case of Islam. “Devotional” is derived from the Latin term devoto, which was originally the name of a ritual in Roman religion, and became predominantly a Christian term, which in the Middle Ages and in modern speech means the obedient submission to God. The theologian John Renard defines devotion as “the elements of personal investment”—energy, feeling, time, substance—that characterize a Muslim communal and individual response to the experience of God’s ways of dealing with them. The Islamic-Arabic term closest to devoto, which was originally the name of a ritual in Roman religion, and became predominantly a Christian term, which in the Middle Ages and in modern speech means the obedient submission to God, is /aṣīla, which reads in translation: “O God, send your blessing [bismillah] on our Lord Muhammad and on the family of our Lord Muhammad and may we be among those who are near to you with humility. Send your blessings on the family, the Holy Prophet, and all the /aṣīla.”

Devotional life in Islam has yet to be mapped and its history is still to be written. So far, most studies have focused on written sources (such as Padwick, Muslim Devotions; Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering: small books and booklets, pamphlets, and manuscripts (amulets) that can be purchased in small bookshops, in the streets, and at religious institutions. Among them are many prayer manuals and devotional texts, often originating in the ritual practices of one of the mystical traditions, the subject of Padwick’s classic study. The pamphlets may be written by classical authors, most often mystics, such as the famous ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), but there are also many modern authors.

Devotion to the Prophet is a dominant element in many Sufi movements. A very popular text is the Dala’il al-khayrat (Guide to happiness) by the Moroccan mystic al-Jazuli (d. 1465). In it, in the 201 names of the Prophet occupy an important place, as well as the tasliya, or prayer on the Prophet, which reads in translation: “O God, send your blessing [bismillah] on our Lord Muhammad and on the family of our Lord Muhammad and may we be among those who are near to you with humility.”

In popular pamphlets older texts such as the Qasidat al-burda by al-.Busiri may be found together with modern texts, forming handbooks of devotion for individual and communal life. Padwick lists different types of ritual forms in addition to the term salat, which may indicate the obligatory salat, the voluntary (nafla) salats, and salats for special occasions, as well as the prayer on the Prophet. These include /ibadat, which refers to the outward aspects, and /awzifa or /ratib, the daily individual devotional office. In addition to forms Padwick mentions different types of texts: munajat, or conversations between God and Prophets or other saintly persons; /du’a, a
Devotional Life

Very important term indicating invocations and prayers that can also be said during the salat, particularly the sujud; or prostration. In this regard, it is important to observe that whereas it is obligatory to recite the Qur’an (undoubtedly the most important devotional text) during the salat in Arabic, du‘as can also be said in the vernacular. There is a connection between prayers in the vernacular and the emergence of popular literature in such Islamic vernaculars as Persian, Turkish, and other languages. *Dbikr* literally means “remembrance,” namely of God and the ninety-nine beautiful names (memorization of which, tradition holds, almost assures a person entrance into Paradise), and may refer both to a type of text (especially in the plural, *adhbkar*) and the ritual of reciting it. *A‘wïr* is a litany often accompanied by a name and associated with the devotional life of a particular Sufi order. Other texts are referred to as *bihz*, litany, a term which also refers to an allotted part, namely of the Qur’an, or of a text such as the *Dala‘il* (divided into eight *abzah*). Al-Shadili (d. 1258) composed the famous *Hizb al-bahr* aboard a vessel on his way to Mecca. *Abzah* have a strong connotation of offering protection against hostile natural or human forces. The same holds true for the *Hirz*, which literally means “stronghold.” All such types of texts are recited at different ritual occasions. In addition, many popular pamphlets deal with other devotional subjects such as magic (Ar. *sihr*), evil powers, for example, those of the *jinn* and the evil eye (*al-busad, al-‘ayn*) and how to avert or control them, and with the afterlife and eschatological subjects (for example, “life” in the grave). Devotional life should also be approached through music and literary works of prose and poetry. For example, in his autobiographical work *Ein Leben mit dem Islam* (A Life with Islam; 1999), Nasr Abu Zaid reminds us that recitation of the Qur’an had spiritual as well as aesthetic and physical aspects. Another interesting autobiography, and an important source for devotional life of a woman in the Islamist movement, is that of Zaynab al-Ghazali.

Studies into devotional life based on field work exist, but do not abound and is only rarely the subject of a monograph. One may think of the accounts by Edward Lane (*Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 1846), Snouck Hurgronje of life in Mecca, Edward Westermarck’s *Ritual and Religion in Morocco*, Usha Sanyal on Barelwi devotions (although it focuses on *fatawas* rather than on field work), Abdul Hamid El Zein’s study of saint veneration in Lamu, John Bowen’s *Muslims Through Discourse* (a study in the Gayo highland), or Ian Netton’s book on Sufi ritual in the United Kingdom.

Images, pictures, and paintings form an important source for the study of devotional life. In this respect, a promising new contribution can also be expected of visual anthropology (e.g., films such as those by Fadwa El Guindi, *El Sebou‘*, on life-cycle rituals in Egypt). Finally, the Internet, in particular the World Wide Web, has emerged as a medium for the spread of devotional life. Quite a few Sufi orders are active in cyberspace, and noteworthy developments take place there with regard to publications as well. A great lacuna remains, however, the lack of empirical analysis on a micro level in which textual (and musicological and iconographical) study is combined with (participant) observation.

See also Adhan; Dhikhj; Du‘a; ‘Ibadat; Tasawwuf.

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Dhikr is a complex word variously translated as “remembrance” or “recollection.” The word dhikr was developed initially in the Qur'an to reflect a special kind of piety toward God, then extended in the hadith to reflect the multiplicity of ideas associated with the Prophet's own pious practices, and ultimately adapted by the ascetic and mystic traditions as an institutional meditational ritual.

The word dhikr and its cognates form a dense structure in the Qur'an, which insists that the prophets were all linked together by virtue of the message they collectively brought: They were all members of one brotherhood (23:51–52) and all brought the same din (religion). The Qur'an identifies them all as mudhakkirat, a word derived from the root “to remember” or “to recollect”; thus, they are all rememberers. Their message is tadhkira, reminder. Humans, however, are in a state of forgetfulness, and they need to be reminded by believers; it is the believer’s chore to constantly witness (dhakir), both because of the human propensity to forgetfulness, but also because God has allowed Satan to entice humans away (17:62–64).

The remembrance of Allah as a rite has a special place in Islam. The Qur'an says, “Those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of Allah; for without doubt, in the remembrance of Allah do hearts find satisfaction” (13:28). The remembrance of Allah is understood to embrace both acts of service and kindliness, and failure to do so curbs spiritual growth (83:9). At the same time, the Qur'an envisions dhikr of wider significance than the formal requirement of prayer, including devotions such as
silent meditation and personal contemplation (24:37). Remembrance is also linked directly to accepting Allah’s guidance, a key initiative of God in human salvation, and failure to remember leads to the withdrawal of God’s grace (72:17). In short, “Remembrance of Allah is the greatest thing in life, without doubt” (29:45).

**Dhikr in Mystical Islam or Sufism**

Sufis adhere to the Qur’an’s words to “remember God” and they do so in rituals both rich and variegated. Some Sufis regard dhikr as the mystical equivalent of canonical prayer, and wherever dhikr as liturgical remembrance has been practiced, it has generally been held to encompass the same pious goals as prayer and to reflect the same ritual effectiveness. The dhikr tradition, then, is a means of meditation on past verities and on the transcendent being of God, a base upon which Sufism built a structure for probing higher consciousness, engaging with spiritual forces, and ultimately coming into a personal encounter with God.

Dhikr developed into a pious ritual very early in the growth of ascetic practices, and, with the establishment of the orders, became specifically designed for brotherhood meditations. It became the means to develop internal cohesion within the order, and for the head of the order to maintain control over the adepts. Dhikr thus evolved into part of the discipline imposed by Sufism’s institutional structure. While its practice was open to those “on the Way,” each order required dhikr to be approved and carried out in the presence of the shaykh or the order’s other officials.

Such teachings embraced the following notions: Dhikr could be either silent or spoken, reflecting the domains of practice, that is, remembrance of the heart (dhikr khaﬁ, or dhikr al-galbi) or remembrance of the tongue. Spoken dhikr is ultimately overcome by silent dhikr, since words fail before the grandeur of God, or they inevitably maintain the self separate from the source of all life. By the sixteenth century, dhikr would encompass seven different levels of meaning, according to some practitioners.

Finally, dhikr, spoken by saintly people or their representatives, is widely regarded as having spiritual potency, and the vehicle of memory suggests that dhikr’s inspiration can be carried beyond the atmosphere of the order into Muslim society itself, where it can effect change in unpredictable but significant ways.

*See also* Devotional Life; ‘Ibadat; Tasawwuf.

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**DIETARY LAWS**

Islam’s dietary laws are based on scripture, juridical opinions, and local custom; the latter, in turn, reflects the religious milieu of pre-Islamic Arabia. Foods are designated as lawful (halal), unlawful (haram), and reprehensible (makrub). Generally, all things, including foods, remain lawful unless proven otherwise. The Qur’an rules that the flesh of swine is unlawful, as is carrion, blood, animals that have been strangled, beaten to death, killed by a fall, gored to death, or savaged by other animals. Apostolic traditions render unlawful carnivorous animals, birds of prey, and most reptiles. The schools of law differ with regard to some foods: For the Hanafites, crustaceans such as lobster, shrimp, crab, and the like are reprehensible, for the Malikites even reptiles are lawful, and for the Shafites meat products not consumed by the early Arab community are unlawful.

The name of God must be invoked on all animals before slaughter, although some jurists waive this rule where the slaughterer is Muslim. The trachea, and at least one carotid artery, must be severed with a sharp instrument to minimize pain and suffering. Game hunters need not follow these rules if the name of God was invoked when their properly trained hunting animals were set loose. Also lawful is an animal killed by weapons such as arrows, lances, and so on that when launched—in the name of God—tear through flesh and cause bleeding. Because no bleeding occurs when live ammunition is used, some jurists render the consumption of such animals as unlawful.

Animals slaughtered by people of the book, that is, Jews and Christians, are lawful, although some jurists insist that they too invoke only the name of God, and not that of Jesus, or any other deity. More recently, and as a consequence of migrations to the West, a further distinction, particularly evident among Muslims in the United States, is made between animals slaughtered by people of the book, termed


**Disputation**

Disputation is the ritual practice of dialectical argument among schools of thought. In early and medieval Islamic societies, disputation is especially important in regard to the elaboration of competing religious doctrines. Two Arabic terms, *jadal* (and its more intensive form *mujadala*) and *mumacaara* designate dialectics or disputation with an opponent. A culture of disputation was well established in the Middle East prior to the rise of Islam, between and within the Jewish and Christian communities and among philosophical schools, such as the Peripatetics (Aristotelians), Stoics, Neoplatonists, Skeptics, Materialists, and others. Emblematic of this dialectical form of scholarship in the Middle Eastern environment of nascent Islam are the writings of the Church Father, John of Damascus (d. 749). In a tractate “Against the Saracens,” written under Umayyad Islamic rule, John instructs Christians in the methods and the limits of disputing with Muslims on matters of belief.

Engaging the opponent through argument is also well attested in the Qur’an. Humans are referred to “as the most disputationous (jadal) of things” (18:54). The verbal noun *mujadala* and its active verb form, meaning disputing with an enemy, occur twenty-seven times, in such phrases as “the Satans inspire their friends to dispute with you” (6:121) and “dispute not with the People of the Book” (29:46). Qur’an 16:125 associates disputing with proselytism or inviting unbelievers to become Muslim: “Invite (humankind) to the way of your Lord with wisdom and kind words and dispute with them (jadilhum) in (a manner) which is less offensive.”

By the ninth century, in Baghdad, Basra, and other centers of learning, disputation was recognized as a skill and an art that enhanced one’s scholarly status. The biographical dictionaries mention accomplishment in the “science of disputation” (*‘ilm al-jadal*) or the rules of conduct in debate (*adab al-jadal*), alongside knowledge of law, theology, the Qur’an, hadith, and the grammar and lexicon of the Arabic language. Although the earliest manuals of instruction in the art of disputation no longer exist, the existence of such works as early as the ninth century is attested by references that appear in the tenth-century catalogue of Arabic works by Ibn al-Nadim (*Kitab al-fibrist*).

Arabic theological texts from the ninth to eleventh centuries give evidence of the oral environment of debate and argument in which claims were made, scripture was interpreted, rulings were established, and ideas were advanced and criticized. Typical of these texts is the following pattern. An incipit formulation of a problem is stated, for example, the Mu’tazilite theological school’s claim that the Qur’an, like all material things in the world, is created and not eternal—a view that orthodox Muslims rejected. Next, the claim or doctrine is broken down into constituent subsections of the argument. Often the contending positions of other schools of thought are stated. The text then proceeds to advance the details of counterargument, followed by the teacher’s reply to that argument. A typical text reads: “If the interlocutor (*al-qarib*) should ask such and such, then the following should be said to him. . . .” The textual forms of these disputes are in reality school texts that were dictated by a shaykh or teacher in his home, at a *madrasa*, or in the corner or outer halls of a mosque, often to quite large gatherings of students. That the same problems were disputed over and over by succeeding generations of students and teachers, as was, for example, the claim that the Qur’an was created, or that the Qur’an was a miracle that proved Muhammad’s prophethood, indicates a dynamic conception of religious truth that always had to be tested and defended with strengthened arguments.

This very method of teaching invited disputes in the lecture halls, and both teachers and pupils often became practitioners. At the simplest level, students would often be given a problem to dispute in practice session. Medieval annalistic historians like Abu Mansur ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) describe how on many occasions the more advanced students of a shaykh would go or be sent to the sessions of a rival teacher to challenge the latter with counterarguments. Other medieval observers of this form of teaching through public debate commented upon how loud and contentious...
they would often become, even late at night, disturbing neighbors who were trying to sleep. The theologians Abu ‘Uthman ‘Amr ibn al-Jahiz (d. 869) and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) argued that common people who were not trained in the rules and discipline of disputation should not be allowed to debate religion and theology in public, because their lack of knowledge and skill often led to public disorder and raucousness.

The advanced cultural context for highly developed disputational skills were the evenings sponsored by local rulers and other patrons, in many cases bringing together Sunni and Shi’ite religious spokesmen as well as representatives of the Orthodox, Nestorian, and Monoophysite Christian communities, Rabbanite Jews, philosophers, poets, and other intellectuals to debate whatever important issue of the day interested the patron. In many cases, religious truth was framed as the problem and debated across confessional lines. In many cases, too, disputation over religious truth was conducted across disciplines. In one celebrated debate in the year 932 in Baghdad, for instance, the grammarian Abu Sa‘id al-Sirafi debated the logician Abu Bishr Matta. The logician held that truth is determined in formal logic, not in natural language (which is the medium of the Qur’an). Al-Sirafi successfully argued that meaning is embedded in the language of the text itself, thus preserving the importance of the text of scripture, which in Islamic religious thought is more than propositional truth.

Not every scholar appreciated or participated in public disputations, especially across confessional lines. The literary historian Abu ‘Abdallah al-Humaydi (d. 1095) tells of a certain Hanbali religious scholar who reported having attended one such public disputation in eleventh-century Baghdad. He complained that nonbelievers (kuffar) were allowed to stand up and say that Muslims would not be allowed to argue using their Book (the Qur’an), but rather that all disputants would be restricted to rational argument. When all present, including the other Muslims, agreed to the terms of the dispute, the Hanbali reported that he left and never went back.

In modern literary and anthropological terms it is possible to see the phenomenon of *jadal* and *munazara* as a form of poetics and social ritual. Taking the form of verbal conflict, such practices occurred in the highly charged atmosphere of competing religious communities living under Islamic rule in the central Islamic lands of the Middle East, especially during the Abbasid Age (750–1258). Potentially dangerous and volatile conflicts were defined and framed, then regulated and controlled by rules of conduct. A measure of how effective these cultural forms were is the fact that often those who refused to dispute according to the rules took their concerns to the streets of Baghdad in more physical and even violent forms of conflict. Violence, however, was often outweighed by the more civil forms of conflict. In no small measure it was the cultural practice of agreeing to disagree in disputation among contending religious communities that made civil society possible in the Islamic Middle Ages.

See also Christianity and Islam; Kalam.

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*Richard C. Martin*

**DISSIMULATION** See Ta’qīyya

**DIVORCE**

In Islamic law, the husband has the exclusive right to *talaq*, termination of marriage. *Talaq* is defined as a unilateral act, which takes legal effect by the husband’s declaration. Neither grounds for divorce nor the wife’s presence or consent are necessary, but the husband must pay his wife’s *mahr*—translated in English as “dower,” this is the gift the bridegroom offers the bride upon marriage—if he has not done so at the time of marriage, and maintenance (*nafaqa*) during the *‘idda* period (three menses after the declaration).

The wife, however, cannot be released from marriage without her husband’s consent, although she can buy her release by offering him compensation. This is referred to as “divorce by mutual consent” and can take two forms: In *khul*, the wife claims separation because of her extreme dislike (*ikrah*) of her husband, and there is no ceiling on the amount of compensation that she pays; in *mubarat* the dislike is mutual and the amount of compensation should not exceed the value of the *mahr* itself.

If the wife fails to secure her husband’s consent, her only recourse is the intervention of a judge who has the power either to compel the husband to pronounce *talaq* or to pronounce it on his behalf. Known as *fakhr* (recession), *tafrig* (separation), or *tatliq* (compulsory issue of divorce), this outlet has become the common juristic basis on which a woman can obtain a court divorce in contemporary Muslim world. The facility with which a woman can obtain such a divorce and the grounds on which she can do so vary in the
different schools of Islamic law and in different countries. The Maliki school is the most liberal and grants the widest grounds upon which a woman can initiate divorce proceedings. Among Muslim states where Islamic law is the basis of family law, women in Tunisia enjoy easiest access to divorce.

See also Gender; Law; Marriage.

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Ziba Mir-Hosseini

DOME OF THE ROCK

The Dome of the Rock (Ar. Qubbat al-Sakhra), a large octagonal building in Jerusalem commissioned by the Umayyad caliph 'Abd al-Malik in 692 C.E., is the earliest major monument of Islamic architecture to survive. Muslims today consider it the third holiest shrine in Islam, after the Kaaba in Mecca and the Mosque of the Prophet in Medina. Its age and its sanctity, along with its visibility and extraordinary decoration, make it a major monument of world architecture and one of the most important sites in Islam.

The Dome of the Rock is set over a rocky outcrop near the center of the large esplanade known in Arabic as al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary), which was once the site of the Jewish Temple, the traditional religious center of Jerusalem. The building is a large low octagon divided internally by an arcade into two octagonal ambulatories encircling a tall cylindrical space measuring approximately 20 meters (65 feet) in diameter. A high wooden dome, whose metal roof is plated with gold, spans the central space and covers the rock.

The glory of the building is its decoration. Above a high dado of quartered marble, the exterior and interior walls were once entirely covered in a mosaic of small cubes of colored and gold glass and semiprecious stones. In the sixteenth century the mosaics on the exterior were replaced with glazed tiles, themselves replaced in the twentieth century, but the mosaics on the interior stand much as they did when they were put up in the late seventh century. They depict a vast program of fantastic trees, plants, fruits, jewels, chalices, vases, and crowns. A long (about 250 meters, or 820 feet) band of Arabic writing in gold on a blue ground runs along the top of both sides of the inner octagon. The text is largely Qur'anic phrases and contains the earliest evidence for the writing down of the Qur'an. It ended with the name of the patron, the Umayyad caliph 'Abd al-Malik (replaced in the ninth century by that of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun), and the date of construction.

In form, materials, and decoration, the Dome of the Rock belongs to the tradition of late Antique and Byzantine architecture that flourished in the region before the coming of Islam. The domed, centrally planned building was a typical form for a martyrium, and the Dome of the Rock is similar in plan and size of dome to the nearby Holy Sepulcher, the building (also raised over a rock) that the emperor Constantine had erected in the fourth century to mark the site of Christ's burial on Golgotha. Other Christian buildings erected in the area in the eighth century, notably the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, show a similar use of marble and mosaics, perhaps executed by the same team of mosaicists.

Despite its antecedents and even its workmen, the Dome of the Rock is clearly a Muslim building, commissioned by a Muslim patron for Muslim purposes. Its mosaic decoration, notably its inscriptions in Arabic and its lack of figural representation, immediately distinguishes it from contemporary Christian buildings in the area. It was not intended as a place for communal prayer; that function was fulfilled by the
nearby Aqsa Mosque. Rather its domed octagonal form suggests a commemorative function, though its exact purpose is unclear.

Already in the ninth century several alternative explanations for its construction were proposed. One author suggested that ’Abd al-Malik had commissioned the Dome of the Rock to replace the Ka’ba, which had fallen into enemy hands. This explanation, however, is simplistic and undermines one of the five central tenets of Islam, though the building could have functioned (and does today) as a secondary site of pilgrimage. Another explanation, also current from the ninth century, associates the building with the site of Muhammad’s mi’raj, his miraculous night-journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and back. However, the Qur’anic inscriptions around the interior of the Dome of the Rock, the only contemporary source for explaining the building’s purpose, mention neither of these subjects. Rather, they deal with the nature of Islam and refute the tenets of Christianity. The inscriptions suggest that the building was intended to advertise the presence of Islam. Together with the traditional identification of the rock as the place of Adam’s burial and Abraham’s intended sacrifice of his son and of the esplanade as the site of Solomon’s Temple, the inscriptions suggest that the Dome of the Rock was meant to symbolize Islam as the worthy successor to both Judaism and Christianity.

The Dome of the Rock continued to play an important role long after it was built. The Abbasids, who succeeded the Umayyads, restored it several times, and the Fatimids restored it in the eleventh century after the dome collapsed in the earthquake of 1016. The Crusaders considered it Solomon’s Temple itself and rechristened the building Templum Domini. Saladin, the Ayyubid prince who recaptured Jerusalem for the Muslims in 1187, had the building rededicated as part of his campaign to enhance the city’s sanctity and political importance. The Mamluks, rulers of Egypt and Syria from 1250 to 1517, had the wooden ceilings of the ambulatory and the central dome restored. The Ottoman sultan Suleyman (r. 1520–1566), whose name is the Turkish form of Solomon, ordered the building redecorated as part of his program of embellishing the holy cities of Islam. It was restored six more times in the twentieth century and has become a popular icon of Islam, decorating watches and tea towels and replicated in miniature models made of mother-of-pearl and plastic. The first great monument of Islamic
architecture, it has taken on a new life as the symbol of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation.

See also Architecture; Holy Cities.

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Sheila S. Blair  Jonathan M. Bloom

DREAMS

Muslims throughout history have attached great importance to dreams. Portions of the Qur’an were believed to have been revealed to Muhammad in dreams. Muhammad was also thought to have received numerous prophetic dreams. Moreover, dreams were considered the primary means by which God would communicate with Muslims following the death of Muhammad and the cessation of Qur’anic revelation. Indeed, according to tradition, on the day before his death Muhammad declared, “When I am gone, there shall remain naught of the glad-tidings of prophecy, except for true dreams.”

Medieval Muslims cultivated numerous forms of literature on dreams. Accounts of dreams were collected to establish the sanctity of those who saw the dreams, a practice especially common among Sufis. Accounts of dreams were also collected to resolve points of controversy, to determine the proper reading and interpretation of the Qur’an, for instance, or to resolve legal or theological debates. Especially important, in this regard, were dreams in which the prophet Muhammad appeared, because, according to tradition, Muhammad himself had declared, “Whoever sees me in a dream has seen me in truth, for Satan cannot imitate me in a dream.” Also of great importance was the dream manual, a work that taught its readers how to interpret their dreams. Many Muslim dream manuals were associated with Ibn Sirin (d. 728), the eponymous founder of the genre. While there is little reason to think that Ibn Sirin was in fact the author of a dream manual, it is certain that he was responsible for putting into oral circulation much dream lore.

Famous early dream manuals were written by the litterateur Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889), the historian al-Tabari (d. 923), and the philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 1037). Prominent later dream manuals include works written by al-Salimi (d. 1397), Ibn Shahin (d. 1468), and al-Nabulsi (d. 1730). Many Muslim dream manuals made heavy use of the Greco-Roman tradition of dream interpretation, to which access was had through the dream manual of Artemidorus, a Greek work composed in Asia Minor in the second century C.E. and translated into Arabic by the Christian physician Hunayn b. Ishaq (d. 877). It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of dream interpretation to medieval Muslims. Hundreds of dream manuals have been preserved, some in Arabic, others in Persian and Turkish.

Modern Muslims have been, not surprisingly, divided in their reception of dream interpretation. Some have cast it aside as superstitious nonsense, while others have sought to appropriate it through reinterpretation, suggesting that it foreshadows the discoveries of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. Yet others, especially Sufis and traditionalists, have shown little hesitation in proclaiming the continuing validity of this ancient tradition.

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John C. Lamoreaux

DU’A

In contrast to the prescribed rituals of Islam, such as the daily prayers, the du’a is generally a spontaneous, unstructured, conversation with God. There are, however, prescribed supplications or du’a ma’tbur that are considered particularly propitious because of their scriptural origins.

Whereas form is essential for the performance of the prescribed rituals, consciousness is central to du’a. And whereas every du’a is a form of prayer, only a prayer performed conscientiously becomes a du’a. The du’a is the very essence of worship because it venerates God, celebrates His sublime attributes, and puts trust in Him. Specific requests, however, are frowned upon: A du’a is considered most auspicious when framed broadly to seek protection from evil, solicit the good of this world, and salvation in the afterlife.

For the believer, supplications are always answered, but not in the form of a wish list. Human beings, it is said, lack the
capacity to distinguish good from evil, and often solicit, and are denied, that which is essentially harmful to them.

A du’ā also serves as an incantation to ward off evil, or secure grace. A traveler, for instance, is encouraged to read: “In God’s name let its run be, and let its stopping be!”

See also Devotional Life; ʿIbadat.

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Muneer Goolam Fareed
EAST ASIA, ISLAM IN

Islam has spread to all parts of East Asia, a region that features some of the world’s major centers of Islamic influence.

China

With a Muslim population conservatively estimated at twenty million, China today has a larger Muslim population than most of the Arab countries of the Middle East, and yet few scholars have concentrated on this unique community located at the far reaches of the Muslim world. Of China’s fifty-five officially recognized minority peoples (China’s majority ethnic group is known as Han Chinese), ten are primarily Muslim: the Hui, Uighur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirghiz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbek, Bonan, and Tatar. The largest group, the Hui, are spread throughout the entire country, while the other nine live primarily in the northwest.

As a result of the extensive sea trade networks between China and Southwest Asia dating back to Roman times, there have been Muslims in China since shortly after the advent of Islam. Small communities of Muslim traders and merchants survived for centuries in cities along China’s southeast coast, the most famous settlements being Canton and Quanzhou (Zaitun in the Arabic sources). During the first several centuries there was limited intermixing between the Muslim traders and the local Chinese population. It was not until the thirteenth century with the establishment of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1278–1368) that thousands of Muslims from Central and Western Asia were both forcibly moved to China by the Mongols as well as recruited by them to assist in their governance of their newly acquired territories. Although some of the higher-ranking Muslim officials may have been able to arrange marriages with women from their places of origin, it is generally assumed that most of the soldiers, officials, craftsmen, and farmers who settled in China during this early period married local women. Despite centuries of intermarriage, the Muslims who arrived at this time were able to establish communities that have survived with many of their cultural and religious traditions intact down to this day.

During the early part of the Ming period (1368–1644), the emperor Yongle ordered Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch from Yunnan in southwest China, to lead a series of massive naval expeditions to explore the known world. In all, between 1405 and 1432, seven major expeditions were launched involving hundreds of Chinese vessels and thousands of tons of goods and valuables to be traded throughout the southeast Asian archipelago, the Indian Ocean, and as far as the east coast of Africa. The success of these trading expeditions was no doubt in part due to Zheng He’s religion and his ability to interact with many of the Muslim rulers and merchants encountered along the way. However, shortly after the death of the Yongle emperor, China’s cosmopolitan and international initiatives gave way to a period of conservatism and the redirection of imperial resources toward domestic issues and projects. During this period numerous laws were passed requiring “foreigners” to dress like Chinese, adopt Chinese surnames, speak Chinese, and essentially in appearance become Chinese.

Despite these restrictions and requirements, the Muslims of China continued to actively practice their faith and pass it on to their descendants. By the end of the Ming dynasty there were enough Chinese Muslim intellectuals thoroughly educated in the classical Confucian tradition that several scholars developed a new Islamic literary genre: religious works on Islam written in Chinese that incorporated the vocabulary of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist thought. These texts, known as the Han Kitab, were not apologist treatises written to explain Islam to a non-Muslim Chinese audience, but were rather a reflection of the degree to which the Muslims of China had become completely conversant in intellectual traditions of the society in which they lived. Moreover, as more and more Chinese Muslims lost their fluency in Arabic and Persian, it became clear that in order to insure that future generations of Muslims were able to have a sophisticated
Small groups of merchant and artisan Muslims were present in China just after the rise of Islam. This mosque in Linxia, Gansu Province, is topped with a pagoda-shaped minaret, an elegant example of how Chinese Muslims have combined two cultures. © BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTURES/Corbis

understanding of their faith, religious texts had to be written in Chinese.

The linguistic challenges of transliterating Arabic and Persian religious terms and proper names into Chinese also facilitated the blending of Chinese and Islamic principles as Chinese Muslim authors sought to create new Chinese terms to replace Arabic and Persian ones. Several of these terms are striking in their ability to use traditional Chinese characters to reflect fundamental Islamic concepts: God is translated as zhen zhu, or “the true lord”; Islam is qingzhen jiao, or “the pure and true religion”; the five pillars of Islam become the five constants, wu chang; and the prophet Muhammad is known as zhi sheng, or “utmost sage.”

In 1644, the Qing dynasty was established, marking the beginning of a period of unparalleled growth and expansion, both in terms of territory and population. Travel restrictions were lifted, and the Muslims of China were once again allowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and study in the major centers of learning in the Islamic world. During this period several Hui scholars studied abroad and upon their return they started a movement to revitalize Islamic studies by translating the most important Islamic texts into Chinese and thus making them more accessible.

Despite the opportunities for travel and study that arose during this period, the Qing dynasty also represented a period of unparalleled violence against the Muslims of China. As reform movements led by Muslims who had studied overseas spread, conflicts arose between different communities. In several instances the government intervened, supporting one group against another, leading to an exacerbation of the conflict, outbreaks of mass violence and the eventual slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and several rebellions.

In southwest China, it was the growing number of Han Chinese migrants moving into areas where Muslims had lived for centuries that led to violent conflicts. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China experienced a massive population explosion resulting in millions of Han Chinese moving into the frontier regions. As more immigrants moved into Yunnan province along the southwest frontier, there were increasing clashes with the Hui who had settled there in the thirteenth century and whose population is estimated to have been one million. In a series of disputes between newly arrived Han migrants and Hui who had lived there for centuries, local Han Chinese officials (who themselves were not local residents), repeatedly decided to support their fellow Han Chinese against the local residents. Fighting escalated and eventually a Chinese Muslim leader led a rebellion and in 1856 established an independent Islamic state centered in Dali, in northwest Yunnan. The state survived for almost sixteen years, and the Muslims worked closely together with other indigenous peoples. Eventually, however, the Chinese emperor ordered his troops to concentrate their efforts on destroying it. The massacres that ensued wiped out the majority of Muslims in Yunnan. Some fled to nearby Thailand, and their descendants still live there, while others fled to Burma or neighboring provinces. Estimates of those killed range from 60 to 85 percent, and more than a century later, their population has still not recovered its original number. Another consequence of the rebellion was a series of government regulations severely restricting the lives of Muslims.

In the aftermath of the rebellions, the first priority of the survivors was to pool their resources, rebuild their mosques, and open Islamic schools. Having lost most of their material possessions, they were clearly determined not to lose their religious legacy. This period saw renewed contact with other centers of learning in the Muslim world and the establishment of schools that concentrated equally on secular and religious education.

The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 was followed by a period of unrest and warlordism. After the rise of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, a civil war
ensued, in which both parties sought the support of the nation’s largest minority groups with promises of religious freedom and limited self-government. Many of the Muslims chose to support the Communists, and in the initial period of the People’s Republic of China, the Muslim minority peoples enjoyed a period of religious freedom. However, during subsequent political campaigns, culminating with the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the Muslims of China found their religion outlawed; their religious leaders persecuted, imprisoned, and even killed; and their mosques defiled, if not destroyed. During this period all worship and religious education were forbidden, and even simple common utterances such as insba’llallab (God willing), or al-bandulillah (thanks be to God) could cause Muslims to be punished. Despite the danger, Muslims in many parts of China continued their religious studies in secret.

In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the Muslims of China lost no time in rebuilding their devastated communities. Throughout China, Muslims began slowly to restore their religious institutions and revive their religious activities. Their first priority was to rebuild their damaged mosques thereby allowing communities to create a space in which they could once again pray together, but also so that the mosques could reassert their role as centers of Islamic learning. Over the next two decades mosques throughout most of the country organized classes for not only children and young adults, but also for older people who had not had the opportunity to study their religion. Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the 1990s Islamic colleges have also been established throughout most of China.

Within China, when asked how to explain the recent resurgence in Islamic education, community members cite two main reasons: a desire to rebuild that which was taken from them, and the hope that a strong religious faith would help protect Muslim communities from the myriad of social problems presently besetting China in this day and age of rapid economic development. Chinese Muslims studying overseas reiterate the need to equip themselves and their communities for their future in a state that seems to be ideologically adrift.

Korea
In some respects, the history of Islam in Korea mirrors that of China, but more as a faint reflection than as a comparable historical phenomenon. Little archaeological evidence has survived but it is commonly believed that some of the Muslim sea traders who regularly traveled to the southeast coast of China also made it as far as Korea. Arabic geographers note the existence of al-Sila, a country beyond China, and it is believed that this name is derived from the Korean dynasty Silla (668–935). Although there is some archaeological evidence of goods from Western and Central Asia being found in ancient tombs in Korea, it is not known if they were brought there directly or acquired by Korean traders in China, which had much more extensive sea and land trading routes with the rest of Asia.

During the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1278–1368), Korea also fell under the control of the Mongol empire. As they had a policy of recruiting tens of thousands of men from Central and Western Asia to help them in administering their newly acquired territory, it is probable that some of these Muslims ended up serving in Korea, and that many of them settled there. However, it appears that over the centuries those who settled completely assimilated to Korean society and culture. It was not until the modern period that Muslims returned to Korea. Beginning in the 1920s, thousands of Muslims escaping the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia fled overland through Korea, and many settled there before being forced to leave in the 1940s. The next group of Muslims who arrived were Turkish soldiers sent under United Nations auspices during the Korean War. Several soldiers settled in Korea, establishing the first mosques in Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu. Today the fledging community of Muslims living in Korea is made up of some converts, but primarily recent Muslim immigrants from South Asia.

Japan
Although Muslim traders had sailed the seas off the coast of Japan for centuries, there is no known evidence of any Muslim communities settling in Japan until the early part of the twentieth century, when of the thousands of Muslims who fled Russia in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, several hundred were granted asylum in Japan. Many were settled in Kobe and Tokyo, which became the sites of Japan’s first two mosques, built in 1935 and 1938. In the years leading up to the Second World War, the Japanese military government became increasingly interested in encouraging scholarship on Islam as part of its policy to portray itself as a protector of Islam to the Muslim communities of China and southeast Asia. As Japan invaded neighboring countries under its “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” campaign, it justified its actions in part as a plan to safeguard all of Asia from Western imperialism, but also to protect Islam.

At present there are an estimated 100,000 Muslims living in Japan, the overwhelming majority of which are immigrants from South Asia and Iran; only a few thousand are Japanese who have converted. Scholarly research on the Middle East and Islam has developed tremendously since the early 1980s, with several research centers at major universities around the country.

See also East Asian Culture and Islam; South Asia, Islam in; Southeast Asia, Islam in.

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Within the field of Islam in East Asia, the major developments and most lasting influences between Islam and the indigenous peoples have taken place in China, where Muslims traders first settled in the early decades of the hijra. This early interest in China as a destiny for Muslim travelers is reflected in the famous hadith, “seek knowledge, even unto China.” Despite centuries of relative isolation from the rest of the Islamic world, the Muslims in most regions of China have managed to sustain a continuous knowledge of the Islamic sciences, Arabic, and Persian. Given extended periods of persecution combined with periods of intense government efforts to legislate adoption of Chinese cultural practices and norms, that Islam should have survived, let alone flourished, is an extraordinary historical phenomenon. Although some scholars have attributed the survival of Muslim communities in China to their ability to adopt Chinese cultural traditions, when asked themselves, Chinese Muslims usually attribute their survival to their strong faith and God’s protection.

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a period of extreme political violence and chaos when Muslims together with other minority groups were persecuted, Muslim communities throughout China actively sought to
reclaim their religious identity and revive Islamic education. In addition to repairing and rebuilding mosques returned to them after the revolution, Muslim communities have also pooled their resources to build new mosques and Islamic schools. These schools are filled with students of all ages, including the elderly, who after decades of government control are anxious to study Islam and Arabic. More recently a growing number of Chinese Muslims are pursing advanced Islamic studies at international Islamic centers of learning.

Although there are now Muslims present in virtually every region of China, there have undoubtedly been many communities that were either completely destroyed during government military campaigns, or that simply assimilated to the point of dissolution. One interesting example of a community that came to the brink of complete assimilation, only to be revived for political reasons, was documented by an anthropologist in the early 1980s. In Quanzhou (known as Zaytun in the Arabic sources), a city located along China’s southeast coast, a large clan existed whose members had so assimilated to local customs as to be completely indistinguishable from the local Han Chinese. They took part in the full range of traditional religious practices, many of which had to do with honoring one’s ancestors. They knew nothing of Islam, ate pork, and drank alcohol. There was one slight difference though: During the annual sacrifices made to one’s ancestors, when preparing food to offer ceremoniously to their ancestors, they would not include pork or alcohol. This tenuous connection to their ancestors (Muslim traders and officials who had first settled in this region in the early years of the hijra) was called upon in 1981 when this extended family sought government recognition as one of the officially recognized minority groups. As they had the genealogical records to prove their descent from Muslims, they were able to change their status from Han Chinese to Hui (Chinese Muslim).

**Mosques and Calligraphy**

Mosques and the calligraphy within them have also served as an interesting barometer of the waxing and waning of traditional Chinese influences on the development of indigenous Chinese Islamic traditions.

Although no mosques dating back to the pre-Mongol period have survived, it is assumed that mosques during this period reflected the architecture of the immigrant Muslims who built them, as they were required to live in special districts separate from the general population. By the Ming period in the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, however, there was significant pressure for Muslims to outwardly conform to Chinese traditions. The Huajue mosque in Xian, which dates back to the Ming period and has survived down to the present, is an exquisite example of how Chinese Muslims were able to incorporate traditional Chinese motifs, decorative arts, and temple architectural styles into the structure and decoration of mosques. In this mosque, as in most others in China, Arabic calligraphy is interspersed with carvings and paintings of traditional Chinese images of flowers, fruit, mythical animals, and Chinese calligraphy. The rooftops are protected by small animal figures along the ridges of roof tiles, and the minarets take the form of pagodas. In addition, the Arabic calligraphy is a highly stylized form that differs from region to region and reflects local calligraphic traditions that have evolved in relative isolation over centuries.

However, in recent years, in part as a result from pressure from outside funding sources and the growing number of Chinese Muslims going overseas for the hajj and to study, many communities have torn down these traditional mosques and replaced them with ones believed to be more “authentic.” Over the past twenty years untold numbers of mosques dating back centuries have been destroyed. Nevertheless, in some parts of China in recent years, there has been a growing movement among Chinese Muslims to protect their unique architectural traditions.

**Local Celebrations**

As there are Muslim communities in every part of China with their own histories and local traditions it would be difficult to generalize about the ways in which Islamic practices have been influenced by other local Chinese traditions. However, by looking at local celebrations of "/Id al-Fitr and the Maulid (birthday of the prophet Muhammad) one can gain some sense of the variety of ways in which these interactions have developed. For example, in Yunnan province in southwest China, Muslim communities spread throughout the region. Many are direct descendants of Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams al-Din, a Muslim from Bukhara, who served as an official under the Mongol Yuan dynasty and settled in Yunnan at the end of the thirteenth century. Seven centuries later, during the annual celebrations of /Id al-Fitr, after communal prayers at the mosque, Muslims from different areas travel to the site of Sayyid ‘Ajall’s grave where special prayers are held. First there are readings from the Qur’an, then the tomb is swept and cleaned (reminiscent of the traditional Chinese Qingming festival held once a year when Chinese go to the graves of their ancestors, sweep and clean the area and then make food offerings), and then the accomplishments of Sayyid ‘Ajall are retold. In conclusion, a special service is held to honor the hundreds of thousands of Muslims killed during the Qing dynasty, and the hundreds killed more recently in this area during the Cultural Revolution.

In another region of Yunnan, a group of Muslim villages spread out over a vast plain have developed there a way of celebrating the birthday of the Prophet, which allows them to reassert their ties to one another. Every year the Mawlid is celebrated in the fall over a period of two months beginning with the end of the major harvests. Each village is assigned a weekend when it will host all the other villages in a Mawlid celebration. Although the dates clearly are not connected
In southwest China, Muslim women generally take part in communal prayer in mosques. The women’s section is to one side, and demarcated by a half-length curtain. In central China there is a centuries-old tradition of women having their own separate mosques; while in northwest China, women do not usually take part in communal prayers in the mosques. Jacqueline M. ArmiJo

with the Islamic calendar, their tradition allows them to share their bounty with their neighboring Muslim communities and strengthen their networks.

Meanwhile, in northwest China, the decision of when to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday is influenced not by seasonal harvests, but rather by the desire to offer younger Muslims an alternative activity during the widely and elaborately celebrated Chinese New Year. In recent years local Muslim religious leaders in Xian have considered scheduling celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday to coincide with the festivities surrounding the Chinese New Year.

The Role of Women
Another example of how local histories and traditions within the diverse communities of Muslims in China have evolved over the centuries can be seen in the roles of women in different communities. In central China there is a long tradition of active involvement by women in both Islamic education and religious leadership. Not only is there a long history of women imams in this region, there is also a tradition of separate women’s mosques. In northwest China, however, women have tended not to play an active leadership role within Muslim communities, and usually they do not pray in the mosques with the men. According to Muslims in other parts of China, these attitudes in the northwest toward women are the result of the Muslims adopting local Chinese views, which are considered quite chauvinistic. In southwest China, however, women play an active role within Muslim communities and are also widely credited with insuring the survival of the Muslim population in the aftermath of a brutal massacre that took place in the 1870s. In most mosques men and women pray side by side with a half curtain dividing the prayer hall. Although over the centuries many Chinese Muslim women adopted the custom of footbinding, historically and down to the present, the Muslim community has not adopted the widespread practice of female infanticide.

In conclusion, although maintaining their religious beliefs and practices over the centuries has been a continual challenge, Muslims in China have always been confident of their identities as both Muslims and Chinese. Although some Western scholars have presumed that these identities were somehow inherently antagonistic if not mutually exclusive, the survival of Islam in China belies these assumptions. Islamic and Chinese values have both proven to be sufficiently complementary and dynamic to allow for the flourishing of Islam in China.
In southwest China the tradition of education for Muslim girls dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. These girls are taking part in after school Arabic and Islamic studies classes in a village in central Yunnan province. Jacqueline M. Armijo

See also East Asia, Islam in.

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Jacqueline M. Armijo

ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

The Islamic world and its development have often been examined through its economic development and its relationship with Christian Europe. This has been particularly true of analyses that dealt with the earlier period of Islamic history. The Belgian medievalist, Henri Pirenne, proffered a provocative theory about the end of the Rome Empire in the West and the beginning of the Middle Ages. He asserted that the Middle Ages did not begin in 325, as his contemporaries
would have it, but rather that they began after the Arab conquest broke through the perimeter of the Mediterranean, in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Arab incursion destroyed the unity of the Roman Empire, fracturing its political, economic, and cultural cohesiveness. Pirenne hypothesized that this situation, along with the isolationism of much of Europe, eventually led to feudalism in Europe and the rise of Islamic civilization.

**Agriculture in the Early Islamic World**

Whether or not one agrees with Pirenne’s views of the effect of Arab conquest on European society, it is undisputed that the expansion of the Islamic world had a profound impact on Muslim society. Most notable is its effect on agriculture, where new crops and techniques to enhance production were rapidly introduced from places as far east as Southeast Asia and Malaysia. Some of the new crops introduced during the early Islamic period included rice, sorghum, hard wheat, sugar cane, cotton, watermelons, eggplants, spinach, artichokes, sour oranges, lemons, limes, bananas, plantains, mangoes, and coconut palms. These crops, as well as changes in agricultural techniques, were not only significant in their impact on food production, but also in the role they played in fostering the development of industry, cities, and monetary authorities within the Muslim world.

It is believed that after the rise and spread of Islam, many of the new crops were obtained from the fallen Sassanian Empire and the Indian subcontinent, where the new province of the Sind, conquered in 711, gave early Muslims a foothold in a part of India. The crops from India first came to Iraq and Persia, then diffused into the westerly parts of the Islamic world. By the tenth and eleventh century, the western part of the Islamic world had taken on major crop changes that had been introduced from territories to the east.

In time, the new crops were also introduced into Europe by way of Spain, Sicily, and Cyprus. Unlike the Islamic world, where these new crops were quickly adapted to local culture and tastes, they were not rapidly developed in Europe. In a 1981 article on the “Medieval Green Revolution,” Andrew M. Watson cites spinach as an example of this differential development. He states that spinach was one of the earliest crops to be received into Europe, but although it was quickly adopted throughout the Islamic world, it spread much more slowly in Europe, along with sorghum, sour oranges, and lemons. One reason given for this slowness to adopt new crops was the European peasantry’s lack of skill and technical knowledge about agriculture.

In contrast, the Islamic world saw extensive changes in agricultural techniques. One area of great importance was irrigation. Since many of the new crops came from regions of heavy rainfall, it is significant that they could be grown successfully in the much drier environment of the Middle East. In Persia and the Nile Valley, long underground canals known as *qanat* were used. These canals connected catchments of ground water to surface canals, but they were inadequate to meet the needs of the new crops. A new and more sophisticated system of irrigation was introduced during the early Islamic period that relied on ground water from wells, aquifers, and springs, augmenting older irrigation systems. Dams and cisterns were also used to store water for later use. Taken together, these systems allowed for the irrigation of land that had never before been used agriculturally, or extended the time that other lands could be kept under cultivation each year.

These changes in agriculture gave rise to other changes in the Islamic world. The increase in food production led to increases in population growth, fostering urbanization and industrialization. These developments fed on each other, for as the population grew new importance was put on agricultural improvements in productivity. As towns increased in size there was continued pressure to expand the cultivation of new lands. As villages grew, they often gave rise to new cities.

**Industrialization, Trade, and Coinage**

Industrialization, too, was an outgrowth of agricultural surplus in many parts of the Islamic world. The cities became the place where much of the processing of the new crops occurred. This refining of agricultural goods involved drying, cooking, pickling, and milling of many crops. Watson states that this refining often led to further processing, as in the case of sugar, which gave rise to the confectionery industry, and cotton, from which the textiles industry evolved. The cities
also became the marketplace, where people from the rural areas would come to trade crops for processed goods. It has thus even been argued that agricultural change was at the heart of local and, eventually, long distance trade. As the Islamic world spread, the demand for its raw materials as well as finished goods increased. Consequently, trade between the Islamic world and many parts of Europe grew. As ports and waterways became more important for transporting goods, the cities that lay along waterways grew. There was also the birth of a new class of urban intermediaries—merchants, transporters, financiers, and warehouse owners.

This expansion in trade and commerce also led to a more sophisticated monetary system. At the onset of the rise of Islam, the use of various coins in different parts of the Islamic world was not uncommon. In fact, the Muslims inherited the circulation of metallic money from the Byzantines and Sassanids who preceded them. The Byzantine state had used gold coinage, which constituted an imperial monopoly, whereas the Sassanid empire used silver coinage. As the Islamic world continued to expand, the need to secure an adequate supply of coinage grew more pressing. Initially, the Byzantine and Sassanid coins were used, but eventually a new, Islamic, coinage was introduced. There were two new coins: silver (dirham) and gold (dinar). The introduction of these coins is referred to as the monetary reform of ‘Abd al-Malik.

Professor of Islamic history Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz has stated that the monetary reforms of the early Muslim world go beyond these new coins. The caliphate assumed responsibility for the supply of currency, taking upon itself the problems of finding precious metals for minting and the distribution of coinage. Muslim coins have been found as far away as Scandinavia and Russia, suggesting that at least some parts of the West had a favorable balance of trade with the Muslims. A number of scholars believe that the Varangians (Vikings) were the middlemen, moving goods from the Muslim world to Scandinavia and Russia. This theory is supported by evidence that, beginning sometime between the late seventh or early eighth century C.E., the Varangians migrated from Scandinavia south to the Black Sea, establishing many trading towns and stations along the way.

Growth of Cities and Guilds
As this system of commerce expanded, the Islamic city grew in importance as well. These cities were multiethnic, and their citizens practiced a variety of religions. Different ethnic or religious groups resided in separate, usually exclusive, quarters of the cities, and these residential divisions were associated with occupational specialization as well. Z.Y. Hershlag points out that ethnic Turks were officials and soldiers, the Greeks as well as the Jews were engaged in trade and finance, and the Armenians were artisans. There were certain cities where the main activities of the town were associated with their dominant ethnic or religious groups.

Even the marketplace was organized along ethnic and religious lines, as various kinds of goods and services were associated with particular groups and were made available in separate parts of the bazaar.

In addition, most residents of cities were organized into corporations, termed ‘ainaf, naqabat, or taraw’if in Arabic. These corporations were mainly professional guilds, but while their social functions were on the whole broader than those of the European guilds, their economic power and their control over their professions were less absolute than in their Western counterparts, nor did the Muslim guilds encompass all urban craftsmen or merchants. The case of the Damascus guilds offers insights into how these institutions worked. The Damascus guilds were rigidly organized and exclusive. They had a hierarchy of officers, the head of which was the shaykh, who either inherited his position or was elected. In other Middle Eastern countries, however, the autonomy of the shaykh was not the case. For example, in Egypt guilds were an important mechanism for the government to collect taxes, and the shaykhs became accountable to the government for the actions of guild members as well as for their members’ payment of taxes. In Turkey, guilds were very restrictive and mandated that the number of people participating in a given trade be kept at a certain number.

There has been much debate by scholars as to the significance of guilds as well as their links to Islamic syndicates and trade unions; however, there is little evidence that the craftsmen’s guilds had any influence on these later organizations. Furthermore, there has been much speculation as to why the guilds dissolved. Some writers assert that the decline of the guilds had to do with the rigid structure of the organizations. However, evidence seems to indicate that the dissolution of the guilds is more likely tied to the introduction of European finished goods into the Muslim markets, which disrupted the local handicrafts industry as a whole.

Agriculture and Trade in the Modern Era
Like the earlier period of Islamic history, the modern economic history of the Middle East has been shaped by its relationship and interaction with Europe and Western civilization. Most economic historians of the region trace the origin of this new relationship to the early 1800s and the expansion by many European countries into other regions of the world in search of natural resources and markets for their finished goods. In spite of its earlier economic advances, the Middle East eventually lagged behind Western society in terms of modernization.

As the Europeans expanded their control into other parts of the world, the Middle East itself was galvanized into the formation of a broad network of international trade and finance. The region had witnessed much social upheaval throughout the Middle Ages, much of it attributable to an unstable food supply that had been devastated by famine, plagues, and wars. To safeguard their local populations from...
disruptions in the food supply, governments of the region, in particular the Ottoman Empire, turned to the importation of European consumer goods. This approach to trade fit well with the mercantilist mentality of the Europeans, who were looking for export markets but did not care to reciprocate the trade with equal imports. In fact, this lack of trade reciprocity gave rise to the belief, in many parts of the Middle East and North Africa, that exports impoverished a country and that sales to foreigners should be discouraged. Nonetheless, the Middle East became one of the lowest-duty (import tariff) areas in the world, ultimately providing a large market for European goods. It should be mentioned, however, that during both the First and Second World Wars, the Middle East became a net exporter to Europe, as supply chains were disrupted and Europe needed to provision its troops in the region.

The exception to this trade arrangement was found in Egypt. Under Muhammad 'Ali (r. 1805–1849), Egypt used foreign trade to raise revenue, while taking steps to allocate local resources and protect its domestic industries. In fact, Egypt in the early 1800s was careful not only to minimize imports but also to maximize exports, thus protecting domestic industries from being supplanted by foreign-made products. Muhammad 'Ali's most successful venture was the development of the cotton trade. Egypt was able to produce a much higher quality cotton crop than Europeans. Consequently, beginning in 1821, Egyptian cotton exports rose from 100,000 to 50 million pounds by 1850. Cotton exports continued to surge into the 1860s, as the American Civil War significantly halted production in the United States.

The focus on cotton in Egypt should not be surprising, as agricultural production has played an important role throughout the Middle East. Yet, most of the land in the region is less than well suited to agricultural development. There is a lack of rain throughout the region and the few existing waterways are heavily drawn upon, a scarcity that continues to be a source of great tension throughout the area. Consequently, the crops that have dominated agricultural production have been those that are less irrigation intensive, such as cereals, with the limited introduction of silk production in the late nineteenth century in Lebanon, coffee production in Yemen, and cash crops such as dates, nuts, and fruits in the better-watered parts of Arabia and North Africa.

Turkey under the Ottoman Empire began producing tobacco in the seventeenth century. As with cotton, the American Civil War was a factor in the growth of the Turkish tobacco industry, as the plantations of the American South ceased production and demand for the commodity from other sources increased significantly. Turkey’s tobacco production rose from an estimated 10,000–13,000 tons in the 1870s to 31,000 tons in 1900, and 64,000 tons in 1911. Tobacco remains an important export for Turkey today.

Land Ownership and Reform
In addition to the problems of attempting to cultivate marginal land for agricultural use, many scholars have cited land tenure as a major deterrent to productive agricultural development in the Middle East. Land is normally classified into three types in the Middle East: *raūaba*, which means ownership by the state or ruler; *milki*, which refers to private ownership; or *waqfi*, which is land whose revenues are intended for religious or charitable purposes. Of course, there was a complex system of land-holding arrangements in the region, but in general, during the period prior to the nineteenth century, much of the land was held by the state. The land was often worked by peasants who were heavily taxed. Later, as agricultural production became more profitable, much of the land was transferred to private ownership, held in large estates and, again, worked by peasant farmers.

It wasn’t until after the Second World War that major land reforms took place that favored small farmers. The Egyptian Land Reform Law of 1952 served as a model for the region. The act redistributed land held by absentee landlords, transferring ownership to those who actually worked it. The large estates were broken up into small plots and parcel out to farmers who belonged to cooperatives. Although in most cases land reform was hailed as a needed change, it has proven over time to have been less than successful, for it established a system of small and inefficient farms that has hampered productivity and hindered the use of mechanization in the modern period.

Industrialization
Industrialization also experienced a number of ups and downs in the region. Before the late nineteenth century, the Middle East boasted of a thriving handicraft industry. However, the production of local handicrafts declined with the introduction of European and Indian goods on the Middle Eastern market. There was also a perception, particularly among the middle and upper classes, that local goods were inferior to European goods, and this attitude helped seal the fate of handicrafts in the region. Meanwhile, the development of industrialization in the region was slowed by unfavorable commercial treaties, which did not support export markets. There was also a lack of capital for industrial development, as well as governments that lacked the foresight to foster local entrepreneurs.

Yet, again, the First World War was important for setting the stage for industrialization. The rise of nationalism, coupled with the realization that European instability could interfere with its ability to provide necessary imports for export to the Middle East, led to widespread industrialization projects. With the abolition of trade agreements that favored Europe, a further incentive for industrialization was created. Industrialization continued to be important through the Second World War, for now the countries of the Middle East
not only had to provide for themselves, but some of them also had taken on commitments to supply the Allies.

Because of Egypt's ambitious development initiatives in the 1800s, foreign investment came to play a significant role. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the dissolution of the old trading companies and the emergence of private traders, and the second half saw the emergence of private and incorporated banks. Along with these banks came large accumulation of debt by many governments in the region. Moreover, much of the money that was borrowed was poorly invested, and thus did not create much economic growth. In the cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey, this debt eventually led to foreign occupation. By 1914, the countries of the Middle East had a total debt of about $2 billion, or nearly one-twentieth of the total world debt, of which a little over half was public and the rest private. North Africa had a public debt of about $250 million and a much larger amount of foreign investment in the private sector. Although foreign occupation ultimately led to much political turmoil in the region, it has been attributed initially to better debt management and investment strategies.

The First World War through the Cold War

The two world wars were important events in terms of their impact on the Middle East. The First World War destroyed the old colonial trading system and allowed the region to regain both political and economic independence. This took the form of new trade treaties that were aimed at creating fairer and more appropriate commercial arrangements. The special agreements that had given foreigners extraterritorial rights and sheltered them from local laws and taxation were abolished. Subsequently, the period between the two world wars found the Europeans preoccupied with domestic problems and postwar reconstruction, minimizing their influence and interference in the region. The Second World War was even more significant, for it enabled the creation of a new agenda for the Middle East as political and economic power continued to move from the hands of foreigners to the hands of the endogenous class.

As foreign nationals lost economic and political control in many of the countries of the Middle East, a massive exodus of Europeans took place. This exodus created a vacuum in the upper tiers of the labor market as many of the foreigners had positioned themselves not only in roles as traders and financiers, but as entrepreneurs and managers as well. This vacuum caused the endogenous governments of these states to take on increasingly active roles within their own economies. In spite of the fact that many of these states began espousing socialism, the period of the 1950s was really marked as the period of state capitalism, in which the various governments began to take on the economic roles that are normally associated with the private sector. While the Soviet Union and the West, led by the United States, attempted to win allies in the region through the distribution of foreign aid and loans, governments within the region began experimenting with many alternative economic paradigms.

The cold war policies of the West concentrated on modernizing the Third World through economic development. In Europe, the Marshall Plan provided the capital it needed to rapidly rebuild and develop; consequently, it was believed that an equally big push, in the form of capital infusion, would be similarly effective if applied to the Third World. Foreign aid with an emphasis on industrialization began to pour into the region. Egypt under Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser (1918–1970, president from 1954 to 1970) was very successful at playing the United States and its allies off against the Soviet Union, winning capital and investment from both sources.

In 1952, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser had led a military coup, seizing power of Egypt. Under his leadership, monopolistic capitalism came to the forefront as the institutional structure of the economy. He nationalized a number of industries, including the Suez Canal Company, and carried out radical land reforms. Much of the logic for restructuring the economy was not only to create an equitable distribution of resources within Egypt, but also to offset the damage done by decades of colonial policies, which left Egypt with little to no indigenous business community. Moreover, Nasser saw the need to generate resources to fuel his hopes of economic expansion. Such resources were unavailable in the private sector, but the government was receiving much foreign aid during the 1950s and 1960s. Nasser adopted a foreign policy of nonalignment, courting both the United States and Soviet Union without offering full allegiance to either.

The dilemma for many of the countries in the Middle East, however, was that they were essentially rural, agrarian societies, ill equipped in terms of human capital to absorb the foreign aid that was being given to them. This situation led to economic policies that favored the development of urban centers at the expense of the countryside. This phenomenon, known in development literature as "urban bias," led to much migration of laborers from rural areas to the urban centers, and this influx of prospective workers often outpaced industrialization. Consequently, many countries in the region saw the rapid growth of urban poverty, as the cities attracted vast numbers of underemployed or unemployed citizens for whom no jobs could be found.

Oil and Labor

Although the region boasted some of the world's largest known oil reserves even during the middle of the twentieth century, it wasn't until the 1970s that the governments of the Middle Eastern states came to appreciate the power of this resource. In fact, oil was relatively insignificant to the foreign aid and development policies of the region throughout the 1950s and 1960s. When the 1973 Arab-Israeli War broke out, however, Arab petroleum-producing countries took measures to pressure Western powers in favor of the Arab cause.
First they introduced restrictions on the sale of oil to certain states that supported Israel. Second, they cut back on oil production. By the end of December 1973, they had reduced the production of oil by 25 percent of its earlier levels. The price of oil increased as a result. On 16 October 1973, the ministerial committee representing the six Gulf countries, which are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), decided to further increase the price of oil by 70 percent. Coupled with the oil embargo, the price was later pushed up to $11.56 per barrel. These events, although politically motivated, substantially fueled the economies of the states in the Gulf region.

The initiation and implementation of development plans in the Gulf States required large numbers of migrant workers of many nationalities. Much of Saudi Arabia’s initial needs were in construction, where high levels of unskilled and semiskilled workers were needed. Many of its neighbor states had large numbers of unskilled or semiskilled workers in need of jobs. They constituted a large available labor force with easy access to the Saudi Arabian labor markets, and they flooded into the country.

This situation, coupled with higher wage rates in Saudi Arabia relative to labor–rich states, led to a massive labor migration from Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (mainly Palestinians) to Saudi Arabia and other, similarly well-off Gulf States. This migration would climax and then halt abruptly with the Gulf War of 1990. It has been estimated that, in 1975, the Gulf region had a labor requirement of 9,728,000. Saudi Arabia alone had a labor requirement of 1,968,000 in 1975, but its national work force numbered only 1,300,000. Although it is difficult to know how reliable these figures are, they do illustrate the great need for laborers in the Gulf region.

Middle Eastern oil reserves and the revenues they generate have divided the region into two groups of countries: oil rich/labor scarce and oil poor/labor abundant. Although these countries have not integrated into one system, they have benefited greatly from their proximity to each other. The oil-rich countries have relied heavily since the early 1970s on the labor from the labor abundant states. The labor-abundant states have used capital inflows from migrant remittances, along with financial aid from the Gulf and the world’s superpowers, to build growth economies through state-owned enterprises. From 1960 to 1985, the Middle East outperformed all other regions of the world except East Asia in income growth.

The Middle East witnessed much change in the 1980s and 1990s. Political instability, coupled with too much government control and regulation, caused much of the international financial and business community to shun this region and to invest their capital in the emerging superstars of Southeast Asia. Fund managers estimated that out of a total of $65 billion of capital that floated into emerging markets in the peak year of 1993, only 0.3 percent trickled to Arab markets. Yet, this region continues to be rich in both human and natural resources. It is the home of 6 percent of the world’s population, with a wealth of highly-skilled workers and a GDP of over $600 billion.

The late 1980s, however, was a sobering period for the Middle East. An increase in the world supply of oil caused prices to plummet at the same time as financial aid from the Gulf and abroad came to a halt. Since 1986, real per-capita incomes have fallen by 2 percent per year. The oil producers were hit even harder with the per-capita fall in oil output of 4 percent per year between 1980 and 1991. These events caused the Arab world to rethink its stance on two major fronts: the structure of their economies and the state of war with Israel. These have not been mutually exclusive acts. It can be argued that much of the government control and lack of liberalization in the region was in response to the continuous uncertainty caused by the state of war.

**Arab–Israel Conflict**

The end of violence between Arabs and Israelis has been seen as paramount to the economic stability and liberalization of the region, beginning in the 1990s. This confrontation had first erupted with the proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 on land that had hitherto been occupied by Palestinians. The ensuing hostilities between Arab states and Israel have cost the region much in terms of human and capital resources. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, there appeared to be a consensus in the Arab world that Israel was there to stay and that stagnating economies and poverty in the region were more pressing concerns. For the Israelis, the need for security was tempered with the realization that the threat of hostilities could only be diminished by compromising with its neighbors. The Arabs, on the other hand, sought justice from an unjust colonial legacy, which is how they perceived the creation of a state for the Jews on land already occupied by Palestinians. What these aspirations initially translated into was a land-for-peace settlement.

In March of 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement that included the return of the Sinai to Egypt. On 13 September 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed a Declaration of Principles. It set the ground rules for the transfer of authority of the Gaza Strip and West Bank Palestinian areas to a Palestinian authority. On 26 October 1994, Jordan and Israel also signed a peace accord.

During the mid 1990s there was much discussion of what was to be the peace dividend: the reallocation of resources away from military expenditures and toward other sectors of the region’s economies. Peace was also associated with an opening of political and economic systems that had been overcontrolled by governments, a situation that initially had been due to the lack of an endogenous entrepreneurial class and then later continued in response to the region’s chronic
state of war. There was also a realization that small states such as Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories had much to gain from regional coordination.

**Emerging Markets**

As the mid-1990s ushered in an era of tremendous economic growth in the West, many investors were looking to the Middle East as an emerging financial market for investments. The first important variable for identifying an emerging high-growth market is a government that is willing to change financial and economic policies to suit the needs of the international market. The opening of stock exchanges in the region, coupled with the rapid pace in which legislation for privatization and liberalization were being passed in the Middle East, augured well for this first factor of emergence.

Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Jordan were developing active stock exchanges. Lebanon’s stock exchange reopened in September 1995 after having been closed during its civil war. However, even during the war

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### Oil reserves and production in the Muslim World, early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of World Oil Reserves</th>
<th>Oil Production in 1,000's of Barrels per Day in 1993</th>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
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<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>165</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Small oil producers**

- Albania
- Bahrain
- Kyrgyzstan
- Pakistan
- Sudan

**Members of OPEC**

- Algeria
- Indonesia
- Libya
- Nigeria
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan

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years, the lack of a stock exchange had not kept Lebanon from issuing foreign currency debt as a means of tapping international markets. Moreover, the drive to encourage foreign investment had led many Middle East nations to seek independent credit ratings by recognized agencies. Moody’s Investors Service set up an office in Cyprus in March of 1995 to keep an eye on this region, and the European rating agency IBCA was involved in a joint venture to set up a rating agency in the Arab world.

Privatization in the form of government assets being sold to other actors, such as individuals or corporations, was also taking place throughout the region. Economic policies were liberalized in order to expand the economic freedom of the private sector as well as encourage foreign investment. For most of these countries, and particularly Egypt and Jordan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were active in assisting them to meet their goals.

The second factor for determining whether a regional or national economy is about to take off is the local willingness to remove the maladaptive conditions that had caused that country or region to be uncompetitive in the past. The political instability caused by the state of war with Israel since the 1950s has been the principal inhibiting factor for economic development for this region. The confrontational relationship that the Arab world has had with Israel since the latter’s creation not only cost much human capital, but also much time and resources that could have been used to build their economies. Consequently, peace with Israel was seen as a step in allowing a very well endowed region to start operating more efficiently.

Privatization and liberalization policies. Most of the North African and Levantine countries now embarked on ambitious economic reforms. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928) delivered a May Day 1990 speech calling for economic privatization and liberalization. He also signed a standby credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund in 1991. These events were intended to signal to Egyptians as well as the international business community that Egypt was serious about reforming and restructuring its economy. There are many groups that have vested interests in the reform process in Egypt, including local labor unions, business groups, nongovernmental organizations, international donors, and government officials.

The countries of North Africa, particularly Morocco and Tunisia, also embarked on ambitious privatization and liberalization schemes. Much of the reform in Egypt as well as in other countries in the region centered around trimming the public sector by cutting price subsidies on energy, food, and transportation, along with ending government control of certain sectors of the economy as a means of encouraging private investment. The IMF had been the primary force in calling for reforms in most of these countries. In May 1987, a standby agreement was reached between the IMF and the government of Egypt. The IMF provided $342 million. Egypt was then able to reschedule its debt payments with the Paris Club (a group of creditor countries that treat in a coordinated way the debt due to them by developing countries). This IMF agreement, however, was never fully implemented, due to concerns about the slow pace with which the Egyptians were conducting reforms.

Reducing deficits. Many of these countries were also taking steps to reduce their budget deficits. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia were all seen as initial success stories in reducing their deficits. Most of the reduction was achieved by eliminating food subsidies, raising energy prices to market rates, instituting sales taxes, financing the deficit through Treasury bill auctions, and reducing the ranks of government workers. One of the biggest problems Egypt and its neighbors faced was undoing the excessive level of bureaucratic control over the economy that had been put in place during past regimes. Although they had begun to liberalize many of the investment laws, change was slow. They were also slow selling off government enterprises. The public sector represented 70 percent of industrial production in the early 1990s in Egypt. In 1993, the 314 public sector enterprises were organized into seventeen holding companies, which are permitted to sell, lease, or liquidate company assets and sell government-owned shares.

Jordan. Jordan has been one of the most promising emerging markets in the Middle East. It vigorously implemented a structural adjustment plan in the late 1980s, even in spite of a geographical location that has made it very vulnerable to regional political instability. Jordan is estimated to have a population of 4.2 million, of which an estimated 60 percent is Palestinian. The Palestinians first came to Jordan in 1948, when the creation of Israel triggered their subsequent exodus from Palestine. Each time the Israelis and Arabs had a military confrontation, Jordan experienced an echo effect from Palestine, the most notable of which occurred in 1967. Jordan also served as the gateway for hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf crisis of 1990. In fact, it is estimated that as many as 300,000 returnees from Kuwait emerged on the Jordanian labor market in 1990. All these events have taken their toll on the Jordanian economy.

Unlike Egypt, Jordan has always been viewed as being a free market economy. Yet, it has a substantial public sector, with the government actively controlling 62 percent of the economy and being the largest employer. This is mainly because Jordan has long been a rentier economy, one that collects rents rather than generating its income from domestic production. The rents that Jordan has survived on have been in the form of foreign aid and remittances from Jordanians/Palestinians working abroad. Much of this revenue was generated in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East. In fact, Jordan has been termed an oil economy without oil. This situation was acceptable during the 1970s
and early 1980s, when the oil industry was booming. However, as oil prices plummeted so did the Jordanian economy. This situation has led to a restructuring of the Jordanian economy and a peace settlement with Israel.

Syria. Syrian economic policies since the late 1980s represent an attempt to liberalize and privatize the economy while still maintaining government control. In 1988, Syria began deregulating its economy and coming to terms with the fact that its diversified economy was faltering as a result of excessive government control. A currency that had been ridiculously overvalued was devalued by 70 percent. Land that had been held by the ministry of agriculture was now freed up for private sector use. A group of twelve Syrian entrepreneurs formed an agricultural investment company to work 5,000 hectares of farmland in the Euphrates valley. There were also changes in the law to promote private sector growth; however, the state has continued to play a significant role in overseeing and conducting much of what are supposed to be private sector initiatives.

Syria’s economy has improved since 1990. From 1990 to 1993, its GDP grew at 8 percent annually. Much of this has been due to the quadrupling of oil production, record harvests for the agricultural sector, and significant foreign aid from the Gulf as a reward for Syrian support and participation in the Gulf war coalition. This aid has been used largely to rebuild and repair Syria’s infrastructure. The private sector is also expanding in an environment of liberal investment laws, particularly in the area of agriculture and industry. Yet, there has been a general reluctance by many foreign investors to get involved in Syria, for the government is still in control of many of the major sectors such as oil, electricity, and banking. Consequently, most business opportunities in Syria presently are for exporting to the private sector in areas such as agricultural equipment and inputs as well as capital goods for industrial projects, food processing, and textiles.

Privatization and liberalization have been slow in Syria for a number of reasons. First, this is a regime that has long had a socialist orientation and favors central control. Second, the labor movement is very powerful in Syria and opposes privatization. Although the regime realizes that it must restructure its economy if it wants to survive in an era of globalization, there is a general reluctance to disturb the present balance of power.

Oil Dependency
Despite the wealth accumulated by the Gulf States, the oil dependency of the region’s economies and exports had become alarming by the late 1980s, when the fluctuation of oil prices made for a very unpredictable revenue base. Of course, the 1970s and 1980s saw some improvements, as all the Gulf States built modern infrastructures, increased their standards of living, and enhanced their regional and world power during these decades. With the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s, however, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states fell on comparatively hard times. Several of the countries, notably Saudi Arabia, had ratcheted up government spending and import purchases so that, when oil revenues fell sharply, the country began running chronic balance-of-payments deficits. Government budgets also began to run into the red. These events have caused many of these states to attempt to diversify their economies, with Bahrain endeavoring to become the financial capital of the Middle East. However, these states remain driven by oil markets, and there is little evidence that their attempts to diversify have been successful.

By the late 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century, the Middle East again entered into a new era. The economic pragmatism of the 1990s has given way to politics. The lack of real changes in the underlying factors affecting economic development has bred despair. Many of the countries that were liberalizing and privatizing their economies have fallen victim to a world financial bubble that rose and then burst. Financial markets around the world suffered; however, those in less stable regions such as the Middle East, are hardest pressed. The peace dividend with Israel, too, did not materialize. Meanwhile, foreign aid in the post–Cold War era has not been forthcoming.

Although oil prices have risen, the Gulf countries are more cynical about sharing with their neighbors in the post–Gulf War era. As many of these countries reach out to the World Bank and the IMF for financing, the economic austerity measures demanded by these institutions seem unbearable, given the rise of poverty throughout the region. The lack of stability, coupled with a post–11 September 2001 realization by the West of the impact that radical Islamic groups can have has left the citizens and economies of these regions feeling abandoned. Consequently, the economies of this region remain heavily guided by the state, with a private sector attempting to operate in a state of uncertainty.

See also Capitalism; Coinage; Riba; Waqf.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Nora Ann Colton

**EDUCATION**

Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, is a “religion of the book”—a religion, that is, which derives its authority from a revealed scripture. The Qur’an does not stand alone, however; it is supplemented by a wide array of other texts of a religious nature, such as collections of hadith (stories about the words and deeds of the prophet Muhammad and his companions), commentaries on the Qur’an and hadith, and books from a variety of different fields of intellectual endeavor. The Islamic tradition is thus very much a textual one. That fact has helped to make learning and education a central pillar of the religion, in virtually all times and places.

**Islamic Education in the Premodern Period**

Like most things in the Islamic tradition, the centrality of learning finds expression in sayings (hadith, sing. *hadith*) attributed to Muhammad, such as one that quotes him as instructing his followers: “Seek knowledge, even in China.” That injunction applies with special force, of course, to scholars, but it is directed in a more general way at all Muslims, who need at least rudimentary instruction in those demands which the *shari’ah*, Islamic law, placed upon their lives. Moreover, Muslims typically viewed the process of transmitting knowledge and texts—or at least knowledge and texts of a religious nature—as itself a form of worship. And so, for example, one was not supposed to commence reading the Qur’an, or participating in a class on a religious topic, without performing ritual ablutions similar to those which are to precede prayer.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that an important thirteenth-century treatise on instruction and study by Burhan al-Din al-Zarnuji would stress the importance of education to a pious Muslim life, and conclude that “learning is prescribed for us all.” It is of course impossible to estimate with any degree of certainty the number of individuals in premodern Islamic societies who were educated or literate, and it may even be difficult to be precise about what it meant to be “educated” or “literate.” Nonetheless, it is almost certain that premodern Islamic societies achieved (at least in comparison to premodern European societies) relatively high levels of literacy and of familiarity with the texts in which knowledge was embedded. Inevitably education was largely a concern of men, but the biographical sources available for the reconstruction of the social history of many premodern Islamic societies demonstrate that girls often received some level of education and religious training, and that many became recognized scholars in their own right.

The “knowledge” that Muslims are to seek is known in Arabic as *‘ilm* (pl. *‘ulum*). The word can mean knowledge of almost any sort. In more traditional contexts, however, it refers specifically to knowledge acquired through some course of study, and especially in fields of intellectual endeavor that we would now label “religious.” In this narrower sense, it constitutes the foundation of the authority of the group known by the etymologically related term *ulema* (sing. *‘alam*), literally “those who know.” The *ulema* are those scholars who are involved in the transmission of the religious sciences. In premodern Islamic societies, they included men who functioned in those positions for which training in the religious sciences was required—the judge (*qadi*) who ruled according to Islamic law, the professor (*mudarris*) who transmitted
religious learning to a rising generation of scholars, the preacher (khatib) who delivered sermons in mosques, and so on.

The ulema were not, however, a clergy (a group of people set aside by an act of consecration). Consequently, their social origins and status varied widely. Virtually anyone could be considered one of the ulema if he or she had acquired sufficient learning and the social respect that came with it. Collectively, however, they constituted perhaps the most important indigenous group in most traditional Islamic societies, and so were sometimes identified as the “heirs of the prophets”—that is, as the inheritors (in the absence of the Prophet) of religious authority, the arbiters of the religious tradition. Virtually all premodern Islamic societies have left a record of the respect in which the ulema were held. So, for example, a jurist named Ibn al-Hajj who lived in fourteenth-century Cairo commented that, when a true scholar died, the whole of creation would mourn his passing, even the birds of the air and the fish of the sea.

In many respects the distinction between that which is “secular” and that which is “sacred” is meaningless in the Islamic tradition. Nonetheless, Muslims came to distinguish broadly between those subjects and disciplines that they inherited from pre-Islamic civilizations, such as philosophy, astronomy, medicine, and the like, and those which were more immediately connected with the Qur’anic revelation and the religious tradition that stemmed from it. The former were referred to as the “sciences of the ancients” (al-'ulum al-awwal) or the “rational sciences” (al-'ulum al-'aghiyya). For many centuries, these sciences flourished in the Islamic world: names such as that of the great physician and philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 1037), known to the West as Avicenna, and the Spanish philosopher, theologian, and natural scientist Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), known as Averroes, are sufficient to demonstrate that. Clearly the processes by which the knowledge they had mastered was transmitted to subsequent generations formed a part of the educational process in the Islamic world.

For the first several centuries of Islamic history, the transmission of the religious sciences at an advanced level took place in an entirely informal fashion. Scholars would offer classes in mosques, or in private homes. Such informal settings never ceased to be important to the transmission of ‘ilm. Beginning in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, rulers and other leading figures in the Muslim societies of the Near East began to establish institutions known as madrasas that were devoted specifically to advanced instruction in the religious sciences, and especially jurisprudence. As an institutional type, madrasas may have originated in Khurasan, in eastern Iran. They soon spread throughout the Near East, and became common in the cities and towns of Egypt, Syria, Iran, and later the Anatolian and Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly important cities, such as Cairo, might boast dozens of madrasas of varying sizes. Each madrasa would typically consist of a building providing space for lessons as well as accommodations for one maktab or kuttab, often attached to a mosque. The emphasis at this level was on the rote memorization of the Qur’an, the foundation without which more advanced education was impossible. Kuttab developed within the first century or so of Islamic history, and have in many places continued to function down into modern times, sometimes in competition with schools offering a more modern curriculum.

Once the Qur’an was memorized, some students would proceed to more advanced training in various subjects. Those subjects included the study of hadith, tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis), and especially fiqh (jurisprudence), although the boundaries between them were not always sharp. In many ways, jurisprudence was the most important of the religious sciences, because of the centrality of Islamic law in guiding not only the worship but the social and political behavior of Muslims. Here, too, memorization was important, and the medieval sources are full of accounts of scholars who had committed to memory thousands of hadiths and other texts. But education in the advanced forms of the religious sciences involved much more. Two things in particular stand out. First, higher education trained the student to participate, as reader and as writer, in an interlocking nexus of texts and commentaries on those texts—in essence, it trained the student to engage in a “conversation” or “discourse” that constituted the essence of intellectual life for the ulema. This “conversation” was quite vigorous, and the ulema of the early and medieval periods of Islamic history have left a significant textual record of it. Second, higher education involved a process of socialization, in which the student gradually acquired status in the eyes of other scholars. In the absence of any consecrated priesthood or formal degree system, this element of the educational process was especially important. So a student might attach himself to one or more teachers, developing close personal as well as intellectual relations with them.

Education would begin at a young age, with instruction in Arabic and the Qur’an. This instruction might take place in the home, or alternatively in a primary school known as a maktab or kuttab, often attached to a mosque. The emphasis at this level was on the rote memorization of the Qur’an, the foundation without which more advanced education was impossible. Kuttab developed within the first century or so of Islamic history, and have in many places continued to function down into modern times, sometimes in competition with schools offering a more modern curriculum.
or more teachers and a certain number of pupils. The institution and its activities would be supported by an endowment (waqf) provided by the individual who had founded the madrasa in the first place. As a result, madrasas might vary considerably in terms of their size and the value of the endowments supporting them: Some might employ several professors and provide stipends for hundreds of students, while others might support only a few.

Several aspects of the madrasa and of the educational system it supported deserve comment. In the first place, the spread of these institutions was closely linked to political structures in the medieval Islamic world. In general, political power in the medieval Near East was fairly localized. Much of the central Islamic lands were ruled by military elites of an alien, often Turkish or Mongol, and sometimes only recently and superficially Islamized nature. The rulers’ decisions to establish and endow institutions for the transmission of the Islamic sciences constituted one strategy for securing the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the ulema who commanded considerable respect among the local Muslim population. So, for example, especially in the cities of Egypt and Syria, madrasas would often be associated with elaborate tombs constructed for the benefit of the schools’ patrons, a linkage that had both spiritual and political advantages.

Second, for all the importance of madrasas, the system of transmitting religious knowledge and of training the next generation of ulema remained persistently informal, at least through the end of the Middle Ages. The medieval sources tell us at great length with whom an individual studied, and with which professors a student developed close relationships, but very little about where those studies took place. There was no system of institutional degrees; rather, certification of the character and quality of an individual’s education was found in the ijaza. The ijaza could take different forms: It could be a formal attestation of a scholar that some individual had, in some fashion, studied a particular text with him, or it could be his statement that the student had mastered an entire field of learning. In any case, it was a personal document, which confirmed the relationship of the student to his teacher, and through him to his teacher’s own instructors. Through it, the student took his place in a genealogy of authorities that constituted the only recognized hierarchy of the educational system. Under the Ottoman Empire, this loose and personalized system gave way to a more carefully defined and delineated structure. At least in the capital of Istanbul, madrasas were graded according to a hierarchy that was in turn tied closely to the career paths of the students who passed through them. In other parts of the Muslim world, however, Islamic education continued to follow informal patterns. In Indonesia, for example, education in the Islamic sciences (including Qur’anic exegesis, jurisprudence, etc.) took place in institutions known as pesantren. On the whole the pesantren were less formal institutions than Near Eastern madrasas: They might be supported by fees and alms provided by local Muslims as well as endowments, and often were established by particular scholars themselves (and might not survive their founder’s death).

Third, the spread of madrasas in the Middle Ages had important social consequences, in particular a tendency to bind an increasingly diverse society together in a united cultural project. This tendency can be seen on a number of different levels. The texts and methods of instruction of Islamic legal and religious education were remarkably uniform across the Sunni Muslim world, and a student or scholar from Iran who found himself in, say, Damascus or Cairo would often be able to find a position in a madrasa there. Since these institutions provided stipends for students as well as salaries for teachers, they may have helped to broaden the social base of those able to devote themselves to the long process of becoming a recognized scholar. They also helped to spread Islamic teachings beyond the urban centers in which most of the ulema concentrated, as young men from the countryside might study for a time in a madrasa in the city, and then return home to supervise and instruct the religious lives of peasants and others in the villages.

**Islamic Education in the Modern Period**

In the modern period, the field of education, along with that of the family and of the social and political status of women, has been one of the principal targets of reformers, and thus also one of the major battlegrounds over the character and direction of Islamic societies. Given the traditional status and social role of the ulema, this is hardly surprising. Developments in the field of education can be grouped into three distinct areas: the establishment by Muslim governments of modern schools that have competed with traditional Islamic schools; the establishment in some places of schools sponsored by foreign groups, many of them by missionaries; and the reform of traditional schools themselves.

The establishment of a new network of schools has been one of the principal tasks of various groups of political and social reformers in the modern Muslim world. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, for example, the Ottoman government established a series of schools designed to train students in mathematics, medicine, and various other subjects. Those efforts picked up speed during the period of aggressive reforms known as the Tanzimat, from 1839 to 1876. The Ottoman viceroys of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors, undertook a similar program over the course of the nineteenth century. In both these cases, educational reform was connected with a campaign to reform and improve the effectiveness of the military: The students, that is, were originally drawn from the ranks of army officers. In both cases, also, the social effects were profound. Very often the instructors in these schools were European, and the textbooks written in European languages. Accordingly, instruction in those languages, especially French, formed a core component of the new schools’ curricula, and so they became
a channel for the importation into the Muslim world, not simply of scientific knowledge in fields such as chemistry or engineering, but also of new political ideas values and new ways of thinking about social organization. There was some opposition to these new educational institutions from the ulama, many of whom looked askance at innovations, particularly those adopted in an explicitly Westernizing form, and who resented the challenge that the new schools posed to their former monopoly on education. In the long run, however, the principal consequence of the new schools was the development of a new social elite, trained in a more-or-less European fashion and attuned to the political and social values of modern Europe, a new elite that did not replace the older elite represented by the ulama, but deprived it of much of its social recognition and authority.

Over the twentieth century, a full system of government-sponsored schools developed in most parts of the Muslim world. In many places, this task of educational reform has been linked in one fashion or another to Westernizing elites and to a conscious program of modernization. In Egypt, for example, after the military coup of 1952, the government expanded the network of primary and secondary schools as well as universities, in the process broadening considerably the social base of those with access to a modern education. A similar process took place in Turkey, where the first university was founded in the late Ottoman period, with others established after the emergence of the republic following the First World War. In Turkey, however, the process went further than in many places, because of the pronounced laicism of Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” and his republican regime. In the aftermath of the Kemalist victory, many of the madrasas were closed, along with other religious institutions. (After Ataturk’s death, restrictions on religious education were loosened: A faculty of theology was established at Ankara university in 1949, for example, and instruction in religious matters was returned to the curriculum of the elementary schools.) In Iran, too, the regime of Reza Shah and his son, Muhammad Reza Shah, undertook a vigorous program to secularize and modernize the educational system; there, however, the traditional network of madrasas training Shi’ite religious scholars remained more or less intact, though it shrank in size and lost its appeal to middle-class students. The result was considerable tension between a secularizing government and the traditional ulama, a factor of enormous significance in the Islamic revolution of 1978 and 1979. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has followed a different model, in which the traditional madrasa system has been largely replaced by state-supported schools and universities, but traditional religious subjects have remained an important part of the curriculum of the government institutions.

In many parts of the Muslim world, such as Egypt, Syria, and India, educational institutions established by Europeans (or Americans) have also played an important role during the last two centuries. Many of those responsible for establishing these schools represented religious communities or organizations. Some, such as the institutions established by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, saw their mission as the education, and often the Westernization, of students from particular communities of religious minorities. Others, however, tried to attract a more ecumenical student body, although the success of those efforts varied from place to place. Among the more notable such institutions were Robert College in Istanbul and the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University in Beirut), both founded by American Protestant missionaries. The latter in particular has had a distinguished place in the modern history of the region, as it was associated with a rebirth of Arabic literature and culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and so contributed to the development of a modern Arab national movement. The fate of these institutions in the post-colonial world has been mixed: Robert College, for example, has been effectively integrated into the larger Turkish educational system, whereas A.U.B. and the American University in Cairo have remained independent, and have continued to offer a distinctive and distinctively Western education.

Finally, there is the question of what became of the traditional network of schools, kuttabs, madrasas, and so on in the wake of the emergence of the state-supported educational system. In most parts of the Muslim world, where kuttabs and traditional systems of education have survived, they have done so at the expense of coming to constitute a separate, “religious” educational sphere. From the perspective of the classical and medieval Islamic periods, this in itself is an odd development. Moreover, the conditions that made the ulama so important in previous historical eras have disappeared or been eroded. The religious scholars can no longer rely on the patronage of rulers or an extensive network of wargfs (religious endowments) to provide financial support. Since they have had to compete with more modern, state-supported schools, those who trained and taught in them, the ulama, have often found their social status and power significantly reduced. With a variety of educational and professional options now available, traditional schools and religious subjects have held less appeal for bright and ambitious students. In contemporary Egypt, for example, where subjects such as medicine and engineering attract the most successful pupils, those studying the religious sciences typically rank at the bottom of the academic ladder.

There have been efforts to reform the traditional schools themselves. In Egypt, for example, the organization of the ancient mosque of al-Azhar and its educational program have evolved considerably in the last century. It has expanded its mission and become a full-fledged university, adding new faculties (in medicine, engineering, etc.), instruction in a number of disciplines (English, the social sciences, etc.) which previously had no place in traditional religious education, as well as a separate college for women. At the same
At the Mohabat Khan mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan, a student receives instruction in the Qur’an. In ancient traditions of Islamic education, students were required to memorize the Qur’an before pursuing additional learning, and this early emphasis on rote memorization remains today in many religious schools. Getty Images, Getty Images North America

time, al-Azhar has come much more decisively under government supervision, with the result that its officials are sometimes perceived as lacking that independence which lent authority to the medieval ulema. The Muslim community in India under British rule also produced several distinct movements of educational reform. Chief among them was that associated with the Dar al-Ulum (“House of Sciences”) at Deoband, a school founded in the nineteenth century to provide a traditional religious education with methods and in an institutional environment of a more modern nature, and which has inspired the establishment of similar institutions throughout the subcontinent. More recently, newly established institutions known as madrasas have flourished in Pakistan and elsewhere in connection with the rise of political Islam.

See also Azhar, al-; Deoband; Knowledge; Madrasa; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Science, Islam and.

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ABBASID
The early Islamic empire fell to Abbasid control with the overthrow and decimation of the Umayyad house in 750 C.E. The “Abbasid revolution” followed an extended period of clandestine organization centered in the eastern province of Khurasan. Modern scholarship has devoted considerable attention to the formation and execution of the anti-Umayyad movement. Opposition to Umayyad rule appears easier to explain, however, than the movement itself. Factors contributing to the collapse of the Umayyads included the deleterious effects of several rounds of civil war; divisions within the Syrian-based armed forces; persistent problems of legitimacy fueled by charges of fiscal corruption and impious conduct on the part of the caliphs and their kin; serious military setbacks along the frontiers of North Africa, Armenia, and Central Asia; and a fierce ideological challenge posed by leading ‘Alids and their Shi’ite partisans that gave rise to repeated uprisings, particularly late in the Umayyad period.

Abbasid success against the Umayyads was due in part to support emanating from Shi’ite quarters as well as, it appears, the broader populace of mawali (non-Arab Muslim “clients”). The leadership of Abbasid partisans, key among them Abu Muslim (d. 775), and the strength of the Khurasan-based forces under his command, tipped the balance in favor of the Abbasid movement. As Elton Daniel has made clear, alongside other historians, modern scholarship remains divided on at least two questions.

The first question concerns the point at which the Abbasid family assumed leadership of the anti-Umayyad movement. Evidence indicates that the movement remained clandestine until a very late point and that its propaganda was kept deliberately vague. In an attempt to appeal to ‘Alid sympathies, the slogans of the movement spoke only of restoring “a chosen one” (from the Prophet’s family) rather than a member of the Abbasid house specifically. The Abbasids only showed their hand at a very late point; assuming control of the caliphate, the dynasty alienated the ‘Alids and their Shi’ite backers. The second question relates to the composition of the movement itself. One view is that the movement, however broad-based it later became, only succeeded because of the participation of Arab tribesmen that had settled in Khurasan during the early Islamic conquest period. In response to the “Arabist,” and hence largely ethnic, argument, other scholars have sought an explanation based variously in the socioeconomic conditions of eighth-century Khurasan and the religiopolitical appeal of Shi’ite ideals for Arab and non-Arab Muslims alike.

The reigns of the first two Abbasid caliphs, Abu l-Abbas al-Saffah (r. 750–754) and al-Mansur (r. 754–775), began with a period of consolidation that led to the elimination of Abu Muslim among other leaders of the revolutionary movement. A period of sustained prosperity, if continued political unrest, ensued. Al-Mansur established Baghdad in the 760s and is properly viewed as the real founder of the dynasty. At its height, under al-Mansur’s immediate successors, al-Mahdi (r. 775–785), al-Hadi (r. 785–786) and, most significantly, Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), the Abbasid empire stretched from the central Maghrib across the Middle East and southern Anatolia into Transoxiana. Sustained civil war, initially a conflict between the sons of al-Rashid, Muhammad al-Amin (r. 809–813) and Abdallah al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833), followed by the effort at consolidation by al-Ma’mun over Baghdad and its hinterland, initiated the gradual dissolution of the empire. Despite the skilled leadership of later caliphs, by the end of the ninth century, local dynasties and semiautonomous governing families had come to the fore in Egypt, Khurasan, Spain, and the Maghrib.

Fragmentation of the imperial domain and a dissolution of dynastic legitimacy set in by the first quarter of the tenth century with an eclipse of Abbasid authority at the hands of bureaucratic families and condottiere. By the 940s, Syria, Iraq, Fars, and western Iran were divided into principalities under Hamdanid or Buyid (Buwayhid) control; members of both families had served in the Abbasid military before asserting control over regions of the empire. Egypt, by the 970s, fell to the control of the Fatimids, an Isma’ili Shi’ite dynasty created in the central Maghrib earlier in the tenth century; the dynasty controlled Egypt, and, for extended periods, Syria and the Hijaz, into the second half of the twelfth century. Buyid rule gave way in the mid-eleventh century to a Sunni Turkish dynasty, the Seljuks, whose reign was largely defined by rivalry with the Fatimids, conflict against the Crusader states, and the onset of an extended period of Turkish domination of Near Eastern political life. From the Buyid period on, the Abbasids themselves usually...
wielded little more than the trappings of authority; in Iraq, Abbasid history came to an end with the Mongol invasion in 1258. A branch of the family retained a wholly symbolic role under the Mamluks in Egypt until the Ottoman invasion of 1517 that brought an end to Abbasid claims upon the caliphate.

**Politics and Administration**

Taking their lead from the Umayyads, the early Abbasids worked quickly to fashion a highly centralized state. Like their predecessors, the Abbasids drew inspiration from Sassanian, Byzantine, and more deeply rooted patterns of Near Eastern imperial statecraft. For example, the caliphs relied upon elaborate systems of monarchical ritual and symbolism, such as the use of screens used to shield them during open sessions of the court. More dramatic still was the plan of Baghdad: The city, known as the Round City, was originally built around a massive circular core containing the caliphal residence, mosque, treasuries, and barracks. Historians understand the plan in terms of the assertion, through symbolic means, of the coming of a new imperial age. No less than earlier dynasties, the first Abbasids thus devoted themselves to massive building programs. In Baghdad, Samarra, and elsewhere, extensive palace complexes emerged alongside congregational mosques, extensive markets, and an impressive infrastructure of roads, canals, way-stations, and the like.

It appears as well that the early Abbasids sought to imbue their office with religious as well as political meaning. Commitment to holy war (jihad), a presiding role in the hajj, patronage of religious scholars: All were efforts to perpetuate the caliph’s moral leadership. The claim found little sustained support within the religious community. For the ulema, the traditions of theocratic monarchy contradicted the model of leadership crafted by the prophet Muhammad and the first generation of caliphs. The problem of delineating lines of authority was gradually resolved by the middle Abbasid period as the scholars asserted a near-monopoly over legal and social authority. No less significant a source of challenge to Abbasid legitimation were the sectarian movements of the Kharjites and the various Shi’ite tendencies, all of whom viewed Abbasid authority as illegitimate. Early Kharjite rebellions under the first Abbasid caliphs were suppressed at a moderate expense to the state. Far more costly, in ideological and political terms, was the challenge of their Shi’ite detractors. If the emergent Twelver Shi’ite tendency in Iraq and elsewhere remained relatively quiescent, by the early tenth century, a prominent Isma’ili movement had won support from local forces in the central Maghrib (modern-day Tunisia) and laid the foundation for the Fatimid state.

The considerable wealth of the early Abbasid empire drew predictably on agricultural production and commerce. Al-Mansur’s decision to build a new capital beside the two major Iraqi rivers and in the midst of the extensively farmed areas of central and southern Iraq, had much to do with ensuring control over both sources of income. To assure a reliable flow of money and goods, the early Abbasids continued late Umayyad efforts to systematize tax collection. These efforts, initially successful, ultimately came up short as the health of the Abbasid economy fell victim to the civil war that followed the death of al-Rashid in the early ninth century and, some decades later, the turmoil sparked by the assassination of al-Mutawakklil (r. 847–861). By the early tenth century, the Iraqi agrarian system was in sharp decline. Commercial activity flourished in the early to mid-Abbasid periods, fueled by rapid urbanization in the Near East and the related rise in investment opportunities, urban surplus wealth, and the spread of new products, chief among them paper, cotton, and sugar. Merchant networks would play a key part in the dissemination of Islam into Central Asia, the Pacific Basin, and Saharan Africa from the ninth century on.

To administer their empire, the Abbasids relied on skilled bureaucrats, many of Persian or Christian origins. These officials (kuttab) oversaw a growth in the Abbasid bureaucracy to a size and complexity unknown under the Umayyads. The offices (diwan) of the Abbasid administration included the chancery, treasury, police, and intelligence-gathering services, and a special court of appeals (mazalim) presided over by the caliph. Control of the treasury and access to the imperial family allowed key families to build extensive networks of influence as exemplified by the eastern Iranian (and originally Buddhist) Barmakid family under al-Rashid. In 803, al-Rashid, having long tolerated Barmakid authority, finally turned against the family. By the first half of the tenth century, however, his successors, such as al-Muqtadir (r. 908–932), proved incapable of resisting pressures exerted by their top bureaucrats. High-level bureaucrats retained no less crucial a role under the Buyids and Seljuks; prominent civilian officials played a similar part in Egypt, particularly late in the Fatimid period.

To defend its borders and assure political calm, the Abbasids, like the Umayyads, relied upon a semiprofessional army largely supplied and paid by the state. The mainstay of the earliest Abbasid armies were the Khurasani troops that had fought to bring the dynasty to power. A number of these regiments were settled in Baghdad by al-Mansur and his successors, and naturally viewed themselves as integral to the fortunes of the new state. The civil war that brought al-Ma’mun to power in the early ninth century witnessed the defeat of these regiments at the hands of a new generation of eastern troops recruited by the new caliph bolstered by a new-style regiment of Turkish slave troops led by his brother, and successor, Abu Ishaq al-Mu’tasim (r. 833–842). In good part to house these new forces, al-Mu’tasim founded a garrison center in Samarra, north of Baghdad; his successors would administer the empire from Samarra for the next half-century. The practice of using slave regiments, many of which were drawn from Turkic peoples of Central Asia, would be emulated by later Near Eastern dynasties. The
heads of the Samarran Turkish regiments, however, would rely on their troops, and close ties to the caliphate, to interfere in caliphal decision-making; the result was a period of violence and instability in Samarra that sapped the resources of the caliphate and set the stage for the humiliations of the tenth century.

Culture and Society
A revival of Near Eastern urban culture, rooted in Umayyad history, was a hallmark of the Abbasid period. The early Arab garrison centers, among them Basra, Kufa, Fustat, and Qayrawan, were now functioning towns while, under Umayyad and then Abbasid rule, Damascus and other pre-Islamic centers witnessed rapid population growth and cultural development. Constructed expressly as an imperial center, and occupied probably by the late 760s, Baghdad quickly emerged, however, as the nexus of early Islamic culture and scholarship. (Samarra, the imperial administrative seat for much of the ninth century, never replaced Baghdad in this sense.) Much of this activity was directly tied to the patronage of the imperial state and networks of elite urban families. Historians are divided, however, over the question of whether to credit the support of the caliphs and elite urban society with the complex translation movement that rendered, in Arabic, nearly the entire corpus of Greek scientific and philosophical work over a period of roughly two hundred years beginning under al-Mansur in the later eighth century. Equally significant was urban literary production. The list of writers, poets, musicians, and cognoscenti that flourished in the Iraqi urban milieu included such luminaries as the grammarian Sibawayh (d. 793); the poet Abu Nuwas (d. 810); the essayist, linguist, and theologian al-Jahiz (d. 868); and the tenth-century polymath Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d. 1023).
Urban patronage and the demands created by steady conversion to Islam throughout the empire explain the formation of a community of sophisticated and increasingly self-confident religious scholars (ulema). Their efforts yielded seminal contributions to Qur’anic exegesis, hadith scholarship, and Islamic law. In the Sunni regions, four major schools of legal interpretation emerged: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. The work of the great exegete and historian Abu Ja’far al-Tabari (d. 923) exemplifies both the remarkable scholarly achievements of the ulema and their ambivalent stance vis-à-vis the caliphal state. Ulema served the empire in their capacity as judges, market inspectors, and the like; their role in imperial administration was crucial. As noted earlier, however, they were loath to provide yet further backing to the caliphate. The trajectory to socioreligious prominence of the scholars occurred as the fortunes of the Abbasid state sharply declined.

See also Empires: Byzantine; Empires: Umayyad; Mahdi, Sadiq al-; Rashid, Harun al-.

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Matthew Gordon

BYZANTINE

The Byzantine Empire, which spans the period from 330 to 1453, grew gradually from the old Roman Empire. The first reference to the Byzantines in the Islamic sources occurs in the Qur’an (surat al-Rum) in conjunction with the Byzantine-Persian wars that exhausted the Byzantine Empire and allowed for the conquest of its richest and most prosperous areas by the nascent Islamic community. The Byzantine Empire was, nevertheless, to remain a main political and ideological rival to the Islamic empire. In Arabic-Islamic writings, the Byzantine Empire became the only real “House of War” and the war against it the very model and prototype of jihad.

The first period marked the greatest Byzantine influence on the developing Islamic civilization. The Arabs borrowed abundantly from Byzantine institutions. Byzantine influence was reflected in the retention of the Byzantine civil service; the use of Byzantine administrative, legal, and numismatic traditions; and language. Another striking legacy of the imperial heritage is furnished by the Umayyad policy of erecting imperial religious monuments. Indeed, it was the presence of imposing Christian monuments in Greater Syria that encouraged them to construct the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque in Damascus. Umayyad caliphs are said to have requested Byzantine help in the decoration of the mosques in Medina and Damascus.

The ambition of the first-century caliphs seems to have been directed toward the establishment of their power in Constantinople. The repeated failed attempts to conquer Constantinople, together with the transfer of the capital to Iraq after 750, distanced the center of the Islamic empire from the Byzantine frontiers and made the idea of the conquest of Constantinople a distant dream rather than a goal toward which forces and efforts were directed in a continuous and organized fashion. Predictions of a future conquest waned and were replaced by apocalyptic expectation.

Arab-Byzantine warfare settled now into episodic warfare and raiding. In the course of the eighth century, Islam reached its limits and gradually recognized a pause in the expansion of the Muslim state and faith. The practice of making two or three expeditions a year against Byzantine territory became so established in the ninth century that officials soon laid down a schedule for these operations. Under the late Umayyads and the early Abbasids, the frontier line between Arabs and Byzantines was formed by the great ranges of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus (the northeast extension of the range across the Seyhan River). Here, a line of strongholds, called al-thugur, marked and guarded the frontier. Behind this line was a second-line district containing the strongholds known as al-‘awasim, fortresses where the warriors would seek refuge. Economically, these invasions resulted in a diminution in agricultural, commercial, and industrial activity for the Byzantine Empire. Demographic changes took place as a result of the massive displacement of population. The chronicles paint a picture of devastation and abandonment of the more exposed settlements in favor of the less accessible sites. Life in these areas, which were regularly plundered, meant yearly raids, constant insecurity, and frequent flights. A certain symbiosis, nevertheless, took place along the frontier region. The result of the interpenetration between the two populations was not only the diffusion of
military techniques, material goods, and methods of economic production but also the diffusion of political ideas and general cultural aspects. This period, thus, witnessed the transmittal of classical and Hellenistic scholarship, via the Byzantines, to the Arab Muslim world.

Indeed, the relationship between the Muslim and Byzantine empires was interspersed with diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations. While no permanent diplomatic posts were maintained in either capital, embassies were frequent on both sides, either to congratulate a new ruler, or to conclude a treaty, or to negotiate an exchange of prisoners. Commercial relations and cultural exchanges are attested in an almost continuous fashion throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire.

Whereas in the eighth and ninth centuries the Byzantines had been on the defensive, the tenth century witnessed a Byzantine military revival. Increasing Byzantine consolidation was paralleled with Muslim weakness and division. The Byzantine Empire's successes in the tenth century have to be seen against this background of Muslim disunity and collapse. The rivalries between the Abbasid state, the Umayyad state of al-Andalus, and the newly founded Fatimid state in North Africa colored to a considerable extent the bilateral relations these competing states had with Byzantium.

The whole period of the Macedonian dynasty between 867 and 1025 was a brilliant time in the political existence of the Byzantine Empire. It was now the turn of the Muslim lands to suffer repeated incursions accompanied by looting and devastation. The Hamdanid principality of Aleppo rose to the occasion but the victories of its prince Sayf al-Dawlah were short-lived and soon the emirate of Aleppo and other parts of the Islamic caliphate were to feel the weight of Byzantine invasions. The main events of these wars found an echo in the poems of one of the greatest poets of the Arabic language, al-Mutanabbi.

The late eleventh century contrasted with the early part of the century when Byzantium had been powerful and wealthy. Internal difficulties in addition to the appearance of the Turks in the Near East accelerated the decline of the Byzantine state, leading to the crushing Byzantine defeat at Manzikert in 1071. This marked the collapse of Byzantium as a great political power and the beginning of the Turkification of Asia Minor. The appearance of the Crusaders and the establishment of Crusader states in the Near East revolutionized relations between the Byzantines and their Muslim neighbors. Following the conquest of Constantinople by the Latins in 1204, relations between the Byzantines and the Mamluk sultans of Egypt steadily improved in the late thirteenth century. The existence of threats common to both states, including the Mongol threat, led to the establishment of privileged relations between them. In the fourteenth century, the Byzantine empire systematically lost ground to the Ottoman Turks. In 1453 the Ottoman sultan, Mehmed II, conquered Constantinople, thus spelling the end of the Byzantine Empire.

See also **Christianity and Islam; Expansion.**

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**Nadia Maria El Cheikh**

**MONGOL AND IL-KHANID**

The Mongol empire, which at its peak stretched from Java to Lithuania, was the creation of Genghis Khan (c. 1167–1227) and his descendants. They exercised direct rule for over a century in Iran and Transoxania, southern Russia, and China, and in the less accessible heartland of these regions, particularly in parts of Central Asia, where Mongol khans were recognized as the legitimate rulers until well into the seventeenth century.

The father of Temujin, the future Genghis Khan, was murdered by a rival tribe of Tatars when Temujin was still a small boy. Abandoned by most of his father's followers, he spent a hard childhood, first simply surviving and then working for revenge. By 1206 he had succeeded in unifying most of the tribes in Mongolia and eliminating the Tatars and other powerful groups, incorporating the survivors into his own forces. He was enrowned as ruler of the Mongols and adopted the title Genghis Khan.

There followed a sustained attack, first on the neighboring powers such as the Tanguts (Hsi Hsia) and then on north China, ruled by the Jurchen (Chin) dynasty (1115–1234). Peking fell in 1215, but it took many more campaigns for the Chin to be crushed. The scale and determination of their resistance was one of the factors that helped to transform the Mongol assaults from raids on the traditional nomadic model into more permanent wars of conquest and occupation, for there is little to suggest that the annexation of north China was part of Genghis Khan's original intentions.
As the Mongol war machine gathered momentum, its belligerence necessarily attracted further acts of defiance and inevitable punishment. Their attention drawn ever westward by the flight of their vanquished foes, the Mongols came up against the Khwarazmian empire, based on the cities of the Jaxartes and Oxus rivers. The massacre of a Mongol-sponsored merchant caravan in Otrar in 1218 provided the pretext for the invasions of the Transoxania and eastern Iran, where the Khwaramshah's tenuous control was quickly destroyed in a devastating series of sieges. Pursuing the Khwaramshah across northern Iran, the Mongol generals Subetei and Jebe then turned north across the Caucasus and defeated a Russian force at the Kalka river in 1223, before returning to Mongolia.

By Genghis Khan’s death in 1227, these widespread and crushing victories opened up huge new territories to the Mongols. It was the work of his descendants to consolidate them into an empire. His son and successor, Ögedei (1229–1241), continued the conquest of North China and further expansion west, where the Mongols won great victories in Poland and Hungary before consolidating their rule over southern Russia based on the steppes north of the Caspian Sea. These territories, of the so-called Golden Horde, were held by the descendants of Genghis Khan’s oldest son, Jochi. They maintained their dominance over the disunited Russian princes until the early sixteenth century, by keeping separate from them and retaining the essence of their nomadic lifestyle. Nevertheless, their capital at Sarai on the Volga became a great cosmopolitan trading center. As early as the 1260s, but definitively by the 1330s, the khans of the Golden Horde had converted to Islam.

By contrast, in Iran, an ancient sedentary civilization (like China), a transformation in outlook was required if the nomadic Mongols were to rule effectively. The original conquests were consolidated by Genghis Khan’s grandson, Hulegu, who captured Baghdad in 1258 and took the title Il-Khan or subject Khan (to the Great Khan in Mongolia, and later in China). Hulegu’s dynasty, the Il-khanids (1258–1335), relied heavily on the Persian bureaucratic families to operate their oppressive financial administration, but there remained a fundamental reluctance to abandon Mongol precedents. The unwritten Mongol code of law, the Yasa, continued to be honored, even after the accelerated Islamization that followed the conversion of Ghazan Khan in 1294. Ultimately, the Il-khanate ran out of heirs, the dynasty suffering from an endemic instability in the succession to the throne that had first caused the fragmentation of the empire into four main regional states and then the weakening of the states themselves.

In the last of these states, the Chaghatay Khanate, which embraced Transoxania, Turkestan, and Sinkiang, the Mongols retained rule longer than elsewhere, owing partly to the terrain and the preponderance of desert and steppe over the isolated oases along the celebrated “silk route.” Even more than in the case of the Golden Horde, the Mongols could prey on their subjects from a distance, while the largely Turkicized subjects were more like the Mongols themselves: not Russians, Persians, or Chinese, with their alien traditions and norms. These regions were initially part of the inheritance of Ögedei and his elder brother Chaghatay, but the descendants of Ögedei were almost eliminated when they lost the succession to the Great Khanate in 1251 as the result of a coup by the Toluids (descendants of Genghis Khan’s youngest son, Tolui). While the Western Chaghatay leaders began to embrace Islam in the early fourteenth century, pagan ways prevailed in the east up to the sixteenth century.

Controlling a vast area of Asia, the four contiguous Mongol empires opened up territories to new movements of people, fueling a process of cultural exchange, artistic patronage, and commercial relations, which did much to counteract the initial savagery of their conquests. Despite their first assault on Islam, ultimately the Mongols were responsible for spreading Islam among the Turkic peoples and tribes who were brought into Central Asia as a result of the Mongol conquests.

An illustrated manuscript of Genghis Khan and his sons appears in the volume one color insert.

See also Political Organization.

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*Charles Melville*

**MOGUL**

The Mogul empire of India was established by Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur (d.1530), a descendant of Emir Timur (d.1405). On his mother’s side, Babur was related to the Chaghtai khans of Kashghar. Expelled from his ancestral principality of Farghana (modern Kokand) because of internecine feuds of the Timurid princes and the rise of Uzbek power under Shaibani Khan, Babur eventually established himself at Kabul in 1505, and in 1526, defeating Sultan Ibrahim Lodi in the Battle of Panipat, founded the Mogul dynasty in India. The name “Mogul” was given to it by popular usage in India; the later Central Asian designation for it, equally loose, was Chaghatai. The family continued (with the exception of the Sur interlude, 1540–1555) to exercise imperial hegemony over much of the Indian subcontinent until 1739 when defeat at the hands of Nadir Shah of Iran signaled the empire’s rapid disintegration.

Babur brought with him a tradition in which respect for Mongol customs was quite strong, though modified by the conventional attachment to Sunni orthodoxy. The further
fact that the Timurids were highly urbanized and cultured drew them irresistibly to Iranian culture, despite the fact that in the sixteenth century it assumed a radical Shi’ite color. All these factors demonstrated an eclectic attitude that made the Moguls particularly suited to govern a country of varied cultural traditions like India.

Babur is credited with recruiting a large number of Afghans and Indian Muslims into his nobility. The recruitment of many Persians by Humayun (1540–1556) was a further important development. But the decisive transformation in this respect came under Humayun’s son Akbar (1556–1605). Having recruited a large number of Rajput chiefs, Akbar rendered the Mogul nobility a truly composite group, a characteristic that persisted until 1739.

Akbar, however, was not simply motivated by eclecticism. He came to have strong views on reason and religion. He evoked Ibn al-‘Arabi’s philosophy to justify a policy of universal tolerance under the principle of Sulb-e Kal (Absolute Peace) and became a sturdy defender of reason and critic of old social customs. He, and his major spokesman, Abu’l Fazl, sought to give to sovereignty a nonsectarian character; the sovereign was held to be a direct representative of God and claimed almost limitless authority, as necessary for carrying out the sovereign’s abundant responsibilities.

It is arguable that Akbar’s claims to absolute sovereign powers derived from his own practical success in achieving not only a series of conquests that brought most of India under his control but also from achieving an immense degree of administrative systematization and centralization. The latter was reflected in the introduction of mansab or number-rank (1574) for rigorously setting the pay and size of military contingents of the nobles, and the division of the empire into provinces (subs) (1580) where the administration of one province was like that of any other. The practice of linking mansab obligation to expected income (jama’) from revenue assignment (jagir) gave new impetus to financial unification.

The political authority and control on resources in the Mogul empire tended to be concentrated in the hands of high nobles. They, along with hereditary chiefs allied closely with the empire, formed the ruling class, whose unity and cohesion, according to Irfan Habib in The Agrarian System of Mughal India, “found its practical expression in the absolute powers of the emperor” (p. 366). Detailed regulations governed the extraction of agrarian surplus by the revenue collection machine of the empire, which tended to the method of assessment by measurement and collection of revenue in money rather than in kind.

The urban-based educated Muslims (ashraf) claiming noble descents along with favored non-Muslim scholar priests were marked out for state patronage. Some of the ashraf manned the offices in the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs (Sadarat) including those of judges (qazis) who enforced Muslim as well as customary law and even imperial regulations. The criminal (faudars) cases were generally decided by local military commanders (shiqdar, faudars, and the like) in accordance with regulations (zawab) laid down from time to time by the emperor.

The bulk of the Mogul army was represented by mounted archers and spearmen employed by the mansabdars out of the income of their revenue assignments. An imperial functionary (bakshshi) maintained a descriptive roll of these troopers who were brought to muster. To check fraud, branding (dagb) of horses was practiced. A special corps of cavalry (abadis), a park of artillery (tup-kanaw), and a large number of musketeers employed by the emperor supplemented the armed might of the empire significantly. The matchlock muskets introduced in India by Babur seem to have contributed significantly to the centralizing process in the Mogul empire.

Under Akbar’s successors Jahangir (1605–1627), Shahjahan (1628–1658), and Aurangzeb (1659–1707), the empire continued to expand, though Kandahar was finally lost to Iran (1648). Practically the entire peninsula (excluding Kerala) came under Mogul control, especially with the annexations of the kingdoms of Bijapur (1686) and Golkunda (1687).

Broadly, the administrative institutions of the empire as established by Akbar were maintained by his three successors, with certain changes of a relatively minor character. The religious policy of Jahangir followed mainly that of Akbar, while under Shahjahan and Aurangzeb, it tended to incline toward Muslim orthodoxy. In 1679 Aurangzeb imposed the jizya or poll-tax on non-Muslims, which Akbar had abolished in 1564.

The Mogul emperors were great patrons of art and architecture. In both it was Akbar again under whom the great achievements began. He gave to Mogul painting its particular humanistic touch and realism; and immense innovativeness to architecture as in Fatehpur Sikri and Sikandra. Under Jahangir, painting reached its highest technical perfection, and under Shahjahan, the Taj Mahal stands as testimony to the greatness reached by Mogul architecture.

Under the Mogul emperors several Sanskrit works were translated into Persian. Akbar had had the Mahabharata translated; and Dara Shukoh (d.1659), the Mogul prince, translated the Upanisads. There was also the growth of a lively literature in Persian, leading in the eighteenth century to the development of the literary Urdu language, a real legacy of Indo-Mogul culture.

The Maratha uprising under Shivaji (d.1680) greatly weakened the Mogul empire, and the decline of the empire began with the repeated struggles for succession during 1707–1719. After a little recovery of stability in the early years of Muhammad Shah (1719–1748), the Mogul empire began to cede territory after territory to the Marathas. The coup de grace
was delivered by Nadir Shah in 1739–1740, with the Persian conqueror’s great victory at the Battle of Karnal, near Delhi. The Mogul empire rapidly lost control over provinces. Delhi itself passed under the control of Marathas (1772–1803) and finally the English in 1803. Henceforth, the emperor’s writ was confined to the Red Fort in Delhi. The Rebels in 1857 attempted to restore the last emperor, Bahadur Shah II Zafar (1775–1862), to power, but the English deposed him on recapturing Delhi and so terminated the dynasty.

See also Political Organization.

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*Iqtidar Alam Khan*

**OTTOMAN**

Ottoman state builders (c. 1300–1922) erected and maintained one of the more durable and successful examples of empire-building in world history. Born during medieval times in the northwest corner of then Byzantine-Asia Minor, the Ottoman state achieved world-empire status in 1453, with its conquest of Constantinople. For a century before and two centuries after that epochal event, the Ottoman Empire was among the most powerful political entities in the Mediterranean-European world. Indeed, but for the Ming state in China, the Ottoman Empire in about 1500 was likely the most formidable political system on the planet.

The rapid expansion of the Ottoman state from border principality to world empire was due partly to geography and the proximity of weak enemies; but it owed more to Ottoman policies and achievements. After the migrations of Turkish peoples from Central Asia broke the border defenses of the Byzantine Empire back in the eleventh century, many small states and principalities vied for supremacy. The Ottoman dynasty emerged on the Byzantine borderlands not far from Constantinople, and its supporters employed pragmatic statecraft and methods of conquest and rewarded the human material at hand—whether Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, Turkish, Christian, or Muslim—for good service. These pragmatic policies, coupled with an exceptional openness to innovation, including military technology, go far in explaining why this particular minor state ultimately attained world-power status.

Due to developments elsewhere in the world, notably the rise of capitalism and industrialism in Europe and then elsewhere, and the New World wealth that poured into Europe, the Ottoman Empire lost its preeminent position, and by about 1800 it had declined to the status of a second-class economic, military, and political power. Internally, after its initial rapid expansion, innovation diminished as entrenched bureaucrats and statesmen acted to preserve positions for their children and closed entry to newcomers with fresh ideas. Internationally, the state encountered increasingly powerful European states on its western and northern fronts, and some of these new states had been enriched by New World wealth. Warfare became more expensive and more difficult, and expansion finally ground to a halt in the late seventeenth century.

The empire’s grand defeat before the gates of Vienna in 1683 was followed by some victories, but mainly it experienced defeats during the subsequent one hundred years. During the nineteenth century, a successful series of programs measurably strengthened both the state and its military. The state grew vastly in size and in the scope of its
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A sixteenth-century Venetian portrait of Ottoman sultan Suleyman I. Between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was among the most powerful in the world. © Ali Meyer/Corbis

activities. Whereas the early modern state primarily collected taxes and maintained order, the more modern state took responsibility for the health, education, and welfare of its subjects. Despite an impressive record of reform, however, the empire was defeated in the First World War, and was partitioned by the Great Powers, notably Great Britain and France. Ottoman successor states today include Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Montenegro, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, Turkey, and other states in the Balkans, the Arab world, North Africa, and along the north shore of the Black Sea.

Military, Fiscal, and Political Organization

In its domestic politics, the Ottoman state underwent continuous change. The Ottoman ruler, the sultan, began as one among equals in the early days of the state. Between about 1453 and the later sixteenth century, however, sultans ruled as true autocrats. Subsequently, others in the imperial family and other members of the palace elites—often in collaboration with provincial elites—maintained real control of the state until the early nineteenth century. Thereafter, bureaucrats and sultans vied for domination. In sum, the sultan nominally presided over the imperial system for all of Ottoman history but actually, personally, ruled only for portions of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and nineteenth centuries. It seems important to stress that the principle of sultanic rule by the Ottoman family was hardly ever challenged through the long centuries of the empire’s existence. While this rule was a constant, change otherwise was the norm in domestic politics.

Political power almost always rested in the imperial center and, depending on the particular period, extended into the provinces either through direct military and political instruments or, indirectly, through fiscal means. The state exerted its military, fiscal, and political authority through a number of mechanisms that evolved continuously. One cannot speak of a single, invariant Ottoman system or method of rule, except to say that it was based on policies of flexibility and adaptiveness. Military, fiscal, and political instruments changed constantly, hardly a surprising situation in an empire that existed from the medieval to the modern age. Moreover, much of what historians thought they knew about Ottoman institutions has been challenged and rewritten. Take, for example, the cliché that the janissaries’ prowess as soldiers declined when they ceased living together in bachelor barracks and served as married men. It turns out that already in the fifteenth century, when the janissaries were the most feared military unit in the Mediterranean world, at least some were married with families.

The Ottoman state at first depended on the so-called timar system to compensate much of its military, which was dominated by cavalrymen fighting with bows and arrows. Under this system, the cavalryman was granted revenues from a piece of land sufficient to maintain himself and his horse. He did not actually control the land, but only the taxes deriving from it. Peasants worked the land and the taxes they paid supported the timar cavalryman while he was on campaign as well as when he was not fighting. In reality, the timar was at the center of Ottoman affairs for the earlier era of Ottoman history, perhaps only during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and part of the sixteenth centuries. Hardly had the state developed the timar system when the regime began to discard it, and the cavalry it was meant to support. Increasingly, the empire turned to infantrymen bearing firearms. As it did, the janissaries ceased to be a small, praetorian elite and evolved into a firearm infantry of massive size. To support these full-time soldiers required vast amounts of cash, and so tax-farming replaced the timar system as the central fiscal instrument. (Timar holders owed service in exchange for the timar revenues, whereas tax farmers paid a sum at the tax farm auction for the right to collect the taxes, and they incurred no service obligation.) By 1700, lifetime tax-farms—seen as better cash cows—began to become commonplace. Varying combinations of cavalry and firearm infantry, along with massive uses of artillery worked quite well for a time, but lost out in the arms race to central and eastern European foes by the end of the seventeenth century. The Ottoman military continued to evolve and, in the eighteenth century, firearm troops of provincial notables and the forces of the Crimean Khanate largely replaced both the janissary infantry and the
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A nineteenth-century watercolor depiction of Ottoman sultan Mehmet IV (1642–1692). Early in the Ottoman Empire, the role of the sultan was less autocratic than it became in the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. THE ART ARCHIVE/TURKISH AND ISLAMIC ART MUSEUM ISTANBUL/DAGLI ORTI

timur cavalry. During the nineteenth century, universal male conscription controlled by the central state slowly developed, and this was perhaps the most radical transformation of all. Lifetime tax-farms were abandoned but tax-farming continued, often in the hands of local notables in partnerships with the Istanbul regime.

Judicial Organization

Both religious and secular law regulated the lives of Ottoman subjects. The Ottoman state determined who administered the laws, members drawn from the Muslim, Christian, or Jewish communities, or other officials of the imperial state. That is, the sultan or his agents determined the judges in the respective communities, either directly or by appointing officials who, in turn, named the judges. In principle, the religious laws of the respective communities prevailed, be they community Muslim, Jewish, or Christian. In practice, however, the Muslim courts were commonly used by subjects of all religions. This was due in part to the quality of the justice which the judge (kadi) administered, and in part because it was understood that rulings from such courts might well have greater weight than those from Christian or Jewish sources. In addition to this religious law, the state routinely passed its own, secular ordinances (kanun), while always paying lip-service to its adherence to Islamic principles. In the nineteenth century, when a flood of ordinances and regulations marked the presence of an expanding bureaucratic state, even this lip-service frequently fell away, replaced by claims to scientific management.

Economic Organization

Throughout most of its history, the Ottoman economy remained agrarian, although again the specifics underwent considerable changes over time. During the various periods of the empire’s existence, most Ottoman subjects raised a wide variety of different crops for subsistence and for sale. The particular mix of crops changed over time, but cereals remained dominant throughout, supplemented by a changing array of other crops. During the seventeenth century, for example, tobacco imports from the New World ceased as tobacco became commonly cultivated in the Balkan, Anatolian, and Arab provinces of the empire. In the nineteenth century tobacco became a major export commodity.

In theory, the vast majority of land was owned by the sultan and merely used by others to grow crops and raise animals. In practice, however, these land users generally enjoyed security of tenure. Sharecropping was widespread and was the major vehicle by which goods were brought to market. Most cultivators were small landholders; large estates were comparatively unusual. Slave labor was common for domestic work but very rare in agriculture. Commercialization of agriculture enjoyed considerable development in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in order to meet mounting foreign demand and, in the latter period, the increasing number of Ottoman urban residents. The increasing amount produced for sale derived from committing increasing acreage to cultivation, not from more intensive exploitation.

Ottoman manufacturing, for its part, was and remained largely the domain of small-scale hand producers, although there was some mechanization in the late period. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, foreign markets for Ottoman manufactures fell away, but producers continued to enjoy a vast domestic market for their wares. During the nineteenth century, moreover, several new export industries emerged, notably rug making and silk spinning, staffed largely with female labor working outside the home. In transportation and communication there were important technological breakthroughs during the second half of the nineteenth century. Steam replaced sail on the sea, while a relatively thin network of railroads emerged; telegraph lines, for their part, were built to connect most towns and cities.

Religious and National Identity

There is considerable debate about the nature and quality of Ottoman intercommunal relations, and there are many popular stereotypes around the “terrible Turk” who slaughtered Ottoman Christians. For nearly all of Ottoman history, this stereotype is not true. From the fourteenth century until the 1870s, the majority of Ottoman subjects professed one or
another version of Christianity as their religion. Yet, throughout this period, the state’s official religion was Islam. The key to Ottoman success and a major reason for its longevity lay in the tolerant governmental treatment of those who did not share its professed religion. The Ottoman state, for nearly all of its history, was a multinational, multireligious entity that did not seek to impose Islam on its subjects. This fact has often been forgotten in the confusion surrounding the emergence of the Ottoman successor states, but it remains nonetheless true that much of the credit for the durability of the empire lay in the flexibility of Ottoman rule and the lightness of the Ottoman hand on the subject masses.

The Ottoman system recognized difference and protected those differences so long as its subjects paid their taxes and rendered obedience. Until the eighteenth century, the era of the Enlightenment, minorities in the Ottoman world likely were treated better than in Europe. During some years of the final Ottoman era, however, there admittedly were atrocities. These should be understood in the context of the generally admirable record of intercommunal relations over the 600-year lifespan of the Ottoman Empire.

See also Balkans, Islam in the; Christianity and Islam; Europe, Islam in; Expansion; Judaism and Islam; Kemal, Namek; Nur Movement; Nursi, Said; Young Ottomans.

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Donald Quataert

SAFAVID AND QAJAR

The Safavid period (1501–1722) continued many Mongol and Timurid practices, but may also be seen as the beginning of modern Iranian history. The Safavids unified much of Iran under single political control. Under them a political system emerged in which political and religious boundaries overlapped. The Safavid concept of kingship, combining territorial control with religious legitimacy, would endure, with modifications, until the late twentieth century. Many administrative institutions established by them survived well into the Qajar era. The Safavid era, finally, saw the beginning of frequent and sustained diplomatic and commercial relations with Europe.

The Safavids, who were of Kurdish ancestry, began in about 1300 as a mystical order centered in the northwestern Iranian town of Ardabil, the burial place of the order’s founder, Shaykh Safi al-Din. The nature of their original beliefs remains unclear but in time they turned to a extremist form of Shi’ism that included the veneration of a leader seen as an incarnation of god. Though the Safavid leaders were spiritual leaders rather than tribal chiefs, they built their state with the military assistance of tribal groups. Known as Qizilbash, redheads, in reference to their red headgear, these Turkmen migrants from Syria and Anatolia were to become the mainstay of the Safavid army.

Under Shah Isma’il (r. 1501–1524) the Safavids evolved from a messianic movement to a political dynasty. Upon seizing power, Isma’il proclaimed Tabriz his capital and Shi’ism the faith of his realm, thus endowing his new state with a strong ideological basis. In time, Isma’il extended his territory as far as Iraq and the Persian Gulf. His expansionism brought him into conflict with the Uzbeks in the east and the Ottomans in the west, both Sunni powers that felt threatened by the formation of a militant Shi’ite state on their borders. Equipped with firearms, the Ottomans in 1514 routed the Safavid army in the battle of Chaldiran and briefly occupied Tabriz.

Aside from waging war, Isma’il concentrated on state building. In 1508 he took a series of measures that increased the power of Iranian administrators at the expense of that of the Qizilbash. Henceforth a functional division emerged between ethnic Iranians, who in majority staffed the bureaucracy, and ethnic Turks, who dominated the army. Under Isma’il the first example of the influence of court women is also seen, a legacy of the Central Asian element in Safavid statecraft. Tajlu Khanum, one of his wives and the mother of the future Shah Tahmasp, was as powerful as the shah himself in Isma’il’s later reign.

Shah Isma’il was succeeded by his ten-year-old son, Tahmasp (r. 1524–1576). The first decade of his long reign was marked by a civil war among the Qizilbash that nearly overwhelmed the shah. Once he emerged from this conflict, Tahmasp adopted a policy designed to curtail the unruly Qizilbash. He continued to appoint Tajik officials to key positions traditionally reserved for Turks, and began the trend of giving administrative posts to Georgians and
Armenians, so-called ghulams, who were captured during expeditions into the Caucasus. (The women became employed in the royal harem.) Until 1555, when he concluded a peace accord with them, Shah Tahmasp also fought three wars against the Ottomans, and in the process moved his capital from Tabrız to Qazvin, a city located further in the interior.

Shah Tahmasp presided over a court that fostered culture. The quality of the illuminated manuscripts produced during his reign would never be surpassed. His religious policy focused on the further implantation of Shi‘ism and saw attempts to standardize religious practice around a scriptural, urban-based version of the faith as opposed to the folk beliefs of the Turkmen. To disseminate the creed, the shah also invited Shi‘ite scholars from Arab lands, most notably from Lebanon, to migrate to Iran.

These trends continued and culminated under Shah ‘Abbas (r. 1587–1629), the strongest and most visionary of the Safavid rulers, who came to power in 1576, following the interregnum of the cruel Shah Isma‘il II and the nearly blind Mohammad Khodabandeh. Shah ‘Abbas was above all a brilliant strategist, keen to regain the territories that had been lost to internal sedition and outside enemies during the turmoil preceding his reign. Well aware that he could not fight on two fronts at once, he made a humiliating peace with the Ottomans so as to be able to take on the Uzbeks and attend to domestic matters. This done, he resumed war with the Ottomans and reconquered large parts of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. In later years, ‘Abbas recaptured Qandahar (lost again in 1638), established control over the Persian Gulf littoral by ousting the Portuguese from Hormuz, and seized part of Mesopotamia, including Baghdad (lost again in 1639).

In his domestic agenda Shah ‘Abbas pursued centralized, personalized power and the maximization of cash revenue. He liquidated a number of powerful Qizilbash leaders, including the ones who had helped him come to power, and suppressed any religious group that challenged his authority. He also resettled tribes to far-off regions with the aim of strengthening frontiers and breaking up loyalties. In the 1590s the shah transferred his capital from Qazvin to Isfahan, a move that gave Iran an administrative center closer to its geographical center, aside from completing the shift from a Turkish to a Persian cultural focus. Most importantly, Shah ‘Abbas set out to break the power of the Qizilbash. He removed a great deal of the state land that they controlled as fiefs by turning it into crown domain administered directly by a wazir appointed by the shah, so that revenue would flow into the royal treasury. Ghulams were appointed as governors of these newly formed crown provinces. Shah ‘Abbas’s reforms mark an important phase in the evolution of Safavid Iran from a steppe formation to a bureaucratic state.

Shah ‘Abbas is especially famous for encouraging trade. He reestablished road security and had numerous caravansaries constructed throughout his realm. Under him, Isfahan, endowed with a newly built administrative and commercial center, became a thriving city of some 500,000 inhabitants. His special focus on the Persian Gulf trade and his efforts to stimulate the export of silk combined a need for revenue and a desire to open up an alternative outlet to the land-based routes via Ottoman territory. He allowed Western merchants to settle in the newly founded port of Bandar ‘Abbas, offering them commercial privileges in return for royal profit and the promise of naval assistance. His overtures to the West, expressed in countless embassies to European courts, were mostly aimed at finding allies in his anti-Ottoman struggle.

Under Shah ‘Abbas’s direct successors, Safi (r. 1629–1642) and ‘Abbas II (1642–1666), Iran offered the outward appearance of stability. Baghdad was lost to the Ottomans, but Shah ‘Abbas II managed to recapture Qandahar from the Mughals. Though competent rulers, both lacked the vision and determination of their predecessor. Under them, economic problems became apparent and state control weakened. Some of these problems were perhaps inevitable given Iran’s inherent weaknesses—much arid, unproductive land, an unevenly spread and heavily nomadic population, a dependence on the outside world for precious metal. Others stemmed from the very same measures taken by ‘Abbas I. Good examples of those are the conversion to crown land and his practice of isolating the heir to be in the royal harem for fear that he might present a premature challenge to royal power. The first led to extortion of the peasants by supervisors who only leased the land for a limited time and thus saw no reason for long-term investment. The second produced inept rulers and empowered those who inhabited the royal quarters, eunuchs and women. The army, already weakened by the continuing antagonism between the Qizilbash and the ghulams, became largely neglected following the conclusion of a definitive peace accord with the Ottomans in 1639.

It was under the last two Safavid shahs, Solayman (r. 1666–1694) and Sultan Hosayn (r. 1694–1722), that order and stability began to unravel. Whereas their predecessors had been roving warriors, forever vigilant in patrolling their realm to pacify unruly tribes and repel border raids, they reigned as stationary monarchs who, aside from occasional hunting parties, preferred to live immured in the palace, hidden from the public eye. Disconnected and hardly interested in administrative affairs, they relied on their grand wazirs for the daily running of the state. Though able administrators who successfully tapped new sources of revenue to fill the royal coffers, these chief ministers were unable to combat the increasingly abusive practices of provincial governors and to reverse the crippling corruption and factionalism in court circles. The results were seen in a deteriorating
currency, a fall in agricultural output, and growing numbers of bankruptcies among merchants. Equally serious was the pressure that began to be put on non-Muslims, a function of the growing influence of the Shi’ite clergy, especially under the pious and impressionable Shah Sultan Hosayn, who ruled under the spell of his maternal grandmother, Miryam Begum; the court eunuchs; and Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, a conservative cleric who advocated a literal interpretation of the faith. The Armenians of New Julfa near Isfahan, a group with a disproportionately large role in the economy, lost their tax advantages and by the late seventeenth century many wealthy merchants began to migrate to Europe, India, and Russia.

As of 1710 disintegration set in. While the shah built pleasure gardens, the cost of which was extorted from peasants and merchants, the country faced internal rebellion and outside attack. The final blow came from the east, with Baluchi and Afghan tribesmen occupying Kerman and Mashad. In 1722 a small contingent of Afghan Ghilzai warriors penetrated the interior, defeated a hastily assembled Safavid army, and proceeded to besiege Isfahan. The city fell six months later, brought to its knees by starvation, and Sultan Hosayn was forced to confer the title of shah on Mahmud, the Afghan leader. Meanwhile, Russia and the Ottoman Empire took advantage of the turmoil by occupying Iran’s northwestern regions.

Artwork original to the period appears in the volume one color insert.

See also ‘Abbas I, Shah; Isma’il I, Shah; Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir; Political Organization; Tahmasp I, Shah.

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Rudi Matthee

SASSANIAN

With the Arab victory over the Iranian forces at Nihavand in 641–642 C.E., referred to by the Arabs as the “Victory of Victories,” the fall of the Sassanian Empire was final. The Sassanians had been a formidable power that had endured for four centuries, but in the end the corruption and greed of the ruling and priestly classes had left the imperial coffers depleted and, perhaps more importantly, eroded support among the empire’s numerous heterodox subjects. Such internal problems hampered efforts to efficiently muster and deploy the impressive Iranian defenses. The ponderous Sassanian cavalry ultimately succumbed to the speedy attack and retreat tactics of the lightly armed Arab troops.

Fifteen years after Nihavand, most of the erstwhile Sassanian lands had come under Muslim control. Nevertheless, many of the fallen Iranian cities revolted and had to be reconquered several times. Even after the murder of the last Sassanian monarch, Yazdgard III, ended his flight from province to province from 651 to 652 C.E., parts of the population in various provinces continued to break their treaties of surrender to the Arabs and returned to their old religious practices and traditions. Particularly, changes of local governorship and the deaths of caliphs presented occasions for revolt, as was the case after the murders of ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali.

In spite of this ongoing resistance and the polemics that were directed against the Arab conquerors—who were at times portrayed as devils and associates of Ahriman (the evil spirit in Zoroastrian belief)—a new landholding class eventually emerged, whose strength gradually increased through intermarriage with the indigenous residents.

The arrival of the new Arab overlords in Iran also brought with it a new religion. But the conversion of Iran to Islam was neither swift nor of a piece. Certain groups converted to Islam on a collective basis, but this was the exception rather than the rule. Some sections of the population opted for the jizya (tax levied on non-Muslims) and the kharaj (land tax), accepting the dhimmi status (a second-class-citizen status granting non-Muslims protection and limited religious freedom under Muslim rule) in order to hold on to their old ways. The privileges that came with conversion were, however, a decisive argument for many, especially those who had been disadvantaged by Zoroastrian religious organization and its rules. Artisans and craftsmen had been specifically affected in this way, as the Zoroastrian taboos regarding the pollution of the elements of fire, water, and earth clashed with many aspects of their professions, branding them unclean by association.

Ultimately, greater parts of the populace recognized some of the fundamental similarities between Islamic and Zoroastrian faith, which share the belief in one good god, one evil spirit or devil, a final judgment, and the notions of Paradise and Hell. Acceptance of the Islamic faith became more and more widespread. But even for those that held to the Zoroastrian faith, the restrictions imposed by the dhimmi status were less severe, and the privileges greater, than had been the case for Christians and Jews under Zoroastrian rule. During the Umayyad period, however, there was a marked increase in contempt and intolerance of Muslims toward Zoroastrian subjects, prompting a group of them to eventually emigrate to Gujarat, where their descendants, known as Parsees, practice their belief to this day.

It is noteworthy that adherents of non-Zoroastrian religions, or of groups that had been considered heretics by the Zoroastrian establishment in Sassanian times, enjoyed a distinctly greater amount of religious freedom under Muslim
rule. The Sassanians had suppressed the heterodox groups existing in their empire, and to them the Islamic practice of giving *dhimmi* status to the “people of the Book” was tantamount to liberation.

The decline of Zoroastrianism in the face of the advent of Islam was by no means a rapid nor an altogether peaceful process. Interfaith strife and competition over local authority and resources persisted into Buyid times, and as late as the end of the tenth century an unsuccessful uprising of Zoroastrians took place in Shiraz. Although urban

Zoroastrianism had declined at the close of the tenth century, attacks on Muslims on their way to worship were apparently still quite frequent in some provinces, and religious riots occurred constantly. The Muslims—Arabs as well as Iranian converts—usually emerged victorious from such confrontations due to their increasing numbers, bolstered both by conversion of Iranians as well as immigration of Arabs into Iran.

The rivalry between Zoroastrians and Muslims found expression not solely in riots and skirmishes. The two segments of the population also competed over economic assets,
specifically the trade between China and Iran via Central Asia. On the other hand, some Arab immigrants joined existing trade networks, a cooperation that resulted in an increase of overland trade.

The degree of either cooperation or enmity between the two communities depended to a large extent on the way the conquest of each particular area or province had unfolded. The provinces in Iraq, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan, and Sistan, for example, had surrendered to the Arab invaders after comparatively few battles. In the absence of memories of prolonged and bloody conflict, amicable relations were more readily forged. In these areas, where Arabs and Iranians even stood together against outside aggressors like Turks and Mongols, the Muslim colonizers encountered a more fertile climate for their efforts toward religious conversion, which subsequently took place in a comparatively peaceful manner.

Urban strongholds central to Zoroastrian power, in which had to be conquered in protracted battles under immense bloodshed, were far less welcoming to the invaders, who in turn employed draconian measures to ensure their dominance. The resulting atmosphere in such locales was consequently characterized by mutual resentment, distrust, and constant tension, a state of affairs that was ameliorated only with great hesitation. Finally, there were areas where hostility and active conflict persisted long after Arab settlements had been established. In the Transoxanian and Caspian regions, constant military confrontations between Iranian lords and Arab generals precluded coexistence, cooperation, and peaceful conversion for longer than anywhere else in Iran. But ultimately, all efforts to oust the Arabs failed. The late Sassanian Empire had not fostered a society that stood united behind its ruling and priestly classes. After its fall, Zoroastrian leaders attempting to rally military opposition against the Arab conquest could summon neither the trust nor the support of the masses required for such undertakings.

See also Islam and Other Religions; Minorities: Dhimmis.

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Henning L. Bauer

TIMURID

The Timurid Empire was a powerful, conquest-driven empire that devolved into disunited dynasties more noted for artistic than political endeavors. Tamerlane (Timur Lang) (1336–1405) was not a Mongol but emerged out of the chaos of post-Mongol Turkistan. He was born on 8 April 1336 at Khwarju Ilghar, just south of Samarkand near Shahr-e Sabz. Although his people (Turks), the various lineages of the Barlas, lived a pastoral life and became nomads, they existed in close proximity to sedentary people and sedentary culture, even while antagonistic to it. Thus, like Genghis Khan (r. 1206–1227), Tamerlane was the product of a mixed environment and was not a man of the deep steppe. The political system that he later employed to rule his empire was also mixed. It continued the Chaghatay ulas tradition of a strict separation between sedentary and nomadic sectors, with the sedentary world (the tax base) protected from destructive nomadic incursions to the greatest degree possible and ruled, not by tribal chiefains, who were simultaneously commanders of tribally based military forces, but by local administrators, bureaucrats appointed for set periods of time.

Their methods were primarily rooted in Iranian techniques, including largely Iranian and not Mongolian methods of taxation. By the fourteenth century, to be sure, the two sides of the former Chaghatay domains had begun to interpenetrate, Tamerlane was himself a reflection of the type of changes going on, and much of the formerly nomadic aristocracy had moved into the cities that they ruled, even if indirectly. Nonetheless, they remained culturally and physically quite distinctive and a class apart from their subjects, even the assimilated Turkic ones. One major way in which the nomadic side of Timurid domains differed from the sedentary was in the nomadic tradition that treated land as a collective possession, belonging to an entire tribe, and not to individuals, institutions, or the state, as was the case in sedentary areas. This made groups, and not territory, the key organizational element for the nomadic sector, as had been the case under the Mongols.

Tamerlane’s early life and career is obscure and surrounded by legend, but it is clear that he showed military talents at an early stage of his life and the kind of charisma necessary to acquire a following. He gained power first within his own Barlas people and then, in a manner typical of the steppe-based societies of the era, carefully began to make allies outside it. The most important of these allies was Amir Husayn of the Qara’unas, descendants of a nomadic garrison, or tanha, placed by the Mongols in Afghanistan during the early thirteenth century. Unlike Tamerlane, or Amir Temür, as he was then known, Amir Husayn was an important part of the Chaghatay political establishment of the area, offering a legitimacy much sought by Tamerlane.

Ultimately, Tamerlane and Amir Husayn, after back and forth relationships, had a falling out. Husayn was killed by Tamerlane, who now became the effective ruler of Chaghatay
Empires

Tamerlane spent the remainder of his life warring against his enemies, conquering and reconquering territories, all the while building up and beautifying his capital of Samarkand. The major campaigns were into Khwarazm in 1371, into the Semiryche and beyond from 1375–1377, into Iran and Afghanistan from 1381–1384, and into the Caucasus and Iran from 1386–1388. He undertook two campaigns into the Golden Horde, first from 1391–1392, again from 1392–1396. Next, he brought war against Delhi between 1398 and 1399, and into Anatolia and Syria between 1399 and 1404. At the time of his death, Tamerlane was preparing to attack China. His military strategy was based on the use of steppe archers to the maximum extent, except that by this time these were no longer the lightly armed force of the Mongolian empire, and siege trains and other special forces were a regular part of his armies which, nonetheless, remained highly mobile.

Like Genghis Khan and other Mongol rulers, Tamerlane used terror as a weapon, systematically massacring his enemies in hideous ways, and in terms of numbers of victims he outdid the Mongols. His most enduring military accomplishments were his utter defeat of Golden Horde forces under Toqtamish (r. 1377–1395) on the Terek River on 14 April 1395, from which the Golden Horde never recovered, and his defeat of the powerful Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (r. 1389–1402) in the Battle of Ankara on 28 July 1402, an event which considerably slowed development of the Ottoman empire. It was not during these campaigns but during his youthful fights for survival that Tamerlane sustained the wound that provided him the Persian nickname, Temur-e lang, “lame Temur,” from which our own name for him originated.

After his death, Tamerlane’s empire fell apart quickly and his primary successors, Shahrukh (r. 1404–1447) and Khalil-Sultan (r. 1404–1409), controlled no more than a small portion of its original territory. Later this shrinking realm was subdivided even further. Nonetheless, despite the growing political impotence of the Timurids, whose rule was finally extinguished in the early sixteenth century, Herat and other centers of Timurid power in Transoxiana witnessed an unparalleled cultural development. This was the era of some of the finest books ever produced in the Islamic world, and during this time the already substantial architectural achievements of Tamerlane’s own reign (his mausoleum in Samarkand and the classic shrine of Ahmad Yasavi in Turkistan City) were further enhanced with such marvels as the Registan in Samarkand. This is a planned complex, one of the earliest of its kind in the Islamic world. It focuses on a central square and was once comprised of a mosque, a caravansary, and a khanqa (Sufi convent), in addition to the madrasa of Ulugh Beg ibn Shahrulkh (1394–1449), grandson of Tamerlane, who was responsible for the other buildings, too. With Tamerlane’s mausoleum, Gur-e Amir, the complex celebrates not only the power and glory of the Timurid ruler, but also the artistic fusion achieved under Chaghatay and other Mongol rulers. The colored tiles that are characteristic of the architecture of the time are directly derived from Chinese blue-and-white porcelain that itself represented a response to the tastes of the Mongol world conquerors.

The late Timurid period was also the time of the great wazir, ‘Ali-Sher Nawa’i (1441–1501), who single-handedly turned Chaghatay Turkic into a literary language. A minor Timurid prince, Babur (r. 1483–1530), conquered India, and his descendants, the moguls of India, carried on the Timurid tradition, including the Caghatay language, which persisted in India until the 1920s, and Central Asian cuisine, which still survives.

See also Political Organization; Sultanates: Delhi;

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Paul D. Buell

UMAYYAD

The Umayyad dynasty ruled the early Muslim community from 661 to 750 C.E. The Umayyad Empire had its capital in Damascus and was supported through the military strength of Syrian troops. It was characterized by a continuous effort at territorial expansion of the Islamic empire, reaching its apex in the early eighth century. The territorial growth of the empire set into motion processes of Arabization and Islamization that would shape the culture of the region. Umayyad overexertion of military forces in the continuation of expansionist efforts, together with an unequal treatment of Arab and non-Arab Muslims, and problems of religious and political legitimacy contributed to the weakening of the Umayyad dynasty and its eventual downfall.
Muslim historiographical sources generally portray the Umayyads in a negative light, accusing not only the Umayyad caliphs, but also their ancestors and relatives, of all kinds of moral failings and un-Islamic behaviors. Much of this criticism needs to be sifted carefully for anti-Umayyad biases, as most of the available Muslim sources have been penned in late Umayyad and early Abbasid times, when anti-Umayyad sentiments were extensive, particularly among the emerging religious class that left its imprint on many of the literary sources at our disposal.

Mu‘awiyah b. Abu Sufyan, whose caliphate marks the beginning of the Umayyad dynasty, was appointed the governor of Syria under caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–644 C.E.). During the first Civil War (656–661 C.E.), the third caliph, ‘Uthman b. al-‘Affan (r. 644–656) had been decisively defeated by discontented elements in the growing Muslim empire. Mu‘awiyah, his relative, challenged the authority of ‘Uthman’s successor, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (r. 656–661) purportedly because the latter did not prosecute the murders of ‘Uthman. While Mu‘awiyah’s direct challenge to ‘Ali at the battle of Siffin (657) ended in a stalemate, ‘Ali’s assassination by a Kharijite (separatist) in 661 effectively put Mu‘awiyah in power. During Mu‘awiyah’s long reign, from 661 to 680, a relative calm returned to the Muslim empire, as Mu‘awiyah successfully kept discontented elements in check. The relative stability of the empire allowed Mu‘awiyah to reinvigorate the expansionist warfare of the earlier caliphs. Yet the issues that had led to the First Civil War, namely a different understanding of legitimate leadership of the Muslim community, continued to plague the Muslim community. Upon Mu‘awiyah’s death in 680 C.E., his son Yazid, designated heir apparent, faced revolts by Husayn b. ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, grandson of the prophet Muhammad, and ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, son of a prominent companion of Muhammad. Disorganization and woefully inadequate military support for Husayn brought about his quick defeat and death at the Battle of Karbala in 680 C.E. Yet while Yazid’s military success against Husayn was swift, the ideological repercussions of the Battle of Karbala would come to haunt Umayyad ambitions for political legitimacy for centuries. Husayn’s martyrdom at Karbala became a powerful symbol for Shi‘ite aspirations.

With the death of Mu‘awiyah b. Yazid in 683 C.E., Umayyad control of the empire suffered a nearly total collapse during the Second Civil War (683–692), until Marwan b. al-Hakam assumed the caliphate, inaugurating the Marwandid lineage. Marwan, and later his son ‘Abd al-Malik, gradually restored Umayyad control of the empire, defeating a number of opponents in different parts of the empire. ‘Abd al-Malik reestablished full Umayyad control in 692 C.E., when he defeated counter-caliph ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr after a siege on Mecca that had led to a fire, destroying part of the Ka‘ba. The siege itself and the damage done to the Ka‘ba reinforced criticism against the Umayyads as irreligious usurpers of power. ‘Abd al-Malik also began the process of making Arabic the lingua franca of the empire, and he built the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.

After the Second Civil War between the Umayyad forces and the nascent Shi‘a, a new phase of imperial extension was inaugurated. Of particular importance were annual raids against the Byzantine Empire, including further attempts to conquer its capital, Constantinople (716–717). Additionally, successes in North Africa led to a defeat of the last remaining Byzantine outposts. With the conversion of Berber tribes of North Africa, the conquest forces were reinvigorated, leading to the crossing of the straits of Gibraltar in 711 and a vanquishing of the Visigothic kingdom of the Iberian peninsula. After the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty in the Muslim heartlands by the Abbasids in 750, a descendant of the Umayyads would find refuge in Muslim Spain where an Umayyad kingdom and later caliphate was founded, lasting until 1031. The eastward expansion of the empire in the early eighth century included successful conquests into Transoxania and Sind.

Yet the increase of military failures on the frontiers in the second quarter of the eighth century, coupled with growing tensions among different tribal factions in the Syrian army (which had provided the main support for Umayyad power), and growing unrest among different groups of “piety-minded” opponents led to a weakening of Umayyad strength and its final demise. A carefully organized underground movement, coordinated by the Abbasid agitator Abu Muslim in the eastern province of Khurasan garnered support among various groups in opposition to the Umayyads. The Abbasids’ initial claim to rally troops against the Umayyads in favor of the family of Muhammad particularly appealed to Shi‘a. Only after the Umayyads had been decisively defeated did the
Abbasids reveal their claim to the caliphate, centering its claims to legitimacy on descent from Muhammad’s paternal uncle al-‘Abbas.

The geographical spread of the Islamic empire did not directly correlate with the spread of Islam as a religion among the inhabitants of conquered territories. Indeed, during much of the Umayyad caliphate Islam as a religious tradition was in a state of flux and only gradually assumed more identifiable contours. Forced conversion of local populations was rare; conquered peoples usually continued to practice their religious traditions, and Islamization of these territories spanned several centuries. In addition to a gradual spread of Islam among the conquered peoples, Muslim traders and pious preachers spread Islam as a religion beyond the borders of the conquered territories. Likewise, Arabization in the newly conquered territories was a slow process; Arabic as the official language of Umayyad administration seems not to have been prevalent before 700, and specifically Muslim coinage does not seem to have been in use before the end of the seventh century.

The major contribution of the Umayyads to Islamdom consists not only in their military successes, its Islamization and Arabization, but also in its support for the development of Islam as a religious tradition. In spite of the negative attitude in which later sources portray the Umayyads, the first collections of sayings of Muhammad and of early Muslim historiography were undertaken with some support of the Umayyads; likewise, Umayyad patronage in religious buildings produced a first, identifiable Islamic architecture in buildings like the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque of Damascus.

See also Arabic Language; Arabic Literature; Dome of the Rock; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Byzantine; Husayn; Islam and Islamic; Karbala; Kharijites, Khawarij; Marwan; Mu‘awiya; ‘Umar.

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Alfons H. Teipen

ERBAKAN, NECMEDDIN (1926–)

Necmeddin Erbakan served as Turkey’s prime minister (1996–1997) and was the founder of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). A mechanical engineer, university professor, diesel factory founder, and Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry president, he was elected to Parliament in 1969 as a spokesman for small business.

Erbakan started the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970, which was banned after the 1971 military coup. As founder of the National Salvation Party (Milli Selâmet Partisi, 1972) he became deputy premier. After the 1980 coup this party also was banned and Erbakan ousted from politics. Erbakan’s third party, the Welfare Party (formed in 1983), which opposed corruption and demanded a pro-Islamic, anti-Western foreign policy, received 21 percent of the vote in 1996. Erbakan headed a coalition government with Tansu Çiller of the True Path Party.

As prime minister Erbakan became more moderate, improving Turkey’s Mideast relations while maintaining its Western alliances. Domestically, he raised civil service salaries and cleaned up the cities. He could not halt corruption, however; coalition partners as well as opponents were involved.

Pressure from the military, alarmed by Islamism, forced Erbakan’s resignation (1997) and the party’s closure (1998). He was imprisoned for a year for “inciting hatred,” though supporters considered him a fighter for religious freedom. After his ouster, Erbakan unofficially backed a successor party, Virtue (Fazilet), which disavowed radical Islamism.

See also Modernization, Political: Participation, Political Movements, and Parties; Political Islam.

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Linda T. Darling

ETHICS AND SOCIAL ISSUES

It is important to distinguish how the term ethics was used in premodern Islam compared to its usage in the modern period. In the premodern period, ethics was chiefly concerned about the formation and disciplining of the self through the cultivation of practices that were deemed “good conduct.” Such conduct was naturalized through education, ritual, and
disciplinary practices that were intended to help the devout Muslim internalize the values that underlay an ethical life.

In the modern Muslim context, by contrast, matters such as education, ritual, and disciplinary practices have themselves undergone a significant, if not radical, change from previous eras. The modern period is governed by the logic of systems, bureaucratic processes, and the logic of abstraction. Education in particular, but ritual, and other social practices too, have felt the influences of bureaucratic modernity. Now ethics is conceived of as a set of abstract values, derived from sources that do not always completely resonate with the historical self, given the massive global transformations of cultures and values. Although the earlier understandings of and approaches to ethics are only partly adhered to, Muslim communities are forging new ethical identities in the maelstrom of paradigmatic transitions in knowledge, culture, and history.

Terms and Historical Developments
Ethics in premodern Muslim thought finds its expression around concepts such as character (khululq) and in the literary genre of civility or etiquette (adab). Historically, Muslim ethics draws from several cultural sources: the pre-Islamic ethical traditions of Arabia and the Arab-Islamic tradition followed by cross-pollination with the practices of neighboring cultures, such as Persianate, Greek, and Indian philosophical and ethical traditions, in addition to mystical (sufi) sources all of which no doubt left their marks on the face of Muslim ethics.

Within the first three centuries of several Islamicate cultures of the Near East, several ethical traditions arose. The two principal genres of early ethical writing were pietist (or mystical) and philosophical. The earliest texts are primarily concerned with the ethics of the self, especially with the disciplining of the body and soul. The literary genre of ‘ilm al-akhlalq, literally meaning “the science of innate dispositions” and the emergence of the discourses of civility, urbanity, or humanitas, called adab are among the most prominent contexts in which ethical debates were set forth. In fact, materials in the form of prophetic reports (hadith) make up the bulk of what we consider to be the “science of innate dispositions.”

Normative discourses about morality can be found in both the hadith literature and in the Qur’an. There is a famous report in which ‘A’isha describes her husband, the prophet Muhammad, as the embodiment of Islamic values, saying that his character mirrors the Qur’an. In this pithy statement, the linkage between the Qur’an and ethical values cannot be ignored. In short, the expression suggests that the prophet Muhammad had internalized the virtues proposed in the Scripture. In fact, the Qur’an, addressing the prophet Muhammad, says: “Indeed you [Muhammad] have been endowed with a noble character.” (68:4) Here the word khululq (character) assumes extraordinary emphasis.

Innumerable reports attributed to the Prophet place special value and emphasis on the need to cultivate good character, busn al-akhulq. The phrase also has an aesthetic quality of beauty (busn) to it. In other words, character is related to an inner magnificence. In fact, numerous hadith stress that the perfection of character is equal to the perfection of faith. In some hadith, good character is described as half of faith. Similarly, good character was viewed as the most effective antidote to the human predisposition to commit sins. In early Islam, as today, moral education is the primary responsibility of parents and teachers, who should not only transmit moral knowledge, but also supervise its application through practice, discipline, and training.

The Pietists and the Philosophers
The early Muslim ethicists differentiated between the etiquette of the self (adab al-nafs) and the etiquette of pedagogy (adab al-dari). ‘Abd al-Nabî al-Ahmadnagri (d. 1769), the Indian encyclopedist, describes the etiquette of the self as being designed to protect the limbs as well as religious symbols from harm: Implicitly this invokes the obligation not to inflict harm intentionally (the ethical principle of nonmaleficence). Ideally, through regular practice, this etiquette should become internalized by the practitioner, becoming a part of his or her very disposition, or personality. The ethics of learning, on the other hand, relate to the production of knowledge, especially to questions of language and epistemology. Here the concern is to figure how knowledge is constituted and the manner in which its authority is implemented. Knowledge is deemed to be highly beneficial and almost intrinsically to contribute to the welfare of the self and others, and invokes the active ethical principle of beneficence. Almost all the early Muslim sources discuss prescriptive norms that relate in some way to aspects of nonmaleficence and the promotion of beneficence, among other principles.

A more formal discipline of the “science of ethics” took shape under the influence of philosophical writers like Miskawayh (d. 1030), Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (d. 1023), and Abu ‘l-Hassan al-Amiri (d. 992), among others. These writers expanded the sphere of ethics, developing new meanings within a primarily Persianate environment but in conversation with other regional intellectual traditions. Many of these teachings were intended as moral pedagogy for the young, for bureaucrats, and also for the ruler’s entourage and his aides de camp. In time, more specialized forms of political ethics were developed as part of the nashfa or advice-genre, offered in the form of “mirrors for princes.” The philosophical ethicists also contributed to a marked growth in moral pedagogy, in the form of the adab genre.

Even among the early Muslim pietists the cultivation of character and the disciplining of the self is a preeminent concern. Through pious acts and obedience to the norms were said to be derived from revelation (shar’î) the individual was thought to be able to develop an inner disposition that
compares favorably to a notion of conscience. Figures like Harith al-Muhasibi (d. 857), Raghib al-Isfahani (d. ca. 1108), and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) produced extensive and detailed treatises and manuals dealing with topics that address intentionality, the cultivation of virtuous habits, good character, and how to perfect practices that lead to salvation. Each of these texts specified how a novice in the path of piety could attain sanctity for ethical ends by giving attention to practices. Readers were taught how to undertake a moral self-evaluation in order to identify character flaws, and were also taught how to remedy such ills.

Often the remedial path advocated a conscientious approach to rituals and practices prescribed by legal discourses, both those of the shari‘a and those embodied in the legal regulations called fiqh. The fulcrum of Muslim ethics is ideally expressed in the practical applications of the law at the most public level.

Nonetheless, the ethics practiced by both the mystics and philosophers is highly specialized, with its own rarified vocabulary that was aimed at serving a certain elite and educated strata of Muslim societies. No less an authority than the intellectual historian ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) noted the difference in the perspectives on the shari‘a held by jurists (fiqaba) and jurisconsults (ahl-futya) on the one hand, and the mystics and ascetics on the other. While the former advocated the general rules for devotional practices, social transactions, and customs, the latter provided the etiquette of practice, relying on intuitive cognition or aesthetic sensibility (dhawq) informed by ascetic practices (mujabada) and self-examination (mubasaha).

The Influence of al-Ghazali
In the twelfth century, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali combined the methods of both the jurists and the mystics. He grew dissatisfied with the popular understanding of law, fiqh, and with what he believed to be the ultimate perversion of the law: reductionism, hairsplitting, specialization, and arcane debates. Al-Ghazali admonished that legal debates about marriage, divorce, the manumission of slaves, or the execution of sales and contracts do not result in reverential fear and awe of the divine; in fact they result in the opposite. He argued for the need to retrieve the meaning of fiqh from its earliest usage, when it meant “the path of salvation in the afterlife.”

In order to restore fiqh to its former meaning, Al-Ghazali believed that a deep knowledge of the tribulations of the soul and what constitutes morally detrimental acts was required, rather than a familiarity with the minutiae of the law. He called for fiqh al-nafi (discernment of the soul), a form of inner enlightenment. He believed that a proper understanding of fiqh should inspire awe of the divine within the heart and soul of the practitioner. Ghazali explicitly stated that fiqh primarily signifies the requisites of faith, and least of all was concerned with the dictates of jurisprudence (fatwa, pl. fatwas).

Later on, the martyred jurist-mystic, Ayn al-Qudat al-Hamadhani (d. 1131) considered the necessity of relying on the dictates of the heart, fatwa al-qalb. For him there was no doubt that the heart was the seat of conscience, basing his position on a report attributed to the Prophet, which says: “Solicit a response (fatwa) from your heart, even though the jurisconsult (mufti) had issued a response (fatwa).” This caution places the ultimate ethical responsibility on the individual, and detracts from the expert knowledge of the legal specialist. In short, for al-Hamadhani, fiqh was the medieval homology for what today is called applied ethics.

The Changing Concept of Fiqh
In seeking to identify broad historical trends in Muslim thought on the subject of ethics, Ibn Khaldun provides a valuable starting point. He argued that fiqh, as practiced within its original Arabic linguistic habitat, was an embodied disposition and aptitude (jibila wa malaka). The idea of malaka can be understood as something akin to a socio-biological disposition or aptitude, rather than a purely biological or psychological one. In this sense it has a strong resemblance to what Marcel Mauss calls a habitus. Ibn Khaldun argued that the concept of malaka was subject to cultural erosion as Islam expanded into other cultural and linguistic traditions. In these new contexts, the need arose to theorize about and develop rules and principles of the Arabic language, law and legal theory, and other disciplines. With this development, concepts such as malaka underwent alteration. This altered state of cultural and ethical subjectivities led to the development of what Ghazali would denounce as the soulless formalism of fiqh, deprived of its ethical and moral purposes.

Despite the efforts of people like al-Ghazali, the bulk of Muslim jurisprudence developed along very formalistic lines, and the ethical stress within law (fiqh) in the end gave way to legalism. By the twelfth century, the line was clearly drawn between those who held that fiqh was part of the development of the self and those who saw it as part of a formal legal edifice. If formal jurisprudence during this period retained certain ethical concerns, these are most likely traces of previous understandings of ethics, rather than the product of a lively contemporaneous ethics in conversation with the immediate society in which the law is practiced.

To be fair, some jurists, other than the mystics, did attempt to engage fiqh in a dialog with moral and ethical objectives. In order to highlight the ethical strains implicit in the law, some jurists began to emphasize the role of public interest (maslaha) by elaborating its ethical purposes (maqasid), such as in the protection and advancement of religion, life, reason, wealth, and paternity or family. This method, popularized by the work of scholars like al-Ghazali, Najm al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1316), ‘Izz al-Din Ibn ‘Abd al-Salamm al-Sulami (d. 1262), Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d.1388), and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), enjoyed only limited success. It is no
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coincidence that several of these jurists also adhered to certain mystical traditions.

In fact, in order to reinvigorate the law with an ethical component, many modern-day Muslim jurists have also taken recourse to the doctrines of public interest and the objectives of the law. In fact, much of contemporary jurisprudence and ethics is indebted to this method, but it has met with mixed outcomes. A brief recapitulation of some of these efforts as applied to major issues of the day may shed light on the developments in modern Muslim ethics and the way they relate to the inherited tradition.

The Ethos of Killing
The unlawful killing of a human being is categorically forbidden in Islamic law and ethics, and deemed as a major sin. Both the Qur’an and hadith sources, as interpreted by the jurists, view life as sacrosanct. The preservation of life is one of the moral objectives of the law and intrinsic to human dignity. Life can only be taken as part of a just recompense for the crime of murder and for defensive purposes such as war and restoring order during chaos. The noted hadith scholar, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabi (d. 1348), however, made an interesting point about the legitimate amount of force that is allowed to be used in self-defense. In self-defense against seditious rebels, he argued, the goal is not to kill them, unless of course one’s life is endangered. To kill without need is to revert to a state of spiritual infidelity, according to a hadith attributed to the Prophet. Whoever kills without a just cause carries the burden of killing all of humanity; and whoever saves a life, it is as if the whole of humanity had been rescued, according to the Qur’an (5:32).

Some classical jurists, motivated by an exclusivist and triumphalist ethos, have interpreted these and other Qur’anic teachings to forbid the compensatory execution of a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim or a slave. More egalitarian countervailing viewpoints have discredited this view. Nonetheless, the abolition of the death penalty is not widely advocated in contemporary Muslim societies. Even though the modern state now implements secular criminal codes, in classical Islamic law the right to seek redress in cases of murder belongs to the family of the deceased. The family of the deceased has the right to choose from several options: they might seek material compensation for their loss, they may call for the execution of the offender, or they may even pardon the offender. In other words, the death penalty is not a mandatory requirement in terms of Islamic law. However, some theologians of the classical period viewed the mere desire to be an abolitionist as a doctrinal offense.

The Question of Abortion
Abortion remains a vexing issue in Muslim societies. Most classical Muslim jurists consider a fetus in the first 120 days after conception to be nonviable. However, there is no denial that as the fetus incrementally develops, so too does the complexity of fetal life. This point of view is informed by the theological doctrine that the spirit (ruh) enters the fetus around 120 days (four months) after conception. Those who take a strict position argue that, once the sperm enters the womb, it is destined to produce life, and thus abortion is proscribed. Given the 120-day rule, however, many jurists find it less morally onerous to sanction a justifiable abortion within this period.

The classic precedent for permitting abortion within the first 120 days is the case where a nursing mother falls pregnant. The new pregnancy would stop her from lactating, and the husband may be unable to afford to pay a wet-nurse to breastfeed the infant. When facing two competing harms, it is proposed that one choose the lesser nonmaleficence. In a similar vein, there is almost universal unanimity that if a pregnant woman faces a life-threatening risk, it is permissible to terminate the pregnancy, irrespective of the stage. Preserving the life of the mother takes precedence over the rights of the unborn child.

Muslim ethicists disagree as to what reasons justify termination and, more importantly, how such a determination is to be made. For most jurists, a medical diagnosis that detects a fetus to be severely deformed or defective, carrying a life-threatening hereditary or untreatable disease, or afflicted with a serious handicap is not sufficient grounds for termination. Only the official Egyptian fatwa-body sanctions terminations prior to 120 days in the above-mentioned instances. However, if pregnancy has advanced beyond this period, then termination of such fetuses is not permitted even there. A fetal abnormality that would result in blindness or deafness, for example, is not to be terminated, because the handicap is viewed as tolerable. The Deoband seminary in India only sanctions termination if there is an actual threat to the life of the mother, not on the grounds of a presumed or calculated risk; and fetal defect is not a valid reason to terminate at any stage of pregnancy. Many Muslim jurists are increasingly retracting from the 120-day rule as advances in medical technology provide more visible and definitive evidence of early fetal life.

Abortion for the purpose of family planning or to terminate pregnancies caused by rape or conceived outside wedlock is a controversial topic. Some contemporary jurists permit abortion for family planning purposes within the 120-day period. Ayatullah Fadl Allah of Lebanon is one of the few authorities who permits termination within 120 days, on the grounds that the pregnancy and its consequences will cause an intolerable social hardship for the mother and her family. On the other hand, the mere deformity of a fetus does not constitute grounds for termination, even within the 120-day period. Other scholars counter by arguing that the birth of offspring is predestined and cannot be limited on the grounds of material considerations.
Mufti Nizam al-Din Azami of the Deoband seminary does not consider pregnancy outside wedlock or one caused by rape to be a valid reason for termination. For him, the sanctity of the new life takes precedence over the autonomy of the pregnant woman and the negative social consequences arising from her added responsibilities. A minority of Egyptian jurists at al-Azhar University also shares this view. However, the highly respected Indian jurist, ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Laknawi (d. 1886), argued that it is permissible to terminate a pregnancy conceived outside wedlock, even if there are visible signs of fetal formation, in other words even if the pregnancy has advanced beyond 120 days. He gives greater consideration to the mother’s autonomy and the need to liberate a single woman from social stigma and the accompanying reduced life-chances she would encounter if she carried such a pregnancy to term in very unfavorable cultural conditions. A minority of jurists in contemporary India draw on the rationale of al-Laknawi to permit termination for pregnancies caused by rape and sex outside of wedlock.

Other Reproductive Issues
Ayatollah Fadl Allah has issued several rulings related to modern reproductive technologies, as has the Islamic Fiqh Committee of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Artificial insemination from a husband is deemed permissible, while that from any other donor is impermissible. Islamic law insists on legitimate paternity being an essential requirement for reproduction, thus outlawing donor insemination, since the donor and donee are not married. Ayatollah Fadl Allah expresses some concern that a woman seeking artificial insemination, even legitimately, might be guilty of indecent exposure of her body to a male physician during the course of the medical procedure. Such an indecent exposure is legally prohibited, unless an emergency necessitates it. However, it is acceptable for a female physician to look at the body of another female. Mufti Nizam al-Din of India outrightly prohibits artificial insemination, declaring these procedures are contrary to religion and natural law and increase the prospect of dehumanization.

With regard to sperm banks, Ayatollah Fadl Allah discourages the use of a husband’s stored sperm after his death, since the marital tie ends with death. However, he states that any child posthumously conceived legitimately belongs to the
wife and is to be attributed to the deceased husband, cautiously avoiding the implication that the child may be illegitimate. However, such a child would not be able to inherit from the father’s estate, since the fetus was produced after his death. In Egypt the permissibility of such a practice has also been a subject of serious contention.

Ayatollah Fadl Allah permits a female to store her eggs in order to be fertilized later. Fertilized embryos can be used for experimental purposes, he argues, reasoning that such organisms cannot be equated to a living person, which only occurs at ensemolument around 120 days after conception. He also permits the sale of unfertilized female gametes for experimental purposes, provided that the financial compensation involved covers only the use rights of the gametes; there can not be a monetary value placed on these or any other body parts, per se. He also permits surrogacy, under limited circumstances. Surrogacy is only permissible if the surrogate mother at least temporarily becomes a wife to the man whose sperm fertilized the egg she is carrying to term. Technically, however, the child is attributed to the female whose egg was fertilized, and not to the female who delivers the child. The Ayatollah finds several objections to an argument that allows a mother to act as a surrogate if her daughter is incapable of carrying a pregnancy to term.

Adoption and Fosterage
A limited form of adoption is permissible in Muslim ethics. This form prevents the adopted child from taking on the fictional identity and paternity of his or her adoptive parents. Forging a fictional identity between persons not related biologically is prohibited according to Muslim ethics. As long as the adopted child knows that he or she has biological parents other than the ones in whose household he or she is being reared, then there can be no ethical reservation to deny such children from enjoying all the care and security of family life within the adoptive family. For Muslim ethicists the concern is that creating identity based on nonbiological grounds increases the risk of biologically related offspring unknowingly marrying each other and violating the incest taboo.

In Islamic law, fosterage is when an infant is nursed by someone other than his or her mother (a wet-nurse). This practice creates the same ethical boundaries between child and nurse that exist between children, their biological parents, and their siblings, particularly as they apply to the incest taboo. If an adopted infant is nursed by an adoptive mother, these same bonds and boundaries are also created. The effect is to prevent biological and adopted siblings from unwittingly marrying each other, since they either share the same person as wet-nurse or biological mother. The permissibility of fosterage has also led to the permissibility of milk-banks, where infants get milk from anonymous donor wet-nurses. Mufti Nizam al-Din also supports the idea of milk-banks, and does not raise concerns about how they may affect the relations among siblings who share a wet-nurse.

Contraception
Birth control is deemed permissible, provided that the means of contraception are temporary and not irreversible. The most popular premodern means of contraception was by way of coitus interruptus and other forms of prophylactics. Al-Ghazali held that it was permissible for a wife to practice coitus interruptus if she wished to protect her body aesthetically and avoid the changes to her body that accompany pregnancy and child birth. Birth control can also be pursued in order to avoid the burden of material difficulties of providing for a large family. There is almost unanimity that vasectomy and hysterectomy, unless recommended for sound medical reasons, are not permissible, because they result in irreversible change to the body.

Birth control as part of a national family planning programs whereby governments place an upper limit on the permissible size of a family, has often been controversial and bitter in the Muslim world. Some suspect that the Western-controlled transnational institutions wish to use family planning to limit Muslim populations. Another concern is that that birth control measures such as the pill and condoms may increase promiscuity. The controversy remains unresolved. In Egypt, for instance, former al-Azhar shaykh opposed the use of the pill, while another senior official, the state mufti, encouraged its use. With the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus, the opposition to birth control measures has lessened.

Organ Transplantation and Cloning
Indian and Pakistani authorities have been opposed to organ transplantation from its very inception. Several fatwas, including one issued by Mufti Nizam al-Din, allow organ transplantation only under conditions of emergency. Blood transfusion, too, is only permissible under extreme conditions of necessity. For many traditionalist Muslim ethicists from the Indo-Pak subcontinent, transplantation surgery is an affront to human dignity and to the sanctity of life. However, in recent years there have been attempts to reverse the almost four-decade-old consensus on organ transplantation on the Indian subcontinent. Some scholars in this region have been cautious and have agreed to permit cornea transplantations only.

In the Middle East the ethical committees of several institutions permit both organ transplantation and organ donation. The OIC’s Islamic Fiqh Academy recognizes irreversible brain-stem damage as legal death, and permits doctors to harvest organs from victims of such injury for purposes of transplantation. Scholars supporting transplantation believe that this form of medical care advances human dignity, and argue that such measures are taken precisely to promote the sanctity of life.
There is perhaps greater uniformity among the diverse ethics committees in their approach to the subject of reproductive and therapeutic cloning; all express great caution and apprehension. Fears stem from the idea that biogenetic technology can radically transform human identity, undermining if not perverting current moral and ethical practices. For this reason the Islamic Fiqh Academy prohibits all cloning practices that allow a third party to be associated in genetic reproduction between two married persons, whether it is by means of another womb, the provision of third-party gametes, or through the manipulation of animal or human cells. For now all forms of human cloning are banned, but the future may bring exceptions on a case-by-case basis, as knowledge and experience in genetics advance. Although the Academy permits research in animal and plant cloning, it encourages governments to adopt legislative measures to close all the avenues for direct and indirect experimentation in human cloning until substantive knowledge makes it safe. Similarly the Academy has declared a moratorium on genetic engineering and the human genome project until greater clarity is achieved and its ethics committee is in a better position to offer meaningful and practical guidelines.

Euthanasia

Indian Muslim scholars rule out both active and passive forms of euthanasia. Active forms of euthanasia are a major moral sin and an unthinkable act within Muslim ethics. Mufti Nizam al-Din argues that for terminally ill individuals, suffering has a redemptive quality that should be borne with patience by both the patient and his or her caregivers. Seeking to hasten the death of the terminally ill is tantamount to the abdication of a caregiver’s responsibility, and would be deemed both a criminal offense and a major sin. Passive euthanasia on the part of a caregiver would amount to gross negligence, and such deplorable ethical conduct is deserving of disciplinarian consequences. For this school of thought there remains an irreconcilable gap between ethical and medical standards of assessing life and death. The Indian ethicists do not accept any standard of death to be conclusive, save for the cardiopulmonary standard (cessation of all heart and lung activity). For medical practitioners, other measurements of ascertaining death, such as brain-stem death, are acceptable.

Some of the scholars of the Islamic Fiqh Academy concur with this cautious view, and oppose such acts of passive euthanasia as taking a patient off life-support or withholding treatment. However, the official resolution of the Islamic Fiqh Academy permits withholding treatment and the removal of life-support machines from patients whose doctors affirm that they have suffered irreversible brain-stem damage.

Ethics and Sexuality

Homosexuality is strictly forbidden in Muslim ethics, on the grounds that it is an unnatural act. Some jurists suggest severe penalties for homosexuality, ranging from death to flogging, whereas others disagree. The latter group holds that no punishment can serve as an effective purgative for this act, and therefore that its immorality precludes an earthly penalty. Some jurists are so morally offended by homosexuality that even to raise the question of its permissibility is enough to lead to calls for excommunication and anathematizing. However, Muslim ethicists have yet to reach consensus as to whether homosexuality is a socially constructed practice or part of a biological, genetic predisposition. Such an inquiry may prompt a deeper ethical investigation into whether or not persons can be held accountable for responding to their natural proclivities, even if those proclivities may be deemed unnatural by heterosexual standards.

Ethical Trends for the Future

Over the centuries, Muslim ethics have undergone tremendous change, even though little attention has been paid. In the modern period, new scientific discoveries and technologies have severely challenged the ethical heritage of early Islam. Yet, Muslim ethics remain deeply embedded in the premodern legacy, and little of modern scientific thinking has seeped into ethical discourses in any meaningful way. The cultural, political, and economic encounter with the West continues to elicit great caution from Muslims, especially those within the traditional religious sector, who view the premodern Muslim ethical legacy as a bulwark against external ethical and moral encroachment. Clearly there is very little consensus between various and diverse Muslim religious groups that adhere to diametrically opposed views on ethics. However, the above survey of current ethical issues demonstrates that there are pragmatic approaches to Muslim ethics that seek accommodation with the ethics of modernity. At the same time, there are approaches to ethics that seek to preserve distinctive Muslim subjectivities and identities, finding their best models for such preservation in the historical legacy of ethics in Islam.

See also Fatwa; Futuwwa; Ghazali, al-; Homosexuality; Ibn Khaldun; Law; Shari’a.

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**ETHIOPIA**

Ethiopia was the third political entity to embrace Christianity after the Roman Empire and the Kingdom of Armenia, in 334 C.E. It remained a Christian state, never separating the church from the crown, up to the 1974 revolution. Her long, multifaceted relations with Islam and Muslims can generally be analyzed along two themes. One is the concept of Christian Ethiopia as it has been conceived throughout the ages by Muslim scholars and politicians of the “land of Islam.” The other is the role played by Islamic minorities in Ethiopian history. The two aspects, naturally, have developed with dialectical mutuality.

In a way, Ethiopia was the state most affected by Islamic foreign relations. Muhammad’s sending of the *sahaba* (Companions) in 615 and 616 to seek asylum with the Christian king of Ethiopia, *al-Najashi* Ashama, was also known as the first *bijra*. The *sahaba* were saved from Meccan persecutors by the Ethiopian king, and this gesture gave birth to a legacy of eternal gratitude. This history was reflected in the hadith whose essential message was “leave the Ethiopians alone as long as they leave you alone.” Most orthodox Muslim jurists, scholars, and moderate politicians interpreted this admonition as a declaration that Christian Ethiopia would be a land of neutrality, *dar al-hiyad*. On the other hand, the same *sahaba-najashi* episode was said to have ended with the *najashi* (king), in 628 C.E., embracing Islam. This assumption of Ethiopian neutrality in religious matters was interpreted differently by more radical Muslims—pointing to Christian Ethiopia’s illegitimacy. This principal argument among Muslims over the legitimacy of historical Ethiopia resurfaced whenever Ethiopia became a subject of the radical Muslim agenda, and it remains an active issue today.

Islamic thought concerning Ethiopia was shaped by dynamic cultural, economic, and strategic relations between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. It has been also influenced by the presence of Islamic communities within Ethiopia. Muslims lived in Ethiopia from the very beginning of Islam, and tradition has it that members of the *sahaba* established the first community there, which was tolerated by the Christians. In time Muslims speaking the Semitic Ethiopian languages (Amharic, Tigrinya, etc.) and living in the core regions were called Jabarties. As Ethiopian Christians looked down upon traders and Muslims were often deprived of landowning, there developed a functional economic coexistence, mixed with some cultural segregation, in the country’s central areas. Most Muslims during Ethiopia’s history were members of various ethnic-linguistic groups surrounding the Ethiopian core. Peoples like the Oromo, Afar, Sidama, Somali, the various tribal groups of today’s Eritrea, and various other groups adopted elements of Islamic culture partly due to the long processes of their confrontations with Ethiopia. In medieval times fourteen Islamic emirates, notably Ifat and Adal, centered on the town of Harar, emerged in what is today southern Ethiopia. Their Islamic history culminated in 1529 when, under the leadership of the imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (nicknamed Gran), they united and conquered Christian Ethiopia for a short period lasting to 1543.

Ahmad Gran’s short-lived Islamic unification was inspired by the rise of the Ottomans in the Red Sea area and by simultaneous Islamic scholarly revival in the Arab peninsula. Ulama from Arabia helped the process of Islamic unification by spreading Arabic and the teaching of Islamic law. However, after the demise of Gran the various Islamic groups of the whole region failed to reunite. They remain to this day divided along linguistic, ethnic, and regional criteria. Centers of Islamic learning remained in Harar and in some other towns, but most communities followed popular versions of Sufism and adopted just the basic elements of religious education and law. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Islam flourished again when the Oromo clans began abandoning their sociopolitical system to develop a chain of emirates, and when Egypt captured the Sudan and the Red Sea coast and sent learned men to spread Islam from Harar to its surrounding Oromo-inhabited areas and from the Sudan to western Eritrea. However, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century the Christian Ethiopian empire expanded and conquered nearly all Ethiopian territories and the people who lived there. The process of assimilation into the Ethiopian state and society in modern times has been multidimensional. Coercive measures and forced Christianization were applied, for example, by Emperor Yohannes IV (1872–1889). In general, however, Muslims, who numbered about one half of the population during this period, remained free to pursue their ways as long as they accepted Christian political hegemony. Where Islam was politicized, or when Muslims adopted Arab identity—like in Eritrea of the 1960s—the Ethiopian leadership, recalling the history of Ahmad Gran, mobilized to stem it. Under Emperor Haile Selasse (1930–1974) only a few Muslims could be counted among the country’s political elite. Yet most Muslims, especially the elite, were integrated into Ethiopian life and culture, used the Amharic Ethiopian language, and went on dominating trade in both the periphery and the center.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century Islam seemed to be experiencing a resurgence in Ethiopia. First, the 1974 revolution and Mangistu Haile-Mariam’s communist-inspired regime separated the church from the state. By eroding Christianity, and by recognizing major Islamic holidays as national ones, the new regime helped to grant the two religions more equal national recognition. Then the 1991 revolution reshaped Ethiopia along a decentralized cultural
and administrative line, meanwhile fostering a free market economy. The end result was a visible strengthening of Islam in practically all aspects. As more Muslims make their way to the core of Ethiopian life, the new phenomenon underlines an old question—is their advent a contribution to cultural pluralization and economic progress, and is it therefore a major aspect of Ethiopia’s modernization? Or, is Islamic revival turning political, gradually reviving those old radical ideas about the need to Islamize Ethiopia?

See also Africa, Islam in; Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi; Empires: Ottoman.

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Haggai Erlich

ETHNICITY

The Middle East is distinguished by its ethnic and cultural diversity. This diversity, often referred to as a “human mosaic,” is the product of long historical processes of which the people themselves are acutely aware. Almost every country in the region has local communities and groups that are distinct from the larger society as a whole and are recognized as such both by themselves and by others. In fact, the recognition and acceptance of communal or ethnic differences has been a basic component of social and political organization in the Middle East. This is best exemplified by the Ottoman millet system whereby the ruling Sunni Muslim Ottomans formally recognized the authority of the religious and communal leaders of the different sectarian communities in their empire. By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman list consisted of about seventeen millets, which included Jews, Druze, Alavis, Armenians, and a number of Christian sects. Ethnicity basically refers to a social or group identity that individuals ascribe to themselves and that is accepted by others; ethnic identities are most commonly based on shared religious affiliation, language or dialect, tribal membership, and regional or local customs.

Ethnic identity, which tends to be perceived as immutable and ascribed at birth, is most commonly a cultural conception that, in practice, is both malleable and contextual. Individuals may choose to stress their ethnic identity in one context and mute it in another; thus an individual may claim to be a Kurd, a Muslim, or an Iranian depending on the particular social or political context. In the Middle East, the primary significance of ethnic identity is its role in the social and political structure of the society. Until the mid-1950s, for example, particular ethnic groups tended to be associated with specific occupational niches: the Jews of the Iranian city of Isfahan specialized in fine metal work and trading in gold and silver, Assyrian Christians of Iraq dominated the hotel and restaurant business, Azeri Turks in Iran were car mechanics and long-distance truck drivers, and most of the cooks in Egypt were Nubians. Today this pattern is changing; mass education, social mobility, and the emergence of new occupations have all but eroded the traditional ethnic divisions of labor in the region.

What are the basic sources of ethnic differentiation in the Middle East? The single most important source of individual and group identity and, by extension, social cleavages, is religious affiliation. Coreligionists perceive themselves as having rights and obligations to each other and interfaith marriage is generally discouraged if not strictly prohibited by all the communities. On a larger scale sectarian divisions have important implications for political action. Secular nationalistic movements within any one country or those like pan-Arabism that seek to transcend national frontiers are usually undermined by sectarianism. Likewise, pan-Islamist movements that presume to encompass all Muslims tend to fracture along Muslim sectarian divisions of Sunnis, Shi’a, and Alawis, among others. And while non-Muslim communities like the Jews (until the mid-fifties) and the various Christian sects have, on the whole, accommodated themselves to the dominant Muslim rule throughout the Middle East, questions of what constitutes nationality and full citizenship have yet to be resolved in most of the states in the area. This includes the modern Jewish state of Israel as well as that of the Muslim Wahhabi kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Ethnicity in the Middle East is also structured along linguistic differences which, in general, set the largest cultural boundaries between groups. There are three major language families in the region: Semitic, Indo-European, and Altaic or Turkic. Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages. Hebrew is spoken exclusively in Israel while Arabic, with its many dialects, is the national language of the countries of North Africa, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf states. Modern Persian and Kurdish are Indo-European languages; Turkish and Azeri belong to the Altaic family of languages. The Berbers of North Africa who, like the Arabs, are Muslims, speak different dialects of Berber, an Afro-Asiatic language and generally refer to themselves as Imazighin (or Imazighen). In countries where large linguistically differentiated populations exist, such as the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran and the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria, language assumes a political dimension. National governments tend to strongly promote one
Eunuchs

The greatest fund of information about eunuchs under Islamic regimes comes from the Ottoman Empire (1299–1923), which employed eunuchs from the Caucasus and eastern Africa. Because Islamic law forbids enslaving and castrating subjects of a Muslim ruler, castration was typically performed by Christian physicians: Armenians in the Caucasus, Copts in Upper Egypt. Yet evidence exists of castration being performed in the Ottoman palace itself, so the prohibition must at times have been ignored. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a number of Caucasian eunuchs rose to be grand wazirs or provincial governors. At the same time, both black and white eunuchs served at Topkapi Palace. By 1592, the corps of African eunuchs had acquired a monopoly over the post of chief eunuch of the imperial harem (Darussaade Agasi or Kizlar Agasi), who guarded the residence of the palace women. White eunuchs guarded the “Gate of Felicity” (Babussaade) separating the outer court from the sultan’s throne room. The chief black eunuch also supervised the pious foundations (waqf; Turk. vakuf) endowed to provide services to the poor and to pilgrims to the Holy Cities. Beginning in 1644, the chief black eunuch, on his deposition, was routinely exiled to Egypt, where he cultivated ties of patronage with the provincial grandees.

The earliest mention of eunuchs in Islamic empires dates to the Abbasid era (750–1258 C.E.). In his ninth-century description of Baghdad, al-Ya’qubi notes quarters for African eunuchs in the central square of the original round city. No doubt the most famous eunuch of the Abbasid era is Kefir, the African eunuch who became de facto ruler of Egypt following the death of the last autonomous Ikhshidid governor, just before the Fatimid invasion of Egypt in 969. The Fatimids employed eunuchs not only in their palaces but in their armed forces as well. In one confrontation between the Fatimid and Byzantine fleets, the admirals on both sides were eunuchs.

Eunuchs played a number of important roles under the Mamluk sultanate, which ruled Egypt, Syria, and the western Arabian peninsula from 1250 to 1517. The Mamluks imported large numbers of eunuchs from the Caucasus and from India, as well as from Africa. They evidently pioneered the practice of employing eunuchs to guard sultans’ tombs in Cairo and, ultimately, to guard the prophet Muhammad’s tomb in Medina.

The use of eunuchs to guard rulers’ and their families’ private quarters dates at least to Achaemenid times. They were certainly employed by the Byzantine and Sassanian empires, which were the early Islamic state’s chief models for court culture. Eunuchs were regarded as the most loyal slaves because they were not only separated from their families and territories of origin but robbed of reproductive capability. Hence, their sole loyalty was ostensibly to the ruler who enslaved them, and they had an enormous stake in the continuation of the system in which they were employed.


Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious; Tribe.

See also Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious; Tribe.

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Amal Rassam

EUNUCHS

In the Near East, the use of eunuchs to guard rulers’ and their families’ private quarters dates at least to Achaemenid times. They were certainly employed by the Byzantine and Sassanian national language and may even at times seek to suppress minority languages, as happened in Turkey with Kurdish. To educate their children and to participate fully in the national economy and culture, members of minority ethnic groups must adopt the national language and, to a certain extent, dissociate themselves from their mother tongue.

Of all the elements that may be used to define groups or social categories, phenotypic race or biological variation is the least important in the Middle East, where the vast majority of the people from the west in Morocco to the east in Afghanistan tend to fall within the same racial category often referred to as “Mediterranean.” Where a markedly differentiated population exists such as the ‘abid or blacks in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, the Nubians in Egypt, or the Turkmen of Iran (with their pronounced Mongolian features); such phenotypic differences are locally recognized but are not necessarily associated with an ethnic identity as such. Islam has no racial ideology based on color and, while slavery was practiced throughout the Islamic world, it was not exclusively associated with Africans or any other particular population. The Ottomans recruited slaves from both eastern Europe and the Caucasus and their descendants today do not form either racially or ethnically distinct groups. Outside of a few towns in southern Arabia, slavery in the Middle East was not a primary means of organizing menial labor; as a consequence, the association of class and race or ethnicity and race is not well developed and has no significant implication or social and political organization in the region.

See also Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious; Tribe.
See also Gender; Harem.

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Jane Hathaway

EUROPEAN CULTURE AND ISLAM

Since the rise of Islam in the seventh century there has been continuous interaction between Europe and the Islamic world, often with profound implications on either side. Deepest and with greatest effect has been the interaction between Europe and Islam in the Middle East and North Africa, that is, Arab Islam. The new Arab-Islamic state, established in the 640s and 650s, included major areas that had been conquered from the East Roman (Byzantine) empire. Many aspects of Byzantine culture and custom were absorbed into the nascent Islamic culture, including administrative and legal practices. Over a longer term, the Hellenistic philosophical heritage played a major role in the development of Islamic philosophy, and its gnostic tradition in Islamic mysticism. Through both official and unofficial translation projects, major Greek works of philosophy and science became available in Arabic, laying the foundation of a flourishing of the sciences, including mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, in Arabic.

Arab-Islamic civilization in turn made a major contribution to the development of European Christian civilization a few centuries later. The main routes for this transfer were Sicily and Spain. The influence of Islamic art and architecture on the early Renaissance is often quite explicit, as in many of the well-known churches and palaces of Florence and other Italian cities. Likewise, the impact of the Spanish Islamic philosophers, above all Ibn Rushd (Averroes), on Thomas Aquinas, is widely acknowledged. It is also the case that much of the Greek philosophical tradition, in particular that of Aristotle, was for a long time known primarily through the Arabic versions of the texts. It has been suggested that the influence goes much deeper. Especially via the Norman connections, from Sicily to northern France and England, and through Italian networks, the patterns and structures of learning, of the organization of institutions, and of professional development were transmitted from the Mediterranean Islamic world into western Christendom. So it is suggested that the earliest universities in Europe, such as Bologna, Paris, and Oxford, were founded on Islamic models. Similarly, many of the financial instruments and techniques of long-distance trade, which became so important in the early development of European capitalism, were borrowed from Middle Eastern models. The Crusades, by contrast, appear to have brought into Europe primarily certain military techniques.

Over the following centuries, cultural exchange both ways was diminished. The Ottomans very quickly adopted some of the new military technologies of Europe, especially artillery, while Europe during the eighteenth century developed a fascination with things “oriental” in the arts and crafts. The globalization of European trade combined with the industrial revolution firmly moved the initiative into European hands. At the same time the encounter between Europe and Islam spread beyond the Mediterranean into South and South-East Asia and into sub-Saharan Africa. The imperial expansion was the context for the adoption of “curious” elements of Islamic culture into European culture, but Islamic cultures came under an all-pervading European impact. Initially, this impact was mainly economic. As the industrial revolution gathered pace, so European industrial exports began to replace the products of local craftsmen, and the colonized economies became suppliers of raw materials. Egypt was a good example of this process as it switched its agriculture from producing food to producing raw cotton during the first few decades of the nineteenth century. When Egypt took control of Syria in the 1830s and cut import duties, the finished cotton goods produced in the mills of England from Egyptian cotton replaced the locally produced crafts of the Syrian cities.

But European ideas also started attracting the urban intellectual and professional classes of the Islamic world. Initially the attraction was limited to individuals, but as states began to restructure on European patterns, either because they came under European rule, as in India, Indonesia, or Algeria, or because they sought to meet the European political challenge, as in the Ottoman empire, Egypt, and Persia, they also built up new education systems to produce the kind of manpower they needed. By the end of the nineteenth century there were a number of European-style universities and many more secondary schools. The early attractions of the social and political ideas of the French revolution were supplemented by the end of the nineteenth century by many of the nationalist philosophical ideas that had been developed in Germany. These ideas were being circulated ever more widely among a growing urban middle-class and literate population through newspapers, a new literature of poetry, histories, essays, and political pamphlets.

The early precursors of national movements can be found throughout the Islamic world by the beginning of the twentieth century. Their ideas often combined elements of European ideas with Islamic ones, and many times used Islamic
The Selimiye Camii Mosque sits on a hill in the center of Edirne, Turkey, and dominates the city’s skyline. It was completed in 1575 after six years of construction. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS

The main concentrations of Muslim population in Europe today are to be found in Russia (25–30 million), France (4–5 million), Germany (2.5–3 million), Britain (c. 2 million), former Yugoslavia (2–3 million), Albania (3 million), and Bulgaria (c. 1 million). Many of the smaller countries of western Europe are home to several hundred thousand Muslims each.

History
Almost from the beginning of the history of Islam, there has been a Muslim presence in Europe, first in the form of envoys and traders to the Byzantine empire and soon, as Arab Islam spread across North Africa, into the main trading centers of Mediterranean Europe. The first major arrival of Islam in Europe was a result of the conquest of the Iberian peninsula, which started in 711 C.E. Through settlement and conversion, large Muslim communities became part of the indigenous population of the peninsula. Spanish Muslim intellectuals became significant participants in Arabic and Islamic culture,

against modernity or withdrawing from participation in it, providing some of the Islamist political movements much of their support. On the other hand, many younger people have started using their newly gained educational resources to challenge the traditions of the older generation. They seek to separate local custom from the core of Islamic expectations and principles, placing themselves on a collision course with many of their parents’ generation. A number of Islamic intellectuals have recognized this and have become prominent participants in a rethinking of Islamic law and theology that has a large audience both in Europe and the Islamic world.

A Seldjuk manuscript of Aristotle and students appears in the volume one color insert.

See also Andalus, al-; Balkans, Islam in the; Europe, Islam in.

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Jorgen S. Nielsen
including most famously Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Khaldun. As the Christian kingdoms, led by Castille and Aragon, gradually pushed the borders of Islam southward, so the Muslim population also was pushed south. When the Muslim kingdom of Granada finally fell in 1492, substantial Muslim populations left for North Africa. But many, under the general term Moriscos, remained throughout the region for several generations. For a shorter period Sicily had also fallen under Muslim rule. The conquest was slow, lasting from 827–878, and Muslim control lasted until the Normans conquered the island later in the eleventh century.

While Muslim populations thus disappeared from the European side of the western Mediterranean, the establishment of a continuous Muslim presence in the east had started. In the early thirteenth century the Mongols had spread their power far into Russia. While Genghis Khan’s empire did not last long, it left behind a number of Mongol-Tatar successor states that had adopted Islam. The Tatar state of Kazan survived until the 1530s when it was conquered by Russia, while the Crimean Tatars had fallen under Ottoman rule already in 1475. The Muslim populations of these regions stayed and later spread around the Russian empire as soldiers, craftsmen, and traders settling at various times in regions ranging from the Ukraine and Poland to Finland. Here they remained more or less undisturbed until the great forced migration of the Stalinist period of the 1930s and 1940s, when a large proportion, in particular the Crimean Tatars, were transported to Soviet Central Asia.

Founded at the beginning of the fourteenth century in western Anatolia, the Ottoman empire gained its first foothold in the Balkans in 1354 and within ten years had restricted the Byzantine empire to the region around Constantinople (which finally fell to the Ottomans in 1453). The Ottoman armies then proceeded to spread Ottoman rule westward and northward, reaching the gates of Vienna in a failed siege in 1529. Substantial permanent Muslim communities established themselves in the Balkans as a result. In some cases such communities were Turkish immigrants from the east, some arriving voluntarily, others as part of a deliberate Ottoman policy of settlement. Significant numbers of indigenous people of Slavic culture also converted to Islam. The majority of Albanians became Muslim at this time. As the Ottoman empire was gradually pushed out of the Balkans during the nineteenth century, many Muslims also left. The Ottoman defeat in the First World War led to major population exchanges between Greece and Turkey. But the major communities in Bosnia, the Albanians and the Bulgarian Muslims, often called Pomaks, remained as did large numbers of Turks in Bulgaria, smaller numbers in Greek Thrace, and parts of the former Yugoslavia.

**Immigration**

On this background the most recent arrival of Muslim communities in Europe is a new departure, since it arises not from Muslim expansion but from European expansion. Today’s Muslim communities in western Europe are a consequence primarily of empire. This is most evident in Britain and France. The first major growth came about as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, when British shipping from India began taking on Yemeni and Somali labor in Aden. Over the following decades many of these people settled in and around Cardiff, Liverpool, Newcastle, and London. The first mosques in the country were established in Liverpool and the London suburb of Woking already around 1890. Between the two world wars, the London-based elite sought to lay the foundations for a London central mosque. It was only when a plot of land was granted by the king during the Second World War that the project began to move forward, leading to the opening in 1977 of the Islamic mosque and center in Regent’s Park.

In France, there was an elite immigration during the nineteenth century, including exiles such as Muhammad ‘Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. But labor migration also started then, recruiting mainly into the olive oil industry of the south and mining and heavy industry in the northeast. During the First World War large numbers of North Africans were requisitioned into industry and infrastructure works. Recognizing their contribution during the First World War the government sponsored the establishment of a mosque in Paris, opened in 1926. Numbers of migrant workers fell during the recession of the 1930s and reached a low at the end of the Second World War. But migration soon rose again and, despite their active involvement in the Algerian war of independence, the number of Algerians working in France continued to rise.

The other main country of Muslim immigration in Europe during the twentieth century was the Federal Republic of Germany. Its historical proximity to the Ottoman empire meant that there had been for a long time a cosmopolitan Muslim population in the main trading cities and, after the rise of Prussian power, in Berlin. The numbers grew especially after the two empires started drawing closer to each other toward the end of the nineteenth century. The economic ties between them were such that by the outbreak of the First World War they might be termed at least pseudo-colonial. The defeat of both empires in 1918 left only a small Muslim community in Berlin but it did manage to establish a mosque. During the Third Reich, the German armed forces established several units of Muslim troops that had defected from the Soviet army. While some were handed back at the end of the war, many remained in Germany permanently. It also must not be forgotten that in German-speaking Europe, Vienna had for long been the capital of an empire that included significant Muslim populations. In 1878 the Austro-Hungarian empire had occupied the Ottoman regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Vienna soon had a resident multi. In 1909 the state extended official recognition to Islam. During
Islam's Expansion into North Africa and Europe

Much of this period the Austrian courts were administering Islamic family law for those Muslim populations.

These historical precedents have tended to be forgotten under the overwhelming impact of immigration post-1945. Initially, once the reviving West European economies had absorbed their returning armies, the search for additional labor had extended first into the domestic countryside and then into the countries of southern Europe, which resumed their traditional patterns of sending labor abroad. It was Britain and France that first looked outside Europe. In the latter case, the recruitment from Algeria grew and was supplemented from the 1960s by immigrants from Tunisia and Morocco, then from sub-Saharan West Africa, especially Senegal, and finally, from the 1970s, by Turks as a result of a treaty signed between the two countries. Britain first found its additional labor needs satisfied from the Caribbean, with immigration starting already in the late 1940s. During the 1950s, migration from India came on stream, and in the early 1960s immigration from Pakistan (East and West) took off. By this time other industrial countries of northern Europe also began to need additional labor. Having for some time recruited from Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany signed a labor agreement with Turkey in 1962. The smaller countries followed the lead of their larger neighbors. During the 1960s the Netherlands signed agreements with Turkey, then Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia, while Belgium started finding labor in Turkey and Morocco. Labor immigration into the Scandinavian countries during this period was smaller but was also more varied in its sources, including Turkey, North Africa, and Pakistan.

Just as immigration from Muslim sources into mainland Europe was taking off, so Britain reached a turning point. After almost two years of debate, the doors of labor immigration were closed by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. However, family reunion remained possible. The length of the debate was a major reason for the sudden influx of men from Pakistan, arriving to beat the expected ban. More significantly in the long run, the establishment of family life brought with it a much greater awareness of Muslim self-identity. The closing of the gates of labor immigration and the consequent immigration of women and children led directly to a marked increase in organized Muslim activity and the establishment of mosques and other places of worship.

Organization

A decade after Britain closed its doors, the rest of continental Europe followed in response to the economic downturn sparked by the rise in oil prices during 1972 through 1974. The effects were similar: a marked rise in the opening of Muslim places of worship and in Muslim organizational activity. The process of organization followed a similar pattern across the various countries. Often the initiative came...
from a small group of local leaders who were concerned simply with finding a place where the required prayers could be conducted, and where children could be taught the rudiments of Islamic knowledge, how to conduct the core rituals and how to recite the Qur'an. Soon, however, the initiative passed to specific movements. These had usually existed in the country of origin and were now following the émigrés to the country of settlement. They had the resources and the organizational experience to meet community needs and, often, to provide support to local initiatives. In West Germany a leading organization of this kind during the 1970s was the Verband islamischer Kulturzentren acting as the German branch of the Suleimançi movement. Since the 1980s the Milli Gorus, closely associated with the National Salvation Party of Necmeddin Erbakan, has gained prominence. Similar roles have been played in Britain by extensions of the Deobandi and Breîwi networks, and by a network of organizations related to the Jam'iyat-e Islami, and in France during the 1980s by Foi et pratique, a movement arising out of the Tablighi Jam'iyat, which subsequently forged links with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. Many of these movements had found themselves at odds with the regimes in the countries of origin; some of them, indeed, had experienced repression. To counter their influence, governments sought to establish their own organizations to meet the needs of their émigrés. The Amicales of Moroccan workers was thus a means for the monarchy to maintain close ties to the émigrés, and after the Turkish coup of September 1980, the new government aggressively promoted the role of the official Diyanet among Turks in Germany.

Legal Status
A complicating element has been the very different legal statuses available to immigrants across the continent. For a long time some of the West German states adopted a policy of rotation, whereby no residence extension was given after a certain period, so “guest workers” were regularly replaced. In other German states, longer-term residence was the norm. Germany generally made it very difficult for foreigners to acquire citizenship, as did several other countries, most notably Switzerland. Both Britain and France had comparatively easy access to permanent residence and citizenship, and children born in those two countries had virtually automatic right to citizenship. The Scandinavian and Benelux countries allowed comparatively easy access to citizenship and soon also gave local voting rights to foreigners. These very different stances were reflected in work permit policies. Since the late 1980s immigration for work has been a minor dimension of Muslim immigration, replaced by a growing number of entrants as refugees and asylum seekers, an issue that came to dominate public debate at the end of the twentieth century.

As a result, the situation in each locality in Europe often differed significantly depending on the various patterns of organized presence. A further dimension of such differences was that each European country had its own practices regarding establishment and registration of voluntary organizations, as well as often very different traditions of relations between religion and state. At one extreme, France had inherited an almost complete separation of church and state, which for a long time excluded Muslim groups from any participation in public life. At the same time it was not until a change in the law took place in 1982 that it was possible for foreign citizens to set up their own organizations. At the other extreme were states in which there was a status of officially recognized religions. Under this heading Islam gained official recognition in Belgium in 1974, in Austria in 1979, and in Spain in 1992. One of the main issues of public contention in Germany has been the continued refusal by the state to admit the Muslim community to the recognized status enjoyed by the main churches and the Jewish community.

Public Participation
Over the 1990s Muslim participation in public life has become marked. In many countries Muslim immigrants have become citizens and have started taking part in political life through political parties. In most countries there are now Muslims elected onto local councils, national parliaments, and the elected bodies of European institutions. This is an indication also of the change of generation. The 1989 protests against Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in Britain, and against the banning of girls’ head scarves in certain French schools served to mobilize a new generation into political life, as their immigrant parents began to retire from organizational leadership. Responses to the events of 11 September 2001 have further highlighted some of the tensions which have been arising since a younger, more active

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Muslims (x 1,000)</th>
<th>Muslim % of total population</th>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Muslim population in western Europe.
The expansion of Islam historically embraces two phenomena. The first is the expansion of Islamic states—that is, states whose ruling elite consisted of Muslims and which consciously aimed to extend Islamic rule to new regions. The second phenomenon is the spread of Islam as a religion or faith—that is, the actual process (often called “conversion”) by which individuals and groups came to identify themselves as Muslims, both inwardly and publicly.

These two processes are not unrelated but are far from identical and must be carefully distinguished from one another. On the one hand, Islam historically first came to some (but not all) regions of the world through the expansion into those regions of states whose leading cadres were Muslims and which espoused a self-consciously Islamic view of the world. State expansion was justified by the doctrine of jihad, “striving” or “exerting oneself” (i.e., in God’s service). Jihad embraced a variety of practices, including the moral struggle against sin (even within oneself), peaceful proselytization of others, the use of violence by believers in defense of their way of life when attacked, or aggressive warfare against nonbelievers (nonmonotheists) to force them to recognize God’s oneness and to submit to Islam. All these interpretations of the sense of jihad are rooted in Qur’anic verses (for example, 25:48–52 on proselytization; 22:39–41 on self-defense; 9:29 on aggressive warfare). It was the last understanding of the meaning of jihad that was most germane to the process of Islamic state-expansion.

The most important instance of this process was the spread of the first Islamic state in the early years of the Islamic era (seventh to ninth centuries c.e.), but it also is visible in numerous later historical episodes, such as the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Christian Balkans in the fourteenth through eighteenth centuries, the Ghaznavid and Ghurid conquest of Sind and adjacent parts of South Asia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the conquests of the Delhi sultans in India during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the expansion of jihad states in the western Sudan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and so on. In almost all such cases, the objective of these Muslim rulers or states was not immediate conversion of the local population to Islam, but rather the more mundane concerns of seizing booty or securing the tax revenues of the conquered lands, or gaining control of strategically important areas. In many instances, however, the conquerors were responding not only to these mundane incentives, but also (or, sometimes, exclusively) to a general desire to establish in the newly conquered territories an Islamic public order—that is, a social order in accord with Islamic law (shari‘a). This they wished to do both in order to extend the glory of the faith they espoused, and in order to ensure that Muslims living in such areas could meet their religious obligations to God under Islamic law: open confession of their faith, regular public prayer, fasting during Ramadan, giving of alms, and performance of the pilgrimage to Mecca if that was within their means. In most cases, however, the establishment of an Islamic order in new areas was not accompanied by forced conversions to Islam or by official pressure on non-Muslims to convert; the image of Muslim warriors coming to an area and offering the

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*Jorgen S. Nielsen*
conquered the stark choice between “Islam or the sword” is mostly a myth propounded by Western anti-Islamic polemicists.

The establishment of an Islamic public order in a hitherto non-Muslim area, however, particularly if sustained over the span of several generations, generally created the conditions under which many non-Muslims gradually embraced Islam. This is why it is said that the processes of state-expansion and of individual and group conversion, while distinct, are intimately related. Still, even under the aegis of an Islamic state, the converts’ actual decisions to join the Islamic community openly (to “convert”) seem to have been shaped primarily by individual factors that were also operative outside the realm of control of any Islamic state. These included social, economic, and other practical incentives, as well as the intrinsic appeal of Islam as a faith-system in its own right.

These historical processes can only be sketched here in the broadest outlines; their reconstruction by the historian is moreover bound to be somewhat uneven because of the nature of the sources, which are for many parts of this story seriously deficient or even nonexistent. In general, however, one can say that the process of state expansion is much better documented than is the process of Islam’s adoption by new “converts,” whether within or outside of Islamic states, for whose individual decisions, and the factors contributing to them, there is often no trace whatsoever.

The remainder of this article will examine first the general factors that have contributed historically to people’s decision to embrace Islam, followed by a brief overview of the spread of Islam in various regions of the world, during which the relative importance of state-expansion and other factors will be noted.

**Causes and Agents of Islamization**

As with most complex social processes, the Islamization of a population that hitherto did not identify itself as Muslim normally involved a multitude of causes or factors. These factors impinged in differing degrees on various individuals in the population depending on their cultural, social, economic, and political situations and their personal temperament. It is therefore impossible to generalize from one person’s conversion narrative what the relative importance of various factors in conversion was for his society as a whole, just as it is impossible to work back from the aggregate factors operative in a certain historical situation to deduce just which ones would have been most influential on a particular individual who chose to embrace Islam; the selection of factors that were most important to a given person can only be known if that person leaves some written record of his own reasons for embracing the new faith—something that happens only in a tiny minority of cases.

First and foremost, we must acknowledge that Islam, as a faith system, has significant intrinsic appeal to the intellect.

The relative simplicity and transparency of its basic doctrines (monotheism, prophecy, last judgment, etc.) makes them easy to grasp and to defend in philosophical or theological discourse against religious systems with more convoluted doctrines (e.g., the Christian doctrine of the Trinity). The fact that Muslims developed over the first two centuries of their existence a strong tool for legitimizing some of these doctrines in the form of an elaborate origins narrative helped bolster the intellectual cogency of Islam’s doctrines. Islam’s emphasis on justice (frequently stressed in the Qur’an) and on the brotherhood of all believers—the latter made especially manifest in the daily communal prayers and in major ritual observances such as collective fasting during Ramadan—were also capable of exercising a strong intellectual attraction on many individuals (aside from their obvious possible social attractiveness).

As noted above, the establishment of states with Muslim rulers and an Islamic public order usually created the conditions under which many people came to embrace Islam. Many converted in response to the working of economic or social or other factors that the existence of an Islamic public order made possible. Some, however, embraced Islam for explicitly political reasons. Besides those who wished to enter government service (or who were already in it, and believed that openly confessing Islam would enhance their career chances), many others were doubtless attracted to the faith that was now “official,” publicly proclaimed, and so increasingly prominent, and associated with success and victory. On the other hand, the use of political pressure or force by Muslim authorities to coerce people to embrace Islam, while not unknown in Islamic history, was very seldom practiced, even when politically dominant Muslims absorbed populations of nonmonotheists or “pagans.”

At various times individuals or communities may have responded to economic incentives to embrace Islam. The structure of taxation under an Islamic regime—according to which non-Muslims paid a special tax, the jizya or poll-tax, to the Muslim authorities—sometimes seems to have encouraged individuals to embrace Islam. Generally, however, the tax inequities seem to have been minimal (Muslims, after all, were liable according to the shari’ah to some taxes not levied on non-Muslims, such as the zakat or alms-tax) and not sufficient to generate waves of conversions to Islam. After all, the non-Muslim communities of the Near East embraced Islam only very slowly—a process taking hundreds of years. Far more important, probably, was the force of general economic (and social) dislocation caused by the policies of various Muslim states, which caused great flux in all communities under their rule—Muslim as well as non-Muslim—resulting in a shattering of the communal solidarity of some non-Muslim communities, in the aftermath of which the uprooted individuals may well have embraced Islam in order to find a secure place for themselves in some community. The agrarian distress of the
middle Umayyad period in Egypt, for example, which led to widespread abandonment of lands by their peasant cultivators, many of whom fled to the (predominantly Muslim) towns, weakened or destroyed rural non-Muslim communities and doubtless led many such refugees to embrace Islam more or less out of desperation, as their only economic foothold became one dominated by Muslims among whom they now lived and worked.

Many social factors also contributed to the acceptance of Islam by individuals or groups. Non-Muslims from highly stratified societies who lived in contact with Muslims could not fail to observe the relative egalitarianism of Islam (reflected, for example, in the fact that all believers, from the wealthy merchant to the poorest laborer, prayed side-by-side in the mosque); this may have had an impact in societies with caste-like social restrictions, such as were found in Hindu society in South Asia or among Iran’s Zoroastrians. More generally, the highly visible collective rituals of Islam, particularly communal prayer and fasting during Ramadan, created an obvious sense of solidarity among believers that could exercise a strong attraction on those non-Muslims who yearned for the security of a strong social matrix. These rituals also provided apparent popular affirmation for the cogency of Islam’s doctrines. For some men, particularly of the wealthier classes, the relative ease of divorce and the toleration of polygamy may have been attractive features of Islam’s social system. Perhaps most important of all, however, was the simple desire among some non-Muslims to attain fuller social integration (including intermarriage) with Muslims among whom they lived and worked, and with whom they had other business or social ties. (Since apostasy from Islam was punishable by death, according to Islamic law, Muslims rarely converted to other religions, even when they lived outside an Islamic state.) The fact that Muslim men could, according to Islamic law, marry non-Muslim women meant that a non-Muslim who converted to Islam did not even necessarily cut himself off from the possibility of marrying a woman of his former religious community.

Cultural factors at times also played an important role in the spread of Islam among new populations. During the first several centuries of the Islamic era (roughly eighth through twelfth centuries C.E.), the urban-based Arabic-Islamic civilization that developed in the Middle East was by far the most sophisticated cultural tradition of western Eurasia. As such it exercised a powerful attraction on many people, who both embraced Islam and adopted the Arabic language. (The adoption of Arabic and Arabo-Islamic cultural patterns by numerous people in Andalusia who remained Christian, on the other hand, reveals that the processes of Arabization and Islamization were not always congruent.)

Another cultural development of importance to the spread of Islam was the rise of Islamic literary traditions in languages other than Arabic; this helped to make the faith more accessible and familiar to speakers of those languages, once Islam had begun to spread beyond the Arabic-speaking lands of its beginnings. Usually, the language in which an Islamic discourse was newly developing adopted the Arabic script as an outward marker of its Islamic character, to distinguish such writings from earlier, non-Islamic writings in the same base language. The first appearance of Islamic writings in Persian but using a modified form of the Arabic script, for example, which began in the tenth century C.E., contributed significantly to the consolidation of Islam in the Iranian cultural zone over the next several centuries, against its local rivals, especially Zoroastrianism, which continued to write in a form of Persian using the older Pahlavi script. Similar processes accompanied the rise of Islamic literary traditions in various dialects of Turkish, among Indic languages for which Urdu became the vehicle of Islamic literary culture and identity, and in Indonesian-Malay; the rise of each of these contributed significantly to the consolidation of Islam in areas where these languages were spoken.

It is important to note that the spread of Islam often has followed a pattern of initial superficial Islamization followed after a generation or more by a “reform” movement. The initial Islamization may be little more than nominal and marked by much syncretism and the survival of older, non-Islamic beliefs and practices; the “reform” along the lines of a more rigorous variant of Islam is sometimes carried out by indigenous Muslims (not infrequently led by returning pilgrims), sometimes by revivalist preachers from outside the area. Examples of this can be seen in historical contexts as disparate as the Maghrib in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries (Almoravid and Almohad movements), Anatolia during the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, the puritanical Wahhabi movement in the Arabian peninsula beginning in the sixteenth century, the revitalization of Islamic practice in nineteenth-century Indonesia at the hands of returning pilgrims, and the transformation of the Black Muslim movement in the United States into a form of orthodox Sunni Islam during the second half of the twentieth century. Islamic reformers naturally decry the laxity and heterodox character of the superficially Islamized communities they strive to reform, but it must be recognized that these communities’ loose initial affiliations with Islam, however unorthodox in practice and belief, nonetheless represent a decisive turn on the part of these people toward identification with the broader Islamic community. This early identification with Islam may be an easier step for individuals to take precisely because it is still tentative, tolerant of some cherished pre-Islamic practices of the local community, or associated with political or other programs that are not those of Islam in general (for example, black separatism in the case of the Black Muslim movement); yet it results in a fundamental reorientation of the individual’s identity toward Islam, and so offers the base on which later reformers can subsequently build.
The agents of Islamization are of course almost infinite in variety, as in principle people of any kind can, under appropriate conditions, proselytize others or serve as positive models that attract nonbelievers to the faith. Historically, however, three groups of people in Islamic society have been especially important to the spread of the faith: merchants, popular preachers, and mendicant Sufis (mystics). Muslim merchants, who often established themselves as self-contained colonies in non-Muslim areas, historically were the first to bring awareness of Islam to many new areas. Because of the nature of their work, they usually established close personal ties with the non-Muslims among whom they lived, which gave them many opportunities to engage in patient proselytization among their associates. Moreover, their prosperity, general reputation for honest dealing and upright behavior, and powerful sense of collective identity as Muslims made them strong positive examples of the Islamic way of life that quietly drew many converts.

In some situations, popular preachers also were important to the spread of Islam. Motivated solely by personal piety, these individuals were especially effective in situations where Islam was already known but not yet embraced by many people. The impact of mendicant Sufis was not dissimilar to that of preachers, although the form of Islam they popularized was in some cases less rigorous than that espoused by the preachers; as such it appealed to people who were unwilling to give up all aspects of their former belief-system, and initiated that kind of superficial Islamization that, as has been seen, was often an important first step down the road to full immersion in the faith.

The Expansion of Islam in Various World Regions

Islam began in western Arabia with the preaching of the prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632 C.E.). Under the caliphs, or successors to Muhammad as temporal leaders of the Muslims, the community he had founded in Medina and Mecca expanded quickly to control all of the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Syria-Palestine, Iran, and Egypt; most of these areas were seized through military action from the two great powers of the day, the Byzantine and Sassanian Persian empires. While the early Islamic conquests remain difficult to explain in full as a historical phenomenon, they are probably best seen as an example of state-formation followed by rapid state expansion. Once firmly established, the Islamic state, led by the Umayyad caliphs (660–750 C.E.), established major garrison towns in newly conquered areas (Kufa and Basra in Iraq; Hims in Syria; Fustat in Egypt; Qayrawan in Tunisia; Qom, Marv, and others in Iran). These became important urban centers where Islamic literary culture developed, particularly under the Abbassid caliphs (750–1258 C.E.). From these garrison towns the caliphs launched further campaigns of conquest that brought ever-wider areas under their sway. North Africa was conquered in a series of campaigns sent from Egypt in the middle and later decades of the seventh century, and Muslim armies crossed the Straits of Gibraltar in 711 C.E. and quickly seized most of the Iberian peninsula, followed in subsequent decades by raids deep into Gaul and occupation of significant areas of what is now southern France. All these areas have ever since remained part of the Islamic world, with the exception of southern France and Iberia, from which Muslims were expelled in 1492 by a resurgent Spanish monarchy, and some islands in the Mediterranean, notably Sicily, where Muslims established themselves during the ninth and tenth centuries C.E. In the east, Muslim forces defeated the last armies of the Sassanian Great Kings in western Iran already in the middle of the sixth century, and within several more decades Muslim forces had seized areas far to the east, particularly Khurasan, although some areas of Iran (Sistan, Gilan) resisted Muslim encroachment stubbornly for many more years. From Khurasan, the caliphs dispatched armies into other parts of eastern Iran, Afghanistan, and areas beyond the Oxus River in Central Asia.

The caliphs not only organized and maintained the conquering armies and continued this remarkable expansion of the first Islamic state, they also benefited from the conquests in the form of a share of booty and captives and subsequently in the form of regular taxes imposed on the conquered areas. But it is important to note that for at least two centuries, Muslims constituted a minority (at first, indeed, a very small minority) of the population of the vast area controlled by the early Islamic empire between Spain and Afghanistan; it is estimated that the population of the caliphal domains only became 50 percent Muslim around the middle or end of the ninth century. The conversion of the population of the Middle East, then, even in lands like Syria, Egypt, and Iran, was clearly something that happened very gradually.

It was also during the early Islamic centuries that certain peoples living adjacent to the caliphal empire, but outside its borders, embraced Islam. The Bulgars, who lived along the Volga, had embraced Islam by the ninth century, probably under the influence of Muslim merchants coming from the south. The pastoral nomadic Turkish peoples of the Central Asian steppes were also increasingly converted to Islam during the ninth and tenth centuries; some may have embraced Islam on the advice of itinerant preachers or Muslim merchants to avoid being preyed upon by slave-raiders coming from the fringes of the caliphal empire in Khurasan. Their conversion was to prove of great importance, for in the eleventh century the Turks began their epic migration westward through northern Iran and into Azerbaijan, the Caucasus region, and Anatolia; this folk migration, which their political leaders the Seljuks partly orchestrated and partly followed, brought both the Turkish language and Islam for the first time to many parts of Anatolia. Under the aegis of various rival Turkish-Islamic states, much of the formerly Christian population of what we today call Turkey gradually embraced Islam between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries C.E.—in this case, a process in which both merchants and syncretistic Sufi fraternities played a significant part.
Eventually, this Turkish-Islamic matrix gave rise to the Ottoman state, which in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries conquered vast new territories for Islam in the Balkans and created the conditions under which the faith spread there, particularly in Albania and Bosnia.

The first Muslim presence in South Asia was established already in the early eighth century C.E. in the Indus river valley (Sind and Punjab) by the conquest of key towns in the region, but although this community survived for many centuries little is known about it. The real beginning of the extensive spread of Islam in South Asia came in the late tenth and the eleventh centuries C.E., when the Ghaznavid dynasty began to launch raids from its main base in Afghanistan into the Indus valley and beyond, in order to secure the rich plunder the area offered. Eventually, some of these raids resulted in the establishment of permanent Ghaznavid outposts in Sind, especially as the Ghaznavids’ control of their original base in Afghanistan was challenged and then taken away by others; their Indian possessions thus became a refuge for the Ghaznavids. The Ghaznavids were succeeded by the Ghurids, who in the later twelfth century held not only Sind and Punjab but also came to control most of northern India as far east as western Bengal. With the fall of the Ghurids in Afghanistan in the thirteenth century under pressure of the Khwarizmshahs and Mongols, some Ghurid commanders in India established the first Delhi Sultanate, which engaged in constant campaigning to spread its control against local Hindu and rival Muslim princes. By the fourteenth century, the Delhi sultans had brought an intermittent patchwork of areas under their control, extending all the way to south India and to Orissa in the southeast, and continued battling other Muslim and Hindu principalities. The degree of Islamization resulting from this political control varied, however, from region to region in South Asia; in general, Islamization was (and remains) much more extensive in the regions of Sind, Punjab, Bengal, and, by the fourteenth century, Kashmir in the north and Deccan in the south, than it was in other areas of India, including the Ganges plain.

Although military expansion was important to the spread of Islam in India, however, it was far from the only factor. Perhaps equally important was the establishment, no later than the twelfth century, of numerous trading colonies of Muslim merchants, usually of Arab or Persian origin, particularly along the west coast of India. These merchant colonies brought to the rulers (usually Hindu) in whose territories they established themselves not only important economic benefits, but also an exposure to some aspects of Islamic high culture, and a reputation for honesty and fair dealing. The Muslim merchant colonies were therefore important catalysts for the conversion to Islam of many people in India, even before a Muslim prince or the Delhi sultans brought their area under the domination of an officially Muslim state.
important to the spread of Islam in South Asia were members of various orders of Sufis (mystics), such as the Chishtiyya. Some Sufi saints were closely associated with a Muslim ruler, while others avoided such ties and operated independently; whatever the case, their egalitarianism, emphasis on the spiritual life, and eagerness to welcome new adepts made them powerful magnets for the faith.

In China, Muslims have always been a minority. Already by the ninth century C.E., there was a large colony of Muslim (presumably Arab and Persian) merchants in Canton; it was largely massacred or expelled by the Chinese in 878, though some Muslims remained. The largest communities of Muslims in China were established in Xinjiang in the west during the thirteenth and following centuries, during the period of Mongol rule of China (the Yuan dynasty), when the Mongols, who cared little about religion, allowed Muslim merchants free access to the country. The Mongol Golden Horde conquered parts of central Asia and southern Russia, destroying the Muslim Bulghar kingdom, but by 1290 the khans of the Horde had themselves embraced Islam.

The first Muslims in Southeast Asia seem to have been Arab merchants who established a colony in Palembang in the trading state of Shrivijaya in eastern Sumatra in the seventh century C.E. In the subsequent centuries, colonies of Arab, Persian, and Indian Muslim merchants established themselves along the coasts of the Malay peninsula and Sumatra, some fleeing the Chinese destruction of the large Muslim trading colony at Canton in 878. As in coastal India and East Africa, Muslim merchants established a foothold in most of the trading ports of Malaysia and Indonesia. The important colony of Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra is mentioned already in the thirteenth century by Marco Polo as having a Muslim ruler. The trading entrepot of Malacca, which controlled the crucial shipping lane through the narrow strait separating Malaya and Sumatra, seems to have had a Muslim ruler by the early fifteenth century. In both cases, the wealth and commercially based assertiveness of these trading entrepots resulted in the spread of Islam to neighboring areas. The sultans of Malacca extended their control over nearby areas of the Malay peninsula, bringing to Islam local populations that had not already been attracted to Islam by the glittering prosperity of Malaca’s rulers; but after Malacca’s conquest by the Portuguese in 1511, its commerce declined sharply, particularly because Muslim merchants preferred to take their commerce to Muslim Aceh. The sultans of Aceh eventually expanded their influence and control southward in Sumatra and in adjacent areas at the expense of other local chieftains, particularly in the seventeenth century C.E.; they continued to ply their traditional occupations of commerce and piracy, and the sultanate ended only in the late nineteenth century during the war against Dutch colonial occupation. The spread of Islam to other parts of Southeast Asia—in particular Java, Borneo, and the Moluccas—was carried out through a combination of peaceful commerce, proselytization, and warfare launched against their neighbors by local Muslim princes. In Java, Islam became influential at the court of Majapahit around the mid-fifteenth century, and subsequently spread widely through the island. Similar patterns can be traced in Borneo, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and Luzon during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Rivalry between Muslim preachers and Christian missionaries (Portuguese and later Dutch) in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries sharpened the effort of Muslim proselytizers, who presented their cause increasingly as one of jihad against Christian aggression. In the nineteenth century, Muslim pilgrims returning to Indonesia from extended stays in Arabia were instrumental in fueling a revivalist or purification movement that did much to deepen the local commitment to Islam.

Islam came to North Africa, as we have seen, as part of the rapid expansion of the first caliphal state in the seventh century C.E. South of the Sahara, Islam spread more slowly, arriving by several different routes: up the Nile, across the Sahara to the Niger region of West Africa, and by sea to the East African coast. From Egypt, caliphal control, and with it Islam, spread already in the seventh and eighth centuries southward up the Nile into Nubia and from there into the northern parts of the modern state of Sudan and to the fringes of Ethiopia. Farther west, Muslim merchants from North Africa were by 1000 C.E. crossing the Sahara in caravans via key oasis towns such as Sijilmasa, Tadmekka, and Awdaghast, and had established merchant colonies near the great bend of the Niger River, particularly at the trading center of Timbuktu. The revivalist Almoravid movement established a Muslim state in Mauretania in the eleventh century, and began attacking the Soninke kingdom of Ghana before expanding rapidly northward again. By the thirteenth century, these initial seeds of Islamization had grown into several powerful Muslim kingdoms in the western Sudan: Mali and Gao in the Niger valley, and Kanam, in the vicinity of Lake Chad. These kingdoms and other smaller ones periodically waged jihad against neighboring non-Muslims, and also encouraged commerce, which drew local tribal peoples into closer contact with Muslim merchants and their cosmopolitan vision of the world.

The spread of Islam in East Africa, along the Indian Ocean littoral, resembled in some ways Islam’s penetration of Southeast Asia. The first agents of Islamization were Muslim merchants from Arabia, Iran, and India, who came with the monsoon and founded or established colonies in the major coastal trading ports from Somalia southward, particularly in Zanzibar, where sectarian (Khariji) Muslims from Oman established ties that endured in political form until the mid-twentieth century. Other Muslim colonies remained subject to local rulers, but retained close communal and family ties to their coreligionists in Arabia or India. From the coastal trading ports, Islam gradually penetrated some distance into the hinterlands from which came the goods exchanged at the ports of trade.
Muslim communities became prominent in Western Europe and North America only during the middle and latter decades of the twentieth century. In Western Europe, Muslim communities became established in some cases as an unforeseen by-product of a European country's possession of Asian or African colonies or protectorates with large Muslim populations. Whether in search of work, education, or (after the colony's independence) sanctuary from oppression, migrants from these colonial or ex-colonial possessions sometimes found a way to move to the metropolitan country, whose language and sometimes culture they had often learned. Salient examples are the large communities of Muslims of North or West African origin in France, those of South Asian origin in Great Britain, and those of Southeast Asian origin in the Netherlands. Other Muslim migrants to Europe came to countries with no colonial connections to the Islamic world, mainly for economic reasons, such as the many Turkish guest workers in Germany, or for political reasons (Iranians after the overthrow of the shah in 1979, Bosnians during the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s). Whatever the cause, many of these Muslim migrants to Europe settled there permanently, so that the large and growing Muslim communities of Western Europe are now in their third and fourth generations.

In North America, large numbers of immigrants from majority-Muslim lands in Asia and Africa came to pursue economic opportunities or education, or to escape political oppression or economic deprivation (such as the large influx of Iranians of middle- or upper-class backgrounds who came after 1979). The Islamic community in the United States, however, also includes a sizable number of indigenous African-Americans. Beginning in the 1930s, some African-Americans joined Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam, originally a black separatist movement. The Nation of Islam espoused many ideas that were not part of traditional Islam and most of them identified only weakly with mainstream Muslim communities around the world. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, this movement underwent an internal transformation (led by such figures as Malcolm X) that led increasing numbers of its members to adopt mainstream Islamic values and to abandon the movement's black separatist origins. The American Muslim Movement that emerged from the Nation of Islam after Elijah Muhammad's death in 1975 is thoroughly orthodox in its doctrines.

See also Conversion; Da'wa; Jihad; Tasawwuf.

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Fred M. Donner
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, spiritual leader of the Shi‘a of Lebanon, was born in Najaf, Iraq, in 1935 to a religious family from Southern Lebanon. Known in the West as the spiritual leader of Hizbullah, unlike most Shi‘a ulema, he traces his genealogy to Imam Hassan rather than Imam Hossein. He studied with Ayatollah Khu‘i in Najaf, following which Fadlallah settled in eastern Beirut and became Khu‘i’s representative. He lived and worked as a Shi‘a among Sunnis and Christians during the civil war in Lebanon. At the onset of the war he wrote about the relationship between political power and ideology and became an active community organizer. In his relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, he has both continued his contacts with Tehran as well as maintained a distance from the Iranian leadership.

Fadlallah’s career is marked by differences from other Shi‘a ulema. These differences include his focus on social and charitable organizations, women’s participation in public life, and a rather decentralized view of leadership. He believes that marja‘iyya, religious leadership, should be distinguished from wilayat al-faqih, or political leadership. There should be many waly (political leaders), whereas only one person should hold the title of marja‘. This means that there are many waly who are the interpreters of religion and politics in society. On the other hand, marja‘ is a symbolic and religious leadership and jurisdiction goes beyond the political and national boundaries. Fadlallah believes that marja‘ should be unified under one authority. Regarding jurisprudence, he argues that the Qur‘an takes precedence over the sunna, and that jurists need to interpret meaning directly from the Qur‘an. Fadlallah’s religious and political status increased, especially among radicals, after Ayatollah Khomeini gave him ijaza (religious permission) to collect khums (religious tax) from his followers in 1982.

See also Political Islam.

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Mazyar Lotfalian

FALSIFA

Philosophical speculation in Islamic culture has triple roots in theology (kalam), philosophy proper (falsafa), and mysticism (tasawwuf).

Theological Beginnings
The genesis of Muslim philosophical theology is manifested in the marriage of Greek logic and monotheistic apologetics in the school of Mu‘tazilah initiated by Wasi’il ibn ‘Ata (d. 748) and developed by Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allaf (d. 849/850), his nephew al-Nazzam (d. c. 435/445), and the jurist ‘Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1204/1205). They inquired into such questions as the compatibility of free will for creatures and Divine omnipotence. Can a person act against the will or knowledge of God? If persons have no free will, how can a just God punish them for predetermined actions? If rewards and punishments are arbitrary, why does God send prophets and reveal sacred scriptures to guide His creatures? Wrestling with such key issues in theodicy, the prevalent adherents of the Mu‘tazilah position support the legitimacy of the doctrine of punishment and rewards by proffering their view that persons are free and that God is just. Their position criticized subjectivism in ethics and upheld a rationalist ethic that persons can reason about ethics and thus are responsible for moral actions. Against this family of doctrines arose the school of Ash‘arites (founded by Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Ash‘ari, d. 935), which advocated the so-called theory of occasionalism. Popularized later in Europe by Nicolas Malebranche (d. 1715), occasionalists...
confronted the thorny problem of causality as follows. Among created occasions in the world, there is no causation (neither agent-patient nor an event-type of causation). Specifically, minds/mental events or bodies/physical actions are subject only to an ultimate cause, namely God. Belonging to the Sunni school of theology, this school questioned the meaningfulness of the notion of free will; by contrast, it advocated that God ordained a total resignation to the cosmos, which it claimed. This position does not imply any negative states for humanity; in this tenor, persons (including someone in the position of Job) should envision nature and themselves as mere gifts of the Divine grace; faith commands creatures to passively witness the glory of creation as an icon of the Creator. Other key issues included the controversy as to whether or not the Qur’an is co-eternal with the Divine; this controversy is based on a reading of the Timaeus where Plato postulates a co-eternity among the ideas/forms/universals and the creator-artist-demiurge. Finally they have constantly debated the place of reason versus revelation and the place of philosophy in an Islamic society. A number of Sunni theologians like Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1327) criticized what they considered to be untenable attempts of philosophers to intrude into theology. In contrast, Shi’a writers like Nasir Khusraw, Nasir ad-Din Tusi (d. 1274), and Sadr ad-Din Shirazi (known as Mulla Sadra), all of whom were philosophers in the school of Isfahan in the following three centuries, and even as recent as Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), all view theology and philosophy as interdependent disciplines. The most philosophical group of Muslim sects consists of the so-called Isma’ili’s, among them Khosrow, Hamid al-Din Kirmani, and Nasir ad-Din Tusi.

Classical Philosophy (Ninth to Thirteenth Century)

The classical age of Islamic philosophy is marked by the following features: (a) an increasing awareness of the importance of Greek philosophy, especially of Aristotelian delineation and division of philosophical studies such as ontology, epistemology, normative types of inquiry, analytical disciplines such as logic and mathematics, natural sciences, and theology; (b) the production of commentaries on the Greek texts, and the development of new and creative solutions to the traditional controversies such as the nature of imaginations and the problem of universals; and (c) the pursuit of philosophical investigations independent of religious concerns. A majority of recent and some contemporary investigators in Islamic philosophy focus on the so-called Greek into Arabic, or Arab logic into Latin/Hebrew. There is no doubt that such historical-reductive advances are a legitimate field as illustrated in the case of the Persian-born philosopher and scientist Ibn Sina (known to the West by his Latin name, Avicenna). He claimed that he had read Aristotle’s Metaphysics about forty times, and both peripatetic and Neoplatonic influences are imprinted over his several encyclopedic collections. In turn, Ibn Sina was mentioned over five hundred times by the most important Catholic thinker, St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), who grounded much of his metaphysics in Ibn Sina’s concepts, such as the essence-existence distinctions. In this light Islamic texts may be useful both in tracing the development of Greek thought as well as in revealing the genesis of some Latin and Hebrew philosophical writings.

Major Muslim thinkers of the classical period. A key figure is Abu Ya’qub Al-Kindi (d. 873), who proffered a search for truth over reliance on authority. Moreover, he supported the theory of creation by arguing that the eternity of the world would imply the existence of an actual infinite, which was proven to be impossible by Aristotle. Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (d. 950), is known as “the second teacher,” an original thinker and a logician. His numerous contributions include: (a) constructing a Muslim version of the theory of emanation adopted by a majority of subsequent Muslim philosophers; (b) holding a Platonic position that philosophizing takes place in context of a polity and its societal ethics; and finally (c) having insights in analytical ontology on topics such as the relation between language and ontology. He demonstrated that in the spite of the fact that Semitic languages like Arabic do not contain the copula, they are nevertheless as capable as any Indo-European language like Greek or Persian to express primary ontic concepts designated by terms such as being, existence, existent, and substance. Abu ‘Ali ibn Sina (d. 1037), who is perhaps the most original and systematic Muslim thinker, as is illustrated by the following ideas.

With respect to the logical structure of metaphysics, Ibn Sina modified the ontology of the peripatetic substance-event language ontology (where the first division of being was into the categories of substances and accidents) to a primary encounter with being and the threefold modalities of necessity, contingency, and impossibility. A concatenation of being with necessity leads to necessary being, which, in the second version of the ontological arguments, leads to the notion of The Necessary Existent, the cause of the actualization of all contingent beings.

With respect to the epistemic meditative experience, he postulated a four-phase hermeneutic phenomenological encounter as follows: (i) being, (ii) the field of experiencing the world as the immediate phenomenon, (iii) a search from a contingency of the agent to the inner essence of the agent, which is the necessary existent, and (iii) finally an aim toward dealienation through a unity of existents. Ibn Sina’s system may be used to reread the ontological argument of both St. Augustine (d. 430) and René Descartes (d. 1650). In this light the most celebrated argument for the existence of God is not a static, empty logical argument based on definition, but a phase of transformation due to a search from being, to the self-field of experience, to God and finally a desperate attempt to form a dealienating unity among all existents.

In the field of mysticism, Ibn Sina’s account of mysticism and his distinctions between mystical, religious, and ascetic, as well as his description of states and stations of...
mystics, paved the way for subsequent scholarships on mysticism.

His original system integrated various aspects of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Greek theories with the Islamic intellectual tradition. Subsequent philosophers had to take account of Ibn Sina’s system, criticizing him, in the case of al-Ghazali, Fakhr al-Din Razi (b. 1149), and Ibn Taymiyya, following him (as with Tusi), or including in their philosophy some of his visions, like Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), Shihab ad-Din Suhrawardi (d. 1191), Aquinas, and Sadr ad-Din Shirazi (known as Mulla Sadra). In sum, a comprehensive Islamic philosophical system emerged through Ibn Sina’s encyclopedic works.

A parallel vibrant tradition of original philosophy, mysticism, and scholarly commentaries developed in Islamic Spain. Mention has already been made of Ibn Rushd—known to the West by his Latin name, Averroes—who also wrote a number of commentaries on Aristotle’s work as well as on Plato’s Republic. He is known in Christian medieval circles as the originator of the so-called double-truth theory, which renders religious and philosophical languages to be isomorphically compatible, although scholars today question this interpretation of his theory of truth. Noteworthy among the list of other philosophers is Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185), who presents in a Robinson Crusoe–like tale, an allegorical account of various phases of the development of persons in light of which issues are portrayed such as the acquisition of language, communication with nature and human being, and finally with God.

The Post–Ibn Sina Developments of Metaphysics and Epistemology

Ibn Sina’s original insights culminated in a number of the following ideas in later Islamic philosophy.

The world depicted as a process analogous to a flowing river or a shining sun. To begin with, for Aristotle, the ultimate constituent of the world consists of what he called first substances, which are primarily individual, concrete particulars like the stars, living persons, animals, trees, and rocks. Consequently, other features of the world like quantity, quality, place, time, relations, and alike are accidental and are actual only because of the characterization of a subspace. Against Plato, he argued that the entity, “being green,” does not exist in or by itself; it is realized if it endures as a color of a specific tree or the color of a person’s eyes. The key issue is his accidental depiction of time, which postulates that the primary account of the world is in the language of substances, for example, rocks or trees, and events such as their locomotion, damnation, and growth, and the alteration of their character. By contrast, in the post–Ibn Sinan philosophy, temporal dimensions of phenomena such as experiences of persons were depicted as an essential aspect of their reality, for which Mulla Sadra coined the expression “substantial motion.” In Sadra’s ontology the universe was depicted as a continuum of realms of existents, from the pure absolute existent, identified as God, to series of layers of entities. Consequently, reality was depicted as a process; analysis was compared to waves in the ocean or wind in motion. Now there are two sides to such a process: an external one, like drops of water coming from a river that in turn came from an ocean; thus a drop of water going back to the ocean, or a person dying as an individual and then becoming part of the world, both of which depict the unity of being as entities returning to their archetypal mother, or to the source of their generation. The other side, an internal, an intentional one in light of which a person is transformed from one state of mind to another, is depicted either in celebrated cases like the conversion of St. Paul or in typical cases like becoming a parent, falling in love, and the like. Muslim philosophers needed this Neoplatonic framework of process language as they dealt with the key issue of the paradox of mystical union, which aimed to bring an ultimate intimacy between persons and their source of genesis, like a child seeking to return to the mother. In Aristotle’s vocabulary no two substances could have become identical with one another, as the only substantial changes were generation and corruption; for example, a cat cannot become a dog. But in process language, two waves can merge and become a single wave, or a drop of water can return to the sea or a fire of love to its source, the heavenly sun. In authentic personal experiences, the birth of their child represents the visible fruit of the merged love of two lovers. Medieval Muslim philosophers use the method of allegorical theology by appeals to motifs such as “drowning” or “light”; in such a framework “mystical union” can be clarified by a symbolic or an allegorical theology. Moreover, unlike Aristotle’s system, such processes in the world that were external to persons’ bodies had also a personal and an intentional side. It should be noted that Aristotle’s system is not a static metaphysics, as the ultimate model is an organic depiction of nature, where the highest state consists in imitating the prime movers’ theoretical structure of the cosmos.

The rise of philosophical analysis. An aspect of recent postidealism in the West has been the rise of philosophical analysis, characterized by features such as clarification of key primitive terms and the reconstruction of a clear syntactical meta-linguistic framework. This feature was developed in the philosophy of logical positivism at the turn of the twentieth century and culminated in Rudolph Carnap’s (d. 1970) doctrine of reconstrucionalism. Similar themes are depicted in the following three theses of Islamic philosophy.

The first case lies in Ibn Sina’s tripartite solution to the so-called theory of universals, which questioned the ontic status of universals (indicated by notions such as “being a number,” or “goodness”). Ibn Sina held the position that the meanings of single philosophical terms are to be found in the context of their applications as follows: Syntactical universals (such as “evenness”) as well as a syntactical analysis of universals are significantly independent of our mental state or the actual world; conceptual universals, such as intentions, are middependent; and finally in the realm of empirical sciences,
essences and universals follow our encounter with facts that are existents and particulars. An awareness of the linguistic import of philosophical issues can also be found in the clever solution of Nasir Khusrav (d. 1077) to the question of “Which comes first? The chicken or the egg?” He pointed out the similarity of this paradox with the inquiry about the “initiation of the beginning segment in a circle.” He replied that a chicken means an actualized egg, while an egg means a potential chicken. Thus, a comprehensive language addresses the question’s need to place both of them in the same object language level of terms (in the same way space and time are placed as primitive notions in contemporary physics). Finally let us consider Tusi’s analysis of infinity. As a rational philosopher, he had to agree with Aristotle that there is no actual infinite, but as a mathematician, he sought to take “infinite number” as a significant notion. Thus, he made a meta-linguistic distinction between several senses of infinity, syntactical and ontic, accepting the first sense and rejecting the second. These three examples well illustrate that Islamic philosophy contains an awareness of philosophical analysis, meta-mathematics, and logic.

Depiction of the self as a ground of experience. The concept of a person is a cardinal issue in the philosophical system due to the observation made by Ludwig Wittgenstein (d. 1951) that we can never see our eyes directly, or that the self is not in the world, but that it is implied in the ground of being-in-the-world. Also, he pointed out that the notion of language is like a game, a societal entity; consequently, a substantial notion of the self may prevent the possibility of language and thus of knowledge all together. It is for this reason that a number of western philosophers have rejected the Cartesian depiction of the self as a substance. For example, David Hume (d. 1776) depicts the self in terms of a bundle of impressions, while Kant attempts to clarify the phenomenal self in the search for what he calls a transcendental unity of perception. Finally, Martin Heidegger’s depiction of self as Dasein, meaning “being-in-the-world” is one of the most celebrated philosophical formulations of the twentieth century. Long before these European thinkers, a number of Muslim philosophers focused on a depiction of the notion of a person in ways to avoid the standard paradoxes such as “private language fallacy.” Ibn Sina, for instance, states that if a person abstracts his sensations one by one, he can never presuppose that the subject of this experience is empty. In a similar manner, al-Ghazali points out that both God and the self are without any quality or quantity—they belong to the ground of experience and not to objects of experience (like Hume’s point that there is no impression of the self). In a Sufi depiction of the self, persons are construed in a process which is a continuum of the development of states (azvazal) and stations (magamat); eventually the finite limited ephemeral self is annihilated (fana’) and is merged into its ultimate source; in such a state, a person merging into its essence persists (baqa’) eternity in this blessed state of union. Here a person is not depicted as a substantial soul but in the context of what William James (d. 1910) stipulated as “stream of consciousness”; thus the focus is not on persons as things-substances but on the temporal nature of experiencing the world. In this light, both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra construe a phenomenological metaphysics in which the mind directly encounters being rather than itself as a substance. In sum, a major contribution of Islamic philosophy lies in its depiction of “persons” in the context of the field of experience.

Key epistemological concepts depicted in light of both value and experience. Traditionally epistemic models followed theoretical frameworks of Platonic writings, where knowledge was identified with the abstraction of concepts. Later knowledge was limited either to concepts received by the intellect or sense data experienced by the senses. Analogous to many recent epistemologies such as American pragmatism, Muslim philosophies examined layers of consciousness/awareness in varieties of knowing, as well as the relation between knowledge and morality. Let us consider some examples from everyday life.

In teaching a trade, the apprentice learns “how to” perform a task, for example, learning how to ride a bicycle, or learning to dance. In these examples, one learns “how to do an activity,” instead of learning and conceiving a clarification of an analytical fact like an axiom of geometry or empirical data, like the distance between the sun and earth; one can also become a better perceiver of danger or have a richer experience of music, or sport. With respect to morality and ethics, one may follow Plato’s equation of knowledge with virtue and vice with ignorance. Accordingly, learning from the world makes one also a better human being. The primary sources of these practical and holistic epistemologies are the works of Plato and Plotinus. Specifically, Plato uses the allegory of a blindfolded prisoner who, through a continuum of epistemic ascents, finally confronts the source of all sight, which is the sun; he also depicts love as a ladder through which a lover encounters the true form of absolute beauty, which is another icon for the highest good. Plotinus also discusses the ascent of the soul as it seeks to be united with the One, analogous to a daughter, who, recognizing her true love for the father, seeks “no otherness” from the One. Muslim philosophers developed their epistemologies in ways that resemble Ibn Sina’s theory of pragmatic imagination. Ibn Sina postulates the epistemology of internal senses, translated here as “prehensile imagination,” as illustrated in the case of sheep running away at the sight of a wolf. In such a response, it is not necessary for an agent to be conscious in order to act prudently. Similar cases are found in Muslim theories of learning through the mystical apprenticeship with a Sufic master, as the Disciples of Christ learned from Jesus’ acts or one learns from parables in the sacred texts. Recent development in the West in “fuzzy logic,” Gestalt psychology, the epistemologies of Marxists, American pragmatists, the views of a number of philosophers such as Henry Bergson (d. 1941), Alfred North Whitehead...
(d. 1947), and Wittgenstein—all these question the legitimacy of the notion of a conscious state independent of life activity. Al-Ghazali ironically wrote against philosopher’s mistakes, but in fact was instrumental in strengthening philosophy among subsequent Muslim scholars. For him the major feature of God and persons is intentional volition. In the case of the Divine, there is the will to create the cosmos. In the case of persons, we have intentional epistemic virtues of the soul’s urge in seeking salvation. The most outstanding features of humanity are found in immediate existential feeling tones of exuberance (dhawq), urgency (shurq), and authentic states of intimacy (ans). Al-Ghazali’s system integrates a number of insights from various traditions, such as the supremacy of the power of good will in the Zoroastrian tradition and in Friedrich Nietzsche, in Wittgenstein’s earlier doctrine as well as in St. Augustine’s account of the similarity between persons and the world, of the soul and God. Al-Ghazali’s writings were instrumental in integrating the philosophical dimensions with extensive mystical (Sufi) writings in enriching Islamic epistemology and ethics.

Facets of the ethics of self-realization. A major issue in Islamic moral philosophy is various epistemic and normative facets of the ethics of self-realization. The essence of the self is presupposed to be the divine-God-nature; accordingly, the ultimate self-knowledge lies in the archetypal theme of the return to the origin of cosmogony, expressed as dealienation.

As is to be expected, there are varieties of Islamic ethics, such as treatises on pragmatics of politics for princes, and ethical issues in legalistic theology, as well as standard philosophical ethics such as utilitarianism and the Kantian type of morality emphasizing a sense of duty. The most original and complex Muslim contribution to ethics is the Sufi prescription of the good life. Amazingly, this type of ethics may be described in the context of the problem of alienation—estrangement—taken by Marxists, existentialists, phenomenologists, and psychanalysts to be the most important problem in modern times. The Islamic mystics, known as the Sufis, take a theme common to both Neoplatonism and the Qur’an that all entities seek to return to their source. Because persons are finite and the ultimate being, such as the God of monotheists or the One of the mystics is without a limit, there is a need for a Christ-like sage, a mediator figure who is half-human and half-divine, who can link the two realms. Usually this union assumes the absorption of persons into the ultimate being, as a river returns to the sea. Here is an example. Suppose a male realizes that his beloved resembles his mother, the first instance of the feminine archetype for the male child. If so, then naturally his “new love” integrates his urge to return to the blessed state of an infant cared by his mother. The love of the specific mother induces the unconscious love of the feminine archetype that results in his discovery of the actualization of an instance of the feminine archetype in his future spouse. Thus, love in a sense signifies a return to the original desire. The Muslim mystic’s vision of the ethics of unity is much stronger than the simple case stated above. The mystical return is, in fact, an integration of the last phase of the ethics of self-realization, which constitutes the perfection (kamal) of persons. The Isma’ili philosopher Nasir Khusraw presents the following Neoplatonic version of this theme of unity through emanation and return. To begin with, neither temporality nor existence may be applied to the term God. What can be talked about is the cosmogony of the emanation of the world from the first intelligence, having been begotten from the One who emanates the universal soul; the latter emanates the individual souls. Now the problem is what to do with these individual souls, as they need to be differentiated from one another in the spiritual realm. In this context, Khusraw proffers the view that the souls are temporarily embodied in order to partake of morally significant experiences, and in life’s struggle, they have an opportunity to become purified. The theme is a repetition of Plotinus’s view that a body is like the useful instrument of a musician who sets it aside after the dance of earthly life. This example clearly signifies that the Islamic ethos is not an ascetic one, as Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, clearly distinguish between ascetics, religious devotee, and mystics. In this tenor, it should be mentioned that the prophet Muhammad’s personal life is embodied as a prophet statement, as well as in an Islamic religious law (shari’a), which is concerned with the practical dimension of life on this earth as well as in the afterlife. The Qur’an itself has a number of references to practical issues such as the economics of gender relations, and to God as a provider of blessings available in this life to His creatures.

A global vision of politics. As exemplified in the works of the greatest Muslim social philosopher, ‘Abd ar-Rahman ibn Khaldun (d. 1379), Muslim political philosophy, in contrast to the individualism of John Locke (d. 1704) and John Stuart Mill (d. 1836), focuses on the Unitarian view of persons, viewing these not as independent individuals, but rather as members of a society or even a global village. The essence of an individual is being a member of a polity. Official Muslim theology is tolerant of Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews, for these “people of the [sacred, monotheistic] book.” Accordingly, Muslim rulers have a moral obligation to protect temples and churches, assuring a societal condition wherein monotheistic believers can practice their own kind of worship. In a so-called imaginary jihad, it is conceivable that Jewish and Christian armies can assist Muslims in converting heathens to monotheism. Names of Jewish prophets taken by Muslims and numerous references to parables from the Torah, in the literature of Muslims, show that Muslims regard Jews as the chosen people of the Lord. In the same tenor Jesus, who is taken to be human but a prophet of God, born of a virgin, is often depicted as the mediator figure in Islamic mysticism. In light of these affinities, one may ask in what sense Islamic political philosophy may be unique.
Muslims envision themselves not as being opposed to the earliest monotheistic approaches to society and the *poeiein*, but as a recipient of the later revelation of God to humanity. The Hebrews received the gift of monotheism, calling Elohim/Yahweh the only God of the universe, a source of divine justice prescribing both rewards and punishment. Christians preached the message of a loving God, who sacrificed His Son, God incarnate, for humanity. The salient feature of Islamic political philosophy is its vision of a unity applied to the global politics of achieving a political unity under a theocratic order. A further delineation of this political philosophy has two implications. First is the rejection of the legitimacy of separating the state and religion, similar to Plato’s vision expressed in the *Republic* that morally useful “myths” should be embedded in the praxis of the state. Among the Shi’a, a minority of Islamic creed, this theocracy “myths” should be embedded in the praxis of the state. Among the Shi’a, a minority of Islamic creed, this theocracy takes a stronger turn.

The salient philosophical framework of Islam, unlike Judaism and Christianity, points to a theocratic political philosophy of globalism—that moved individual alliances away from nationalistic conflicts to a single world community of faithful global citizens. Consequently, several modern Muslim thinkers have offered a number of theories about the encounter between Islam and Western cultures. A partial list of these social philosophers includes Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (also known as al-Afghani, d. 1897), Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (d. 1989), and Rahollah Khomeini. Afghani appealed to special Islamic virtues, such as a combination of rationalism and pragmatics of the religious life, such as modesty, honesty, and truthfulness. He suggested that by adopting these archetypal virtues and joining pan-Islamic movements, Islamic culture would be able to encounter positively the power of Western culture. Iqbal was of the opinion that the essence of Islamic culture lies in its transformation of Greek abstract philosophy into an empirical mode of knowledge that takes account of concrete scientific facts; he also saw the active expression of mystical virtues compatible with an Islamic political agenda. Both he and Afghani objected to passive mysticism and attempted to integrate personal intuition and reflections with societal praxis. Tabataba’i integrated the Shi’a notion of the imam as an essential mediator figure in a person’s search for his essence, which leads to knowledge of God. A number of followers of Tabataba’i became part of the group of ayatollahs who initiated and carried out the later Islamic revolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The praxis of his political vision culminated in a division of government into branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) under the supreme leadership of a jurist who has the ultimate power in the state. The new doctrine known as *valayat-e faqih* has important political implications. In fact it establishes the supreme ayatollah jurist as the guardian of the state, since he holds the ultimate political power in the government. This interpretation of Islamic theology views the supreme jurist not as a mere interpreter of archetypal meta-theories for making particular laws but as a direct power that intervenes in national and international politics of the nation and is backed by the military branch of the government.

Islamic themes have been integrated in the social thoughts of a number of recent African political thinkers. For example ‘Ali A. Mazrui (b. 1933) proffers Islam as the first Protestant type of reformation of Christianity; also Islam is viewed as the last revealed universal religion. Moreover, he questions the Eurocentric approach of alienating Africa from the Middle East and advocates a rewriting of the social map of the area under the concept of “Afrabia.” Mazrui’s Islamic themes envision the Afrocentric agenda as a phase of a dialectical encounter to the Eurocentric perspective of the earlier centuries. Following the Islamic principle of unity (*ta'ahid*), he proposes a synthesis found in Islamic political philosophy, namely a vision of global harmony based on justice such as praxes of Black reparation—a vision suited for the global village of the present millennium.

Symbolic/allegorical theology. An outstanding feature of the Islamic intellectual tradition lies in its symbolic expression, which is embedded in allegory and extensive metaphysical poetry. These texts should not be treated as “soft minded” philosophy. A number of philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, Tusi, and Mulla Sadra, who could and did write technical philosophy, such as logic treatises, also chose to write mystical works. Unlike the descriptive dimensions of physical science, and the analytical and deductive dimensions of syntactical studies like logic and mathematics, mysticism neither explains the world, nor analyzes concepts. It is the primary aim of mysticism to transform the intentional phenomenon of the authentic experiences of persons from an alienating one to one marked by harmony—a harmony in which even the death of one’s body is integrated in one’s life experience. Another reason for the use of the symbolic method is that the subject matter of discourse is neither empirically observable, sensible, nor an analytically conceivable specific concept. In contrast, it is concerned with topics such as a Gestalt vision of the unity of being, which places the individual and his experience into a harmonious, unified, connected cosmos, where death and birth, knowledge, and ignorance, good and evil are connected. Let us illustrate this point in the pragmatics of the light motif. As Plato uses light symbolism for the sun in the allegory of the cave, Aristotle’s depicts the active intelligence as light, and with Plotinus’s use of the Sun as an image of the One, it becomes evident that the Sun depicts the Divine in its emanating light. The culmination of the “light motif” is found in the system of the post-Ibn Sina school of philosophy of illumination, founded by Suhrawardi (d. 1119). According to this system, reality may be depicted as a continuum of light; the primordial emanatory called the Light of Lights (depicting the Divine), is part of an eschatological order; last entities are particular bodies, which are also lights. The illumination type of metaphysics overcomes some problems of dualistic ontologies. For example, a mind-body dualism
is avoided by depicting mental experiences as enlightenment, and physical entities as particles; thus a single notion, namely that of light, can be used in an ontology without breaking reality into two incompatible primary terms. Also knowledge as illumination can be used in the context of the incarnation (hull) theory of mystical union. For instance, the mystic poet Rumi calls his own master Shams-e Tabrizi, literally “the Sun of [the City] of/from Tabriz”. The Sufi circular dance with one hand to the center of the circle, the other extended to the sky, depicts an act of imitating the sun and the process of its radiation. In the same tenor, faith is symbolized by warmth in the heart of the believer, fire as love of the Divine, and finally the mirror as the prescribed state in which the creature is open to be a witness of the world, which is a creation. The theme of the cycle of descent and ascent is also found in other common sets of icons, such as drowning in the sea, a flight of the bird to the heavens, and the like. In sum, Islamic epistemologies include but are not limited to the standard views of sense perception, conception by analysis and deduction. The dominance of symbolism in the pragmatic theories of knowledge is due to the emphasis of the Islamic intellectual tradition on mysticism, its ethics of self-realization, and its refined delineation of topics like prophecy and various intentional senses of memory, imagination, and communication.

Conclusion
Philosophical speculations comprise an essential dimension of the Islamic intellectual tradition not only in its technical philosophical corpus, but also in its religious, mystical, and literary traditions. It is true that its major framework lies in Greek philosophical sources, especially in Aristotle and Plotinus, and that its content derives from Islamic sources (the Qur’an, the tradition or hadith, as well as early theologians). However, a number of Muslim philosophers reformulated the earlier Greek views with novel elements that resemble a number of new trends in Western philosophy. Among noteworthy views are a metaphysics of intentional processes, the depiction of persons in the language of fields of experience, a unified global vision of political philosophy, the integration of ethics and metaphysics to form a mystical process of dealienation, and the application of philosophical analyses to both ethics and metaphysics. The salient features of Islamic philosophy are not only special features that differentiate it from other traditions, but they are themes that constitute paradigmatic refinement of philosophical thinking.

See also Ibn Rushd; Ibn Sina; Kalam; Law; Tasawwuf; Wajib al-Wujud.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Parviz Morewedge

FARRAKHAN, LOUIS (1933–)

Louis Farrakhan was born Louis Eugene Walcott on 11 May 1933 in the Bronx, New York. He attended Winston-Salem Teachers College in North Carolina from 1951 to 1953, where he majored in English. He joined the Nation of Islam in 1955.

The Nation of Islam is a community of African Americans formed in the 1930s. The community’s spiritual identity is Islam, and its political identity is black nationalism. Louis Farrakhan joined the Nation of Islam because of the message of community and the coherence of faith offered by the community in the face of white American racism and violence against blacks in the Jim Crow era. After the death in 1975 of Elijah Muhammad, the community’s founder and leader for over forty years, his son Warithudeen Muhammad changed the philosophical base from black nationalism to the global philosophy of Islam. He also enhanced the spiritual identity in Islam. This move into orthodox Islam caused a breach in the leadership in the Nation of Islam and its collapse. In 1977 Louis Farrakhan reestablished the Nation of Islam with black nationalism as its philosophy and Islam as its spiritual identity.

Between 1953 and 1956 Farrakhan worked as a club singer and musician. He is married to Khadijah (née Betsy Ross), with whom he has had nine children. In 1979 Farrakhan established the newspaper The Final Call (whose name is derived from the message in the Qur’an 74:38), and in 1981 he held the first national convention of the Resurrected Nation (a name used briefly to describe the Nation of Islam). On Savior’s Day, 26 February 1989, the community that Farrakhan founded inaugurated the National Center, named Mosque Maryam in honor of black womanhood, in Chicago. During the 1990s Minister Farrakhan was embroiled in a number of controversies: with the American Jewish community over alleged anti-Semitism, with other Muslims over the
ideology of the Nation of Islam, and with many others over the black nationalist stance of the Nation of Islam.

During the 1990s Minister Farrakhan embarked on a steady program to reestablish the Nation of Islam as an African American Sunni Muslim community. This process continues today, and the Nation of Islam is recognized as a member of the world community of Islam.

See also American Culture and Islam; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Elijah; Nation of Islam; United States, Islam in the.

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Aminah Beverly McCloud

FASI, MUHAMMAD ‘ALLAL AL-(1910–1974)

‘Allal al-Fasi was a leading figure in the Moroccan independence movement. From the launching of the new nation, in 1956, al-Fasi was also known as president of the influential Istiqlal (independence) party. Born to an elite family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Fez, the religious capital of Morocco, al-Fasi studied at the prestigious Islamic university of al-Qarawiyyin, and later joined the protest movement against the French and Spanish colonial presence on Moroccan soil. He quickly became one of the most visible national leaders in the pro-independence struggle, and was exiled for nine years by the French to Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. Shortly after his return to Morocco, he chose to leave again, spending another nine years in Cairo, where he and his party thought he could best advance the nationalist cause.

Author of some twenty books, al-Fasi’s writings fall into four categories. The first consists of his reformist, or salafi, works, which focus on the renewal of Islamic law. These include al-Naqd al-dhati (1952, Self-criticism), and Maqasid al-shari’a al-islamiyya wa-makarimuha (1964, The objectives and ethics of Islamic law). The second category is made up of his political essays on the Islamic socialist positions of the Istiqlal party and its support for Morocco’s claim to Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara, and includes Manhaj al-istiqlaliyya (The method of self-reliance). A third category comprises his writings on the modern history of North Africa, especially Morocco, and the fourth consists of his contributions to the genre of nationalist poetry.

See also Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Salafiyya.

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David L. Johnston

FATIMA (C. 605–633)

Fatima (d. 633) was the daughter of the prophet Muhammad and Khadija, spouse of Muhammad’s cousin and companion ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, and mother of al-Hasan and al-Husayn, the Prophet’s only male descendants. ‘Ali headed the line of the Shi‘ite imams. Fatima’s genealogical position reveals the significance attributed to her throughout the Muslim world and explains the veneration she enjoys.

Fatima is said to be the source of blessing (baraka), and is a saint, particularly the patron saint of fertility, and is appealed to as a mediator between God and humans. Her blessing hand is commonly used to protect against the evil eye.

Little is known about the actual figure hidden behind a blooming legend that combines the historical with fictional and mystical elements. Early Islamic literature such as the Prophet’s biography, historiography, hadith collections, and exegetical literature do not provide a comprehensive biography of Fatima. However, they present some genealogical and biographical cornerstones and occasional events of her life.

The date of her birth remains uncertain as well as the date of her marriage to ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (622 or 623). Her son Hasan was born in 624 and Husayn in 626. She also gave birth to two daughters, Umm Kalthum and Zaynab. The authors agree with regard to the year in which she died, although there is no clear reference to the month, that is, the exact period of time after her father’s death. Furthermore, we find contradictory indications concerning the circumstances of her last hours, her burial at night, and the location of her tomb. Only few records deal with historical events she was involved in.

The legend woven about Fatima provides further insights as to her importance as a spiritual personality, both for Sunni and Shi‘ite Muslims. Hagiographical literature is manifold and portrays the Prophet’s daughter as a multifaceted personality, appearing in Shi‘ite texts as early as the tenth century.

The Fatima of the legend is given numerous epithets as al-Zahrat (the Shining one), the Resplendent, or the supreme Mary; they all indicate that she represents the female ideal of Islam.

Sunni hagiography emphasized the “orthodox” virtues, such as her piety and her rank as the Prophet’s daughter, whereas Shi‘ite sources created a figure of cosmic importance, the final avenger on the one hand and a luminous,
celestial being working miracles on the other. Her closeness to the Prophet and the imams is expressed by her belonging to the people of the Prophet’s house, to the five people of the mantle, to the imamkaces, and to the people of the ordeal.

Fatima’s first biographers were two European scholars, Henri Lammens and Louis Massignon. Their portraits of the Prophet’s daughter stood in striking contradiction to each other. Whereas Lammens’s Fatima is unattractive, of mediocrity, and lacking in sublimity, Massignon depicts an almost mystical and sublime personality with a religious significance akin to that of the Virgin Mary. Laura Vecchia Valeri’s comprehensive study tries to emphasize the fact that historical reality ranges between the two portraits. Since historical sources are few and sometimes even contradictory, the conflict in historical apprehension continues. Hagiographical models in the earlier Islamic literature show—even in historical literature—that making a clear distinction between the real person and the legend can be quite difficult.

In the course of the Islamic revolution of Iran the legend of Fatima enjoyed a considerable renaissance and actualization as the female role model. She symbolized the committed fighter, engaged for the Muslim community and thus became the model in opposition to the Western woman pursuing only her individual emancipation.

See also Abu Bakr; ‘Ali; Biography and Hagiography; Hasan; Husayn; Shi’a: Early; Succession.

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Ursula Günther

FATWA

A fatwa (pl. fatawa) is an advisory opinion issued by a recognized authority on law and tradition in answer to a specific question. Fatawa can range from single-word responses (e.g., “Yes,” “No,” or “Permitted”) to book-length treatises. Although typically focused on legal matters, fatawa also treat more general religious issues, including theology, philosophy, creeds, and ‘ibadat (religious obligations or acts of worship). Traditionally, despite numerous exceptions (particularly since the eleventh century), the issuer of fatawa, termed a mufti—whose authority derives from his knowledge of law and tradition—has functioned independently of the judicial system, indeed often privately.

While court rulings rely on the sifting of evidence and conflicting testimonies, muftis assume the facts presented by their questioners, which, obviously, can bias the answer. Moreover, a fatwa differs from a court judgment, or qada’, not only in its wider potential scope—for instance, although ‘ibadat are essential parts of Islamic law, they transcend the jurisdiction of the courts—but also because the qada’ is binding and enforceable, “performative,” while the fatwa is not. Instead, it is “informational,” and, while decisions of shari’a courts usually pertain only to the specific cases they adjudicate, thus setting no legal precedents, fatawa are very often collected, published, and cited in subsequent cases.

See also Law; Mufti; Religious Institutions.

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Daniel C. Peterson

FEDA’IYAN-E ISLAM

Feda’iyan-e Islam was a Shi’ite fundamentalist group that was founded in Iran in 1945 by Sayyed Mujtaba Mir Lauhi (known as Navvab-e Safavi), a man then in his early twenties, with little or no formal Islamic education. Unsettled by the writings of the controversial essayist and historian Ahmad Kasravi, Safavi masterminded his assassination in March 1946. This was followed by the assassination in November 1949 of ‘Abd al-Husayn Hazhir, the influential minister of court, and in March 1951 of prime minister Haji ‘Ali Razmara, who opposed the nationalization of the British-owned oil industry. The Feda’iyan had enlisted the support of the activist ayatollah Abu ‘l-Qasem Kashani, but failed to win over the highest-ranking religious authority in the country, Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi.

The Feda’iyan’s relations with Kashani became strained due to the latter’s support for prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, who assumed power in late April 1951. Refusing to give in to the Feda’iyan’s demands for the establishment of shari’a regulations, Mosaddeq detained Safavi in June 1951. In February 1952, the Feda’iyan’s attempted assassination of
Mosaddeq’s key colleague, Husayn Fatimi, left Fatimi severely injured. By mid-1952 the Feda’iyan had resumed its ties with Kashani, who had begun to oppose Mosaddeq. In the months preceding the coup of August 1953, which toppled Mosaddeq, the Feda’iyan’s antigovernment position led the American and British secret services to count on the group to help oust Mosaddeq. In November 1954 the group’s failed attempt on the life of prime minister Husayn ‘Ala resulted in the execution of Safavi and three of his colleagues. Despite this crippling blow, affiliates of the group were able to assassinate another prime minister, Hasan ‘Ali Mansur, in January 1965.

Based mainly in Tehran, the Feda’iyan largely consisted of young men of limited education, lower class origins, and traditional occupations. The group appealed to the resentments of the lower and underclass urban elements; this, together with its challenge to the ruling elite, enabled it to acquire a significance disproportionate to its size. Ideologically resembling the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, the Feda’iyan espoused a literal reading of Islamic writings and laws; they abhorred what they considered to be decadence resulting from irreligion; they feared modernity, secularism, communism, and civic-nationalism, and were bent on eliminating those whom they regarded as obstacles in their path or stooges of foreigners. Their primary goal was to establish the shari’ah, giving a crucial sociopolitical role to clerics. Following the revolution of 1978 and 1979, many of the beliefs that had animated the Feda’iyan became part of the ruling ideology but gradually came to be identified with the proclivities of the Iranian regime’s traditionalist and right-wing factions.

See also Fundamentalism; Political Islam.

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Fakhreddin Azimi

FEMINISM

There is a struggle within Islamic societies over the definition of Islam and the role of women within it. This struggle has accompanied Muslims throughout their history. The term “feminism” is controversial. It may conceal a Western attempt at cultural hegemony or it may be labeled as that by those who oppose women’s rights but would not admit to it. Many Muslim women who may support women’s rights may not choose to identify themselves as feminists. For many women there may be a perceived psychological, social, and physical danger even in expressing the desire for equal rights.

Whereas one cannot avoid making general comments about Muslim women, it ought to be kept in mind that Muslim communities are widespread and diverse, consisting of a complex set of interwoven subcultures. For example, the issues and realities of Saudi Arabian Muslim life, where women must cover their bodies and hair in public, are very different from those of Indonesian Muslim women, where there is currently a female Muslim head of state.

A common claim is that pre-Islamic Arabia oppressed women and Islam liberated them. There is a similar claim made today by Islamist movements that Western societies or women in non-Muslim cultures in general are oppressed and traditional Islam liberates them. One should remember that spiritual or emotional liberation through Islam is individual and personal and cannot be judged from the outside. But economic, social, and political rights can be gauged by intersubjective criteria and Muslim women lag far behind Muslim men in all these areas, especially in Muslim majority countries. Whether this is due to or despite Islam is open to debate.

At the other end of the spectrum from the Islamists, there is a stream of feminist thought that considers Islamic tradition as irredeemably misogynist and patriarchal. These sentiments are an echo of those voiced by the women of al-Ta’if in the seventh century who wailed and protested when the temple dedicated to the Goddess was destroyed at the instruction of prophet Muhammad. Between these two extremes lie a variety of approaches and convictions, both defined and undefined, regarding the issue of women and Islam. Whereas the Islamists may desire to discredit feminism as a Western ploy, one may posit that neither Islam, nor feminism as a movement for the full dignity and equality of women in society, are either Western or Eastern. Feminism represents a deep human aspiration for a sense of community with the world, and Islam, at its core, represents the same aspiration for a sense of community both with the human race and the realm of the Unseen.

Most of the literature produced by Muslims in the previous centuries is still in manuscript form waiting to be discovered or published. The extent to which women participated in the production of the Muslim cultures that they inhabited cannot be determined without access to information that may not have been recorded or that may not have been adequately preserved even if initially recorded. One of the tasks for feminists today is to use the available sources to construct a more accurate picture of women in early Islam, from which they can deduce early Islam’s implications for modern women. This study may entail a wider use of noncanonical texts and sources, as theological canons generally reflect the biases of the male elites.
Egyptian feminist Nawal Saadawi in her Cairo home in July, 2001, a day before an Egyptian court would decide whether to take legal action against her for calling Islam a pagan religion. The case arose because a group of male Islamist lawyers accused Saadawi of being an apostate for this statement; if convicted, she would no longer be able to call herself a Muslim and would face compulsory divorce from her Muslim husband. The case was finally thrown out of court, but not before alarming human rights groups worldwide. © REUTERS NEW MEDIA INC./CORBIS

In the recent past there has been an urgent attempt to understand the definitive political defeat and colonization of Muslims at the hands of the Christian West, as this shattered the imperial Muslim self-image. Modernist male Muslims forced to study and understand their subjugation, and thus feminization, began to name its causes. Some identified the malaise of the umma (community of believers) as intellectual backwardness and lack of dynamism, whereas others identified it in falling away from the path of the earliest generations of Muslims whose political success was seen to stem from their adherence to a certain static conception of Islam. The former stream of thought endeavored to study and emulate the West whereas the latter warned of its moral decadence and sought only to appropriate its material technologies of power to regain Muslims’ freedom, dignity, and even supremacy.

It was from among the reformist modernist male thinkers that the first proponents for the education and rights of Muslim women arose. Women raised in reformist homes became the first Muslim feminists. As anticolonial nationalist movements took over the Muslim world women participated in them along with men. However, the disillusionment of the postcolonial era with its dire economic problems, political instabilities, corruption, and military or dynastic dictatorships, as well as covert and overt interference from the superpowers, militated against civil liberties and human rights in Muslim countries. Under such conditions Islamist movements gained ascendancy in many of the Muslim countries causing women to lose many of the rights that they had gained in earlier decades. The loss of women’s human rights where religious fundamentalism gained in power is merely an indication of the lack of human rights for all in such societies. Such a situation has given rise to a spectrum of Muslim feminist responses.

Among Muslim women who had the benefit of higher education are feminists who consider Islam to be a matter of personal choice that ought not to be “used or abused” for political purposes. There are also women feminist scholars who are socialist, agnostic, atheist, or Marxist in their orientation. There are scholars who see Islam as a rich and viable culture in need of a thorough and yet sympathetic feminist critique. There are liberal Muslim theologians writing in the politically free Western environment who nonetheless remain apologetic, staying within the prescribed traditional approach to the Qur’an and the sunna.

Finally, in the Muslim countries where one sees a mismatched marriage between feminism and Islamism it is not clear whether the Islamist Muslim women leaders/preachers are contributing toward the relative subjugation or relative liberation of their large female following. The ideological or intellectual differences among Muslim feminist scholars are paralleled in the various forms of feminist activism in various parts of the Muslim world. In certain areas one finds highly visible feminist movements, in others only guarded private conversations.

In general, the area that takes up the attention of most feminists, whether they work within a traditional Islamic framework or not, is the implementation of various Islamic laws. Until recently the area of shar‘a (Islamic law) that was discussed and implemented in most of the Muslim world was the Muslim family law covering issues of marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. In all of these women do not have equal status with men. For example, Muslim family laws and the social consciousness associated with them circumscribe and constrain women’s lives, and so-called honor killings that dishonor the lives of innocent women and the indiscriminate application of hudud (Islamic criminal) laws directly threaten their lives.

Dishonor killings (an integral feature of all patriarchal societies) as well as female infanticide (a preemptive dishonor killing practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia) were outlawed by the prophet Muhammad as evidenced both by texts in the Qur’an
and the sunna. However, the taking of innocent female life in the name of male honor continues to exist in many Muslim countries with the tacit approval of law enforcement agencies and clerics, instilling a deep-seated fear of their male family members in the hearts of women.

More recently, the enforcement of some of the most severe hudud punishments has alarmed a majority of Muslims, human rights activists, and feminists internationally. Pseudo-liberal Muslims, who in principle do not disagree with an informed application of hudud laws, question its implementation in the absence of social welfare and economic justice, as is the case in some of the areas attempting to implement shari’ah laws. But these Muslims fail to recognize or address the significant lack of political, social, and religious freedom for individuals in such areas to carry out an expression of religion that is harsh and lacking in compassion.

In the twentieth century, progressive Muslim scholars have come to look at the hadith corpus as a record of the concerns and understandings of earliest Muslim male communities rather than an authoritative divine guide to all the details of one’s life. Yet they have continued to adhere to an understanding of the Qur’an as the literal word of God. This, however, is giving way to a more complex and self-reflective reading of the Qur’an as a vehicle engendering a “theo-ethics” and aesthetics of mercy and justice as well as a record of the Prophetic struggle, both within his own person and with the community of Muslims. The Qur’an, the primary symbol of Muslim identity, for the most part has become an idol that petrifies the community’s understanding of the compassionate will of God in their lives. In an intellectually and spiritually mature and honest Muslim community the Qur’an and its readings would be seen as progressive records both of an individual’s and a community’s encounter with, as well as projection unto, the Unseen. Such a Muslim community that understands the good example of the Prophet not in terms of the ethical values that he struggled to embody at his best, shall provide the context within which women and other groups targeted for discrimination (simply due to a difference in their religion or sexual orientation) will find dignity and equitable treatment.

See also Gender.

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Ghazala Anwar

FEZ

The oldest of Morocco’s four imperial cities, Fez (Ar., Fas) is situated just above the Sefrou valley, at a natural intersection of the commercial routes connecting the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts with the Atlas mountains and the Sahara. Fez’s location and water-rich surrounding helped the city become an important political, religious, and commercial center of the medieval Islamic world.

Founded on the east bank of the Wadi Fez in 789 C.E. by Mulay Idris b. ‘Abdallah, a descendent of the Prophet who had fled from Mecca to Morocco to avoid Abassid persecution, Fez was expanded onto the west bank by his son, Idris b. Idris, in 809. Fez grew under the Idrisi dynasty when waves of immigrants from southern Spain (Andalusia, or Ar., Al-Andalus) and northern Africa quickly inhabited both sides of the city. With the foundation of the Qarawiyyin mosque and university in 859 (believed to have been established by a wealthy woman from the Tunisian city of Kairouan) and the Andalusian mosque in 862, Fez became an Islamic capital of learning that rivaled Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

Alternating Fatimid and Umayyad influence over Fez nourished bitter rivalry between the two parts of the city, which ensued until they were united by the Almoravid dynasty at the end of the eleventh century. Under the Almoravids and the Almohads (who ruled the city from 1145 to 1175) Fez also became an essential military base and was surrounded by a defensive wall pierced by eight huge gates, which are still functioning today. Fez reached the peak of its political and
cultural prosperity under the Marinid dynasty, which conquered the city in 1248 and made it the capital of Morocco for almost three centuries. This period saw the construction of numerous prestigious religious colleges in rich Hispano-Moorish style, the finest examples of which are the Al-Saffarin and the Al-Attar in madrasas (Islamic colleges). The city became home to the famous Arab traveler Ibn Battuta, who composed the memoirs of his journeys across Asia while living in Fez, where he remained until his death in 1369. Although Fez’s political importance waned in the sixteenth century when Marrakesh was preferred as a capital by the Sa’adi dynasty (1517–1666), it has retained a religious primacy throughout the centuries. The treaty of Fez, which established the French protectorate in Morocco, was signed on 30 March 1912.

In the twentieth century Fez, whose urban population exceeds 510,000 (1994 census), expanded into four distinct areas:

1. The old city (locally referred to as Fez al-Balī), which was declared a world heritage site by the UNESCO in 1981, is characterized by rich Andalus architecture, narrow dark alleyways crossing at irregular patterns, high-walled houses, and traditional markets. It treasures the Qarawiyyin mosque and university, whose present dimensions date back to the 1135 Almoravid enlargement.

2. The thirteenth-century Fez al-Jedid (New Fez in Arabic), lying west of the old medina, served as the Marinid administrative center and consists of the Royal Palace with its adjoining Great Mosque, a Muslim neighborhood, and a formerly vibrant Jewish quarter (the Mellah).

3. The Ville Nouvelle (the New City in French), built by the French administration in 1916 to accommodate modern colonial lifestyle, lies on the southwest plateau and is largely a residential and industrial area.

4. A new town, which has sprung up since Morocco’s independence, lies to the northwest.

Fez, which gave its name to the brimless, red felt hat and was its sole producer until the nineteenth century, remains today a center of religious learning, traditional crafts, and tourism.

See also Africa, Islam in; Sultanates: Modern.

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Claudia Gazzini

FITNA

The word fitna (pl. fitan) is used in the Qur’an to mean both “a temptation that tests the believer’s religious commitments” and “a punishment by trial.” In classical Arabic historical texts, it is used primarily to mean “civil war,” “rebellion that leads to schism,” or “violent factional strife,” but even in historical texts, it bears connotations of “communal test, affliction” and “the temptation to turn upon one’s fellow Muslims.” In the hadith literature, fitna signifies both “strife between Muslims,” and “a trial by which God tests and purifies the believer.” Especially when combined in the hadith literature with the words malakim (great battles) or asbrat al-za’a (signs of the [Last] Hour), fitan specifically indicate apocalyptic schisms and battles predicted to break out within the Muslim community before the Last Hour. The apocalyptic connotation that the word fitan acquired during the first two centuries of Islamic history likely arose partly out of perceptions that the early civil wars that were cleaving the fledgling Islamic community asunder were signs that the world was ending, and partly from the propagandistic use of apocalyptic hadiths during those wars.

Early Islamic history saw a series of fitan, or civil wars, unfold in relatively rapid succession. Interspersed between many smaller uprisings and rebellions, the first three major fitan dominated the historical memory of the early community. The first fitna broke out in 656 C.E.—within twenty-five years of the Prophet’s death—and lasted until 661 C.E. The second fitna erupted nearly a generation later, in 680 C.E., and because various rebellions continued to erupt in different places, it was a dozen years before Umayyad dynasts again consolidated power, in 692 C.E. The third fitna, the Abbasid revolution (747–750 C.E.), successfully overturned the Umayyads, bringing to power the new Abbasid dynasty. A fratricidal fourth fitna (which will not be treated here) erupted in 810 C.E. between two sons of the Abbasid ruler Harun al-Rashid, the brothers al-Amin and al-Ma’mun, and lasted until the complete victory of al-Ma’mun in 814.

Armed strife between Muslims began with complaints about oppressive or unjust practices of the third caliph, ‘Uthman, and led to that caliph’s assassination by a party of Muslims in 656 C.E. Many Muslims then supported the leadership of ‘Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet, who was chosen to succeed ‘Uthman. But troubling questions about the assassination of ‘Uthman harried the caliphate of ‘Ali. Was the assassination of ‘Uthman justified, or should the
assassins have been promptly punished? Different religio-
political parties formed in response to these questions and
engaged in battles against each other over the correct re-

response (although this was by no means the only issue in-
volved). One group supported the leadership of ‘Ali, with his
apparent decision not to punish those who had killed ‘Uthman.
Another group, led by the Prophet’s wife ‘Aisha and two of
his most important companions, Talha and al-Zubayr, op-
opposed the leadership of ‘Ali and called for the punishment of
the assassins of ‘Uthman. The forces of these two parties met
at the Battle of the Camel (656 C.E.) during which ‘Ali’s forces
routed their opponents, Talha and al-Zubayr were killed, and
‘Aisha was sent home chastened.

‘Ali’s troubles did not cease with this victory, since a new
opponent arose: Mu’awiyah, a relative of the slain caliph
‘Uthman, and a seasoned governor of the province of Syria.
Mu’awiyah sent his Syrian forces against ‘Ali and his supporter-
s, and the two sides engaged in battle at a village called
Siffin. The battle of Siffin ended with an agreement to engage in
arbitration. One group of ‘Ali’s supporters rejected this
agreement, and eventually turned against ‘Ali, demanding
that Muslims adhere to “God’s judgment” alone (manifested
on the battlefield and in Qur’anic injunctions) rather than
fallible human judgments exercised in arbitration. This group
(the Kharijites) was defeated by ‘Ali’s forces but lived on to
challenge both the Umayyads and the early Abbasid dynasties
in later rebellions and depredations.

It was not only the Kharijites who threatened ‘Ali’s rule,
however. Since the arbitration agreed to at Siffin did not
resolve the conflict, the Islamic community became fractured
for a time into three competing groups: the supporters of ‘Ali,
the supporters of Mu’awiyah, and the Kharijites. After a
Kharijite assassin killed ‘Ali in 661 C.E., Mu’awiyah was eventu-
ally recognized as caliph by all but the Kharijites, whose
rebellions during Mu’awiyah’s firm rule were promptly put
down. Thus, although the first fitna came to an end in 661
C.E., the issues of the first fitna did not disappear. They would
erupt again in the second and third civil wars, to haunt and
eventually undermine the Umayyad dynasty established by
Mu’awiyah.

The sons of several of the leaders involved in the first fitna
became embroiled in the second fitna in 680 C.E.: Al-Husayn,
the son of ‘Ali and the grandson of the Prophet, rejected the
caliphate of Mu’awiyah’s son Yazid, and set off for the Iraqi
city of Kufa to gather support for his own bid for the
caliphate. He and a small band of supporters were intercepted
en route from Mecca and cut down by Umayyad forces at
Karbalah. Al-Husayn was rapidly transformed into a martyr-
figure among those Muslims who looked to the family of the
Prophet to provide just religious and political leadership,
namely, the early Shi’ites. The dramatic story of how al-
Husayn and his supporters were killed has long loomed large
in Shi’ite historical memory, and their deaths are still annu-
ally mourned in Shi’ite ritual.

Several other important Muslims rejected Umayyad rule
in the years immediately following the death of Al-Husayn,
including al-Mukhtar, who claimed to represent another son
of ‘Ali, Ibn al-Hanafiya, and Ibn al-Zubayr, who represented
a pious alternative to certain oppressive Umayyad policies.
Although this fitna ended in 692 C.E. with the Umayyads
having regained control, the ideological seeds of the third
fitna had already been planted. The early Abbasid movement
that eventually successfully overturned the Umayyads called
for rule by a member of the Prophet’s family, and the earliest
Abbasids claimed to have inherited their legitimacy from a
descendant of the same man whom al-Mukhtar had earlier
claimed to represent, Ibn al-Hanafiya. In terms of political
ideology, all of the first three major civil wars were thus
linked, and all involved competing notions of who should rule.

Later Sunni historical works betray some reworking of
historical accounts aimed at dealing with the vexing question
of how the Companions of the Prophet and their immediate
successors, venerated and idealized by Sunnis, could have
engaged in such violent conflict with each other. The mem-
ory of these wars and the fracturing of the religious commu-
nity were particularly problematic for Sunnis, because the
Qur’anic verse, “You are the best community that has been
raised up for mankind” (3: 110) was widely interpreted as
referring to the Prophet’s Companions. This presented diffi-
culties, since the Sunnis eventually developed the concept
that all of the Companions, including ‘Ali and several of the
Companions who fought against him, were to be considered
righteous.

This series of civil wars—along with many other smaller
rebellions—brought up not only issues related to Islamic
leadership, but other theological issues as well, in part be-
cause these conflicts over leadership of the community were
not understood as mere contests over temporal power, but
rather as struggles to establish righteous Islamic governance.
The early Shi’ites deemed ‘Ali and his descendants (or, more
broadly, “the family of the Prophet”) to have had exclusive
erights to legitimate leadership based on their relationship to
the Prophet, their designation by the Prophet as his succes-
sors, and their superior knowledge and religious insight. The
Kharijites, on the other hand, argued that genealogy played
no role in the leadership of the community, which instead
should be based on pious righteousness and rigorous observ-
vance of the religious law alone. The Sunni position, as it
eventually developed, included a requirement that the leader
be from the Prophet’s tribe, but not necessarily of his family,
and strongly promoted obedience to constituted authorities,
no matter how unjust, so as to prevent the chaos, violence,
and schism engendered by fitna. Issues that arose out of the
competing claims made by these groups included, among
other issues, the legitimacy of rebellion against unjust or invalid rulers, predestination and free will, and the question of whether or not those who committed grave sins should continue to be considered Muslims.

The impact that the early fitna had on the Sunni hadith literature is manifested in several ways. There are a variety of hadiths that reflect arguments about the relative virtues of 'Ali on the one hand and the earlier caliphs, Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthman on the other. These arguments were linked to competing conceptions of history. In addition, the early civil wars bequeathed to Islamic eschatology a number of formative apocalyptic hadiths. Certain hadiths about the figure of the Mahdi, the rightly-guided restorer predicted to usher in a reign of justice before the End Times, can be traced, as Wilferd Madelung and others have argued, to the second fitna. The Sufyani, a mythical heroic figure associated with the End Times, emerged as part of Umayyad propaganda during that conflict. Finally, the earliest portrayals of the figure of the Dajjal (“the Deceiver”), akin to the Christian Anti-Christ, predicted to battle the Mahdi in the End Times in apocalyptic hadiths, may have been modeled in part upon another of the participants in the second fitna, al-Mukhtar. The Dajjal and the Mahdi are still prominent in Islamic eschatological ideas. The third fitna, too, produced numerous hadiths extolling the Abbasids, often in the form of apocalyptic hadiths aimed at motivating men to fight for the Abbasid cause.

More broadly, the impact of the confusing profusion of battles and competing groups associated with the first two fitna in particular can be seen in the positive value placed in Sunni sources on neutrality or quietism, usually called qu’ud. The apocalyptic hadiths found in the canonical sources, as well as in early collections such as those of Nu’aym b. Hammad, give a clear sense of the despair engendered by fitna that in part led to this Sunni emphasis on qu’ud. One such hadith, cited by Nu’aym b. Hammad, predicts that “there will come a time when men will come to graves and roll on them, as animals roll in the dust, wishing that they could be in the graves in place of their occupants—not out of a desire to meet God, but because of the fitna they witness.” This aversion to internecine conflict found expression in numerous quietist hadiths attributed to the Prophet, such as one cited by al-Bukhari: “Whoever dislikes something that his leader has done, let him be forbearing, for whoever departs even a hand’s span from authority will die the death of a pagan.”

While this quietist position, expressed in credal statements as well as in hadith, was obviously congenial to the political elites, one cannot understand these condemnations of fitna only as tools of domination. Rather, they should be understood as Sunni responses to some of the claims of the Shi’ites and Kharijites, and to the bloodshed, schism, and destruction wrought by intra-communal conflicts in general. Although the injunction to obey authorities even when unjust and corrupt was strongly expressed in the hadith literature, some Sunni exegetes and jurists, as Khaled Abou El-Fadl has shown, allowed for activist responses to tyranny and oppression (which also served to justify the actions of ‘Ali and others in the past.) The Shi’ites, too, developed quietist tendencies as a result of their successive defeats in their early struggles for leadership of the community, eventually relegating the duty to “fill the world with justice as it is now filled with injustice” to a descendant of ‘Ali who would appear at the End of Time. Despite the claims of the early Kharijites that Muslims must be held responsible by other Muslims for their actions (rather than by God alone), and that rebellion against unjust and impious rulers was religiously incumbent upon true Muslims, later moderate Kharijite groups also developed quietist doctrines. Thus, the early civil wars and the religious schisms that they engendered led to sectarian divisions and doctrinal developments that continued to be influential throughout Islamic history until today.

Sandra S. Campbell

FOLKLORE, FOLK ISLAM See Vernacular Islam

FUNDAMENTALISM

The term fundamentalism generally describes a religious attitude or organized movement that adheres to most or all of the following characteristics: a holistic approach to religion, one that sees religion as a complete moral or legal code, providing answers for all life’s questions; a tendency toward literal understanding of scriptures; a belief in a foundational golden age, when the principles of the faith were perfectly applied, and a desire to recreate such a period today; suspicion and sometimes renunciation of not only people of other faiths, but also supposedly hypocritical adherents of the same faith; and discomfort with or rejection of many aspects of modern, secular societies. The term was coined in the early twentieth century to refer to a Protestant movement in the United States that reasserted a literal reading of the Bible in opposition to the new biblical criticism and to such scientific theories as evolution, which had gained currency at the time. Because of its Christian origins, many scholars and religious activists reject its use in other religious contexts. The term is particularly controversial in the Islamic context, where, it is argued, “Islamic fundamentalism” is used indiscriminately to describe all Islamic activists, whether they are radicals or moderates, and because it is generally laden with pejorative...
meanings, such as obscurantism, dogmatism, sexism, and violence. Many alternatives have been suggested, including “Islamic revivalism,” “political Islam,” or simply “Islamism.” These terms, however, have the drawback of not allowing comparative treatment of a phenomenon common to many religious traditions. Namely, from the 1970s to the present there has been an increased social mobilization and political activism on the basis of religion. Moreover, by equating fundamentalism with political Islam, the alternatives discount another ideological strand that has played an important role in Islamic revivalism, namely, Islamic modernism. So, for the lack of a satisfactory alternative, “Islamic fundamentalism” has been widely adopted in both scholarly and general parlance.

Islamic fundamentalism is found today, in varying degrees of strength and popular support, in every Muslim-majority country and in many countries with large Muslim minorities. Although they do not form a monolithic movement, fundamentalists do share certain common features in both their ideology and their organization. The similarities derive from the fact that most contemporary Islamic fundamentalist groups trace their origins to two organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab countries and the Jama’at-e Islami in the Indian subcontinent. Both emerged during the 1930s and 1940s as responses to the problems confronting Muslims under British imperialism and to the perceived conformism of secular or modernist Muslim elites to European ideas and institutions. Thus, twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism is in many ways a modern phenomenon, a product of both foreign and indigenous influences. Yet, it is also the latest manifestation of a long tradition of reform and revival movements within Islamic culture. Fundamentalist ideologues often quote the Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) to provide a classical sanction for their ideas. Similarly, Hanbali influences are evident in the Wahhabi fundamentalist movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which had a profound, conservative impact, not only in the Middle East but also in India and Africa. A more direct forerunner of contemporary fundamentalism was the Salafiyya movement led by Jamal al-Din Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The more liberal spirit of Afghani and ‘Abduh animated Islamic modernism, while the more conservative approach of Rida hints at the conservative backlash against modernism that moved Hasan al-Banna to found the Muslim Brotherhood and Abu l-A’la Maududi to create the Jama’at-e Islami.

Both the Brotherhood and the Jama’at were organized by local chapters, into which members were initiated only after they had been tested for their conviction, piety, and obedience. The local cells answered to a central coordinating committee. The head of the organization was the mursid (guide) or emir (leader), who was assisted by the majlis al-shura, an advisory council of senior members. Thus, the organization putatively mirrored the structure of the early Prophetic community in Medina, but it also resembled the Sufi orders whose quietism the fundamentalists rejected.

The ideology of the Jama’at was elaborated primarily through the prolific writings of Maududi. Al-Banna’s writings are more limited because of his early death. Sayyid Qutb would become the chief ideologue of the Brotherhood and because of Maududi’s influence upon him, the main conduit for propagating Maududi’s ideas in the Arab world.

The fundamentalist worldview is premised on the idea that most societies, including nominally Muslim societies, are in a state of jabiliyya, or “ignorance,” akin to the jabiliyya that prevailed in Arabia before the advent of the prophet Muhammad’s mission. Only a small, committed vanguard of true Muslims discern the corrupted state of Muslim affairs and the proper means to remedy it. Their initial mission is to withdraw mentally and even physically, if need be, from the jabiliyya in order to inculcate truly Islamic values within themselves and their organization. This hijra, or “flight,” is the first type of jihad that they must wage. On the instructions of the leader, the Muslim vanguard must transform their inner jihad into an outer jihad aimed at overthrowing the un-Islamic order and correcting societal ills. The details of an authentic Islamic political system are left vaguely defined in most fundamentalist writings. The basic principle of such an order, however, is declared to be hakimiyyat Allah, or the “sovereignty of God.” This requires the application of divine law, or shariya, in all its dimensions. The fundamentalists generally do not feel bound to any one school or to the entire corpus of classical jurisprudence that defined shariya. They feel empowered to perform ‘ijtibad, that is, to derive law themselves through their own reading of the Qur’an and sunna. Compared to the modernists, who also claim the right to ‘ijtibad, the fundamentalist reading of scriptural sources is far more literal and conservative.

Both Qutb and Maududi castigated those Muslims who renounced forceful means in the jihad to establish an Islamic order. Qutb was executed for his views and the Muslim Brotherhood after his death officially renounced revolutionary violence against the Egyptian state. The Jama’at under Maududi was always a loyal opposition party within Pakistani politics. During the late 1970s, inspired in part by the Islamic revolution in Iran, splinter groups consisting of a younger generation of activists broke off from the two older parties to form new, much more violent groups. One of these groups, Islamic Jihad, assassinated Anwar Sadat in October 1981. Other spin-offs are at the forefront of violent struggles in such diverse parts of the Muslim world as Algeria, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Indonesia. It should be noted, though, that one of the most widespread and important fundamentalist organizations, the Tablighi Jama’at, is not only nonviolent in its tactics, it generally eschews politics altogether.
Shi’ite fundamentalism differs from Sunni fundamentalism in a few particulars, mainly in the greater millenarian emphasis that results from Shi’ite expectations of the return of the Hidden Imam, the greater emphasis upon sababada, or “martyrdom” in jihad, and the theory of the direct rule of the Shi’ite religious scholars as enunciated by Ruhollah Khomeini in the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Yet, in most other ideologica

 aspects and in organization, Shi’ite fundamentalist groups can hardly be distinguished from Sunni groups. Greater interaction and mutual influences are evident, for example, in the upsurge in suicide attacks by Sunni groups, a tactic pioneered by the Shi’ite Hizb Allah in Lebanon.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Banna, Hasan al-; Ghazali, Muhammad al-; Ghazali, Zaynab al-; Ibn Taymiyya; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Jama’at-e Islami; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Maududi, Abu I-Ala’; Political Islam; Qutb, Sayyid; Rida, Rashid; Salafiyya; Tablighi Jama’at; Velayat-e Faqih; Wahhabiyya.

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Sobail H. Hashmi

FUTUWWA

The term futuwwa refers to organized groups of youth adhering to a code of honor who devoted themselves to manly, noble virtues. By the twelfth century, futuwwa organizations appeared throughout the Fertile Crescent and Iran as organized entities with elaborate rituals and initiation rites.

Derived from the Arabic word for youth (fata, pl. fityan), futuwwa groups are mentioned in texts related to Sufi orders; they existed in Transoxiana and Khorasan and as akbis (brotherhoods) in Turkic areas, where they sometimes appeared as paramilitary fighters and had connections with artisan guilds. During the eighth through tenth centuries, individuals were referred to, such as Nuh al-’Ayyar, a fata of Nishapur who adhered to an ascetic way of life, as groups of well-to-do fityan who lived apart from society and enjoyed each other’s company. Some, when traveling to a new town, looked to men’s organizations for musical entertainment, drinking, and self-indulgence.

Generally, however, during the periods of intermittent anarchy and competition for political power that characterized the Fertile Crescent from the ninth through the twelfth centuries, these societies were active in the cities, some forming paramilitary groups in Baghdad. Some of these groups included fityan and ‘ayyarun, often defined as vanguard devotees, who, at times, fought with the political regime, at other times defended local autonomy against the military invaders, and frequently terrorized, plundered, harassed, and extorted the wealthy. In Syria, similar groups called abdath formed urban militias and were used by important notable families for political purposes: as hired toughs to fight against each other or the regime in power.

Historians have disagreed about the origins and nature of these groups. Some see their antecedents in earlier versions of men’s groups that existed in the Middle East such as Byzantine circus factions that originated in the Roman Empire or the Sassanian Persian fraternities (javanmardis), whose wrestling devotees met at the “House of Strength” (zurkhaneh) in a master-novitiate relationship. Others look to their relation to Sufi orders or guilds of artisans.

By the twelfth century, chroniclers tell of the existence of futuwwa organizations in the Fertile Crescent that were distinctly men’s clubs. Some were paramilitary organizations or youth gangs. Some were clubs devoted to sports such as crossbow shooting, wrestling, and training homing pigeons while some were mutual aid organizations. Members could include Muslims and non-Muslims. There were artisans and workers, but also the lower class or the marginalized—eunuchs and slaves. Women, tax collectors, wine merchants, fortune-tellers, magicians, diviners, astrologers, astronomers, and perpetrators and accomplices of any serious crime were excluded. There were members who practiced celibacy while some married; often groups lived together in futuwwa clubhouses or ate in a common mess hall.

Taking different forms in various locations, they nevertheless had common characteristics that set them apart from the rest of Muslim society. They wore special clothing and were invested with their futuwwa trousers and belt of honor (libas al-futuwwa) during an initiation ceremony when they drank the futuwwa drink, a cup of salted water. The members were supposed to adhere to the futuwwa code of honor: generosity, solidarity, courage, and hospitality toward those in their group, the last a virtue not necessarily applicable toward society at large.

Futuwwa groups were urban, consisting of groups of youth probably not large in number who formed associations. Some
Futuwwa lived apart in special clubhouses, with novices under the supervision of and discipline of superiors. Each clubhouse (bayt) was distinguished from the others by a particular belief or opinion and there was often animosity between groups. Houses were subdivided into parties (bizh, pl. azhab), each under the supervision of an elder (kabir) with whom the members had a mutual bond. Members or companions (sing. rafiq) drank to the honor of the kabir who supervised their behavior and adjudicated disputes. If companions disagreed with the kabir, they could move to another house but not change elders within the same club to avoid dissension in the bayt.

In this evolving, mobile world, futuwwa orders provided a niche for men without social status or genealogical prestige. With their emphasis on personal qualities as a standard for nobility instead of Arab tribal kinship, religious lineage, or military prestige, futuwwa organizations provided marginal men with social links that crossed class and religious boundaries.

As part of his program to revitalize the Abbasid caliphate, in the face of military threats and competition for leadership, Caliph al-Nasir li-Din Allah (1181–1223) used the futuwwa as a mechanism to instill loyalty to the caliph. He became a member of a futuwwa group in Baghdad and in 1207 declared himself head of all futuwwa organizations in Baghdad and throughout the Islamic world. Creating an elitist, courtly version of futuwwa with privilege, he forbade pigeon raising and crossbow shooting except under his auspices, and issued decrees setting proper behavior for members. As the head of futuwwa, al-Nasir used the society and its codes of behavior to reduce endemic conflict in Baghdad; and, after initiating neighboring rulers into the order, to create diplomatic bonds between local dynasties and himself.

The new regulations bound by tradition were legitimized by ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi (1145–1234), al-Nasir’s confidant and founder of pragmatic Sufi orders, and by Ibn al-Mi’mar (d. 1248) whose Kitab al-Futuwwa was written to provide all those interested with information about futuwwa, noting that futuwwa was incorporated in the shari‘a, and that only a true believer can be a fata. Futuwwa advocates linked futuwwa ideals with pre-Islamic poetry, the Qur’an, and the hadith. Often cited, these refer to the generosity of Hatim al-Ta’i; the trust in God by the young men in the cave and Ibrahim’s rejection of idolatry (Qur’an 18:10 and 21:60); and a tradition about ‘Ali as the heroic fata exemplar: “There is no sword but Dhu al-Fiqar ['Ali’s sword] and no fata but ‘Ali.”

By the late medieval period, futuwwa groups, guilds, and Sufi orders had become interwoven through institutionalization, membership, and adaptation of geneology, rites, and ritual. In modern times, futuwwa has denoted such organizations as the Iraqi paramilitary youth organization of the late 1930s and protectors of Cairo neighborhoods. The javanmardi of Iran maintain the religious and social connections closest to the medieval prototype.

See also Youth Movements.

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GASPRINSKII, ISMA‘IL BAY (1851–1914)

Isma‘il Gasprinskii (Gaspirali), a leading intellectual in the Turkic world, was born in Bahcesaray, Crimea, on 8 March 1851 and died in the same city on 11 September 1914. He received his early education in his hometown and later attended the Gymnasium in Akmescit (Simferopol). After graduating from the Military Academy in Moscow in 1867, he briefly served in the Ottoman army, and then subsequently taught at various Muslim schools in Russia. It was the latter experience that made him realize the necessity of educational reforms for Russian Muslims to achieve social and economic progress.

From 1883 on, when he established the newspaper Tercuman (Interpreter), Gasprinskii advocated reforms in curriculum and teaching methods, with an emphasis on advancing the abilities of students in reading, writing, and arithmetic. In his view, religion was to be taught as culture and for spiritual revival. He believed that many of the ills of Muslim societies could be cured by an improved new educational system (Usul-i Cedid).

At the First and Second Congresses of the Union of Russian Muslims in 1905 and 1906, held in Nizhni Novgorod and St. Petersburg, respectively, Isma‘il Gasprinskii’s ideas on educational reforms and politics received close attention. In 1907 he helped found Ittifak-i Muslumanlar (Union of Muslims) urging not political but linguistic and cultural unity among the Muslim Turkic peoples of Russia. During the following decade, voicing his motto of “Unity in language, thought and action,” he traveled to Istanbul, Cairo, and India urging educational and social reforms in the Islamic world. Despite opposition from existing traditional Muslim educators, by the time of Gasprinskii’s death, around five thousand Usul-i Cedid schools had been established.

Isma‘il Gasprinskii also championed women’s rights and the importance of education for Muslim women. In one of his important journals, Alem-i Nisvan (Women’s world), which he began publishing with his daughter Sefika Hanım in 1906, he consistently argued that society could only reach a high level of civilization if women were also educated. 

See also Education; Feminism.

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A. Uner Turgay

GENDER

To speak of gender is necessarily to make a distinction between sex and gender. While sex is the biologically defined capacity of the human body, gender connotes the social significance attached to members of a particular sex. Gender is, therefore, a human construction that nevertheless draws upon divinely inspired texts, social and cultural conventions, and biological capacities to define its role in public and private life and societal institutions.

Gender-Related Verses in the Qur’an

In the Qur’an, which is regarded as divine revelation by Muslims, female life is considered intrinsically valuable (Q. 81:9). The creation of the female is attributed, along with that of the male, to a single soul (4:1) from which the other is created as its mate (4:1). Another verse declares: “Allah created you from dust, then from a little fluid, then He made you pairs” (35: 11). These verses have been interpreted as granting both sexes equality from the perspective of origin and spiritual status. Although the Qur’anic texts do not
Gender

specify which sex is the primary creation, some argue that the feminine form of the noun “soul” (nafs) in Qur’an 4:1 could be read to suggest that the female was created first. Unlike the account found in the second book of Genesis, the Qur’an does not make the creation of the female derivative from the male or for the purpose of the male. However, such a view enters the Islamic interpretive framework through various sources, chiefly through the writings of the very earliest commentators on the Qur’an, as detailed in Barbara Stowasser’s excellent study.

With respect to morality and spirituality, men and women are equally accountable to God for their actions and for their religious beliefs and responsibilities (33:32–33). In this regard, the Qur’an holds an egalitarian vision, as has been pointed out by Leila Ahmed. In the social sphere, women are entitled to inherit (4:7) half the portions received by men (4:11), two women’s testimonies count in weight to that of a single male’s (2:282), and men are placed in charge of women because they excel over them and are financially responsible for them (4:34). Women must remain monogamous, although nowhere is this specified in the Qur’an but rather is implied in the injunction that “all married women” are forbidden to men (4:24). Men are permitted as many as four wives on the condition that each wife be treated equally, with the additional caveat that if a man cannot provide for four he should marry only one. He may also possess as many concubines as he can afford (“their right hand may possess”) (4:3). Verse 3:129 further declares that “You will not be able to deal equally between [your] wives, however much you wish [to do so],” suggesting to some Muslims that the Qur’an preferred monogamy as the marital state, but in keeping with the customs of the time allowed polygamy. Men may marry any of the women of the ‘ahl al-kitab (“people of the Book”) (5:5) whereas women may marry only Muslim men (this being a traditional stipulation rather than a Qur’anic injunction). Marriage to idolatresses is forbidden (2:221), as is marriage to one’s father’s wives (4:22), one’s mother, daughters, sisters, father’s sisters, mother’s sisters, brother’s daughters, sister’s daughters, foster-mothers, foster-sisters, mothers-in-law, stepdaughters born of women with whom one has had conjugal relations, the wives of blood-sons, and two sisters from the same family (4:23) as well as all married women except slaves already owned (4:24). Marriage with former wives of adopted sons is permitted (33:37). Women with whom marriages have not yet been consummated may be divorced, and should a marriage portion have been promised, half of that must be paid unless the woman—who is encouraged to do so as a pious act—is willing to give it up (235–237).

Conjugal relations are forbidden with menstruating women (2:222); otherwise, conjugal relations are permitted at will (2:223). Disobedient wives are subject to a graduated set of measures ranging from admonishment to beating, depending on how the term darraba (admonish, strike) is interpreted (4:34). Should a conflict arise between a married couple, then an arbiter from each one’s kinsfolk should be appointed to attempt a reconciliation (4:35). According to the Qur’an, a man who forswears his wife must wait four months (2:226) during which time he may change his mind; however, if divorce is determined as a course of action, then the woman must wait a term of three menses to ensure that she is not impregnated; if the wife is found to be pregnant it is recommended that the husband take her back as his wife (2:227). Should divorce proceed in such an instance, the wife is entitled to support from the husband until she gives birth (65:4), and, if mutually agreeable, while she nurses (65:6). A woman may be divorced no more than twice by the same husband in order to be retained; after the third time, she may not be taken back unless she has married another man in the meantime. In cases where a man chooses to divorce a pregnant wife, the Qur’an urges the man to release her with honor only after the birth of the child. Additionally, the husband must not obstruct her remarriage if there has been a mutual agreement based on kindness. Furthermore, upon divorce, nothing that has been given to the woman can be taken back (2:229–232). Widows may choose their own course of action regarding remarriage after a waiting period of four months and ten days (2:234). A married man who is about to die should make provisions for his wife or wives for a period of one year, including a provision for housing, unless the wife or wives choose to leave of their own accord prior to his death (2:240).

Women should suckle their children for two years unless both parents mutually agree to wean the child earlier, and the father is charged with the duty of feeding and clothing the nursing mother appropriately. The child may also be given out to a wet nurse, provided the nurse is adequately compensated (2:233).

In matters of dress and comportment, both men and women are enjoined “to lower their gaze and be modest” (24:30–31); however, in addition women are asked to draw their veils (khumur) over their bosoms, and only reveal of their adornment (cawra, lit. pudendum) that which is manifest, and reveal their adornment only to a specified list of close relatives with whom marriage is disallowed (mahram), eunuchs, and children not yet conscious of women’s nakedness. Similarly, women should not stamp their feet in such a manner that might reveal their adornments by drawing attention to their bodies (24:31). Testimony against women accused of lewdness must be brought by four witnesses, and if the charge is proved, the woman must be confined to her house until her death or until God provides new legislation (4:15). Those accused of adultery, including the adulterer and the adulteress, are subject to a punishment consisting of one hundred lashes (24:2).

Special sanctions are placed upon the wives of the Prophet: the punishment for lewdness is doubled compared to other women (33:30), as is the reward for surrendering to God and
In Jakarta, Indonesia, Muslim women use fountain waters to make their ablutions before praying. The role of women in Muslim countries varies tremendously: Indonesia has a woman president as of 2003, yet in some countries women are required to cover their hair. © AFP/CORBIS

the Prophet and engaging in righteousness (33:31); they are declared not to be “like any other women” and cautioned to keep their speech customary, not soft, lest it causes another’s desire (33:32). They are commanded to stay in their houses (33:33) and abstain from ornamentation, as was the case in the days before Islam. The Prophet’s wives should pray regularly, engage in charity, and obey God and his messenger (33:33), keeping in mind the revelations of God and wisdom (33:34). Conversation with the wives of the Prophet is to be conducted from behind a curtain (hijab) and visits to the Prophet’s household are to occur upon invitation, with the guests departing after the meal is ended. The Prophet’s wives may not remarry after his death (33:53). They may converse freely only with a stipulated set of males: fathers, sons, brothers, nephews, the sons of their female slaves, or their male slaves (33:55).

Further, the wives of the Prophet, his daughters, and the women of the believers are enjoined to “draw their cloaks” (jilbab) close around them while going out in order that they may be recognized as Muslims and not be harassed (33:59). Women past childbearing age with no hope of marriage may discard such outer clothing, provided they do not reveal their adornments, though it is better for them to retain such coverings (24:60).

The Qur’an views women as human beings who are creations of God and are vouchsafed full ontological equality with men. With regard to their moral agency, women are not subordinate to men and, like men, they are called upon to surrender to God and the Prophet and embark upon a path of righteousness for which they will be justly rewarded.

In the social sphere, the Qur’an protects and safeguards women’s right to life, inheritance, legal recognition, dowry, upkeep, child support after divorce, protection from male voyeurism, and safety while in public. These considerations are laudable given the seventh-century context into which the Qur’an was revealed. As previously stated, restrictions are, however, placed on the portion women may inherit (4:11) and on the weight of their legal testimony. The Qur’an’s least egalitarian verse is to be found in 4:34, which declares: “Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property [for the support of women]. So good women are the obedient.” Traditionally, this verse has been interpreted as granting to men authority over women, as well as advocating a social division of labor, suggesting that it is men’s responsibility to support women (and hence, that women need not work but rather should tend the affairs of the hearth). Many Muslims, women included, believe that the Qur’an’s objective with regard women is to vouchsafe their rights as they apply to the economic and legal spheres, especially during childbearing and child-rearing years. With regard to dress codes, there do not appear to be any specific Qur’anic guidelines for male dress, although both men and women are called to observe modesty, a term that could include dress as well as behavior. Qur’an 34:59 asks the Prophet to “Tell thy wives and thy daughters and women of the believers to draw their cloaks (jilbab) close around them [when they go out]. That will be better, that they may be recognized and not annoyed.” The Qur’an’s concern here clearly is to protect women from the male gaze, especially harassment from the “hypocrites” or religious backsliders (munafiqun), thereby tacitly suggesting that women are vulnerable to impropriety on the part of males and that males posed a significant threat to women’s safety in that era. In all of these stipulations, the Qur’an’s spirit of affording protections and rights to women illustrates that it is a sacred document in support of women.

Sources for Gender Construction
Should the Qur’an be construed as a patriarchal text? Later Muslim theology developed the notion that the Qur’an, as a body of revelation, is eternal and a copy of a heavenly prototype, that is, it is eternally valid in all its aspects. The Egyptian shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) argued that
while all Qur’anic injunctions pertaining to ‘ibadat (worship or ritual acts) were eternally valid and binding on Muslims, other Qur’anic injunctions, such as those pertaining to mūslaha or societal well-being, were valid within the context in which they were revealed. Hence, Muslims must assume responsibility for following the intention, and not necessarily the letter, of the Qur’an in matters pertaining to societal well-being. Some modern scholars, such as Amina Wadad-Muhsein, have also argued that the social aspects of the Qur’an should be viewed in a historical and cultural context. From this perspective, pronouncements that were received and intelligible to the patriarchal milieu of an earlier period must be reviewed in light of present-day social arrangements and thus reinterpret.

Historians such as Leila Ahmed have convincingly shown that Islam did not invent patriarchy; rather, it was a form of social organization well established in the Mesopotamian, Greek, Iranian, and Byzantine spheres of influence that Muslims encountered during the first century of Islam. Thus, the key discourses generated in the classical period of Islamic civilization (from the seventh century to 1250 C.E.) took place within a patriarchal frame of reference. Indeed, Eleanor Doumato has argued that much of the legislation derived from the Qur’an and other sources was consistent with the contemporary Jewish and Christian legal praxis.

There are several strands of literature during the first three centuries of Islamic self-definition that are critical to the formation and articulation of gender constructs. These include the qisas al-anbiya”; the ashab al-nuzul; the hadith; the tafsir; and the fiqh. The qisas al-anbiya’, literally the “stories of the prophets,” was one of the pathways through which Biblical lore entered the Islamic realm of discourse, through which Muslims in general—bearing in mind that many Muslims were converts from Judaism or Christianity—gained an intimate familiarity with Biblical figures and stories. The asbab al-nuzul, literally the “context of the revelation,” was a genre imbedded within many tafsir (commentaries) on the Qur’an, seeking to explain the reasons for a particular revelation, reasons that were orally transmitted until such time as the Qur’anic commentators sought to incorporate them within their commentaries. The hadith (tradition literature), which recalled narratives of the Prophet’s thoughts and deeds, was also orally transmitted through succeeding generations until hadith collectors such as al-Bukhari (d. 869 C.E.) and others sought them out, collated them, checked them for accuracy using various methods, and combined them to form canonical collections in the ninth and tenth centuries. Finally, the fiqh (jurisprudence) drew upon various sources, including primarily the Qur’an, the hadith, ‘urf or local custom, and juridical reasoning (variously ra’y, qiyas, ijtihad, ijmā’), to formulate the legal regimes adopted by Muslim rulers. It is in these bodies of literature that extra-Qur’anic features of the social construction of gender are largely located. For instance, the interpretive lens through which the Qur’an was understood and utilized as a basis for social organization adopted the essentialized notions pertaining to the female gender that were well established as part of the patriarchal norms of the conquered societies. Further, key social institutions such as the legal regimes that would govern Muslim societies were inscribed with gendered markings consonant with the cultural practices of the conquered societies comprising the Muslim empire. To illustrate, while nowhere in the Qur’an is Adam’s partner named or identified as having proceeded from the male, for the purpose or in service of the male, biblical antecedents of the derivative and service-oriented origin of the female from the rib of the male enter the Islamic interpretive frame through biblical lore, most likely through the qisas al-anbiya’ literature, thereby ensuring for the Muslim female a subordinate role in society. To be sure, the Muslim interpreters granted greater weight to the subordinate account found in Genesis 2:21 than to the more equitable account found in Genesis 1:27, but they did so in a social and intellectual context in which such a view was favored within their subject peoples. The subordinate role, with respect to the essential nature of the female, however, was firmly lodged through the Muslim appropriation of the biblical notion that the female, unnamed in the Qur’an but named Hawwa by Muslim tradition, was ultimately responsible for the fall of the male, Adam, from the paradisiacal garden as a consequence of her seduction by Iblis, the Arabic equivalent of the devil, or Satan. Such moral frailty on the part of the female is attributed by Muslim commentators variously to her weak intelligence, her willful disobedience, or to her sexually heightened powers of seduction, and punishments similar to those meted to the biblical female sex are attached to the Muslim female. All this despite the many occasions in the Qur’an where either both the primordial couple together or Adam explicitly are named as responsible for the act of disobedience, and where no punishment save expulsion from the beatific state enjoyed in the garden is visited upon the couple; indeed the primordial couple is assured of God’s guidance, with the pledge that “whoever follows My guidance shall have no fear, nor shall they grieve” (2:38).

Having appropriated and elaborated upon the Biblical Eve in order to establish women’s essential nature as morally frail, seductively powerful in order to create moral and social chaos, and eternally punishable, the Qur’anic commentators continued their implicit project of gender construction through their interpretations of the female figures mentioned in the Qur’an, whether Biblical, pre-Islamic, or Muslim (such as the wives of the Prophet). In this project, they were aided by the bodies of discourse also being produced at that time and by the social and institutional arrangements already in place in Arabia and in the conquered territories. Included in these discourses are the ashab al-nuzul literature that “remembered” the context in which a verse was revealed; the qisas al-anbiya’ literature that glorified the lives and acts of prior biblical figures; and the isra’i’llyat literature that comprised...
the narratives deemed biblical lore. These discourses served both to illuminate and reinforce the contemporaneous understanding of the role of God’s prophets and their concomitant social arrangements as divinely ordained rather than as an ever-dynamic result of historical factors, and played a significant role in directing the attitude toward the female gender in the construction of the emerging legal regimes between the first century after the Prophet’s passing and the third century (eighth to tenth centuries of the common era).

Stowasser suggests that the Qur’anic commentators interpreted the references to biblical figures mentioned in the Qur’an as paradigmatic for women’s behavior. Thus, the story of Joseph and Zulaykha was seen to be reflective of the social chaos (fitna) engendered by a woman, and the story of Moses’s future brides was considered paradigmatic for female conduct in the presence of males (work only if there is no other male to do so; walk behind the male, remain bashful and shy in his presence). Ironically, the cumulative effect of such discourse was to define the male in relation to and by contrast to the female, and thus, as argued by Abu-Odin, was far more relevant to the construction of male gender than, as might ostensibly appear, to the construction of female gender. To be sure, the picture was never entirely a simple one: The prophetic status of Mary, the mother of Jesus, was debated, and the wives of some of the prophets were depicted as moral agents in their own right, able freely to choose the path of righteousness or disobedience. However, the notion that a woman might be a moral agent in her own right was not pursued except insofar as how that freedom might be contained given woman’s essential nature.

Similarly, in the hadith literature, an ambiguous picture of women emerges again: on the one hand, women are accorded authority by implication through the relatively large number of hadith narrations attributed to women, such as the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha; On the other hand, as Mernissi has pointed out, perhaps the adjudicators of the hadith literature’s veracity were less vigilant when it came to retaining hadith from sources that reflected unfavorably on women from less than trustworthy sources, as, for example, the hadith stating the prophetic remark, “Those who trust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity” (Mernissi, quoting a hadith cited in Bukhari). Such a hadith inculcated in many Muslims a mistrust of the innate capacity and ability of women to hold political office. In a similar vein, commentators on the Qur’an gave relatively short shrift to the account and interpretation of the female political leader, Bilqis (the Queen of Sheba), mentioned in the Qur’an. Despite the later historical record in which women successfully negotiated their way through political institutions to attain leadership roles (as, for instance, the medieval Yemeni Sulayhid queen Sayyida Hurra) and the modern record in which there have been more female heads of state in Muslim nations than in North America, the force of the hadith continues to be cited by opponents as an impediment when Muslim women agitate for inclusion in the political process or in political leadership.

The legal regimes developed over the course of this formative period, from the eighth to the tenth centuries, again reflecting a patriarchally informed lens that led to a greater weighting of the socially restrictive verses in the Qur’an over the morally equitable verses also found in the Qur’an. Thus, for instance, the legal formulators found it far more important to lay down the rules under which polygamy was to be practiced than heeding the Qur’anic suggestion that God was aware that men would not be able to deal justly with more than one wife. The discrepancies with respect to gender issues between the various Sunni legal schools, and between the Sunni and the Shi’ite legal schools, suggest, at the very least, that jurists exercised their discretionary interpretive skills in addressing issues of gender, thereby belying the notion that the legal regime is divinely ordained, eternally valid, and therefore immutable. The jurists also saw fit to inscribe legal codes with concurrent views of gender, thus, for instance, although the Qur’an says nothing about the validity of ritual prayer as predicated on proximity to women, a legal code invalidates all prayers performed by men if not distanced from women by a space of at least two arms’ length, perhaps in keeping with the segregation of men and women in Jewish and possibly Christian ritual prayer contexts. The essentialist views pertaining to women’s weakness that enter the Islamic commentarial discourses through biblical lore may explain why the statement found in 4:34 (“Men are in charge over/ superior to women”) resulted in the legal arrogation of guardianship rights to the male, extending to women’s buying and selling property, their commercial activity, and their ability to contract their own mates and so forth, again, none of which rights are accorded to men in the Qur’an explicitly. Rather, these rights are given over to the male through the explicit statement found in 4.34, and the creative interpretation of a Qur’anic verse that required guardians to handle the legal affairs of orphans and children (4:6) and those of inferior intellect (4:5).

The present observations regarding the legal regimes produced in the three centuries following the Prophet’s death are not meant to suggest that males willfully and misogynistically curbed women’s legal agency and comportment. Nevertheless, the claim that authoritative discourses in the Islamic world are divinely decreed or generated needs to be more carefully examined and analyzed, as it does not take into account the historical and social factors and processes through which shari’ah law came to be constructed, defined, and implemented, a process that took at least a couple of centuries. Further, the claim impinges to the divine being legal and social discrimination against women, who are creatures considered in the Qur’an to be equally worthy of life as men, created from the same soul, equally morally accountable, and as much moral agents as men. Such a claim does not stand up
to theological reason. Rather, the historically and sociologically constructed nature of many of the authoritative discourses in the Islamic world must be acknowledged, namely, that the hadith collectors, the Qur’anic commentators, and the jurists were doing the best they could to contribute to and illumine a self-understanding of what it meant to be Muslim in their day, in social frameworks intelligible to and consistent with the cultural modes of the time in the diverse geographical locales of the Muslim empire(s). Studies in legal praxis, such as those of Mir-Hosseini and Tucker, indicate that jurists treated the shari‘a as a fluid set of directives that allowed them some limited scope in taking context into account and in treating each case on its own merit, something that one sees in practice in Iran today.

The Challenges of Gender Reform

Several developments at various points in history left in their wake significations of gender that are almost impossible to dislodge, and render gender legal reform difficult in the contemporary world. A brief examination of three such developments is merited. In the first, the influential theologian and jurist al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who, in a move reminiscent of St. Augustine, linked piety to shari‘a observance. He suggested, thereby, that a Muslim, by definition, was one who adhered to the shari‘a, in contrast to the more loosely articulated view that defined a Muslim as one who ascertained the shahadah (lit. testimony, namely, “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger,”) to which Shi‘a add: “and Allah is the Master of the believers”). In addition to according the shari‘a quasi-divine status, such a move on al-Ghazali’s part ensured the difficulty of ameliorating the shari‘a in any manner as to do so would be to suggest that it was a humanly crafted instrument for the governance of society, albeit one taking its cue from a divinely ordained text, the Qur’an. The implications of this theological development for gender are immense: Does any attempt to introduce gender-equitable treatment under the shari‘a then suggest that one is tampering with what it means to be a Muslim? It is no surprise that the Hudood Ordinances introduced by President Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan in 1978 under the advisement of the shari‘a bench have proven to be one of the greatest obstacles in assuring Muslim women in Pakistan equal consideration under the law. Indeed, the infamous zina‘ (adultery) laws have provoked international debate with respect to the setback rather than the protection, let alone reparation, they provide raped women who, as a consequence of these laws, are punishable for the rape. Muslim women academics and activists, such as Asifa Qureishi, have proposed different ways in which the issue of rape might be conceived within an Islamic framework.

The second development was the caliphal prerogative, rendered justifiable by his titular mandate as “Defender of the Faithful,” to set up institutions whereby his office could govern society in manners he saw fit. Thus, for instance, in Abbasid and Ottoman times, the caliph could and did set up institutions through which criminal, property, and foreign policy law was handled by his appointees, while laws pertaining to worship and to the family were rendered under the jurisdiction of the religious specialists, thereby further linking worship with laws pertaining to gender issues and making it even more difficult to modernize or otherwise ameliorate the latter without implicating the former. Legal institutions under the direct control of the caliph, on the other hand, were more amenable to context-driven adjustments, as reflected in the work of the Ottoman administrator Ahmad Cevdet Pasha (d. 1895), a member of the ulama, who took his inspiration from Roman and French legal systems, while remaining within the fold of Islamic principles in working out the Ottoman code in order to take into account early modern legal challenges and approaches.

The third development concerned the colonial, especially British, practice of relegating personal and family law issues to the control of religiously defined communities, thereby undermining traditional or customary practices developed over time and resurrecting and perpetuating legal regimes developed by religious institutions that were, in the Muslim case, formulated several centuries ago. Such a practice further reinforced the connection of family law with religious identity and perpetuated gender equities inscribed in the religiously formulated legal system. The colonial attitude of pointing to the “backwardness” of Islamic societies by holding up, for example, the segregation of women from public spaces, has ironically created, as observed by Leila Ahmed, the very signifiers through which Muslims now assert their identity as different from the West and their former colonial masters. In other words, the bodies of women are the sites on which the postcolonial struggles to define and delineate the authenticity, integrity, and marks of an Islamic identity are to be fought. Such a resignification of women’s bodies, comportment, and legal status has been no more vociferously and proudly proclaimed than by resurgent Muslim groups. Such groups, often armed with a political agenda that includes taking control of the institutions of governance—assisted by all the tools of modern technology, including print, Internet, and educational media—and attempting to convince Muslim youth disenchanted with global Western political and economic hegemony, as well as with the ineptitude of local government and economic instability, that wearing one’s Islamic identity on one’s head and a public expression of Muslim piety establish one’s identity as a site of resistance to the West. There is no doubt that modern Muslims face significant challenges, both internal and external, to building viable and healthy postcolonial societies; however, the use of religion for political ends has resulted in the creation of organizations calling themselves Muslim who serve to whip minorities, governments, secularists and non-Muslims into pious (thereby unquestionable) submission to a specific political aim in the name of God by offering the indisputable promise: (their form of) Islam is the solution. Their goals and methods run contrary to the Qur’anic call to humans to
believe, to act righteously and with social justice (76:5–9; 90:13–17), and to impose no compulsion in matters of religion.

In contemporary times, Muslim women are caught in the nexus of Islamic resurgence, state agendas, feudal social structures, and the economic forces of globalization with its sometimes devastating impact on developing societies. State agendas include the desire to deliver education, training, health, and legal parity in order to facilitate social development that can harness the productive capacity of women in order to build viable societies. However, the need for states at times to buy into the legitimating power of Islamic parties has meant a nimble bartering away of women’s rights, or simply a stalling of reforms in exchange for political power. Islamist parties have often reinforced feudal social structures that reinforce a gendered division of labor, thus dovetailing nicely with the Islamist perception of gender roles and laws. The effects of globalization have resulted in an increasing number of women finding it essential to join the paid workforce, a labor migration in search of work, often separating families or creating a subclass of domestic worker or sex-worker slavery, and a movement away from the rural areas into urban outskirts in search of work, leading both to urban congestion and rural impoverishment, thereby providing increasing fodder for Islamist movements. Globalization paradoxically supports both the state agenda for its female population and the Islamist resistance to western economic hegemony, leaving the often already weak state machinery further vulnerable to negotiations with the political threat posed by Islamist parties. Any attempt at discussion of gender issues in many parts of the Muslim world has been silenced through tactics that have attempted to delegitimize the discussant; such tactics include accusing the discussant of being brainwashed by the West, being a western feminist, blaspheming, and so forth.

Muslim gender activists, mostly but not exclusively women, have explored various routes toward addressing issues of gender equity in Muslim societies. In Iran, for instance, women’s magazines have taken on the challenge of reexamining patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an, arguing that the verse supporting male privilege could be understood differently if greater attention were paid to the language of the Qur’an, as in the spirit of the work of the Moroccan feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi and the American Muslim activist Amina Wadud. Iranian Islamist women, as elsewhere, have also sought to create a parallel universe for women that would enable women to participate in activities not normally possible in a gender-segregated society, as for instance in the Iranian Women’s Games. Islamist women in various parts of the world have argued that nowhere do sacred texts prevent women from acquiring an education or participating in the political and the legal spheres. Many Islamist women hold the position that the broad display of headwear and piety has earned them the right to have a say in public affairs, and here the example of the Egyptian Zaynab al-Ghazali comes to mind. Islamist women also argue that the application of Islamic law has ameliorated women’s rights over and against feudal or tribal or customary practices. Characteristic of all these approaches is the underlying assumption that Islam as a social and legal system offers gender equality, often drawing upon the oxymoronic adage “equal but different” that bears the semblance of erasing hierarchy but reinscribes it in making the woman the upholder of the shari’ah vision of respectability as the “difference” inevitably reintroduces differential equations of power. In the current climate of Islamic resurgence, it is likely that the Islamist form of gender activism, which entails a form of reinscription of Islamic legal frameworks, is likely to prevail and will continue to do so until such a time as Muslim societies can work out forms of governance that keep Islam out of politics and enable a fresh approach to juridical principles that emphasize women’s agency, control over their bodies and destinies, and full humanity. Such a prospect requires fresh thinking on how it might be possible to remain a Muslim spiritually while allowing for clear thinking on what an egalitarian and just society might look like without being fettered by social and legal norms developed historically under very different circumstances. In this regard, issues of health, poverty, and universal access to education, work, and childcare should be addressed, and regimes seeking populist affirmation through Islamization policies need to be examined closely.

Another approach has been to argue that a Muslim cannot be Islamized, since a person who is already a Muslim should not be made subject to punitive laws in the name of Islam or be subject to an interpretation of Islam that does not accord well with its principles of fairness and social justice. Further, one does not need to be an Islamist, that is, one who believes that public and state institutions must adhere to shari’ah prescriptions, developed under different circumstances several centuries ago, in order to work for the benefit of society, especially with respect to gender. Thus, for instance, Maha Azzam has argued that the challenges facing Muslim women ought to be articulated and addressed “with the use of analytical frameworks that, for example, draw on the sociology of religion and on the political and economic dynamics of nationalism and dependency” (quoted in Esposito and Haddad, p. 49) and not conducted within a religious framework that dispenses what the correct comportment of a Muslim woman should or should not be from a seventh-century social perspective. Others, such as the sisters Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani Jahangir in Pakistan, have sought to address gender equity issues under the rubric of the law and state enforceability, while activist lawyers, academics, and other intellectuals such as Asifa Quraishi, Amira Sonbol, Rifat Hasan, and Amina Wadud in North America have sought to address issues as widely divergent as rape laws in Pakistan, gender issues in legal regimes in parts of the Muslim world, honor killings, and rereading sacred texts, to name a few. A significant form of activism is the consciousness raising evident in the production of literary and analytical works by Muslim women.
throughout the world, which, if read by Muslims and non-
Muslims alike, may result in transnational feminist activism
that may finally unmask and address the endless varieties in
which Islam, as all world faiths, is used for patriarchal purposes.

See also Divorce; Feminism; Ghazali, Zaynab al-; Marriage;
Masculinities.

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Zayn R. Kassam

GENEALOGY

Genealogy plays an important role in Islamic civilizations,
often drawing on local pre-Islamic traditions, common to
most oral cultures, of preserving memory and history through
recitation of long chains of ancestors. The pre-Islamic Arab
tribes, such as Quraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, traced
their lineage back to a common ancestor who was the eponym
of the group, which was further subdivided into smaller clans,
each sharing a common line of descent. Islamic concepts of
genealogy derive from pre-Islamic Arabian identification
with tribal lineages, honor, and prestige, participation in
early Muslim history, and relationship to the Prophet and his
Companions.

With the triumph of the Islamic vision, tribal loyalties
were to be superceded by common Muslim brotherhood.
Traces of the tribal genealogical precedence and concept of
nobility persisted, however, augmented by specifically Is-
lamic associations. One genre of Arabic historical recordings
was the citation of lineages (ansab), and this was incorpo-
rated in the compilation of early Islamic biographical compendia
such as the Tabaqat of Ibn Sa’d. The importance of lineage
was based conceptually on the idea of noble ancestry as
shaping character through lineage (nasl) or origin (adl).
Priority in accepting Islam also had pragmatic benefits in
early Islamic history as the caliph Umar established a system
known as the diwan, recording precedence in conversion and
apportioning payments to families based on this ranking.

As the Muslims expanded into new territories, they ini-
tially garrisoned Arab troops separately from local popula-
tions, who needed to form client relationships with Arabs and
establish quasi-genealogical links to them as they Islamicized.
Gradually these populations converted and assimilated, the
dates of this process having been traced by historian Richard
Bulliet through genealogical material and especially nomen-
clature preserved in the early biographical compendia. This
tracing of conversion dates is possible because the period of
the family’s conversion to Islam is visible in the name of the
final ancestor to preserve a local pre-Islamic first name.

Arabic names include various components. The kunya
(patronymic) tends to be in the form “son of” (ibn), “daughter
of” (bint), father (abu), or “mother of” (umm), and additional
long strings of a person’s ancestors (nasab) are recorded in
more formal documents or histories. Names may further
contain what is called a *nisba* or relational suffix that may indicate city of origin or principal residence, tribal or ancestral relationships, and a further *laqab* or descriptive epithet based on physical characteristics or profession.

Descendants of the Prophet are often designated by the title *sayyid* and given special respect in certain Muslim societies. For example, in Iran, *sayyid* males wear a black turban in ritual settings, in Morocco they are known as the *shuraifa*, and in India and Pakistan they are the highest “caste” of Indian Muslims, followed, respectively, by those claiming Arab, Mogul, or Pathan ancestors. These groups are the nobles (*ashraf*) or descendants of migrants to India rather than the descendants of indigenous converts (*ajlaf*). This honoring may thus be seen to emerge from religious sentiment of respect for and charisma of the Prophet’s household and Companions, and also of the cultural precedence accorded to Arab Muslims in non-Arab contexts. A modern example of this respect based on genealogy is the designation of Jordan as “the Hashemite kingdom.” Banu Hashim being the clan of the Prophet, as a factor legitimizing the ruling dynasty, who claim descent from the Prophet’s lineage.

A further element of genealogical understanding in Islamic cultures is the concept of spiritual or intellectual lineages in Sufi or scholarly traditions. Here chains of succession are formed the Renaissance Party (*hizb al-nahda*), and also of the cultural precedence accorded to Arab Muslims in non-Arab contexts. A modern example of this respect based on genealogy is the designation of Jordan as “the Hashemite kingdom.” Banu Hashim being the clan of the Prophet, as a factor legitimizing the ruling dynasty, who claim descent from the Prophet’s lineage.

See also Biography and Hagiography; Historical Writing; Tariqa.

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Marcia Hermansen

**GEOGRAPHY** See Cartography and Geography

**GHANNOUSHI, RASHID AL- (1941– )**

Rashid al-Ghannoushi is a prominent Islamic thinker and political activist. Born in 1941 into a religious family in rural Tunisia, Ghannoushi received a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Damascus University in 1968. After a year in Paris, he returned to Tunisia to teach philosophy at a secondary school. A former member of the Tablighi Jama’at and a Qur’anic study group, he founded the Islamic Tendency Movement (*barakat al-ittijah al-islami*) in 1981, which later formed the Renaissance Party (*biza al-nahda*, or Ennahda). Ghannoushi was first arrested in 1981, released in 1984, rearrested and sentenced for life in 1987, but amnestied in 1988. Shortly thereafter he left for exile in London. While his role in the Islamic opposition movement within Tunisia remains controversial, his stature as an eminent representative of modern Sunni Arab Islamic thought is largely undisputed. In a series of books, articles, lectures, and interviews he presented his aim to make Islam relevant for modern society, notably for the young, by integrating key concepts of modern sociopolitical thought such as good governance, human rights, social justice, freedom, pluralism, and equality into an Islamic framework, insisting on general norms and values rather than conventional understandings of Islamic law and theology, which he considered to be largely irrelevant to present realities.

See also Political Islam.

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Gudrun Krämer

**GHAYBA(T)**

*Al-Ghayba* (Persian *ghaybat*), literally “the hiding,” is sometimes translated as “the Occultation.” While a number of early Shi’ite theological groupings proposed that their imam had gone into “hiding,” it was the Twelver Shi’a, the only such group to survive into the classical period in any significant numbers, who fully developed the doctrine. Proclaiming that one’s imam had gone into hiding had a number of advantages for persecuted Shi’ite groups. First, it reduced their explicit challenge to the established political order. A hidden imam is (potentially) less disruptive than a manifest imam, thereby reducing political tension with the ruling Sunni authorities. Second, if this imam is predicted to return at some point, the community can be charged with merely waiting (*intizar*) for his return, rather than actively agitating against the governing political powers. Third, while the Shi’a

**Ghayba**

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had divided into various groups, based around the charisma of particular would-be imams, a hidden imam could act as a unifying factor, as personality conflicts between imams were avoided.

The majority of Shi’a settled upon both an individual and a point in time when the imam went into hiding. The individual was Muhammad, son of Hasan al-‘Askari (a descendent of Imam ‘Ali and proclaimed as the eleventh imam), and the time was 868 C.E. According to Shi’ite reports, Hasan died when Muhammad was only six. Muhammad, also referred to as the Mahdi, went into hiding in order to avoid persecution from the Abbasid rulers. At first, he continued to communicate with his Shi’a through intermediaries. These four intermediaries (known as “gates” or “ambassadors”) passed on the orders of the hidden imam. After sixty-nine years (in 941), when the fourth agent was close to death, the imam announced that from that point on there were no further agents. While the imam was not leaving the world, he would remain in hiding until God decreed an appropriate time for his return. This ended the lesser occultation (al-ghayba al-sughra), and the greater occultation (al-ghayba al-kubra) began. The Shi’a are still awaiting the return of the imam, known as the Mahdi.

This doctrine appears to have taken some time to reach its final formulation, and later it was subjected to extensive theological justification. For example, in the eleventh century Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tusi, in his Kitab al-Ghayba, outlined both textual and rational justifications that later became common in Shi’ite texts of theology. He argued that God would not leave his community without a guide—for to do so would entail his neglect of the Shi’a and hence his injustice. There must, then, be an imam present in the world who acts as God’s guide, and this imam must be sinless. Because there is no manifest imam who is both sinless and recognizable as the emissary of God, the imam must, therefore, be in hiding.

The doctrine of the ghayba also has a number of legal consequences. For example, the zakat and khums taxes, collected by the imam, become problematic. Eventually, Shi’ite jurists avoided these duties being lapsed by proposing the doctrine of niyaba (deputyship) of the scholars to carry out these functions.

See also Imamate; Shi’a: Imam (Twelver).

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Robert Gleave

GHAZALI, AL- (C. 1059–1111)

Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali (or al-Ghazzali) (1058/9–1111) was born some seven years before the Battle of Hastings, the Norman conquest that transformed England. As an intellectual and thinker, Ghazali’s legacy is not only rich, but his imprint on the Muslim tradition is both diverse and complex. For this reason the enigma of his legacy makes him both a highly esteemed as well as a controversial figure. Generations of scholars have debated Ghazali’s role, studying the range of texts he had written in order to get a better picture of the man and his oeuvre. For some people Ghazali is the great “Defender of Islam” (Hujjat al-Islam, hujjat literally meaning “proof”). Others blame him for damaging the rational edifice of Islamic thought in his sharp critique of Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina and al-Farabi. However, Ghazali’s ideas can best be described as a work in progress and not easily abridged. Therefore, reducing his work to such polarities is to grossly oversimplify the achievements of a very complex life and mind.

Ghazali’s childhood was marked by a frugal and impoverished existence, partly caused by the untimely death of his father. His early years were spent in his birthplace in Tus, near what is today the city of Mashhad in modern Iran. After his elementary education with his tutor Ahmad al-Radhkani, he traveled to the city of Jurjan near the Caspian Sea for higher studies with a leading scholar, Isma’il b Mis’ada al-Isma’ili (d. 1084). We learn of the apocryphal story of his encounter with brigands during his return journey from Jurjan. After the brigands had robbed all the travelers in the caravan, Ghazali pleaded with the brigands’ leader to return only his precious dissertation (ta’līqa), offering him the rest of his possessions in return. The brigand leader ridiculed Ghazali’s claim to knowledge and mocked him by showing that a thief could so easily take it away. Struck by this insight, Ghazali later commented: “He [the leader of the brigands] was an oracle (mustantaq) whom God made to speak, in order that He could guide me through him.” After that episode Ghazali committed all his notes to memory.

But the major transformation in Ghazali’s intellectual life took place when he attended the Nizamiyya College in Nishapur. There he impressed the leading scholar of the day, Abu ‘l-Ma‘ali al-Juwayni (d. 1085), renowned for his expertise in dialectical theology (‘ilm al-kalam) and Shafi’i law. Juwayni’s
influence on Ghazali effectively brought him into a full engagement with the rational sciences, especially law, theology, logic, and later philosophy. Thus in Nishapur one begins to see the first signs of Ghazali’s extraordinary strength in law and dialectical theology. In law he followed the Shafi’i school while also studying Ash’ari theology without being a slavish adherent to this orientation. These intellectual gifts would serve him well in his rise to intellectual celebrity. At Nishapur, Ghazali learned Islamic mysticism (tasawwuf) from Abu ‘Ali al-Farhani (d. 1084/5). It is not clear what Ghazali did for roughly seven years after completing his formal studies in Nishapur. Most historians believe that he remained in Nishapur but regularly joined the retinue of scholars cultivated by the indomitable Seljuk wazir (Ar. wazir) Nizam al-Mulk.

In 1091 Nizam al-Mulk appointed Ghazali professor of Shafi’i law at the Nizamiyya College in Baghdad. It is in Baghdad that Ghazali’s intellectual reputation culminated in the honorific “Defender of Islam.” It also marked one of the most productive periods in his life. He wrote several books on logic and law. It was also during this period that he wrote his famous refutation of the controversial doctrinal beliefs held by Muslim philosophers about the eternity of the world, their rejection of corporeal resurrection and that God only knew universals, The incoherence of the philosophers (Tahaft al-falasifa), followed by a vitriolic exposure of the doctrines of the Isma’ili Shi’a called The obscenities of the esoterists (Fada’ib al-batiniiyya). But his meteoric rise came to an abrupt and dramatic end when he experienced a debilitating spiritual crisis, which he described in some detail in his spiritual testimony, Deliverance from error (al-Munqidh min al-dalal). He decided to abandon his public life of teaching and embarked on a life of contemplative reflection and asceticism. Explanations abound for this dramatic turn in Ghazali’s life. Some argue that he suffered intellectual self-doubt in his engagement with philosophy. Others link his anxieties to the series of Isma’ili assassinations targeting political and religious figures, which gave Ghazali cause to fear for his own life. There is also a view that he found his political alliances with the Seljuk rulers and his ties to the Abbasid caliphal palace to be a source of moral suffocation. Perhaps cumulatively all these pressures had a deleterious impact on his mind and soul.

Under the pretext of making the pilgrimage to Mecca, Ghazali left his family in the province of Khurasan and sought the anonymity of Jerusalem and Damascus, where he spent time meditating at the Dome of the Rock and the Umayyad mosque. After an absence of nearly five years (1095–1099) Ghazali returned to his native Tus. During this period, as a novice on the mystical path, he engaged in reflection and disciplinary practices of the self as taught by master mystics such as Junayd of Baghdad, Harith al-Muhasibi, and others. It is also in this period of his life that he undertook the writing of his magnum opus for which he is best known in the world of scholarship, The revivification of the sciences of religion (Ihya ulum al-din). This is now a classic in Muslim religious writing and is widely used to this day. In it Ghazali explores the ethical purposes of religious practices but more importantly provides a road map to how this can lead to a transformation of the self. As a body of writing, Revivification represents Ghazali’s personal journey, in which he writes his ailing soul to health. Given his broad intellectual repertoire, Ghazali was able to explore a variety of themes in a complex and convincing manner, drawing on a variety of sources and ideas that he combines into an almost seamless narrative. The Revivification consists of four books, each addressing an overall theme: starting with rituals (‘ibadat), customs and practices (‘adat), practices that lead to peril (mublikat), and salvific practices (munjiyat).

See also Ash’arites, Ash’airia; Falsafa; Kalam; Law; Tasawwuf.

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GHAZALI, MUHAMMAD AL-
(1917–2001)

Born in 1917, al-Ghazali was an Egyptian Islamic thinker who was educated as a jurist at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, and held prominent positions with the Ministry of Awqaf and the Mosques Department. During his early career he sided with the Muslim Brotherhood party until he separated himself from the organization in the 1950s. Al-Ghazali wrote over forty books that are considered to be very important in the field of modern legal studies and modern theology. In Islam and Political Despotism and Prejudice and Tolerance in Christianity and Islam, he advocated the variety of ways in which religion could be a source of social justice and promote peace in the modern world.

As a scholar, al-Ghazali was known for an independent, well-balanced approach to jurisprudence, and he cited Islamic texts in favor of gender equality, greater political participation, environmental awareness, and human rights.
He was critical of modern Muslim scholars who focus too much on pedantic details of adhering to rituals and not enough on governance, finance, ethics, and moral philosophy. Al-Ghazali was critical of radical and neocorporative scholars who failed to understand the comprehensive nature of religion and he refused to recognize their myopic views of faith. He felt that they were poorly trained scholars who purposely select esoteric hadiths and sunna accounts to argue their point and further their political agendas. Al-Ghazali’s contribution to modern Islamic thought was to treat faith as integrally linked with the political, economic, and social order.

See also Political Islam.

Qamar-ul Huda

GHAZALI, ZAYNAB AL- (1917– )

Zaynab al-Ghazali al-Jabili (b. 1917) is Egypt’s prominent female Islamist, a leading figure as a lecturer, teacher, and propagator of Islam who describes herself as the “mother” of the Muslim Brotherhood. After a short interlude in Huda Sha’rawi’s Egyptian Feminist Union, she resigned and founded the Muslim Women’s Association (1936–1964). Her Islamic upbringing molded her conviction that a secular and Western-oriented movement for women’s liberation was not adequate for Muslim society. Moreover, she emphasizes that the rights of Muslim women were entirely guaranteed by Islam as long as they fulfill their duties as mothers and spouses.

Until 1945 she refused Hasan al-Banna’s offer to incorporate her organization into the Muslim Brotherhood, but she asserted her readiness for cooperation. This refusal safeguarded her independence and leadership position, taking into consideration the patriarchal patterns and hierarchies within the Muslim Brotherhood. After the ban of the Brotherhood she gave al-Banna her oath of allegiance and formally joined the organization in 1948, becoming the driving force behind its secret reestablishment.

Her own organization was banned in 1964. In the course of the arrests of Brotherhood members she was imprisoned and tortured. Six years later, in 1971, she was released. Her memoirs from prison made her famous, even beyond Egypt’s borders.

The fact that Zaynab al-Ghazali’s own life as a religious activist appears to contradict women’s primary duties (as mothers and spouses) should in no way diminish her significance.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Political Islam.

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See Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi

GLOBALIZATION

The term globalization is used in various related senses to refer to the intensified integration of the world economy, declining autonomy and separation of the nation-states, the growth of international and transnational forms of governance, and the rapidly expanding communication networks across national, regional, and religious boundaries, especially with the advent of the Internet. With the exception of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey, the impact of economic and financial globalization on the Muslim world has been smaller than in other parts of the world. The integration of Middle Eastern and North African countries into the global economy has been particularly slow, except for the case of Turkey, and the attempts at the privatization of the economy have been largely unsuccessful in the region.

By contrast, the Internet and e-mail have created rapid forms of communication linking different parts of the Muslim world, from Morocco to Indonesia, to each other and to the rest of the world, even though the spread of these electronic media has been slower than in many other parts of the world. This has sometimes been called “globalization from below,” to distinguish it from economic globalization through multinational corporations and international financial institutions. The globalization of communication through the Internet, as well as somewhat older media, such as telecommunications and broadcasting, has had a significant and ongoing impact on Islam as a religion. There has also been unprecedented migration, both from the Muslim world into North America and Western Europe, and within the Muslim world into the Gulf countries. Last but not least,
transnational political trends and international organization have also had a notable impact on the Islamic world.

**The Push toward Universalism**

The missionary expansion of the world religions among nations and across the frontiers of empires can itself be considered the prototype of the process of globalization. These religions have a tendency toward missionary expansion because they are in principle universalistic, which gives them a built-in tendency to overcome many forms of particularism and to expand their influence beyond familial, ethnic, and national boundaries. In practice, the ideal commitment to universalism is tempered by all sorts of compromises with the forces of particularism. As a result of globalization, however, these very compromises transform the character and terms of reference of particularism from local to what sociologists have called “glocal” (from the combination of “global” and “local”). Furthermore, globalization is an important factor in the contemporary resurgence of Islam and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism.

The Internet and satellite communication have weakened the very tight control of the states over national radio and television networks that had once compartmentalized the Muslim world into differently oriented nation-states, and have stimulated the growth of a new, transnational Muslim public space within the global context. These effects of globalization on Islam are interpreted very differently by different observers. Some see the combined effect of globalization as it impacts upon the world’s one billion Muslims. They point to the growth of education and vigorous discussion of Islam in books and in public debates in the press, the audio-visual, and the electronic media as contributing to an Islamic Reformation. In this view, the current Islamicization of social life has been both far-reaching and dispersed, lacking any focus or single thrust. Whether or not one concurs with the value-judgment that it constitutes Reformation, it is undeniable that there is an unmistakable dispersion of the current trends in Islamization. The opposite view holds that globalization has put Islam on the front lines of a “Jihad versus McWorld” confrontation, creating a sharply focused and vehement anti-Western as well as anti-universalist struggle. This latter view tends to obliterate the distinction between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.

The negative view on Islam and globalization, though widely shared by journalists and commentators, seems essentially mistaken. Not only is there variety in Islamic fundamentalism, but Islamic fundamentalism is by no means identical with all the contemporary manifestations of Islam as a universalist religion. Urbanization, development of roads and transportation, the printing revolution, and other contemporary processes of social change, including globalization, simply reinforce trends toward expansion and intensive penetration of society that are typical of Islam as a universalist religion. These trends remain distinct and are not swamped by fundamentalism.

The twentieth century also gave rise to a combination of internal subglobalization processes typical of the early modern period and externally stimulated globalization. On the one hand, the continuous improvement and declining cost of transportation since the Second World War has greatly increased the number of pilgrims to Mecca, and of missionaries from Africa and Asia to the main centers of Islamic learning in the Middle East. It should be noted that this aspect of globalization reinforces Islam’s old universalism, which was institutionalized around the hajj. On the other hand, the postcolonial era has also witnessed the massive immigration of Muslims into Western Europe and North America, where sizable Muslim communities have formed. Meanwhile, there has been unprecedented global integration of Muslims through the mass and electronic media.

The international repercussions of the Salman Rushdie case are the best illustration of the impact of the media on a globally integrated Muslim world. The protests and burning of his *Satanic Verses* by indignant Muslims began in Bradford, England. Images of these protests were broadcast throughout the world, and stimulated more violent protests in Pakistan and India. In a particularly low point of Iranian post-revolutionary politics, after the book had been banned in India, South Africa, Bangladesh, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini broadcast his famous *fatwa* condemning Rushdie, a non-Iranian writer who lived in England, to death for apostasy on 14 February 1989.

**Particularism within Globalization**

An interesting feature of globalization is the unfolding of antiglobal sentiments in particularistic, variety-producing movements, which seek local legitimacy but, nevertheless, have a global frame of self-reference. The flexibility of signing international conventions with reservations has allowed a large number of Muslim states to confirm their membership in the international communities by signing such agreements while retaining their own particularity of identity and interests. For instance, Muslim nations could sign onto the United Nations’ human rights instruments, such as the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but insist upon significant reservations that affirmed the priority of the *shari’ah* rules.

More typically, however, global integration induces many Muslims to emphasize their unique identity within the frame of reference of their own culture, which can be said to be at once universal and local or subglobal. There can be no doubt that global integration has made many Muslims seek to appropriate universalist institutions by what might be called Islamic cloning. We thus hear more and more about “Islamic science,” “Islamic Human Rights,” an “Islamic international
Globalization

In a shop in downtown Cairo, an Egyptian woman drinks Coca-Cola. In February 1999, a Muslim Internet site started a rumor that the Coca-Cola logo, looked at upside down or reflected in a mirror, read “No Mohammed, no Mecca.” Mufti Nasr Farid Wasel, Egypt’s highest religious authority, concluded after a study of the logo that the allegation was false and that “there was no defamation to the religion of Islam from near or far.”

system” and a variety of organizations modeled after the United Nations and its offshoots, most notably the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which was founded in 1969 and has fifty-seven countries as its members.

The cloning here is unmistakable. Not only is the charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference derived from the UN charter, but it has an Islamic Development Bank (modeled after the World Bank), a Commission of the International Crescent (corresponding to the Red Cross), and an Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (corresponding to the UNESCO). In 1980, the OIC voted to establish an International Islamic Law Commission to secure representation of the Islamic viewpoint before the International Court of Justice. The OIC has also set up the International Islamic University of Malaysia as a modern university for the study of Islamic subjects in accordance with global standards. This phenomenon is a direct result of globalization, not an outcrop of fundamentalism. It is a reactive tendency, however, and can be viewed as a form of defensive counter-universalism. This defensive counter-universalism diverges from the old universalism of Islam as a world religion in its reactive character and “glocal” self-consciousness.

Despite its intent, however, the assimilative character of defensive counter-universalism is quite pronounced. It has already resulted in the assimilation of universal organizational forms, and albeit restrictively, of universal ideas such as human rights and the rights of women. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, despite its intent, defensive counter-universalism is inevitably a step toward the modernization of the Islamic tradition.

A Changing Islam in the Global Context

The increasing integration of the Middle Eastern states into the international system has exposed them to the global wave of democratization and the promotion of the rule of law. This exposure has introduced a new element of legal pluralism and generated ambivalent reactions throughout the Middle East. The impact of the human rights revolution on the legal culture of Middle Eastern societies has been significant, and constitutional and supreme courts of a few Muslim countries, such as Egypt and Malaysia, have insinuated international rights provisions into their national legal systems.

Among the human rights, the ones with the strongest social backing that results from structural and occupational changes in contemporary Middle Eastern societies are those concerned with women’s rights. Women’s rights are represented by official organs of the states, and by a growing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are increasingly linked with international NGOs and the United Nations agencies. According to some reports, the women’s NGOs stole the show from the state delegates at the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994), and delegates from the Muslim countries were conspicuous in the Fourth World Conference on the Status of Women in Beijing (1995). In Iran, women constituted the largest group of President Mohammad Khatami’s supporters, and the reformists in the Majles include a few prominent women. The Iranian women’s movement has made significant gains since 1997, and is acting as a channel for the slow but continuous influence of international conventions on women’s rights on Iran’s administrative and civil law.

In contrast, the transnational Islamic resurgence has caused the rejection of the assertion of the universality of human rights, and has generated an official “Islamic alternative.” This Islamic alternative is embodied in the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. As is to be expected in an imitative document, much of the legal terminology of
the international human rights conventions is swallowed, even as quite a number of rights are in substance nullified. For instance, the Cairo Declaration offers no guarantee of religious freedom. It prohibits the use of any form of compulsion or exploitation of poverty and ignorance to convert anyone to atheism or a religion other than Islam (Article 10). Article 22 of the Declaration bars “the exploitation or misuse of information in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values, or disintegrate, corrupt, or harm society or weaken its faith.” It is interesting to note that, in flat contradiction to the historical experience and the public law of virtually all the signatory countries, Article 19 of the Cairo Declaration provides that “There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for in the Shari’ah.” Article 25 further declares the shari’ah the only source for the explanation and clarification of the articles of the Declaration. While endorsing the Cairo Declaration, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in April 1993 also confirmed “the existence of different constitutional and legal systems among [the] Member States and various international or regional human rights instruments to which they are parties.” This amounts to a very significant qualification of the categorical recognition of the shari’ah in the Cairo Declaration, as most Middle Eastern countries are signatories to several such international instruments. Iran, for instance, is among the signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The acknowledgment, therefore, leaves open the kind of insinuation of the international law on human rights into national laws of the kind undertaken by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt.

An increasing number of Muslim intellectuals are defending the right to the freedom of expression by insisting that religious liberty and freedom of conscience are clearly deducible from the text of the Qur’an. A number of Qur’anic verses strongly imply a form of “natural religion” among mankind, which entails religious liberty, and make explicit the concepts of freedom of conscience and religion, most notably, “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256). Proliferation of the communications media beyond government control has made the freedom of interpretation of Islam itself a prominent feature of the emerging Muslim public sphere. In Iran, ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush has gone so far as putting all the world religions on an equal footing in the 1998 essay, Saratba-ye mostaqim (Straight paths), the very title being a sacrilegious pluralization of a fundamental Qur’anic concept. In Syria, Muhammad Shahruhr has offered a similarly radically modernist interpretation of Islam.

See also Internet; Networks, Muslim.

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Said Amir Arjomand

**GOVERNMENT, ISLAMIC** *See Hukuma al-Islamiyya, al-* (Islamic Government)

**GRAMMAR AND LEXICOGRAPHY**

In the period before Islam the Bedouin tribes in the Arabian peninsula held poets (sing. *sha’ir*) as well as soothsayers (sing. *kabim*) in the highest esteem. Both delivered their message in a fixed form of meter or rhyming prose and they occupied an important position in their own tribe, while they were feared and respected by other tribes. This shows how much power was assigned to language and the spoken word in Bedouin society. When the prophet Muhammad brought the message that had been revealed to him, it was therefore only fitting that this message emphasized its sacred force by referring to the linguistic and rhetorical qualities of the revealed book: The Qur’an was delivered in a clear, eloquent language (*qur’an mubinan*), which was the language of the Arabs. At the same time, the message emphasized the difference between the revelation and other literary productions: the Prophet was not a poet and the fact that he had never learned to read or write demonstrated the miraculous nature of the revelation.

Right from the start, the believers were concerned with the preservation of the revealed book. According to Muslim tradition, during the life of the Prophet parts of the message were written down on scraps of writing material, and the Prophet himself sometimes employed scribes to whom he dictated the revelations. It was not until the third caliph ‘Uthman (r. 644–656) that a codified text of the Qur’an was made, the so-called *mushaf*. Although this codex became the canonical text for all later generations, the presence of a large number of variant readings forced the believers to concentrate not only on the contents of the text, but also on its form.

After the death of the Prophet, the Islamic conquests led to a drastic transformation, not only of pre-Islamic values and customs, but also of the language of the Arabs. The inhabitants of the conquered territories had to acquire the new language in a short period of time, and their mistakes affected Arabic to such a degree that a new type of Arabic arose, which
eventually became the basis for the modern dialects. As a result of this process, which was regarded by the Arabs themselves as a process of corruption of speech (fasad al-lugha), the text of the Qur’an became difficult to understand.

Because of the central place of the Qur’an in Islamic society it is not surprising that specialists came forward in the community to help the common believers understand the text. The name most often cited in this connection is that of Ibn ‘Abbas (d. 687), but we may be sure that each city in the empire had its own experts. The earliest commentaries all shared a semantic approach, since they focused on the implications of the text for religious, legal, and ritual purposes. Yet, the existence of variant readings and the discrepancies between the language of the text and everyday vernacular speech also led to an interest in formal elements in the text as well. For instance, signaling the presence of foreign loanwords in the Qur’an and discussing the tribal provenance of some of the lexical items were not essential for the understanding of the text, but nevertheless most of the commentaries provide such information.

Some of the earliest commentators, such as Mujahid (d. 722) and Muqatil (d. 767), used conventional terms in discussing, for instance, the various text types that are found in the Qur’an or the vowel-endings of words. The terms for the vowel-endings, which were probably derived from the Syriac grammatical tradition, provided a starting point for later grammarians and may therefore be regarded as the beginnings of the discipline of grammar in Islam.

From Text to Language

The preoccupation with the formal properties of the text of the Qur’an inevitably led to an interest in the structure of the language in which the revelation was couched. The sources have preserved the names of some scholars in the second century of Islam, who dealt with the Arabic language on a professional basis, not only in order to study the revealed book, but also to understand the structure of the language, to find out the qiyaṣ al-‘arabiyya “the rules of Arabic.” Since what is known about these grammarians comes only from later sources (chiefly the quotations in the first complete grammar of Arabic, Kitab Sibawayhi), it is difficult to say with any certainty what their opinions were, but so much seems to be certain that they did not hesitate to correct the text of the Qur’an whenever they thought it was contradicted by the linguistic usage of the Bedouin.

This attitude toward the text and the language of the Qur’an was to change with Sibawayhi (d. c. 793), a Persian, who became the first grammarian to compile a book encompassing the entire structure of the language. For Sibawayhi the text of the Qur’an had been established once and for all by the ‘Uthmanic codex, compiled by order of the third caliph, and he did not feel the need to concern himself with the text itself. Instead, he turned to the structure of the language of the Arab Bedouin, which was assumed to be identical both with the language of the revelation and with that of the pre-Islamic poems. In his Kitab, Sibawayhi set himself a task that went beyond the explanation of the text and aimed at a much larger scope: the explanation of grammar. He dealt with all possible constructions in the language and accounted for their structural differences in terms of the different case endings found in them.

Sibawayhi introduced a framework that was truly innovative, the system of declension (s’rab) that became one of the central notions of Arabic grammar. Nouns, and to some extent imperfect verbs, were assumed to have a series of endings whose function differed from that of the permanent end vowels of other words such as the perfect verbs or the particles. The declensional vowels were the result of the action of an ‘amal, an operator governing the case endings. This function could be performed either by a verb (e.g., in the sentence daraba zaydun ‘amran “Zayd hit ‘Amr” the verb is the operator of the nominative in the agent, zaydun, and the accusative in the object, ‘amran), or a particle (e.g., the particle fi is the operator of the genitive in fi l-bayti “in the house”).

Since it is not always possible to explain the structure of the actually spoken sentence, it is sometimes necessary to have recourse to an underlying level of speech (taqdir). Thus, for instance, in the sentence an-najdata! “help!” the grammarian posits an underlying verb ad’u “I call for, I ask” in order to explain the accusative in the noun. With the help of the notion of taqdir grammarians built a large explanatory framework that was neither intended as normative (after all, the Bedouin were native speakers and did not need correction), nor as a simple description, but as an explanation of the rules of grammar. Exceptions were not allowed in this analysis, since language was regarded as part of God’s creation, of which even the minutest detail must find an explanation.

Even though after Sibawayhi competing schools arose in Basra, Kufa, and Baghdad, the theoretical framework remained the same for all grammarians. Both the grammarians in Basra, such as al-Mubarrad (d. 898), and those in Kufa, such as al-Farra’ (d. 822) and Tha’lab (d. 904), used the principle of ‘amal to account for the case endings in the language, and although they differed as to the scope of the examples they allowed as a basis for their qiyaṣ, essentially they may be regarded as belonging to one linguistic paradigm.

The science that worked with this paradigm is called in Arabic nabw (which also means “syntax”). Almost right from the beginning a strict distinction was made between this science and that of lexicography (’ilm al-lugha). The earliest beginnings of lexicography are found in the commentaries of the Qur’an, some of which concentrated on the lexical meaning of words that had become archaic by that time. These early attempts at compiling word lists of the Qur’an or the hadith culminated in the Kitab al-‘ayan, initiated and perhaps partly based on the notes of al-Khalil ibn Ahmad (d. 791),
Sibawayhi’s teacher in grammar. Like the Kitab Sibawayhi, this dictionary no longer concentrated on the Qur'an but on the language itself, as is evident from the fact that poetic quotations are far more frequent in it than quotations from the Qur'an. The Kitab al-'ayn set the trend for a long line of ever larger dictionaries that attempted to encapsulate the lexicon of the entire language, culminating in Ibn Manzur’s (d. 1311) famous lexicon, Lisan al-'Arab.

**From Language to Language Use**

A new development in Arab linguistics was initiated by the introduction of Greek logic and philosophy in the Islamic world. The translation of Greek texts that had already started under the Umayyad caliphs, usually through Syriac, started in earnest under the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (d. 833), who personally supported this development by founding the Bayt al-Hikma (an academy of translators in Baghdad). The influx of new ideas in Arabic had a profound influence on Islamic thinking, especially in the theological system of the Mu'tazilites, who for some time enjoyed official recognition of their ideas.

Thanks to the Mu'tazilites rationalist logic became the cornerstone for theological thought. Because of their emphasis on the unity of God, they refused to accept an eternal status for the revealed book, which they regarded as created (khulq al-Qur'an). Through the discussions on this topic the Mu'tazilites became interested in questions about the status of God’s speech, the relationship between word and meaning, and the intricate question of the origin of speech. This last issue had always been connected with the revelation of the Qur'an, but was discussed now as a logico-philosophical problem.

Although grammarians in general avoided any contact with the “Greek sciences,” they could not avoid some of the topics that had become popular in general debate, such as the relationship between words and the things they referred to or the logical correlates of grammatical categories, as in Zajjaji’s (d. 949) Kitab al-idab. Greek influence also manifested itself in the debate about the status of grammar vis-à-vis logic and about the competence of logicians and grammarians. Significantly, many grammarians in this period adhered to Mu'tazilite ideas. Apart from its influence on the public debate Greek logic also insinuated itself in the general format of grammatical treatises. Contrary to the earlier tradition, it became customary to define grammatical notions and to devote special attention to the division of their treatises into separate topics. Likewise, grammarians started to write introductory treatises, such as Zajjaji’s Kitab al-jumal or Farisi’s (d. 989) Kitab al-idab.

In the third/fourth centuries of Islam, grammar had become a technical discipline with its own terminology and apparatus. Although grammarians such as Ibn Jinni (d. 1002) showed a vivid interest in all matters pertaining to language in his linguistic encyclopedia al-Khassā'iṣ, most grammatical treatises in this period were concerned with repeating and refining the contents of Sibawayhi’s Kitab rather than innovating the discipline.

This situation started to change with grammarians such as Jurjani (d. 1078) who combined their interests in rhetoric and grammar and criticized their predecessors for not having taken into account the semantic aspect of speech by focusing exclusively on the syntactic parameters. This new interest in a comprehensive science of language, including style and poetics, may be yet another example of Mu’tazilite thinking in linguistics. Their influence is certainly evident in the field of the ‘ilm usul al-fiqh, in which the epistemological value of linguistic utterances was studied for its relevance to legal reasoning. These new developments meant effectively a separation between grammar in the strict sense and other language-related sciences.

See also Arabic Language; Arabic Literature; Qur’an.

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Kees Versteegh

**GREEK CIVILIZATION**

The rapid expansion of the Islamic empire led to its speedy contact with a cultural world heavily marked by Greek thought. Greek civilization had spread throughout the urban
areas of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Iberian peninsula, and it was reflected in the relatively high standards of living and education, for at least a portion of the citizens. When the Arabs came to confront this culture, they might have rejected it totally and sought to destroy it. After all, it was a culture that rested on unbelief, from an Islamic perspective, and whose practitioners were ethnically quite distinct from the Arabs themselves. In the early Middle Ages, however, there was an attempt to understand and learn from the Greek-influenced cultures, and to use that knowledge to improve the delivery of the Islamic message itself. Several theories could explain this. It could be because the new rulers were intent on obeying those parts of the Qur’an that recommend toleration of divergent points of view, at least when held by other people of the book; it could have been because Islam was not at this stage confident enough to alienate those under its recent control; or it could be that the Muslims were impressed by the level of wealth and culture that they observed and sought to emulate it by coming to grips with its basis in Greek culture.

A very practical issue that soon faced the Muslims was the need to argue with their new subjects, since the issue of conversion was a live one. Yet the non-Muslims were often far better at disputation than the Muslims, given their long practice of rhetoric and logic. The ancient Greeks had developed the art of disputation to a very high degree, and this continued to be studied and practiced by their successors in the Middle East. Perhaps even more significantly, the Greeks had developed a sophisticated scientific system, not only one that was theoretically rich in its understanding of how the universe might operate, but also a system that was capable of making a very substantial practical contribution to everything from how to design cities to how to cure (or at least alleviate symptoms of) a variety of diseases. Clearly any rational ruler was going to avail himself of this intellectual largesse if he could, and the Muslims certainly took advantage of what they found in their new territories.

The first step that needed to be taken was to rapidly translate Greek texts, often via Syriac (a Semitic language like Arabic). It was an expensive and time-consuming process carried out largely by Christian translators. The Abbasid caliph al-Ma’sun founded in 832 C.E. the House of Wisdom (an institution where translators and collectors of Greek and Syriac manuscripts could cooperate; ḥayt al-hikma), and its scale is an indication of the importance with which the rulers of the time regarded Greek thought. The availability of Greek texts in Arabic formed the basis of what came to be a very rich tradition of Islamic philosophy, which continued in the Arabic world until the twelfth century as philosophy, and that was to enjoy an even longer life in the Persian world, where philosophy continued to be studied and written for far longer. The problems that philosophy met in the Arabic-speaking world owed much to its Greek, and hence non-Muslim, origins. There was a prolonged campaign by many thinkers to oppose the use of Greek-inspired thought, from Abu Sa’id al-Sirafi (893–979) to al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). Interestingly, the arguments against Greek thought often employed Greek mechanisms and so could be representative of Greek civilization’s ultimate success in the Islamic world.

In some parts of the Islamic world such as al-Andalus (the Iberian peninsula) there was a particularly happy combination of Greek thought and Islam, resulting in a great outburst of science and culture generally. There is much evidence that the intellectual wealth thus produced had as a side-effect considerable material wealth, and certainly during this period the Islamic world was far more advanced than Christian Europe. It may be significant that Christian Europe during the early Middle Ages had only a limited supply of Greek texts, and indeed only acquired any significant degree of these when they were translated out of Arabic into Latin (often via Hebrew).

It is sometimes argued that the Islamic world was not able to make creative use of Greek thought, merely being transmitters of Greek civilization. This is plainly false, as a great number of original and innovative theories came out of the Islamic world, and the Greeks were not the only group to make a contribution to the culture of the Islamic world, since the role of the Indians within Islamic life deserves careful consideration.

In a whole range of disciplines such as mathematics, astronomy, chemistry—and, of course, philosophy—Greek-inspired thought was the catalyst for a creative outburst. In what are today not regarded as respectable sciences, alchemy and astrology, Greek thought played an even more important role. Greek thought affected the paradigmatically Islamic sciences of theology and law that came to acquire many of the techniques and principles used in Greek thought. Finally, the Islamic adab tradition of literature was also influenced by the Greeks. There were many editions of books that contained “wisdom” literature of the Greeks, chiefly consisting of aphorisms often incorrectly attributed to thinkers like Socrates. Despite the questionable sources the wisdom literature was probably widely read and certainly had an effect on the notion of what constituted style in literature. Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani’s collections of wisdom literature were particularly widely distributed from the tenth century onward. In short, it is difficult to find an aspect of Islamic civilization that was not affected by the Greeks.

Another area of thought where Greek civilization played a notable part was the development of political thought. The idea of a ruler who combines the roles of legislator, thinker, and religious authority was constructed by adding Islam to Plato, as it were, proving to be a very fruitful way of analyzing the state and the nature of political authority. The description of the state as organic in Plato’s Republic fit in nicely with the Islamic notion of the state being necessarily structured in
terms of a religious doctrine, where every individual has a role that satisfies higher purposes than merely providing him with particular benefits and duties. It was not difficult to add to the characteristics of the ruler the status of prophecy, or intermediary between the community and the Prophet, and this enables the state to claim a higher purpose than merely assuring the material welfare of its members. Even long after the direct influence of Greek thought disappeared from the Islamic world, this theme in political thought continued and flourished.

See also Africa, Islam in; Americas, Islam in the; Falsafa; Islam and Other Religions; South Asia, Islam in; Southeast Asia, Islam in.

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Oliver Leaman

GUMI, ABU BAKR See Abu Bakr Gumi
HADITH

Hadith is a genre of Muslim literature that originated in the early period of Islamic history. It is found in the earliest preserved compilations of legal and historical material ascribed to authors of the eighth century. Since then and continuing until the present time, a huge number of hadith collections have been brought to light.

The term hadith (often capitalized by Western scholars) denotes both the genre of literature and an individual text of this genre. Originally the term meant story, communication, or report but as a scholarly term hadith means tradition. Muslim scholarship tends to limit the term hadith to the accounts of the prophet Muhammad. Many Western scholars use hadith more broadly to include the traditions of the Prophet’s Companions and even later generations. In this broader meaning, however, it was also used by early and a few later Muslim hadith scholars.

In the early and classical sources, that is, those dated until the eleventh century, one mostly encounters the hadiths in a typical form. Every single tradition begins with a chain of transmitters, called isnad (support, foundation). The first transmitter in the isnad is often the collector (sometimes even his pupil) in whose compilation the hadith in question is found, then the collector’s informant is mentioned, then the latter’s informant, and so on until the chain arrives at the original reporter of the text. The text, which is called matn in Arabic, could be either a short sentence or a long story. Here is an example of a hadith:

Yahya related to me from Malik from Ibn Shihab from ‘Ata’ b. Yazid al-Laythi from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri that the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, said (= isnad): “When you hear the call to prayer (adhan), repeat what the muezzin (mu’adhdhin) says” (= matn).

In this tradition the isnad informs us that Abu Sa’id al-Khudri, a Companion of the Prophet, reported this saying of the Prophet, and that his report has been transmitted via ‘Ata’, Ibn Shihab, Malik, and his pupil Yahya to the editor of the collection in which the hadith is found.

Role in Muslim Culture

The hadiths, embodying the tradition on the origins of Islam, are for Muslims an important source of guidance next to the Qur’an. The “way” (sunna) of their Prophet and of the first generations of Muslims is taken as a model of how Muslims should live in this world in order to lead a happy eternal life in the hereafter. This is most obvious in that this sunna, particularly that of the Prophet, became after the Qur’an the second fundamental source of the shari’ah, the Law of God. According to Muslim scholars this status of the sunna is advocated both in the Qur’an and in hadiths of the Prophet and was already acknowledged by his Companions. In contrast, Western scholars usually think that the sunna acquired its status as second source of the Law only gradually during the eighth century and that in Sunnite law the hadiths of the Prophet gained the absolute superiority over other expressions of the sunna only in the first half of the ninth century. In Imami Shi’ite law the traditions of the Prophet did not acquire such a superiority but are considered equal in value with that of the imams.

The important role that the hadiths came to play in Muslim scholarship in general, and for the establishment of the shari’ah in particular, induced Muslim scholars to scrutinize the tradition material critically and to define rules as to which hadiths could be accepted and which must be rejected. The traditional Muslim hadith criticism focused on the chains of transmitters (isnads), which accompany a hadith, but also checked whether its content (matn) is compatible with other recognized traditions and with the Qur’an. This led among the Sunnites to a classification of hadiths in four classes: (1) sahib (sound); (2) basan (fair); (3) da’if (weak), with some subcategories of this class; and (4) mawdu’ (spurious).
Additionally, special classification systems were developed for the evaluation of isnads and matn. The critical evaluation of the hadiths found its expression in special compilations in which their authors collected the hadiths, that they considered reliable or accepted. The “six books” (see the section “Collections” below), which among the Sunnites acquired an almost canonical status, belong to this type of collection. Nevertheless, the evaluation of particular hadiths, even of those contained in the most revered collections, remained disputed in Muslim scholarship. In Imami Shi‘ism hadith criticism was less sophisticated and appeared late because the isnads consisted in large part of the (infallible) imams.

In modern times the Muslim debate about the reliability of the hadiths got a new impetus. Reform-minded scholars and intellectuals tried to revise the issue of which hadiths are essential and binding for a Muslim and which are not. Names like Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), Muhammad ‘Abdulwahab (d. 1905), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Mahmud Abu Rayya, and Ghulam Ahmad Parwez are connected with the critique of the traditional hadith scholarship. Scholars advocating Islamic revivalism, such as Abu l-A‘la’ Maududi (d. 1979), Muhammad ‘Abdulwahab, and Abu Rayya, also called for a reassessment of the classical hadith literature in light of the Qur’an and modernity. They argued for a more sophisticated criticism of the content (matn) of the hadiths. A few others like Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) and Mohammed Arkoun advocated a new understanding of the development of the hadiths.

Collections

The earliest preserved hadith collections confine themselves to certain types of traditions. For example, the Sira of Ibn Ishaq (d. 767) in the recension preserved from Ibn Hisham (d. 828 or 833) contains mainly historical traditions on Muhammad and his time. The Musawwita’ of Malik b. Anas (d. 795) as transmitted by Yahya b. Yahya (d. 848) is a collection of legal hadiths, as is the Zaydi Shi‘ite Majmu’ al-fiqh ascribed to Zayd b. ‘Ali (d. 740), but probably compiled only by Ibrahim b. Zibriqan (d. 799). By contrast, the Tafsir of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-San‘ani (d. 827) contains exegetical traditions.

This manner of collecting traditions continued and there are many later examples of compilations confined to a certain type of tradition or to traditions on certain topics. From the ninth century onward more comprehensive collections became available. There are two main types. In most of the comprehensive collections the traditions are put together in chapters and paragraphs according to the content of the traditions. We thus find chapters on prayer, marriage, commercial transactions, Qur’anic exegesis, maghazi (campaigns of the Prophet), and so forth in which traditions on the particular topics are combined. This type of ordering of the subject matter is called musannaf (classified). The oldest comprehensive collections preserved, such as the Musannaf of ‘Abd al-Razzaq (d. 827), the Musannaf of Ibn Abi Shayba (d. 849), the Sunan of Sa‘id b. Mansur (d. 841), or the Sunan of al-Darimi (d. 868), belong to this type, as do the six hadith collections of al-Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim (d. 874), Ibn Maja (d. 886), Abu Dawud (d. 888), al-Tirmidhi (d. 892), and al-Nasa’i (d. 915), which over time were recognized by Sunnite scholars as the most reliable ones. The collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim were even called the “sound” (sahih). The canonical hadith collections of the Imami Shi‘ites compiled by al-Kulini (d. 939), al-Babuya al-Qummi (d. 991), and al-Tusi (d. 1067) also belong to the musannaf type.

Several comprehensive collections compiled from the ninth century onward show another method of ordering the hadiths. All traditions whose isnads go back to the same original reporter are put together; for example, the hadiths transmitted from the above-mentioned Abu Sa‘id al-Khudri. The entries are arranged alphabetically according to the name of the original reporters. Such a type of collection is called musnad. Generally it confines itself to hadiths of the Prophet. The most famous compilation of this type is the huge Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855), but there are earlier ones, such as the Musnad of al-Humaydi (d. 834) and the Musnad of al-Tayalisi (d. 813)—the latter probably compiled by one of his pupils—and many later ones, like the Tabdhib al-athar of al-Tabari (d. 923), which is incomplete; the Musnad of Abu Ya‘la (d. 919); or al-Mujama‘ al-kabir of al-Tabarani (d. 970).

Muslim scholars did not always use the terms musannaf and musnad consistently in the titles of the collections, and they classify hadith collections also according to several other criteria.

History

Hadiths are available in collections dating from the ninth to the eleventh centuries or even later. The hadiths themselves, through their isnads, claim to have been transmitted from earlier times. There are four sources that allow us to know more about the history of these hadiths: (1) the isnads of the traditions; (2) their texts (matn); (3) biographical traditions about the transmitters found in the isnads; and (4) the later norm and practice of transmitting traditions (known from different types of sources).

Most Sunnite Muslim scholars are convinced that it is possible to reconstruct the history of the hadiths on the basis of the four sources, which they consider on the whole as being reliable. They usually sketch the origin and development of the hadiths as follows: The Prophet taught his “way” (sunna) to his Companions orally, by writing or by practical demonstration. He encouraged his Companions to diffuse his teachings and sent teachers and preachers to newly converted tribes. His Companions were very eager to learn as much as they could from their Prophet. They learned his sunna, that is, his practice, by doing it with him, they memorized it, or—if they could write—wrote it down. After the death of the
Prophet, his Companions continued their efforts to memo-
rize the hadiths and to write them down, and instructed
others whenever they felt that this was needed, and some
Companions even attracted circles of students whom they
taught regularly.

In this way the hadiths were also transmitted to the
following generations. The students of the Companions, the
older Successors, became teachers themselves and the circles
of students committed to the study of the Qur'an and to the
preservation of traditions grew steadily. There were only few
Successors who had collected hadiths from different sources,
but their students, who flourished in the first half of the
eight century, devoted themselves to the task of collecting
traditions more systematically. They also began to arrange
them thematically and transmitted their written collections
to wider circles of students. This is the material out of which
the early substantial collections of traditions were compiled,
such as Ibn Ishaq’s Sira or Malik’s Musawwita’, which are
preserved through recensions of their pupils.

This scenario, which has a certain attraction by appearing
natural or even inevitable, at least as far as the Prophet and his
Companions are concerned, is almost completely based on
information taken from traditions that go back, according to
their isnads, to eyewitnesses of the time of the Prophet, the
Companions, and theSuccessors. It is rejected outright by a
Western school of thought that argues that the precise
history of the hadiths available in the collections of the ninth
century and later cannot be reconstructed anymore. Scholars
belonging to this school of thought doubt, first of all, the
historical value of the isnads, which they consider as generally
fabricated and as arbitrarily attached to the traditions. They
furthermore argue that the biographical traditions about the
transmitters who appear in the isnads are not an independent
historical source, because the information contained in the
biographical traditions may be invented to support the isnads.
If these two sources, isnads and biographical traditions, are
unreliable, then we are left with the texts alone. On the basis
of their content and style, only a very global reconstruction of
their history is possible. As models for such a reconstruction,
the developments of the Jewish and Christian religious litera-
ture can be used. The result is “salvation history,” the recon-
struction of how the Muslim community at the turn of the
eighth century reflects through its traditions on its own
origins. This school of thought derives its inspiration from
the studies of J. Wansbrough (1977, 1978). According to this
approach the hadiths are generally inauthentic in the sense
that they do not reflect the factual history of the first two
Islamic centuries. This skepticism of the traditions has its
roots in the studies of I. Goldziher (1890) and J. Schacht (1950).

Not all Western scholars hold to the extreme skepticism
that doubts the historical reliability of the Muslim traditions
altogether. Many Western scholars of Islam assume that
there may be both unreliable and reliable traditions and that
it might be possible to discern between them. They differ,
however, widely as to the methods through which this could
be achieved. In this respect more or less skeptical and sophis-
ticated approaches can be distinguished. Some scholars (like
M. W. Watt) rely in their methods mainly on the texts of the
hadiths, while others (like Junblott) focus on the isnad, and
yet others (like J. van Ess, H. Motzki, or G. Schoeler) use a
combination of matn and isnad analysis. The latter method
starts from collections in which the traditions are available
and tries to detect indications in the isnads and the texts as to
whether the traditions in question were really transmitted or
fabricated. The investigation can be focused either on a single
tradition, of which variants are available in different collec-
tions, or on the traditions contained in one and the same
collection. In the first case the aim is to find out whether it is
possible to reconstruct the transmission history of a particular
hadith. In the second case the issue is scrutinized to deter-
mine whether the history of a whole collection can be recon-
structed, whether the collector may have invented the hadiths
or the isnad or both, or whether he has received them from
the informants he names.

This source-critical approach produces another scenario
of the history of the hadiths. In contrast to the pictures
drafted by Muslim scholars and extreme skeptics, the
conclusions of the source-critical scholars are general but
confined to the collections and traditions studied. Their
scenario is therefore fragmentary and provisional.

According to the source-critical approach there are collec-
tions, such as ‘Abd al-Razzaq’s Musannaf or Ibn Hisham’s
Sira, which can be shown to have been compiled from earlier
sources. That means that the names to which the collectors
ascribe their materials are, at least partially, their real inform-
ants. This does not yet say anything about the quality of their
textual transmission. These informants or sources of the
collectors, like Ibn Jurayj or Ibn Ishaq, lived in the first half of
the eighth century. It is also obvious that the huge amounts of
traditions that were transmitted by these informants were
mostly not invented by them or falsely ascribed to some other
informants, but were really received from the persons named.
This is suggested by the great variation between the isnads
and the matns, which are said to derive from the different
informants and by formal peculiarities that suggest a real
transmission. In this manner the materials going back, for
example, to ‘Ata b. Rabah (d. 733) or ‘Amr b. Dinar (d. 744),
some of the key informants of Ibn Jurayj (d. 767), or the
material going back to al-Zuhri (d. 742), a key informant of
both Ibn Jurayj and Ibn Ishaq (d. 767), can be recovered. The
quality of the material transmitted from these informants—
much of which is found in other reliable sources and transmitted by
compilers other than Ibn Jurayj and Ibn Ishaq. In this way
suspicious transmitters can be detected as well. The procedure can, at least in some cases, also be applied to the material deriving from the Successors. That means that through this method it is possible to date large amounts of traditions step by step back until, at least in some cases, the time of the Companions.

The materials reconstructed as being earlier sources allow for conclusions about the way hadiths were transmitted from generation to generation until they were incorporated in the collection in question, for example ʿAbd al-Razzaq’s Ṣaḥīḥ. It could be established, for example, that the transmission of traditions in Mecca and Medina from the middle of the seventh until the middle of the eighth century occurred orally but was accompanied by written notes. This indicates that the transmission focused on the content of the traditions, not on the exact wording. In the succeeding generations transmission occurred orally in combination with verbatim copying. The use and quality of isnads differed among the early scholars. It seems that incomplete isnads coexisted with complete ones from the time of the Successors onward until the end of the eighth century.

It can also be said that in early Meccan scholarship transmission of traditions played a minor role compared to that of Medina, but the situation changed in Mecca in the course of the first half of the eighth century. These differences notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that there are traditions about the Companions and the Prophet that were known and transmitted in both centers of learning already in the second half of the seventh century. It is improbable, however, that the source-critical approach can lead to an earlier period, aside from exceptional cases. One of the limitations of this method is that it cannot generalize. That means that as long as a single hadith or a group of traditions has not yet been or cannot be scrutinized by this method, their dating remains obscure. A judgment about their historical reliability must be postponed or cannot be made.

See also Succession.

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Harald Motzki
HAJJ

See Pilgrimage: Hajj

HAJJ SALIM SUWARI, AL- (C. 1300)

Al-Hajj Salim Suwari is a name that appears in a number of scholarly lineages in West Africa. He is credited with transmitting a significant Maliki teaching tradition to a region stretching from Ghana and Burkina Faso to Senegal and Gambia in West Africa. This tradition included jurisprudence, exegesis, and the biography of the Prophet. Historians are divided between his provenance in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the early fifteenth century. Those who support the latter believe that he played a leading role in the cultivation of extensive trade in gold between West African kingdoms and North Africa. According to them, al-Hajj Salim Suwari laid the foundation for a Maliki tradition that fostered trade and accepted the authority of non-Muslim rulers. It is this tradition that played a leading role in relations between Muslims and other religious groups until the Fulani Jihad states emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But it is also a tradition that continues today in countries like Senegal and other regions in West Africa.

Following the local hagiographies more closely, S. O. Sanneh believes that al-Hajj Salim Suwari should be situated in the twelfth century. Al-Hajj Salim Suwari performed the pilgrimage seven times, and on returning from the last one, he began a migration from Diakhe-Masina on the Niger River to Diakhe-Bambukhu further southwest on the Senegal River. There he founded a city-state with his many followers, and established the scholarly tradition that flourished for the next several generations. Sanneh also believes that al-Hajj Salim Suwari and his followers, the Jakhanke, were not directly engaged in the gold trade. Rather, they were engaged in agriculture (through the extensive use of slaves) and were devoted to travel and study. The Diakhe-Babukhu of al-Hajj Salim Suwari became a model for many similar city-states in the long history of Islam in West Africa.

See also Africa, Islam in; Islam and Other Religions; Networks, Muslim.

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HAJ ‘UMAR AL-TAL, AL-
(1797–1864)

The last revolutionary in the jihad tradition of Western Sudan, Shaykh ‘Umar al-Tal was born in Futa Toto, in the Senegambia region, where he received his religious training. While in Mecca for pilgrimage in 1826 he was appointed the caliph of the Tijaniya brotherhood in the Western Sudan. He lived in Mecca and Cairo, and eventually settled at the court of the Sokoto Caliphate. After almost a decade away from home he decided, in the late 1830s, to return to the Senegambia region. He settled first in Dingirai, a town on the frontiers of the Futa Jalon imamate. There he began to preach and build his own following. For the next decade, his focused primarily on writing and teaching. He used his authority to challenge the leaders of the locally powerful Qadiriya Sufi order.

In his efforts to forge a large Muslim state, ‘Umar declared a jihad around 1852 or 1853, when he began to widen his military operations north toward the upper Senegal River through non-Muslim, Malinke-dominated areas. By then he had acquired firearms and was proving to be a formidable force in the region. By the mid-1850s he had established the Tukolor Muslim empire, with his capital at Nioro. His activities in the Senegambia eventually led to a confrontation with the French, who were seeking to establish absolute control over the region. ‘Umar’s military operations further east in the Muslim state of Massina were largely successful, until he was killed in 1864 during a counterattack. His successors divided up the empire and continued to challenge the French over the next couple of decades.

See also Africa, Islam in; Caliphate; ‘Ibadat.

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HALLAJ, AL- (858–922)

The mystic and martyr Husayn ibn Mansur al-Hallaj was born in 858 in Bayda, Persia. An Arabized Iranian whose...
grandfather was a Zorastrian, al-Hallaj's father, a cotton-wool carder (hallaj) by trade, converted to Islam. The family had emigrated through textile centers in Iran, settling in Sunni (Hanbali) Wasit, Iraq, where the young Hallaj was educated in grammar, the Qur’an, and exegesis. He returned in 873 to Tustar and placed himself in the service of the noted Sufi shaykh Sahil. In 857 in Basra he received the Sufi habit (kbirqa) and came under the influence of such noted shayks as Muhasibi and ‘Amr Makki, both of whom were associated with al-Junayd, head of the Baghdad school of Sufism.

In the period between 877 and 883 he married and had a daughter and three sons. The third son, Hamd, left an eyewitness account of his father’s last days in prison and his public execution. He became involved in the black slave (Zanî) revolt centered around Basra, which was driven ideologically by Shi’ite opponents of the Sunni ‘Abbasid Caliphate. Though Sunni, he moved in Shi’ite circles and was later accused of having been influenced by Mahdism. He made the first of this three yearlong retreats to Mecca, and uttered his famous statement “I am the Truth” (Ana al-Haqq), which his opponents interpreted as blasphemy but which later supporters interpreted as “God has emptied me of everything but Himself.” This was the most extreme expression of mystical union with God in the history of Islamic mysticism.

After his family settled in Baghdad, Hallaj departed on two long missionary journeys to Khurasan and India between 887 and 901, preaching especially to Turkish nomads and Manichean Uyghur Turks. During this period he composed his first books and was given the sobriquet “the reader of hearts” (al-Hallaj al qulub). Between journeys he made his second pilgrimage to Mecca and met two noted shaykhs, the aging Nuri and the young Shibli. In 904 he visited Jerusalem, praying in the Holy Sepulcher of Jesus, who in an earlier period he had proclaimed the Mahdi. At this time he also preached the idea of fulfilling the pilgrimage obligation outside Mecca by creating miniature Ka’bas in homes, which was raised against him as a transgression of sacred law at his trial. He preached openly against the tax scandals and political corruption linked to the weakened Caliphate, which finally resulted in his arrest, in the name of public order, and long imprisonment (913–922). In 922 in Baghdad he was charged with heresy, flogged, gibbeted, and his body was burned.

Masked as a legal trial for heresy, the death of Hallaj has remained a controversial subject throughout subsequent Islamic history, and has become a dramatic theme of many modern plays in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and English.

Among his principal mystical ideas were total union with God and the Essence of Desire (‘isyaq dhatta), speech with God (shabth), the existence of substitute saints (ashbal) for the whole community, the present witness (shabid an’i) of the Eternal, fraternal union of two souls (ittihat an-nafsayn), and the outcry for justice (sayha bi’s-l-haqq).

See also Heresiography; Kharijites, Khawarij; Mahdi; Muhasibi, al-; Tasawwuf.

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Herbert W. Mason

Hamas

Hamas is an acronym drawn from the Arabic initials of the Islamic Resistance Movement (barakat al-mugawamat al-Islamyyah), but which also bears a literal meaning of “zeal.” An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was established in 1987, during the first Palestinian intifada (uprising). The context for the creation of Hamas was the continued failure of efforts such as the Camp David Accords to achieve the goal of Palestinian statehood.

In November of 1987, the Arab League met in Amman, Jordan, and issued a statement identifying the export of Islamic revolution from Iran as the greatest threat to stability in the region. This was the first time the Arab League had not identified Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory as the major threat to regional stability. Feeling betrayed by the international community and abandoned by fellow Arabs, some members of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood lost faith in the approach to the problem of Palestinian statelessness taken by that organization during the past few decades. The immediate cause of the intifada was the death of some Palestinian workers hit by an Israeli driver. A group of Islamist Palestinians came together at a meeting called to discuss the incident, and the result was the formation of Hamas. While the Palestinian Brotherhood’s parent organization, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, continued to follow a quietist approach to achieving Palestinian goals, Hamas leaders were persuaded that militarism would be required to achieve security for Palestinians.

In addition to distinguishing itself from its parent, the Muslim Brotherhood, by insisting on the need for armed resistance, Hamas distinguishes itself from the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in rejecting the right of the Zionist entity (as it calls Israel) to exist because Israel denies Palestinians the rights of freedom and independence. Further distinguishing itself from the PLO, Hamas demands that an Islamic state be established in place of Israel or a secular Palestinian state. The basis of this position is the claim that Jerusalem and, by extension, all of Palestine, are waqf, that is, properties entrusted to Muslims to administer in perpetuity, for the benefit of society. Hamas ideologues believe that an
Islamic state is necessary to ensure the rights of all citizens, Jews and Christians as well as Muslims, since Islamic law protects the rights of religious minorities. Thus, the HAMAS charter proclaims, “God is the goal, the Prophet is the model, the Qur’an is the constitution, jihad is the path, and death on God’s path is our most sublime aspiration.”

The spiritual leader of HAMAS, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin (b. 1936), was leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and founder of Gaza’s Islamic Center. He sought to establish HAMAS as an alternative to the PLO. HAMAS, therefore, devotes the majority of its budget to an array of social services. These include support for the families of slain, jailed, or exiled activists; health centers; kindergartens and other schools; mosques; and mediation services (a common form of civil conflict resolution in Arab societies). Its military activities, which it considers legitimate resistance to Israel’s military occupation which is in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, are conducted by an armed wing called ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, named after a Palestinian hero killed by the British during its “Mandate” occupation of Palestine in 1936.

The ability of HAMAS to provide its services depends upon its funding, which is both local and international. Internal funding comes from the Islamic charity offering, zakat. Support also comes from Muslim governments, such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran, from Islamic organizations throughout the world, as well as remittances from Muslims living abroad.

Organizationally, HAMAS is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the HAMAS charter of August 1988, it is a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Palestine. Its activities are coordinated by liaisons between Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, and HAMAS leaders living abroad. Its leadership structure is informal, with several founders and ideologues. Shaykh Yasin remains the acknowledged spiritual leader, but specific decisions are taken by a consultative council (majlis al-shura) with a flexible membership. This structure is in accordance with the traditional Sunni Islamic model, and is effective in allowing the organization to survive the incarceration and exile of its leaders from time to time.

HAMAS is most notorious for its use of suicide bombings in its armed struggle against Israel, targeting both military personnel and civilians. Both suicide and the targeting of civilians are forbidden by Islamic law. Both have been condemned by major Islamic scholars since the attacks against America on 11 September 2001. However, many religious scholars make an exception to the prohibition of suicide in the case of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation, provided the victims of the attacks are military personnel.

The HAMAS charter describes the organization as the resistance wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore a part of an international movement. At the same time, Shaykh Yasin describes the movement as essentially political, in that its goal is to secure the rights of Palestinians in their homeland. Like other political movements, the significance of HAMAS is based not so much on the number of its official members as on the popularity of its political agenda. The popularity of HAMAS among Palestinians is impossible to measure precisely without general elections. However, elections among students in Palestinian universities indicate that by the mid-1990s, HAMAS had the second-largest following, after FATAH (barakat al-tabrir al-watani al-filastini, the largest organization in the PLO). While the popularity of militant Islamic groups in general was declining slightly by the end of the 1990s, that trend was reversed following Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Without clear benefits to the majority of Palestinians from the 1993 Oslo Accords, and in the context of stalled negotiations between Israel and the PLO, the claim that militant Islam had defeated Israel in Lebanon and could do so in Palestinian territories as well became believable to some.

Because of its military activities and political positions, HAMAS is banned in Israel. Many of its members have been arrested or deported, and a number of its leaders have been assassinated. HAMAS was designated a terrorist organization by the United States in 1995, and contributing to it was prohibited by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Pub. Law 104–132) of April 1996.

See also Arab League; Fundamentalism; Intifada; Lebanon; Martyrdom; Terrorism.

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Tamara Sonn

HAREM

The practice of the harem (Ar., harim), or the seclusion of women, dates back to the pre-Islamic period. The root *b-r-m* also refers to *al-baram al-sharif*, the sanctuary of Mecca as the reserved space for Muslims. The form *harem* connotes a sacred and inviolable space, which is forbidden to any men,
other than the members of the immediate family. Its institution and derivate forms have been common in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean cultures as an integral part of royal and upper-class families.

Culturally, the Mesopotamian, Greek antiquity, and Persian societies shared in common the practice of the harem. While women were confined to their quarters, men enjoyed the privilege of engaging in the public sphere. This segregation also marked a labor division based on sexual difference; females were responsible for the management of the household, whereas males served as head of the family and were responsible for public affairs. As the women’s role was limited to managing the house, their presence in the public sphere was also regulated through a manner of dress that rendered them invisible from public gaze. Historically, followers of Judaism and Christianity also secluded women. For example, in the early Jewish family, where gender relations varied, women were nonetheless confined to a private sphere in which they performed household duties for the family as well as religious rites. In the early Christian era, women were often secluded within their own residence, guarded by eunuchs, and required to be veiled when they left the home. These practices found their way into the caliphate as the Abbasids conquered the lands inhabited by the dominant Christian and Jewish cultures, and so the elite female members of the Abbasid caliphate were secluded within their own quarters called “harem.” The institution of harem flourished in Muslim societies during the successive invasions and conquests of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions, Africa, and India. The conquest of Persia during the Sassanian times led to the assimilation of Persian culture, especially in the garrison towns. This conquest and the subsequent expansion of the Muslim territory provided Muslim dynasties with the opportunity to own, inherit, and capture prisoners of wars, including eunuchs, slaves, and minors, as well as the wives of royal families. For example, the Abbasid nobles and leaders adopted the Persian custom of the ownership of hundreds and thousands of concubines and slaves. Muslim dynasties and the notables maintained a harem as a part of their palaces.

The inclusion of the harem fit well with the societal structure adopted from the Irano-Semitic culture in its Islamic form, called the a’yan-amir system. In this form of administration, the “notables” (a’yan) of the towns and villages and the umara’ (leaders or commanders) of local or regional garrison courts shared power and authority. Within this web of social relationships, individual social status depended on the male’s ability to settle formal quarrels among the tribes or factions and to invite sexual jealousy. The patterns of feuding and sex relations with numerous concubines marked masculine honor and worthiness in society. These masculine traits belonged exclusively to the notables (the a’yan) and the commanders/leaders (the umara). As the masculine honor within the a’yan system depended heavily on the honor of wives, concubines, and female slaves, the total control and the subservience of these females became necessary. For this reason, it was in the best interest of the masters to institute a severe seclusion and rigid privacy for the females.

For outsiders, the “imagined harem” came to represent the abased and subjugated treatment of women in Islamic civilization. This harem discourse emerged in the seventeenth century after the Europeans discovered harems filled with women. The explicit connection between the “imagined harem” and the status of women in Muslim society and Islam was generally produced and reproduced by the European Orientalists in the two centuries following the colonization of the Muslim lands. This harem element shifted the medieval discourse on Muslim women, which previously portrayed them as victimized, yet powerful in charm and deceit.

Stimulated by the translation from the Arabic of the folk story The Thousand and One Nights, the “imagined harem” produced narratives of Muslim women whose sexual desire was strong, yet subordinated, oppressed, veiled, and secluded. These harem narratives circulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, functioning not only to feed the Orientalist imaginary of the harem, but also to serve the superiority of imperialist power over the Muslim world.

The harem as a social institution for women in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, finally came to an end in the early twentieth century. It ended not because Muslims discovered that it was incompatible with Islam, but because they lost control over their land and politics.

See also Gender; Marriage; Purdah.

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Etin Anwar

HARON, ABDULLAH (1924–1969)

Abdullah Haron was an imam in Cape Town, South Africa, and a symbol of Muslim involvement in the apartheid struggle. Born in Cape Town in 1924 he lived all his life in that city and died there in 1969, a victim of apartheid’s security police. He attended a Muslim school in the city and as a youth spent two years as a devotee of a shaykh in Mecca.
On his return to South Africa he studied under respected local scholars. In 1955 he was appointed to the position of imam at a mosque in a Cape Town suburb. He was a keen sportsman and played rugby and cricket even after he became imam. He concentrated on social issues and established an organization devoted to making Islam meaningful to youth in South Africa. He was the first editor of Muslim News, an influential weekly among the country’s Muslims.

As apartheid rule intensified the imam was among a small group of Muslims that explored ways to challenge the state from an Islamic basis. But Abdullah Haron also believed in a united front of the oppressed against racial domination. He grew close to members of the then proscribed Pan-African Congress. On his travels to the Middle East he met exiled South Africans and spoke out against apartheid to Arab audiences and leaders, including King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. In September 1969 he was reported dead in detention, the eighteenth political detainee to die in police custody in the 1960s. During the 1980s, in the last wave of rebellion and resistance to the apartheid state, his memory and image were revived as a symbol of Islam’s stand against injustice. He became better known and more revered as a martyr than when he was alive.

See also Africa, Islam in; Modern Thought.

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Shamil Jeppie

HASAN (624–670)

Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib was the grandson of the prophet Muhammad and the second Shi‘ite imam. Born in Medina in 624, three years after the hijra, he died at age forty-six in Medina in 670. In Shi‘ite parables he and his brother Husayn, the third imam, are figured as two alternative political strategies against injustice in the world and in politics. Hasan embodies the path of patience, which allows the enemy slowly to demonstrate unworthiness and lose any claim to legitimacy. Husayn embodies the path of armed revolt.

After the death of his father, ‘Ali bin Talib, the first imam, Mu‘awiya became caliph. According to the Shi‘ite account, Hasan should have succeeded his father. Hasan was an important rawi (reciter) and interpreter of the hadith and sunna (sayings and practices) of the Prophet and his Companions, reflecting the role of the imams in having access also to the divine meanings of revelation. But Hasan was too weak politically to challenge Mu‘awiya for the leadership of the community. After Mu‘awiya attempted to have him assassinated, and many of his followers abandoned him, Hasan came to an understanding with Mu‘awiya, wherein Hasan was sent to live in Medina, while Mu‘awiya promised that leadership would revert to the family of the Prophet upon his death. But Mu‘awiya broke his promise by appointing his son Yazid to succeed him, and convinced Ja‘da, Hasan’s wife, to poison the imam. In addition to paying Ja‘da, Mu‘awiya also promised to marry her to his son and heir, Yazid. The giving of poisoned water is the inverse of the denial of water to Husayn on the battlefield of Karbala, where the third imam was martyred by the forces of Yazid. Imam Husayn’s revolt subsequently disgraced Yazid, and created in him the archetypal figure of evil in Shi‘ite stories of injustice.

This parable structure is also encoded in a hadith quoted by Mohammad Baqer Majlesi, the preeminent mujtahed of the seventeenth century. On Id al-Fitr, according to the hadith, Gabriel descended with a gift of new white clothes for each of the Prophet’s grandsons. The Prophet said that the grandsons were used to colored clothes. So Gabriel asked each boy what color he wanted. Hasan chose green, Husayn red. While the clothes were being dyed, Gabriel wept. He explained: Hasan’s choice of green meant that he would be martyred by poisoning, and his body would turn green, and Husayn’s choice of red meant he would be martyred and his blood would turn the ground red.

Hasan is buried in Medina with a green banner on his mausoleum. Husayn is buried in Karbala with a red banner, the sign of a martyr whose revenge is yet to come.

Sunni accounts of early Islamic history deny that Hasan was poisoned, claiming he died of consumption. Sunni accounts also stress the temporary shift of power to Damascus under Mu‘awiya and Yazid, but since revenues came mainly from Iraq, power eventually shifted to Baghdad.

For Shi‘a, Hasan’s story is a precursor to Husayn’s martyrdom, which is the overarching cosmic and paradigmatic story of existential tragedy, of injustice in this world triumphing often by force over justice, and of the duty of a true Muslim to sacrifice himself, to witness for truth and justice.

See also Ahl al-Bayt; Imamate; Shi‘a: Early; Succession.

Michael M. J. Fischer
HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI, ‘ALI-AKBAR (1934–)

‘Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was born in Rafsanjan, Kerman province, Iran, in 1934 and was educated in Qom Seminary as one of Ruhollah Khomeini’s students. (The Ayatollayh Khomeini became the revolutionary leader of Iran in 1979.) Rafsanjani was one of the exiled Khomeini’s chief agents, opposed to the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and was arrested on several occasions. He spent three years in prison (1975–1977). Upon the overthrow of the shah in 1979, Rafsanjani was appointed to the Revolutionary Council. His loyalty to Khomeini, combined with political skills, resulted in his elevation to the leadership of the Iranian parliament.

Rafsanjani orchestrated the arms-for-hostages deal with members of the administration of the U.S. president Ronald Reagan, an action that later set into motion the Iran-Contra scandal in the United States. After the death of Khomeini in 1989, Rafsanjani emerged as the pragmatist president of Iran (1989–1997) and declared a plan of economic reform, known as an “adjustment program,” that included unifying exchange rates, privatizing the economy, and canceling subsidies. Rafsanjani kept Iran from direct involvement in hostilities during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. After the war he continued to carve out a middle ground between his more conservative religious colleagues’ calls for Iranian insularity and his own inclination toward oligarchic modernization. He also worked to renew close ties with Middle Eastern neighbors and the countries of Europe. Rafsanjani was accused by a federal court in Germany of ordering the murders of certain opponents who were gunned down in a Berlin restaurant. Rafsanjani was reelected to the presidency in 1993 but stepped down in 1997 and became the leader of the Expediency Council after completing his second term as president.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Revolution: Revolution in Iran.

Majid Mohammadi

HEALING

It is a hazardous task to attempt to offer a summary of Islamic medicine and healing and to map the contribution of the Islamic empire to human civilization. The Islamic empire covered a wide territory stretching from the western shores of Europe to the Indian subcontinent to the former Soviet states in Asia. The Islamic empire maintained unchallenged authority in medicine for over six centuries. This entry offers brief synopses of this history.

Islamic scholars have referred to the medicine that existed within the bounds of the Islamic empire as “Islamic.” The term refers to a heritage consisting of two distinctive categories of medicine. First, there was what might be termed Islamic folk medicine, which existed among the populace throughout the Muslim world. Folk medicine did not enjoy the blessings of the ruling elite and is still very often dismissed as sheer quackery. Second, there was what might be termed Islamic state-sanctioned medicine. This category was the pride of the Islamic empire and enjoyed lucrative support from the Muslim ruling elite, particularly during the golden age of the Islamic empire (seventh to thirteenth centuries).

Islamic Folk Medicine

Islamic folk medicine derives its legitimacy from its claim to have been based on the teachings of Islam. This claim is corroborated by frequent use of Qur’anic verses, prophetic prescriptions, and the wisdom of saints and imams. It should be noted here that exceptionally few passages in the Qur’an can be related directly to healing and medication. Prophet Muhammad made no claim to be an authority in medicine and most of his relevant speeches correspond with what was practiced within his culture. The hadith collection of Sabih al-Bukhari, one of the most authoritative works on prophetic narratives, stands as testimony to this, that is, to this continuity with pre-Islamic practices. Al-Bukhari’s voluminous work contains less than one hundred entries that are of relevance to medicine. Most of these entries are no more than different versions of the same narratives. Other less authoritative collections exist, such as al-Tibb al-Nabawi (Prophetic medicine). There is a consensus among scholars that collections under the term prophetic medicine—a genre of medical writings intended as alternatives to the exclusively Greek-based system derived from Galen—do not stand up to any scholarly or theological scrutiny. The Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun described this class of medicine as essentially a Bedouin craft that has no divine revelation and thus cannot be obligatory under religious laws.

Barely literate practitioners dominate Islamic folk medicine, serving primarily illiterate masses. Far from being a weakness, this made it more flexible and hence accommodating to the diverse cultures of the Islamic empire. The result is a craft that varies with cultures while retaining some degree of harmony within each. Many of these diverse cultures did no more than adapt their new medical creed to their original etiology and treatment of disease.

Four categories are identified in Islamic folk medicine as major causes of disease: sorcery, the evil eye, jinn, and adverse routine conditions (e.g., adverse weather, food problems, accidents, etc.). Holy power represents a primary source of medicine for all categories of disease except the last. Holy power is often manifested in combinations of Qur’anic verses and magical formulas in various forms: Qur’anic verses that are worn on the body or drunk; direct recitation from a holy person; an object from a holy site and saintly tombs; and so on.
Islamic Medicine

In general, the contribution of the Islamic empire to modern medicine is often underrated in the West. More often than not, Western scholars have overlooked Islam’s true contribution to human civilization. A Eurocentric outlook affects even the most authoritative scholars in the field. However, more recent scholarship shows that medieval Muslim physicians made many contributions to the medical knowledge from Greece, Persia, and India that passed through their hands. In reviewing medieval Islamic medicine, one should be wary of creating false impressions. The Islamic empire was more welcoming for non-Muslims than is popularly imagined in the West. In fact, many of its famous doctors were Jews (Musa ibn Maimon Maimonides, 1135–1204 C.E.), Christians (Hunayn ibn Ishaq, 809–873 C.E.), and non-Arabs, mostly Persians (al-Razi / Rhazes, 841–925 C.E.; ibn Sina /Avicenna, 980–1037 C.E.). Moreover, the term “Islamic medicine” disguises a fundamental aspect of this class of medicine. Namely, that it was not based on Islamic teachings. Instead, it simply existed, and prospered within that cultural space that the empire afforded.

In its technological advancement, and to its credit, the Islamic empire did not attempt to reinvent the wheel. Starting from where others stopped is now a central tenet of modern science. The empire was fortunate that the wealth of Greek philosophy was already at its doorstep. Up to the sixth century, Alexandria and Athens stood as rival centers of medical learning. Persia was the new flourishing abode for scientists following the expulsion of the “heathen philosophers” from Athens and Alexandria (527–565 C.E.). Khalid ibn Yazid (655–704 C.E.) was unquestionably the first emir who laid the foundation for the translation of Greek works into Arabic. Following its fall under Muslim rule in 641, Alexandria proved to be a rich repository of Greek manuscripts. A century later, caliph al-Mansur reinvigorated Baghdad as a center of knowledge enshrined in the famous Institute of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikma). Scholars were enticed to convert foreign manuscripts appropriated from the city of Jundeshapur (in Persia) into Arabic. This city provided a vast wealth of Latin manuscripts in addition to equal numbers of other documents of Indian and Chinese origin. The Christian medical scholar Abu Zakariya ibn Masawayh (died 857 C.E.), who was a personal physician for four caliphs, was in charge of this establishment. Other no less famous centers of knowledge and translation followed and were abundant across the Islamic empire from the Persian Gulf to the European Atlantic borders.

Early scholarship tended to portray the contribution of the Islamic empire to world medicine as no more than that of a diligent storekeeper. In other words, that no original contribution was made during the vibrant era of the Islamic empire (seventh to thirteenth century) when the Christian world was dormant. Nothing could be further from the truth—and it would be futile to even attempt to map out this vast contribution.

Almost every field of modern medicine has a founding figure in the early Muslim world. Avicenna, often called the “prince of physicians,” left behind more than a million words in medical documents. His contribution to science in general, but medicine in particular, can also be found in his methodology, which insisted on the use of reason alone to solve all medical problems.

Ibn Haytham (965–1039 C.E.) made great strides in optics, earning the nickname “father of optics.” He also made a broad paradigmatic shift in the pursuit of science, which he centered around the use of inductive reasoning in the search for knowledge. Experimentation—the backbone of modern science—is what he preached in his approach to medicine.

Sinan ibn Thabit (died 946 C.E.) earned a good reputation in both the Arab world and later in the West. He contributed significantly to the art of presenting medical teaching books. Moreover, he was instrumental in establishing a regulatory system of medical control, examination, and registration of doctors and formulating ethical rules to govern medical practice.

Another figure who made an immense contribution to the art of medical writing is ‘Ali ibn al-‘Abbas al-Majusi (died between 982 and 995 C.E.). He was distinguished by his influential style of presenting medical facts with clarity, lucidity, and freedom from both magical and astrological ideas of the past. Al-Majusi had a wealth of knowledge that spanned several branches of medicine, but is legendary for his illustrated thesis on the movement of the blood in the human body.

The Islamic empire inherited a medical system in which surgery was regarded as an inferior branch of medicine, if it was ever a part of it at all. Abu'l-Qasim al-Zahrawi (936–1013 C.E.) elevated surgery to a primary position in medicine. Ample literature attests to his successful clinical treatment of bone fractures, bladder lithotomies, hemorrhoids, hernia, wounds to the abdomen, tonsillectomies, and many other ailments that required surgery.

The contribution of Islamic medicine was also impressive in chemistry and preparation of medicinal drugs, distillation, and sublimation. Many drugs now in use in modern medicine are of Muslim origin.

It has often been argued that Islamic medicine was crippled by Islam’s attitudes toward dissection. These attitudes are said to have been derived from the Islamic prohibition of human body mutilation. It is true that Prophet Muhammad instructed his followers to respect the dead, foes and friends alike, and to avoid mutilation. He also instructed his followers to hasten the burial of their dead, a practice that is favored to this day in the Muslim world. It is conceivable that following
such commands would have made dissection or indeed autopsy a compromising practice. One must realize that such prohibition was issued in tandem with other prescriptions accompanying jihad wars and was designed to oppose excessive revenge and humiliation of slain enemies. While few theologians might have opted to extend this prohibition to the practice of medicine, the ban has never been a central issue in debating the advancement of medicine. The Muslim philosopher and theologian al-Ghazali (d. 1111 C.E.) did exactly the opposite when he hailed anatomy as an important branch of medicine, stating “whoever does not know astronomy and anatomy is deficient in the knowledge of God.” Indeed many of the prime pillars of Islamic medicine have left writings and narratives as evidence of their practice in the field of *tasrib* (dissection or anatomy). To name but a few, the list includes Rhazes, Masawayh, al-Zahrawi, and Avicenna. It is important to note that not every religious prohibition was zealously observed, particularly by the powerful. After all, the prohibition against alcohol was flouted even in the palaces of the emirs. The biggest obstacle against dissection was possibly the Arabian weather. In the absence of modern methods of refrigeration, it would take much more determination to handle a cadaver hours if not days after death. It has often been argued that Islamic medicine was no more than a theoretical exercise that was not translated into practice. Nothing could be further from the truth as most major Islamic cities had their medical establishments, which were similar to modern teaching hospitals that combine healing with training. D. L. Wright narrates that hospitals were established in the Arab world as early as the seventh century; that in the thirteenth century, al-Mansuri’s hospital in Cairo had four large quadrangles complete with fountains. The same hospital had wards for male and female patients, a library, a lecture hall, and a mosque. Such a hospital could indeed be the envy of modern hospitals in the modern Muslim world. In 1160 C.E., Baghdad city had some sixty dispensaries and infirmaries.

Early Islamic and Modern World Medicine

The eleventh century saw Europe just beginning to awake from its long period of oblivion. It was Europe that was behind the Arabs in every field. The march to regain supremacy in medicine began with the rebuilding of knowledge, most of which was available only in Arabic scripts. In 1085, Toledo of Spain was won back from the Arabs and was soon to house the School of Translation founded by Domenicus Gundissalinus (1020–1087). Other scholars were also commissioned, most notably Gerard of Lombardy (joined 1150), who translated hundreds of Arabic works, including the masterpieces of Rhazes and Avicenna.

Italy, too, had its center (Salerno), which far exceeded Toledo’s establishment. It was the Tunisian-born scholar Constantinus Africanus (1020–1087) who helped to realize the European dream of ascending to supremacy in medical knowledge. Salerno’s medical establishment was reputed to be the first organized medical school in Europe. In his visit to Italy as merchant, Constantinus was appalled by the poverty of medical knowledge in Italy. He decided to go back to Tunisia for three years to study medicine and bring worthwhile knowledge to his new abode. That he did with spectacular success and he was later to rank among the most diligent translators of his time. These medical centers proved valuable sources of information and were replicated in other European cities. For many years to come, the same sources of knowledge were used in the other European schools, which mushroomed in Seville, Montpellier, Paris, Padua, Bologna, and elsewhere. While many texts of Arab origin continued in use in these European medical schools throughout the Middle Ages, names of their Arab authors continued to be filtered out through translation or otherwise.

See also Medicine; Miracles; South Asian Culture and Islam; Southeast Asian Culture and Islam.

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*Abdullahi Osman El-Tom*

HERESIES See Heresiography; Kharijites, Khawarij

HERESIOGRAPHY

Heresiography is, literally, the writing of and about heresies. It is, however, an extremely relative term as one group’s heresy is ultimately another’s religion. Those who write about heresies, known as heresiographers, are for the most part engaged in the documentation of the errors and incorrect beliefs of other groups, which are often pejoratively referred to as “sects.” However, as Jonathan Z. Smith argues, “a ‘theory of the other’ is but another way of phrasing a ‘theory of the self’” (p. 47). Heresiography, then, functions in
two primary ways. First, it lists the perceived heretical doctrines or ideas of others, showing how they have either gone or been led astray; secondly, and most importantly, it allows the group doing the writing to present what it is not, thereby providing the contours of social, ideological, religious and political self-definition.

**Definition and Origin**

The closest Arabic term for heresiography in Islam is *al-milal wa al-nihal*, literally meaning “religions and sects.” The origin of this phrase is unclear and both words, despite occurring separately in the Qur’an, do not seem to appear together as a technical term before the tenth century. Shahrestani (d. 1153), one of the most famous medieval heresiographers, argues that *milal* (sing., *milla*) refer primarily to the parameters of a shared social or communal set of beliefs, whereas its synonym *din* more closely approximates what we would today call “religion.” Other sources, however, do not make such a sharp differentiation between these two terms. In one of its earliest usages, that by Abu Bakr al-Khwarizmi (d. c. 977), it is employed to denote religions other than those of *ahl al-kitab* (i.e., “the people of the Book,” meaning followers of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity). The first time the phrase is employed in a title is in the *Kitab al-milal wa al-nihal* of al-Baghdadi (d. 1037). Other Arabic terms used in Islamic heresiographical literature to designate heretics include *zandaqa* (“free-thought,” or “atheism”) and *ilbad* (“heresy,” or “heterodoxy”).

The Muslims were extremely interested in documenting the religious beliefs and doctrines of other groups. They did so, however, not as dispassionate scientists or academics, but often as legal scholars, whose main job was to delineate and establish the beliefs, and thus legal status, of other religious groups in order to determine both their taxation rates and rights under Islamic law (*shari`a*). The basis for all their categories of comparison, then, was not necessarily meant to be scholarly or anthropological in its own right, but rather it was grounded in the traditional sources of Islam (e.g., Qur’an, hadith). Yet, both the breadth and depth of the taxonomies that the Muslim heresiographers created were impressive. According to Gustave von Grunebaum, “in their books on sects, or comparative religion, the research acumen of the Muslims shows at its best.” Precisely because so much of the *milal wa al-nihal* literature deals with the collection and subsequent listing of the beliefs of others, many modern scholars frequently refer to this genre as a genealogical precursor to the modern history of religions.

Steven Wasserstrom locates the origins of this technical genre of literature in the eighth and ninth centuries, when Muslims increasingly encountered other, rival, monotheisms in a highly “disputational, polemic, apologetic, and sectarian milieu.” Despite the ambiguity surrounding the origins of *milal wa al-nihal* as a technical term, the literature associated with it seems to be predicated on the following hadith, in which the Prophet proclaims: “The Jews are divided into seventy-one sects, the Christians into seventy-two; my community will be divided into seventy-three sects.” This tradition seems to be the proof text for all subsequent attempts to document and delineate the various heretical groups.

**Judaism and Heresy**

In the background of much Islamic heresiographical writings is the monolithic category of “the Jews.” Wasserstrom claims, for instance, that Muslim heresies can often be traced back to a Jewish origin. According to Islamic history, the Jews are the archetypal community that has gone astray. As such they are constantly held up as an example of what must not happen to the Muslim community. Yet because Islam and Judaism had been in contact with one another since the advent of Islam in the seventh century, they were phenomenologically very similar. As a result, much time is spent differentiating Islam and Muslim teaching and dogma from that of the Jews. Moreover, when the Muslim heresiographers look for internal divisions within Islam they tend to blame it on a Jew or a Jewish convert to Islam. In many ways all heresies within Islam begin with the fact that Muhammad produced no male heirs, something that was generally blamed on Jewish magicians. Moreover, it was Jews that were said to be responsible for the following “heresies”: the Christian decision to worship Jesus, the *ghulat* (Shi`ite extremists), the Shi`ites, the Isma`ili, the Fatimid dynasty, and one of the most divisive theological issues in early Islam, that of the created Qur’an.

A common feature used in the literature associated with heresiography is the list of sects and where they have gone wrong. Such lists are, according to John Wansbrough, “schematic and based on a variety of propositions: (1) numerical (to make up the celebrated total of ‘seventy-three sects’); (2) *ad hominem* (‘schools’ generated from the names of individuals by means of the *nisba* suffix [denoting origin or descent]); and (3) doctrinal (divergent attitudes to specific problems).” Furthermore, despite the fact that Islam is generally considered to be an orthoprax (“correct practice”) religion as opposed to an orthodox (“correct belief”) one, heresiography is primarily concerned with documenting the incorrect or heretical beliefs, as opposed to actions, of others. The goal is to show how such beliefs are to be differentiated from what is considered to be “normative,” which of course differs according to those doing the writing. Every Muslim group, then, is interested in showing how its belief system is “normative” and how that of its rivals is heretical. A common feature is that heretical belief is always something that deviates from, and is thus subsequent to, an original or pure teaching. For this reason heresy in Islam is often synonymous with the charge of innovations (*bi`d`a*).

**Muslim Heresiographers**

One of the most famous of Muslim heresiographers is the Andalusian Ibn Hazm (994–1064), an important though...
Heresiography

idiosyncratic legalist, philosopher, exegete, and polemicist. His *al-Fisal fi al-milal wa al-abwa wa al-nibal* (The book of opinions on religions, heresies, and sects) offers an elaborate account of all the religious groups that had ever come into contact with Islam from the seventh century to his own day. In addition to his extremely thorough historiographical method, Ibn Hazm was also a zealous theologian who employed a literalist (*zahir*) reading of the Qur’an and Islamic doctrine. His *Fisal* examines both the histories of various groups, their offshoots, and their present status, thereby showing how they have changed or stayed the same over time. For example, his treatment of the Jews is severe, accusing the rabbis who produced the Talmud of heresy and of intellectual skepticism. Interestingly, he accuses the rabbis of the same heretical doctrine as the materialists of early Islamic skepticism. Interestingly, he accuses the rabbis of the same heretical doctrine as the materialists of early Islamic theology. This reveals a common theme in Islamic heresiography: Often one loosely labels a number of one’s opponents with the same heretical doctrine.

Ibn Hazm’s goal, then, was not necessarily historical or theological accuracy. He did not simply study religions for their own sake; on the contrary, he attempts to demolish the errors of others and, in the process, set Islam up as the most perfect of all religions. As such, he is less interested in understanding other religions than in reducing them to certain dogmas or problems that allow him to compare them with, often artificially, Islam. In short, Ibn Hazm knew what his conclusions were before he even set out to establish the premises of comparison.

Another famous heresiographer was the aforementioned Shahrastani, who wrote the *Kitab al-milal wa al-nibal*, which, in his own words, proposed to present “the doctrinal opinions of all the world’s people.” Like the work of Ibn Hazm, Shahrastani is interested not only in documenting the various religious groups both in his day and before, but also in examining the various doctrines of the philosophers. Shahrastani divides his book into two parts, with the first dealing with revealed religions that base their obedience on a book (e.g., Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians), and the second examining the doctrines that are of purely human origins (e.g., the Sabians, philosophers, and the pre-Islamic Arabians).

**Function of Heresiography**

Heresiography was, and still continues to be, used as a means of legitimating the ideology—whether political, religious, legal, or other—of the group defining what constitutes the “real Islam.” In recent times this has coincided with the increased use of the *fatwa*, a legal ruling that is given by a legal expert. Such legal experts need not occupy official positions, but they are generally recognized for their legal learning and acumen. More recently, *fatwas* have become a convenient vehicle employed by various groups, many of whom are marginal, as a way of condemning the beliefs and practices of groups, Islamic or not, with differing opinions. For example, certain Islamist groups have issued blanket *fatwas* condemning all Jews and Christians as enemies of Islam; yet other groups have employed *fatwas* to condemn the rulers of Arab countries as infidels. It should be noted, however, that many who issue such controversial *fatwas* are often accused by those in the mainstream of having insufficient credentials to do so.

In recent times, heresiography has taken on even greater political and ideological dimensions, as it is used now as a means of silencing one’s perceived enemies. In many Islamic countries this is as easy as employing the concept of *takfir*, or accusing someone, often one’s political opponent, of *kufr* (“unbelief”). A famous example of this in the 1990s was the case of a University of Cairo professor by the name of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd. An Islamic moderate, he called for an understanding of the Qur’an and other early Islamic literature according to literary, contextual, and historical principles. In particular, he asked the question: What does the Qur’an as a document, and not necessarily as the sacred scripture of Muslims, say about a given subject (e.g., human rights)? When Egyptian Islamists got wind of his academic work they accused him of heresy and began legal proceedings against him. An Egyptian high court, to the great surprise of many, agreed and declared him an apostate. As a result Abu Zayd was ordered to divorce his wife and was effectively forced out of Egypt. To this day he is a professor in the Netherlands. This case is so interesting and problematic because it raises the nature of the tenuous relationship between what is considered heretical, the religious establishment, and, at least in theory, the autonomous nature of the court system in Egypt.

Heresiography is, thus, instrumental in defining not only the parameters of what is considered to be normative for a religion, but is also employed by the various groups that constitute that religion. Heresiography has been used, in one way or another, since the advent of Islam in seventh-century Arabia. At that time, it helped to differentiate Islam from rival monotheisms in the area of the Hijaz. Gradually, however, it was employed as a genre to help establish “normative Islam” by showing how various “sects” had gone astray in terms of their beliefs. So although one uses heresiography as a way of showing who is “inside” and who is “outside” one’s group, as a genre it often tells us more about the “in” group than it does about anyone else.

*See also Bid’a; Hadith; Hallaj, al-; Historical Writing; Islam and Other Religions; Kalam; Qur’an; Shari’a.*

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Aaron Hughes

**HIJAB** See Veiling

**HIJRA**

In 622 C.E. the Meccan prophet Muhammad immigrated to Yathrib, later known as Medina (al-nabi), on the invitation of a group of Arabs from that town. This event is termed hijra. Having sent his adherents ahead, Muhammad secretly followed with Abu Bakr b. Quhafa, leaving ‘Ali b. ‘Abi Talib in his (Muhammad’s) bed, to deceive the Meccans who sought to kill him. On the way they stopped at a cave on Mount Thaur, where a spider’s web, spun across the entrance, fooled the Meccans into not looking within (Q. 9:40). Here, according to Sufi tradition, the Prophet taught Abu Bakr the secrets of silent remembrance, *dhikr-e khab,* which earned Abu Bakr the title Yar-e ghar, friend of the cave.

Hijra has also been interpreted to mean “the breaking of old ties,” cutting off the era of knowledge from the previous era of ignorance (*jabilifya*). The caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, establishing an Islamic calendar, chose this event as its starting point. Muhammad reached Medina in September 622. The calendar opens with the first month of the Arabic lunar year in June 622 and proceeds without intercalation for a 354-day year in keeping with the lunar months.

**Hijra** is based on the root h-j-r, the root of the name Hagar, the concubine of Abraham; the term Mahagrave was used by Christian sources to describe the Arab-Muslims, the descendants of Hagar. *Muhajirun* is the Arabic term given to those who emigrated from Mecca with the Prophet.

See also Astronomy; Muhammad.

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Rizwi Faizer

**HIJRI CALENDAR**

There is no reference in the Qur’an to the pre-Islamic system of *anwa* in which the year is divided into precise periods on the basis of the rising and setting of certain stars. According to tradition, this system was considered anathema in Islam. The most relevant Qur’anic allusion to calendar-related computation is to the stations of the moon (*manazil al-qamar,* 10:5, 36:39). There are twenty-eight such stations defined on the basis of a combination of the pre-Islamic system of *anwa* with the lunar stations system.

The official Islamic calendar is lunar, with year one coinciding with the year 622 C.E., the date of Muhammad’s migration (*bijra*) from Mecca to Medina. This calendar was adopted during the reign of the second caliph ‘Umar. The Hijri lunar calendar is used as the basis for computing the official months (*abilla,* new moons), and for determining the dates for important religious activities such as fasting and pilgrimage. The lunar months alternate between twenty-nine and thirty days, and the lunar month retrogrades yearly by about eleven days. Although the beginning of the lunar month is determined by sighting the new moon, numerous methods were developed to compute the exact length of the lunar months, to determine the days of the lunar year in relation to the solar year, and to perform calendar conversions between different eras.

Initially, folk astronomy and nonscientific traditions provided handy methods for solving problems related to the regulation of the lunar calendar and the determination of the times of prayer. Folk astronomical methods, such as the observation of the lunar crescent and the use of simple arithmetical shadow schemes, were used even after the introduction and dissemination of sophisticated scientific methods. A more mathematical approach to timekeeping developed as Muslims acquired and developed skills in mathematical astronomy. Although the computations of astronomers may have initially been appreciated only by a small group of
The Hijri calendar is normally 344 days, making it eleven days shorter than the Solar calendar.

scientists, their methods eventually supplanted the simple methods of folk astronomy. The establishment of the office of a mosque timekeeper (muwaqqit) illustrates the official recognition, by the religious institution, of the authority of the exact-scientific methods of astronomers in the fields of calendar computation and the determination of times of prayer.

With the rise of the office of the timekeeper in the thirteenth century, the technical knowledge of the astronomers became more accessible because the compilation of extensive tables made the results of the exact-mathematical methods more readily usable. The science of timekeeping (‘ilm al-miqat) was thus an area of investigation where religion and science intersected.

Timekeeping tables, first compiled in Baghdad in the ninth and tenth centuries, were later expanded by timekeepers employed at the major mosques of Syria and Egypt to include hundreds of thousands of entries. In contrast to earlier Greek sources, Islamic astronomical handbooks often started with discussions of calendar computations and conversions between different eras (for example, Persian, Coptic, Syriac, Chinese-Ughur, Jewish, and Hindu calendars). In addition to the basic computational techniques, numerous works also provide additional information covering calendar-related subjects such as the length of day and night; patterns of weather and wind; dates and descriptions of Christian, Jewish, and Indian festivals; and agricultural practices at various times of the year. Another problem of timekeeping that was addressed in various astronomical treatises is the problem of crescent visibility. The lunar month starts right after sunset with the sighting of the crescent. The visibility of this crescent, however, is itself a function of several variables, including the celestial coordinates of the sun and the moon, the latitude of the place where the crescent is sighted, and the brightness of the sky. Various methods were devised to determine the conditions under which the crescent would be visible.

See also Astronomy.

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Ahmad S. Dallal
HIKMA, BAYT AL- See Education

HILLI, ‘ALLAMA AL- (1250–1325)

‘Allama al-Hilli was a Twelver Shi‘ite jurist and theologian based in Hilla in southern Iraq. Hasan b. Yusuf al-Hilli is credited with establishing a set of Twelver theological and legal ideas that dominated subsequent Shi‘ite learning. Biographical sources list around five hundred works attributed to him, though some of these are undoubtedly chapters within works or short treatises. Those that have survived form an impressive oeuvre encompassing theology, jurisprudence, and biography (rijal). In his theological works and creed commentaries, he argued, primarily from logic and reason, for all the main Twelver doctrines. This extensive use of reason rather than traditional textual sources was to be the dominant mode of theological discourse in Twelver Shi‘ism from ‘Allama onward. His legal works were the subject of much commentary and in legal theory (usul al-fiqh), he showed extensive originality by incorporating the previously disparaged term ijtihad into Shi‘ite jurisprudence. His biographical work is a comprehensive dictionary of early Shi‘ite transmitters of the imam’s doctrines. He soon outshone his teachers, who included such luminaries as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d.1274) and al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d.1277). Hilli also had some relations with political powers, and is credited with the conversion of the Ilkhanid sultan Khudabanda of Iran to Twelver Shi‘ism.

See also Hilli, Muhaqqiq al-; Law; Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver).

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HILLI, MUHAQQIQ AL- (1205–1277)

Muhaqqiq al-Hilli Ja‘far b. al-Hasan was a Twelver Shi‘ite jurist based in Hilla, southern Iraq. Al-Muhaqqiq’s Shara‘i al-Islam (Paths of Islam) is probably the most popular work of Shi‘ite law among later commentators, and represents Muhaqqiq’s most lasting influence on subsequent Shi‘ite tradition. It belongs to the type of work known as abridged (mukhtasar), in which an author presents his interpretation of the shari‘a in a highly abbreviated form. This style made the work an excellent basis for later discussions of the law, even though subsequent jurists did not always agree with his conclusions. His other mukhtasar, an even more abbreviated legal compendium entitled al-Nafi‘ (The useful), was also the subject of commentaries by later generations of scholars. He also wrote an influential work of the principles of jurisprudence (Ma‘arif al-akham), which one also finds regularly cited in later works. In particular, Ja‘far al-Muhaqqiq introduced the idea that the rules and regulation of the shari‘a were not all known with absolute certainty, for the texts are not always clear and the reports from the Prophet and the imams are not always reliable. Such doctrinal advances paved the way for the full elaboration of these concepts by his nephew and pupil, al-‘Allama al-Hilli (d. 1325). Other famous pupils include various members of the influential Ibn ‘Tawus family.

See also Hilli, ‘Allama al-; Law; Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver).

HINDUISM AND ISLAM

The relationship between these two great religious traditions in South Asia is often characterized as one of civilizational or cultural clashes, confrontations, and discontinuities. Popular accounts of South Asia’s religious history often juxtapose Hinduism’s tolerance of diversity, innate spirituality, and rootedness in the Indian soil with Islam’s doctrinal rigidity, innate militancy, and foreignness. Such essentializations, which gained ascendancy during the era of British imperialism, fail to recognize that, as complex social and cultural phenomena, religions undergo historical change. A critical assessment of the relationships between Hinduism and Islam accounts for multiple histories involving subtle encounters, exchanges, and conversions, as well as overt confrontation and conflict. A more accurate and multifaceted range of perspectives emerges, reflecting the ways in which Hinduism and Islam interact with each other, and with other social, cultural, and political formations in South Asia through time.
A Demographic Overview
Today there are an estimated 1.2 billion Muslims, one-third of whom live in South Asia—mainly in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, there are as many Muslims in South Asia as there are in the Middle East and North Africa combined. The majority of South Asian Muslims come from indigenous ethnic populations. Muslims constitute clear majorities in Pakistan (96%) and Bangladesh (87%), while in India and Sri Lanka they are sizable minorities (12% and 7.6%, respectively). Prior to the 1947 partition an estimated 24 percent of greater India’s population was Muslim, the remainder being predominantly Hindu. Today, there are more than 800 million Hindus in South Asia.

The extent of Islam’s indigenization in the region is reflected in the languages spoken by its adherents: Numerous Arabic and Persian loanwords are found in local languages, especially those of the Indus and Ganges basins. Furthermore, the primary language of most Muslims is the same as that spoken by local non-Muslim populations, such as Punjabi or Bengali in the North and Malayalam or Tamil in the South.

Just as Hindu religious ideas and practices are constituted in a variety of traditions and movements, ranging from the brahmanic to the devotional, mystical, intellectual, and reformist, so too Indian Islam finds expression in diverse ways. Sunni Islam, primarily of the Hanafi legal tradition, has been the official religion for most urban Muslims and landholders. Less than one-fifth of South Asian Muslims adhere to one of two main divisions of Shi’ism, the Ithna’ashariyya (Twelvers) or the Isma’iliyya (Isma’ili). Most South Asian Muslims have been formally and informally affiliated with Sufi shrines and tariqas (brotherhoods). Indeed, it is widely held that Islam was established in South Asia through Sufism, though there is little evidence of an organized, deliberate Sufi strategy of conversion. Nonetheless, Sufism has participated in the creation of local expressions of Islam, which embody the greatest degree of assimilation of Hindu religious ideas and practices. Since the sixteenth century, several Islamic reform and revival movements have emerged, directed in part against unorthodox practices among Sufis and the Shi’a, and also against Hindu influence on Muslim belief and practice. Thus, assimilation and differentiation are the two alternating processes governing relations between Hindus and Muslims through more than one thousand years of shared history.

Medieval Hindu-Muslim Encounters
The first contacts between Hindus and Muslims occurred through trade and conquest. Arab Muslim colonies involved in the Indian Ocean spice trade appeared on the Malabar Coast of southern India as early as the ninth century, continuing a long history of commerce between India and the Near East. Local Hindu rulers granted Muslims permission to build mosques and intermarry with their subjects. Though these early immigrants were merchants, Muslim legends remember them as holy men and pilgrims, and even claim that at least one Hindu prince converted to Islam and went to Mecca on the hajj. Muslim trading colonies also flourished in Sri Lanka and on the Coromandel Coast in what is now Tamil Nadu. By the time the Portuguese arrived in 1498, Islam was firmly implanted in the region, and intertwined with its Hindu cultures.

Islamization in northern India followed a different course. Arab Muslim expeditions reached the banks of the Indus by 711, but systematic raids into the heartland did not commence until the tenth century. Armies under the command of the Turkish rulers based in Afghanistan, most notably Mahmud of Ghazni (r. 998–1030 C.E.), repeatedly plundered towns in the Punjab and Sind. Muslim rule in the Indian heartland was established when Turkish, Persian, and Afghan warriors crossed the northwest frontier, defeated Indian
Rajput forces in 1192, and established their capital at Delhi in the Indo-Gangetic plain. The Delhi Sultanate (1211–1526), bolstered by Muslim immigrants fleeing Mongol armies in the west, extended Muslim control across northern India to Bengal and southward into the Deccan, rendering the region a dar al-islam. However, the Delhi Sultans often yielded to local Muslim and Hindu rivals when they were unable to absorb them into the imperial order, as did the Mughal dynasty that succeeded it (1526–1857).

In retrospect, Muslim historians recalled the conquests as heroic wars against pagan infidels (kafirs), and they lauded conversions along with the destruction of Hindu temples. These accounts obscure the fact that where Muslim attacks were made on Hindu temples, they were aimed at enriching Muslim elites (temples were repositories of gold, jewelry, and cash), and undermining the power of local rulers, the traditional temple patrons. Mosques and shrines were erected in their stead. However, most rulers treated subjugated Hindus as “protected” peoples (dhimmis), leaving temples untouched, authorizing and often patronizing new shrines. Nonetheless, there were occasions when they followed the advice of men like Diya’ al-Din Barani (1285–1357), a court historian, who, in counseling rulers to maintain the purity of the “true religion,” urged them to “use their efforts to insult and humiliate and to cause grief to and bring ridicule and shame upon the polytheistic and idolatrous Hindus” (Mujeeb, p. 68). Brahmanic Hindus, for their part, regarded Muslim invaders as impure mlecchas (aliens), or as Turks, Tajiks, and even Greeks, which suggests that they defined Muslims more by their foreign ethnicity than by their religious identity.

Muslim elites sought to comprehend the religions of their subjects intellectually. Al-Biruni (973–c. 1050) gives the earliest and most detailed Muslim account of Indian religion, writing in detail about brahmanic concepts of divinity, cosmology, reincarnation, ritual practices, and yoga. He approached these topics comparatively, drawing parallels with Sufism and Greek philosophy. The Mogul emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605), famous for his interest in comparative religions, sponsored Persian translations of Hindu epics, the Bhagavad Gita, and books on Vedanta philosophy. His great-grandson, Dara Shukoh (1615–1659), befriended Hindu holy men, translated the Upanishads and, inspired by Ibn ‘Arabi’s pantheistic ideas, attempted a synthesis of Sufism with Hindu Vedanta. He was executed for heresy by his brother and rival to the throne, Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707). As a zealous promoter of Sunni revivalism, Aurangzeb reimposed taxes on Hindu subjects and razed temples in major Hindu religious centers. As Akbar and Dara Shukoh became emblematic of Hindu-Muslim conviviality, Mahmoud of Ghazni and Aurangzeb are today remembered as symbols of Muslim militancy and intolerance.

Conversions and Convergences

Most South Asian Muslims are descended from indigenous peoples who converted to Islam. As a rule, conversion was not an all-or-nothing break with Hindu belief and practice, nor did it usually occur at the end of a sword. Rather, it was a process that occurred in different degrees, and it involved a variety of social, cultural, political, and economic factors. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the history of Islam in South Asia is that it gained the most converts in areas situated beyond the traditional centers of political power and brahmanical religious authority. Today, the largest proportions of Muslims are to be found in the northwest (now Pakistan and Kashmir) and northeast (now Bangladesh); even Kerala (1991: 23.3%) in the south has a higher percentage of Muslims than does Uttar Pradesh (1991: 17.3%), where Delhi and Agra are located.

The chief agents for Islamization on the local level were wandering Muslim saints, teachers, and warriors. Isma’ili missionaries in Sind and Rajasthan adopted Nath yogi guise and formulated their Islamic message in terms of Hindu concepts of divinity and cosmology. In Bengal, communities grew up around saint shrines and mosques built where lands had been newly converted to wet-rice agriculture during the Mughal era. Through local Sufi centers Islam was often introduced and integrated into the socioreligious landscape, establishing points of exchange between the Muslim rulers and the populace, thus integrating people and property into the infrastructure of the kingdom. Across India shrines are patronized and even managed commonly by Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Christians, and some have evolved into major pilgrimage centers, such as that of Mu’in al-Din Chishti in Ajmer. Such places are identified with supermundane beings who offer their devotees power, healing, fertility, and occasions to participate in ecstatic rites. Muslim warrior saints have been incorporated as guardian deities into the cults of Hindu hero gods and goddesses, where Muslims as well as Hindus worship them. This is exemplified by Vavar, the battle companion of the popular south Indian deity Ayyappa, and by Muttal Ravutan, guardian of Draupadi shrines in Tamil Nadu.

The interpenetration of Hinduism and Islam is further evident in folk epics and religious poetry. Thus, regional oral epics contain elements from the classical Hindu epics of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana that have been reshaped as a result of interaction with Muslims. At assemblies of poets throughout India, Hindus, Muslims, and others recite the compositions of poet saints such as Kabir (died c. 1448), known as the “apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity.” The compositions of vernacular poets like Baba Farid Shakarganj, Sultan Bahu, and Bulleh Shah are on the lips of every Punjabi, regardless of creed. The Sikh religion founded by the North Indian holy man Guru Nanak (d. 1539) is often characterized as a fusion of Islamic monotheism and Hindu devotionalism. Across north India and Pakistan, people sing romantic ballads, or qisas, such as Hir-Ranjha, Sass-Patha, Mirza-Sabban, and Laila-Majnun. These are inevitably tragic tales of romantic heroes and heroines destined to remain apart and doomed
to die because of differences in caste, class, and religion. Nonetheless, the songs in which these boundaries are crossed are sung and beloved by people from all walks of life. Through richly symbolic language and imagery *qīsa* are also mystical allegories of the human soul seeking union with God.

Hindustani music is another excellent example of the interplay between Hindu and Muslim culture. One of the greatest innovators of Hindustani classical music is often identified as Tansen (d. 1589), the Great Mogul Emperor Akbar’s court musician. The musical modes and the code of conduct within the musical lineages, or *gharanas*, draw on Indian and Perso-Arabic styles. The initiation ceremony of the student into the master’s school closely mirrors that of the Hindu *guru-sishya* initiation. Furthermore, although many of these lineages are principally Muslim in terms of personnel, worship of Hindu deities, especially the goddess Saraswati, and the lighting of lamps and garlanding of musicians are all common practices associated with Hinduism. The popularity of explicitly Islamic devotional styles such as *kafi*, *ghazal*, and *qawwal*, and of Muslim singers such as Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan and Abida Parveen among all audiences indicates a shared aesthetic culture.

Finally, in many areas conversion, intermarriage, and shared community life have led to common cultural practices. Often customs and observations of lifecycle events, such as births, marriages, and death, are regionally extremely similar. The offering of a child’s first haircutting or pilgrimage to bless a marriage is performed by all religious communities at local shrines. Dress and eating habits are frequently shared. Muslim social status usually reflects caste distinctions found among the wider society; and in Malabar, Muslim traders intermarried with Hindu locals to such an extent that they adopted their matrilineal social organization.

**Hindu-Muslim Encounters after 1857**

The Mogul Empire’s territory reached its apogee under Aurangzeb, encompassing the Deccan plateau and parts of the South Indian coast. After his death in 1707, Mogul power rapidly unraveled, paving the way for the British East India Company to transform its commercial power bases into political centers. In 1757 at the Battle of Plassy, the British forces took effective control of much of North India, placing it under the Raj. Though nominal authority still lay in Mogul hands, this ended following the British defeat of a large-scale rebellion of Hindu and Muslim troops in 1857. After this power shift, religious movements arose to address the new sociopolitical milieu, which rewarded modernism, secularism, and progressive scientific thought over traditional values.

Reaction to the impact of foreign rule was channeled in many cases through religious movements. Revivalist and reformist groups emerged representing the full range of responses to the new power structures. Some sought to incorporate and integrate Western values, others focused on internal revitalization, and still others mobilized to oppose British rule. Hindu revivalist groups such as the Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, Hindu Mahasabha, and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) advocated different means of promoting Hinduism in modern society. Whereas the Mahasabha, RSS, and Arya Samaj strove to purify Hinduism and reestablish an inherently Hindu national identity, the Brahmo Samaj emphasized social reform and education more in line with modern Western concepts. Similarly, Muslim organizations addressed the educational, social, and political interests of the Muslim population. The Dar al-‘Ulm Deoband was founded in 1867 to generate a new Indian body of ulema. In 1875, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan established Aligarh Muslim University with a westernized secular curriculum, to educate Muslims capable of reviving Islam and addressing the exigencies of modernity. The Jama’at-e Islami, founded by Abu 1-A’la’ Maududi in 1928, advocated religious renewal and political independence. Grassroots movements, like Tablighi Jama’at (founded 1926), arose to teach basic Islamic principles and practices and to eradicate “Hindu”
accretions, such as pilgrimage to saints's tombs, music, elaborate weddings, and mourning and death rites. The Muslim League formed in 1906 as a political group working to protect minority Muslim interests in an independent India.

Throughout the independence struggle relations between Hindus and Muslims worsened. Many factors contributed to this: British divide-and-conquer policies, Muslim underdevelopment, the Hinduization of the nationalist movement, and Hindu and Muslim prejudices and fears. Following the Indian National Congress's (INC) formation (1892), Muslim participation decreased steadily. However, there were moments of cooperation, such as Gandhi's support for the Khilafat movement to reestablish the Ottoman caliphate. Gandhi viewed this as a kindred freedom struggle and a means of garnering Muslim support. Nevertheless, as the independence movement progressed, the Congress leadership consistently failed to address Muslim fears of a Hindu majority nation without safeguards for their sizable (24%) minority. The INC rejected power-sharing schemes proposed by the British in the Communal Award (1932) and during the final Cabinet Mission negotiations (1946). After the Muslim League in 1940 publicly called for the creation of a separate state for Muslims, many Hindus no longer trusted Muslim ambitions for a free and unified India. Hindus sought a strong center and Muslims wanted strong regional governments and electoral reservations. Unable to find a compromise, the rapid departure of the British in 1947 resulted in horrific violence—an estimated 500,000 to 1 million died as 8 million Hindus and Sikhs shifted to India and 7 million Muslims departed for East and West Pakistan.

Since Partition, India's non-Hindu population has steadily increased, whereas Pakistan's non-Muslim population has declined—currently below 5 percent. The secular mandate of India's constitution nominally protects equal rights, and several controversial government schemes—particularly reservation of seats for various minority groups in the civil service, elected bodies, and universities—ensure at least some Muslim presence in India's civic life. Nonetheless, divisive politics persist. Three issues in particular frustrate understanding between Hindus and Muslims: Muslim personal law, Ayodhya, and Kashmir.

Currently there is a separate personal law for Muslims regarding marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Hindu nationalists and many women's advocacy groups champion a uniform civil code, which would apply the same legal regulations to every Indian citizen. Many Muslims cling to their separate legal code as a small realm of autonomy and the only available institutional means of maintaining their cultural identity.

In the early twentieth century Hindu radicals identified the Babri Masjid, a sixteenth mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, as the god Rama's birthplace and began agitation for its "liberation." In the absence of decisive action by the state and central governments and the Supreme Court, the situation remains unresolved. In 1992 Hindu radicals tore down the mosque and placed Rama's image at the site. The riots subsequent to this demolition claimed thousands of lives, and the tension is periodically reactivated with similarly tragic results. In 2002 a move by Hindu organizations to begin construction of a temple resulted in another round of disturbances, destabilizing interreligious relations.

Finally, at Partition, Muslim-majority Kashmir gained "special status," or semiautonomy, under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. India has promised a referendum on statehood or independence, but three wars with Pakistan, continual border skirmishes, Pakistani support to militants and freedom advocates, severe government repression of Muslim movements, and Hindu agitation over Article 370 keep tensions high. This situation is more alarming now that both nations are nuclear powers.

Real fissures do exist between Hindu and Muslim communities testifying to continued Hindu resentment of temple desecration by Muslims (real or alleged) and persistent Muslim fears (both reasonable and baseless) of assimilation or annihilation in Hindu-majority India. This mutual suspicion and hostility threaten constantly to overshadow the enormously rich and diverse shared traditions of the subcontinent. Yet the constitutional secularism of the largest democracy in the world, the persistence of shared places such as the shrine of Vavar in Kerala, and the continuing popularity of common cultural traditions such as music, literature, and art forms, indicate that there is a sound and strong common ground.

See also Akbar; South Asia, Islam in; South Asian Culture and Islam.

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HISBA

The Arabic term *bisba* (or in later works *ibtiishah*) is associated with the idea of “reckoning” or “accounting” and has, in works of Islamic law, come to refer to the activities of state-appointed individuals (usually termed *mubtsabis*) who enforce the law of Islam (the *shari’ah*) in both the public and private spheres. The function is normally conceived of as more preventative than remedial: the *mubtsabi*’s task is to prevent transgressions of the law, and thereby avoid the need for court proceedings. However, he does have the power to bring individuals before a judge (*qadi*) if they fail to take heed of the *bisba* regulations. Most works of law from the twelfth century onward contain some discussion of the role of the *mubtsabi*, often in the section dealing with the role and functions of the *qadi*. While enforcing *bisba* (“bringing people to account”) is conceived of in these works as the role of an appointed person, it is recognized that this person is merely performing the general duty (to which all Muslims are bound) of “promoting good and prohibiting evil” (*al-amr bil-ma’ruf wal-nabiyy ‘an al-munkar*). This is a Qur’anic phrase (e.g., 3:104 and 9:61), and linking it with the doctrine of *bisba* (which is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an) gives *bisba* (and its institutional manifestations) a firm grounding in the Qur’an.

Works that describe the function of *bisba* in Muslim society are often highly theoretical, and depict what might be termed an “ideal” law-enforcement system for an Islamic community. The works open with a discussion of the various meanings of *bisba* and *ibtiishah*, followed by discrete chapters on various activities that a *mubtsabi* is supposed to prevent, and finally a description of the powers of a *mubtsabi* and his relationship with the judicial system. The list of activities considered forbidden, and therefore coming under the *mubtsabi*’s power, are often an interesting indicator of local religious life in the area where the work was written. The *mubtsabi* is recommended to restrict the playing of chess or backgammon in various works, and in the Indian sub-continent works, Muslims visiting the temples of Hindus is specifically mentioned as a reprehensible practice. Works written in the western parts of the Muslim world, such as *al-Hisba fil-Islam* by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), mention the visitation of Muslims to tombs of the *shaykhs* in search of intercession, as a practice needing to be restricted by the *mubtsabi*. Works of *bisba*, then, despite their appearance as theoretical, also provide an insight into medieval Muslim practices (many of which have been left unrecorded elsewhere) since the more literate scholars demanded that such practices be restricted.

The theory was translated into practice by the appointment of local *mubtsabis* in various parts of the Abbasid empire. After the Mongol invasions and the reemergence of Muslim dynasties in Turkey, Iran, and India, the position of *mubtsabi* and the enforcement of *bisba* also reappeared. Local *mubtsabis* were charged with enforcing *bisba* in towns and cities across the Muslim world. One particular emphasis was the role of the *mubtsabi* in ensuring that market law was obeyed, and official documents regularly refer to such a figure. In some parts of the Muslim world, the *mubtsabi* was responsible solely for ensuring that traders used the correct weights and measures. In this role of restricting unscrupulous merchants, some *mubtsabis* gained a reputation as protectors of the poor. The institution only died out with the introduction of more organized police forces and administrative ministries in the nineteenth century.

*See also* Ethics and Social Issues; Law; Political Organization.

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Robert Gleave

HISTORICAL WRITING

The term *ta’rikh* is presently used in languages such as Arabic, Turkish, and Persian for “history.” Similar to the connotations of the term in the major European languages it refers, on the one hand, to the past itself and, on the other hand, to the writing of history. Narrative texts (chronicles, biographical dictionaries, etc.), written with the explicit purpose to be preserved, have been of particular importance for studying the history of the Islamic lands. Even more than in the European and the Chinese contexts, substantial documentary and archival evidence of history for regions such as the Arabic-speaking lands is practically nonexistent for the period prior to the fourteenth century. Hence, most of our knowledge of the regions’ past depends on its representation in Islamic historiography.

In contrast to the modern study of historical writing for other regions such as the European lands, the study of Islamic
historical writing is to a large degree still characterized by predominantly philological concerns. It is only since the 1990s that an interest into the wider societal context of the production of historical knowledge has taken a significant place in works such as Tarif Khaldī’s *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period* (1994). Approaches taking up the challenges and possibilities arising out of the linguistic turn in the second half of the twentieth century are rare except for isolated examples such as Aziz al-Azmeh’s *Histoire et Narration* (1986).

Historiography, in the sense of reflecting on the writing of history itself, was restricted to short references in the introduction of historical works in the Islamic lands until the fourteenth century. The Persian religious philosopher al-‘Ijī (d. after 1381/82) composed in Arabic the first reflection on the technique and methodology of writing history, the *Gift of the Poor Man*. This and similar treatises of the following centuries were partly translated by Franz Rosenthal in *A History of Muslim Historiography* (1968). The famous North African scholar and official Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) developed in his *Introduction* a theoretical pattern to classify events of the past, well beyond mundane considerations of technique and methodology.

Similarly, history gained only over time an independent place in the Muslim canon of disciplines. Philosophical classifications of sciences such as those by al-Fārābī (d. 950) did not refer to history as an independent field of knowledge, emulating the tradition of the Hellenistic classifications. However, educational classifications included it as a discipline in its own right from the tenth century onward, although it was rarely taught as such in madrasas. At the same time, introductions to chronicles show that the authors considered themselves, among others, as historians (mu’arrīkh)—a term also often encountered in medieval biographical entries.

**Historical Writing in the Central Islamic Lands—Premodern Period**

Islamic historiography, in the sense of recording history, started with texts written in Arabic, but its early development is still largely unknown. The Greek and Persian literary traditions of the newly conquered lands were not adopted as direct models to build upon. It was rather the oral pre-Islamic Arabic tradition that shaped early Islamic historiography to a certain degree. The focus on genealogy and the authentification of reports by means of chains of transmitters were remnants of this heritage. However, the concrete forms of this historiography developed very much within the dynamics of early Islamic history, that is, through the interplay between the different Near Eastern cultural traditions.

Early Islamic historical writing was intimately linked to immediate theological concerns. The first writings, which might be labeled as being historical, treated the life of the prophet Muhammad and his Companions. These writings were recorded mainly as hadiths, that is, as reports on the deeds and sayings of the Prophet. For later historiography this beginning was of importance: The outwardly isolated character of each single report (*khabar*) proved to be influential in shaping longer narratives. This early material has engendered a major ongoing debate in present-day scholarship about its authenticity as its dating has posed manifold problems. One of the earliest reliable examples is the *sīra* by the hadith scholar Muhammad Ibn Ishaq (d. 761), a biography of the Prophet.

In the following centuries historiography found two main forms of expression: chronicles and biographical dictionaries. The religious scholar al-Ṭabarī (d. 923) composed in Baghdad the typical example of the former category: the universal chronicle *History of Prophets and Kings*, which dealt with events from the creation of the world until his time. “Universal” referred here obviously to Islamic history and what was perceived to be its predecessor(s). At the same time, chronicles were produced with a more limited geographical focus on towns (e.g., Damascus) and regions (e.g., Syria). The writing of history in the form of chronicles is similar to the writings produced in Latin Europe or Early and Middle Imperial China.

On the contrary, the second major form of historical writing, biographical dictionary, was in its importance and elaboration unique to Islamic historiography. Reflecting pre-Islamic genealogical interests and Islamic concerns of tracing the reliability of transmitters, the genre experienced an important development from early times onward. An early example of this genre, Ibn Sa’il’s (d. 845) *Grand Book of the Generations*, reflects its exclusive theological concern by focusing on transmitters of hadith. This focus changed over the centuries, and in the thirteenth century the jurist Ibn Khallīkān (d. 1282), for example, included in his dictionary individuals from more varied backgrounds. More specialized works started to be limited to specific towns or specific professions, such as the *Generations of Physicians* by Ibn Abī Usaybi’a (d. 1270).

This development was an expression of the gradual change in the social identities of authors of historical works. From the eleventh century onward important parts of the ulema started to interact more closely with court circles and rulers. Typical examples in this regard are Salādīn’s biographer Ibn Shaddād (d. 1234), who was the ruler’s judge of the army, and Ibn al-Adīm (d. 1262), the author of a local chronicle of Aleppo, who served the ruler of the town as a secretary, judge, and wāzir. Nevertheless, authors of historical works continued to belong almost exclusively to the elusive group of the ulema. Authors, being part of the military elite, continued to be rare, while authors belonging to the commoners remained nonexistent.

Toward the end of the tenth century Arabic lost its position as the exclusive literary language in the Islamic lands. The regionalization of political power also found its expression in the rise of Persian historiography. This development was not only of linguistic nature. Persian historiography gained specific characteristics, such as stronger efforts to
Historical Writing

Historical Writing Beyond the Central Islamic Lands—Premodern Period

Persian historiography spread subsequently also to newly Islamized regions like South Asia. There, Muslim historiography was from its outset in the thirteenth century almost exclusively written in Persian. Early Indo-Persian historical writings reflected closely the outlook of its Persian models, such as its intimate links with court life. It is only during the Mogul period (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) that Muslim South Asian historiography developed distinct characteristics, like the genre of memoirs written by members of the royal family or private persons.

The life of Nur al-Din Raniri (d. 1658), a South Asian scholar with a partly Arab genealogy, might serve as an example for the close links between the historiographical traditions of the different predominantly Muslim regions. After moving to the sultanate of Aceh (Northern Sumatra) he composed a Malay chronicle striving to mirror the classical historiographical style (e.g., al-Tabari) and drawing simultaneously heavily on the Malay Annals. The Malay Annals are one of the early examples of Southeast Asian Muslim historiography, written around 1500. Here, an anonymous author writing in Malay had cautiously aimed at harmonizing indigenous traditions and Islam, that is, Raniri’s text reflected a bundle of different regional historiographical traditions. This interaction within the Muslim world via members of its literary elites might not be sufficient to legitimize the use of the single term “Muslim historiography” for such diverse traditions. Nevertheless, it shows at least that texts shifted easily from one region to the other and were reworked during this process.

Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa are further examples of how texts and genres were transferred and adopted. Muslim troops conquered the western lands of Central Asia during the early eighth century. Therefore, the region’s historiography was part of the Arabic and later Persian and Turkic traditions as well. However, in regions beyond these initial conquests, the development of a Muslim historiography was more complex. Here, the interplay between local oral traditions and written Muslim works was more accentuated. For example, the earliest surviving history for the Volga-Ural area, the Turkic Collection of Chronicles, completed in 1602 by ‘Ali Jalayiri, derived not only from Rashid al-Din’s fourteenth-century work with the same name but also to a large degree from oral folklore sources circulating among the Muslim nomads.

The interplay between oral and written historical traditions was also a salient feature in sub-Saharan Africa. While historiography written by indigenous authors came into existence around 1500, these narratives continued to circulate simultaneously in a context of oral culture. The first written texts appeared in those regions that had previously been strongly Islamized and Arabized: the Sudan Belt and the East African Swahili coast. Consequently, chronicles such as the East African Kilwa Chronicle, written around 1530, or the West African Ta’rikh al-Sudan, written by the Timbuktu historian al-Sa’di in the seventeenth century, were generally composed in Arabic. West African Muslim historiography developed also the genre of biographical dictionaries, such as Ahmad Baba’s (d. 1627) work on the learned men of the Western Sudan. During the nineteenth century, authors switched increasingly to indigenous languages such as Hausa and Fulfude written first in Arabic and subsequently in Latin script. In combination with the developing dominance of European languages, Arabic ceased to be the literary elite’s prime means of expression.

Historical Writing in the Central Islamic Lands: Ottoman and Modern Periods

During the fifteenth century Ottoman Turkish emerged as a major literary language in Anatolia and in parts of the Arabic-speaking Middle East. Ottoman historiography started in the fourteenth century with rather short appendixes to existing chronicles. It was only in the fifteenth century that independent historical works in Ottoman Turkish were composed. These works were mainly chronicles written by individuals close to court circles. Other genres (e.g. biographical dictionaries) did not play a significant role in Ottoman historiography. History of Events, a work by the officially appointed imperial historian Mustafa Na’ima (d. 1716), enjoyed considerable popularity. His recourse to Ibn Khaldun’s patterns in order to describe the perceived decline of the empire was typical for this period’s historiography. With the Ottoman period the importance of narrative historiography for modern day scholarship decreases. The large amounts of surviving archival and documentary material for the central Islamic lands allow more varied venues to the history of this and the following periods.

Persian, Ottoman, and Arabic historiographies witnessed significant changes during the late nineteenth century. This process culminated for the Arabic context in works such as the History of Islamic Civilization by the Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (d. 1914), published in Egypt between 1902 and 1906. Here a distinct shift in form and content becomes visible, especially as he drew heavily on European works dealing with Arab or Islamic history. Nevertheless, these “modern” works were still to a large degree embedded in traditional historiography, visible in a similar use of poetry. Contrary to traditional assumptions, which refer the nineteenth century developments exclusively to the modernizing impact of the West, recent scholarship such as Crecelius...
(2001) has stressed the vivacity of Arabic historiography also in the “declining” eighteenth century.

The changes led in the late nineteenth century to a reorientation of historiography toward narratives of Ottoman and Arabic national origins. In the early twentieth century the Ottoman narrative was Turkified and with the rise of Arab national states the Arabic version started slowly to be supplemented and ultimately replaced respectively by national narratives. This universal trend toward national identities was also visible in other Muslim regions. The politician and writer Muhammad Yamin (d. 1962), for example, integrated the Malay Annals into his narrative of an Indonesian national history dating many millennia back.

The dominant second trend during the twentieth century was the professionalization of the writing of history. The general expansion of higher education in the Middle East, especially after World War II, led also to a significant rise in the number of university history departments. This has changed the general pattern of the first half of the century when Middle Eastern historians generally took their degree from Western universities. However, historical research remains a difficult task because of limited material resources and the variant political conditions, which are not always favorable for dealing with certain topics.

See also Arabic Literature; Biography and Hagiography; Heresiography; Ibn Khaldun; Tabari, al-.

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Konrad Hirschler

HISTORY See Historical Writing; Timelines and Genealogies in backmatter

HIZB ALLAH

Hizb Allah (Hezbollah, Hizbullah) from the Arabic bīzb Allāh, or “party of God,” became a popular name for political Islamist groups in the late twentieth century, after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran began to use the Qur’anic phrase (5:56–59; 58:19–22) to distinguish the righteous from the oppressors.

Focusing on the perennial conflict between the forces of good and evil, and the Qur’an’s apocalyptic vision in which the “party of God” will be “victorious” and will go to heaven, whereas the “party of Satan” will ultimately “be the losers,” was effective in consciousness-raising and forging solidarity in the postcolonial context of sociopolitical strife. This general usage of “Hizb Allah” dominated in Iran in the late 1970s, when it was used by those who supported Ayatollah Khomeini in his opposition to the shah, “the West,” and Israel, and in his advocacy of government based on Islam as interpreted by religiously trained (Shi’ite) legal scholars. Somewhat earlier, a group of Sunni political Islamists in Yemen called themselves Hizb Allah, and later another small Sunni Hizb Allah appeared in Egypt, reputedly under the leadership of Yahya Hashim. A faction that broke away from Islamic Jihad in Palestine during the 1980s, led by Ahmad Muhamma, also called itself Hizb Allah. The Palestinian Hizb Allah, like its parent Islamic Jihad, is military in nature, rejects compromise with Israel, and believes the question of Palestine is fundamentally religious in nature. That is, returning Palestine and, in particular, Jerusalem, to Islamic sovereignty is considered a religious duty.

However, the term Hizb Allah (Hezbollah/Hizbullah) is most frequently associated with the Lebanese Shi’ite group founded in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Shi’ite leader Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who had studied with Khomeini in Najaf during the latter’s exile in Iraq, became an outspoken opponent of Israel, and of “the West” in general. At that time, Iran’s Islamic government sent a contingent of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon to assist in the resistance to Israel, becoming the core of Shi’ite militancy in Lebanon. The movement is led by a secretary
Hojjat al-Islam

Hojjat al-Islam literally means “Proof of Islam.” Hojjat al-Islam began as an honorific title given to high-ranking scholars (ulema) in both Sunni and Shi’ite Islam. Hence al-Ghazali (d. 1111) was given the title Hojjat al-Islam, to signify his skill in arguing for the truths of Islam. It appears to have remained a general term of respect for a scholar. In the nineteenth century, the title began to reflect the more hierarchical structure of the Shi’ite seminary system. At first, scholars like Muhammad Baqir al-Shafti (d.1844) were given the titles mujtahid, Ayatollah, and Hojjat al-Islam. Later usage of the term Hojjat al-Islam was restricted to scholars of a rank lower than Ayatollah. A Hojjat al-Islam, since the Islamic revolution in Iran, is an “aspiring Ayatollah” who has completed his habib-e kharaj (the highest level of formal instruction) and is teaching, but has not yet gained sufficient prestige to be regarded as Ayatollah. While both Ayatollah and Hojjat al-Islam were titles of distinction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the titles have become relatively common in recent years, and this may reflect either a lowering of the qualification threshold, or an improvement in educational techniques in the Shi’ite seminaries of Mashhad, Qum, and the Atabat.

See also Ayatollah (Ar. Ayatullah); Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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Tamara Sonn

HOJJATIYYA SOCIETY

The Hojjatiyya (Hojjatieh) Society is an anti-Baha’i group that was established in 1957 by Mahmood-e Halabi, one of the well-known preachers and publicists of Mashad, the religious center of Khorasan province in Iran. (Bahaism is a religious movement that originated in Iran in the nineteenth century.) After the resignation of Reza Shah (1941), who opposed political activity by clerics, Halabi began to criticize the history and doctrine of Bahaism. When Halabi moved to Tehran, after Mohammad Reza Shah’s coup d’etat against the national government of Mohammad Mosaddegh at 1953, he found significant support from the conservative clergy, and the leading ulema approved of the Hojjatiyya Society’s activities. Hojjatiyya opposed any radical or revolutionary activity, and consequently there were no prohibitions on its social and cultural approach.

After Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1978–1979, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who opposed Hojjatiyya’s thesis as criticizing and crushing Bahaism as the main agenda of the Islamic Revolution, put some limitation on the activity of this group. Nevertheless Hojjatiyya was successful in closing the Baha’i’s public meetings and preventing the dissemination of the movement’s ideas. In 1983, Halabi stopped the educational activities of the Hojjatiyya Society, following Khomeini’s request that he do so. Hojjatiyya members have since been active in Iran’s judiciary, security system, and in offices responsible for staffing Iran’s governmental institutions.
HOLY CITIES

The Prophet of Islam is reported to have said that a Muslim should not embark on a pilgrimage or pious visit to any mosque other than the Holy Sanctuary of Mecca, the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, and the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. This statement in a sense maps out the sacred geography of the Islamic landscape. Muslims revere the cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem primarily because of the powerful spiritual symbolism associated with these sanctuaries.

Different religious traditions define sacred space according to different criteria, alluding to the multiplicity of ways in which holiness is conceptualized. Some traditions hold that sacred space is discovered through the manifestation of the divine, while others argue that holiness is created through a process of cultural labor. In the Islamic tradition, the origins and the performance of rituals of worship play an integral part in the sanctification of space. As such, the concept of the holy is more closely linked to the process of cultural labor, whereby space is sanctified due to its function in divine communion and not because of the perceived manifestation of the divine in a certain place. Therefore, the cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem are embraced as holy and regarded as sacred centers because of their intimate association with fundamental Islamic ritual practices.

In order to grasp the significance of these holy cities to the Muslim imagination their religious symbolism needs to be emphasized alongside their histories. Foremost among the three centers is Mecca, followed by Medina, and finally Jerusalem.

Mecca

The city of Mecca has been venerated as a holy center since time immemorial. In the pre-Islamic period it served as a center of pilgrimage for the pagan Arabs and was home to their most important idol deities. Muslims, however, view Mecca as the center of monotheism and the city where the Ka’ba, the first house for the exclusive worship of the one true God—Allah—was established. The prophet Abraham is reported to have built the Ka’ba in this barren valley by divine command. Abraham had long before left his son, Isma’il, with his mother, Hagar, in this place, also by divine command. Returning many years later, Abraham and his son undertook the construction of the Ka’ba. The Arabs, who are the progeny of Isma’il, flourished in the region but deviated from the pure monotheism of their noble ancestors, and at the time of the birth of the prophet Muhammad, Mecca was a center of idol-worship.

When Muhammad began preaching his message he was severely persecuted by his fellow Meccans and was forced to seek asylum in the nearby city of Medina. With the rise of Islam, the Prophet was finally able to conquer Mecca. He entered the city in 630 C.E., purging it of all its idols and reestablishing the Ka’ba as a symbol of pure monotheism once again. Mecca thus became a center of Muslim pilgrimage (hajj). Even today, Muslims from all over the world congregate in the city annually to perform the hajj, which is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam.

The Prophet did not choose to remain in Mecca, and settled in Medina instead. Thus, Mecca never became a city of any political significance, and the seat of governance in the Muslim world was always located elsewhere. The only time the city was of political importance was during the brief period after the death of the caliph Mu’awiyah. He was succeeded by his son Yazid in 680 C.E., but his rule was contested by ‘Abdallah ibn Zubayr, who was proclaimed
Ibn Zubayr managed to gain ascendancy over most of Arabia and certain parts of Iraq, but was finally crushed and killed by the Ummayyad general al-Hajjaj in 692 C.E.

When the Abbasids ousted their Ummayad cousins, they chose to continue ruling from Baghdad. Mecca was well patronized by the Abbasid caliphs, and they distributed vast sums of money to its inhabitants during their visits on pilgrimage. The appearance of the Qarmitiya, a militant sect opposed to the Abbasids, made some impact on the history of Mecca in this era. Over a fifty-year period, the sect made constant raids on pilgrim caravans, and in 930 C.E. they raided Mecca, massacring its inhabitants. They even carried away the Black Stone, the cornerstone that marks the beginning of the ritual of circumambulation around the Ka’ba. It was, however, returned some twenty years later, and a relatively calm state of affairs ensued thereafter, with pilgrimage taking precedence over politics in Mecca once again.

The city’s recent history also bears witness to some dramatic political events. In 1979 a group of Saudi militants stormed the sacred sanctuary that houses the Ka’ba and occupied it for sixteen days, killing many civilians and soldiers in the process. Apart from these infrequent events, however, Mecca has always been of preeminent importance to Muslims because of the Ka’ba and the hajj. It is solely because of the rituals of hajj performed in the city and its environs that Mecca is hallowed in sanctity.

When viewed in terms of sacred geography, the city can best be conceived of as a patchwork of sacred spaces. At the very center is the Ka’ba, which is for Muslims a veritable gateway opening into the realm of the transcendent. Muslims the world over face in the direction of the Ka’ba during the performance of the five daily prayers, and the Ka’ba is undoubtedly the most potent symbol of Islamic identity, due to its intimate association with the obligatory act of prayer. The history of the Ka’ba is even detailed in the Qur’an, and it is described as the first house established for the sole purpose of worshipping God (3:96). Although the Qur’an describes Mecca as being “full of blessing” (3:96) and an “asylum of security” (5:97), it goes on to emphasize the functional characteristic of the Ka’ba far more cogently. It was built for no other purpose but the establishment of prayer (14:37).

The immediate vicinity of the Ka’ba was also regarded as a sanctuary, and as such the Ka’ba and its surroundings make up the holy Mosque of Mecca, which is commonly known as al-Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary). Two very important rituals of hajj are performed in this Mosque. The first is the circumambulation of the Ka’ba. This ritual is associated with Abraham and Isma’il’s building of the house. As they laid the foundations, the two prophets supplicated Allah, imploring for mercy and asking that their sacrifice be accepted. In similar vein, the pilgrim reenacts the process and supplicates Allah as he or she completes the cycles known as tawwaf.

The second ritual performed in the Mosque is the sa’i, which literally means to strive. The pilgrim reenacts the frantic search for water undertaken by Hagar, an African freed slave, who ran between the two hills of Saffa and Marwa. Abraham had left her there, alone with her son, without any provisions. She ran between the two hills until God finally rewarded her quest with the blessed well of Zamzam, which suddenly gushed forth from the ground. The pilgrim therefore recalls the anguish of this noble woman, and is also reminded of the mercy of Allah.

Another sacred space linked to the pilgrimage is found on the outskirts of Mecca, not too far from the holy Mosque. This is the campsite of Mina. Not only do the pilgrims spend most of the five days of pilgrimage camped at Mina, but they also perform the ritual pelting of Satan there. This ritual is associated with Satan’s attempt to dissuade Abraham from obeying Allah’s command, and Abraham is reported to have chased the Evil One away by pelting him with pebbles on three occasions. The pilgrim therefore reenacts this event through the ritual pelting, thereby striving to fight his or her own spiritual weakness rejecting temptation. Mina only comes to life once a year, during the pilgrimage, and is virtually uninhabited for the remainder of the year.

Moving on from Mina, the pilgrim follows the path to the plains of Arafat, about 9 kilometers away from central Mecca. Arafat also only comes to life during the pilgrimage, and is the site where the prophet Muhammad delivered the famous last sermon. Standing on the plains of Arafat and supplicating Allah is the pinnacle of the hajj. The pilgrim who does not manage to make his way to Arafat on the specified time and day invalidates his or her pilgrimage and has to perform it over again. This ritual, unlike most of the others, is not related to Abraham and is more directly associated with the prophet Muhammad, who is reported to have said that the essence of pilgrimage is the supplication at Arafat.

Between Mina and Arafat is Muzdallifa, an area intimately linked to the pilgrimage rituals as well. The pilgrim must pass through Muzdallifa on the way back to Mina after completing the supplication at Arafat and perform the obligatory prayers there, as was instructed by the prophet Muhammad.

Like any world capital, Mecca is continuously being transformed and upgraded. The pilgrimage sites have been developed to facilitate the millions that visit there, and the city itself will surely grow and expand in the future. However, Mecca will always retain its aura primarily because of the pilgrimage.

Medina

Unlike Mecca, a visit to Medina is not an obligatory part of the pilgrimage, but the Prophet had personally sanctioned journeying to his mosque in Medina for the purpose of ziyyara, or pious visit. During the early Islamic era, Medina, called
The second holiest city in Islam is Medina, where the Prophet's Mosque, shown here, is located. Though he was born in Mecca, Muhammad failed to convince people there of his beliefs and was severely persecuted before he resettled in nearby Medina, where he gained more followers. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Yathrib in pre-Islamic times, had been the political capital of the nascent Islamic empire. Mecca was and still is by far the more important in terms of sacred geography, however. The oasis town of Yathrib, which lies about 500 kilometers away from Mecca, was renamed in honour of the Prophet, and is more properly referred to as al-Madina al-Munawwarra, or the Illuminated City.

The Prophet had migrated to Medina in 622 C.E., after failing to convince the Meccans of his mission. The city was far more diverse than Mecca, with a population comprised of Jews, Muslims, and idolaters. The Prophet attempted to unite the various factions into a single polity and his efforts were recorded in a pact known as Sahifa al-Madina, or the constitution of Medina. In the interim, the conflict between the nascent Muslim community of Medina and the Meccan pagans continued. The Prophet undertook over seventy expeditions against the Meccans from his new power base in Medina before finally conquering Mecca. The Prophet did not return to Mecca, however, as Medina was now his home. It was from here that he turned his attention to spreading the message of Islam to frontiers beyond the Arabian Peninsula. By the time of his death in 632 C.E., Islam stood poised to conquer the Byzantine Romans and the Persians that threatened its northern frontiers.

Medina remained the political capital of the Islamic Empire during the reign of the four caliphs who succeeded the Prophet. With the outbreak of civil war during the reign of ‘Ali (the last of the four caliphs) the city slowly began to lose political importance. ‘Ali left Medina in October 656 C.E. to quell insurrections in Iraq and never returned. The city of Kufa was for a brief period the center of events, but with the ascendance of Mu’awiya as caliph in 661 C.E., Damascus became the political capital of the Muslim world. Apart from isolated instances of upheaval, not much else occurred in Medina that was of major political significance from here on.

While Medina may have become completely marginalized in the political sphere, it gained considerable fame as a center of Islamic intellectual life. The scholars of Medina played an important role in the early development of Islamic jurisprudence and in the collection of hadith (prophetic traditions). In this important formative period, the legal school of Medina was made famous through the work of one of its most outstanding scholars, Malik ibn Anas, who died in 795 C.E.
However, it is neither the intellectual nor the early political status of Medina that is ultimately of primary importance to the Muslim community. Medina is venerated because it is the city of the Prophet of Islam and the first Islamic polity. It is in Medina that Islam took root and was strengthened. The city is also the site of a few important mosques that are intimately associated with the history of the ritual prayers. This is perhaps the main reason why the Prophet encouraged Muslims to visit Medina. Its sacred sites not only capture the early history of the prayer ritual, but also strengthen the believer’s resolve and commitment to these very practices.

The first mosque built in Medina was the mosque of Quba. This mosque lies on what was then the outskirts of the city, and it is where the Prophet paused for a few days before entering the city. Here he laid the foundations of the Quba Mosque. The mosque at Quba remained dear to the Prophet, and long after he had settled in Medina he would still make his way there on Saturdays to spend time in prayer and reflection. Muslims visiting Medina today still emulate this practice, and follow the path to the mosque of Quba in the early hours on Saturday mornings, where they remain until noon, as was the habit of the Prophet.

Nonetheless, the most important mosque in Medina is still the Prophet’s Mosque, also referred to as the Haram al-Madina (the Sanctuary of Medina). The Prophet’s own living quarters were attached to the mosque, and when he died he was buried in one of his apartments. The Mosque’s gravesite is thus attached to his mosque even today. While orthodox Islamic doctrine frowns upon the veneration of gravesites, Muslims the world over come to the mosque to visit the grave. This practice is tolerated as long as it is done under the pretext of visiting the mosque, for the Prophet is reported to have said that prayer in his mosque is rewarded more greatly than prayer elsewhere, except for prayer in the baram of Mecca, which carries the highest reward. In Medina, as in Mecca, it is once again the act of prayer that lends sanctity to this important space.

The final mosque that enjoys special status is the Qiblatyn Mosque, which literally means the mosque of two directions. Unlike the first two, this mosque is more of historical than ritual significance. There is no special reward mentioned for praying in it, nor did the Prophet set a precedent of visiting it on a regular basis. However, it is important because of the momentous event that occurred in it. For a period of sixteen months after the Prophet’s migration to Medina, the obligatory prayers were performed facing in the direction of Jerusalem. While praying in the Qiblatyn Mosque, the Prophet was ordered by divine directive to change orientation and face the Ka’ba in Mecca while praying (2:142). Even today, Muslims the world over pray facing Mecca, and in memory of God’s command to the Prophet, Muslims still frequent this mosque when visiting Medina.

Religious literature on Medina is replete with accounts that outline the virtues of the city, but many of these are apocryphal and therefore not worthy of mention. Such accounts do, however, lend an added aura and appeal to the holy status of the city, even if they are not really of great importance.

Jerusalem

Although Jerusalem’s status as the third holy city of Islam is extremely well established in the primary Islamic sources, Muslims do not claim exclusive spiritual rights to the holy city. Jerusalem is dear to all three of the Abrahamic faiths, and has been severely battled over by Muslims, Christians, and Jews through the centuries.

The Jews have always venerated the city as the site of the holy temple, but the pagan Romans had already obliterated all remaining vestiges of Jewish life in Jerusalem about five centuries before the city came under Muslim rule, in 638 C.E. When the Roman emperor Constantine embraced Christianity, the city was covered in Christian monuments. Although there was no chance of the Jews rebuilding their temple, Constantine did allow them into the city once a year, on payment of a fee, so that they could mourn the destruction of the temple.

In 614 C.E. the Persians captured Jerusalem, massacring thousands of Christians in the process. Fourteen years later, the Roman emperor Heraclius was able to drive the invaders out and recover the land and the city. He, in turn, wreaked a terrible vengeance upon the Jews, who were accused of colluding with the Persian invaders. At the dawn of Islam, therefore, the Jewish presence in Jerusalem had once again been viciously purged by the Christians.

The Islamic Empire underwent massive expansion after the demise of the Prophet. In the reign of the third caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, the Byzantines conceded Jerusalem to Islam. In 638 C.E., the caliph himself accepted the capitulation of the city from its Christian patriarch, Sophronius. In an unprecedented display of tolerance, ‘Umar granted the Christians protection of their religious sites and vouched for their safety. He even refused the patriarch’s offer to perform the midday prayer in a Christian shrine, recognizing the significance of the prayer in the appropriation and sanctification of space. He explained his reasons for refusing, saying that he did not want to create a pretense for future generations that may seek justification for the confiscation of this Christian shrine and turn it into a place of Islamic worship.

‘Umar immediately set about identifying the sites that were of religious significance to Muslims. Jerusalem is mentioned in the Qur’an as the city to which the Prophet had traveled in a night journey and in which he had assembled with all the previous prophets, leading them in prayer. ‘Umar therefore sought out this area and marked it out as a sanctuary. It was here that the al-Aqsa mosque was built. The
Al Aqsa Mosque and Temple Mount in Jerusalem. After he conquered Jerusalem in 638, the third caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, built Al Aqsa. The caliph chose a site the Qu’ran describes the Prophet Muhammad having traveled to in a night journey in order to gather all the previous prophets and lead them in prayer. © DAVE G. Houser/CORBIS

Prophet is then reported to have ascended to the heavens, where the five daily prayers were obligated upon him and his followers by Allah. His ascension was from a large rock, which was discovered under a dung heap, indicating that the area of the sanctuary was of no significance to the other religious communities at that time. 'Umar ordered the area to be cleaned and performed the prayers there. Building of the structure known as the Dome of the Rock commenced round about 688 C.E. on the order of 'Abd al-Malik ibn al-Marwan, the fifth caliph after Mu’awiyah.

Jerusalem became known to Muslims as Bayt al-Maqdis or simply al-Quds (the Holy City). It was thereafter patronized and maintained as a sacred site by all the Muslim caliphs from the Abbasids right through to the Ottomans, who finally lost the city to British mandate in the early twentieth century. The city remained under Muslim rule for thirteen centuries, with the exception of the brief interruption effected by the Crusades. In this long period, the greatest calamity to have befallen Islam was the loss of Jerusalem to the Crusaders in 1099 C.E. The city was finally reconquered by Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin) ninety years later, in 1187 C.E. In the interim, thousands of Muslims and Jews were slaughtered in the name of Christ. Saladin displayed remarkable tolerance not only to the Jews, but to the Christians as well, and under his rule the Jewish community once again thrived in the city, finding safe asylum from persecution there.

It is important to note that no Jewish place of worship is made mention of from the time of the Arab conquest in Jerusalem. Mention of the Wailing Wall as a place where pious Jews came to lament the loss of the temple only appeared around the time of Saladin’s reconquest. This wall was identified as the Western wall of the Al-Aqsa compound, and Jews from thereon frequented the place to pray.

This act of devotion was tolerated by the Muslim rulers of Jerusalem, with the gravest of consequences in recent times, after the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in occupied Palestine. What was initially a gesture of tolerance came to be held by some faithful Jews as an absolute right, not merely of access but ultimately of possession. Today the strife between Jews and Muslims over the site of the al-Aqsa complex rages fiercely.

United Nations attempts to accord the city of Jerusalem international status, with equal access for all three faith-groups, has up until now been unsuccessful. What Jerusalem needs today is the tolerance and foresight of a modern-day ‘Umar or Saladin; a leader with the temperament to show
equal respect to all three faiths and uphold the sanctity of Jerusalem to the benefit of all.

Holy cities or sites are inextricably linked with the transcendent and will always dominate the religious imagination, in spite of the tremendous toll sometimes exacted through conflict and contestation. It is only in these sacred spaces that human mortality is ultimately transcended, enabling the believer to stand in the presence of the divine. As long as Muslim practice and faith prevail, there will always be people who lay claim to the sanctity of the three spiritual capitals of the Islamic world: Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.

See also Caliphate; Dome of the Rock; ‘Ibadat; Mi‘raj; Muhammad.

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Aslam Farouk-Alli

HOMOSEXUALITY

Both erotic attraction and sexual behavior between members of the same sex have always been recognized phenomena in Islamic societies, but attitudes toward them have been complex, severe religious and legal sanctions against the latter coexisting with accommodating and at times indeed celebratory expressions of the former.

Religious discourse has mostly focused on sexual acts, which are unambiguously condemned. The Qur’an refers explicitly to male-male sexual relations only in the context of the story of Lot, but labels the Sodomites’ actions (universally understood in the later tradition as anal intercourse) an “abomination.” (Female-female relations are not addressed.) Reported pronouncements by the prophet Muhammad (hadith) reinforce the interdiction on male-male sodomy, although there are no reports of his ever adjudicating an actual case of such an offense; he is also quoted as condemning cross-gender behavior for both sexes, but it is unclear to what extent this is to be understood as involving sexual relations. Several early caliphs, confronted with cases of sodomy between males, are said to have had both partners executed, by a variety of means. While taking such precedents into account, medieval jurists were unable to achieve a consensus on this issue; some legal schools prescribed capital punishment for sodomy, but others opted only for a relatively mild discretionary punishment. There was general agreement, however, that other homosexual acts (including any between females) were lesser offenses, subject only to discretionary punishment.

Whatever the legal strictures on sexual activity, the positive expression of male homoerotic sentiment in literature was accepted, and assiduously cultivated, from the late eighth century until modern times. First in Arabic, but later also in Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, love poetry (by men) about boys more than competed with that about women, it overwhelmed it. Anecdotal literature reinforces this impression of general societal acceptance of the public celebration of male-male love (which hostile Western caricatures of Islamic societies in medieval and early modern times simply exaggerate). As in other premodern societies, such love was generally understood as an asymmetrical relationship, between an adult male (the lover) and an adolescent boy (the beloved), clearly paralleling the power differential between men and women in heterosexual relationships; rather than a single category of “homosexuals,” there were two, or rather three: “active” male-male lovers, “passive” adolescent beloveds, and a third, pathological and despised, category of adult males who sought out the passive role. Female-female relationships (never a subject for literary celebration) were less role-dominated, at least in earlier times; by the late Middle Ages a “butch-femme” paradigm seems to have asserted itself for them as well.
With the impact of Western colonialism in the late nineteenth century, these patterns (specifically, accepted “active” homoeroticism, subject to the same strictures on behavior as obtained with regard to extramarital heterosexual relations) began to change in most Islamic societies. The Western construction of the “homosexual”—often, however, misinterpreted as representing only the traditional pathological adult “passive”—has imposed itself with increasing force. Legal sanctions on homosexuality in various Islamic countries today vary considerably, as does their degree of dependence on traditional pronouncements of Islamic law. Societal attitudes have become more negative, and increasingly dominated by the new, imported paradigm of what “homosexuality” is (for both males and females); but recent liberalizing shifts in attitude in the West are also having their effect, and the entire subject is currently a nexus of considerable conflict.

See also Eunuchs; Gender.

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Hosayniyya

Hosayniyya is a rather recent name for public buildings in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon that are used by the Shi’a for mourning ceremonies, especially during the months of Muharam and Safar (the first two months in the Muslim calendar) wherein the martyrdom of Imam Husayn b. ‘Ali, grandson of the Prophet, is mourned. Their counterparts in India and Pakistan are called imambura or azakhbana, and in some places, ashurkhana, dargab, and alawi. Although mourning ceremonies have been common since the Buwayhid era, no definite date can be set for the emergence of the name hosayniyya before the last part of eighteenth century. Until that time these ceremonies were held in royal palatial halls, spacious houses, in streets, and open spaces. Apparently, from the second half of the Safavid era the tekkeyeb and khanqaha (also khanakha), buildings that originally served as establishments of the dervishes, were gradually transformed into hosayniyyas, often assuming this name from the latter part of the Zand and early Qajar periods onward. Starting in the mid-1950s, buildings serving similar religious purposes have been named after other imams and Shi’ite saints. For instance, in 1996 there were 1358 hosayniyya, 148 tekkeyeb, 34 fatimiyya, 32 mabdiyya, and 57 zainabiyaa in the Khorasan province. Scores of such buildings built during the last few decades of the twentieth century in the city of Mashhad bear such names as sajadisyay, baqiyya, sadiqiyaa, kazimiyaa, radawiyaa, jawwadiyya, naqawiyaa, askariyya, mahdiyya, fatimiyya, nargisiyya, and zaynabiyaa.

Apparently, the religious influence of the Safavid era (1501–1736) led to the building of the ashurkhana of the Deccan during the reign of the Shi’ite Quth-shahi dynasty, and Mir Muhammad Mu’mn Astarabadi (d. 1625), an eminent religious and political figure, is known to have built several of them in and around the city of Hyderabad, establishing a tradition that later spread to the north and other parts of India. The magnificent imambura of Asaf al-Dawlah at Lucknow is perhaps the most impressive of this kind of structures ever built.

See also Rawza-Khani; Ta’ziya (Ta’ziye).

Rasool Ja’fariyan

HOSPITALITY AND ISLAM

Generous hospitality extended to family, friends, and strangers is one of the best-known features of Muslim societies, whether pastoral, rural, or urban. This tradition of hospitality goes back to ancient times in the Middle East, an arid region where trade early became more important than in other regions and where the need for travelers to rely on the kindness of strangers was correspondingly greater. In Arabia, the pre-Islamic chieftain Hatim al-Ta’i represents the ideal generous host, and has remained a symbol of exuberant hospitality to this day.

For Muslims, the ideal of hospitality derives first from the Qur’an itself, which requires that hospitality or charity be offered to travelers: “It is righteous to believe in God; [and] to spend of your substance, out of love for Him. For your kin, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask,” (2:177; 2:215; 4:36; 8:41; 9:60; 17:26; 30:38; 59:7) and to the poor (3:89; 22:28; 36; 58:4; 74:44; 76:8–9; 90:14–18, 93:10; 107:3). The Qur’an also mentions rules relating to the hospitality of relatives and friends (24:61), and portrays the Prophet Abraham as offering hospitality to the visiting angels by slaughtering a calf (11:69–70; 51:24–27). Refusing to offer hospitality is reproved (18:77), as is treating guests insultingly or threatening them (11:77; 15:68). Indeed, such behavior is considered a great shame.

The prophet Muhammad’s own well-attested hospitality included reluctance to ask guests who had stayed too long to
leave, even though he was the head of state at Medina (33:53), and he let multitudes of envoys, guests, and the poor there enjoy hospitality in the mosque, which was also the courtyard of his house. More directly, in many extra-Qur'anic traditions the Prophet insisted that generosity be shown to guests, travelers, and strangers. As a result, Muslim law recognized offering guests three days’ hospitality as the Prophet’s way (sunna).

Khalid Yaba Blankenship

HUKUMA AL-ISLAMIYYA, AL-(ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT)

While continuing to refer to classical doctrines of the caliphate, contemporary Sunni concepts of the Islamic state, or Islamic order (al-nizam al-islami), have moved well beyond classical precedents to include elements of what is today considered to constitute “good governance”: the rule of law, participation, accountability, and the independence of the judiciary, without abandoning certain specifically Islamic notions such as “sovereignty lies with God, who has defined the fundamental moral and legal code regulating all human activity” (shari‘a). Government and society derive their legitimacy from “applying” the shari‘a. In their capacity as God’s representatives or trustees on earth (sing. khalifah), men and women are equal (though within specific domains, their rights and duties are not identical). The ruler (caliph, imam, or president) derives his authority from the community of believers, who elect him and are bound to obey him as long as he stays within the limits of God’s law. Consultation (shura) in all public affairs is obligatory, albeit not necessarily binding on the ruler. He is accountable before God and the community (though the instruments of sanction, including his removal from office, remain ill defined). Some authors further include universal suffrage, majority rule, and the separation of powers as basic elements of Islamic government in the modern age.

See also Political Islam.

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Gudrun Krämer

HUMAN RIGHTS

Contemporary discourses concerning human rights (huquq al-insan) and Islam, or rather their compatibility or incompatibility, are manifold and controversial, both in the Near and Middle East and in the West. In the nineteenth century, concepts such as political rights, public liberties, constitutionalism and related issues, found their way into the Muslim world through thinkers such as the Egyptian scholar Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (1807–1871) and the Persian diplomat Miza Malkom Khan (1833–1908). In the Ottoman Empire, significant reforms were initiated with the batt-i serif (1839; noble rescript of Sultan ‘Abdulmejid) and the batt-i humayun (1856; imperial rescript, reaffirming the batt-i serif) guaranteeing security of life, honor, and property, and a fair and public trial for individuals, and civil equality for all Ottoman subjects.

The United Nation’s Charter of Human Rights of 10 December 1948 was signed by the Muslim countries. In 1990 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, founded in 1973), which is composed of all the Muslim countries, submitted the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, in an attempt to identify specific Islamic features of human rights in combination with elements of international law. The Cairo Declaration has not been ratified; nevertheless it is referred to as a meaningful contribution to the discourse on human rights and Islam. Although the signatories emphasized in the OIC preamble their “commitment to the UN Charter and fundamental human rights,” the document of 1990 reveals differences and even conflicts with international human rights theory, since the latter does not accept that religious concepts are of overriding importance.

Article 24 of the Cairo Declaration subordinates all rights and freedoms to shari‘a (Islamic law), without clarifying the limits or questioning the area of conflict between civil and political rights, enacted in the constitution and international conventions on human rights, and the obligations that arise according to shari‘a. The sensitive points lay in the area of equality, particularly gender equality, as well as in the fields of art and science. Some examples may illustrate the dilemma: Under shari‘a, all human beings, men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, are equal in terms of dignity, but not in terms of rights. For instance, Muslim women and non-Muslims are not equal with Muslim men regarding family law and the law of inheritance. Although non-Muslim citizens enjoy the same rights and obligations as Muslim citizens, they are excluded from certain positions. Freedom of expression has to comply with the principles of shari‘a, that is, it must conform to the prevailing interpretation of Islam. Furthermore, the right of religious freedom is extremely limited for Muslims, since apostasy entails numerous civil law sanctions—such as the loss of the entitlement to inherit or the loss of the right to remain married to a Muslim partner—and even carries the possibility of a death sentence. It should be mentioned that numerous human rights organizations and activists in the Muslim world (for example, in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) have called for a revision of the Cairo Declaration in order to bring it into line with the fundamental principles of the UN Declaration.
The actual situation in Muslim countries reflects the complex social and political balance of power, inclusive of the monopoly of definition and interpretation, rather than the relation between Islam and human rights. This explains the existing gap between ideals and practice. Still, contemporary interpretations and applications of the shari‘a, especially under prevailing culturally or socially rooted inequalities and under authoritarian regimes, serve as a “legal” basis for violations of human rights. In these cases Islam is used to legitimate undemocratic measures. Pakistan provides one of the most striking examples because tribal (also patriarchal) traditions and customs, a gradual Islamization of the legal system, and a lack of adequate state protection there have resulted in the violation of several fundamental principles of human rights, such as freedom of religion, protection of minorities, and women’s rights or gender equality. Muslim Shi’ite communities and members of the Ahmadiyya, who are considered to be heretical, and non-Muslim (Christians) minorities suffer severe persecutions and violence. Discriminatory practices against women, including honor killings, abuse, rape, institutionalized gender bias, among others, are widespread and rarely prosecuted.

The case of the Egyptian scholar Abu Zayd provides but one example of how the limits set by the principles of shari‘a are defended by orthodoxy. Abu Zayd was accused of apostasy in 1993 because of his writings. After having taken his case to Egypt’s final court of appeal, he was condemned to divorce in 1996. Further, despite concepts in legal thought providing for the protection of minorities in Muslim societies, the actual situation contrasts sharply with existing theoretical ideals. Non-Muslim critics and intellectuals focus on the apparent contradiction between the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of shari‘a. On the one hand, civil and political rights are accorded to any citizen in Muslim countries by the constitution and the UN Charter but, on the other hand, the necessity of conformity with the norms and prescriptions of shari‘a are religiously legitimized. However, this discourse rarely includes the intense and diverse debates that are going on simultaneously within the Muslim world regarding the limits and possibilities of the adoption of human rights within the Islamic context.

The contemporary voices are complex and diverse, but an inquiry into two positions should be ample to give an idea of the wide range of interpretations and readings with regard to human rights within the Islamic world. Secular positions, such as that of the Egyptian scholar ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), argue that the Qur’an does not prescribe any particular form of government, and therefore a system wherein religion and politics are separated is not necessarily un-Islamic. Many scholars and intellectuals are in favor of ‘Abd al-Raziq’s model, for example, the Egyptian jurist Muhammad Sa‘id al-Ashmawi and the Syrian sociologist Burhan Ghaliyun. Proponents of this position state that Islam implies individual responsibility before God, and in this sense provides a moral and ethical basis for a society, but this does not imply any specific form of political system.

Some modernists even go further in arguing the secularists’ thesis. Like the secularists, they hold that Islam does not impose political or legal prescriptions, and add that Islam does not resolve the problems concerning the few and definitive legal regulations specified in the Qur’an and in the tradition. For Islam to do so, they argue, would call into question the Qur’an’s authenticity as the eternally valid word of God. In order to avoid this, modernists such as the Syrian Muhammad Shahrur argue that although the Qur’an is the last revelation and thus the last truth, this does not mean that there is only one interpretation. To the contrary, the Qur’an is open for different approaches and readings. Shahrur’s ideas elicit a great many positive responses within the Arab world. He is but one example of a scholar who pleads for an interpretation of Islam supportive of human rights. He, and scholars like him, challenge the prevailing Western perspective on Islam, while revealing that it is not Islam as such that is (or is not) compatible with human rights, but rather that certain interpretations of Islam are at the root of the issue.

See also Ethics and Social Issues; Gender; Law; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Secularism, Islamic; Shari‘a.

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Ursula Güntber

HUMOR

There is no classical Muslim definition of humor, but professor Franz Rosenthal offers one that attempts to be universally inclusive. In his Humor in Early Islam, Rosenthal suggests that the hallmark of humor is a “certain freedom from conventional motions” that, in ordinary circumstances, constrain us all. Thus any “deviation” from what is expected may cause laughter even if it happens to be partially tragic.

Humor in Early Islam

Humor is a modality for releasing tension. Muslims, like all other peoples, have their share of jokes, anecdotes, and other “deviations from ordinary reality,” to use one of Rosenthal’s
phrases. While in early Islam there was a tendency to lean toward seriousness because of the need to maintain *hilm* (dignified and civil behavior, propriety), there was considerable divergence from this austere stance. In the first century of Islam, for example, there were several schools of humorists, storytellers, and professional entertainers. These schools trained individuals in the art of devising as well as relating humorous anecdotes (*nawadir*, sing. *nadir*), along with teaching the skills of vocal and instrumental music. While there was religious objection to these arts, the justification for humor in early Islam was also based on religious arguments. The Qur’an does not forbid laughter as it is God “who grants laughter and tears” (53:43). In fact, there are many instances of humor in Muslim scripture, providing testimony to Islam’s “lighter side.”

Second only to the Qur’an are the traditions of the prophet Muhammad, who is said to have made frequent use of humor. There are numerous reports, found in authentic hadith collections, of the Prophet either smiling or laughing, or causing others to laugh. ‘A’isha, the wife of Muhammad, reportedly said that the Prophet often smiled. She noted, however, that he never laughed in a loud manner or exposed his uvula. The following anecdote, found in *Sunan Abu Dawud*, illustrates the Prophet’s humor:

A man broke his fast during Ramadan. The Messenger of God commanded him to emancipate a slave or fast for two months, or feed sixty poor men. He said: “I cannot provide.” The Apostle said: “Sit down.” Thereafter, a huge basket of dates was brought to the Messenger of God. He said: “Take this and give it as *sadaqa* [charity].” He said: “O Messenger of God, there is no one poorer than I.” The Messenger of God thereupon laughed so that his canine teeth became visible and said: “Eat it yourself.” (Hasan 1984., hadith 2386)

The eleventh-century Muslim author al-Husri refers to the prophet Muhammad’s liking of humor, saying he possessed a rather pleasant personality and was not averse to a decent joke. He even reports that the Prophet played practical jokes. For instance, he reports that the Prophet told an elderly woman that old women will not enter Paradise, causing her great distress. The Prophet then cited the Qur’an, which promises that she will enter Paradise as a young woman. Other companions of the Prophet are also reported to have approved of humor. For example, Ibn al-Jawzi refers to Imam ‘Ali as having said: “Whoever possesses a humorous element is cured of vanity and self-pride.”

### Classical Attitudes Toward Humor

In traditional Muslim religious discourse, one finds a general reproach for laughter and joking (*al-baz*), within a religious context. A widely circulated hadith in support of this stance is taken from *Sahib al-Bukhari*, which quotes the Prophet as saying: “By God, if you knew what I know you would weep much and laugh little.” At the same time numerous scholars in early Islam and continuing on into the Middle Ages found laughter and joking to be of extreme importance to their literary enterprise. The most notable reference work listing collections of humor stories comes from Ibn Nadim’s *Kitab al-fibrist*, a bibliographic work from the tenth century.

Among the works of notable Muslim scholars and mystics, who have either mentioned amusing anecdotes in their otherwise serious scholarly (*adab*) works, or have devoted entire works to the subject of humor, al-Jahiz’s (d. 868) *Kitab al-bukhala* (Book of misers) stands out. There are many others, including *‘Uyan al-akbar* by Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889), *al-Iqd al-farid* by Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih (860–940), and *al-Basa’ir wa al-dhukhrar* by al-Tawhidi (d. 1010). In al-Jahiz’s style of writing, serious subjects are presented together with jokes and amusing stories, and he quotes the Qur’an in associating laughter with life, stating that while laughter is not prohibited, it must be carried out in moderation.

Other scholars, such as al-Husri al-Qayrawani (d. 1022) in his *Jam’ al-Jawahir fi al-Mulab wal-Nawadir*, followed al-Jahiz in inserting amusing stories in their *adab* works. Similarly, many Shi’ite scholars, such as Baha al-Din al-Amili (d. 1621) and Ni’mat Allah al-Jaza’iri (d. 1701), argued for and made use of anecdotal humor in their writings, often citing hadith examples specific to Shi’ism.

There is ample evidence that numerous collections of such anecdotes (*nawadir*) existed in early centuries of Islam. Some collections have survived, but many disappeared during the Middle Ages due to criticism of witticism from orthodox circles. It is therefore to be noted that jocularity and laughter was not just a literary issue but also a moral and a religious one for many Muslim authors. Despite religious stiffness, however, a rich heritage of Arab and Islamic humor exists today by way of folklore. Contemporary Islamic and Sufi studies have also helped revive the humorous in conjunction with learning.

### Humor Characters in Islamic Literature

In his 1927 essay on humor in Arabic literature, Margoliouth reports that in early Islam there were not only the professional entertainers and court-jesters (sing. *maskbara*) whose job was to keep the ruler entertained, but even some cities had their known jesters and entertainers. One such personage was Ghadiri of Medina, who earned his living by telling amusing stories to his rich patrons and who was later taken over by Ash’ab. The figure of Ash’ab, called “the greedy,” was clearly known for his comic poetry and humorous remarks in a variety of circumstances, and his jokes remained popular well into the Abbasid period. In one of the many Ash’ab anecdotes, the greedy one is told:

“If you would transmit traditions (*abadith*, sayings of the Prophet) and give up your jokes, it would be more becoming of you.” Ash’ab replied: “Indeed, I have
heard traditions and transmitted them.” Asked to tell a
tradition, he said: “I was told by Na‘fi on the authority
of Ibn ‘Umar that the Messenger of God said: ‘A man
in whom there are found two qualities belongs to
God’s chosen friends.’” When asked what the two
qualities were, Ash‘al replied: “Na‘fi had forgotten
one, and I have forgotten the other.” (Rosenthal
1956, p. 117)

Another personage who came to be famous in many
Islamic societies and who has survived till the present is Juha,
also variously called Joha, Hoca, Zha, and many other names.
Juha is seen as a strange character who combines wit and
simplicity in his actions. He appears to be foolish and yet his
foolishness contains a deeper wisdom. Juha has a reputation
for escaping trouble, and his silly actions are a sign of
foresight. For instance, when Juha was appointed governor
by Timur, the emperor, he wrote his accounts to be submit-
ted to the emperor on thin pieces of bread. This seemingly
foolish act is, in fact, quite wise, because he knew that Timur,
when angered by his previous governor, had forced that
unfortunate man to eat his account books. There were other
characters, such as Abu Nuwas and Bahlul, who had similar
reputations.

By the eleventh century Juha was accepted as a historical
entity, but his precise name and lineage were still a matter of
much confusion. In the late Middle Ages, Juha appears in
Turkish writings as Nasreddin Hoca (in Arabic, Nasr al-Din
Khwaja, the name signifies “a learned man”). The name of
Hoca seems to have replaced Juha in popular folklore, and in
later Islamic writings they are seen as the same person with
two different names. Among Persian speaking peoples, he
became known as Mulla Nasr al-Din (or Nasrudin). In the
seventeenth century, Turkish folklore absorbed vast number
of anecdotes from earlier centuries in the name of Hoca, even
though these stories existed in some form before the develop-
ment of the latter figure.

This jester is still known by various names. As Nasrudin or
Nasreddin, he has over twelve hundred stories attached to his
name. In Egypt they know him as Juha, in Turkey and
Persian-speaking countries he is widely known as either Hoca
or Nasreddin; in other regions, including Indonesia, his joks
are told in the name of Abu Nuwas. He thus represents a vast
number of characters that have been developed over the
centuries by professional humorists and other religious and
adab writers, and can be found in some form in every Muslim
culture. He has gained considerable popularity in many non-
Muslim countries.

Humor and wit are also found in poetry, which is a
developed art form in Islamic civilization and finds expression
in Arabic, Persian, and other Islamic languages, such as Urdu.
The poetic humorists especially flourished during the Abbasid
period. They were called shu’ara‘ al-mujjam, and included
court poets such as Abu Dulama, who used to entertain by
way of bringing insults on himself. A description of Abu
Dulama’s style of entertainment is found in al-Husri’s Jam‘al-
jawabir:

Let it be known to you, Abu Dulama
You neither belong to a noble people,
nor do you have any nobility in you.
When you put on the turban, you appear like a monkey,
And when you put off the turban, you look like a swine.
You have combined in yourself both ugliness and
meanness,
And meanness is always followed by ugliness.
If you happen to have obtained the worldly pleasure,
Don’t shout, for the Day of Judgement is quite
near at hand.


Contemporary Humor
Although modern humorous literature may properly be shelved
under folklore, contemporary Sufi writers have argued that
the use of humor has always been essential in conveying the
spiritual wisdom of the sages. Idries Shah, for example, has
related many stories featuring the character of Mulla Nasrudin.
In his work on the Sufi use of humor, Special Illumination,
Shah argues that humor endures because it has the power to
teach while it amuses:

Jokes are structures, and in their Sufic usage they may
fulfill many different functions. Just as we may get the
humor nutrient out of a joke, we can also get several
dimensions out of it on various occasions: there is no
standard meaning of a joke. Different people will see
different contents of it; and pointing out some of its
possible usages will not, if we are used to this method,
rob it of its efficacy. . . .The joke, like the non-humorous
teaching-story, thus presents us with a choice instru-
ment of illustration and action. (Shah 1977, p. 11)

Humor is also a medium for expressing social and political
criticism. Often it can present a subject which is otherwise
prohibited by political or religious authorities. In her article
“Humor: The Two-Edged Sword,” Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid
Marsot offers one example of political humor from Egypt:

When Nasser died, the question of where to bury him
arose during a cabinet meeting. One minister said,
“Let us bury him in the tomb of the Unknown Sol-
dier.” Another objected, saying, “You can’t bury a
colonel with a common soldier.” A third suggested that
he be buried in one of the tombs of the Mamluk
sultans. “No! No!” was the objection. “You can’t bury the Rais with a slave.” Finally running out of burial sites, someone suggested Jerusalem. Whereupon, the rest of the cabinet rose in horror and said, “Never! The last time they buried someone there, he came back after three days!” (p. 263)

During the Gulf War in the early 1990s, many Palestinians came up with their own jokes to escape the otherwise horrible experiences of the war and its aftermath. One such joke is related by Sharif Kanaana in his article “Palestinian Humor during the Gulf War”:

Shortly after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Saddam’s little daughter had a birthday. Saddam asked her, “What would you like me to get you for your birthday?” She replied, “Get me Qatar.” (Kanaana 1995, p. 70)

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*Irfan A. Omar*

**HUSAYN (603–661)**

Husayn ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, grandson of the prophet Muhammad, the third Shi’ite imam, was born according to Sunnis on 6 Ramadan, according to Shi’i, on 3 Sha’ban. He was martyred at Karbala at noon on Friday the tenth (‘Ashura’) of Muharram at the age of fifty-eight in the year 680 C.E. For Shi’i, Husayn’s martyrdom is the paradigmatic story of existential tragedy, of injustice in this world triumphing over justice, of the duty a true Muslim has to sacrifice oneself, to witness for truth and justice as Husayn did, and to shock others into returning to the cause of Islamic social justice, a theme that has come again to political importance in the rhetoric of Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1977 through 1979, but also in Iraq in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Husayn in 2003.

**The Importance of the Difference between Sunni and Shi’a Interpretations**

What is at issue in the different understandings of Sunni and Shi’i is not mere history, but the abstractions from history that compose the mythos or symbolic structure of religious belief. The account of early Islam by Western historians, as well as the Sunni account, is a story of alliances among Bedouin tribes that controlled the trade between the three great agrarian empires of Byzantium, the Sassanians, and Abyssinia. The second caliph, ‘Umar, was the architect of expanding the polity that Muhammad had initiated. He nominated Abu Bakr to succeed Muhammad, then ‘Umar became the second caliph. Conquest proceeded quickly across the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and Iran. The state was based on the separation of the Arab military garrisons from the conquered populations. ‘Umar’s governor in Syria, Mu’awiya, commanded from Damascus, but elsewhere garrison towns were established: Kufa near Ctesiphon, Basra on the Gulf, Fustat at the head of the Nile delta. A register of Muslims was established so that these garrisons could be paid from the booty of war and revenue from lands conquered. As expansion slowed, this system caused problems under the third caliph, ‘Uthman, who reacted by relying increasingly on his own clansmen, the Umayyads. This provoked further complaints. In an attempt at symbolic unity, ‘Uthman imposed a standardized Qur’an; this also led to resentment. ‘Ali became a center of opposition to these policies. ‘Uthman was assassinated in 656, and ‘Ali was proclaimed the fourth caliph in an attempt to stabilize the state by using his religious position as imam to strengthen the secular position of amir al-mu’minin. But it did not work: he was assassinated, Mu’awiya became caliph, and he appointed his son, Yazid, to succeed. The Hejaz refused to recognize Yazid, and Kufa invited Husayn to lead a revolt. It failed, ending with Husayn’s death at Karbala.

This history can be followed in the Shi’ite version but with quite different nuances, emphases, and meanings: Leadership should have passed from Muhammad to ‘Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, whom the Prophet had adopted as a boy even before Muhammad’s first marriage. According to Sunnis succession was elective, and Abu Bakr, the father-in-law of Muhammad’s youngest wife, was legitimately elected. But according to Shi’a this was an usurpation, not just of Muhammad’s designation but of the special access to the infallible interpretation of the Qur’an that passes via the lineage of the twelve imams from ‘Ali to Hasan and Husayn. ‘Ali withdrew
into quiet teaching, and also compiled an authoritative edition of the Qur'an (having been one of the recorders of Muhammad's recitations of revelation), allowing the first three caliphs to show by their actions and legal decisions how imperfect and unfit they were to lead. The story of 'Ali's martyrdom while praying in Kufa on the 19 Ramadan 661 C.E. provides Shi'a with a prologue to the central martyrdom of Husayn: 'Ali's foreknowledge of his death, his generosity toward his assassin, his courage in battle, his knowledge of Islamic law, his humility as an officerholder, and his wisdom as a judge. These are celebrated by Shi'a. Hasan, 'Ali's eldest son, who was too weak to wrest the leadership from Mu'awiya, was poisoned, and Mu'awiya declared his own son, Yazid, his successor.

**Husayn's Martyrdom at Karbala**

Husayn, 'Ali's second son, refused to swear allegiance. It is alleged by Shi'a that Yazid sent assassins to mingle with pilgrims at the hajj. To avoid bloodshed during the hajj, Husayn cut short his pilgrimage. Foreseeing his martyrdom, he released his followers from any obligation to follow, and with his family and seventy-two men, he went toward Kufa. Yazid had co-opted the Kufans. Husayn's forces, who were trapped in the desert at Karbala, were denied access to water (to the Euphrates), and on the tenth of Muharram all but two of Husayn's men were slain, his body was desecrated, and the women were taken prisoner. According to a Shi'ite legend Husayn's head was taken to Damascus, where the caliph Yazid beat it with sticks in a vain attempt to keep it from reciting the Qur'an. The details of the battle of Karbala form the key imagery of passion plays (ta'ziyeh, shabih) and preachments (rawzehs).

The details heighten the significance of Yazid's tyranny and desecration of the sacred and proper order of life and Islam. Not only had Yazid usurped the caliphate and was using that office tyrannically, but he had attempted to desecrate the hajj, had desecrated the time of communal prayer (Friday noon), and had destroyed one by one the elements of civilized life symbolized most powerfully by the denial of water. Three sons of Husayn were slain: the infant 'Ali Asghar, the five-year-old Ja'far, and the twenty-five-year-old 'Ali Akbar. Destruction of family, community, government, and humanity are all themes of the Karbala story, retold and relived in rawzehs (a form of preaching that uses the Karbala story to frame the topic of the sermon), taziyehs or shabibs (passion plays), dasteh or matam (lines of men chanting, beating their chests, and flagellating their foreheads and backs with knives), and the carrying in processions of naqle (large wooden structures representing Husayn's bier that requires scores of men to carry; called ta'zizyehs in India and Trinidad, there in the shape of the Taj Mahal).

**The Karbala Paradigm**

For Sunnis, the tenth of Muharram is merely a day of voluntary fasting that has to do, not with Husayn, but with Muhammad. Sunnis focus their symbolic structure on Muhammad, while Shi'a, also honoring the details of Muhammad's life, focus attention on 'Ali, Husayn, the Five Pure Souls of the Family of the Prophet, and the twelve imams. Key calendrical events differ: For Shi'a, Husayn's birthday is not the 6 Ramadan, nor 'Ali's 22 Ramadan, as they are for Sunnis, and all such happy events are in other months the better to focus on the martyrdom of 'Ali during Ramadan. Sunnis deny that Hasan was poisoned: He died of consumption; Sunnis say that Abu Bakr, not 'Ali, was the first man (after Muhammad's wife Khadija) to accept the call to Islam.

Such systematic differences help signal the Shi'ite drama of faith: Believers are witnesses (shahada) through their acts of worship (ibada) to the metaphysical reality that is hidden (gib'ib). Shahada means both martyrs and witnesses. Husayn, knowing he would die, went to Karbala to witness the truth, knowing that his death would make him an enduring, immortal witness, whose example would be a guide for others. Gib'ib refers to a series of inner truths: a God who is not visible, a twelfth imam who is in occultation, a personal inner faith, and the special light (nur) that created Muhammad, 'Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn, the Five Pure Souls of the Family of the Prophet (33:33), and whose direct connection with the divine passes down through the line of the imams. The nur doctrine parallels the divine royal farv of Persian epic tradition. There is a story that Bibi Shabnanu, the daughter of the last Sassanian king, married Husayn so there is a connection between Persian royalty and the imams. The nur doctrine says that all 124,000 prophets as well as the imams were created from a ray of divine light, often making for a divine birth, as was the case with Husayn. Fatima emerged from a stream pregnant, the pregnancy lasted only six months, and her womb glowed with incandescent light.

There are thus three parts to the notion of the Karbala paradigm as encoding for the Shi'a story of Husayn: (1) a story expandable to be all-inclusive of history, cosmology, and life's problems; (2) a background contrast (of Sunni conceptions, but also other religions) against which the story is given heightened perceptual value; and (3) ritual or physical drama to embody the story and maintain high levels of emotional investment: rawzeh, shabib, ta'zizyeh, dasteh, and matam.

Husayn is an intercessor at Judgment Day, and with various interpretive sophistication, one is induced by the pietistic and didactic exercise of the rawzeh to weep for Husayn in an act of repentance so that he may intercede and judge one's sins more lightly and with compassion. Some rawzeh-khwans (preachers) elicit tears for the injustice of the world and the misfortunes that befell Husayn and Shi'a; others stress Husayn as an example of bravery and courage in the fight for freedom rather than as a victim. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the time of the Iranian revolution stressed that one should not cry for Husayn, but one should march with the same determination that he showed to fight
Muharram is a Muslim festival commemorating the death of the martyr Imam Husayn, Muhammad’s grandson and the third Shi’ite imam (pictured here with Nawab of Nurshidabad in prayer). Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims conflict in their versions of Husayn’s story. The Art Archive/ British Library

for justice against all odds. Since martyrs are said to go to heaven, one need not mourn their deaths as one does the deaths of ordinary people. During the Iranian revolution young men wore white shrouds to symbolize their willingness to die, and wall graffiti proclaimed that those who died did the work of Husayn, those who fought did the work of Zaynab (she kept the survivors of Karbala together and maintained the message of Husayn until the fourth imam had recovered and could assume leadership), and those who did not fight did the work of Yazid.

The dramatic performances of the events of the first ten days of Muharram at Karbala (the passion plays, shabih, ta’ziyeh, and rawzebs) are occasions when the story can be expanded to stories of the earlier prophets who had foreknowledge of the martyrdom of Husayn and were told that their own sufferings were minor in comparison. Thus, Adam, when first put on Earth, wandered across the future site of the battle of Karbala and cut his toe, a prefiguration, God told him, of the more serious blood that would be shed there by Husayn. The infant Isma’il suffered thirst but found water; Husayn and his children suffered a greater thirst and were denied water. God substituted a ram for Isma’il, but Husayn was in fact slain.

In politically charged times—as in the years before the 1977–1979 Islamic revolution in Iran—the Karbala paradigm could be a vehicle for political mobilization. The shah was identified with the caliph Yazid (who sent his army to defeat Husayn) and injustice, while Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who would lead the revolution, was identified with Husayn and with the forces of justice. Preachers could speak against Yazid and be understood to be attacking the shah. In the Persian Gulf and the Subcontinent (Lucknow, Karachi), the processions of ‘Ashura’, the tenth of Muharram—when the bier of Husayn (ta’ziyehs in India, nagfs in Iran) is carried through the streets along with chanting (“Husayn! Husayn!”) and breast-beating groups of men (dasteh) sometimes also beating their backs with chains and slashing their foreheads with knives—in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries often caused riots between Sunnis and Shi’a. Under Khomeini, conflict with Saudi Arabia was stirred up by invoking the hajj
in the Husayn story, and using the hajj as a site for organizing and spreading the message of the revolution; in the war with Iran, Iraq utilized slogans about Karbala and a series of military operations were code-named Karbala.

In less politically charged times, as well, the emotional work of the passion plays, processions, and rawzebs is one of instilling stoicism and determination to fight for justice even against the overwhelming odds of a corrupt world. After the ousting of Saddam Husayn from power in Iraq in 2003, on the fortieth day after the tenth (‘Asura) of Muharram, hundreds of thousands of Shi’a joyfully joined processions to Karbala (a practice forbidden under Saddam Husayn) with many dasteb[s] of chanting men, head slashing and flagellation with chains.

See also Imamate; Martyrdom; Shi’a: Early; Shi’a: Imam (Twelve); Succession.

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Michael M. J. Fischer

HUSAYNI, HAJJ AMIN AL- (1895–1974)

Amin al-Husayni was both the religious and preeminent political leader of the Palestinians during British rule in Palestine (1917–1948). Born in Jerusalem to a patrician family, he studied briefly at al-Azhar University.

The British appointed him mufti (jurist who gives legal decisions, or fatwā) of Jerusalem in 1921, and President of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922. Fearing Zionism’s consequence on his people, he helped galvanize the Palestinians and the Arab and Islamic world against the Zionist program in Palestine. To emphasize the centrality of Jerusalem to Muslims, he renovated in the 1920s the Dome of the Rock, with Muslim funds, and organized two Islamic conferences in Jerusalem in 1928 and 1931.

The 1929 disturbance (Western [Wailing] Wall riots) catapulted him to political power. He cooperated with the British and attempted to change their pro-Zionist policy. But his attempts failed and he joined the Arab Revolt in 1936. When the British tried to arrest him, he fled to Baghdad, where he participated in an unsuccessful anti-British revolt. Al-Husayni fled to Germany and cooperated with the Nazis until 1945. He rejected the 1947 UN partition resolution, and the Palestinians, despite Arab military help, were unable to stop the establishment of Israel. Some 726,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled by Israel during the 1948 war. The Mufti spent the rest of his life as a religious leader in the Islamic world, where he had been popular since the 1930s.

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HUSAYN, SADDAM See Ba’th Party; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military and Judicial Reform; Nationalism: Arab; Pan-Arabism

HUSAYN, TAHА (1889–1973)

Taha Husayn was a prominent Egyptian writer and educational reformer. Born in a village in upper Egypt, Husayn was left blind after an illness at age two. In 1902, he began studies at al-Azhar in Cairo and was quickly at odds with its traditional curriculum and teaching methods. Switching to the newly opened Cairo University, he became the first student to receive a doctorate there in 1914. He completed a second doctorate at the Sorbonne (Paris, France) in 1919. As a professor of Arabic literature at Cairo University, he quickly emerged as one of the most prolific and controversial literary figures in the Arab world. His book Fi’l-shi’r al-jabali (On pre-Islamic poetry), published in 1926, incurred the condemnation of religious conservatives for casting doubt on the authenticity of pre-Islamic poetry and, by extension, possibly of the Qur’an and other early religious texts. His most systematic work of social commentary is Mustaqbal al-thaqafa fi Misr (The future of culture in Egypt), in which he argues that Egypt was historically an integral part of the Mediterranean culture that gave birth to Western civilization. Modern Egyptians should therefore see themselves, and be seen by others, as part of Europe. Essential to this new identity is the secularizing of national life in Egypt. His three-volume autobiography, begun in 1929 as al-Ayyam (The days), is considered a milestone in modern Arab literature.
See also Arabic Literature; Modern Thought.

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Sohail H. Hashmi
Ibadat

The sacred law of Islam (the shari'ah) distinguishes two kinds of practices: ‘ibadat (practices concerning the relations between God and human beings, or devotional practices) and mu'amalat (social ethics, i.e., the part of the law that guides the relations between humans). The ‘ibadat include the salat (prayer), zakat (alms giving), sawm Ramadan (fasting during the holy month of Ramadan), and the hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca and the holy places near to this holy city, namely ‘Arafat, Muzdalifa, and Mina).

Some aspects of the ‘ibadat can be qualified as ritual and other aspects fit less easily in this category. For example, zakat regulations pertain to goods or wealth that are to be handed over to certain categories of persons who are entitled to it (in particular, the needy). This takes place in a nonritual context on the one hand, and a ritualized context, that of giving zakat (zakat al-fitr) on the Day of the Breaking of the Fast, on the other.

According to the shari'ah, the ‘ibadat are all the individual duties that each mentally competent, mature, and healthy Muslim (male and female) is obligated to perform. The formulation of the niyya, the intention to perform these rituals before performing them, is of crucial importance for their validity, or, as the Prophetic tradition has it: “The works are (only) rendered valid by their intentions.”

In the fiqh (jurisprudence), actions are qualified as follows. Fard or wajib indicates that an act is obligatory in such a way that omission will be punished and the performance will be rewarded. The qualification sunna or mustahabb indicates that an act is recommended but that omission will not be punished. Mubah or ja'iz means that it is indifferent, and makroh, reprehensible, that is, omission will be rewarded. Finally, forbidden (haram) indicates that omission will be rewarded and performance will be punished. These qualifications may vary among the law schools with regard to their precise connotation.

Together with the testimony of faith (shahada), the ‘ibadat constitute the five pillars of Islam (arkan al-Islam). According to Islam, humans have been created to serve God. Both the individual and the community are under the obligation to follow the stipulations of the revealed law. According to the scholars, the religious duties are clearly set out in the two sources of the revelation: the ayat al-shari'ah in the Qur'an and in the sunna, the Prophetic tradition. There is no difference of opinion among scholars with regard to the obligatory and clear (bayan) nature of these duties. This status explains why someone who denies them their obligatory character places him- or herself outside religion. That person expresses kufr, unbelief.

Status

According to religious views, the ‘ibadat are constant and do not allow for varying interpretations based on spatial and temporal circumstances. In reality, however, some changes in the way the ‘ibadat have been performed and interpreted by the believers have taken place. There can be no doubt that its religious status explains why the ‘ibadat changed far less than the mu'amalat. They are the “symbolic capital” (the term was coined by Pierre Bourdieu) of the ulema, who have been able to retain their position until the present day. Nowadays that position is being challenged by emerging religious authorities, such as liberal intellectuals like Mohamed Arkoun, and also Islamist leaders who enjoined no traditional religious education, such as the late Sayyid Qutb.

New media and political situations also allow further possibilities to acquire authority. For example, “Cyber muftis,” who give fatwas via the Internet, and often have unclear backgrounds, draw new audiences. In 1960 Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba argued in various addresses to his
population that under the circumstances in which the nation found itself, namely that of the recently recovered freedom from French colonial rule, it should be permitted not to fast during Ramadan. According to him, Tunisia could be considered to be in an economic jihad, with regard to its struggle for a better economic position. Fasting, he stated, would bring about too considerable a loss of productivity. It soon appeared, however, that the most important Tunisian ulema did not endorse the proposal and that the population did not give up the fast.

The aforesaid high status of ritual obligations does not always correlate with a high rate of performance. Empirical research by Bruno Etienne and Mohamed Tozy showed that only 10 percent of the men in the Moroccan city of Casablanca attended the obligatory Friday prayer and that only one out of every thousand persons performed the daily salat in a mosque.

Although often discussed as if they are isolated phenomena, the ‘ibadat are in practice embedded in and closely interwoven with a complex system of informal and formal religious behaviors. These behaviors are not only guided by the rules of the fiqh, but also by cultural and political traditions, local circumstances, the norms and values of the believer’s own community and other religious communities, politics, and society at large. A discussion about whispering or reading aloud particular recitations during the salat among the Gayo (Indonesia) had a background in local debate between traditionalists and reformists about conceptions of community and faithfulness to the normative example of the prophet Muhammad. This shows that the opposition between universal versus local meaning, or great and little traditions, does not hold in the case of the salat. Other researchers made it clear that connected oppositions, namely between orthodox (male) versus heterodox (female), did not hold in the case of gender roles, either.

Ritual in Pre-Islamic Arabia

The rituals that became the ‘ibadat as we know them today were not unknown in sixth-century Arabia. Rituals such as fasting were known (see Q. 19: 26–27). Certain fasting practices and purity regulations were also observed by Meccan monotheists. Hence, the religious scholars make a distinction between the meaning of a term such as sawm (fasting) in daily
use and its meaning in the *sahih*. In daily use, *sawm* means abstention, for example, from food or drink. In the terminology of the *sahih* it has received the (revealed) meaning of refraining from food and drink from dawn to sunset.

The hajj was also practiced in the pre-Islamic period (“time of ignorance”), but in a form different from the Islamic hajj. Unlike today, pilgrims performed different hajj rituals. For example, the tribal alliance called the Hums, to which the Prophet belonged, refrained from performing the standing at ‘Arafat and the running between the hills al-Safa and al-Marwa for religiopolitical reasons. Instead, the importance of the Ka’ba as a central sanctuary was enhanced. It is also known that tribes had different *tahlja* and *ibram* practices.

In pre-Islamic times, the rituals were embedded in a cycle that was determined both by the solar and lunar calendars. The ‘*umra* was a spring ritual in the month of Rajab in which animals were sacrificed, the hajj fell in the autumn, celebrating the harvest. The eleven days separating the lunar from the solar year were compensated for by the so-called intercalation, the *nasi‘*. The *nasi‘* was abolished by the Prophet after the conquest of Mecca, as is attested in the Qur’an (9:37). From that moment onward calendrical feasts and rituals were no longer tied to the seasons.

Other ritual changes introduced by the Prophet aimed at dissociating rituals from sunset and sundown, for example, the running of the pilgrims between ‘Arafat and Muzdalifa and prayer during sunrise. Ritual restrictions observed by the Hums were also abolished in order to symbolize the unity of mankind in Islam. Hence the Qur’an states that there is no sin (2:158) in performing the *sa‘y* (pacing back and forth seven times) between Safa and Marwa, something that the Hums had refrained from doing. Through the example of the Prophet during the farewell-pilgrimage, the ‘*umra* was joined to the hajj and so both rituals became united. They can still be performed separately, however. Moreover, the rituals of running around the Ka’ba and running between the Safa and Marwa were united with the rituals in ‘Arafat, particularly one of the hajj’s central rituals of “standing.” This ritual takes long hours where, ideally, the pilgrims stand in prayer. A preferred place for this ritual is near or on the Hill of Mercy.

Thus, prayer, giving *zakat* (2:215, 9:6), fasting (2:179), and the hajj (3:91) became individual Islamic duties. Friday afternoon became the day of communal prayer, accompanied by a sermon (*khutba*). This day and time were chosen since a market was held in Medina in the morning and many people gathered there. After the death of the Prophet in 632 C.E., the rituals further developed both with regard to actual practice and the norms and values held by the community. In this process the religious identity of Islam as a separate religion played a great part.

**Religious Identity**

Traditions recommended that believers distinguish themselves from the followers of other religions and not assimilate with regard to dress and prayer rituals (for example, whether or not to pray while wearing shoes). These traditions were an expression of the desire to establish an Islamic religious identity, and they have continued to influence Muslim attitudes and behavior until today and are the cause of numerous discussions. For example, the present-day custom among Dutch Muslims of Surinamese origin to make a ball of flour out of the child’s hair and throw it in the river should be shunned, for it was said to have been taken over from the Hindus. Another example is the question of whether Muslims are allowed to attend Christmas celebrations, a matter that is hotly debated in many places.

But not only did such behavior serve to mark off Islam from other religions, it also functioned inside the Islamic community. For example, in medieval times there was a great ritual divide between Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam about the acceptability of the purification ritual of passing the hand over the boots, which even found its way to medieval creeds. The issue here was whether it was permissible to wipe the boots instead of the feet themselves when travelling. Shi‘ites did not allow this, while Sunni Muslims did.

**Emerging Rituals**

New customs were not always looked upon favorably by the ulema. In many cases they were qualified as innovations (*bid‘as*). The celebrations of the birthday of the Prophet (the *mawlid al-nabi*) and of the middle night of Sha‘ban are two famous cases in point. Complete inventories of such *bid‘as* came into existence in the Middle Ages. Many ulema applied the same sort of rules to these *bid‘as* as to other actions, hence they might vary from laudable to forbidden. Rispler Chaim argues that the purpose of such inventories was not to prohibit such new ritual forms, but rather to bring them under control and steer them in such a way that their performance would not infringe on morality and good manners (for example, by mixing men and women).

Muslims are exhorted not to devote themselves to rituals to the detriment of the body. Hence, women may abstain from fasting, and the ill and sick do not have to perform the *salat* or fast. Islam advises believers to take care of the body and soul in a harmonious way. Islam incorporated and transformed existing rules of purity in its religious system. The overall term for these rules is *tabara*, which means purity. A well-known tradition says “Purity is half the faith.” All ‘*ibadat* are in one way or the other related to notions of purity. For example, giving alms is associated with purifying goods as well as oneself (see 9:103, “Take alms from their wealth, wherewith thou mayst purify them and mayst make them grow, and pray for them”). The *salat* should also be performed in a ritually clean state (5:6).
Prayer (Salat)
The following passages from the Qur’an form the foundation of the five daily prayer times.

So give glory to God when you reach evening and when you rise in the morning. Yes, to Him is praise in the heavens and on earth and in the afternoon and when the day begins to decline. (30:17–18)…celebrate the praises of your Lord before the rising sun, and before its setting. Yes, celebrate them for part of the night and at the sides of the day, so that you may have spiritual joy. (20:130)

The five prayers should take place in the following order:
- Fajr: break of day
- Zuhr: midday
- Asr: during the afternoon
- Maghrib: evening
- ‘Isha: night

These are a few of the words and positions of prayer, which is always said in Arabic. Movements one through five constitute one rak‘ah. Each of the prayer times consists of two to four rak‘ahs. Movements six and seven complete the prayer.

Through wudu’, the ritual washing, Muslims prepare for prayer in mind, body and spirit.


For this reason books on fiqh usually begin with a discussion of purity rules. A key term in this respect is that of the fitra, a concept that can be rendered as the natural disposition of humankind created by God. The state of fitra includes circumcision (khitan), the clipping of the nails, trimming the mustache, removing the hair from armpits and pubis. All these acts refer to bodily practices with a connotation of purity. According to many Muslim scholars, the salat performed by an uncircumcised man is void, nor can he serve as an imam during prayer. However, that purity is not of a
medical-material nature, but has a religious symbolic side, it appears, from the possibility of using sand or dust instead of water for the ablution when the latter cannot be found (tayammum, mentioned in 5:6). The ground on which the salat is performed (hence the use of prayer rugs) should also be pure. Dress should be modest. Private parts should be covered. In addition to the body, Islamic devotional life structures time (rites of passage, feasts, festivals, pilgrimages) and place and space (the home, mosque, masjid). These aspects will be discussed below.

The Ritual Calendar
The ritual cycle is connected to the lunar year, which opens with the feast of ‘Asura on 10 Muharram. For Shi’ite Muslims this marks the day on which the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet, al-Husayn, at Karbala in 680 C.E., is commemorated by emotional and at times violent mourning rituals. According to Sunni fiqh ‘Asura had been a fasting day before the prescription of the Ramadan fast, and it has remained a voluntary fasting day until the present. In Morocco it is a festival on which the dead are honored, and during which the participants give alms, eat dried fruit, and buy toys for their children. It is accompanied by reverie and carnival-like rituals such as masquerades, processions, and theater.

On 12 Rabi’ I, the third month, the birthday of the Prophet is celebrated. This festival grew out of the Fatimid Shi’ite ritual practice (eleventh century C.E.), commemorating the birthdays of the members of the the Prophet’s immediate family, the Prophet, and the reigning Fatimid imam. It was gradually introduced in Sunni circles in successive parts of the Middle East and the Muslim West. Nowadays, celebrated nearly everywhere (although exceptions, such as Saudi Arabia, exist), its status as a feast has nevertheless remained controversial. It is considered to be a bid’a (see above) and is rejected by movements that consider it to be veneration of a human being, something that should be reserved exclusively for God and hence as shirk (the act of associating with God).

The first Friday night in Rajab, which is especially celebrated in Turkish Islam, is a holy night, called laylat salat al-ragha. On 27 Rajab, the Laylat al-Mi’raj, or night of ascension, is celebrated. The ascension of the Prophet via Jerusalem (al-isra’wal-mi’raj) is one of the great symbols of Islam in which the believer ascends toward God. It is at this occasion that the number of daily salats was fixed at five. Elements of the ritual celebration may include recitation of surat al-isra’ (17), followed by commentaries, singing, and the recitation of religious poems of sorts.

The celebration of the fifteenth middle night of Sha’ban, also called laylat al-bar’a, is another bid’a. Its popularity can be explained by its age-old associations with the divine decision of who will die the next year, which is believed to be made on that night.

The month of Ramadan is marked by the fast, and on the 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29 of that month Laylat al-qadr is celebrated. Ramadan is the holy month par excellence. Even those who otherwise hardly practice Islam participate in the Ramadan fasting. According to popular beliefs, the devils (shayatin) and jinn are powerless, while in contrast God is nearer than during other months. This increased religious awareness culminates in laylat al-qadr, when, as some people believe, the gates of heaven are opened. On 1 Shawwal, the Day of the Breaking of the Fast (‘id al-fitr) is celebrated. After the salat al-‘id, people pay visits to relatives, which often includes visits to the graves (ziyarat al-qubur).
On 10 Dhu-l-Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic year, ‘id al-adha is celebrated. This ritual marks the end of the year, but in fact it does not represent the end of the ritual cycle, since there is a clear connection between the ‘id and the ‘Ashura rituals.

Rites of Passage

Other elements of the ‘ibadat fit in the life-cycle rituals or rites of passage. This holds true for birth rituals, circumcision, and death rituals. Birth rituals include the custom of whispering the adhan and iqama in the newborn’s ear. This includes the recitation of the sibada or Confession of Faith, as discussed below. This ritual is recommended according to the Shafi’ite madhhb. The ‘aqiqah, the sacrifice of a sheep or goat, takes place on the seventh day, through which joy and thanks for the child are expressed. It is usually accompanied by a naming ceremony (tasmiya) during which the child receives its name, and shaving the hair of the child as a sacrifice. The meat of the sacrifice and the weight of the hair in silver are sometimes given away as alms. Circumcision (Ar. khit atan, tabara) is a fixed sunna (strongly recommended) according to most schools. The Shafi’ites are of the opinion that it is obligatory. In actual life, virtually all male Muslims are circumcised.

The deceased is purified by a ritual bath (ghusl), and the corpse is dressed in a kafim, which resembles in many ways the clothing of the pilgrim, the baji. The salat al-janaza is performed. The deceased is buried with the face in the direction of the qibla. Marriage, another life cycle ritual, is not reckoned among the ‘ibadat, but among the mu’amalat, and will therefore not be considered here.

Daily Rituals

The days of the believers are marked by the rhythm of five obligatory salats: the morning salat (salat al-subb or fajr) consisting of two rak’as, to be performed between first dawn to sunrise; the noon prayer (zuhur) to be performed after the sun has reached its highest point until the mid-afternoon, consisting of four rak’as; the ‘asr (from mid-afternoon to sunset) consisting of four rak’as; the prayer after sunset (maghrib) consisting of three rak’as; and the ‘isha’ (after complete darkness). It is sunna to perform the call to prayer (adhan). In places where Muslims live as minorities (about 30%) the public performance of the call to prayer has always been a very important symbol call to prayer has always been a very important symbol for the public presence of Islam. In Western Europe, the adhan is especially publicly performed before the salat al-jumm’a (see above). The formula of the adhan is the following: “God is great [4 times, only the Malikites pronounce it twice]; I testify that there is no god but God [2 times], I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God [2 times]. Come to Prayer, Come to salvation, God is most Great, there is no God besides God.” This formula is the same for all schools of law; although they differ with regard to repetition of some lines. In the adhan before the salat al-subb the phrase “prayer is better than sleep” is inserted. Shi’ites insert between the fifth and the sixth line the words: “Come to the best work.”

Many believers at times perform voluntary (naﬁla) salats, for example, during Ramadan, when the salat al-tarawih is performed in the mosques. In addition to the salat, there exist numerous invocations (du’as), to be said at different times of the day, and for different reasons. There are also many motives why Muslims may fast outside Ramadan. The fiqh books detail these different types of fasting.

Place and Space

Prayers and other rituals can and may be performed at any place, in agreement with the injunction that it is laudable to pray together with others. The Friday prayers (salat al-jumm’a) are obligatory for men and must be performed in the mosque. Moreover, a hierarchy of sacred places exists. Such places may be buildings such as mosques, graves (the visiting of the graves or ziyarat al-qubur), zawiyas—but also geographical areas; mountains, rivers, wells, and cities. Often the relative merits of these places, for example, in the works on the fida’il, or merits, express political notions as well.

The hajj has Mecca (the Ka’ba and the Safa and Marwa, nowadays all part of the complex of the Masjid al-Haram) and the holy places near to it (Muzdalifa, Mina, ‘Arafat) as its direct objects. Mecca, whose baram was founded, according to Muslim tradition, by the prophet Ibrahim, and Medina, the baram of which was founded by the Prophet himself, became the most holy cities in Islam. On the baram where the Masjid al-Aqsa was built, Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik erected the Dome of the Rock at the end of the seventh century.

Rituals, among which a is a tawaf, performed in the opposite direction as the tawaf in Mecca, were instituted in order to divert the pilgrims from Mecca, which at the time was in the hands of an opponent, ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr (624–692 C.E.). It was in this period that Jerusalem became an established object of pilgrimage. Many other places throughput would follow. Nowadays, ziyaras, visits to the tombs of the male and female saints (Ar. wali, pl. awliya; 10:63), and to sacred places, are quite common in many parts of the world both in Sunni and Shi’ite Islam.

Also very important is the birthday festival (‘urs or mawṣim) of the saint, when huge celebrations may take place. The veneration of saints serves the psychological needs of many believers to be close to their objects of veneration, from which they hope to receive baraka (blessing), cure from illnesses, help in misfortune, intercession with God, and so on. The connection with notions of kinship and descent from the Prophet is symbolized in the notion of nobility (sharaf). Because of large-scale globalization and diasporic processes, one nowadays witnesses the creation of many new “Muslim spaces.”
See also Devotional Life; Law; Shari’a.

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IBN AL-‘ARABI (1165–1240)

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a prolific, influential, and controversial scholar whose writings, based on close readings of the Qur’an, combined the perspectives of jurisprudence, philosophy, kalâm, and Sufism. His more complete name is Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-‘Arabi al-Ta’i al-Hatimi.

He was born in the Moorish kingdom of Murcia, where his father was a government official. After his family moved to Seville, a visionary experience shook him out of adolescent concerns. He famously recounts how his father took him, his beard not yet sprouted, to visit the great philosopher Averroes, who was awed by the God-given understanding he saw in the boy. He studied hadith and the other religious sciences with many teachers in Andalus. In 1200, a vision instructed him to go to the East. In 1202 he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, then traveled widely through the Arab countries and Anatolia, and in 1223 settled down in Damascus, where he taught and wrote until his death. He is the author of over four hundred highly sophisticated and technical treatises, including the encyclopedic al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan openings), the celebrated Fusus al-hikam (The ringstones of wisdom), and a few collections of poetry. His teachings became controversial with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).

In the later literature Ibn al-‘Arabi’s name is closely associated with the notion of wahdat al-wujud (“oneness of being”), though it is difficult to explain why this should be so simply on the basis of his writings. Few of his works have been studied with care by modern scholars, but it is safe to say that they circle around a number of themes. Chief among these is the depiction of the various paths to perfection represented mythically by the 124,000 prophets sent by God, though he focuses on Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad. He is commonly labeled a “Sufi,” but not by himself; he would have much preferred the term muhaddiq, “realizer” or “verifier,” the active participle of the word tabqiq. Derived from the word baqq—truth, reality, worthiness—tabqiq means to see all things in relation to the unity (tawhid) of al-baqiq, the absolute truth and reality that is God, and then to act appropriately. To achieve tabqiq, one must open the two eyes of the heart (qalb), which are reason (aqd) and imagination (khayal). With the eye of reason, the heart verifies that the absolute baqq is transcendent and incomparable with any created thing. With the eye of imagination, it verifies that this same infinite baqq is immanent and present in every created thing. The indispensable guidelines for achieving tabqiq are provided by the Qur’an and the sunna.

The Fusus al-hikam, object of well over one hundred commentaries before modern times, offers an epitome of Ibn al-‘Arabi’s methodology and goals. In twenty-seven chapters it discusses twenty-seven wisdoms, each designated by one of the fundamental attributes of reality, such as holiness, reality, light, unity, and mercy. Each wisdom is embodied in a divine word (kalima) that takes human form, the first of which is Adam and the last Muhammad. Adam incarnates the wisdom of the name Allah, which comprehends the meaning of all the divine names. It was Allah—not the Creator or the Compassionate—who created Adam in his own image, and it
was Allah who “taught him all the names” (Q. 2:30). Human perfection is then to realize every divine attribute as one’s own, in keeping with the prophetic saying, “Assume the character traits of God.” The children of Adam represent the infinitely diverse synthetic images of God that arise because of the differing proportions in which the divine names become manifest in each individual. The twenty-six perfect human beings to whom the remaining chapters are devoted realized the full divine image while simultaneously displaying the characteristics of one specific divine attribute. Each chapter builds on references in the Qur’an and the hadith to illustrate the applicability of the revealed passages to the prophet in question and to human beings in general.

The Fasas has attracted much attention partly because its often obscure contents allowed scholars to demonstrate their mastery of the science of tawhid. Its sometimes provocative interpretations of Qur’anic verses, rare in Ibn ‘Arabi’s other writings, aroused the ire of a great number of critics and produced an extensive secondary literature of attack and defense.

See also Falsafa; Kalam; Tasawwuf; Wahdat al-Wujud.

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IBN BATTUTA (1304–1368)

Ibn Battuta (sometimes Batuta or Battutah), whose full name was Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Shams al-Din al-Lawati al-Tanji, was a Moorish traveller who was born 25 February 1304. He died in Morocco in November 1369.

Although some details of Ibn Battuta’s itinerary are lost or uncertain, it is known that he left Tangier on 13 June 1325, and traveled across North Africa to Egypt and Syria to Mecca. He toured the Middle East and the Near East, sailed along the East African coast, returned to Mecca, and then traveled through Asia Minor, stopping in Constantinople, capital of the Byzantine Empire. Ibn Battuta journeyed through the territories of The Golden Horde (the steppes of Central Asia) and across the Himalayas to India, where he stayed for eight years. Afterward he traveled to the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bengal, Assam, Sumatra, sailing all the way to China. He returned to North Africa through India and the Middle East during the time of the Black Death. He arrived back in Morocco in November 1349. After a short stay he visited Moorish Spain and later traveled to Mali. He ended his travels in December 1353.

After completing his long journey Ibn Battuta spent two years dictating the story of his travels to his secretary, Ibn Juzayy, who was appointed to him by the sultan of Morocco. The result was a masterly contribution to the genre known as riha, and Ibn Battuta gave this kind of travel narrative a new dimension. Less than a century earlier Marco Polo had made a journey to Asia with a resulting narrative of lesser scope and detail.

Ibn Battuta’s account of his journeys is a narrative of travels through three continents, 120,000 kilometers (80,000 miles) of known and unknown cultures, and included, among other observations, ceremonies at the courts of sultans, the burning of widows in India, and African cannibals. Ibn Battuta’s travels represent the longest journey overland before the invention of the steam engine.

See also Cartography and Geography; Travel and Travelers.

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Thyge C. Bro

IBN HANBAL (780–855)

Ahmad b. Muhammad Ibn Hanbal was a renowned traditionist, theologian, and jurist who was born in Baghdad where he spent most of his life studying and teaching. As a young man, he traveled widely in connection with his studies, most especially in the cities of Kufa and Basra in Iraq and Mecca and Medina in Arabia. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca five times. Ibn Hanbal had inherited a modest estate and was able to spend most of his time in study. He was not, in any formal sense, a teacher or part of a school, but as his reputation for knowledge grew, he was widely consulted as an expert on all matters of law and religion. As a scholar, Ibn Hanbal was one of the foremost members of a group called the traditionists, or ahl al-hadith. The traditionists believed that as a source of religious knowledge, the sunna, or practice of the Prophet and the early community of Muslims, was second only to the Qur’an and that the sunna could be ascertained through a study of traditions, or hadith.

After the death of the Prophet, the members of the early community transmitted knowledge of the sunna orally and in anecdotal form, but as time went on, and the first few
generations of Muslims died off, remembering and recording the sunna became an important scholarly task. Hadith collections provide the documentation of the sunna. Each hadith consists of a text (matn) preceded by a chain of its oral transmitters (isnad), beginning with the most recent. The earliest transmitter is usually a relative of the Prophet, one of his close associates, his Companions, or someone who knew one or more of his Companions. Ibn Hanbal’s collection, his Musnad, is among the most esteemed of the Sunni hadith collections.

By Ibn Hanbal’s day, there were thousands of hadiths in circulation, some patently false, others less obviously so. The traditionists separated the genuine from the false, and then compiled and presented the genuine traditions in an orderly fashion. This required knowledge about the reliability of the people included in isnads, as well as about the subject matter of each matn. Ibn Hanbal’s knowledge of traditions was prodigious, and traditionists traveled to Baghdad from other parts of the Muslim world specifically to study with him. His Musnad contains between twenty-seven and twenty-eight thousand traditions, whereas the standard collections of Sunni hadith, the “Six Books” contain fewer than half that number. Further, unlike these somewhat later collections, the Musnad was arranged according to the name of the initial transmitter rather than according to subject matter.

Ibn Hanbal’s activity was not limited to teaching and answering questions about hadith. In theology, the traditionists were ranged against the “rationalists,” and here, too, Ibn Hanbal was preeminent among the traditionists. They avoided rational speculation and held that belief in the divine nature of the text of the Qur’an and obedience to its tenets as practiced by the Prophet were the goals of the true believer. The rationalists speculated about the nature of God, His qualities, and His relationship to the created world. The group of rationalists who engaged in this kind of speculative theology during Ibn Hanbal’s lifetime were the Mu’tazilites. A particular point of disagreement between the traditionists and the Mu’tazilites was on the nature of the Qur’an. The Mu’tazilites held that God had created it in time; the traditionists held that it was the uncreated word of God. In 833, shortly before his death, the caliph Ma’mun adopted a policy of demanding that prominent religious figures publicly embrace the doctrine of the created Qur’an. Ibn Hanbal refused to do this, and was imprisoned and tortured. Although the next two caliphs continued Ma’mun’s policy, Ibn Hanbal was released from prison after two years. However, he did not resume teaching publicly until 847 when a new caliph finally abandoned the Mu’tazilite doctrine and reinstated traditionist Sunnism.

In jurisprudence too, the traditionists—again with Ibn Hanbal preeminent among them—were ranged against the rationalists. The traditionists wished all juridical problems to be solved by reference to the sunna as expressed through traditions. The rationalists, on the other hand, preferred to base their decisions on thinking through a problem rather than finding a solution in a tradition. The rationalists quoted the opinions of their teachers and colleagues as authoritative; the traditionists thought they thereby placed human reasoning above the divine guidance found in the Qur’an and the sunna. Although the practical results of the rationalist jurists were not very different from those of the traditionist jurists, the methodological differences between the two groups were fiercely debated.

At his death, Ibn Hanbal was widely mourned. His erudition, personal piety, and moral fortitude had made him a revered and famous scholar, and his tomb in Baghdad was much visited until it was destroyed by flood in the fourteenth century. His disciples carried on his teaching. A number of them, including his sons, Salih (d. 879/880) and ‘Abdallah (d. 903), compiled collections of his masa’il, the responses he gave to questions of ritual, law, and dogma put to him by colleagues and students. Ibn Hanbal’s responses are important both for their specific content and for the traditionist method they illustrate. The Hanbalite legal school (or rite) of Sunni Islam evolved on the basis of the interpretation of these responses by successive generations of Hanbalite scholars. His son ‘Abdallah was also responsible for collecting, editing, and commenting upon his father’s Musnad. The Musnad is Ibn Hanbal’s best-known work. Most of his other works have not survived intact although they are often quoted by later scholars, and very little if anything by him is available in English. For a translation of a creedal statement attributed to Ibn Hanbal, see Cragg and Speight; for several versions of his responses on topics related to marriage and divorce, see Spectorsky.

See also Ahl al-Hadith; Hadith; Kalam; Law; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila.

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Susan A. Spectorsky

**IBN KHALDUN (1332–1406)**

(Introduction), has become one of the best-known and important works on medieval historiography for modern scholars. Ibn Khaldun was also actively involved in the politics of the period and traveled extensively across Spain, North Africa, and the Middle East. He died in Cairo on 16 March 1406.

Ibn Khaldun came from an influential family that had originally settled in Andalusia at the beginning of the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. Shortly before the beginning of the Reconquista his ancestors migrated to Tunis, where they became important administrators in local governments. His father, however, worked primarily as a jurist and a scholar. Because of his father’s position as a legal scholar, Ibn Khaldun was able to attain an education from some of the most famous North African scholars of the age. In the mid-fourteenth century the western Berber Marinid tribe invaded Tunis and established a short-lived dynasty. The Marinids imported a large number of legal scholars and theologians into Tunis and for a short period Ibn Khaldun, at this time in his mid-teens, was able to learn from a wide array of scholars in a variety of fields. The Marinid occupation of Tunis was, however, short and by the time Ibn Khaldun was seventeen most of the great scholars had already left Tunis for Fez, Morocco.

The Marinid occupation of Tunis left its mark on the young scholar. He came to see the period as a model for the historical development and decline of Islamic societies. He argued that Islamic societies followed a specific path of development and decline whereby desert tribes invade a given society and infuse it with a sense of vitality and what he called asabiyya (group solidarity). Asabiyya becomes the foundation for all social relations and provides the fundamental motives for cultural, intellectual, and economic development. Over time, however, the sense of group solidarity breaks down, followed by a slow period of decline until a new group asserts itself into society and brings with it a new sense of asabiyya.

The withdrawal of the Marinids back into Morocco left an intellectual and political vacuum in Tunis, and by 1353 Ibn Khaldun decided to migrate west to Fez. In Fez, Ibn Khaldun rose quickly into the inner circle of the Marinid sultan Ibn Abi ‘Amr. By 1357 he fell out of favor with the sultan and was thrown in prison until Ibn Abi ‘Amr’s death in 1358. Ibn Khaldun appears to have attempted to remain involved in the changing political situation, but by 1359 he decided to retire from politics and accepted a position as a judge. By 1362 his position became so untenable that he was forced to flee to Granada.

Over the next twelve years Ibn Khaldun continued to involve himself in the politics of Spain and North Africa. By his late forties, however, he had tired of politics and decided to return to scholarship once again. He wrote a number of works during this period and appears to have begun developing many of his ideas on history and sociology. He wrote his Muqaddima to his world history (Kitab al-Ibar) between 1375 and 1379, as well as a number of other important works. By 1378, Ibn Khaldun returned to Tunis to work as a scholar and teacher. His ideas, however, were considered threatening by several of his peers and he was forced to flee to Cairo in 1382.

In Cairo, Ibn Khaldun continued to teach and write, and by 1399 was appointed judge. In 1400 he accompanied the Mamluk sultan al-Nasir to Syria during the invasion of Timur and was involved in negotiations with the Mongol leader for the surrender of Damascus. As had previously been the case, Ibn Khaldun frequently ran afoul of political powers and was dismissed from his judgeship upon his return. Over the remaining six years of his life he was appointed and dismissed from the judiciary five more times.

Ibn Khaldun remained a controversial figure even after his death. His Muqaddima, and to a lesser extent his other writings, were both respected and reviled by later scholars. In the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun sets forth a clear exposition of his theory of social and historical development and decline. He describes the various Islamic sciences, their development, and the process of professionalization that scholars had to endure to become certified by their contemporaries as qualified academics. This process of professional certification, according to Ibn Khaldun, which had become so extensive by the medieval period that it prevented scholars of in-depth knowledge in any one field, was one of the factors that led Muslim societies to decline. His theories about the decline of Muslim society would influence late-nineteenth and twentieth-century Muslim scholars who embraced Ibn Khaldun’s theories as evidence of the need for renewal of Islamic culture and thought.

See also ‘Asabiyya; Falsafa.

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IBN MAJA (824–887)

Ibn Maja, Abu ‘Abdallah Muhammad b. Yazid, was from Qazwin in Persia and lived from circa 824 until 887 C.E. He is the compiler of the last of the “Six Books” of authoritative (shahib) Sunni hadith collections. Ibn Maja’s Kitab al-Sunan contains 4,341 reports that he collected during his peregrinations through the Hejaz, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, conducted in search of hadiths. About three thousand of these
hadiths are contained in the other five standard collections. Initially Ibn Maja’s collection was criticized for containing a number of weak (sc. defective) (da'if) and discredited reports, which prevented it from being accepted by the large majority of scholars as a reliable compilation. Although Abu Da‘ud and al-Tirmidhi, editors of two other authoritative hadith compilations, also recorded weak hadiths, they identified them as such, whereas Ibn Maja did not. For these reasons, some of the traditionists preferred the Sunan work of al-Darimi (d. 869), another well-known hadith scholar, over that of Ibn Maja. However, by about the early twelfth century c.e., Ibn Maja’s standing as a traditionist (muhaddith) had improved considerably and his Sunan ultimately became recognized as one of the Six Books, although it is still regarded as the weakest one.

See also Hadith.

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Asma Afsaruddin

IBN RUSHD (1126–1198)

Ibn Rushd, whose Latin name was Averroes, was the most outstanding philosopher in the Islamic world working within the Peripatetic (Greek) tradition. He was particularly interested in the work of Aristotle and wrote a large number of commentaries of differing length on his works. Ibn Rushd was not only a philosopher but also a judge, legal thinker, physician, and politician, like so many of the other philosophers in the Islamic world. His work is marked by its commitment to what he took to be pure Aristotelianism and his relative antipathy to Neoplatonism. He defended the acceptability of philosophy in the Islamic world, arguing that it does not contradict religion but complements it. Ibn Rushd held that philosophy represents the system of demonstrative or rational argumentation, while religion presents the conclusions of philosophy to a wider audience in a form that enables the latter to understand how to act.

This thesis came to be characterized as the “double-truth” thesis, which held that philosophy and religion are both true despite contradicting each other. Nevertheless, Ibn Rushd did not hold such a thesis, whatever views were attributed to him outside of the Islamic world after his death. During his lifetime, Ibn Rushd suffered at the hands of rulers who were occasionally unsympathetic to philosophy, and after his death his style of philosophy soon fell out of fashion in the Arabic-speaking Islamic world. It is the commentaries that led to his continuing influence in Jewish and Christian Europe long after he was forgotten in the Islamic world.

See also Falsafa; Law.

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Oliver Leaman

IBN SINA (980–1037)

Ibn Sina (Avicenna), was a poet, music theorist, astronomer, and politician, but he was best known as a philosopher and as a medical doctor.

From his autobiography we learn that he was born in an Isma'ili family in Afshana, in the Persian region of Bukhara. By the age of ten, he had completed the study of language and literature and memorized the Qur'an. He studied Greek logic and mathematics under his father’s friend al-Natili, a teacher and a prominent advocate of Isma’ili Shi’ism. However, he soon felt that his education and skills exceeded his teacher’s and he no longer needed him. By the age of sixteen, he had covered the various sciences and became a teacher and practitioner of medicine. Because of his fame as a doctor, he was called upon to treat the prince Nuh Ibn Mansur, who then gave him access to the princely library, which was rich in rare books. By eighteen, he was confident that he had mastered the sciences except for metaphysics. He read Aristotle’s metaphysics many times without understanding it until he came across al-Farabi’s interpretation of it. He spent his last years writing and practicing medicine in Isfahan, but owing to constant travel, insufficient sleep, and hard work, he fell sick and died. He was buried in Hamadhan.

Ibn Sina wrote over 250 works, including books, odes, and essays. The most important of his philosophical books are Healing and Remarks and Admonitions. Each has four parts, the first three being logic, physics, and metaphysics. The first work closes with a part on mathematics, the second with one on Sufism. His most important medical work is the Canon of Medicine, which served as a significant reference in Europe from the eleventh to the seventeenth century.

Ibn Sina’s philosophy centers primarily on the divine and human natures and their relationship to each other and the rest of the universe. The human soul individuates its body and gives it motion and life. Thus the body is dependent for its survival on its soul, but the soul’s existence is independent of the body. In life the soul uses its body for gaining sensory knowledge. This knowledge, when abstracted, becomes pure
Ibn Sina was an intellectual giant whose philosophy combined Greek and Islamic thought but was unique in many respects. His ideas left a strong impact on future Eastern and Western thought.

See also Falsafa; Wajib al-Wujud.

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Shams C. Inati

IBN TAYMIYYA (1263–1328)

Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran in northern Syria in 1263 C.E. and died at the age of sixty-five in Damascus in 1328. A prolific writer on all subjects related to the Qur’an, hadith, sunna, theology, law, and mysticism, he was a dynamic and controversial figure during his lifetime, and he remains to this day an influential figure in Islamic thought and practice. A loyal associate of the Hanbali theological and legal school of thought, he put his beliefs into practice as a religious, political, and social reformer. Responding to various crises of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries in the Middle East, such as the Mongol invasions, the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate, and the eventual rise of the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt and Syria, Ibn Taymiyya sought the revival of Islamic society based on a model of what he believed was the pristine community of Muslims at the time of the Prophet and his companions at Medina. But his efforts to revive Islamic society were not only aimed at political and social reform, he sought also to achieve the revival of the inner or spiritual components of Islam. In fact, he believed the inner reform had to occur first before any outward reform would be possible. This perspective on his part brought him into conflict with many speculative theologians (mutakallimun), philosophers, and Sufi mystics, whom Ibn Taymiyya accused of deviating from the pure Islam of Muhammad and the Qur’an by adopting non-Islamic systems of belief, in particular the logic and philosophy of the ancient Greeks.

Ibn Taymiyya’s life can be divided into three distinct periods, each representing a significant phase in his development as a thinker and reformer. The first phase goes from his birth until 1304, during which time he received his training as a scholar and was involved in defending Damascus from incursions by the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia. The second period lasts from 1304 until 1312, during which time he was in Egypt. This period is marked by his growing controversy with Sufi mysticism as well as his involvement with the political turmoil related to Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad b. al-Qalawun’s consolidation of power. Ibn Taymiyya spent many years on trial and in prison during this time, stemming from his religious pronouncements and his support for al-Nasir Muhammad. The third phase begins with his return to Damascus in 1312 and lasts until his death in 1328. This is the period of the maturing of his ideas and the time of his most prolific and significant writings. Although these years were relatively free of controversy, toward the end of his life he came into conflict with religious and state authorities over doctrinal and legal issues. Ibn Taymiyya died in prison in Damascus shortly after being denied contact with all but his closest family members and being forbidden to write any more letters, essays, or legal rulings.

The core of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought revolves around a set of principles from which he develops an elaborate worldview. These principles can be summarized as follows: an absolute distinction between the creator and the creation, revelation as a complete and self-sufficient system, and a necessity to constantly return to and understand the Qur’an and the sunna in light of the traditional teachings of the earliest generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih).

Ibn Taymiyya has been described as a “dogmatic historian,” for he developed a theology based on the concept of a necessarily preserved true religion. This religion as embodied in the Qur’an and the sunna of prophet Muhammad was transmitted intact by the salaf al-salih. The canonical collections of authenticated hadiths contain this transmitted wisdom, and thus, for Ibn Taymiyya, forms the basis for all interpretation and practice in Islam. His methodological approach is premised on the correct use of five sources for gaining knowledge of the beliefs and practices that are pleasing to Allah. These are (1) the Qur’an, (2) the sunna of the Prophet, (3) the statements and actions of the companions of the Prophet (al-sahaba), (4) the opinions of the followers (al-tabi’in) of the companions, and (5) the Arabic language, which for him is the only divinely ordained religious language. These sources make up what Ibn Taymiyya believes is a comprehensive notion of revelation. Any methodology or
belong to the idea of a personal God with whom a believer can establish an intimate spiritual relation. This stance brought him into conflicts with other jurists, even with his fellow Hanbalis.

But more than his political and legal opinions, Ibn Taymiyya’s theology remains the most salient feature of his religious thought. Devoted to a defense of a monotheism that does not compromise the nature and attributes of Allah as derived from the Qur’an and the sunna, he set himself against the great traditions of speculative theology (kalam), philosophy, and mysticism that had evolved in Islamic civilization. Following closely the creeds established by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and other hadith scholars of the ninth century, Ibn Taymiyya developed a very sophisticated and subtle theology that he promoted quite vigorously. His theology begins with the notion of God as the eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent creator who brought the universe into existence out of nothingness (ex nihilo) as a willful act. He rejects any form of pantheistic thought that compromises this belief. Thus he does not want to compromise the idea of a personal God with whom a believer can establish an intimate spiritual relation. Therefore, he also rejects the sterile descriptions of Allah put forth by philosophers and speculative theologians, who stripped him of many of his essential names and attributes. His main targets of refutation are the Mu’tazilites, the Ash’arites, and philosophers such as Ibn al-$	ext{-}$Arabi (d. 1242). However, he does not want to compromise the manner in which these attributes exist in Allah.

**See also** Fundamentalism; Law; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Traditionalism.

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**IDENTITY, MUSLIM**

In Islamic societies, religion, rather than language and ethnicity, has typically defined political, social, and personal identity. Obviously, Muslims have always been aware of linguistic, ethnic, and territorial divisions, but, through much of Islamic history, these have seemed relatively unimportant to them. Their formative past and spiritual ancestry were to be found in the line of prophets and believers chronicled in the Qur’an, prominently including the prophet Muhammad and his companions, rather than, depending upon where they lived, among the related but spiritually foreign peoples of, say, pharaonic Egypt, or polytheistic Babylonia.

Although the situation has become more complex during the past two centuries, Muslims have traditionally been integrated by their common identity as followers of Muhammad and the Qur’an, and, secondarily, by their allegiance to dynastic rulers (caliphs and sultans). At least in theory (but very often in fact), Muslims of entirely distinct tongues and genealogies have recognized one another as brothers, yet reject as aliens compatriots who, while sharing both dialect and ancestry, differ in religious affiliation. In recent years, certain unfortunate consequences of these attitudes—generally reciprocated with at least equal fervor by the non-Muslims involved—have been strikingly illustrated in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Before residents of the region adopted such nineteenth- and early twentieth-century terms as Middle East and Near East, no equivalent vocabulary, and, hence, no unifying concept of shared geographical identity, seems to have existed in the area. Until modern times, the Turkish language had no word for **Turkey**, the word used today to designate the nation-state originated in Europe. Arabic still lacks a word for **Arabia**. On the other hand, such distinctions as that between the **dar al-islam** (the “abode of Islam” or “of submission [to God]”) and the counterpoised **dar al-barb** (“the abode of strife” or “of war”) were readily available and far more salient.

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**James Pavlin**
It must be understood that religion in the areas dominated by Islam has commonly included rather more than a mere system of belief and worship, distinct from and possibly subordinated to national and political allegiances. Those of Muslim background often retain a shared communal identity even in instances where Islamic faith and practice have been abandoned.

Initially, the fact that the Qur’an had been revealed in Arabic, while obviously useful to its first hearers, was not enough to forge a unique identity. After all, its entire original audience, both believers and unbelievers, were Arabic-speakers. With the spread of Islam westward to Iberia and eastward to India, however, the Qur’an’s Arabic character (emphasized in the book itself at 12:2; 13:37; 16:103; 20:113; 26:195; 39:28; 41:3; 42:7; 43:3; 46:12) marked the Arabs as a favored nation whose ethnic identity was intimately connected with the identity most of them shared as Muslims. Arabic came to be the principal language of a vast civilization that, although it included considerable numbers of non-Muslims who enjoyed the status of protected dhimmis, had been formed and shaped by Arab-Islamic sensibilities. In this were sown the seeds of later Arabic nationalism.

From the start, there also existed a sense of distinct Islamic peoplehood that went beyond ethnicity. It was compounded of both genuine reality and idealistic aspiration. “Let there be from among you,” says the Qur’an, “an umma summoning to good and forbidding evil” (3:104; compare 3:110, also 2:143). The term umma is used several times in the Qur’an to refer to ordinary ethnic groupings, both past and present. In certain passages, however, it plainly characterizes the body of Muslim believers as a new kind of supertribe, transcending family, clan, and ethnic affiliation. “This your umma is one umma,” says the Qur’an (21:92).

Even in the days of the Prophet and his immediate successors, however, old tribal and other affiliations proved resilient, as appears in early tensions between the muhajirun—the “emigrants” who, like Muhammad himself, had sought refuge in Medina—and the ansar or “helpers” who took them in. Long-standing tribal rivalries continued to be a factor in the early days of the Arab conquests. And even as Arabian tribal divisions decreased in importance, other ethnic rivalries—such as those between Arabs and non-Arabs (particularly Persians)—came to the fore in such movements as the so-called sbtu`biyya. Moreover, the question of precisely what constituted a believer, and what caused one to forfeit that status, was a matter of significant controversy in the first period of Islamic thought.

The survival and even flourishing of non-Muslims within areas of Islamic rule also helped adherents of Islam to refine and sharpen their own sense of identity. Central to this was the Qur’anic Arabic term milla (Turkish millet). In the Qur’an, the word milla is essentially equivalent to religion, and it came, with the passage of time, to signify a religious community, especially the Islamic community. Opposed to the community of Muslims, according to a popular tradition rather dubiously ascribed to the prophet Muhammad, was the community of unbelievers—undifferentiated because their differences, like those among believers, were unimportant: “Unbelief is one milla,” the Prophet is reported to have said. Nonetheless, by the time of the Ottomans in the fourteenth century, the term millet also signified non-Muslim communities, legally recognized to be plural and varied.

From at least the fifteenth century, Muslim rulers (particularly among the Ottomans) managed religious diversity in their domains through a system based on the millets. A quite complex structure of semiautonomous communities whose religious leaders had formal relations with their Muslim overlords promoted peaceful coexistence and minority representation at court. In the nineteenth century, however, under the influence of European nationalism and with grave implications for traditional arrangements, millet came to mean “nation” as well as “religious community.”

The Ottoman Empire and Its Immediate Aftermath

In its classic Ottoman form, the millet system dates from the reign of Mehmed II (r. 1451–1481), and endured until the nineteenth century. By the end of Mehmed’s reign, Orthodox Christian, Armenian Christian, Jewish, and Muslim millets had been organized. Each was headed by its own highest-ranking religious dignitary (respectively, the Orthodox patriarch, the chief rabbi, the Armenian patriarch, and, for Muslims, the Shaykh al-Islam). Once chosen by their respective communities, these officials were confirmed in office (or, occasionally, rejected) by the Ottoman government. Millets decided on issues related to religious doctrine and practice and questions of personal status (e.g., marriage, divorce, and inheritance).

However, Ottoman sultans understood themselves, first and foremost, as Muslim emperors ruling an Islamic empire. Subsequent Ottoman monarchs accordingly sought to transcend their dynasty’s origin as a line of successful war lords and border skirmishers—so frankly expressed in the title sultan itself, which is derived from the Arabic word sułṭan, meaning “power”—and to claim religious sanction for their rule. This is evident in the treaty of Kucuk-Kaynarca (1774), in which, for the first time, the sultanate asserted extraterritorial religious jurisdiction over non-Ottoman Muslims. A few years later, the story appeared that the last Abbasid caliph had transferred the caliphate—the right to universal Islamic rule as legal heir of the prophet Muhammad—to Selim I upon the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. While the claim had relatively little practical impact beyond the effective borders of Ottoman political power, it reinforced the sultan’s claim to authority based on the religious identity and self-understanding of the majority of his subjects.
Vocal claims to Islamic authority, however, carried no weight with the sultan’s non-Muslim subjects, and, indeed, probably tended to alienate them. Thus, as the empire weakened and Western influences (including legal and commercial privileges granted to European powers) increased in Ottoman lands, nationalist sentiments arose among the empire’s Christian minorities, who had a natural kinship to the Christian West and were understandably more susceptible to its influence. These new nationalist ideas were introduced to populations lacking any prior experience of secularism, or of a separation between religion and politics. Minority nationalisms therefore came to be expressed religiously, within the context of the already existing millet system.

In partial reaction, the Ottoman government attempted to establish “Ottomanism” as the legal basis of the empire as reflected, for example, in the law of nationality and citizenship promulgated in 1869 and the Constitution of 1876. The related concept of kubb al-watan, “love of country” or patriotism, had already appeared in Turkish by 1841. Thinkers connected with the Young Ottoman movement (formed in 1865) were promoting the “fatherland” (vatan; Arabic watan) and the Ottoman “nation.” Ottomanism, however, was somewhat ambivalent with regard to the weight to be placed upon Islamic faith as component in individual, societal, and political identity. The new constitution also included a formal declaration that the “high Islamic caliphate” belonged to the Ottoman ruling house, thus staking a claim to universal Muslim authority. And the writings of Namik Kemal, the Young Ottomans’s intellectual leader, show interest neither in the history of the Turks before their conversion. Partially on that basis, they created a distinctively Turkish nationalism. At the same time, their own destiny, Ottoman intellectuals became aware of the principle of legal equality for minority religions, he felt that Muslims beyond his borders. Although he affirmed the Islamic faith for the masses.

Ottomanism was, in fact, incoherent, torn between particularistic loyalty to the multiethnic, multi-faith empire as it was and a dream of Muslim unity similar to that which motivated the famous pan-Islamic activist, Jamal al-Din Afghani (d. 1897). Of course, despite his own public piety, Afghani himself seems to have been a natural-law deist and rationalist, and to have valued Islam primarily as a civilization rather than as a religious faith. Clearly indicating that he recognized its power as a political force, however, he insisted on orthodox Islam for the masses.

Ottomanist ambivalence did not escape the non-Muslim minorities. Understanding that they were not, and could not be, incorporated into the empire as full equals, sharing a common culture, they realized that they could not truly be Ottoman patriots in the same sense that English, Spanish, or French patriots were loyal to a country and a unified nation-state. In contrast, the separatist ethnic nationalism that had already arisen in the polyglot empires and small principalities of eastern and central Europe was fully available to them. Thus, when in 1875 the Ottoman treasury declared insolvency, nationalist revolts broke out among the Christians of the Balkans, leading to bloody ethnic and religious confrontations. Responding, the European powers pressured Ottoman leadership to grant autonomy to Christians. And, in fact, the short-lived legislative assembly established by the Constitution of 1876 included deputies from all the peoples of the empire.

A disastrous war with Russia nearly ended the Ottoman state in 1877, and the difficult negotiations that ensued continued until 1882. Ultimately, the Ottomans surrendered large territories to Russia, the Balkan states, and other powers. These territorial losses, which cost the sultan many of his Christian subjects and precipitated a substantial migration of Muslims from Russia and the Balkans into the remaining Ottoman lands, left the empire overwhelmingly Muslim. Seen by many Muslims as an episode in the battle between the dar al-islam and the dar al-harb, the crisis inflamed religious sentiments and, by the century’s end, inspired a yet more insistent Muslim nationalism—before which the ambivalent and never very popular “Ottomanism” quickly gave way.

Attempting to cope, ‘Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1909) concentrated government investments and reforms in the predominantly Muslim parts of the empire. He emphasized Islam as a basis of internal social and political stability and solidarity, further stressing his authority not merely as sultan but also as caliph in a bid to simultaneously neutralize opposition from the varied Muslim ethnicities within his dominions and to mobilize support, when needed, among Muslims beyond his borders. Although he affirmed the principle of legal equality for minority religions, he felt that Muslims were the only truly loyal Ottoman subjects. For this reason, pan-Islamists like Afghani regarded ‘Abdulhamid as a symbol of Islamic solidarity and cohesion.

By the opening of the twentieth century, however, nationalist movements in and about the Ottoman empire had destroyed more than the idea of political unity among Muslims, Christians, and others. With the imperial regime in Istanbul looking increasingly helpless both domestically and in foreign affairs, separate nationalist movements arose even among Muslims—which severely undermined ‘Abdulhamid II’s appeal to Islamic solidarity. As various non-Turkic peoples sought to dissolve their ties to the sultanate and to forge their own destiny, Ottoman intellectuals became aware of the pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Partially on that basis, they created a distinctively Turkish nationalism. At the same time, centralizing, industrialized European nation-states—foreign to the reality in which they found themselves—became the ideal among the Ottoman elite. Consequently, when the Young Turk revolution occurred in 1908, it was strongly pro-Turkic, devoted to a centralizing and secularizing vision.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s famous and more lasting political involvement began in terms of Ottomanism, and, early on, he tended to speak in pan-Islamic terms. His conversion to Turkish nationalism was accelerated by the disastrous 1912–1913 Balkan War, but, although he is associated with secularism, there is no evidence that he ever sought to attack Islam. Atatürk’s notable successes garnered immense prestige for the secular nationalism he came to espouse, which has assured its dominant role in Turkey into the twenty-first century.

Among the Arabs
The Young Ottoman thinker Namik Kemal argued that separatist movements would not arise among the empire’s diverse ethnic groups because they were too intermingled to be able to form viable states. The only possible exception to this, he felt, was the Arab community. However, he reasoned, Arabs were bound to the Ottoman state not only by their loyalty to the sultan but by their sense of Islamic brotherhood with the empire. And, in fact, Afghani’s great Egyptian disciple, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d. 1902), opposed local patriotism or nationalism as a threat to Islamic unity. Race and nation, in his view, were unimportant accidents, irrelevant to one’s fundamental identity as a member of the Islamic umma.

Kemal was wrong. Arab nationalism—the idea that Arabic speakers form a single nation with legitimate aspirations to separate statehood—seems to have been born among the Christian Arab elite of Lebanon, perhaps under the influence of their European fellow believers. They, of course, felt no religious loyalty to the sultan, but deeply prized the language and culture they shared with their Muslim fellow-Arabs. In 1860, the Christian journalist Butrus al-Bustani founded “The Patriotic School” (al-madrasa al-wataniyya); by 1870, the motto “love of country is part of the faith” appeared on the masthead of the magazine he edited. The watan of which he spoke, however, was not the Ottoman empire. His “country” was Syria, an Arabic-speaking land.

Graduates of newly founded schools in Syria and Iraq were likewise infected with nationalism and political consciousness, but their pride, too, was in Arabic language and Arabic history. They called first for decentralization, then independence. The Arab revolt of 1916 resulted in the eventual creation of at least nominally independent states in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan after the interwar British and French mandates ended. These were constructed essentially on the European model that had been invoked previously by the Young Turks.

Local patriotism did appear in Egypt, somewhat later than in Turkey, largely under the influence of Shaykh Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (d. 1873). In numerous odes and poems, al-Tahtawi, also fond of the formula “love of country is part of the faith,” praised Egypt, the Egyptian army and its soldiers, and the then-ruling dynasty of the Khedives. While his works evince little or no interest in other Muslims or Arab speakers beyond Egypt, the history and legacy of the pharaohs clearly fascinated him. They also served the complexly pan-Islamic purposes of Afghani, who praised the glories of pagan Egypt (as well as the ancient polytheistic Hindus) in polemics composed, unlike those of Kemal and the Young Ottomans, in Arabic.

For their part, the khedives encouraged and even sponsored this new patriotism, since the cultivation of a distinctive Egyptian identity and personality so obviously furthered their own separatist ambitions, and the “National” or “Patriotic Party” (al-hizb al-watani) was founded in 1879. It cannot be maintained that the new Egyptian patriotism was wholly secular—for most of its advocates, Islam was an essential part of Egyptian identity—but it grounded a movement that even non-Muslim Egyptians felt they could join. Thus, even prior to British occupation in 1882, the Christian journalist Selim Naqqash coined the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians,” which was then popularized by the Jewish pamphleteer Abu Naddara and put into practical action by the Muslim soldier ‘Urabi Pasha. But the Syrian intellectuals and others who had taken refuge in the relatively open society of Egypt were often marginalized as “intruders” (dubkala) by prominent Egyptian patriots.

Significantly, it was chiefly Syrian immigrants who brought the idea of political Arabism to Khedivial Egypt. Prominent among these were ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d. 1902), who was perhaps the first to demand an Arab state headed by an Arab caliph independent of Ottoman Turkish rule, and Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935). On the whole, however, Egypt proved resistant to pan-Arabism, although that ideology played a substantial role during the presidency of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (under whom, for a time during and after his abortive merger with Syria, the venerable name Egypt was officially sacrificed in order to build a “United Arab Republic”).

‘Abd al-Hamid II’s imperial pan-Islamism thus proved entirely unsuccessful. And, eventually, with the abolition of the sultanate in 1922 and of the caliphate in 1924, the last effective, legitimate political symbol of collective pan-Islamic identity disappeared. Former Ottoman Muslims found themselves residing in a disunited variety of nation-states, much as their descendants do today.

The Mogul Empire
Founded in 1526 and lasting until the mid-eighteenth century, the Mogul empire ultimately dominated the entire Indian subcontinent excepting the south. Yet the existence of a vast, subjugated population of Hindus had always posed a problem for India’s Muslim rulers, and continued to do so under the Moguls.

Acutely aware of the problem, Akbar (r. 1556–1605), arguably the greatest of the Mogul emperors, chose a radical method of dealing with it. He integrated Hindus into all levels of imperial administration, married Rajput princesses,
and abolished the jizya tax on non-Muslims. Worse, in the eyes of many devout Muslims, he began to experiment with an eclectic blend of Islamic and Hindu concepts. Akbar’s actions, in their view, represented a serious threat not only to the Islamic identity of Muslim India but to Islam itself.

The most significant opposition to Akbar’s syncretistic liberalism emerged out of the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood. This helped to foster a religious revival among Indian Muslims in the face not only of the emperor’s heresies and the resurgence of local Hinduism, but, as time passed, in opposition to Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French incursions into India. Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), an Indian Sufi who powerfully influenced the development of the Naqshbandi order, is often considered by Muslim admirers to have saved Indian Islam.

Certainly Sirhindi represented a challenge to Mogul authority. Accordingly, a subsequent emperor, Awarngzib (r. 1658–1707), banned portions of his writing. But as Naqshbandi-inspired Islamic opposition grew, and amid spreading Hindu and Sikh restiveness that many Muslims attributed to Mogul laxity, Awarngzib also found himself obliged to dismiss non-Muslims from government service and to replace them with Muslims. Furthermore, under pressure from the orthodox ulema, he ordered the restoration of the jizya tax and reimposed shari’ah (Islamic law).

But Naqshbandi revivalism was by no means limited to the Indian subcontinent. As early as 1603, Naqshbandi emissaries had entered the Arabic lands, and, soon thereafter, texts of the order were being translated from Persian into Arabic. The important Naqshbandi figure Shah Waliullah of Delhi (d. 1765), in fact, sometimes composed his works in Arabic, probably in an effort to address a much wider Islamic public.

Mogul power had virtually disappeared by the mid-eighteenth century, and the British deposed the last emperor in 1858. Many Muslims, however, feared that their loss of political power would also result in Islamic cultural and religious losses. Accordingly, figures such as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, while still maintaining loyalty to British rule and admiration for English culture, insisted on a separate political identity for Indian Muslims. Similarly, educational movements such as the Deobandis sought to cultivate and preserve Muslim traditions. More dramatically, Sayyid Ahmad Bareli emerged from circles close to the family of Shah Waliullah to lead a jihad in northwestern India, seeking to restore Muslim political rule in that region. His followers persisted in the attempt for roughly thirty years after his death in battle in 1831.

The concept of a sovereign Islamic political domain was kept alive by various figures over the intervening years. In 1906, the All-India Muslim League was established as a counterweight to the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress. Eventually, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah (d. 1948), arguing that both Islam and Hinduism were comprehensive social orders that could not be merged into a single nationality, concluded that the religious, political, and cultural interests of Muslims could be safeguarded fully only in a separate Muslim state. Interestingly, the Deobandi ulema overwhelmingly opposed Jinnah and his proposed separate state, presumably because his vision for Pakistan—and that of the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938)—was insufficiently grounded in strict observance of the shari’ah. Nonetheless, Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947, following the independence and partition of British India, and is now the world’s second most populous Muslim nation. Uniquely among Islamic countries, it was expressly established in the name of Islam. More than a hundred million adherents of Islam continue to live in India, however, making it roughly equal to Pakistan (and thus one of the largest of all nations) in terms of Muslim population.

Iran

Iran, the ancient Persia, resembled Egypt in possessing a long and distinguished history and relatively clearly demarcated borders. Its people spoke a distinct language that was deeply rooted in antiquity. Perhaps most importantly, it was distinguished from the Sunni Ottomans to the west and the Sunni Uzbeks and Moguls to the east by the Shi’ite form of Islam that it had adopted after the founding of the Safavid dynasty in 1501. When the Shi’ite Safavids assumed power, Iran was mostly Sunni, but descendants of ‘Ali enjoyed prestige and privileged status among ordinary people. The Safavids themselves were originally Turkic speaking, possibly even of Kurdish extraction, so Persian nationalism as such was not acceptable to them as a basis for fostering unity within their domain and between themselves and their subjects. A national transition from Sunni to Shi’ism suggested itself to them, therefore, as both desirable and reasonably easy, and, thus, within the first century of Safavid rule, an orthodox form of Twelver Shi’ism was established as the state religion.

In the sixteenth century Iran was already far along the path to becoming what we would today recognize as a national state. There has been relatively little tension between Iranian patriotism and Islamism as foci of national identity, since the two are so closely related. Despite strong interest in Persia’s ancient past (as reflected, for example, in Firdawsi’s epic tale, Shahnameh) and with some fluctuations of emphasis, Islam has maintained its primacy in Iranian self-identification. The constitutional revolution of 1906 gave a considerable boost to the Iranian national identity and to patriotism, and the modernization of the state under the Pahlevis (r. 1921–1979) went hand in hand with the enhancement of Iranian national identity in modern schools. The late shah, like his father before him, launched a campaign to glorify pre-Islamic Iran. Leaders of the Islamic Revolution denounced the effort as a return to paganism and even spoke of destroying the ruins of Persepolis (as, more recently, the Afghan Taliban obliterated...
the Buddhas of Bamiyan). But an unmistakably Iranian patriotism thrives even amid the explicitly religious rhetoric favored by leaders of the Islamic Republic.

**The Persistence of Islamic Identity**

Through the ideological turbulence of the past two centuries, the fundamental self-understanding of Muslims as Muslims remained intact, though sometimes tacit. The first Arab rebellion against Ottoman Turkish rule came with the rise of Wahhabiyya in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and its attempt to repair, Islamically, what it perceived as serious defects in Muslim society. Although that irruption was contained and reversed, Wahhabiyya again came to power, this time more lastingly, with the Saudi conquest of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in 1925. The discovery of Arabian petroleum in the 1930s has made advocates of this brand of militantly Islamic self-identification both wealthy and influential.

Resistance to European imperialism has been most effectively captained, in many instances, not by political or military officials but by popular religious figures. For example, Ahmad Brelwi, who was both an initiate of the Naqshbandi order and a Wahhabi, led armed resistance between 1826 and 1831 both to perceived encroachments of the Sikhs and to the rising menace of British power in northern India. Slightly later, from 1830 to 1839, Shamil of Daghestan, another Naqshbandi, led similar resistance against the infidel Russians, and, between 1832 and 1847, ‘Abd al-Qadir, a chief of the Qadiriyya dervish order, fought the infidel French in North Africa. Likewise, the struggle of the Sanusi order in Libya against the Ottomans and, later, the Italians, and the revolt of the Sudanese Mahdi, were explicitly conducted in the name of Islam, not local patriotism.

The Young Turk revolution faced a short-lived mutiny in 1909, when members of a pan-Islamic group calling itself the “Muhammadan Union” joined with the First Army Corps to demand imposition of the shari’ah. Later, the Young Turks themselves flirted with pan-Islamism (at least for propaganda purposes) with Enver Pasha’s 1918 launch of the “Army of Islam,” designed to liberate the Muslims of Russia. The previous year, the grand wazir Mehmed Said Halim Pasha had delivered a classic statement of pan-Islamic belief, declaring that “the fatherland of a Muslim is wherever the shari’ah prevails.” Even the communists, jockeying for power in the months after the fall of the Ottoman empire, found themselves constrained to invoke Islamic solidarity rather than class struggle.

The Muslim masses have continued to see the chief threat to them not in foreigners but in infidels. (That the two were often identical obscures but does not remove the distinction.) When, for example, on 2 November 1945, Egypt’s political leaders invited protests to mark the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, resulting demonstrations turned into anti-Jewish riots and then into attacks on Catholic, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox churches. In January 1952, anti-British demonstrators in Suez, angry at the British, killed several Coptic Christians—arguably Egypt’s most Egyptian residents—and looted and burned a Coptic church. Meanwhile, many hundreds of miles away, the Algerian response to the French slogan of “Algérie française” was neither “Algérie arabe” nor “Algérie algérienne,” but “Algérie musulmane” (“Muslim Algeria”). During the Lebanese civil war, when civil government lost effective authority over the country, residents reverted to their essential identities as Maronite Christians, Druze, and Sunni and Shi ‘ite Muslims.

See also ‘Abd al-Qadir, Amir; ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal; Balkans, Islam in the; Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; Ethnicity; Kemal, Namik; Pan-Islam; Secularization; Shaykh al-Islam; Umma; Wahhabiyya; Young Ottomans; Young Turks.

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Daniel C. Peterson

**IJTIHAD**

In early Islam *ijtihad*, along with terms such as *al-ru‘y*, *qiya*, and *zann* referred to sound and balanced personal reasoning. By the third century of Islam, however, prophetic traditions replaced these terms as the primary indicators of the law after the Qur’an. The term *qiya* remained operative but was severely curtailed by jurists of all schools. *Ijtihad*, however, was universally embraced by all jurists and theologians, including those who, in all other matters, held strongly opposing views. This was perhaps due to *ijtihad*’s authority residing...
in a prophetic tradition, but more likely it was because the actual definition of the term varied from jurist to jurist. Al-Shaf‘i, for instance, when asked, replied that ijtihad and qiyas are two names for the same process. Ibn Hazm, in contrast, denounced qiyas but not ijtihad. The former, he maintained, referred to baseless speculation, and the latter, to the individual’s attempts at unraveling the truth by textual corroboration. All nonetheless used ijtihad to refer to no more than the search for the legal norm (hukm) in Islam’s corpus sancta without much regard for context.

In contrast, postcolonial Islamic thinkers used ijtihad as shorthand for intellectual and social reform, and as a break from taqlid or blind imitation of past legal rulings. The Indian poet/philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, for instance, saw ijtihad as the catalyst for Islam’s intellectual resurgence, whereas the grand mufti of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Abduh, considered it a break from traditional scholarship, and Maududi as the key to establishing an Islamic political order. The relationship between taqlid and ijtihad during this period became less juridical and more symbolic: The former now referred to the general deterioration of everything Islamic and the latter to its reformation. In general, ijtihad served to validate the reformist’s efforts to subordinate the sacred texts to the exigencies of a modern context.

While ijtihad was warmly received, no methodology for reasoning by ijtihad was established, as was the case with qiyas, for instance. Jurists spoke of the four essential constituents of qiyas, and its various forms, but in the case of ijtihad, spoke only of the qualifications of the mujtahids who do ijtihad, and of their rankings within particular schools of law. More importantly, they spoke of the closing of the doors of ijtihad.

The Crusades, the rise of regional dynasties subsequent to the collapse of the Abbasid empire, and the Mongol invasions were seen as threats to Islamic intellectualism in general. Coupled with this, attacks by rationalists and philosophers on Muslim orthodox thinking convinced jurists that any further ijtihad posed a great danger to orthodoxy itself. The doors of ijtihad were thus closed in the fourth Islamic century, and a long period of taqlid followed. Recent scholarship has challenged this view based on evidence that mujtahids existed well into the sixteenth century, and that several prominent premodern scholars denied the closure of the doors of ijtihad.

See also Law; Madhhab; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Shari‘a.

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Muneer Goolam Farreed

IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMIN

The first modern Islamic mass movement, the Society of the Muslim Brothers (Jam‘iyat al-ikhwan al-Muslimin), was born in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928. Its founder, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), was from a pious Muslim home and inherited his father’s Salafiyya (reformist) orientation. He was strongly affected by both the rigor and devotion of Sufism and the nationalist spirit of the 1919 anti-British uprising. Upon graduating in 1927, he was appointed to teach primary school in the Suez Canal town of Ismailia, where he called people to fervently practice Islam (da‘wa).

There al-Banna founded a society which, in its first four years, built a mosque, a boys school, and a girls school. The society’s branches multiplied around the country, founding numerous Qur’an schools, clinics, and hospitals, and establishing a system of cooperative insurance for its poorer members. In the 1930s it rapidly developed its own distinctive characteristics, enabling it to endure and continue to play a key religious and sociopolitical role in many Muslim countries until today.

Features of the Ikhwan

The Society of the Muslim Brothers aims to bring complete spiritual revival (nabda) to society under Islam—a vision encompassing the moral reformation of youth through physical training, sports, religious and ideological indoctrination, social welfare, national pride, resistance against foreign domination, and the establishment of a state run by Islamic norms. Its members share an activist ethos, critical of traditional Islam, as well as a certain pragmatism that sanctions the use of Western ideas and technology as a tool to advance Islam. Its founder’s unique talents and sense of divine call was evidenced by his celibacy and his tireless self-sacrifice in visiting the society’s branches all over Egypt, as well as a commitment to writing, speaking, and organizing.

The society enjoyed phenomenal growth right from the start. Although it could boast only 5 branches in 1930, that number had jumped to 2,000 in 1949; by 1941 the society had become so influential that the British had the Egyptian prime minister arrest al-Banna and his lieutenant, Ahmad al-Sukkari, but he soon released them without British permission, fearing that their continued imprisonment would touch off a revolt that would topple his government.

The society was organized in a tight, hierarchical structure. Executive power was vested in the General Guide (almursbid al-‘amm), who was supported by a General Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-irshad al-‘amm) whose members numbered fifteen in 1934 and who were handpicked by the General Guide. During the 1930s, most administrative tasks were carried out by a Central Consultative Council (the Majlis al-shura al-markazi)—a structure which required centralization—at the district level (al-dawa‘ir), of which there
were eighty-nine in 1937. The society possessed an efficient system for recruiting, training, and multiplying cadres and, over time, several levels of commitment were developed. For instance, the Rover scouting movement (jawwala) emphasized teaching (ta'rif) with summer camps, athletic training, prayers, Qur’anic study, and charitable work. The Battalions (al-Kata‘ib, meaning “formation”) were added in 1937 and were composed of one to four subgroups of ten members, each subgroup being headed by a deputy (munadib), to whom the local members pledged an oath of strict obedience, discipline, and secrecy. Later, al-Banna replaced the Battalions with the “cooperative family” (iṣraa‘).

A third level of commitment (tanzib, “execution”) materialized around 1940, when al-Banna founded the Special Apparatus, which served as the secret military branch of the organization. Current research suggests, however, that pressure from his more militant members led al-Banna to allow the formation of the Special Apparatus earlier than he might have personally chosen, and that he worked hard to maintain its low profile during the period of the Second World War.

The society’s core belief was that, just as the Prophet ruled in Medina, there could be no Islamic society without an Islamic state. But in the 1930s and 1940s, al-Banna explicitly sought to reform society though education and to foster Islamic principles within the existing government. Although he condemned the multiparty system, he sought to increase the Ikhwan’s political influence within the Palace and the Wafd parties. The Brotherhood’s clear ideological stance of social justice and championing the rights of the educated lower classes, peasants, and urban poor presented a strong challenge to ruling elites.

**Ikhwan Milestones**

The evolution of the Ikhwan reveals unresolved inner tensions between the moderate and pragmatic option chosen by al-Banna and more militant options that would seek immediate military overthrow of the state. In 1939 dissidents broke off from the Brotherhood to form the more militant Muhammad’s Youth. In 1947 and 1948 al-Banna collaborated with the Arab League to send arms, money, and some of his trained units as volunteers for the Palestinian resistance. Further, in 1948, in a climate of great unrest, the Ikhwan’s organization (including its publications arm) was shut down, and al-Banna was placed under house arrest. In response, in December of that year, the Egyptian prime minister was assassinated by government agents. The Ikhwan reached the zenith of its influence in 1952, after the “Free Officers” revolution, but consequently drew the ire of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Legally dissolved in January 1954, the Brotherhood was decimated: Six of its top leaders were hanged publicly, and thousands of members were imprisoned. Since then the organization has remained mostly underground, yet its activities nonetheless have exerted a powerful influence at the grassroots.

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), after a three-year assignment in the United States for the Ministry of Education, returned in 1951 as a convert to the Ikhwan’s version of Islam and became the Brotherhood’s chief ideologue. Arrested and tortured with others in the movement in 1954, he spent most of the rest of his life in prison. This is where he wrote two of his most influential works, a voluminous Qur’anic commentary, *Fi zilal al-Qur’an* (1952–1965, In the shade of the Qur’an), and *Ma‘alim fi al-tariq* (1964, Signposts along the way), which inspired an entire generation of more radical Islamist groups. Central to his writings were his identification of Nasser with Pharaoh, and the bulk of Muslims with the “ignorant” people who preceded Islam in Arabia (al-jahiliyya). Under these conditions, he wrote, only through violent jihad could a truly Islamic state be instituted.

Four milestones can be discerned since the 1980s, with the mainstream of the Ikhwan increasingly turning toward peaceful, progressive methods of implementing Islamic law (shari‘a). Between 1974 and 1981 there appeared several militant groups, including al-Jihad, which was responsible for Anwar al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Between 1981 and 1988 the Brotherhood founded a number of Islamic investment companies and joined with other political parties in order to have its people elected to parliament. In 1984, the Brotherhood claimed twelve parliamentary seats, and in 1987 that number rose to thirty-eight seats. The Mubarak government (1981 to the present) has cracked down on Islamic businesses and, with a failing economy, Egypt has witnessed greater violence on the part of Islamists targeting police and tourists. At the same time, the influence of the Brotherhood has been felt in all strata of society, especially within professional syndicates. Since 1998, the violence has lessened, and a new party has broken off from the Brotherhood. This is the Wsasat (“middle ground”), which includes both Christians and women. Some analysts view this as possibly the dawning of a “post-Islamist” era in Egypt.

**The Ikhwan in Syria and Jordan**

The Ikhwan spread their message into Syria in the mid 1930s, chiefly through students returning home from Egypt. In addition, Hasan al-Banna visited Syria in 1946, after which the movement officially entered Syrian politics as the Islamic Brotherhood Party. Its first General Secretary (al-muragib al-‘amm) was Mustafa al-Siba‘i, an al-Azhar graduate.

When the Syrian Ikhwan entered the fray of democratic politics, some Brotherhood members entered parliament, while others accepted ministerial portfolios. This stopped, however, after the Ba’thist coup of 1963. The general secretary, ‘Issam al-‘Attar, chose self-exile in Europe, and the rest kept to a more traditional Brotherhood role. In their place, new Islamist groups rose up, with militant names and agendas.
The coming to power of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970 inaugurated a second round of confrontation between the Syrian Ikhwân and an authoritarian, socialist regime. The Brotherhood succeeded in securing benefits mostly for the poorest minority, the Alawis, who were considered a heretical sect by the Sunni majority of the urban elites. Al-Asad’s strategy against the Ikhwân was two-pronged. First, he began to include more Islamic symbols in Syria’s political and cultural life; second, he mercilessly repressed the Islamist groups that had launched a campaign of assassinations in Syria in the 1970s. Al-Asad’s policies culminated in the massacre of more than ten thousand civilians in the city of Hama in 1982.

In the 1990s, the Syrian government permitted a timid liberalization of the economy, aiming to revive the private sector, and thus lessening some tension between itself and the Islamists, who mostly came from the petite bourgeoisie. Also, noticing the growing Islamization of Syrian society as elsewhere, al-Asad initiated a mosque-building campaign, and sought to coopt the moderate elements among the Ikhwân. At the turn of the century Syrian ruler, Bashar al-Asad, elected to pursue his father’s course, and the Brotherhood joined other parties to call for greater political openness and respect for human rights.

By contrast, King 'Abdallah of Jordan encouraged the founding of the Jordanian Ikhwân in the 1940s, and that tradition of common alliance against communism continued under King Hussein. Despite their differences, the Jordanian Ikhwân’s reformist stance never moved beyond a loyal opposition to a monarchy proud of its Islamic legitimacy. The political reforms introduced by King Hussein in 1989 marked a new era by opening the way for multiparty parliamentary elections. The Ikhwân ran candidates with good results, winning twenty-two seats out of eighty, with twelve more going to independent Islamic candidates.

The Jordanian Brotherhood then joined the cabinet, but it has not been able to capitalize on its early momentum. First, their inexperience in legislative politics showed, as accusations of inefficiency and mismanagement were levelled against several of their elected members. Second, its moderate members have tended to radicalize the smaller, more militant Islamic offshoots. One group, started by mostly Afghan returnees (Muhammad’s Army), began a series of attacks in 1991. Eight were arrested and tried in a military court. Although the king later commuted their death sentences to life imprisonment, the strong message from the palace was clear. This and other instances of violence and repression worked to discredit the Islamists. Third, when a new round of elections came in 1993, the king changed the election law, thus weakening the chances of a new Ikhwân-controlled Islamist coalition, the Islamic Work Party. The outcome was predictable: poor voter turnout, and less than half of the original seats for the Islamists.

The failed peace process between Palestine and Israel has rendered relations with the Brotherhood all the more delicate for King Abdallah II, due to Jordan’s majority Palestinian population. As in Syria, the Brotherhood in Jordan is committed to nonviolence and multiparty democracy, but the question remains: How long they will be able to contain the anger and frustration of the lower classes?

The Ikhwân in Sudan

The Sudanese Muslim Brothers’ Society officially came into being as an extension of its Egyptian counterpart when Hasan al-Banna appointed a director general in 1949. Already, an indigenous movement had started to operate among students under the name Islamic Liberation Movement. The various strands of politically minded Muslims, mostly in university circles, banded together in the years following independence (1956), forming an Islamist coalition and pressing for an “Islamic” constitution. By the early 1960s the movement emerged as a political party called the Islamic Charter Front (Jabhat al-Mithaq al-Islami), and from this time forth, the leader for the Ikhwân strand of Islamism became Hasan al-Turabi, who in 1962 had just returned from his studies in Britain.

In spite of the Front’s participation in two elections and its success in getting the Communist Party banned from Sudanese politics, it remained weakened by internal divisions. Two main tendencies vied for control, both inherited from the Egyptian mother organization. Of these, the “political” option, led by Turabi, believed that achieving power in the political sphere was a prerequisite for Islamization. A second, “educationalist” option prioritized indoctrination and reform. By 1969 Turabi’s ideology had prevailed.

At first the military coup of 1969, led by Colonel Ja’far Nimeiri (Ar. Numayri), established a seemingly irreversible trend toward secularism and thus, during most of the 1970s, the Ikhwân joined forces with the opposition, participating in three failed coup attempts. Then, in 1977, as Nimeiri saw his own support base eroding, he began to call for a rapprochement with Islamic parties. The Ikhwân rallied to his side, along with the leader of the Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi (who was also Turabi’s brother-in-law). This enabled the Islamists to implement an impressive strategy aimed toward becoming a mass movement poised to take over the state. They achieved this by using their new-found freedom to recruit followers outside the university setting; by gaining experience in statesmanship by participating in the Nimeiri government; and by exploiting an experiment in “Islamic banking” to build an extensive Islamist business network. Their campaign to Islamize society succeeded so well that Nimeiri decreed the enactment of the shari’ā penal laws (hudud) in 1983.

A popular uprising in 1985 enabled Suwar al-Dhabah to topple Nimeiri through a military coup, and in the elections of 1986 the Ikhwân candidates successfully ran as the leaders of the new National Islamic Front (NIF). Their influence continued to rise, to the point that most observers believe that
The military coup led by Omar al-Bashir in 1989 was actually staged by the Ikhwan. Certainly, until the fallout between Bashir and Turabi in 2000–2001, Sudan was ruled by the NIF, with Turabi as its chief ideologue.

The 1990s were marked by a hardening of the NIF’s one-party authoritarian regime, the imposition of an intolerant Islamization of Sudanese northern society, and the intensification of the war against the southern forces—a civil war that since 1983 has killed over two million people. Though Turabi’s writings project a progressive and almost liberal Islamist position on democracy and human rights, the United Nations’ International Labor Organization and numerous human rights groups have protested the use of torture, ethnic cleansing, and the return of slavery to the Sudan. The Sudanese situation in the early 2000s appears as precarious as ever, unless Bashir’s post-Turabi regime develops a more open Islamist political agenda.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Fundamentalism; Qutb, Sayyid; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Turabi, Hasan al-.

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David L. Johnston

IKHWAN AL-SAFA

Ikhwan al-Safa, literally “Brethren of Purity” or more broadly the “Fellowship of the Pure,” is a term used to designate a group of Muslim intellectuals who compiled the well-known encyclopedia of learning called the Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa. Many of them lived in the tenth century, constituting a collaborative forum for discussion, debate, and writing that led to the composition of fifty-two epistles of the Rasa’il.

The consensus of modern scholarship is that the philosophical attitudes and ideas reflected in the Rasa’il are consistent and have much in common with views developed by Shi’ite Isma’ili thinkers of the same period. Their writings reflect clearly a vibrant philosophical orientation, strong familiarity with the major sciences, religious and intellectual traditions, and a critical stance toward what they perceived to be the cultural and political stagnation of the time. The evidence in the text, as well as references to them in early Isma’ili writings suggest that the philosophy reflected in the Rasa’il was closely affiliated with Isma’ili aspirations of the pre-Fatimid period.

Intellectual Approach

Beyond what initially appears to be an encyclopedic work, there is a far-ranging and comprehensive program of intellectual and educational reform. Such an agenda of reform was founded on three assumptions.

First, the Ikhwan acknowledged the existence of “sciences and wisdoms,” some divinely inspired, which had been produced by past faith communities, individuals, and learned societies. This base of knowledge represented a foundation for developing a synthesis, appropriate to a new time and circumstances. Such a synthesis would harmonize Qur’anic and Muslim values and ideals with the best that all other religious philosophical systems had to offer.

Second, the ultimate goal of such a synthesis, taught and properly applied to life and society, was a moral one. It was the advancement of human beings in their material life and conditions and their spiritual lives here and in the hereafter. Such an objective was best fulfilled through personal moral and intellectual growth and spiritual development through sound teaching and learning. This, however, assumed a foundation of knowledge, pedagogy, and the capacity to synthesize and assimilate existing resources through the application of intellectual and moral discipline. This personal commitment and emphasis on character development receives a great deal of emphasis in the Rasa’il. Piety, compassion, gentleness, and humility are prerequisites to wisdom and virtue. The attainment of such wisdom is the highest quality of Muslim learning, iḥkma, a religious and philosophical wisdom.

Third, the acquisition of knowledge as a virtue that fosters moral character created in turn a society with a common set of civic values and behavior. Thus, the individual, social, and religious goals intersected in the Ikhwan’s vision. The building of this foundation of learning drew upon the following major sources:

- Mathematical and natural sciences
- Scriptures revealed through prophets
- Nature and the environment
- Inspiration vouchsafed to purified souls

Each source was capable of being converted into a series of disciplines, further formalized into a curriculum, directed at students through sessions involving reading, study, and discussion. These were divided into four broad areas:
Mathematics and deductive subjects, including, interestingly enough, music
Physical and natural sciences, including the study of biology of living things and culture
Psychology and intellectual inquiry
Religious science and knowledge, including ethics and governance

The hermeneutical approach of the Ikhwan, and their blending of knowledge traditions, reflects the growth and diversity of learning in the Muslim world of the ninth and tenth centuries. In particular, the translation of the ancient heritage of Greece and the Mediterranean world had made available to Muslims tools from philosophy and science that could serve to underpin an interpretation and explanation of Qur’anic principles. The Ikhwan like other Muslim philosophers or rationalist groups, such as the Mu’tazila, were committed to building such an intellectual framework, but in the process they wished to affirm a commitment to core notions such as tawhid, the unity of God, the necessity of religious faith, law, and salvation, which they perceived, quoting the Qur’an (89:26), as the return of the contented soul to the God of Unity.

Just as the symbolic significance of numbers and mathematical values reflected their methodological approach to science, so with regards to the Qur’an, whose verses they considered as having an interior, symbolic meaning (batin) that required a rational interpretation and a hermeneutical approach.

The Rasa’il also contains many references to Christian and Jewish scriptures and traditions, acknowledging respect and recognition of the commonalities the Abrahamic traditions share and the affirmation that an ecumenical spirit is a prelude to knowledge and appreciation of the other. In addition, the Ikhwan draw from the literature of ancient Iran, India, and Buddhism. They used well-known stories and parables, such as the legend of Bilawhar and the Debate of the Animals, which suggest the diverse milieu of the time, but are also indicative of the Ikhwan’s efforts to broaden and deepen Muslim discourse by engaging it with the intellectual strands of the time. Their approach thus reflects the ethos of the period—a time of debate, intellectual ferment, and synthesis in many fields of Muslim thought, including philosophy, theology, law, and politics.

By and large their work was read by and influenced many later Muslim thinkers. The Rasa’il were translated into many languages and transmitted all over the Muslim world. Their writings have also attracted the attention of Muslim and other scholars in modern times, and their approach and commitment to education as the most constructive vehicle for change appears to have stood the test of time.

See also Falsafa; Shi’a: Isma’ili.

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IMAM

The word “imam” is an Arabic term signifying a leader, a model, an authority, or an exemplar. The term occurs in the Qur’an, for example at 2:124, with reference to God’s promise to make Abraham an “imam for the people,” and at 11:17 and 46:12, where the “Book of Moses” is characterized as an “imam.” In early theological and juristic literature, the Qur’an and the sunna are sometimes referred to as imam, although the Qur’an does not describe itself as such. The leader of the congregational prayers is typically designated as an imam, and from the ninth century onwards the term was also used for leading Sunni religious scholars. Most commonly, however, the term refers to the caliph in the Sunni juristic literature and, in Shi’ism, to the infallible guide of the community.

Debates on the question of who was best qualified to be the imam and whether a sinful leader might be removed from his position as the head of the community played an important role in the development of Sunni religious and political thought. Medieval Sunni jurists held the position of the imam to be deducible from revelation rather than reason, and considered this position to be essential for the defense of Islam and the implementation of the sacred law, the shari’a. In general, they required that the caliph/imam be a member of Muhammad’s tribe of Quraysh, be duly elected by the people or nominated by his predecessor, and possess moral probity, religious knowledge, and the physical faculties necessary for the discharge of his duties. With the decline of the caliphate and the rise to power of the military warlords, however, the jurists came to recognize that any ruler—and not necessarily the caliph—who wielded effective political power was the legitimate imam, as long as his actions did not flagrantly contravene the shari’a.

To the Shi’ites, the term imam has a different signification altogether. It refers to a member of the family of the Prophet (abl al-bayt), and usually to a member of “the family” as descended from Muhammad’s daughter Fatima (d. 633) and

See also Falsafa; Shi’a: Isma’ili.
her husband ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661). The history of Shi‘ism is marked by numerous disagreements on the precise identity and number of the imams, as well as on how to define the imam’s authority and functions; and many of these disagreements have continued to the present, as have distinct Shi‘ite communities. The Imamis, who came to be the most numerous group among the Shi‘ites, believe in twelve imams, hence their common designation as “Ithna ‘asharis” or “Twelvers.”

The Twelver imams are believed to be sinless, the repository of authoritative knowledge, and indispensable for the guidance and salvation of the community. The last of these imams is believed to have gone into hiding in 874. While leading Twelver-Shi‘ite jurists (mujtabids) have continued the imam’s function of providing religious guidance and leadership to the community (even as they have long debated the scope of their own authority in his absence), belief in his eventual return is a cardinal feature of the Twelver religious system.

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IMAMATE

Imamate is the English word used to describe the office of the imam. In works of Muslim jurisprudence, both Shi‘a and Sunni, the leader of the Muslim state is referred to as the imam. The term imam is also used in other religious contexts (such as a prayer-leader). This entry will concentrate on the former usage.

The imam, in Sunni political theory, was the head of the Muslim state, whose responsibility it was to ensure that the state operated in the correct Islamic manner. It was to the imam that the Muslims should pay their alms (zakat) and land tax (kharaj). It was with the imam that minority communities (such as Christians or Jews, normally termed “the protected people” or abl al-dhimma) would make their agreement of protection, and when necessary, it was the imam who would lead the state in war with the enemies of Islam. This theoretical presentation was rarely realized, and the gap between theory and practice was recognized by other terms for the actual holders of political power (khilafa, sultan, amir, and even shaykh) that were rarely used to describe leaders in the theoretical works of jurisprudence, but were the standard appellations in works of history and biography, and in the increasingly popular mirror works, containing advice for kings and governors. The compromise evident in the interface between the theory and the historical development of the Muslim community is neatly exemplified by the debate among Sunni thinkers concerning the imamate of one who, though not the most pious of the community, has the appropriate political skills.

It is perhaps in the Shi‘ite tradition that the term imam has been subject to the most discussion. For all the Shi‘a, the imam was the descendant of ‘Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad), who held both religious and political authority (irrespective of the extent of his own personal power). The imam was commonly held to have inherited these roles from the prophet Muhammad. In this sense, an imam was like a prophet. However, in other ways the imam was distinguished from a prophet. In particular, the imam was not the recipient of a divine revelation (wahi), but was “inspired” to lead the community. This was often attributed to an unusually close relationship with God, through which God guides the imam, and the imam in turn guides the people. The divisions between the various contemporary Shi‘ite groupings (Twelvers, Zaydis, and Isma‘ilis) are, primarily, over questions of the imamate (What authority does he have? What power can he exert? Who, precisely, is the imam at the present time, and how is the imam selected or elected from among the Prophet’s descendants?). The Zaydi Shi‘a (so called because of their belief in the imamate of Zayd b. ‘Ali, a son of the great-grandson of the prophet Muhammad) have determined the imam to be a learned and pious descendant who comes forward to claim the office of the imam. For Zaydis, there may be periods when the world is devoid of an imam, and for some Zaydis, there may be times when there are two Imams. The major Zaydi community is based in Yemen, and the political leaders of Yemen were usually considered imams. However, in 1962, the last Zaydi imam (Imam Ahmad Hamid al-Din) died, leading to a revolution in Yemen and the end of the Zaydi imamate there. There has been no universally recognized imam for Zaydi Shi‘ite since then, though there is no theoretical bar to one emerging in the future. The Isma‘il Shi‘a have consistently argued that the imam is the current oldest male in a long line of descendants of the Prophet descended from Isma‘il, the son of Ja‘far (the great-great-grandson of the Prophet). Isma‘il fathered Muhammad, and the Isma‘il imams are all, supposedly, descended from him. The Isma‘ilis have splintered into various groups over the past one thousand years. Some believe the line of imams to have disappeared and been
replaced with a line of “propogators” (du'at); many others have recognized a line of imams, right up to the present day. The current holder of the imamate (according to these Isma'iliils), is Karim Khan Agha Khan, who became imam in 1971.

A most extensive discussion of the Shi'ite theory of the imamate is that found within the Twelver Shi'ite tradition. Twelver Shi'a (or Ibna' 'azbari) are so named because of their belief in twelve imams ('Ali, followed by eleven descendants), the last of whom has gone into hiding on a semipermanent basis (ghayba), to return at some point in the future to judge humankind. The Twelver Shi'ite writers shared with some Isma'ili theologians a rational argument for the existence of an imam: God would not leave the world without some sort of “guidance” (bi'da) for humanity, for to do so would make him both uncaring (in terms of neglect for his creation) and unjust (in that people would be punished in the afterlife for sins committed due to a lack of guidance from God). The imam, then, becomes a necessary condition of humankind’s continuation of religious life in the world. In Twelver philosophical works (such as those of the Twelver Mula Sadra [d. 1637]), the imam's role is expanded, from a mere guarantor of religious life to a creational conduit, through whom the world was created, and by whom the world is maintained in existence. In addition to these rational deliberations on the nature of the imam, there were exegetical efforts, whereby the imams were identified with certain expressions within the Qur'an. Qur'an 7:181, for instance, mentions people created by God to “guide [human beings] to the truth.” This for Twelver Shi'ite writers like the great Qur'anic exegete al-Tabarsi (d. 1158) is a clear reference to the imams. The Twelver Shi'ite theologian al-Shaykh al-Tusi (d. 1067), for example, outlines the terms of an imam, which include designation (nass—for a previous imam), omniscience, being the most excellent (afdal) of the people, and (most crucially) being infallible (ma'ṣum).

While the strictly political functions of the imam in Shi'ite thought do not differ significantly from those outlined in Sunni writings, the notion (particularly evident in Isma'ili and Twelver writings) of the imam’s infallibility (‘isma), both in terms of interpretation and in terms of behavior, makes the Shi'ite conception distinctive. The imam, therefore, holds a more central role in Shi'ite community life than the imam of Sunni political theory. He is both perfect political leader and unchallenged religious authority.

See also Ghayba(t); Mahdi; Shi'a: Imami (Twelver); Shi'a: Zaydi (Fiver).

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Robert Gleave

**IMAMZADAH**

*Imamzadah*, literally “one borne of an imam,” refers to a descendant of a Shi'ite imam and, by extension, to a shrine where such a descendant is buried. *Imamzadahs* exist throughout the Shi’ite world; their relative importance is determined by the perceived legitimacy of their genealogy. The major tombs of Zaynab, daughter of the first imam, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, and Ruqayyah, daughter of the third imam, Husayn, are located in Damascus, Syria. Prominent *imamzadahs* in Iran include the tomb in Qum of Fatimah, also known as Ma’sumah, sister of the ninth imam, Riza, and the tomb of Ahmad b. Musa, popularly known as Shah Cheragh (King Light) in Shiraz. *Imamzadahs* of less-certain provenance are venerated in cities, towns, and the countryside. Although formally educated Shi’ites often disdain less well known *imamzadahs* and view fervent devotion of them as tantamount to idolatry, those who visit *imamzadahs* approach the shrines with sincere faith and affection. *Imamzadahs* are regarded as accessible local representatives of divinity, and are appealed to as intercessors.

Pilgrimage to an *imamzadah* is known as *ziyarat*, a formal personal visit. The amount of time spent visiting an *imamzadah* is proportional to the saint’s importance. For example, three days are considered appropriate for a visit to Hazrat-e Ma’sumeh; one day suffices for *ziyarat* to Shah Cheragh. Cursory visits are paid to small neighborhood shrines. Pilgrims visit the shrines in much the same spirit as they would visit senior relatives.

*Imamzadahs* have distinct characters, and are often regarded as having specialties related to the character and personal history of the individual to whom they are dedicated. For example, the Seyyed ‘Ala al-din Husayn shrine in Shiraz, burial place of an *imamzadah* who died at thirteen years of age, is renowned as a site where children may be cured. Other shrines cure particular diseases or provide special kinds of assistance. Female *imamzadahs* are particularly responsive to women’s and girls’ concerns, such as the desire to find a suitable husband or have an easy childbirth.

Visits to small local *imamzadahs* are popular among many women. Men are more numerous at formal religious sites, which are generally less comfortable places for women to spend time. Locations of *imamzadahs* are suggested by dreams or the discovery of old tombstones, and confirmed by the occurrence of miracles. Graves of popular *imamzadahs* are
marked by zarih{s}, often elaborate barred enclosures that
surround the tombs and protect them from visitors anxious to
carry away some of the shrine’s blessing, or barakat. Letters of
petition addressed to the saints as well as money and gifts may
be placed inside the zarih to signal vows made or answered.
Shrines that attract many visitors may be divided into sepa-
rate men’s and women’s sections, each on one side of the zarih.

Political figures eager to demonstrate their piety may pay
well-publicized visits to prominent shrines or assure that the
shrines are refurbished with government funds. Since the
advent of the Islamic Republic in 1979 in Iran, imamzadabs in
that country have received a great deal of official attention
and investment. Shrines are maintained by support from
donations given to the imamzadabs or, lacking these, from the
government endowments (awqaf) office. Popular imamzadabs
are frequently located near bazaars, which benefit from the
flow of pilgrims. As sacred space, shrines can provide sanctu-
ary and often serve as focal points for Shi’ite rituals, such as
‘Ashura observances.

See also Devotional Life; Dreams; Imam; Pilgrimage:
Ziyara; Religious Beliefs; Religious Institutions.

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Anne H. Betteridge

INTERNET

The Islamic presence in cyberspace relates to both religious
authority and the accessibility of authoritative texts, scrip-
tural and juridical, reflecting a spectrum of views internal to
the diverse Muslim community. Digital Islam projects Mus-
lim values yet is also bound by them. It is further influenced
by the American origins of the World Wide Web: Afro-Asian
Muslim students who came to the United States to be trained
as engineers were also the first to create specifically Islamic
websites (especially through Muslim Student Associations, or
MSAs). Their concerns remain the concerns of Muslims
worldwide: to foster cyber Islamic environments that rein-
force Muslim values no matter what the dominant culture or
the vocational demands that individual Muslims face.

The Boundaries of Digital Islam
One of the most fertile and recurrent metaphors from Mus-
lim imagery is the Straight Path. It is first introduced in the
opening chapter of the Qur’an. “Guide us on the Straight
Path,” each Muslim asks of Allah each day and each time that
he or she engages in canonical prayer (salat). The Straight
Path, and only the Straight Path, leads to peace, to truth, to
certainty, in this world and also in the next.

The boundaries of digital Islam reflect the scriptural,
creedal, and historical boundaries of Islamic thinking before
the Information Age. There can be no Islam without limits or
without guideposts. One cannot have a Straight Path unless
what is beyond or outside or against the Straight Path is
known. Cyberspace, like social space, must be monitored to
be effectively Muslim. As Gary Bunt has noted, “much is
done by Muslims in the name of Islam that is dismissed as
inappropriate, or worse, by other Muslims. Not every surfer
(Muslim or non-Muslim) is able to make appropriate judg-
ments, or possess the knowledge to determine ‘the truth.’”

Yet the horizontal, open-ended nature of the Internet
makes the boundaries of digital Islam more porous and more
subject to change than those of its predecessors. There are
still the same guideposts: the scripture (the Qur’an), the
person (the Last Prophet) and the law (with the ulema or
religious specialists as its custodians). Each has to be defined
or redefined in cyberspace in order to reflect the staggering
diversity within the worldwide Muslim community (umma).
The cyber-umma remains a subset of, not a substitute for, the
actual umma.

The most profound diversity is the global distribution of
Muslims themselves. Muslims comprise between one-quarter
and one-third of the world’s population. More Muslims are
Asian than African, more are African than Arab, and many
Muslims now live outside their countries of origin, whether
in Europe or North America. It is Euro-American Muslim
immigrants who form the leading edge for change in the
Muslim world as a whole. Children of the information tech-
ology revolution, they have a heightened sense of diversity,
at the same time that they use expanded human and material
resources to link themselves with other, like-minded groups.

There is a debate about whether or not the Internet
encourages democracy in the Muslim world. Some cybernauts
have assumed that the expansive technology of the World
Wide Web makes it as democratic in access as it is global in
scope. But others claim that the Internet further shores up
traditional authority, since only certain groups of Asian (or
Arab or Iranian) Muslim immigrants get their views projected
on web pages in cyberspace. The South Asian cultural critic
Ziauddin Sardar (1996), for instance, lambasts cyberspace as “social engineering of the worst kind. . . . The supposed democracy of cyberspace only hands control more effectively back to a centralized elite, the ideology of the free citizen making everyone oblivious to the more enduring structures of control.”

The Internet and the Information Age

For those Muslims who do have access to cyberspace, two key terms frame their experience of the Internet. Both terms, Muslim networks and the Information Age, come together in digital Islam. Muslim networks precede and inform the Information Age. Manuel Castells accents the difference inaugurated by the information technology revolution. This revolution did not erase prior networks, but it did enhance the way they function. The information technology revolution has made the internal diversity and historical networking of Muslims more apparent. The Internet, in particular, opens up access to communities that were closed or inaccessible, thus facilitating an investigation of the ways in which diverse peoples encounter their diversity and interpret their experiences. It provides options for new forms of collective interaction.

During the 1990s, the Internet became part of daily life in many parts of the world. While access in Africa and Asia remains limited for economic and political reasons, grassroots organizations are learning how to exploit the democratizing potential of e-connectivity and to circumvent attempts to centralize control. In Malaysia, for example, networks opposed to the government have established a tiered system of distribution. Elites with computer access download materials as hard copies, which are then widely distributed into rural areas, where they can be read aloud to groups of illiterate people. Virtual communities are becoming the norm, even as technophiles debate with neo-Luddites about whether they are the harbingers of a brave new world or the end of fully human life.

While the information revolution emerges out of technological developments and organizational patterns long in place throughout the world, it can be marked as a revolution because of its difference from these same antecedent patterns. What is different are the speed, scope, and directness of communication, nowhere more evident than in the concept of telepresence.

Telepresence and Resistance

Telepresence is a new form of association, and, as such, it compels a reconsideration of the meaning of community: What is community when participants do not share place but can communicate as if they did? If shared place is not a necessary condition, is the notion of community as embodied contact a romantic projection of an idealized past? Sociologists since the nineteenth century have been worrying about the impact of technology on community, as though it possessed a solid, immutable core. But a century later, communities survive, albeit in less solid but no less real forms. While it is too early to predict how transformative the Internet will be, its impact on individual, communal, and national identity is growing.

The challenge for Muslim cybernauts is the same as for other “netizens” (a neologism meaning “internet citizens”): How to define place and community in new ways that do not oppose virtual and real but rather see them as complementary? Can social networking in the flows of the information superhighway provide an alternate context within which to build communities as small as a kinship group, or as large as a nation?

The cybernetic revolution provides unprecedented opportunities for local and transnational community formation. Whether Muslims aggregate in virtual associations, such as cyber-Muslim chat groups, or actual networks, such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws (<http://www.wluml.org>), they project a common pattern of fragmentation, dispersal, and reaggregation. In this era of mass migration, when violence and economic necessity have forced many to travel, diasporic Muslims are split from their birth communities. They are compelled to negotiate multiple speaking positions as they imagine and project national identities. Nationalism today, though geographically fragmented, is socially networked through language and systems of meaning that allow participants to share cultural practices and experiences. People are able to diversify their participation in various communities to reflect shared interests rather than shared place or shared ancestry. They may also form contingent virtual communities to respond to emergencies at the collective and individual levels, as well as to provide companionship, social support, and a sense of belonging.

The Internet seems to empower individuals who would not otherwise have a public voice to express and present their opinions to strangers. However divergent from the norm, an individual can insist on his or her unorthodox position. A debate that could be closed in real space by the assertion of dominance by a majority remains open in virtual space. Consider the fierce debate concerning women’s rights as human rights and Muslim women as fully the equal of Muslim men. Often this debate centers on one hadith of the prophet Muhammad, to wit, that “a nation which places its affairs in the hands of a woman shall never prosper.” Traditionalists have used it to deny women any role in affairs of state or the public domain, but a contemporary Nigerian jurist, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, has demonstrated through an essay circulated on the Internet (at <www.gamji.cm/sanusi.htm>) the extent to which rival interpretations of this hadith render it suspect as the eternal norm governing Muslim women’s access to professional employment and political power.

Heteroglossia and contestation do not automatically replace the ideological closure of other forms of telecommunication such as newspapers, television, radio, and even telephone.
Still, dissension that might have been quashed previously in an environment where hegemonic discourse held sway might today persist beyond presumed endings. To the extent that the necessarily horizontal nature of relationships on the Net challenges traditional hierarchies, the democratizing potential of the Net holds out hope for people living under authoritarian rule in many postcolonial Muslim states.

**Consequences of the Information Technology Revolution**

The Information Age is an age defined by media, whether print (newspapers), auditory (the radio and telephone), audiovisual (television and movies), or print-auditory-visual-tactile (the World Wide Web). There could be no World Wide Web without antecedent technological breakthroughs, yet it represents the culmination of a process the further consequences of which no one yet knows. While Muslims did not create the World Wide Web, they have been among its beneficiaries, at least in those nodes of the global capitalist community where Muslims work, live, and pray either in their own cosmopolitan centers or as part of the demographic pluralism of Western Europe, North America and South/Southeast Asia.

What will be the consequence of the information technology revolution for Islam during the next two decades? Castells has argued that it will augur the biggest revolution experienced by humankind since the invention of the Greek alphabet in 700 B.C.E. It is too early to confirm Castells’ grand vision, but even if one acknowledges its long-term potential, its immediate impact has to be qualified on two major points. First, the boundaries of religious knowledge are not so easily or so swiftly changed. The major web site for Muslims in the Euro-American diaspora today is IslamiCity in Cyberspace, located at <www.islam.org>, <www.islamic.org>, and <www.islamicity.org>.

It has been embraced by Muslim Student Associations throughout North America, at the same time that it has benefited from the early endeavors of student-based webmasters to create Cyber Islamic environments. Because IslamiCity in Cyberspace claims 120 million hits since January 2001, it would seem that it fulfills its mission, namely, to service the global Muslim ecommunity.

But does IslamiCity actually represent all Muslims, in geographic space as well as in cyberspace? IslamiCity in Cyberspace is itself an offshoot of HADI, the acronym for a Saudi overseas holding company based in California: Human Assistance and Development International. In Arabic, badi means guide or leader. Hadi is also one of the “99 Most Beautiful Names of God,” and it echoes the phrase from the Qur’an cited above: “Guide us on the Straight Path.” In this case, however, the Straight Path guides the Muslim cyberspace towards norms and values that reflect the Saudi sponsors of HADI. It reflects the effort of the Saudi government to project itself as the bastion of Islamic orthodoxy, at once the conduit and the center for the one billion strong umma. Yet the HADI-sponsored websites have little relationship to other cyber-Muslim voices with a variant notion of Islamic loyalty and ritual practice.

Among the numerous alternative Muslim websites, two kinds contrast sharply with Islamcity in Cyberspace. One is the principal Twelver Shi’ite website at <www.al-islam.org>. This site, like HADI, originates from North America, in this case from Canada, but instead of the dominant Sunni stress on scripture and Prophetic practice, it projects a personal loyalty to ‘Ali, the cousin/son-in-law of the Prophet and an individual whom Shi’ite Muslims esteem as one of the Infallibles, or perfect beings who guide others to Allah. Also reflecting a personal loyalty, but to other semidivine mediators, are numerous Sufi sites, among them those dedicated to the Chishti-affiliated Sufi Order of the West and its founder, Hazrat Inayat Khan. For example, <www.cheraglibrary.org/library.htm> is the home page of a Chishti devotee from New Mexico, and it offers a broad appeal to numerous, non-Muslim spiritual paths, all under the canopy of a universal perspective of Sufism.

The huge conceptual gap between the IslamiCity sites and their Shi’ite or Sufi counterparts illustrates the second major demural from a cyber-utopia of the sort that Castells projects. Differences in virtual space will be as multiple and myriad as ground-level disparities within the umma. Not only will there be a limited number of Muslims who have access to the World Wide Web, but those who do become Muslim netizens will find many competing notions of Islamic loyalty and options for ritual practice. It will also continue to matter where one resides. In Malaysia or Turkey the government is less prone to monitor or to filter websites than in Saudi Arabia or Syria, and, while hacking can take place as easily within a cyber-Islamic environment as elsewhere, it will occur more often in border zones of actual conflict, such as Palestine and Kashmir. Because information technologies, like religious traditions, are inherently conservative, they tend to reinforce global structures and asymmetries rather than to bode a new era for civil society and transformative justice. The information technology revolution will continue to benefit diasporic Muslims more than their homeland co-religionists. The disparity between north and south, between rich and poor will be as evident, alas, among Muslims as it is among non-Muslims, at least for the foreseeable future.

*See also Globalization; Networks, Muslim.*

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INTIFADA

*Intifada* ("shaking off") is the name given to two Palestinian uprisings against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first began in December of 1987 as a popular uprising, its hallmark being the image of Palestinian youths throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories. This Intifada was triggered by an incident in Gaza that turned violent and subsequently spread rapidly to the West Bank territories. Over the next several years, the Intifada escalated, involving demonstrations, strikes, riots, and violence against Israelis. The Intifada lasted until 1993 when, in response to the uprising, the Oslo Accords were drawn up between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.

Al-Aqsa Intifada began after Ariel Sharon, a leader of the Israeli right-wing LIKUD Party, visited al-Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), in Jerusalem, on 28 September 2000. Al-Haram, which contains al-Aqsa Mosque, is the third holiest shrine of Islam. The visit was provocative to Palestinians, especially because Sharon was accompanied by one thousand riot police, but what triggered the Intifada the following day was the Israeli police use of live ammunition and rubber bullets against unarmed, rock-throwing Palestinian demonstrators, killing six and injuring 220.

The fundamental cause of al-Aqsa Intifada was the breakdown, in July 2000, of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that had begun with the Oslo Accords of 1993. Palestinians expected that the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) recognition of Israel, which was a part of that agreement, would lead to an end of the thirty-three-year Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and to the establishment of a Palestine state. However, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza doubled to 187,000 and increased to 170,000 in East Jerusalem in the 1990s, and Israel confiscated more Palestinian land for the settlements and their access roads. Israel extended its policy of restricting the movement of Palestinians, and of establishing checkpoints where Palestinians experienced humiliation. Israel also continued to demolish homes and to uproot and burn olive and fruit trees, as a form of collective punishment and for security reasons. In short, Israeli repression and unmet Palestinian expectations of freedom and independence contributed to years of pent-up frustration, despair, and rage.

Like the first Intifada, Palestinians in October 2000 began by using nonviolent methods. After 144 Palestinians had been killed, however, Islamist groups, such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, began a campaign of suicide bombings against mostly civilians in the occupied territories and Israel, while groups associated with Fatah organization, such as al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, focused on resistance against Israeli army incursions and conducted attacks on settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. Starting in January 2002, al-Aqsa Brigade also began conducting suicide bombings against mostly Israeli civilians, a practice condemned by the international community. Yasir ‘Arafat, head of Fatah and the PLO, and president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) since 1996, did not initiate the Intifada, but he reportedly gave tacit approval to armed resistance and terrorism, despite his promise made in the Oslo Accords in 1993 to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to renounce “the use of terrorism and other acts of violence.”

Sharon became Israel’s Prime Minister on 6 February 2001. A proponent of Greater Israel, an architect of the settlements, and an opponent of the Oslo process, he proceeded, with broad public support, to use harsh measures against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In response to Palestinian violence, he initiated a policy of assassinations, euphemistically called “targeted killings,” of suspected terrorists leaders, but which included activists and innocent bystanders. He reoccupied major Palestinian cities, using helicopter gunships, war planes and tanks. Some of Sharon’s methods were condemned by both human rights groups and the United States.

The Intifada was costly to the Palestinians, Israel, and the United States during the first thirty months. Some strategists, including Palestinian analysts, considered the militarization of the Intifada to be a blunder. The Oslo process was destroyed, ‘Arafat sidelined, the Palestinian economy damaged, and the PA areas occupied, while settlement construction continued apace. Sharon’s harsh measures cost the lives of over 2,000 Palestinians, of whom most were civilians, including about 275 children. In addition, the Palestinians lost much popular, moral, and diplomatic support around the world. The Intifada also cost the lives of over 700 Israelis, most of whom were civilians, brought insecurity to their lives, and resulted in the loss of faith in the Palestinians as peace partners.

See also Conflict and Violence; HAMAS; Human Rights.

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IQBAL, MUHAMMAD (C. 1877–1938)

Muhammad Iqbal, South Asian poet and ideological innovator, wrote poetry in Urdu and Persian and discursive prose, primarily in English, of particular significance in the formulation of a national ethos for Pakistan. A popular lyric and patriotic poet in his youth, he later shifted to more philosophical themes that sought to discover in the heritage of Islam a spirit of individual and social activism that would inspire an alternative path to modernity and demonstrate the universal relevance of Islam for the modern world. An opponent of nationalism, particularly the Indian nationalist movement, he promoted a renewed aspiration for a worldwide Muslim umma. Nevertheless, his advocacy of Muslim social self-sufficiency and his occasionally more specific political statements were later construed in Pakistan as the guiding principles for the country’s separation from India.

Born in Sialkot, Punjab, of Kashmiri background and modest economic circumstances—his father had a small tailoring and embroidery shop—Iqbal received an early education in Arabic and Persian and a British colonial education that earned him a masters degree in philosophy at Government College, Lahore, where he also established his reputation as a poet. His academic brilliance won him a scholarship to continue his studies at Cambridge University in 1905, while also qualifying him as a barrister. He then earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Munich in 1908 with a dissertation, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, which was published that year. His three years in Europe, during which he was immersed in philosophical idealism, also inspired a powerful concern with the historical circumstances of Muslims throughout the world in the face of the technological and political domination of the West. His Urdu poem Shikwa (Complaint), in 1911, asked why God had allowed Muslims to fall from their position as leaders of humanity.

To reach a wider Muslim audience and establish a deeper historical connection with the cosmopolitan civilization of Islam, Iqbal chose to write most of his later and more philosophically ambitious poetry in Persian. Asrar-e khudi (Secrets of the self, 1915), his first major poem in Persian, was a sharp rejection of the mystical goal of absorption into undifferentiated being, which Iqbal associated with passivity on the part of individuals and communities. For Iqbal, the assertion of khudi, individuality, allows for the possibility of love and creativity in the unfinished creation of the world.

Although calling for practical action in the world, Iqbal’s poetry remained steeped in erudite, abstract, and metaphorical language and in the metrical conventions of the Persian tradition. At the same time he mixed in allusions to European literature and contemporary events. His most ambitious work, the Javid Nama (1932), a kind of Divina Commedia, recounts the poet’s journey through the solar system, guided by the great Sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273 C.E.), encountering a wide range of mythic and historical figures. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930) sets forth his social and religious philosophy, which seeks to construct a concept of a dynamic, democratic society inspired by the Qur’an and the life of the prophet Muhammad. Rejecting the goals of secular nationalism associated with Europe as a false division of matter and spirit, Iqbal’s ventures into politics as president of the Muslim League in 1930, participation in the London Round Table Conferences in 1931 and 1932, and occasional commentary, set forth a positive vision of a modern Muslim social and political order.

See also Liberalism, Islamic; Persian Language and Literature; South Asia, Islam in; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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David Leibyveld

IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

Founded in 1979 in the wake of a violent and dramatic revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran walked a delicate tightrope between modernity and theocracy. For millions of Muslims throughout the world, the Islamic Republic inspired hope that Muslim law could be applied to a modern nation state, while for others who were opposed to its agenda, the country stood out as a repressive, fearful regime.

The Islamic Revolution of 1978 and 1979 destroyed the monarchy of the Pahlavis, who had pursued a secularization policy at the expense of the majority public opinion and
allowed foreign investment to control large sectors of the national economy. Millions of Iranians of varying political persuasions—leftists, merchants, and ulema—were particularly troubled by the predominant influence of the American government on Iranian foreign policy and economic decision-making. Despite some gains for the population during the White Revolution (1967–1963) most Iranians lived in poverty, totally alienated from the luxury of the Pahlavi regime, and repressed by its security forces.

The revolution forced Muhammad Reza Shah (1919–1980) to abandon the country by January 1979, ushering the return of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989). Although Khomeini had been in exile since 1964, his anti-Western and anti-secularization messages had been distributed widely throughout the country, in both print and cassette form. In the wake of the shah’s exile, Khomeini returned to Iran in February 1979, becoming the spiritual figurehead of what was now an Islamic Revolution. On 1 April 1979, Iranians voted overwhelmingly to found an Islamic Republic. Their action was inspiring to some, and frightening to others.

From 1979 until 1982, Iran existed in a revolutionary crisis mode. The entire apparatus of government had collapsed, along with the economy. The military and police forces were in disarray, and battles between hard-line clerics and more moderate politicians raged in an effort to determine who would control the new society. The extreme anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, tone of the revolution cut Iran off from the West, compounding its economic problems, yet giving strength to its revolutionary credibility among struggling nations. Although there were many factions against him, Khomeini was able to come to the forefront of the government with the backing of the Revolutionary Guards, formed in 1979 to suppress opponents of the Islamic Republic, and a series of revolutionary tribunals, which meted out harsh justice to collaborators of the Pahlavi regime. For the next few years, those shaping the new Islamic government would completely crush their opposition in a bid to consolidate their power over Iran.

By the end of 1979, Iran had a new constitution, officially declaring the nation an Islamic Republic. The government was structured with an elected president, a prime minister chosen by the president, and an elected parliament, the Majlis, and a twelve-member Council of Guardians, dominated by six religious jurists with veto power over all legislation passed by the elected parliament. Finally, the most powerful position in the government lay in the institution of velayat-e faqih, which established the office of supreme jurist, one who would rule on all workings of government on behalf of the Hidden Imam of Twelver Shi’ism. This jurist would be Khomeini, effectively making him the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.

In 1980, the new republic faced serious new crises. In November of 1979, students took control of the United States Embassy in Tehran, holding fifty-seven hostages for 444 days. This inflamed Western hatred of the revolution, fueling its radicals further. Moreover, in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, hoping to take advantage of its fragility to seize control of its large oil fields, as well as to prevent the spread of the revolution across its borders. While anti-Western sentiment was fueling the purge of the military establishment, Iran was now forced to mount a military defense.

In the midst of these international problems, the Islamic Republic’s first president, the secular leftist Abu ʾl-Hasan Bani-Sadr (b. 1933), attempted to rein in the power of the ulema at home by consolidating the power of local revolutionary tribunals under the watch of the central government and by promoting secular reforms. However, the ulema resented his attempts to assert secular authority, as well as his botched efforts to resolve the hostage crisis with the Americans and the escalating war with Iraq. By 1981 Bani-Sadr was impeached and forced into exile in France, the same place he had been exiled during the shah’s regime. Now the road was
paved for Khomeini and his Islamic Republic Party (established in 1979) to take full control of Iran.

In the first years of the Republic, a radical program of Islamization purged all secularists and leftists from education, civil service, the military, and other aspects of public life. Universities were particularly altered, with new curricula and libraries privileging Islamic values over all others, and all students with leftist backgrounds barred from attendance. Strict sex-segregation in public was enforced, and women were required to wear the traditional hijab while in public. The Islamic Republic’s strict moral codes were enforced by the Revolutionary Guards, who maintained a vigilant watch over society on behalf of the clerical ruling class. All secular law was replaced by Islamic interpretations, and those who rebelled against Islamization were subject to imprisonment.

Meanwhile, the war between Iran and Iraq continued. For eight years these neighboring nations battled in a brutal war of attrition, ultimately resulting in 262,000 Iranian casualties and 105,000 Iraqi deaths. Iran stunned the world by repelling the Iraqis and maintaining its borders, but it was not without cost. Iraqi bombing left 1.6 million Iranians homeless, and the nation was forced to dip deep into its already unstable financial reserves to accommodate widowed families and rebuild its damaged infrastructure. However, the Islamic Republic was not toppled by Iraq; indeed, its ability to maintain its sovereignty boosted public morale, despite the terrible human and economic costs.

In 1988 the war with Iraq ended, and Iranians now faced a hard question: Should they continue to reject all Western overtures or was it possible to engage economically with Western nations and still remain Islamic in government? In the next decade, Iran restored diplomatic relations with many European countries. However, it did not restore ties with the United States, which continued to be its primary adversary on the world stage. Even as late as 2002, the United States considered Iran part of an “axis of evil” in the world, while Iran continued regular anti-American protests in response.

With the death of Khomeini in 1989, grief struck the Islamic Republic, and the ruling establishment had to find a replacement for the society’s preeminent religious guide. The new supreme jurist, Sayyed ‘Ali Khamane’i (b. 1939), had been president since 1981 and had assumed the position, knowing full well that Iran faced tremendous difficulties. Normalizing the nation after years of revolution and war, and stabilizing an economy facing a shocking demographic shift would be difficult. In the early 1980s, the new regime had banned birth control and abortion, and the government promoted the notion that all families should have as many children as they could provide for. This gave Iran a birthrate of 3.9 percent by 1983, and the population nearly doubled to over sixty million people by 1990. That year the government, overloaded with trying to provide for such a massive increase, changed its policy, allowing contraception once again. In 1992 it went a step further and revoked government assistance from any family with more than three children; and it made abortion legal up to 120 days after conception.

Such reforms made Khamane’i and Iran’s third president, ‘Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (b. 1934), popular with moderates in the country, but the republic continued throughout the 1990s and beyond to vacillate between periods of liberalization and moments of hard-line crackdown. Under Rafsanjani, Iran’s markets became more open to Western goods, but the clerical ruling class continued to exercise dramatic influence over all aspects of public life, particularly in the realm of gender segregation and speaking out against Islam. Meanwhile, sales from Iran’s vast oil reserves could not stabilize its economy, and people struggled to maintain their families in the wake of increased prices.

At the end of Rafsanjani’s second term, in 1997, spiraling inflation and public dissatisfaction with censorship ushered in the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943), a man many saw as a reformer interested in opening up debate in Iranian political life and building social and political bridges with the Western nations. Although he was reelected in 2001, Khatami’s liberal positions were balanced by the clerical elite, who continue to exert their influence over a conservative legislature. Opening up Iran’s public culture to the influences of Western consumerism, secular government and non-Islamic culture is still a sensitive issue in the Islamic Republic, more than two decades after the beginning of its dramatic revolution. Despite landslide victories in two presidential elections (1997 and 2001), in the elections for municipal and village councils in 1999, and in the parliamentary elections in 2000, Khatami and the reformists have made little progress in the power struggle against the clerical ruling elite.

The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the most dramatic events of the twentieth century. For millions of Muslims throughout the world, its foundation was a symbol of the continued validity of their religion for the modern world. For those weary of theocracy, however, it stood as a symbol to be feared. For many Iranians and others, the Islamic Republic continues to represent, in the words of its founder Khomeini, a “third way, neither East nor West.”

See also Abu ’l-Hasan Bani-Sadr; Hashemi-Rafsanjani, ‘Ali-Akbar; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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Nancy L. Stockdale
ISLAM AND ISLAMIC

ISHRAQI SCHOOL

The term *ishraq*, from the Arabic root *š-r-q*, meaning both illumination and orient, has been used in a general sense in several contexts in Islam, including in reference to certain currents of Sufism. More specifically, however, the term *ishraqi* refers to the school of philosophy/thesosophy founded by Shaykh Shihab al-Din Suhrwardi in the twelfth century C.E. The most important source of this school of thought is the major opus of Suhrwardi, *Hikmat al-šīrağa* (“Theosophy of the Orient of Light” also known as *The Philosophy of Illumination*), which is also the name of this school in traditional Islamic languages. Certain other works of Suhrwardi, especially his *Hayakil al-nur* (Temples of light), are also of much importance for the later *ishraqi* tradition.

After Suhrwardi was killed by the political authorities in Aleppo in 1191, followers of his teachings went underground for a generation. But in the middle thirteenth century two major commentaries on *Hikmat al-šīrağa* appeared, the first by Shams al-Din Shahrazuri and the second by Qutb al-Din Shirazi, the next two major figures of the *ishraqi* school. From that time on, the teachings of this school became widespread, especially in Persia itself from which Suhrwardi had hailed. Such figures as ‘Allama al-Hili and Jalal al-Din Dawani wrote commentaries on Suhrwardi in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The founder of the School of Isfahan, Mir Damad, who lived in the Safavid period that began in Persia in 1499 and lasted until the eighteenth century, was influenced by Suhrwardi and used the name Ishraqa for his pen name. Mulla Sadra, his student, wrote one of the major works of the *ishraqi* school, his annotations on the *Hikmat al-šīrağa*. Later Persian philosophers such as Sabziwari were also deeply interested in *ishraqi* teachings, and a figure such as the nineteenth-century philosopher Shihab al-Din Kumiiani was a purely *ishraqi* figure.

The school of *ishraq* also spread into India and had many followers there, including Fatallah Shirazi and Muhammad Sharif Hirawi. Suhrwardi’s teachings became in fact a part of the program of traditional Islamic *madrasas*, a program that came to be known as the Nizamī curriculum. The *ishraqi* school attracted even the attention of Hindus and the Parsees of India.

Likewise, the teachings of the *ishraqi* school spread widely in the Ottoman Empire, especially in Anatolia, and produced some notable figures such as Isma’il Anqarawi, who lived in the seventeenth century. The complete history of this school in the Islamic world, especially in India and the Ottoman Empire, has not been fully studied. As for the West, Suhrwardi was not translated into Latin but there are indications that some of his ideas were known in the Latin West perhaps through Hebrew sources and a number of Jewish philosophers who were *ishraqa*i in their perspective.

The *ishraqa*i school holds that the origin of philosophy is divine revelation and that this wisdom was handed down in ancient times to the Persians and the Greeks, creating two traditions that met again in Suhrwardi, who spoke explicitly of eternal wisdom or the perennial philosophy. This school believes that authentic philosophy must combine the training of the mind with the purification of the heart and that all authentic knowledge is ultimately an illumination. The *ishraqa*is always emphasized the unbreakable link between philosophy and spirituality and the salvific power of illuminative knowledge. They considered God to be the Light of lights and all degree of cosmic reality to be levels and grades of light. They rejected the sensualist epistemology of Aristotle and were critical of not only Aristotelian cosmology but also of his logic and epistemology.

During the twentieth century the teachings of Suhrwardi were introduced to the West by Henry Corbin and have attracted many European philosophers. In Persia and certain other Islamic countries there is also a major revival of interest in Suhrwardi and the *ishraqa*ri school.

See also Falsafa; Ibn al-‘Arabi; Mulla Sadra; Tasawwuf; Wahdat al-wujud.

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Seyyed Hossein Nasr

ISLAM AND ISLAMIC

The word *islam* is a verbal noun (Ar., *masdar*) in Arabic for the action of submission or total commitment, usually referring to acceptance of and submission to the will of God. It is the name identifying the faith tradition and community of those who believe that there is one God and that the prophet Muhammad was God’s messenger, and the person who submits is a “Muslim.” In the Qur’an, *islam* appears eight times. It is associated with the concept of *din*, which is translated in modern times as “religion” but has a broader sense of including creed, normative standards, and the whole range of standard behavior. The Qur’an affirms that “With God, the
**Islam and Other Religions**

In the historical development of the faith tradition and community of Muslims, the term “Islam” is important in at least two different frameworks. In religious thought, one important issue was defining the relationship between Islam, identified as submission to God expressed in observance of ritual requirements and social behavior, and *iman* or the inner faith of the believer. In this issue, the concept of *islam* was a component part of the broader structure and vocabulary of theology.

A second significant framework is that “Islam” was used as the term denoting the whole body of the faith tradition and the peoples and regions where Islam was practiced. Within this context, the identification of someone as a “Muslim” gave emphasis to being a member of the community of those who recognize the Qur’an as the record of God’s revelation and Muhammad as the messenger of God, with less emphasis on the particular practices and behavior of the individual Muslim.

This usage facilitated the transition to modern usage in which “Islam” is identified in the scholarly study of this religion as one of the major religions of the world. This reification of “Islam” was similar to the processes of Western scholarly classification of other “world religions,” as in what came to be called “Hinduism” or “Confucianism.” Initially, other objectionable and historically inaccurate terms like “Mohammedanism” were used but they have gradually been displaced in common usage by “Islam.”

By the late twentieth century, in the context of the Islamic resurgence, some made a distinction between “Muslim” used as an adjective and “Islamic.” The term Muslim is increasingly identified with the existing community and the practices of people self-identified as Muslim. The term “Islamic” has sometimes been reserved for those instances where there is a conscious effort to reflect the fundamental principles and ideals of Islam interpreted in a relatively restrictive way. In this usage, for example, a “Muslim state” is a state where the majority of the people are Muslim, while an “Islamic state” would be one in which there is a formal program of implementation of the regulations and ideals of Islam. “Islam” remains the identification of the religion underlying both usages.

See also Islamicate Society.

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John O. Voll

**ISLAM AND OTHER RELIGIONS**

Understanding the relations between Muslims and a variety of religious “Others,” including Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, Buddhists, as well as Africans, Chinese, Mongols, Turks, and Westerners, depends on how one defines religion and religious. In addition, there is a diversity of Muslim identities that shapes the various perceptions of and relations to religious Others, just as there are many identities other than religious ones that intersect with the Muslim-Others duality, such as tribal, ethnic, linguistic, national, and the like.

As with any categorization of identities and concepts, the boundaries between Islam and Others remain fluid, and exceptions can often be found. The most striking example of this fluidity is the term *umma,* which came to mean, from the first centuries of Islam until today, the community of all Muslims in contradistinction to all Others, whether religious or not. Yet, initially, *umma* included Muslims as well as non-Muslims, and it especially included Jews, as indicated in the so-called Constitution of Medina negotiated by the prophet Muhammad as a basis for the migration of his nascent Islamic community from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. The *umma* referred to then was inclusive of all the peoples living in Medina under the leadership of the prophet Muhammad.

It is nevertheless possible to generalize and say that the history of Muslim-Other relations has been interpreted by Muslims through the lenses of a tripartite theological division of the human world: Muslims, who submit to the will of God as revealed in the Qur’an; People of the Book, who believe in the same God although their knowledge comes from a distorted version of the original divine revelation; and Unbelievers, who either associate idols to God or deny God’s existence. This categorization emerged out of the unique historical context of the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad, (ca. 570–632 C.E.) in central Arabia, and evolved over time, becoming increasingly complex as Islam grew in numbers and in geographical spread.

**The Lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad**

The first period of Muslim-Other relations corresponds to the lifetime of the prophet Muhammad. The best sources on these first relations between Muslims and religious Others include pre-Islamic poems, the Qur’an, early hadith, and biographies. While the reliability of these sources for historical reconstruction has been highly debated in recent years, it remains possible to infer that prior to 610 C.E., when the prophet Muhammad is believed to have received the first
Qur’anic revelation, his encounters with religious Others primarily included Christians and Jews that he may have met in some Arabian oasis as well as during his northern caravan trips into greater Syria. With subsequent revelations, which he continued to receive until his death in 632 C.E., the prophet Muhammad gradually distanced himself from the various tribal practices of his fellow Quraysh tribesmen while developing a new Islamic identity, thereby turning most Meccans of his own clan and tribe into religious Others too. Together with the earliest converts, the prophet Muhammad experienced a series of encounters with religious Others that included an increasingly hostile Meccan resistance as well as banafa (sg. banif: monotheistic ascetics), Jews, and Christians of mostly unknown theological leanings, except for the small number of early Muslim converts who sought refuge with Ethiopian Christians in the Abyssinian kingdom in 615 C.E.

A greater formative influence came from 622 C.E. onward, after the prophet Muhammad had negotiated the Constitution of Medina, which allowed the Muslim community to migrate there from Mecca. This agreement not only provided an escape for the nascent Muslim community increasingly threatened in Mecca, but it also propelled the prophet Muhammad to the status of both arbitrator and religio-political leader of this oasis. Its two largest, formerly animist tribes, the Aws and Khazraj, had been fighting each other for many years before they settled on the prophet Muhammad as their arbitrator. The Constitution stipulated the conditions for the Prophet’s intervention as leader, as were the respective rights and responsibilities of the immigrant Muslims and Ansars (the newly converted Medinan Muslims of the Aws and Khazraj), as well as those of the three small Jewish tribes (Banu Qaynuqa’, Banu Nadir and Banu Qurayza).

Within the Constitution, Jews were included in the definition of the one community or umma. This marked the beginning of a short period of cooperation between Muslims and Jews that has left permanent traces in Muslims’ self-understanding as monothetists, such as the incorporation into Islamic beliefs of the long genealogy of Jewish prophets. In addition, early Muslims recognized Jesus as another Jewish prophet, albeit with some unique Christian characteristics, such as the virgin birth and the special role he played in being the messenger of the injil (Gospel). Other influences included the brief use of Jerusalem as the direction for daily prayers, the development of fasting during the month of Ramadhan in opposition to and part imitation of the day of atonement (yom kippur), and the emphasis on orality within a sacred textuality, later developing into the unique religious legalism that makes Islam so similar to Judaism. However, in 624, due to attacks from the Meccans and accusations of treason, the Jewish tribe of Banu Qaynuqa’ was expelled from Medina. A year later, after another defeat, the Banu Nadir suffered the same fate. Finally, in 627, after a long siege of Medina itself, the barely victorious Muslims exterminated the last Jewish tribe, the Banu Qurayza, under recurring accusations of treason.

The short history of Muslim-Jewish relations in Medina that had started well with the Constitution of Medina ended up tragically with the disappearance of the Jewish tribes from the oasis. These various historical events are reflected in the many, and at times contradictory, Qur’anic passages regarding the Jews in general and Muslim-Jewish relations in particular.

This brief history holds the hermeneutical keys to the subsequent treatment of Jews and other minorities on the basis of analogy. The hermeneutical concept of abrogation (which holds that later revelations overrule earlier ones) has been used at different times in Islamic history, but especially in the later part of the twentieth century, to claim more intolerant and exclusivist positions regarding Jews, but others favor a return to the ideal of the constitution of Medina because it implies that a more tolerant and inclusivist approach was willed initially by the prophet Muhammad. In reconstructing these historical encounters, contemporary Muslims and non-Muslims alike have uncovered a dual historical process: The historical events of the pristine community become paradigmatic models that shape future relations. With newer historical events, new interpretations emerge, but always within the conceptual framework of what the paradigm initially set forth. This process can be exemplified today in how the constitution of Medina serves as a rich historical and theological document to guide contemporary reinterpretations of how Muslims ought to relate to religious Others, especially within contemporary nation-states in which Muslims comprise the majority population.

The Early Muslim Conquests: 632–750 C.E.

The second period in Muslim-Other relations begins after the death of the prophet Muhammad, in 632 C.E. With the sudden departure of their religiopolitical leader, Muslims developed additional and, at times, overlapping categorizations and concepts to manage their relations with religious Others, whether within the nascent Islamic polity or outside of it. The dual categorization of the house of Islam (dar al-islam) versus the house of war (dar al-harb) emerged to describe the relations between Muslims in Muslim-controlled areas and Others in non-Muslim controlled areas.

Within Muslim-controlled areas, the concept of the protected people (ahl al-dhimmi) arose to regulate Muslim-Other relations. The dhimmis, organized collectively by religion, had to pay a head tax (jizya) and a land tax (kharaj) in exchange for military protection by Muslim armies. They included Jews, Christians, and Sabians, as noted in the Qur’an, but soon also included Zoroastrians, who constituted the majority population of the Sassanian Empire, which was taken over by Muslims within a decade of the Prophet’s death. There were a few exceptions to this general practice, such as the Armenians contributing men to the Umayyad army to fight against the Byzantine Empire, thereby briefly avoiding the jizya tax. Yet, on the whole, these new categorizations and
concepts remained central to Islam for over a thousand years. They continue to this day to be used in their traditional meanings by many Muslims, while a few others reinterpret them in light of new modern political realities. The silent majority probably dismisses these traditional categorizations and meanings as no longer relevant.

**The Consolidation of Power: 750–1258 C.E.**
The centralization and consolidation of Muslim political power was exemplified respectively by the first and second halves of the Abbasid Empire (749–1258 C.E.). This long period witnessed a slow conversion process that led to the gradual emergence of majority Muslim societies in what came to be known as central Islamic lands from Spain (al-Andalus) to central Asia. Internally, most religious Others within Muslim polities were Islamized over generations. In part because Islamic worldviews and practices became normative in these regions, exerting social pressure to convert, and in part because dhimmi laws came to be perceived as discriminatory and no longer as relevant in a period of pax islamica. Externally, in addition to the People of the Book, Muslims in South and Central Asia came into contact with increasing numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, and a variety of Turkic and Chinese Others, which often rendered the boundary between religion and culture harder to delineate.

The greatest experiment in coexistence and mutual respect between Muslims on the one hand and Jews and Christians on the other is undoubtedly the case of Muslim Spain, al-Andalus, during its own Umayyad dynasty (756–1031 C.E.). The degree of symbiosis that emerged, especially during the respective but not sequential reigns of the three ʿAbd al-Rahmans (styled I, II, and III), is exemplary of its popular name, the Golden Age of Spain.

By the end of the weakened Abbasid Empire, the destruction brought about in the mid-thirteenth century by the Mongol invasions from the east to what had been the center of Islamic power surprisingly resulted in the Islamic conversion of this new enemy. The changes brought about by this rapid influx of new cultural traditions from peripheral nomadic cultures were therefore not as dramatic, but they did bring about a certain cleansing that resulted in a greater homogeneity in those parts of the Muslim world. A similar phenomenon had already happened earlier at the extreme west of the Islamic world, with the sequential waves of the al-Murabitun (Almoravids 1056–1147) and the al-Muwahhidun (Almohads 1130–1269), sweeping from the Sahara into what is now Morocco and Spain. They were reacting in part to the Christian Reconquista that was gradually taking over Muslim-controlled areas in the Iberian Peninsula.

The long Abbasid period was marked by the consolidation of Islamic laws that became normative and remain so up to this day. They consolidated many practices regarding non-Muslims through the integration of earlier key concepts such as People of the Book and *ahl al-dhimma*, together with customary practices (*ṣadiq*) in various parts of the expanding Muslim world. This flexibility in the Islamic legal system to accommodate many local cultural practices that did not directly infringe on central Islamic tenets greatly enabled the long term consolidation of Islam wherever it spread. Muslim-Other relations thus often proved to be a two-way bridge with mutual influences.

An important incursion into the heart of Islamic lands occurred when the Crusaders captured Jerusalem, in 1099. Their arrival was marked by massacres of both Muslims and Jews. They were considered barbarians by the mostly Muslim local population. Salah al-Din recovered Jerusalem in 1187 without any bloodshed. The Crusaders slowly lost control of their principalities until their last defeat, in 1302. The memory of the Crusades remains alive to this day, having caused great distrust between Muslims and Christians in particular. Today, many Arab Muslims use this historical vignette as a trope for interpreting mid- to late-twentieth and early twenty-first-century politics associated with the creation of the State of Israel.

**The Continued Expansion of Islam: 1258–1798 C.E.**
After consolidation, Islam continued to spread through a slow process of land migrations and conversions in Southeastern Europe; sub-Saharan Africa; and South, Southeast and East Asia, up to and into the colonial period. This was a vast and mostly peaceful expansion on the peripheries of central Islamic lands, with two exceptions: the Ottoman Empire (1300–1918), centered in what is today called Turkey, and the Mughal Empire (1483–1858) of South Asia. Between the two, the smaller and short-lived Safavid Empire (1501–1722) exemplified the internal Islamic conversion from Sunni to Twelver Shi‘ite Islam, bringing few changes to the interpretation of religious Others. The continued presence, albeit dwindling, of Zoroastrians, Assyrian Christians, and Jews proved the long-term resilience of the traditional Islamic system of *ahl al-dhimma*, traces of which are found today in the fixed Jewish, Christian, and Zoroastrian seats in the democratically elected parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

At the height of its power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire expanded dramatically into Southeastern Europe and besieged Vienna twice (1529 and 1683). The Ottomans refined the *millet* system, an administrative elaboration on the *ahl al-dhimma* concept that accommodated religious diversity and often provided each religious community (*millet*) with a large degree of autonomy. However, the Ottomans also developed the practice of *devshirme*: the forcible conscription and conversion to Islam of young Christian boys, especially in the Balkans, in order to build an elite military corps, the Janissaries. Since much benefit could have come from a link to central power through one’s son, at times, Christian elite families, even some Muslim families, offered up their sons to the Ottomans voluntarily.
At the same time, in South Asia, the Mughal Empire reached its apogee. The difference was that the majority of the population under its control, mostly Hindus, never converted to Islam. The Mughal emperors used radically different approaches in their relations to their subjects. While the initial and later Muslim military and political presence in South Asia witnessed much intolerance and destruction, the most powerful of its emperors, Akbar (1542–1605) and his nephew Dara Shukoh (1615–1659), tried to have Hindus recognized as People of the Book. Emperor Akbar even developed his own religion, din ilahi, that combined Islamic and Hindu worldviews and practices. While his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, a similar but more popular effort led to the development of Sikhism in the Punjab.

The Colonial Period: 1798–1945 C.E.
The period of Western European colonization of most majority Muslim lands radically changed the nature of power dynamics in Muslim-Other relations. In 1798, Napoleon invaded Egypt for a brief period of three years. This event is often referred to as the symbolic beginning of a major shift in power between Muslims and non-Muslim Others, whether religious or not. While earlier political events such as the Crusades, the Reconquista, as well as the Mongol and Turkic (Tamerlane 1336–1405) invasions directly impinged on majority Muslim areas, the first was relatively brief, the second took place over centuries, and the third and fourth resulted in the conversion to Islam of the new Mongol and Turkic rulers, the last two being more incommensurable in the collective memory despite their even more violent histories than that of the Crusades. In contrast, the military and political Western European takeover of most of the world between 1492 and 1945 took place together with an economic, cultural, and ideological penetration that overwhelmed majority Muslim societies. For the first time in their history they lost control over the balance of power that they had collectively held since their earliest memories. Only Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree, Iran, retained some measure of independence.

Parallel to this colonial enterprise was the introduction of new scientific discourses that have sought, ever since the Enlightenment period, objective truth about the world, both material and human. The part of science which has dealt with discovering the truth about Islam has been known as Orientalism. This influential school of thought helped consolidate power in the hands of the colonial masters by means of arguments that often, though not always, supported the logic of empire: The West would civilize the backward Islamic world (as part of the ‘Orient’). Yet, despite its politically pro-Western bias, Orientalist scholarship also brought about new standards of interpretation and preservation of much Islamic heritage, resulting in greater mutual understanding. Nonetheless, much of the Muslim-Other relations during this period were reduced to Muslim-Westerner relations, due to the unavoidable colonial power of the West.

The Post-Colonial Period: 1945 to the Present
The post-colonial period has seen a continuation of many established trends, despite the emergence of independent nation-states. New technologies, however, brought about radical changes in migration patterns: Muslim workers were brought into Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, others migrated to Australia and the Americas, especially to North America. In the United States, important African-American conversions to Islam started a local Islamization process that is currently unfolding rapidly, despite the backlash in American perceptions of Muslims.

Scientism was imported initially through colonialism and later strengthened by programs of national education supported by the westernized Muslim elites of newly independent majority Muslim nation-states. With this, much Orientalist thinking was integrated into popular modern Islamic self-understanding. This influence is clearly at work in the rise of militant Islam, which is a phenomenon similar to Christian fundamentalism in the West in that they both essentialize their understanding of religion in political discourses. The result is a growing reciprocal popular intolerance between the West and Islam, further fueled by the 11 September 2001 events in the United States and their subsequent impact on world politics.

The encounter with modernity through colonialism has taken a toll on the possibility of seeing positively the values of democracy, the rule of law (Western style), and human rights, because such discourses come from political oppressors. With the continuation of this control through the more subtle forces of neo-liberal discourse and globalization, the West has become an overarching Other among many Muslims worldwide. The cost of this has been the development of a major malaise for many westernized Muslims, and especially for Muslims living in the West itself. Yet, the Muslim world is no different from many other religiocultural worlds that have fought to distinguish between modernization, which they want to participate in for its obvious material benefits, and westernization, which often imposes Western values and models for democracy upon societies that have their own cultural heritage and blueprints for collective decision-making.

The interaction between Muslims and Others in general remains a two-way bridge of potential mutual benefits, if only reciprocal fears did not prevent many of both sides from traveling across it. The advent of interreligious dialogue in the later part of the twentieth century has encouraged this movement, however. Many contemporary Muslims are thinking anew not only their relationship to sacred Islamic texts and their various traditions of interpretation in light of historicocritical and dialogical methods of inquiry, but are also reconsidering the very nature of their interdependence with religious Others, whether by opposition or attraction. With the advent of Western European colonialism and the
emergence of postcolonial nation-states, as well as the expansion of Muslims worldwide in modern times, the balance of power has recently undergone radical change. Many of the older Islamic categorizations and concepts that have served Muslim-Other relations relatively well in the past have now either faded or been judged as obsolete by well-thinking but often paternalistic modernists, or else are in the process of being reinterpreted for a better integration of past and present, as well as internal and external aspects of Islam.

**The New Expansion of Islam in Cyberspace: 1995 to the Present**
The advent of the Internet is radically changing the nature of communication worldwide, creating transnational communities of all kinds into virtual entities that are both global and local at once. This transformation brings in its wake new rules of communication and the potential for new forms of grassroots politics, as well as a paradoxical understanding of what constitutes private and public spaces, thereby affecting both traditional Islamic self-understanding as well as Muslim-Other relations. The potential impact of this new period of expansion is as yet unknown for the future of Islam and Muslim-Other relations. This cyberspace expansion helps at once to sustain greater cultural and religious continuities globally, despite large migration movements, and yet threatens the fabric of traditional Islam by its very intrusion into the private spaces of those who can afford being wired into this new space to be explored, shared, disputed, but never truly conquered.

**Complex, Ongoing History**
Throughout their long history, Muslims have continued to develop and expand worldwide, bringing them into contact with a variety of religious and nonreligious Others. The legacy of those encounters is rich and complex, with moments of great tolerance and cross-fertilization as well as episodes of intolerance and mutual violence. External and internal influences from religious Others have been felt at all times and continue to this day. What has changed the equation from tolerance to intolerance at different times in history, including very recently, is the degree to which threats and insecurities are perceived by a Muslim community that has internalized the ideal of political control as an implicit measure of its collective identity and success, from the inherited reading of its own history from the time of the prophet Muhammad until today.

The history of Muslim-Other relations is, therefore, a complex and ongoing set of both tolerant and intolerant attitudes and episodes. Both sets are diverse in kind at any one time, even sometimes contradictory to one another; they are shaped by socio-political, theological, and ideological realities that change over time, albeit at different rhythms. Internal dynamics within Muslim societies have always been interdependent with external ones. The history of Muslim-Other relations is, therefore, an integral part of any search to understand Islam. The converse for any religious Others who have come in contact with Muslims throughout their history is equally true.

*See also* Andalus, al-; Central Asia, Islam in; Christianity and Islam; Dar al-Harb; Dar al-Islam; East Asia, Islam in; European Culture and Islam; Expansion; Hinduism and Islam; Hospitality and Islam; Internet; Judaism and Islam; Modernism; Networks, Muslim; Orientalism; Science, Islam and; South Asia, Islam in; Theology; Umma; Vernacular Islam.

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Patrice C. Brodeur

**ISLAMICATE SOCIETY**
The term *Islamicate culture* was coined by Marshall Hodgson (d. 1968) in the first volume of his *The Venture of Islam* (1974). Hodgson invented the term in response to the confusion surrounding such terms as “Islamic,” “Islam,” and “Muslim” when they are used to describe aspects of society and culture that are found throughout the Muslim world. Hodgson used the term to describe cultural manifestations arising out of an Arabic and Persian literate tradition, which does not refer directly to the Islamic religion but to the “social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims” (p. 59). For example, Hodgson argued that
there are a variety of artistic, architectural, and literary styles indicative of Islamicate culture. No matter where these aesthetic styles are found, they are identifiable as deriving from Islamicate cultural complexes. Thus, if one finds the use of arabesques, calligraphy, or arched doorways anywhere in the world, these forms are identifiable as Islamicate in origin. In contrast, Hodgson argued that those elements of Islamic society that are not shared by non-Muslims are not indicative of Islamicate culture (for instance, mosque architecture). Due to the overriding influence of Islam on non-Muslims living within Muslim realms, however, Hodgson used the term to demonstrate the importance of Islam as a cultural force that influenced non-Muslim forms of art, literature, and custom.

See also Islam and Islamic.

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R. Kevin Jaques

ISLAMIC JIHAD

Two groups have the name Islamic Jihad (sometimes called the Organization of the Islamic Jihad), one Egyptian, the other Palestinian. These two movements contend that armed struggle is the Islamically ordained form of striving against a corrupt authoritarian regime in Egypt and military occupation in Palestine. Both were influenced by the teachings of the Muslim Brothers, but grew more critical of its reformist approach.

A small group of students founded the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihād (Jihad organization) in Alexandria in 1977. The Jihad concentrated its activities in Cairo, while its rival al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) dominated Upper Egypt. Despite similarities in dogma and membership—and an attempt at unification in 1981—Jihad has not formed a grassroots movement. The main theorist of the Jihad is Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, who wrote a tract entitled al-Farida al-gha‘iba (The forgotten obligation). The forgotten obligation among Muslims today is jihad, or the struggle to uproot Muslim leaders perceived by the group as infidels, and replace them with a comprehensive “Islamic state.” The main path to its goal is by penetrating the military. The closest the group came to attaining its goal was when members of Jihad assassinated President Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981, but failed to complete the takeover of the state. Conspirators were executed and hundreds of other members arrested. Arrested members were young, educated, and lower to middle class. It was not until the late 1990s that the Egyptian government succeeded in eliminating the security threat of the Jihad, at a high cost of repression and violation of the basic human right of nonviolent opposition. Some Jihad members escaped into Afghanistan and joined Usama bin Ladin in forming al-Qa‘ida. The most prominent of them is Ayman Zawahiri, second to Bin Laden and linked to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

The Palestinian Harakat al-jihād al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Movement) was founded by Fathi al-Shiqaqi and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Auda in 1981. Both studied in Egypt and were influenced by the teachings of Egyptian radical Islamists. Another inspiration was the Iranian Revolution. The main goal of this organization is the liberation of Palestine, as the central issue for Muslims, and the establishment of an Islamic state. At least two other groups embrace the same name, but the Shiqaqi faction remains the largest. The group carried out several violent attacks against Israelis prior to the first intifada (1987–1993), in which it was active. Israel retaliated by expelling its two founders, and arresting and even assassinating some of its activists, including Shiqaqi, who was murdered by the Mossad (the Israeli secret service) in Malta in October 1995. Ramadan Shalah succeeded Shiqaqi as the organization’s Secretary General. Since the establishment of Hamas in 1988, the Islamic Jihad has lost some of its appeal. Despite hostility in the late 1980s between the two groups, both have closed ranks in their opposition to the Oslo agreement and the Palestinian Authority, and after 1994, were joined in this effort by leftist Palestinian groups. Since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, the Jihad has taken active part in fighting occupation forces and assailing Israeli civilians.

See also Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Political Islam; Qa‘ida, al-.

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Najib Ghadbian

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

Even for Algerians, the founding of the Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Front Islamique du Salut, or al-Jabba al-Islamiyya li-l-inqadh), in February 1989, and its sweeping electoral victories in the 1990 municipal elections, and then in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991, were events as unforeseeable as they were phenomenal. Islamic symbols and discourse had been used
repeatedly to oppose the alliance between the army and the sole legal political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN, or Front de Libération Nationale), since Algeria’s birth as a nation in 1962. Nonetheless, the meteoric rise of the FIS can mostly be attributed to the growing economic gap between the elites and the masses, which worsened in the 1980s and pushed people over the edge of frustration and despair.

In October 1988 young people took to the streets to protest the state’s inability to satisfy their basic needs, and in five days the army had killed over five hundred protesters. President Chadli Benjedid, sensing the gravity of the situation, boldly proposed a constitution to pave the way for multiparty elections. Yet it was not the handful of secular-leaning parties who gained from the riots, but rather those who saw in Islam the salvation for the nation’s woes—Algeria’s homegrown Islamism.

Islam had already played a key role in Algeria’s struggle against French colonialism. The reformist Salafiyya movement was launched by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis when, in 1931, he founded the Association of Algerian Ulema. The FIS’s two founding leaders claimed to wear Ibn Badis’s mantle, yet only ‘Abbas Madani (b. 1931) could realistically do so. Indeed, he grew up in ulema circles, joined the FLN, and spent several years in French prisons. He later obtained a doctorate in philosophy in England. As a professor he and other Islamic leaders cultivated the growing Islamist student movement of the 1980s. By contrast, the second leader, ‘Ali Belhadj, born in 1956, was a school teacher, and knew no French. His rise began as a young, fiery, eloquent imam who successfully organized a massive peaceful rally at the end of the bloody 1988 riots. From the start, Madani led the more moderate, reformist wing of the FIS, and Belhadj its more radical wing.

The army arrested Madani and Belhadj in June 1991 and, after the December first-round elections, which portended an Islamist majority in parliament, deposed Benjedid and banned the FIS. With all of its leaders either imprisoned or exiled, the uneasy populist coalition fell apart. A more moderate leadership took over the party under ‘Abdelkader Hachani, and the radicals broke off to found the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). In the bloody civil war that ensued (over 120,000 killed, mostly civilians, in ten years), two rays of hope appeared in the 1990s. First, eight opposition parties, including the FIS, signed the Rome Platform in 1995, condemning violence and calling for the reestablishment of democracy. Second, single presidential candidates were successively elected by majority vote, Liamine Zeroual (1995) and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Bouteflika (1998). In the early 2000s the army retained its strong grip on power, but in spite of the continued ban on the FIS and the competition of two other legal Islamist parties (Hamas and al-Nahda), most Algerians believe that without the reinstatement of the FIS, Algeria will not likely see the return of democracy and national reconciliation.

See also ‘Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis; Madani, ‘Abbasi.

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David L. Johnston

ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA

The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was founded in 1982 and is currently based in Plainfield, Indiana. ISNA grew out of the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which was founded in the 1960s by predominately South Asian Muslim students who, upon graduation, sought to organize professional Muslim associations under one administrative apparatus. The ideology of the organization is influenced by the writings of Abu l-‘Ala’ Maududi (d. 1979).

Maududi argued that Islam had become corrupted because of a general Muslim ignorance of Islamic history and piety. Only through an active movement of community organization and education could Islam return to the position of power and authority that Maududi understood the classical Muslim world to possess. ISNA has sought to educate American Muslims through a variety of programs and by funding workshops and conventions to teach people how to develop strong Muslim communities in a North American cultural context. Since the mid-1990s, and especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York, the centerpiece of ISNA activities has been its Community Development Department, which organizes a variety of conferences and workshops dealing with such issues as community development, domestic violence prevention, conflict resolution, and media relations.

In contrast to other Muslim organizations, ISNA has tended to stay out of electoral politics, preferring to educate Muslims about the American political system and allowing local communities to choose candidates based on local needs. In addition, ISNA also publishes a bimonthly magazine, Islamic Horizons, which discusses issues relating to Muslim life in North America, and includes information on conventions and workshops as well as a matrimonial section. ISNA does not currently publish membership statistics. As of the year 2003, however, Islamic Horizons reported a circulation of approximately 60,000. Since many, if not most members receive the magazine as a part of their membership, this figure most likely reflects membership totals.

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Before becoming king, Isma‘il’s religiosity reflected Shi‘ite “exaggerated” beliefs such as anthropomorphism with respect to God, transmigration of souls, and occultation and return. In his poetry, he claims divinity for himself, and proclaims to be the Hidden Imam. His followers were said to have followed him into battle without wearing armor, believing him to be invincible.

In 1501, however, Isma‘il established not ghulwān Shi‘ism, but orthodox Twelver Shi‘ism as the official state religion, imposing this sect upon a predominantly Sunni Iran. He spent the next ten years of his career consolidating and expanding his rule inside Iran and beyond. He was defeated in Azerbaijan by the Ottomans at the battle of Chaldiran in 1514. This led to a ceasing of military campaigns. Isma‘il died ten years later, in 1524.

See also Empires: Safavid and Qajar.

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Sholeh A. Quinn
JA‘FAR AL-SADIQ (C. 701–765)

Born sometime between 700 and 702, Ja‘far al-Sadiq died in 765 C.E. An erudite jurist of Medina, al-Sadiq was associated with a wide range of scholars. Abu Hanifa, and Malik b. Anas, among other prominent figures, are alleged to have heard hadith from him. Regarded as a reliable traditionalist in Sunni circles, he is cited in several isnads (chains of transmissions). Al-Sadiq is credited with the construction of a legal system called Ja‘fari school of law, which Shi‘ites follow. He is also seen as an eminent ascetic and is revered in Sufi circles. Many mystical ideas are narrated from him. According to the alchemist Jabir al-Hayyan, al-Sadiq was also a teacher in alchemy.

Sunni sources maintain that Shi‘ites, such as Hisham b. al-Hakam, formulated distinctive doctrines like that of the imamate and ascribed it to al-Sadiq. In Shi‘ite sources, al-Sadiq is considered as the sixth Imam and the author of thousands of traditions that were recorded by his disciples and documented in the writings of al-Kulini and Ibn Babuya, among other, later, scholars. These sources also indicate that al-Sadiq was responsible for the formulation and crystallization of the Shi‘ite doctrine of the imamate. This stipulated that the imam be designated by God through the Prophet or another imam. The imam was also believed to be infallible, hence he was empowered to provide authoritative interpretations of Islamic revelation. Designation and infallibility were complemented by the imam’s possession of special knowledge that was either transmitted from the Prophet or derived from inherited scrolls. The imams reportedly had access to esoteric knowledge and were able to foretell future events.

Al-Sadiq’s political stance became the cornerstone of Shi‘ite political theory, which taught coexistence with rather than opposition to tyrannical rulers. The removal of the imamate from a political role was compounded by al-Sadiq’s teaching of dissimulation, which meant the imam did not have to publicly proclaim his leadership.

Al-Sadiq attracted an intellectual and cohesive following. He is reported to have trained thousands of disciples in diverse fields such as theology, jurisprudence, and Arabic grammar. Speculative Shi‘ite theologians and jurists like Hisham b. al-Hakam, Zurara b. A‘yan, and Muhammad b. Muslim were associated with him. Some of his prominent disciples are reported to have differed with him on major points of law and theology, for which they were condemned or excommunicated. Al-Sadiq claimed that they had misrepresented his teachings.

Al-Sadiq was at the center of much extremist speculation. Abu l-Khattab (d. 755–756) claimed that al-Sadiq had designated him to be his deputy and had entrusted him with esoteric knowledge and the greatest name of God, thus empowering him to comprehend occult sciences. He also attributed divinity to al-Sadiq. Along with other extremist groups, Abu l-Khattab was repudiated by al-Sadiq.

After his death, al-Sadiq’s followers differed on his successor. The Isma‘ilis claimed al-Sadiq had designated his eldest son, Isma‘il, to succeed him. Most of al-Sadiq’s followers initially accepted ‘Abdallah, the eldest surviving son. When ‘Abdallah died without a son, the majority accepted al-Sadiq’s next son, Musa. They formed the basis of the Twelver Shi‘ites. The Nawusiyya asserted that al-Sadiq was in occultation (hiding), and would reappear as the eschatological Messiah (mahdi).

See also Imamate; Law; Succession.

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Jahannam

Jahannam is a designation for hell and is related to the cognate Hebrew word gebinnom (“Hinnom Valley”), originally a site near ancient Jerusalem where children were immolated as sacrificial offerings, which subsequently became a garbage dump. In early Jewish and Christian eschatology, Gehenna was believed to be where wrongdoers would be punished by fire in the hereafter. This is the meaning Jahannam carries in the Qur'an (where it is mentioned seventy-seven times), the hadith, and later Islamic eschatological discourses. It is often used synonymously with “the Fire” (“nar”), and in juxtaposition to “the Garden” (“janna”), the Islamic paradise of the blessed.

The Qur'an depicts Jahannam as an infernal dwelling or refuge with seven gates (counterparts for the seven heavens) awaiting unbelievers, hypocrites, and other sorts of offenders (4:140; 15:43–44). It will be the fiery abode of Jinns and satans, as well as humans (11:119; 19:68), including polytheists and “people of the book” (98:6). Indeed, according to one verse, all will go to Jahannam, but God will save the pious and abandon wrongdoers there on their knees (19:72). Polytheists and their idols will become fuel for its fire (21:98). The authoritative hadith collections, such as those of al-Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), and Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), expand upon these Qur’anic discourses, detailing its horrific features and inhabitants. Hadiths describe it as a pit of fire seventy times hotter than earthly fire, guarded by the angel Malik, into which plunge the damned who fail to cross a narrow test bridge (al-sirat) that traverses it. They enumerate the kinds of sinners punished there, among whom are the Jahannamites—Muslims who have committed major transgressions, but who will eventually win entry to paradise.

The most elaborate descriptions were formulated in the tenth century C.E., and later commentaries and eschatological texts are those of al-Tabari (d. 922), al-Samarqandi (d. c. 983), al-Ghazali (d. 1111), al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), Ibn Kathir (d. 1373), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1350), and al-Suyuti (d. 1505). In these books, Jahannam is said to consist of seven hierarchical levels, the highest for Muslims and the lower levels for Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, polytheists, and hypocrites. Commentators furnished it with geographic features such as blazing mountains, valleys, rivers, and seas, as well as houses, prisons, bridges, wells, and ovens. They also provided it with venomous scorpions and snakes to torment its inhabitants. In modern times, Jahannam remains a popular sermon topic.

See also Calligraphy; Janna; Law; Muhammad; Qur'an; Tafsir.

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Juan Eduardo Campo

JAHIYYA

The word jabiliyya, rendered as ignorance or barbarism, occurs several times in the Qur'an (3:148; 5:55; 33:33; 48:26). Used pejoratively to describe pre-Islamic Arabia, it means the period in which Arabia had no dispensation, no inspired prophet, and no revealed book.

The seven Mu'allaqat, written down in Umayyad times, are believed to be a collection of prize-winning pre-Islamic poems on the courage and endurance of its warriors, recited in contests at the annual fair at ‘Ukaz. Fragments of similar poems are also found in the Kitab al-aghani of al-Ishahani (d. 967). The ideal Arab virtues referred to in this literature are muru'a (courage, loyalty, and generosity), and ‘ird (honor). Courage was reflected in the number of raids undertaken, and generosity in the readiness with which one sacrificed one’s camel for a guest. Killing was discouraged. Murder resulted in blood feuds and vendetta. Three months of the year (Rajab, Dhu-l-Qa‘da, and Dhu-l-Hajj) were pronounced sacred, however, when no fighting or raiding were permitted.

Trade had brought wealth to some, but the poverty of many was disregarded, and there was no strategy to care for them. Females were regarded as a burden and many were killed at birth. Muhammad viewed this attitude as ungodly. The religion of the pre-Islamic Bedouin was primarily animistic, while urban populations, such as the Meccans, worshiped a supreme God, al-Ilah, and its three daughters, al-Uzza, al-Lat, and Manat. Hubal was the chief deity of the Ka‘ba. Women were required to circumambulate the Ka‘ba in the nude. Various tribes in different regions identified with different gods to whom they turned for immediate favors. Muhammad, who preached the existence of one, invisible God, taught that man would be judged for his actions, and rewarded accordingly. He fought to establish Islam in Arabia, and had the pre-Islamic idols systematically destroyed. Thus, he claimed, Islam brought an end to jabiliyya. Nevertheless, several pre-Islamic observances have been incorporated into Islamic ritual, such as the circumambulation of the Ka‘ba,
the running between Saffa and Marwa, with new significance attributed to them.

In the twentieth century, *jahiliyya* took on a new meaning. Writing from Pakistan, Abu l-A’la’ Maududi (d. 1979) had considered aspects of modern life reflecting Muslim imitation of the West, as comparable to *jahiliyya*. On the same lines, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) asserted that the world consisted of but two cultures, Islam and *jahiliyya*, which included both the West and the atheistic communist world. The polytheistic societies of Asia, and Christian and Jewish societies, were now considered “ignorant” or *jabili* because of their movement away from God, as were the Muslims who accepted Western elements into the Islamic system. For Qutb the only antidote to *jahiliyya* was *bakimiyaa*, that is, the adherence to the belief that governance, legislation, and sovereignty belong only to God.

See also Arabia, Pre-Islam; Modern Thought; Political Islam; Qutb, Sayyid.

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Rizvi Faizar

JAMA’AT-E ISLAMI

Jama’at-e Islami (JI) is one of the most influential religiopolitical parties in the Muslim world, particularly in South Asia. It was founded in 1941 in Lahore, the creation of Abu l-A’la’ Maududi, who was working for the Islamization of Pakistan. The party’s goal was to contest the Congress (representing the Hindu majority) and the Jama’iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (JUH; aiming for composite nationalism) as well as the Muslim League (with territorial nationalism as its platform). In contrast to these other parties, the Jama’at-e Islami party echoed the ideas of Maududi, who favored the creation of an Islamic state. Maududi was supported by a number of young, activist religious scholars, among them some Deobandis and Nadwis. Maududi was the first emir (commander) of the Jama’at-e Islami, a post he held until 1972. As can be seen from the shifting areas of popularity, the history of the JI cannot be separated from the emir’s lives—Maududi (1941–1972), a muhajir settled in Punjab; Miyan Tufail Muhammad (1972–1987), a muhajir-converted Punjabi; and Qazi Husain Ahmad (since 1987) from the frontier province—a fact also reflected in its seats in provincial assemblies.

To start with, the Jama’at-e Islami needed to consolidate its base, which would strengthen its internal bonds and permit the development of a sense of *umma*, a term that means “the imagined community.” From its founding days in the city of Pathankot, the party grew through a strong campaign that disseminated its ideals through a variety of channels of communication, including political conventions and the use of the mass media.

The Jama’at-e Islami is strictly and hierarchically organized, under the leadership of its emirs. Party affiliation can be broken down into two categories, fully-fledged members (*arkan*) on the one hand, and sympathizers and workers (*karkun*) on the other. In the first year of the party’s existence, 1941, there were 75 members. A decade later, in 1951, membership had grown to 659, with 2,913 sympathizers. By 1989, membership had swelled to 5,723, with some 305,792 nonregistered but active sympathizers. In 2003, membership reached 16,033, and the number of sympathizers to the party’s goals had reached 4.5 million. The party is guided by an emir who is obliged to consult an assembly called the *shura*. This authoritarian, pyramidlike structure is complemented by other sub-organizations, such as women’s wings and student organizations, all working toward the common goal of establishing an ideological Islamic society, particularly through educational and social work. Jama’at-e Islami’s organizational structure is replicated throughout the world, wherever it has taken root.

The Jama’at-e Islami is based on social action in a variety of fields, and encourages Muslims to set up a better society here and now through constantly contesting the political establishment. In Pakistan, most of its members come from the educated lower-middle class, including immigrants from India, called the *muhajirun*. The party never did appeal to the upper-class clientele that favored most of Pakistan’s other parties, such as the Pakistan People Party and the Muslim League, who frequently based their platforms upon traditional landowning loyalties. The Jama’at-e Islami also failed to attract the poorer classes, who lacked the literacy that would permit them to comprehend the Jama’at’s rhetorics.

Anchored firmly in the rather ambitious middle class, with a following drawn from the newly rising elites, the Jama’at-e Islami increasingly finds itself in confrontation with the power assertions of the postcolonial political establishment, which is characterized by the party as westernized and corrupt. The discontent that motivates the collective membership of the Jama’at-e Islami derives from the difficulty people face in gaining access to political power and cultural privilege. The party has enlisted the help of a small religious elite that is itself struggling for political survival and controls a mass base, and which provides a common language and symbolism with which to express and generalize the social discontent that Jama’at-e Islami seeks to redress. In the terms of this language
Qazi Husayn Ahmed, head of the Pakistani religious party Jama’at-e-Islami (Party of Islam) in Peshawar, Pakistan, speaking to religious students in a mosque, where he condemned the introduction of new laws by the Musharraf government designed to bring the madrasa system under greater government control, as well as American presence in Pakistan. Jama’at-e-Islami was founded in 1941 by al-Maududi in Lahore to advocate an Islamic state. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

and symbolism, only the spread of Sunni Islam throughout the world can make possible the revival of an ideal, if mythical, original community. The Jama’at-e Islami relies heavily upon the concept of purification. Not being bound by history, the party is free to distinguish itself from secular politicians, sometimes radically, and see itself as the avant-garde.

Jama’at-e Islami’s fundamentalist critique centers on issues of moral decline, particularly on sexual morality, and sets itself up in opposition to European culture and values and the concept of modernity. The social pathologies resulting from modernization are often cited as evidence of a Machiavellian strategy employed by the West with the goal of seizing power. The purpose of such rhetoric is to produce a normative consensus, to increase cultural self-confidence, and to mobilize the party’s membership and sympathizers. In its dealings with the broader society, the party’s spokespersons generally employ ideological arguments, keeping references to purely Islamic symbols to a minimum. But when addressing traditionalist groups, the party employs a more overtly theological approach, supporting public worship and participating in debates on religious issues.

When Maududi first became politically active in post-partition India and Pakistan, it was through the party that he articulated his political visions and ideas. Only a few years after the creation of Pakistan, the Jama’at-e Islami was forced to face the issue of the role of religion in politics. Maududi consistently confronted the Pakistani government on this issue, questioning the state’s legitimacy, ultimately forcing the politicians to include provisions regarding Islam in the national constitution. The ongoing struggle between Jama’at-e Islami and the government led to the party being outlawed several times. The anti-Ahmadiyya movement in 1953–1954, however, was the party’s ticket into the mainstream of Pakistani politics because by heresizing the Ahmadiyya movement, thereby questioning the Islamicity of state functionaries, the JI also opened up to other schools of thought.

During the Ayub era (1958–1969), the Jama’at-e Islami was forced into the background for a while, until 1965, when it entered into new political alliances against the Ayub regime and, at last, became a proper political party. Its participation in the anti-Bhutto coalition intensified the politicization of the Jama’at-e Islami, for it could now call the government un-Islamic. Eventually the party was able to mobilize a large enough portion of the society to topple the Bhutto regime. It supported Zia ul-Haq’s coup d’etat in 1977, and earned leading positions within the government. But the party was unable to widen its social basis, and found itself being used by the government to further its own ends, instead. Hence, in the elections that followed, the JI was not able to secure enough seats to gain an effective political voice.

Since the 1980s, the party has started to diversify its membership, spreading out from Karachi into other areas of
the country. It has accomplished this through its welfare program, especially in the field of university higher education, and by establishing madrasas (religious training centers), as well as by working hand in hand with the relief agencies in the Afghan refugee camps after 1979.

In spite of its limited electoral success prior to 1988, the Jamaat-e Islami has become a powerful political and cultural force in Pakistani politics. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the party has been increasingly successful in recruiting members and sympathizers, and thus has been able to establish links with future leaders drawn from a wide spectrum of society, including the bureaucracy and the civil service. In 1997 the party publicly called for the adoption of a more populist approach, and was rewarded with a swelling of its ranks to 2.2 million registered members by mid-August of that year. In the 2002 elections, the Jamaat-e Islami could claim sixty-eight members in the National Assembly, gaining for itself the ability to play “kingmaker” within Pakistani politics. The party’s success in Pakistan has not been mirrored by equal success for its counterpart in India. Since the Pakistani-Indian partition in 1947, the Indian branch of the party has taken a much more docile and secular approach toward politics and religion. As one of the few national Islamic parties in India, it has attracted a following through its activities in missionary work, social services, publications, and conventions.

See also Maududi, Abu l-A’la; Pakistan, Islamic Republic of.

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Jamal Malik

JAMIL AL-AMIN, IMAM (1943– )

A gifted rhetorician and civil rights activist, the American Muslim leader Jamil al-Amin (formerly H. Rap Brown, born in 1943) came to national prominence in the 1960s as an outspoken advocate of black power. In 1967, Brown succeeded Stokely Carmichael as leader of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a prominent African-American civil rights organization. Brown also became known for his advocacy of black self-defense and his saying that “violence is as American as cherry pie.” In 1969, he published his most famous work, Die Nigger Die, a blistering critique of American racism. Because of Brown’s radical rhetoric, he became a target of the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which harassed many black leaders during this period. In 1972, Brown was apprehended on federal weapons charges, tried, convicted, and sentenced to four years in prison. During his prison term, he converted to Islam under the auspices of Darul Islam, a predominantly African-American Islamic group organized in the 1960s. He also adopted a new name, Jamil Abdullah al-Amin. Paroled in 1976, al-Amin moved to Atlanta, Georgia, where he became the owner of a community store and an imam (leader) at a local mosque. Over the next two decades, he emerged as a Sunni Muslim leader with followers throughout the United States. Over thirty mosques recognized Imam Jamil as leader of a group called the National Islamic Community. Focusing on economic and social, as well as religious, empowerment, he also became known for his role in attempting to revitalize the West End of Atlanta. In March 2000, Imam al-Jamil was accused of murder in connection with the death of a police officer. But many American Muslims of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds defended Imam al-Jamil’s innocence and offered him financial and moral support as he prepared for his trial. In March, 2002, he was convicted of murder and was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

See also American Culture and Islam; Americas, Islam in the; Nation of Islam.

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*Edward E. Curtis IV*

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**JAM’IYAT-E ‘ULAMA-E HIND**

Muslim politics saw the era of institutionalization in two new religiopolitical bodies that formed in 1919: All-India Khilafat Committee and Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (The Association of Scholars of India, or JUH). The JUH was the first political solidarity foundation of Indian ulema, who saw themselves as religious guides, even in political matters, at the peak of the Indian Muslim agitation for the Ottoman Caliphate. By using the potential of the religious infrastructure, along with new political structures, ulema were mobilized and unified to defend the caliphate. The first meeting in November 1919 in New Delhi demanded that Muslims abide by Islamic tenets, strengthen their relationship with the Islamic world, and foster Muslim-Hindu amity. The holy places of Islam were to be defended, separate *shari‘a* courts and *zakat* system were to be established, and the Indian Congress supported. This solidarity traditionalism found its climax in a *fatwa* for noncooperation and civil disobedience in 1920. Use was made of Islamic repertory—proselytization and forcible conversion were rejected. JUH stood for an independent, multireligious India in which Muslims and Hindus would have their separate institutional structures.

The major contribution of the JUH was the idea of composite nationalism (*muttahida gaumiyat*), in contrast to the two-nation theory proclaimed by the Muslim League in 1940. This concept of territorial nationalism was unique in Islamic thought, and was put into practice by a nationalist campaign against the creation of Pakistan.

Shortly before the partition of India in 1945, a dissident group was formed, the Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam (JUI).

After 1947, JUH pursued noncommunalism, stood for social and religious reforms, and supported the secular constitution of the Republic of India. However, it still holds rigid positions concerning Muslim personal law, but the ambivalent image created through the tussle between political pragmatism and religious dogmatism has been improved through its social activities.

See also *Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam; South Asia, Islam in.*

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**JAM’IYAT-E ‘ULAMA-E ISLAM**

Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam (JUI) broke off from the Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (JUH), which stood for Indian nationalism and opposed the demand for an independent Pakistan. In contrast to its mother organization, the JUI, established in 1945 under the leadership of Shabbir Ahmad ‘Uthmani, supported the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. However, after independence in 1947 it had to struggle for a long period before being accepted by the Pakistani elites. The JUI remained a religious organization until the late 1960s, when general elections were announced after the collapse of the Ayub Khan regime. The JUI then entered the Pakistan political arena, where it demonstrated a remarkable career. It soon split into a politically quiet faction, led by the Karachi-based Ihtisham al-Haqq Thanawi, and a more activist group centered around Mufti Mahmud and Ghauth Hazarawi, primarily in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). During the elections of 1970 Mufti Mahmud’s faction of the JUI became quite popular by making use of Islamic symbolism, postulating the establishment of *shari‘a* in Pakistan, and advocating the implementation of Islamic economic and social reforms. The party benefitted from the use of traditional infrastructure, such as *madaris* (Islamic schools) and *waqf* (pious foundations), and established an umbrella organization of religious schools. In this way it won quite a number of seats and eventually entered into a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP) and thus managed to form provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. Mufti Mahmud became chief minister of the NWFP from 1971 to 1973. The Islamization of this region under his tenure influenced the following political scenario.

Under the leadership of Fazl al-Rahman, the son of Mufti Mahmud, the JUI became increasingly orthodox and also anti-Shi‘ite, as can be witnessed in the activities of the Punjab-based communal Anjuman-e Sipah-e Sahaba, a militant splinter group of the JUI established in 1985. In the same year JUI senators Sani‘ al-Haqq—who runs the largest religious school in Pakistan, the Dar al-‘Ulam Haqaniya—and Qadi ‘Abd al-Latif introduced the Shariat Bill to the National Assembly.

Although the JUI has not been very successful in gaining political influence at the national level, it is one of the most powerful political and social forces in Pakistan, particularly in the NWFP and Baluchistan. It controls a large number of religious schools throughout the country that have been

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*Jamal Malik*
recruitment centers not only for thousands of young religious scholars but also for the Afghan mujahidin who fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Since the mid-1990s the madaris also have been very actively supporting the Taliban. The Talibanization of Pakistan goes to the extent that after the Afghani Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, the JUI openly declared abjuring the electoral politics of Pakistan. The JUI is also believed to have a wide international jihadi connections, such as in Tajikistan, Chechnya and Kashmir.

See also Deoband; Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind; South Asia, Islam in; Taliban.

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JAM‘IYAT-E ‘ULAMA-E PAKISTAN

The Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Pakistan (JUP) is a Barelwi-dominated religious party established in 1947 under the leadership of Abu al-Hasanat (1896–1961) and ‘Abd al-Hamid Badayuni (1898–1970). The JUP attempted to give legitimacy to the cause of Pakistan and the Muslim League, contrary to the Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (JUI), and also in some contrast to the Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam (JUI). The JUP proclaims Ahmad Reza Khan, the founder of the Barelwi movement, as the first to advocate the nation theory, which led to the partition of Pakistan and India. Engaged in social activities—mainly the settlement of refugees in Sindhi and rural Punjab—the JUP remained politically insignificant for more than two decades. It established, however, a Sufi organization in 1948 and a student wing in 1968, when its leader Shah Ahmad Nurani (born 1926) started propagating Islamization. In 1973, Nurani was nominated for the position of prime minister by the member parties of the United Democratic Front against the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). When in 1977 the JUP stood for the establishment of the Muhammadan System, it united the Islamic parties in the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Zulfiker Ali Bhutto’s PPP. After 1977, JUP changed sides several times—sympathizing at times even with its main adversaries, the JI (Jama‘at-e Islami) and JUI. Its integrity thus suffered and therefore it split into two major factions (Nurani faction and ‘Abd al-Sattar faction). Its success lies in its reliance on oral tradition, its drawing its constituency from the followers of Sufi pir—preferably Qadiris—observance of ritual traditions associated with saint worship, and usage of millenarian postulates and symbols mediated in a multimedia staging. Like the JUI, the JUP runs an umbrella organization of madaris (Islamic schools), and has been actively defending the nationalization of pious foundations.

See also Deoband; Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind; Jam‘iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam; South Asia, Islam in.

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JANNA

Janna (Ar. “garden,” pl. jannat; Persian firdaws “paradise,” “enclosure,” “orchard”) is the designation for the primordial paradise of Adam and Eve and for the paradisal garden (or gardens) in the hereafter, where the blessed will dwell for eternity after passing the trial of the last judgment. This dual significance of the garden in Islamic cosmography is rooted in ancient Near Eastern myths and afterlife visions that were subsequently adapted to biblical narratives about the origin and destiny of the human being, and were further elaborated within the communities of rabbinic Judaism and early Christianity. In Islamic discourse, janna is usually juxtaposed to nahr (“fire”), the hellish abode of wrongdoers (nahr and jahannam).

Muslims usually conceive of janna as a real place where humans experience contact with supramundane beings, as well as pleasurable bodily existence. This understanding of paradise was canonized in the Qur’an and elaborated further in the hadith, theological tracts, and visionary literature. Thus, Adam and Eve enjoyed communion with God and the angels, and consumed the fruits of the garden until they ate of the forbidden tree (2:35–36, 20:117–123), which caused their fall into the abode of mortal life. God then promised their return to immortality in the hereafter. In contrast to the Bible, extensive passages of the Qur’an deal with the subjects of resurrection and the afterlife, beginning with chapters traditionally consigned by scholars to the Meccan phase of Muhammad’s career (c. 615–622 C.E.). In the Qur’anic afterlife world, paradise is a domesticated arboreal garden or park perfumed by musk, camphor, and ginger, through which rivers of milk, honey, and wine flow (47:15). It is populated by
families of immortal believers who dress in elegant garments and who dwell in heavenly mansions furnished with couches, carpets, and precious household vessels (9:72, 15:47, 36:55–58, 88:10–16). Angels greet them (13:23–24), and handsome youths and beautiful maidens (bawris (black-eyed maidens) offer food and drink (43:71, 52:19–24, 76:15–22). The Qur’an also intimates that the blessed will enjoy the vision of God there (10:26, 39:75, 75:22–23), a doctrine that was later subject to much debate among theologians and Qur’an interpreters. The hadith mention that paradise has eight gates, each named for a virtue through which the blessed possessing that virtue will enter. They also speak of the existence of eight paradies rather than a single one, each deriving its name from a Qur’anic term or phrase, such as dar al-salam (House of peace), jannat al-kbeld (Garden of eternity), and jannat ‘Aden (Garden of Eden). In number, therefore, paradise surpasses hell, which is said to have only seven levels or gates (jahannam). It is also speculated that God’s throne (kursi) stood above paradise. Sufis acknowledged the lower levels of paradise, but stressed the ecstasy of communion with God in the heart, or in the highest level of paradise—that of the elect.

Ideas of paradise so captured the Muslim imagination that they inspired caliphs and sultans, artists and architects, learned scholars—even ordinary people—to invest the cultural landscape with heavenly significance. According to the hadith, the Ka’ba and the Black Stone in Mecca originated in paradise, and the span between the Prophet’s grave and the minbar in his Medina mosque is one of the gardens of paradise. Representations of heavenly gardens occur on the Umayyad Grand Mosque in Damascus (seventh century C.E.), in the Alhambra of Granada (fourteenth century C.E.), on Persian royal pavilions (seventeenth century), and in illuminated Turkish and Persian manuscripts of the Muhammad’s Night Journey and Ascension (fifteenth to eighteenth centuries). The city and palaces of Baghdad, the imperial capital of the Abbasids (r. 750–1258), were named and described as earthly paradises. In India, the enclosed park within which the Taj Mahal, the grand mausoleum of Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1657) and his queen Mumtaz Mahal (d. 1631), was constructed was an adaptation of the “four garden” (chahar bagh) design of royal Persian gardens, a microcosmic image of paradise with its four rivers. The magnificent building itself may well represent God’s throne in heaven, believed to be located above paradise. Elsewhere, inscriptions and murals in mansions and ordinary Muslim homes created metaphorical relations between the domestic spaces of the living and the abodes of the blessed in the hereafter.

See also Calligraphy; Jahannam; Law; Muhammad; Qur’an; Tafsir.

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Juan Eduardo Campo

JERUSALEM See Holy Cities

JEVDET PASHA (1822–1895)

Ahmet Jevdet Pasha was an Ottoman historian, administrator, and educational and judicial reformer. Born in Bulgaria, he pursued a religious education; dissatisfaction with traditional methods led him to study secular mathematics, law, and history. He wrote the first Ottoman grammar primer in Turkish, Kayvaid-i Osmanlize.

Jevdet’s unique combination of religious and secular education made him useful as an advisor to the Tanzimat reformer, Mustafa Resit Pasha. He worked on educational reforms, wrote a religious text for schoolchildren, and began his history of the later Ottoman Empire, Tarih-i Jevdet, based on state papers and personal observation. He became a judge and member of the government, writing judicial and cadastral regulations. After a series of administrative positions in the reformist government of the Tanzimat, he became minister of justice, established a secular court system, and drew up a modernized Islamic law code, the Mejelle (1869–1876), based not on French law but on Islamic Hanafi law.

Jevdet opposed the constitution of 1876 and the deposition of Sultan ‘Abdulaziz. He served the absolutist Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II in various ministerial posts and prosecuted the reformer Midhat Pasha for the murder of ‘Abdulaziz (1881). He retired in 1882 and continued work on his history and his memoirs, Tezakir, but returned to government service from 1886 until his death in 1895.

See also Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform.

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Linda T. Darling

JIHAD

The word jihad is derived from the Arabic root jabada, meaning “to strive” or “to exert oneself” toward some goal. In this general sense, jihad could mean striving to achieve something with no particular moral value, or even a negative value. The Qur’an itself twice uses the verb when describing the efforts of pagan parents to induce their Muslim-convert children to return to polytheism (29:8, 31:15). Other occurrences of this verbal form and its derivatives, however, are limited to the struggle of the Muslims to attain and maintain their faith. Thus, jihad has come to mean in the Islamic context only a virtuous struggle, toward some praiseworthy end, as defined by religion. It is therefore often linked with the phrase fi sabil Allah, meaning “struggle in the path of God.”

The term jihad occurs infrequently in what are believed to be the Meccan revelations of the Qur’an. During this first part of the Prophet’s mission, lasting some twelve years, jihad is used in the sense of cultivating personal piety, perseverance in the preaching of Islam, and forbearance and patient suffering in the face of persecution by the Muslims’ enemies. Qur’an 25:52, for example, advises Muslims to “listen not to the unbelievers, but strive against them with it [the Qur’an] with the utmost effort.” There is no recorded instance during the Meccan period in which the Prophet ordered or allowed his followers to use violence against their enemies. Jihad during this period meant exclusively nonviolent resistance.

Following the Prophet’s migration to Medina (the Hijra), occurrences of jihad increase in the Qur’an. While some of these verses may be understood as still referring to nonviolent struggle, the majority clearly refer to physical force or fighting (qital). Qur’an 22:39 is believed by many scholars to be the first verse on this topic. It permits the Muslims to retaliate with force against those who continue to attack and persecute them. A subsequent verse of verses (2:190–191) converts the permission of self-defense into an obligation, with the argument that “oppression is worse than killing.” Then, after eight years of warfare between the Muslims and their polytheist enemies, the Jewish tribes of Medina, and the Christian empire of the Byzantines, the Qur’an seems to enjoin a war of conversion against all remaining polytheist Arabs (9:5) and a war of subjugation against Christians and Jews (9:29).

The Classical Theory

Following the Prophet’s death, Muslim scholars produced a large body of literature analyzing Qur’anic terms and collecting traditions of the Prophet as part of their effort to codify divine law (shari’ah). Defining and understanding jihad, a concept with complex religious and moral significance, naturally occupied a great deal of their attention. The scholars outlined a number of different types of jihad, all of which may be grouped into two basic categories, the spiritual jihad and the physical jihad. The objects of the first type included one’s own soul (nafs), whose evil inclinations had to be overcome, or Satan (Shaitan), whose attempts to sow doubt and confusion and to lead the believer astray had to be perpetually fought. The physical jihad was aimed at unbelievers outside the Muslim community, as well as hypocrites and troublemakers within the Muslim ranks. Its goal was to establish the supremacy of divine law and thereby to promote justice and social welfare according to Islamic values. In this sense, jihad was closely related to the Qur’anic injunction that Muslims “command the right and forbid the wrong” (amr bi-l-ma’ruf wa nabi ‘an al-munkar).

The classical scholars also listed various means by which both the spiritual and the physical jihad could be conducted, including by the heart, tongue, pen, hand, and sword. Some traditions ascribed to Muhammad profess the merits of jihad conducted by the tongue, as in one hadith in which the Prophet said, “The greatest jihad is a word of truth spoken to a tyrant.” Other traditions describe the jihad of the pen, that is, of scholars, as more meritorious than the jihad of the sword. One of the most famous such hadiths declares the spiritual jihad to be the greater jihad (jihad al-akbar) as compared to the physical jihad, which is the lesser jihad (jihad al-asghar).

But the most widespread use of the term jihad in classical Islamic thought was in the sense of a divinely sanctioned struggle, through war if necessary, to establish Islamic sovereignty and thereby to propagate the Islamic faith to unbelievers. In classical jurisprudence (fiqh), the dominant strand of intellectual activity in these early centuries, the chapters on jihad in legal treatises contained rules for the declaration, conduct, and conclusion of such religiopolitical wars.

At the heart of the classical theory was the division of the world into two basic spheres, dar al-islam (land of Islam), a unitary state comprising the community of Muslims, living by the shari’ah, and led by the just ruler (imam); and dar al-barb (land of war), where Islamic law did not prevail, leading presumably to anarchy and moral corruption. It was commonly understood that Muslims had an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) to defend dar al-islam whenever it was threatened by aggression from dar al-barb. This type of war received little attention in the chapters on jihad.

The jurists’ attention was focused on what may be called the expansionist jihad. The imam was obliged to undertake a jihad whenever the conditions of the Islamic state permitted him to reduce dar al-barb and bring its lands and peoples into dar al-islam. This was a collective duty of the Muslim community (fard kifaya), one that required participation only from
During an Islamic Jihad rally at Hebron University in 1997, some two thousand students rallied and chanted against Israel and America as a round of Palestinian and Israeli peace talks began in Washington D.C. This protester’s headband reads “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great). Though the idea of jihad has been used by some terrorist groups to advocate killing civilians, mainstream Muslim scholars condemn such supposedly Qu’ranic justifications. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

those financially and physically capable of undertaking it. One school of Sunni jurisprudence, the Shafi‘i, interposed a third category between the other two, dar al-sulh (land of truce), comprising peoples with which the Muslims had a treaty of truce, which suspended, but did not end, the jihad obligation. The maximum duration of such a truce, according to most scholars, was ten years, although nothing prevented the imam from renewing the truce if he deemed it in the Muslims’ interest.

The jihad in dar al-barb, in the view of the scholars, was aimed at bringing Islam’s higher civilization to those unaware of it, not territorial conquest or plunder. Thus, they elaborated rules on what Muslim armies may or may not do in dar al-barb. The basis for such moral injunctions was the Qur’an’s general command, “Do not transgress limits, for God loves not transgressors” (2:190), which was given greater specificity by the practice of the Prophet and his first four successors.

Before the start of any attack, the enemy was to be offered the choice of accepting Islam, in which case no further action against them was permissible. If they refused, they were to be offered dhimmi (protected) status as an autonomous community within dar al-islam. This option, deriving from Qur’an 9:29, initially pertained to Jews and Christians, but was steadily expanded to include Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists as the Islamic frontiers expanded. Only the polytheist Arabs who had fought so bitterly against Muhammad and the early Muslim community were excluded from the dhimmi option and forced to convert according to Qur’an 9:5.

In fighting the enemy, Muslim soldiers were to avoid directly targeting women and children. Some jurists included old men, peasants, hermits, merchants, the insane, and other males who do not ordinarily take part in fighting on the list of prohibited targets. According to most scholars, all able-bodied adult males could be killed at the discretion of the
imam, whether they were fighting or had been taken prisoner. The scholars permitted the use of all types of weapons or military tactics that were necessary to overcome the enemy, including laying siege to fortresses, firing incendiary devices, cutting off the water supply, or flooding. The exceptions were certain practices that were categorically prohibited by the Prophet, such as killing by mutilation or torture, burning individuals alive, and violating oaths or grants of security to soldiers or envoys.

The difference in Shi’ite views on jihad was that only the righteous imam, a descendant of ‘Ali, could lead the expansionist jihad. Because the line of imams ended with the disappearance of the twelfth imam in the ninth century, according to the dominant strand of Shi’ism, only a defensive jihad to repulse enemy aggression is theoretically possible.

The classical theory was already outdated as it was being formulated in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries. With the launching of the Reconquista in Spain and the Crusades in Syria and Palestine, the expansionist jihad gave way to a defensive struggle. In the nineteenth century, as European imperialism advanced throughout much of the Muslim world, the defensive aspects of jihad assumed paramount importance.

Modern Interpretations
The Christian missionary activity that accompanied British rule in India led some Indian Muslims to undertake major revisions of classical notions of jihad. The literature produced by these writers is unmistakably apologetic in tone, straining to answer the charge of Christian writers that Islam was spread by the sword. According to the apologists, the wars of early Islam were purely defensive in nature, and jihad in modern times should be largely divested of its military connotations and reduced mainly to its spiritual aspects.

Such writings inevitably created a backlash among other Muslim interpreters. Two broad reactions may be identified, the modernist and the fundamentalist. The modernists’ goal is not so much to respond to criticisms of early Islamic history and dogma, but to reinterpret jihad in ways that make it compatible with the principles of modern international law. Thus, they challenge the classical theory’s conception of a dar al-islam in opposition to a dar al-barb, pointing out that such categories are nowhere to be found in the Qur’an or hadith. If these two basic sources for Islamic law and ethics are properly analyzed, they claim, jihad cannot be properly understood as a war to spread Islam or subjugate unbelievers. It is waged only in self-defense, in conformity with international law, when the lives, property, and honor of Muslims are at stake.

The fundamentalists also appeal to the Qur’an and hadith to challenge what they consider various false understandings of jihad. First, they refute the mystical strand of thought that emphasizes the superiority of the inner, spiritual jihad over the outer, physical jihad. By the end of the Qur’anic revelation, according to them, jihad meant a struggle, through fighting if necessary, to establish the Islamic order over all unbelievers. The more tolerant and pacific texts relating to unbelievers were abrogated by the later, more belligerent verses. But the category of unbelievers in fundamentalist writings includes nominal Muslims as well as non-Muslims. The transformation of hypocritical Muslim societies into true Islamic communities, led by true Muslim leaders, is the immediate goal of most fundamentalist ideologies. Although some writers continue to speak of dar al-islam and dar al-barb, the jihad to spread Islam beyond its current borders seems for most fundamentalists to be a secondary concern.

As for the proper conduct of war today, the vast majority of Muslim scholars agree that principles of international humanitarian law are compatible with Islamic teachings. These include the notion of noncombatant immunity and the prohibition against inhumane forms of killing. Muslim terrorist groups have, however, sought to justify the killing of civilians on Islamic grounds, but their arguments and tactics have been condemned by mainstream scholars.

Finally, many Muslims today are trying to reclaim the broad meaning of jihad as “effort” or “struggle” apart from war. Increasingly, we find references to such struggles as the “jihad for literacy” or the “jihad for economic development.”

See also Conflict and Violence; Terrorism.

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JINNAH, MUHAMMAD ‘ALI
(1876–1948)

Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah was born on 25 December 1876 in Karachi and became one of the most celebrated leaders of the independence movement. Later he became the founder of Pakistan. He died one year after independence on 11 September 1948.
People of Pakistan know him better by his title, Quaid-i-Azam, meaning “the great leader.” After earning his degree in law from London’s famous Lincoln’s Inn in 1896 and with a certificate to join the bar of any court in British India, he returned to his homeland. He settled in Bombay where he practiced law and soon rose to fame as the most distinguished attorney in the country. He split his time between the legal profession and politics. As a liberal nationalist trained in British constitutional and democratic tradition, he became a passionate advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity against British rule. For almost two decades, he devoted his energies to bringing the two communities together on one political platform by focusing on the idea of common political interests against British imperialism.

By the early 1920s, he began to feel disenchanted by the leaders of the Indian National Congress Party. He did not feel comfortable with their militant, confrontational style with the British. Rather, he advocated the course of moderation and dialogue to win freedom. His real disappointment came on the issue of minority rights, specifically those of the Muslims who comprised nearly 20 percent of the population, with concentration in the eastern and western parts of the British Indian Empire. Given their numbers, they were not a minority in a traditional sense, but a people with a heritage of more than one thousand years of Muslim rule and separate sense of identity. Jinnah favored a tripartite understanding on the constitutional guarantees for the rights of the Muslims once India became independent.

Muslim nationalism developed parallel to secular Indian nationalism in the later part of the nineteenth century. Muslims in the Indian subcontinent regarded themselves as a separate community with distinctive culture and civilization. But their political separatism was confined to the issue of minority rights that Muslim leaders like Jinnah strongly advocated in seeking representation in elected councils through separate electorates for Muslims. That ensured that Muslims would get adequate representation according to the size of their population. The dominant Hindu groups, including the Congress Party, were opposed to continuing any such arrangements once the British left.

By the late 1930s, Jinnah began to argue for a separate country for the Muslims in the eastern and western fringes of British India. With the passage of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 by a great assembly of Muslim leaders from all over India, Jinnah formally demanded the creation of a Muslim homeland. For the next seven years, he mobilized the Muslim masses on the basis of separate nationhood and convinced the British that that was the only option to prevent a communal war between Hindus and Muslims. Although Jinnah invoked Islamic symbols for political mobilization, he was a liberal, constitutionalist politician with a rational and progressive outlook.

See also Pakistan, Islamic Republic of.

Rasul Baksh Raiz

JUDAISM AND ISLAM

Jewish-Muslim relations have been shaped by the interactions of the theological perspectives of both religions and the historical circumstances in which they are found. Both use sacred texts and history to form the basis of their perceptions of the other, with the result that there are often conflicting versions of the same events. This entry will show how historical circumstances, the place of Jews in Islamic religious text, and political ideology combine in varying degrees to shape Jewish-Muslim relations.

Historical Perspective
In each historical period, the definition of who was a Muslim or a Jew has shifted. Often only a religious identification, more frequently it signifies a particular social, economic, or political group. Ethnic categories and religious identities
have been conflated by both insiders and outsiders alike, thus complicating the task of analyzing intergroup and intercommunal relations. In the first two centuries of the Islamic era, for example, we have evidence that some Jews who had converted to Islam still retained Jewish home practices, not from hypocritical motives, but because the development of Islamic practices for the home were somewhat underdeveloped.

Another important tool for Jewish-Muslim intergroup analysis is the placement of behaviors and ideas in specific temporal and geographic contexts. Visions and ideas of the past have a strong influence on both religions. Many Muslims have as keen an awareness of the events around the time of the Prophet as they do their own time. The Qur’an and the sunna of the Prophet are guides for a Muslim’s relations with Jews, as they are in all areas of behavior. A similar level of historical consciousness, albeit with different perspectives and details, helps shape Jewish attitudes toward Muslims. The historic interactions of Muslims and Jews have resulted in each being shaped and transformed by the other, and both by interactions with Christians, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and others. It is hard to imagine how each religion would be as it is without the presence of the others.

When the prophet Muhammad was born in 570 C.E., Arabia, a central trade and military location, was caught in the Byzantine-Sassanian rivalry. Arabs, including Jewish Arabic-speakers, were in the armies of both sides, providing horse and camel cavalries, and each empire maintained Arab client states as buffers and bases of operation. Only around fifty years earlier, the last Jewish kingdom in southern Arabia, allied with the Persians, had been defeated, replaced by a Byzantine-supported Christian army from Abyssinia. According to early Muslim historians, this army, led by a general named Abraha, is referred to in Surat al-Fal in the Qur’an.

The Hijaz had numerous Jewish settlements, most of long standing, dating to at least the time of the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. According to some scholars, the earliest Jewish presence in the Hijaz was at the time of Nabonidus, circa 550 B.C.E. The Jews in these settlements were merchants, farmers, vintners, smiths, and, in the desert, members of Bedouin tribes. The most important Jewish dominated city was Yathrib, known later as Medina. The Jews of the Hijaz were semi-independent, but often allied with both Byzantium and the Persians. Some made the claim to be “kings” of the Hijaz, most probably meaning tax collectors for the Persians, and for a variety of reasons, more Jews were loyal to Persian interests against those of the Byzantine empire. Jews, as well as Christians, seem to have been engaged in attempting to convert the Arabian population to their religious and political views, often with some success. The loyalties of the Jews and Christians to one or the other of the two empires meant that choosing either Judaism or Christianity meant also choosing to ally with a superpower interested in dominating Arabia.

Arab sources report that at the time of Muhammad’s birth, some Meccans had abandoned polytheism and had chosen monotheism (Ar. banīf), in a Jewish, Christian, or nonsectarian form. From Qur’anic and other evidence, it is clear that Meccans were conversant with the general principles of Judaism and Christianity and knew many details of worship, practice, and belief.

When Muhammad had his first revelation in 610 C.E., his wife, Khadija, tested the validity of his experience by seeking the advice of her cousin, Waraqa b. Nawfal, a banīf learned in Jewish and Christian scriptures. In declaring that Muhammad was a continuation of the prophetic traditions of Judaism and Christianity, he said that he had been foretold in Jewish and Christian scripture. A central doctrine of Islam places Muhammad at the end of a chain of prophets from God, starting with Adam and embracing all the prophetic figures of Judaism and Christianity, and holds that Muhammad’s advent is announced in the Torah and Gospels. Denial of this central idea by Jews and Christians is said to be a result of the corruption of the sacred texts, either inadvertently or on purpose. This disparity of perspective underlies much of what Muslims believe about their Jewish and Christian forebears and conditions Islamic triumphalist views about the validity of Islam against the partial falsity of the other two traditions.

The Qur’an and the Sira, the traditional biography of Muhammad, present ambivalent attitudes toward Jews and Christians, reflecting the varied experience of Muhammad and the early community with Jews and Christians in Arabia. Christians are said to be nearest to Muslims in “love” in Qur’an 5:82, but Muslims are not to take Jews or Christians as close allies or leaders” in Qur’an 5:51. The Qur’an sometimes makes a distinction between the “Children of Israel,” that is, Jews mentioned in the Bible, and “Jews,” members of the Jewish tribes in Arabia during Muhammad’s time. This distinction is also present in the Sira and other histories, and one sees some Jews as hostile to Muhammad and his mission, while others become allies with him. The so-called Constitution of Medina, which Muhammad negotiated with the Ansar, the Muhajirun, and the Jews of Medina, include Jews in the umma, allowing them freedom of association and religion in return for the payment of an annual tax, originally called the kharaj. This agreement and the subsequent treaties negotiated by Muhammad with the Jews of Khaybar, ‘Ta‘ma’, and other cities in the Hijaz, establish the precedent of including “people of the book” (Ar. abl al-kitāb) in the umma. As the armies of conquest encountered communities of Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, the model of Muhammad’s accommodating behavior extended the original notion to incorporate all these recipients of God’s revelation as abl al-dhimma, or dbimmi.
Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), a rabbi, philosopher, and physician, was born in Cordoba, Spain, where Christians and Jews participated in a lively intellectual community along with Muslims. When Maimonides was still young, however, Almohads from North Africa arrived in Cordoba and forbade Christians and Jews to worship openly, so his family left and eventually settled in Egypt. © CORBIS-BETTMANN

The death of Muhammad and the subsequent expansion of Islam out of Arabia brought about a break with the Jewish Arabian communities, so that subsequent relations are built on Jewish and Christian interactions with Muslims who knew the Prophet’s actions only as idealized history. During the first Islamic century, the period of the most rapid expansion of Islam, social and religious structures were so fluid that it is hard to make generalizations. Jews and Christians were theoretically expelled from Arabia, or, at least, the Hijaz, but later evidence shows that Jews and Christians remained for centuries afterward. As late as the eighteenth century, for example, Jewish Bedouin roamed Northwestern Arabia, terrorizing pilgrims.

The era of the Umayyads was a time in which Muslims, Jews, and Christians negotiated the new power arrangements. The parameters of dhimmi status were developed, and both head and land taxes were paid to the Muslim rulers. Jews and Christians related to the Muslim caliphs through representatives and not individually. For the Jews, the Resh Geluta or exilarch was designated as a “prince” in the Muslim court, representing all the Jews. Because the exilarch was from the Rabbinic branch of Judaism, it became the dominant form, generally displacing other groups. Also, because Muslims expanded to include most of the world’s Jews in their polity, Rabbinic Judaism was able to develop its institutions within the context of the Islamic umma. For the newly forming Islamic state, the loyalty of the exilarch, and, by extension, the Jews, added legitimacy to Muslim claims to legitimate rule over its various non-Muslim populations. The interaction between Jews and Muslims thus produced profound effects on both Judaism and Islam. The occasional uprisings against Muslim rule—as the Jewish uprisings of the early eighth century—were local, over specific grievances, and not anti-Islamic as such. In fact, the Jewish revolt against the Umayyads, driven, it seems, by messianic visions, was sympathetic to early Shi’ite ideology while it unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the last Umayyad caliph.

The first two Islamic centuries were a time of translating Jewish and Christian scripture into Arabic, along with a vast body of commentary, particularly on biblical figures. Qur’anic tafsir became the repository of much Jewish tradition about such figures as Abraham, Moses, Solomon, and others. It was during this period that Rabbinic Judaism met a strong challenge from Karaite Judaism and ultimately triumphed as the dominant form of Judaism in the world.

The period from the tenth through the eighteenth centuries of the common era witnessed a rise of Western military, technological, and economic power, ultimately eclipsing the great agrarian-based Islamic empires that had formed in the wake of the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate. In the western Islamic lands of the Iberian peninsula and North Africa, Jews, Christians, and Muslims combined in a society that is often described by later historians with the adjective “golden.” The areas of poetry, music, art, architecture, theology, exegesis, law, philosophy, medicine, pharmacology, and mysticism were shared among all the inhabitants of the Islamic courts and city-states at the same time that Muslim armies were locked in a losing struggle with the Christian armies of the Reconquista. In the eastern Mediterranean, similar symbiotic societies could be found. Within the intellectual circles of the Islamic world, Jews become Hellenized through contact with Muslim philosophers and theologians, just as Muslims had from contact with Christians earlier. In the areas of commerce, world trade was dominated by trading associations made up of Muslims, Jews, and Christians from Islamic lands.

Political Ideology
The twin attacks on the Islamic world in the Middle Ages by the Crusaders from the West and the Mongols from the East transformed Muslim attitudes toward the dhimmi. In the resulting visions of society, the influence of Jews, Christians, and Shi’ites was circumscribed and made more rigid, but not eliminated. Muslim religious scholars used depictions of Jews and Christians found in the foundation texts as cautionary models for Muslims, but actual communities of Jews and Christians were treated with strict adherence to Islamic legal
precedent. *Dhimmi* had to wear distinctive clothing and badges to indicate their position in society, as did Muslims as part of a general “uniform” indicating rank and status. Certain occupations became common for Jews and Christians, such as tanning, which was regarded as imparting ritual impurity to Muslims, and it became less common in this period to find Jews and Christians in the highest ranks of advisors to the rulers. Jews and Christians usually lived in separate quarters of cities, and, while they were inferior to Muslims in public, barred from riding horses or blocking the public way with religious processions, they lived autonomously with respect to their communal affairs. This autonomy, while protective of the individuals, was to prove to have long-term consequences, however.

When Jews and Muslims were expelled from Spain in 1492, the majority of Jews chose to move to Islamic lands, the area of the Ottoman Empire in particular. The Iberian Jews were so numerous, well educated, and prosperous that Iberian Jewish culture often supplanted that of the older Jewish communities so that Sephardic became the general term for Jews living in Islamic lands. The trading and manufacturing skills and the capital of these immigrants to the Ottoman empire provided much of the wealth for Ottoman expansion. Under the Ottomans, Jewish and Christian communities achieved the greatest degree of autonomy. Through the *millet* system, each community was distinct and responsible directly to the sultan.

In the Ottoman Empire, the British and French found Jews and Christians to be attractive agents for their commercial activities, and the Ottomans, in turn, were pleased to employ the *dhimmi* for these purposes as well. Many Jews sought to secure the benefits of Western societies for themselves and their offspring by asking for and getting Western protection, passports, and, in some instances, citizenship. The increasing identification of Jews and Christians with non-Muslim powers served only to isolate these non-Muslims from the rest of Islamic society. By the end of the nineteenth century, most Muslims were under Western political and legal influence. The secular legal systems devised in the West supplanted Muslim customary and religious law, seriously challenging or eliminating the category of *dhimma* in those countries. The result was often a complete separation of Jews from a relationship in law with Muslims and an increasing identification of Jews as “European.” This was particularly the case in Western Islamic lands, where a knowledge of the growth of European forms of Judaism was greatest.

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I resulting in the creation of a number of small nation-states brought about a further separation of non-Muslims from Muslims. The ideology of nationalism reduced religion to the status of only one of the components of a nation-state ideology. Education became Western, technological, and secular, further reducing religion to peripheral status. By the eve of World War II, most Islamic countries were prepared to overthrow colonialism and establish nation-states along Western secularist models. When this happened after World War II, constitutions were modeled after such countries as Switzerland, the United States, and France, usually guaranteeing freedom of religion, but providing no particular safeguards for religious expression. Other religious and ethnic groups also desired nation-states. Christian states were formed in the Balkans and the Jewish state of Israel was formed in the formerly British Mandate territory of Palestine. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 became a central focal point for Jewish-Muslim relations that had steadily deteriorated since before World War I. The worsening conflicts in Palestine increased Jewish-Muslim conflict in the Arab states, where Jews were seen as both foreign and instruments of Western colonial designs. Within twenty years after the formation of the state of Israel, the majority of Jews living in Arab lands migrated to Israel, thus crystallizing the conflict in Palestine into a Jewish-Muslim conflict. Rulers in predominantly Muslim countries no longer had a constituent Jewish population. Jews became an abstract and hostile Other, and Judaism, increasingly identified with Zionism by Jews and non-Jews alike, was revalorized as the ever-present opposition to Muslims in Islamic history. This last notion, while having its roots in the foundation texts of Islam, was now abstracted in a way unlike any time in the past, and Jewish-Muslim relations took a new direction.

**Jews in Islamic History**

A common thread among many Islamic intellectuals concerned with the role and direction of Muslims in the postcolonial world is the role of the Jews in Islamic history. As mentioned above, the historical circumstances of a strong Jewish presence in the Hijaz during Muhammad’s time and the opposition of a few of the Jewish tribes to Muhammad’s mission, embedded numerous seemingly anti-Jewish statements into the early literature. For a few, in a quest to use the Islamic historical past to explain the present, the negative accounts of Judaism and Christianity became abstracted so as to confute the past with the present Arab-Israeli and East-West conflicts. Biblical descriptions of Jews rebelling against God’s commands, Medinan Jewish opposition to the forming Muslim state, and Israeli actions against Palestinians were read together as an eternal Jewish character, a view sometimes informed by Western anti-Semitic literature. The article by Egyptian intellectual Sayyid Quth, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” is one example, as are the views expressed in America by leaders of the Nation of Islam.

Other Muslim intellectuals read the same foundation texts with an emphasis on the special relationship between God and people of the book. While deploring the problems in Palestine, they separate the Arab-Israeli conflict from discussions about Jews (and Christians). Some at Al-Azhar in Egypt cite Qur’an and sunna to support peace accords between Israel and the Palestinians, and Warith D. Muhammad, the
son of Elijah Muhammad, has countered the anti-Jewish essentialist reading of the past with a Qur’anic-based message of mutual cooperation among Muslims, Jews, and Christians.

Discourse about Jewish-Muslim and Christian relations has been dominated in the last century by the problems of forming new group identities after the dissolution of colonialism. Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities have all suffered from conflicts pitting one ethnic group against another. As with any conflict, this period has produced considerable polemic. It has also produced positive calls for mutual respect and cooperation. It remains to be seen if the positive richness of past Jewish-Muslim relations can overcome the current antipathies.

See also Christianity and Islam; Islam and Other Religions; Minorities: Dhimmis.

Gordon D. Newby
KALAM

Kalam is an Arabic term for speech, and has several other, related, technical connotations in Islamic religious thought. Used in the phrase kalam allab it means the word of God as revealed to humankind through prophets (2:75, 9:6, and 48:15). In this sense, kalam is analogous to the Greek term logos, as it is used in Jewish theology by Philo of Alexandria in about the first century c.e. In its second sense, kalam designates God’s creative word. In the Qur’an, God’s words, as commands, create reality. This can be seen in such Qur’anic quotations as: “Yet when We will a thing We only have to say ‘Be’ and it is” (16:40). In this context, the word of God, kalam, takes on a performative function—the utterance of the word accomplishes the creative act.

The third and the most primary usage is found in the phrase ‘ilm al-kalam, which connotes “the science of (dialectical) theology” that establishes and elaborates on the doctrinal teachings of the various schools (sing. madhhab) of theology, such as the Mu’tazilites, Ash’arites, and Maturidites. In Islamic intellectual traditions, the scholars of kalam gradually came to be delineated as dogmatic theologians (mutakallimun), as distinct from philosophers (falsaf) and mystics (Sufis).

The mutakallimun developed a dialectical method of framing and defending religious claims over rival teachers and schools. Some scholars believe that Greek and Hellenistic philosophy influenced the rise of kalam as a form of theology, while others point out that Islam, as a revealed, word-centered religion, was the primary factor in the emergence of the kalam method and schools of thought. The latter method, as it appears in literary form, strongly indicates the disputational context of early and medieval Islamic thought. A theological claim was made, then defended against critics in a series of conditional statements of the form: “if someone from such and such a school asks you so and so, then say to him . . . .”

The subject matter of kalam included such topics as God and his attributes, classification of and arguments against other religions, ethical responsibility and its eschatological consequences, and the doctrine of the imamate (political theology). ‘Ilm al-kalam became the lingua franca of most religious discourse among sects and groups in medieval Islamic society from the eighth century onward. Sunni and Shi’ite schools adopted the kalam method. So, too, did medieval Christian and Jewish communities living in Iraq and Iran and elsewhere in the central Islamic lands. After the eleventh century, Aristotelian philosophy and logic began to wax as the kalam methods and schools waned. Nowadays, kalam is studied historically but does not claim thriving schools or exponents. Nonetheless, in his widely read theological treatise on Islam and modernity, Risalat al-tawhid (Theology of unity), Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) preserved a modified version of the dialectical method of the medieval Mu’tazilite and Ash’arite schools.

See also Ash’arites, Ash’airah; Disputation; Falsafa; Knowledge; Murji’ites, Murji’a; Qur’an.

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Parviz Morewedge

KANO

Kano is the capital city of Kano State, in northern Nigeria. Its 1992 population (the last year for which census data is available) was estimated at 700,000 inhabitants. Kano State has an area of 16,630 square miles and an estimated population 5.6 million.

Archaeological evidence suggests that Kano was founded in the fifth century as a settlement at the foot of Dalla Hill.
The early inhabitants were animist, believing that a soul or spirit inhabited all things. The animist tradition is still followed by some peoples of northern Nigeria, but Kano’s inhabitants were introduced to Islam possibly as early as the tenth century.

Kano was visited by strangers in the tenth century. These newcomers may have been early Muslims, but a firm Islamic presence was not established until the fourteenth century. By the late 1300s, Kano became an independent Islamic sultanate, with close links to other Islamic centers located across the Sahara to the north. With the creation of the sultanate, the people of Kano began to publicly observe Islamic festivals, and the appointment of ulema to office—a practice common in courts elsewhere in the Islamic world—was begun in Kano as well.

By the fifteenth century, Kano had assumed control of the trans-Sahara caravan trade, due in large part to its powerful army. Camels appeared in the city, acquired through trade, and slave raiding in the countryside to the south had become a profitable occupation of the Kano aristocracy. Later in the sixteenth century, Kano came in direct contact with European traders, and further expanded their trade repertoire by specializing in indigo-colored textiles and red “Morocco-leather.”

During the period of European colonization, Kano developed as a center of Western-style education. The British colonial government set up a school to train teachers of Arabic and Islamic sciences in the methods of modern pedagogy. Nonetheless, the city remained an important center of Sufi activities as well. It became in the same period an emporium of the new groundnut trade, on which the economy of northern Nigeria today largely depends.

Kano is not remarkable for creative literary contributions. It relied on works that were imported from peripheral Islamic areas. The first Kano scholar in Islamic literature was Usuman, an imam from Miga, who lived in the middle of the eighteenth century. A century later Asim Degal contributed works on astrology. The Makarantan Ilmi schools of higher Islamic learning played an important part in the Islamic life of Kano City. There are at least twelve establishments of this kind in Kano, but the number is believed to be much higher.

In the eighteenth century Kano was besieged by the Fulani, a powerful West African people. After the Fulani came the Europeans. British troops took the city in 1903 and imposed indirect colonial government. The emir stayed in power, but a British colonial official was present at all times. Kano grew during the twentieth century. A railroad was built in 1912, an airport in 1937, and a system of roads and highways expanded over the years. Today the city preserves a mixture of the old and the new. Its walls still stand. Built in the fourteenth century of mud-brick, the walls are nearly 30 kilometers long, with 15 gates. Still standing, too, are traditional houses of mud-brick, finely decorated in Hausa style.

Other prominent buildings in Kano are the Amir’s palace, the Grand Mosque, and the museum.

See also Africa, Islam in; Marwa, Muhammad; Uthman Dan Fodio.

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Thyge C. Bro

KARAKI, SHAYKH ‘ALI

Nur al-Din Abu ‘I-Hasan ‘Ali b. al-Husayn b. ‘Abd al-‘Ali al-Karaki, also known as al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani (d. 1533), was an Arab Twelver Shi’ite jurist from Karak Nuh in present-day Lebanon, who acquired the scholastic tradition of Jabal ‘Amil in Syria and stood in the intellectual line of descent from Muhammad b. Makk (d. 1384), who was known as al-Shahid al-Awwal (the First Martyr). Al-Karaki was the first major Shi’ite scholar to emigrate from Jabal ‘Amil to Najaf in Iraq during the sixteenth century and from there to Safavid Iran (1501–1736), where Shah Isma’il (r. 1501–1524) appointed him shaykh al-Islam. He implemented the Ja‘fari (Twelver Shi’ite) legal rulings, observed the previously suspended Friday prayer, and tried to draw Shi’ism out of its scholastic puritanism to fit the Safavid state structure. In 1532, and as a visible sign of al-Karaki’s eminence at the court, Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–1576) issued a royal decree declaring him the deputy (na‘ib) of the imam and the seal of jurisconsults (khatum al-mujtahidin), thus undermining the position of the Iranian sadrs, chiefs of the Safavid religious administration who adjudicated in criminal and religious matters. Shah Tahmasp also conferred on al-Karaki extensive land holdings as a hereditary waqf (religious endowment). Al-Karaki’s ardent defense of the Shi’ite faith earned him the nickname “inventor of the Shi’ite religion.” Among his descendants was the seventeenth-century Iranian jurist and philosopher Mir Damad.

See also Empires: Safavid and Qajar; Isma’il I, Shah; Shaykh al-Islam; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver); Tahmasp I, Shah.

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KARDBALA

Karbala is the second largest town in Iraq, with over 350,000 inhabitants in the early twenty-first century. It is situated about sixty miles southwest of Baghdad, where the mausoleum of Muhammad’s grandson Husayn (Mashhad Husayn) was erected and frequently destroyed and restored during the early centuries of Islam.

When the first Umayyad Sunni caliph, Mu‘awiya, died in 680 C.E., his son Yazid came to power. The majority of Muslims saw the nomination of Yazid to the caliphate as an usurpation of the notion of consensus (ijma‘), the legitimate means of choosing a caliph. When Husayn received confirmation of the loyalty of the Kufis from his cousin Muslim Ibn ‘Aqil, he headed toward Kufa. On his way, Husayn learned that his cousin had died at the hands of Yazid’s men and that the Kufis had shifted their allegiance to Yazid.

Husayn nevertheless continued in the direction of Kufa. Ibn Ziyad, the governor of Kufa, with one thousand soldiers at his command, told Husayn that he could neither go to Kufa nor return to Mecca, and was permitted only to go to Damascus, the capital. Instead, Husayn led his heavily outnumbered and underequipped followers to battle in Karbala, where they were slain mercilessly on the battlefield. This event played an important role in the development of Shi‘ite theology and has been the source of dissension among Muslims. The battle of Karbala accentuated the split between the two major branches of Islam. The event forged in Shi‘ite Muslims an identity as believers who are subjected to persecution for the sake of the true succession of Muhammad.

A cult of martyrdom is linked to the death and downfall of Husayn at Karbala. The ‘Ashura (date of Husayn’s death) was elaborated upon and systematized in the articulation of Shi‘ite theology. Every year during the first ten days of the month of hijra, the battle of Karbala is commemorated by Shi‘ite Muslims during Muharram, and many go on pilgrimage to Karbala. Husayn’s martyrdom has become a source of strength and endurance for Shi‘ite Muslims in times of suffering, persecution, and oppression.

During its long history the tomb of Husayn was desecrated several times and had to be restored. In 850 and 851, the Sunni Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil destroyed the tomb of Husayn and prohibited pilgrimages to the sanctuary. Sulayman the Magnificent visited the tomb in 1534 and 1535 and participated in its restoration. At the end of the eighteenth century Agha Muhammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, covered the dome in gold and the manara of the sanctuary. In April 1802, twelve thousand Wahhabis under Shaykh Sa‘ud invaded Karbala, killed over three thousand inhabitants, and sacked the city.

See also ‘Ali; Husayn; Qur‘an; Shi‘a: Early.

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KEMAL, NAMEK (1840–1888)

Namek Kemal, a writer and journalist belonging to the group of the Young Ottomans, attempted to introduce political liberalism into the bureaucratic despotism of the Tanzimat reform era. Kemal came from an aristocratic background, and after learning French he began his career in the Translation Office of the Ottoman government in Istanbul in 1857. He published a journal and wrote essays on reform in a simple but powerful Turkish style. In 1865 he helped found a secret political society and was dismissed from his government position when this became known. In exile in Europe (1867–1870), he discovered European civilization and French revolutionary thought, which he found compatible with certain Islamic political ideas. He popularized the concepts of fatherland and freedom, and started the newspaper Hurriyet (Freedom) to develop public opinion (1868). On returning from exile he became a journalist and political essayist, advocating liberal political rights founded on Islamic principles, constitutional separation of powers, and halting of European economic penetration. His controversial 1873 patriotic play, Vatan (Fatherland), resulted in renewed imprisonment and exile. In 1876 he returned to join state service under the constitutional regime. He criticized Ottoman modernization as insufficiently liberal, destroying old safeguards against absolutism, notably the sbar‘a and the Janissaries (elite corps of Turkish troops) without providing new ones. Suspected of plotting to depose Sultan Abdulhamit after the 1878 abrogation of the constitution, he was again exiled and his writings were banned. He died in exile, but his works, read secretly, fired the imagination of the Young Turks, who took up the cause of liberalism during the autocratic regime of ‘Abdulhamit.

See also Young Ottomans.
KHALID, KHALID MUHAMMAD (1920–1996)

Khalid Muhammad Khalid was a popular Egyptian writer on religious and political topics, and the author of more than thirty books and numerous newspaper and magazine articles. He received his theological degree from the faculty of shari’ah at al-Azhar University in 1947, and then gained a teaching certificate, also from al-Azhar. He taught Arabic language, and then worked in the Egyptian Ministry of Education and in the Ministry of Culture. He became a supervisor in the Department for the Publication of the Heritage.

His first book, From Here We Begin (Min buna nabda’), published in 1950, was a forceful and controversial call for separation of religion from state, as well as for a democratic socialism, effective birth control, and furtherance of the rights of women. It was shortly translated into English, as was Socialism, and the Islamist response to it, Our Beginning in Wisdom, by his friend Muhammad al-Ghazali. These two books provide a good sample of the secularist-Islamist debate in Egypt at mid-century. Khalid expressed similar views in other passionately written books in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Later he wrote a number of books on Muhammad and other heroes of early Islam. In his book al-Dawla fi al-Islam (The State in Islam), published in 1981, he revised his earlier secularist position, stating that Islam does have civil principles that should be applied by the state, although it does not prescribe a “religious government.” According to Khalid, parliamentary democracy is the contemporary application of the Islamic principle of shura (consultation).

See also Ghazali, Muhammad al-.

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KHAMANE’I, SAYYED ‘ALI (1939– )

Sayyed ‘Ali Khamane’i, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (r. 1989–) was born in Mashad, Khorasan province, Iran, in 1939. Khamane’i finished his study in Qom Seminary in 1964. During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, Khamane’i was a student of Ruhollah Khomeini, the future leader of the Iranian Revolution. Khamane’i was arrested many times during the shah’s rule, served a total of three years in prison between 1964 and 1978, and was exiled for a year between 1978 and 1979, spending his time in Kanshahr, Baluchistan province. In 1979, following the overthrow of the shah, he was selected as the representative of the Revolutionary Council in the army as well as Deputy for Revolutionary Affairs at the National Ministry of Defense. He was also chosen as the leader of the Friday prayer in Tehran.

In 1980 Khamane’i was elected to the Iranian Parliament. He was one of the founding members of the Islamic Republic Party. In June 1981 he became the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt. In 1981, following the assassination of President Raja’e, he was elected as the third president of revolutionary Iran. He was reelected president in 1985 and served a second four-year term. On 4 June 1989, after the death of the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Assembly of Experts chose Khamane’i as the vali-ye faqih or leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His main problem in leadership as a substitute for his predecessor, Khomeini, has been his lack of traditional and charismatic legitimacy.

After several attempts to make him the sole marja’ al-taqlid (Twelver Shi’ a leader) had failed, he was endorsed as one of seven maraja’ by the conservative Qom clerics in December 1994. His political modus operandi includes conspiracy theory, religious authoritarianism, antipluralism, and anti-intellectualism. Khamane’i has been accused of killing about eighty political activists and intellectuals both within and outside Iran since the 1990s. He closed more than eighty newspapers and imprisoned sixty journalists, political activists, and intellectuals in 2000 and 2001.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Majid Mohammadi

KHAHAN

The meaning of the word khan is dependent upon the context in which it is used. It is often used as a title, but can also refer to an office, a form of address, an attribute of rulership (following Genghis Khan’s thirteenth-century Mongol unification), or as part of a place name. Its etymology is obscure, though probably Turkic. It continues to be used commonly in Central Asia, North India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. It is seldom used in Arabic, except as a place name.

G. R. Garthwaite
KHANQA (KHANAQA, KHANGA)

In twelfth century Sufism—a new strand of Islam based on the knowledge of God through personal experience of a spiritual nature—developed its own institutions, the most important of which were the zawiyas and khansas. Zawiyas were mostly associated with tariqas (Sufi “orders”). They spread a type of popular Sufism, which appealed to the masses, and they were left free to develop from the control of the ruling elite. Khansas, known for their spread of a type of “orthodox” Sufism, often had their fate closely linked to that of the ruling elite, whose patronage was crucial to their survival.

The khanga institution made its first appearance in Persia from where it spread rapidly to the rest of the Muslim world. It was introduced to Egypt in the twelfth century by Saladin, who put the institution under the control of the state. Two centuries later, the khanga had reached its full development thanks to patronage of the Mamluks.

According to the fifteenth century historian al-Maqrizi, the term khanga (Arabic form, pl. Khawaniq) derives from the Persian. It is formed by two words: khan, which means sultan, and kah, which means people. In the Eastern lands of Islam, the term khangas was used to refer to foundations reserved for Sufis. In these "monasteries" Sufis and their master could dedicate their lives to the practice of orthodox Sufism according to the rules set by their patrons. For medieval Egypt and Syria, the set of rules that regulated the communal life of Sufis are known from extant endowment deeds (waqf). Sufis and their master were generally appointed by the founder of the khanga or his successors. They were housed in the foundation, and were given a salary, food, and clothing. Sufis living in a khanga were to remain celibate; the ones married would spend the day there but would live outside it. All Sufis were required to attend the daily Sufi gatherings, perform the ritual of Dhikr (remembrance) and spend time in meditation. As the khanga evolved, its function became associated with that of the madrasa. As a result, Sufis’ activities also included attending classes in the various religious sciences.

Khansas were mostly urban foundations to which the founders often attached their funerary domes. The plan for khangas did not differ much from that of the madrasa. Most khangas followed the four iwan (vaulted hall) plan with an open courtyard in their middle. In time the latter’s size was reduced and it was covered by a roof. Fifteenth-century khangas consisted of elaborate complexes that included a grain mill, a bakery, an oil press, and living quarters for the founder and his family.

The presence of a khanga within an urban setting affected the life of the individuals living around it. Often the growth of the whole quarter depended on the khanga’s survival, and sometimes the ruin of the khanga meant the gradual disappearance of the quarter.

By the sixteenth century, khangas began their steady decline as they had lost their patrons. Indeed, the Ottomans, new masters of the region, were rather interested in patronizing Sufi orders. Since khangas did not follow any particular order, the Ottomans showed no interest in maintaining these institutions. Moreover, times had changed and the whole society had experienced a rise in popular Sufism sponsored by the masses. Although it had managed to maintain itself a little longer, soon the institution became defunct. Sufism survived in the zawiyas, which remain active today.

See also Architecture; Tariqa; Tasawwuf.

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Leonor Fernandes

KHAN, REZA OF BAREILLY

(1856–1921)

Ahmad Reza Khan Barelwi (Bareilly) was an influential scholar and Sufi whose followers emerged in the colonial period as one of two major groupings among South Asian Sunni Muslims—the other being the Deobandis. Ahmad Reza’s voluminous writings include a translation of the Qur’an and many volumes of advisory opinions, or fatwas. Although often called “Barelwi” by outsiders, those associated with this religious style claim the name Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’at, that is, the true Sunnis. They follow the Hanafi school of legal interpretation and primarily follow the Qadiri order in Sufi affiliation.

For the Barelwis, a good Muslim is defined as one faithful to the shari’ah and personally devoted to the prophet Muhammad as continuous intercessor to Allah through the mediation of the Sufi master. Unlike other reformers, they participate in ceremonies like the ‘urs observances at Sufi shrines (the saint’s “wedding” with the divine) and the mawlid celebration of the Prophet’s birthday. Conflict with the Deobandis revolved around issues related to the Prophet’s attributes: his ability to see into the future, to have knowledge of the unseen, and to be present in multiple places, all of which they accepted. Ahmad Reza charged those who differed with him as being “Wahhabi,” a politically charged label in the colonial context because it linked opponents with the militant followers of the Arab Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1787).
Ahmad Reza opposed participation in the Khilafat movement and, subsequently, his followers were averse from the Jam’iyyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind. Mosques and madrasas identifying themselves as Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a are currently found across South Asia and in places of Indo-Pakistani settlement like Britain and South Africa. The Jam’iyyat-e ‘Ulama-e Pakistan political party represents these ulema in Pakistan. The apolitical Dawat al Islam movement engages in grassroots “Barelwi” proselytizing in both India and Pakistan.

See also Jam’iyyat-e ‘Ulama-e Pakistan; Khilafat Movement; South Asia, Islam in; Wahhabiyya.

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Barbara D. Metcalf

KHARIJITES, KHAWARIJ

The Kharijites, or Khawarij, began as a group of ‘Ali’s supporters who “exited” (khuraraj) after the battle of Siffin (657 C.E.), when ‘Ali accepted arbitration (tahkim) with Mu’awiya (r. 661–680). The “exits” (khawarij) opposed a human tribunal in place of a battle victory decided by God’s judgment, hence their slogan, “Judgment belongs to God alone,” echoing Qur’anic verses 6:57, 12:40, and 12:67. They subsequently identified themselves as “exchangers” (shurat) for God’s pleasure, as in Qur’anic verse 2:207. Both militant activists and quietists used the exchange concept in their rhetoric, including their highly esteemed poetry. In opposition to the dynastic nature of the Umayyads, they purported to choose leaders by religious merit rather than by heritage. Considering themselves true Muslims, they developed rigid standards for proving one’s faith and for what is permissible in Islam, which led to a variety of practices and consequent divisions. Militant groups attacked towns, engaging Umayyad generals al-Hajjaj and al-Muhallab for decades. Major leaders included the activists Nafi b. al-Azraq al-Hanafi, Qatari b. al-Fuja’a, and Shabib b.Yazid al-Shaybani, and quietists Najda b. ‘Amir al-Hanafi, and ‘Abdallah b. Ibad al-Tamim. “Sufriya” is a general term used for quietists. Many quietists took up arms after the Umayyad’s brutal massacre of Abu Bilal Mirdas b. Hudayr b. Udayya and his men while praying, in 680. Women were involved militarily and culturally. The Khawarij/Shurat were found variously in Arabia, Iraq, and Iran until largely eradicated at the end of the Umayyad period (750). A branch of Kharijites known as the Ibadis persevered and are found today in Oman and North Africa.

See also Law.

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Annie C. Higgins

KHIDR, AL-

Al-Khadr (“the green” man) is the guide and mentor of Moses described in Sura Kahf (Q. 18.60–82) as “Our exceptional servant to whom We gave compassion from Ourselves and inner knowledge from Our presence.” Exegetes interpret this as “God-given knowledge” (ilm laduni), which complements Moses’s knowledge of shari’a. The Qur’an narrates that Moses vowed to his servant (identified in hadith as Joshua) to reach the place where the two seas meet. When Moses learns their fish has plunged into the water, he resolves to return and finds al-Khadr, God’s exceptional servant filled with God’s Compassion and Inner Knowledge. Moses asks to follow al-Khadr. Al-Khadr cautions that since Moses will neither be able to be patient with him nor understand, he must agree not to ask any questions until al-Khadr gives him permission. Moses protests, and al-Khadr scuttles the boat in which they ride. Al-Khadr renews his warning about patience. When al-Khadr kills a child, Moses protests, and receives a similar reprimand. In a village where they are denied hospitality, al-Khadr builds a wall. When Moses protests, al-Khadr announces his parting and explains the true meaning (ta’wil) of the events: The ferrymen were poor people whom al-Khadr wanted to prevent from having their boat seized by an approaching king; the child would have corrupted the faith of his believing parents and will be replaced; and the wall concealed an inheritance belonging to two orphan sons of a righteous man, a “treasure which is a mercy from your Lord,” signifying the deep meaning, learned through patience, that behind apparent injustice lies mercy.

In al-Bukhari’s collection of hadith, the prophet Muhammad is quoted as saying: “He was named al-Khadr because behind apparent injustice lies mercy.” Bukhari presents the story of Moses and Khidr as a model for seeking knowledge with diligence and humility.
The association of al-Khidr with Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.E.) stems from the fact that the Khidr narrative in the Qur’an precedes that of Dhu l-Qarnayn (the man “of two horns”), who is often identified with Alexander, and from the motif in the narrative of the water of life reviving a cooked fish; al-Khidr, like Elijah, Jesus, and Idris, is considered immortal. Al-Khidr is a protector of travelers, a rescuer, and a saint. In the Levant, sacred places often have multiple dedications to Khidr, Elijah, and St. George. In India, Khwaja Khidr is depicted as resembling Vishnu’s Matsya (fish) Avatar.

In Sufism, al-Khidr represents the saint and the spiritual master. For Sufi Qur’an commentators, al-Khidr represents spiritual guidance (subha) as distinguished from instruction (ta’lim). In hagiographies, Khidr gives to humankind initiation, guidance, and liturgies. The famous Sufi Ibn al-‘Arabi reported receiving al-Khidr’s mantle of initiation (khirqa) twice, and the poet and mystic al-Rumi’s relationship to Shams-e Tabrizi was described by Rumi’s son, Sultan Veled, as being like that of Moses and Khidr.

See also Prophets.

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Hugh Talat Halman

KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

The Khilafat movement (1919–1924) was an agitation on the part of some Indian Muslims, allied with the Indian nationalist movement, during the years following World War I. Its purpose was to pressure the British government to preserve the authority of the Ottoman sultan as caliph of Islam. Integral to this was the Muslims’ desire to influence the treaty-making process following the war in such a way as to restore the 1914 boundaries of the Ottoman empire. The British government treated the Indian Khilafat delegation of 1920, headed by Muhammad ‘Ali, as quixotic pan-Islamists, and did not change its policy toward Turkey. The Indian Muslims’ attempt to influence the treaty provisions failed, as the European powers went ahead with territorial adjustments, including the institution of mandates over formerly Ottoman Arab territories.

The significance of the Khilafat movement, however, lies less in its supposed pan-Islamism than in its impact upon the Indian nationalist movement. The leaders of the Khilafat movement forged the first political alliance among Western-educated Indian Muslims and ulama over the religious symbol of the khilafat (caliphate). This leadership included the ‘Ali brothers—Muhammad ‘Ali and Shaukat ‘Ali—newspaper editors from Delhi, their spiritual guide Maulana Abdul Bari of Lucknow, the Calcutta journalist and Islamic scholar Maulana Abu’l Kalam Azad, and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan, head of the Deoband madrasa. These publicist-politicians and ulama viewed European attacks upon the authority of the caliph as an attack upon Islam, and thus as a threat to the religious freedom of Muslims under British rule.

The Khilafat issue crystallized anti-British sentiments among Indian Muslims that had been increasing since the British declaration of war against the Ottomans in 1914. The Khilafat leaders, most of whom had been imprisoned during the war, were already politically active in the nationalist movement. Upon their release in 1919, the issue of the khilafat provided a means to achieve pan-Indian Muslim political solidarity in the anti-British cause and a source of communication between the leaders and their potential mass following. The Khilafat movement also benefited from Hindu-Muslim cooperation in the nationalist cause that had grown during the war, beginning with the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, and culminating in the protest against the Rowlatt anti-sedition bills in 1919. The Congress, now led by Mahatma Gandhi, called for nonviolent noncooperation against the British. Gandhi espoused the Khilafat cause, as he saw in it the opportunity to rally Muslim support for the Congress. The ‘Ali brothers and their allies, in turn, provided the noncooperation movement with some of its most enthusiastic troops.

The combined Khilafat-noncooperation movement was the first all-India agitation against British rule. It saw an unprecedented degree of Hindu-Muslim cooperation and it established Gandhi and his technique of nonviolent protest (satyagraha) at the center of the Indian nationalist movement. Mass mobilization using religious symbols was remarkably successful, and the British Indian government was shaken. In late 1921 the government moved to suppress the movement. The ‘Ali brothers were arrested for incitement to violence, tried, and imprisoned. Gandhi suspended the noncooperation movement in early 1922, following a riot in the village of Chauri Chaura that resulted in the deaths of the local police. He was arrested, tried, and imprisoned soon thereafter. The Turks dealt the final blow by abolishing the Ottoman sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924.

See also South Asia, Islam in.

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**Khirqa**


**Gail Minault**

**KHIRQA**

A *khirqa* is a wool cloak, often patched (*muraqqa’*a*). Sufis wore the *khirqa* as a sign of having embarked on the Sufi path from at least the eighth century. By the eleventh century Sufis had developed ways of transmitting spiritual knowledge and authority: Sufi authors describe the binding of a disciple to a master through an oath (*akhdh al-‘*abdad or the *bay’a*), becoming part of the master’s spiritual chain of authority (*silsilah*), the inculcation (*talqin*) of a method of prayer (*dhikr*), and the bestowal of the *khirqa* from a master to a disciple. Investiture with the *khirqa* had an initiatic aspect. A disciple could be given the *khirqa* at the beginning of his training with a shaykh, in which case the *khirqa* indicated that the disciple had been invested with the means necessary for progressing along the path. The bestowal of a *khirqa* could certify that the novice had been trained by a master who could attest to his spiritual fitness and preparedness. The *silsila* and the *khirqa* served the same purposes as the chain of authority (*isnad*) and the certificate of permission (*ijaza*). They certified that the Sufi had studied and trained under an authoritative master, whose spiritual pedigree could be traced back to the Prophet, and thus gave him the authority to transmit a particular spiritual way.

*See also Clothing; Khilafat Movement; Tasawwuf.*

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*Margaret Malamud*

**KHIRQA**

 KHIVA, KHANATE OF

The khanate of Khiva (Khwarazm) was established in 1511 on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, to the south of the Aral Sea and along the lower course of the Amu Darya River. The main ethnic groups living in the khanate were Uzbeks, Turkmen, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, and Sarts, the latter being the original inhabitants of the region.

The first ruler of the khanate was Sultan Ilbars, who had a Shaybanid Uzbek connection. He founded the Yaghigardish dynasty in Urgench, a city in the north of Khiva, today situated in Uzbekistan. In 1619, following a catastrophic drought, the capital of the khanate was moved to Khiva. By the late seventeenth century the effective reign of the Yaghigardish began to decline, and their successive khans were left as protégés of influential Uzbek clans. During this period the unvarying assaults by Turkmen tribes, in addition to the endeavors at subjugation by Peter the Great of Russia in 1719, and by Nadir Shah of Persia in 1740, accelerated the process of disintegration of the khanate. In 1804, Inaq Iltuzer deposed the latest Yaghigardish khan and established the Qungrats dynasty. Following their earlier unsuccessful attempts to conquer the khanate, the Russians eventually (1873) occupied Khiva and imposed a protectorate status on the khanate. The protectorate status lasted until 1920 when, with the aid of Red Army, the era of the khanate of Khiva came to an end and Khiva became the capital of the newborn Khwarezm People’s Soviet Republic. In 1924 Khiva was incorporated into the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan.

In the khanate of Khiva, the khan was the supreme ruler in all affairs. During the early period of its formation, the khanate was divided between the male associates of the ruling dynasties, each enjoying the military support of various leading tribes. However, following the establishment of Qungrats dynasty, the administrative hierarchy was systematically developed. Below the khan was the *divan-begi* or prime minister, who was followed by the *kusbegi*, who was in charge of military affairs, and finally the *mehter*, who ran the civil administration of the khanate. Furthermore, the khanate was divided into a capital and twenty districts, known as *beglik*s; each *beglik* was governed by a *bakim* or local governor. The nomads’ chieftains, usually bypassing the *bakims*, were directly accountable to the khan.

The khanate’s judiciary system was based on *shari’a* or Islamic jurisprudence and *adat* or customary values. The highest position belonged to the *gazi-kalan* or chief judge/prosecutor. Following *gazi-kalan*, there were *gazis* and then the *gazi’s* agents or *re’is* who were policing the civil as well as moral behavior of the population. The khanate’s tax-collectors, known for their corrupt behavior, were also subordinate to the *gazis*.

On the eve of the twentieth century, the population of the khanate of Khiva was estimated at 700,000. A majority of the people worked in agriculture, either as tenant farmers, sharecroppers, or slaves. Cotton, wheat, and fruits were the main agricultural products. Cattle breeding was common among the Turkmen. The Sarts chiefly engaged in foreign trade, which was mainly with Russia and Iran.

During the Soviet era, the city of Khiva, like the other old khanate capitals, lost its political importance.

*See also Central Asian Culture and Islam.*
Khomeini, Ruhollah (1902–1989)

Spiritual and political leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini became one of the most influential theologians of the twentieth century. A prolific writer and charismatic speaker, Khomeini inspired millions of Iranians to rise up against the Pahlavi regime and establish Iran as a truly Islamic republic.

Khomeini was born in 1902 in Khumayn, into a family of Shi’ite clerics. As a child and young man, he learned Arabic and studied Islamic law, and by 1923 he was a student in the holy city of Qum. Here Khomeini dedicated nearly forty

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Touraj Atabaki

KHO’I, ABO ’L-QASEM (1898–1992)

Sayyed Abo ’l-Qasem Musavi, Grand Ayatollah, was born in Khoi, Azerbaijan. He was one of the well-known Shi’ite maraji’ (sources of emulation). His book Ajvad al-Taqrirat (The best interpretations) is one of the more important texts in Shi’ite seminaries. His other book, Al-Bayan (Explanation), is a comprehensive text on Qur’an commentaries. He taught at the highest level of seminaries in Najaf, Iraq. He also instituted the Al-Khu’i Foundation with many branches around the world, including London and New York.

Kho’i was apparently the undisputed marja’ of Iraq and gained ground among the Shi’ite people of Iran, Lebanon, India, and other parts of the Muslim world. Kho’i was a traditionalist of the old school and disagreed with the notion of clerical rule, or the Islamic state under the rule of the jurist (velayat-e faqih), as put forward by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Kho’i had good relations with the shah of Iran and received the Iranian queen shortly before the Islamic revolution of 1979. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Kho’i, having observed absolute silence during the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988), published an anti-Saudi fatwa prohibiting the “recourse to the non-believers against Muslims “and inviting the latter “to resist to the enemies of God, who seek to attack Islam.” This was reportedly issued under great pressure from Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

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Majid Mobammadi

KHOJAS

Derived from the Persian khwaja, a term of honor, the word Khoja referred to those converted to Nizari Isma’ili Islam in the Indian subcontinent from about the thirteenth century onward. More particularly, it included certain groups, predominantly from Gujarat and Cutch, who retained strong Indian ethnic roots and caste customs while sustaining their Muslim religious identity under continual threats of persecution. In the nineteenth century, the Isma’ili imamat (office of the imam) became established in India and a program of consolidation and reorganization of the community and its institutions began. These changes led to differences of opinion among Khojas. While the majority of the Khojas remained Isma’ili, one group became Ithna’ ‘Ashari and a smaller number adopted Sunnism.

In the context of the overall policy of the Isma’ili imam of the time, Aga Khan III, of consolidating the Shi’a Isma’ili identity of his followers, the ethnic connotation of being “Khoja” became diluted over time and a wider sense of self-identification as Isma’ili Muslims began to emerge. With the increasing recognition of the diversity of the worldwide Isma’ili community itself and the positive value of the pluralist heritage represented within each of the traditions, the Khojas now regard themselves as an integral part of the larger community, to whose development they make a strong contribution.

The Khoja Ithna’ ‘Asharis, while seeking to develop relations with the larger Twelver Shi’a community, retain their own organizational framework.

The Khojas live today in East Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Europe, and North America and show a strong commitment to values of Muslim philanthropy in their entrepreneurship and contribution to societies in which they live.

See also Aga Khan; Nizari; South Asia, Islam in.

Azim Nanji

KHOMEINI, RUHOLLHA (1902–1989)

Spiritual and political leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini became one of the most influential theologians of the twentieth century. A prolific writer and charismatic speaker, Khomeini inspired millions of Iranians to rise up against the Pahlavi regime and establish Iran as a truly Islamic republic.

Khomeini was born in 1902 in Khumayn, into a family of Shi’ite clerics. As a child and young man, he learned Arabic and studied Islamic law, and by 1923 he was a student in the holy city of Qum. Here Khomeini dedicated nearly forty
years to the study of traditional shari‘a, as well as mysticism, gnosticism, ethics, and philosophy.

By 1944, Khomeini had grown increasingly angry at the secularization of Iranian life under Reza Shah Pahlavi. He continued to teach at Qum, but also began his prolific career of political writings. Over the next two decades he collected disciples, whom he taught to relate their study of the shari‘a to all aspects of public and private life.

In 1963, Khomeini stepped into the national spotlight by leading anti-Pahlavi protests in Qum. Horrified by the violence of the government’s response, he became the leading religious figure opposing the regime. Exiled for his outspoken views, he ultimately went to Iraq (1965), settling in the holiest of Shi‘ite cities, Najaf. Through his writings, however, Khomeini’s views were widely disseminated throughout Iran, denouncing the shah and his allies in the United States.

In 1978, a variety of anti-Pahlavi forces—leftists, merchants, and ulema—rose up in open revolt, inspired by Khomeini’s vision of a new future for Iran that eliminated the corruption of the shah’s regime. Finally, in January 1979, the shah fled Iran and Khomeini returned from exile to lead the revolution. In March 1979 a referendum established the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Khomeini became its spiritual leader.

In opposing the shah, Khomeini had taken the title of imam, legitimizing his leadership by associating himself with Holy Imams of Iranian Shi‘ism. Surrounding himself by a coterie of former students, he created a revolutionary government dedicated to restoring Islam to the center of Iranian life. He created new national institutions predicated on the teachings of Islam and administered by clerics, using the confiscated property of the previous rulers to pay for his reforms. Although he called for an elected governing body, all political writings. Over the next two decades he collected disciples, whom he taught to relate their study of the shari‘a to all aspects of public and private life.

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In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran with United States support. The war, which lasted eight years, became increasingly unpopular, and Khomeini ultimately agreed to sign a cease-fire. In its aftermath, Khomeini continued his attempt to create a truly theocratic state, suppressing dissenters, including those who practiced minority variants of Islam.

As ruling jurist of the new, theocratic Iran, Khomeini grew increasingly vehement in putting down dissent, ordering mass executions of prisoners who had run afoul of his revolutionary courts. Isolated from the West by his anti-American rhetoric and from the Soviet Union for his insistence on the centrality of religion in his government, he further incensed outside observers when, in February 1989, he issued a fatwa (a judgement carrying the sentence of death) against author Salman Rushdie for having written a novel that contained passages offensive to his view of Islam. Khomeini died in June 1989, still hugely popular among the people who looked to him as Iran’s spiritual leader. His funeral was attended by over one million mourners.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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Nancy L. Stockdale

KHUTBA

The sermon, or khutba, serves as the primary formal occasion for public preaching the Islamic tradition. Sermons occur regularly, as prescribed by the teachings of almost all legal schools, at the noon (zuhr) congregation prayer on Friday, the weekly day of assembly, which it is incumbent upon all free and able adult male Muslim residents to attend. In addition, similar sermons are called for on the two festival days, or in response to an eclipse or excessive drought, although these sermons are expected to contain features relevant to the celebrations or the natural phenomena at hand. For instance, on ‘id al-fitr the preacher is charged to instruct the faithful concerning zakat, or almsgiving, while on ‘id al-adha he is to include remarks specifying rules for the sacrifice.

Sermons or related types of religious oratory may be pronounced in a variety of settings and at various times, but the term khutba, abbreviating the more ample expression khutba al-jum‘a, usually refers only to the address delivered in the mosque at these weekly and annual rituals. Other occasions of preaching may be described as a lesson (dars) or an admonition (wa‘z), and their formats would differ accordingly.

The khutba is believed to have its origins in the practice of the prophet Muhammad, who used to speak words of exhortation, instruction, or command at gatherings for worship in the mosque, which consisted of the courtyard of his house in Medina. However, the word khutba with this technical meaning does not appear in the Qur’an. But one passage that
explicitly alludes to the Friday noon prayer summons believers to “the remembrance of God” (dhikr Allah) [Q. 62:9], an expression that some commentators have regarded as denoting the sermon.

Building on this precedent, the khutba has been closely associated with authoritative discourse in several important ways. Initially, for example, the delivery of the Friday sermon was restricted to the caliph himself, or his official representatives such as provincial governors. Eventually, however, the task was delegated to others, chosen for their learning and eloquence, who then spoke in the ruler’s name. From this relationship, the practice emerged that the preacher (khatib) was obliged to include within the sermon an explicit mention of the sovereign, normally in the form of a blessing upon him. This aspect of the sermon resulted in a political function for the khutba as it became, notably in periods of great tension and instability, the moment for signaling a change of regime, a shift in loyalty, or a call for rebellion.

In modern times, the naming of a ruler in a Friday sermon has largely fallen into disuse, expect perhaps on patriotic occasions, although the established bond between the pulpit and political legitimacy has not disappeared. This deeply rooted relationship helps to account for the shape of controversies in many Islamic lands, where governments may variously, through financial subsidies or censorship, seek control over preachers, while some who contest this assertion in the name of reform or resistance may resort to sermons as effective vehicles for opinion formation and mobilization.

Another important way that sermons have expressed their authority derives from the physical context framing their presentation. Traditionally, as defined by classical legal treatises, Friday congregational prayers were restricted to urban centers and normally to one major mosque in each city. Such a site designated as a masjid jami’, that is, a “Friday Mosque” or a “cathedral mosque,” would typically be distinguished by its central location, extraordinary dimensions, and monumental architecture. This facility would also contain a number of symbolic furnishings indicative of its exalted stature, the most demonstrative of which was a ritual pulpit or minbar.

It was from this platform, possibly several meters high and frequently impressively built and adorned, that the sermon was proclaimed, and only the preacher would occupy it. Likewise, a number of fixed rubrics were to accompany the khutba. These specified such details as the preacher’s dress, his posture, a sequence of standing and sitting, and the directive that he speak while leaning on a bow, a sword, or a staff. In the contemporary Islamic world, many of these archaic specifications may no longer be observed, while other culturally appropriate elements have been adopted. Most notably, both in largely Islamic lands and elsewhere, Friday congregational prayers with sermons are no longer restricted to a few central locations, but are common in mosques of all sizes and conditions, as well as being dispensed through newspapers and broadcast on radio and television. Moreover, a formidable market of sermons circulated on cassette recordings has emerged in recent decades, providing an especially appealing medium for dissident preachers who are denied access to official channels.

Finally, the khutba has drawn traditional authority from its conformity to a classically defined structure and rhetorical style. Recommendations regarding preaching arise, for instance, in certain hadith, such as the well-known dictum: “Make your prayers (salat) long and your sermon (khutba) short.” But the recognized legal sources also specify set features and formulas for the validity of a khutba’s performance. First, a Friday sermon must consist of two parts, sometimes referred to as two sermons, between which a pause occurs. Second, within the sermon, a preacher is obliged to pronounce the praise of God, blessings upon the Prophet, and prayers on behalf of the congregation. Third, he is to exhort his listeners to virtue, such as warning of judgment, and to recite from the Qur’an.

Sermons were also to be delivered in classical Arabic, a linguistic requirement that not only assumed substantial training on the part of preachers if their sermons were to consist of original compositions, but a notable degree of education on the part of listeners, especially non-Arab Muslims, if the sermons were to be fully intelligible. Not surprisingly, this expectation of the khutba contributed to the growth of a literary genre consisting of model sermons, such as those by the renowned ibn Nubata (d. 984), which were committed to memory by some preachers and then recited with little adaptation. However, preaching in colloquial languages, while often retaining certain Arabic expressions, has become increasingly common. This, in turn, has led to disputes between traditionalists, who prefer classical Arabic, and revivalists, who insist that the sermon should be delivered in a language understood by the audience.

Like many elements of Islamic learning and piety in modern times, the sermon has been the object of concerted efforts at reform and revitalization. These efforts have led to a renewed scholarly interest in the history of the khutba and a widening enthusiasm regarding its use.

See also Arabic Language; ‘Ibadat; Minbar (Minbar); Masjid; Religious Institutions.

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A mullah delivers a sermon, or *khutba*, in Termez, Uzbekistan. The majority of religious schools require a weekly *khutba* on Fridays, the Muslim day of assembly. All able male adults are expected to attend. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS


Patrick D. Gaffney

**KHWARAZM** See Khiva, Khanate of

**KINDI, AL-** (801–866)

Abu Yusuf Ya’qub Ibn Ishaq al-Sabbah al-Kindi, also known as “the philosopher of the Arabs,” was born around 801 and died in Baghdad around 866. He belonged to the courts of the caliphs al-Ma’mun and al-Mu’tasim, but lost influence at the end of his life during the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil. Al-Kindi flourished during the period of both the Arabic translation movement of Greek philosophical and scientific texts, of which he played a limited role as a translator, and the Mut‘azilite controversy, of which al-Kindi appeared to have affinities with Mu’tazilism.

A significant contribution of al-Kindi is his assimilation and appropriation of Greek science and philosophy, writing nearly two hundred and fifty treatises on philosophy and science, of which less than forty are extant. Examples of this assimilation are his adoption of such Aristotelian concepts as the act/potency, form/matter, substance/accident relations, and the four causes. One also finds hints of Neoplatonism in his discussion of the “one” and the “many” in his On First Philosophy and his subsequent positing of the One True Being. Still al-Kindi did not blindly follow the Greeks, especially when Greek philosophy contradicted the Qur’an. Thus, notably, he rejected the eternity of the world, a doctrine held by most Greek philosophers and most other Islamic *falsafa* (e.g., al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd).

Al-Kindi’s scientific achievements included work in mathematics, optics, medicine, and music. Again, although Greek scientists such as Hippocrates, Euclid, and Ptolemy influenced him, his work shows originality, especially in optics and medicine.

See also *Falsafa; Mu‘tazilites, Mu‘tazila.*
**KNOWLEDGE**

The concept of knowledge in Islam is generally designated by two Arabic terms that have overlapping meanings but different connotations, *ilm* and *ma'rifah*. *Ilm* designates knowledge, the “science or study of” a field such as the Qur’an, prophetic traditions (hadith), grammar, dialectical theology (*kalam*), and astronomy. It also denotes the knowledge of God in particular. *Ma'rifah* acquired two different meanings, secular knowledge on the one hand and gnosticism (secret knowledge) on the other. This latter sense was particularly characteristic of the language of *tasawwuf* (Sufism). The mystical Islamic vision of knowledge expresses the celebrated Arabic proverb that “He who knows [has the gnosis of] his God also knows [has the gnosis of] his God.”

Other terms give the concept of knowledge in Islam an even richer complexity of breadth and depth. For example, *shi'ir* also translates as knowledge, but usually in the special sense of learning or knowing something intuitively. One of the primary meanings of *shi'ir* is “poetry.” *Fiqh* means to understand or comprehend something, to have knowledge of something, particularly legal knowledge. The chief antonym or opposite of *ilm* is *jahl*, which connotes ignorance, but also includes the concepts of boorishness and cultural crudeness. Islam teaches that the time before the revelation of the Qur’an was a dark age of ignorance of knowledge of God. This era is called the *Jahiliyya*.

**The Traditional Sense of Knowledge**

The key sense of knowledge, in both Persian and Arabic, then, is the one attributed to *ilm*. This term is related to the Persian *danim*, the Latin *scien\text{ia}* , and the Greek *episteme*. In ordinary English, this term refers to the concept of scientific knowledge. By adopting this sense of knowledge for the sciences, the subsequent Jewish, Christian, and Muslim epistemologies formulated natural science as having two major constituents: (external) sense experience and analytic conception. According to this epistemology, external senses provide the knowledge of the surface of bodies. Both sense data and analytical (mathematical and logical) axioms are constituents of an axiomatic system, which provided the genesis of contemporary notion of a “model.” Such a system uses scientific laws to both explain and predict nature.

The nonobservational dimension of scientific knowledge employs concepts in a syntax depicting logical and mathematical axioms of the model used in scientific theory. Here, knowledge is achieved primarily by carrying out an analysis of concepts and making deductions of conclusions from premises according to valid rules of logic, thus preserving a correspondence of truth that continues, unbroken, from the premises to conclusion. Muslims contributed to the development of logic through the discussion of temporal modalities, including the modalities of necessity, impossibility, and contingency. Within these discussions, these modalities, along with temporal indexes, were relevant in evaluating the truth value of statements.

A small number of Muslims, such as Abu Hamid Ghazali (d. 1111), as well as a minority of European thinkers, such as René Descartes, followed the views of ancient Greek skeptics, who held that neither perception nor analysis provides certainty. In spite of such occasional skepticism, philosophers subsequent to Aristotle, including Muslims as well as Jews and Christians, followed Aristotle’s classification of scientific knowledge into three kinds: theoretical (in which the subject-matter of knowledge is not related to the inquirer), practical (where the inquirer is involved in the inquiry), and productive (which aims to produce useful entities).

Whereas, in Aristotelian philosophy, there are three categories of scientific knowledge, there are five kinds of theoretical inquiries, or sciences. First, are the dialectical religious sciences, such as *kalam* (speculative theology) and *fiqh* (disciplined interpretation of the sources of the sacred law). Next is philosophy, understood as a study of being and a study of causes. Here subjects of inquiry are unrelated to physical bodies (things) in definition or examples. The next type of speculative inquiry is analysis, to which belong the disciplines of mathematics, logic, and music. Here the subjects of inquiry are not related by definition, but are conceptually related to physical bodies. Finally there are the natural sciences, such as physics proper, physics of motion, astronomy, meteorology, zoology, botany, and psychology. Here, both definitions and examples are related to bodies. Finally, there are the practical sciences, which include public management (with religious laws and politics as subdisciplines), and household management. Subdisciplines of the latter include the science of the household, civics, which concerns one’s duty as a citizen, the science of the self, which includes the various senses, and the science of the soul.

Among all of the aforementioned sciences, the subdiscipline of practical science known as the science of the soul is most relevant to epistemology. Like those of its Western counterparts, Islamic epistemologies follow Aristotle’s tripartite doctrine of the classification of the souls into vegetative, animal, and rational types. Two kinds of intelligence, the passive and the active, mark the rational soul. The passive intellect
abstracts conceptual features from the sensible, such as the symmetry between two figures; whereas the active reason receives by intuition the first principles of science. Muslim philosophers and theologians, like other medieval monothestic theologies, added a religious, spiritual dimension to the active intelligence.

Al-‘aql (reason, intellect) has many functions in Islamic thought. In theology and law it is usually contrasted with tradition (naql or sam‘). While a majority of epistemologies of physical sciences follow the Aristotelian model, in the mystical as well as the post–Ibn Sina (Avicenna, b. 980, d. 1037) traditions, Muslims go beyond the peripatetic (that is to say, Aristotelian) model. For example, the Muslim instrumental theory of knowledge emphasizes the intentional, pragmatic, practical, and normative senses of knowledge. Moreover, it also encompasses an account of knowledge as wisdom, which includes but goes beyond discursive science by seeking norms, and thus partakes of the search for the secret of the good life. For the religious devotee, the best life is lived in imitation of the lives of the prophets, like Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, and expressed by service to humanity in imitation of Imam Husayn and ‘Isa (Jesus).

Three Senses of “Imagination” and a Creative Vision of Knowledge
Traditional epistemology divides the senses into the five external senses (sight, touch, taste, smell, and hearing), and a set of “internal senses,” such as memory. Muslims extend the Greek theories of internal sense, which included common sense and the notion of memory as “sense imagery,” into refined accounts of “intentional” memory and three special senses of imagination. In this usage, a psychological notion is “intentional” if it fails the so-called rule of extensionality. This rule can be exemplified in the following way. Suppose “John thinks he loves Mary” and “Mary is a spy”; it does not follow that “John thinks that he loves a spy.” A number of philosophers hold that intentional notions cannot be explained by a materialistic, reductionist psychology. Because Muslim philosophical psychology followed an experiential or a phenomenological method, it did not use materialistic causes to explain a number of psychological notions.
In this light, new Muslim theories of imagination extended beyond the passive, reproductive type to embrace creative and productive types of images experienced, in both waking and dream states, variously characterizing it as: (a) imagination providing cognitively significant icons, (b) imagination providing sacred and mystical insights, and finally (c) an intentional sense of imagination with pragmatic and prehensive significances (when the meaning of an event is different for every person, i.e., love).

The first sense of iconic imagination points to the creative role assigned to visions and dreams, and follows an earlier tradition, exemplified in the Hebrew Bible. It is the sense of Joseph’s celebrated interpretation of the pharaoh’s dream, where a specific dream has a social significance. The cognitive import of this interpretation points to an iconic imagery through a natural revelation. This medium (the dream) contains insights about future events, mediated by an agent, the pharaoh in this case, who is not a prophet; instead, he or she is a spokesperson who can be understood in the role of the religious archetype of the messenger. Consequently, in addition to its psychological and therapeutic significance, the iconography of mystical and religious symbolism and rituals contains cognitive information about the actual world.

The most celebrated of these kinds of symbolism is the light motif, employed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, all three of whom use light to symbolize self-realization and mystical progress. Plotinus takes this symbolism the furthest, using an allegorical or symbolic type of theology to express the emanation of the word from the One (which is super-being) in the language of illumination (he also uses the analogies of a fountain of water and the reflection in the mirror). In a similar vein, the Qur’an depicts God as the Light of the Heavens and the earth. Following from this, the illumination philosophy of Suhrawardi depicts the ultimate being (God) as the Light of Lights, with the rest of the world being its emanation. Other symbolism includes drowning in the water (recalling the fish as a symbol of Christ in Christian iconography), and the flight of the birds toward the heavens. In Islamic carpets, four-footed animals depict the body, the tree symbolizes the various phases of life-experience, and a bird depicts the soul. Other ways of symbolically depicting the mystical way of self-realization include parables that tell of awakening (attaining puberty) and stories of birds caught by hunters.

These examples illustrate various different dimensions of the Islamic notion of knowledge. To begin with, the primary sense of knowledge used in science is to explain experience and to predict the future, in order to produce a technology that will control nature for useful projects. In contrast, the aim of the present iconographically related experience transforms a person through dealienation—through the recognition that an individual participates in a larger social or spiritual context. Consider the case of a young person who has fallen in love. This person begins to comprehend her or his transformation from a self-involved individual to an entity who is part of a union with a partner in the context of love, marriage, and family. To the members of such a couple, their child is a living testimony to their intended union through marriage.

In Islam, revelation and sacred insights are provided to a privileged few, such as the prophets, imams, mystics, and Ayatollah-jurists. These images imparted are not of particular objects, which are available through the senses, but of societal and meta-legal dictums, from the Qur’an and other sources, delineating religious social law (shari’a) and formal jurisprudence. It is the third sense of imagination, as an intentional sense of imagination with pragmatic and prehensive significances, that signals a radical departure of Islamic epistemology from the confines of mainstream, realistic, discursive epistemology. A paradigmatic case of this type of epistemology is the notion of prehensive imagination (wahm), as illustrated by the example of a sheep running away from a wolf, providing a symbolic representation of apprehension (realization) of fear.

Muslim philosophers took the Aristotelian notion of active reason, extended it, and incorporated it into their mystical framework. They began with the assumption that the distinguishing faculties of the human soul are passive and active faculties of reason. Passive reason expresses the soul’s ability to abstract non-sensible relations from experience, for example, in observing the topological symmetry between two figures. In such an operation, the mind does not create a new datum in the actual world, but has the ability to abstract relations of particulars observed by the senses. A majority of the Muslim philosophers who followed Aristotle did not share the Platonic view that interpreted mathematical and other forms as supersensible realities independent of human minds. A few philosophers, such as Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (d. 1234) and Mir Damad (d. 1631) adopted the realist ontology in taking mathematics to be re-cognition of actual entities and not intellectual abstraction from particulars. Most Muslim philosophers postulated that, unlike passive intellect, active intelligence demonstrates an ability to intuit the first principles of science, such as the premises of Euclidean geometry. They held that, as these axioms are derived by deduction, we can derive knowledge of arithmetic, various types of geometries, and other analytical sciences, which provide the frameworks that are used in the empirical sciences.

**Theological Knowledge as an Activity**

The celebrated theologian Abu Hamid Ghazali (1058–1111) proffered that philosophy should begin with an inquiry into how creatures should imitate the Divine will in the act of creation. This “vector” of will to life-reality is analogous to the theoretical axiom of the ancient Persian Zoroastrian religion, according to which believers, by positive living—for
example, being engaged in farming, begetting children, developing cities, and creating social order—adopt a perspective that denies the evil force (Ahriman). Evil here is understood as the denial of life and the privation of all existence.

In this tenor, Ghazali outlined a list of mystical virtues, which are both epistemic and ethical. They include archetypal recall (memory), exuberance, intimacy, and a taste for life. Such a doctrine moves ontology from an investigation of substances to the pursuit of the good will. Ghazali posits that facts and values are interrelated. His thought also upholds an instrumental theory of knowledge, rejecting the so-called spectator theory, which places the mind of the agent outside of the object of knowledge. In contrast, Ghazali’s instrumental theory of knowledge mixes ethics with a practical sense of knowledge.

Up to the last thirty years of the twentieth century, most investigators approached Islamic philosophy from the standpoint of Aristotelian thought. This approach imposed a limited rendering of Islamic epistemology in the peripatetic, static context of the discursive knowledge of external senses and axiomatic system. However, to take account of some of the refinements of Muslim epistemologies, it is necessary to use the frameworks of post-peripatetic Western philosophers. Recent Muslim investigators such as Nader El-Bizri use the conceptual frameworks of philosophers such as Gottfried von Leibniz (1646–1716), who held the nexus of metaphysics is monads as energy; Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), who began his metaphysics by the temporal concept of “being-in-the world”; Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), who proffered a process instead of a substance-event metaphysics); and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), who clarified the notion of “scientific model.”

**Mystical Knowledge as an Authentic Hermeneutic Dealienation**

It is revealing that Ibn Sina, who was one of the most significant Muslim philosophers, wrote an Arabic version of Plato’s *Symposium*, wherein he shared with the Greek philosopher the vision that love is the salvation of the human soul. For Plato, the highest knowledge is a confrontation with the Absolute Good, a stance that is analogous to the notion of *Shahada* (being an authentic witness to God’s gifts—unique existence, guidance, and creation) as presented in Islamic mystical theology. In addition, Ibn Sina’s version shares with...
Plotinus’s vision a view of the mystical journey as a return to the origin and the ground of all existence.

For Ibn Sina, three main phases of this journey are alienation, love, and union. In the first phase, a person individuates his or her personality by building a castle, a wall of privacy, that protects and distinguishes the person from others. Soon, this castle or wall of protection imprisons the person and alienates him or her from the rest of humanity and nature. In the next phase, by falling in love, a person transcends his or her egocentric perspective to form a relation of intimacy, leading to the opening up of an authentic encounter with others. This is a phase that is often depicted through the archetypal role of the beloved, who acts as a mediator figure, a logos, or through the role of a prophet, who links the alienated self to its source. Finally the last phase is a mystical union between the person, symbolized as a river that flows toward Divine-nature, which is the origin, arche, as well as the completion of the person. This union is often depicted as a drop of water joining a river that returns it to an ocean.

The process of self-enlightenment in Sufism points to two distinct but interrelated dimensions of knowledge that can be illustrated in the common pedagogy used to teach a foreign language. The teacher instructs the pupil to perform externally imposed tasks, such as memorizing a set of words, using verb-conjugation flashcards, practicing writing exercises, and repeating sentences in conversation courses. The pupil obtains a certain level of knowledge in vocabulary and rules of grammar. Having reached this stage, the pupil can now recognize the content of a conversation and a written French communication. In a similar sense, the more persons in love share experiences, like cooking and traveling together, visiting each others’ parents, and working on common tasks, the more they “prehend” each other’s personality and are able to make crucial decisions such as marriage.

This notion of “prehension,” as used in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, signifies an epistemic, non-conscious state of immediate-intimacy and intuition, is also expressed by the Arabic-Persian term, bal, which refers to the role of the mystical master in directing his disciple. For example, a person believing himself to be pious is directed to walk into a bazaar carrying bloody pig meat on his shoulder, which makes people lose their respect for him. After such an experience, he loses his pride and is able to reflect authentically on the ground of his soul. Such tasks lead to self-knowledge as well as to self-strength, as the disciple learns that his happiness should not depend on gaining the approval of the common people. In the Sufic tradition, knowledge is thus associated with goodness, as in becoming a better person, and in learning to live in harmony with nature. It is a process ofalienation, enabling people to cope with responsibilities outside of parental protection as well as with problems, such as aging, and fates like death. In addition, knowledge is explainable in both theoretical terms and through practical experiences, as well as by its psychosomatic features, such as habits and unconscious behaviors.

**Philosophical Knowledge as an Immediate Encounter with “Being”**

Ibn Sina and a number of his successors challenged the peripatetic model of knowledge by adopting the phenomenological method, in which ontology is not separated from epistemology. Here, philosophy begins with the world as it is revealed in experience. Accordingly, Ibn Sina, Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274), Mulla Sadra (b.1571–1640), and others replaced the substance-event language of ontology with an intentional phenomenology of the mind’s direct encounter with “being” (wujud, basit). Subsequent, ontology proceeds by an application of “being” to three modalities (impossibility, contingency, and necessity), which then results in impossible entities (such as a round square), necessary entities (namely the Necessary Existent), and contingent entities (such as an entity of humanity, a unicorn, or a chair).

In the next phase, the mind encounters the subject of being-in the world—experience. This entity is not a Cartesian substance, but rather a field of experience. It is similar to the phenomenal self, or the notion of “a transcendental unity of apperception,” as it is termed in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). It is also analogous to Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) notion of “dasein.” Unlike Aristotle and, later, René Descartes, (1596–1650), Kant, David Hume (1711–1776), and Heidegger, as well as a number of other Western thinkers, reject the view that a human soul is a substance.

The third phase is an inquiry for the inner-essence (dhat) of the self. This notion differs from another sense of (common) essence (mahiyya) shared by other members of the same species. For example, it is common to say that an essence of a child’s mother, like the essence of any human, is her possession of a rational soul; but for the child, there is another, existential sense of “essence” (expressed by the Arabic-Persian ‘dhate’), which concerns the peculiar dependence of a specific child to a particular mother. In Persian mystical poetry, God, or one’s mother, is depicted as “the existence of my experience,” or “the cause of the actualization of my life.” The mystics seek a connection with this sense of essence. The nature mystics add a last phase to this process, namely a search for a dealienation or the unity of existence (wabdat al-wujud). Here we come back to the celebrated Arabic proverb, that “he who knows [gnosis] his self-soul, also knows [gnosis] his God.”

In the primary sense of knowledge as “scientific inquiry,” Muslims philosophers followed the Greek tradition as outlined by Aristotle. In addition to a few innovations in logic, such as temporal and modal types of logic, the Muslim contribution to epistemology is found in secondary senses of knowledge. These include a phenomenological intentionalty, the development of the pragmatics of an instrumental theory of knowledge, creative theories of imagination, and
iconography. The crown of Islamic epistemology, however, lies in a unique application of the notion of unity (tawhid), which integrates persons with God, or the ultimate being of philosophers. Similarly, Judaism and Christianity seek an authentic encounter with the Divine, but Islamic mysticism seeks an identity beyond any duality. It follows the theme that the soul seeks no “otherness” from the One.

See also Ghazali, al-; Ibn Sina; Mulla Sadra; Tasawwuf; Theology; Tusi, Nasir al-Din.

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KOMITEH

The Komiteh-ha-ye Enghelab, or Revolutionary Committees, were created immediately after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979. The Komiteh substituted for some of the governmental institutions that no longer functioned after the shah was deposed, such as social services, security, and police. The Komiteh were more widespread and active in cities than rural areas and were located in captured police centers, in the houses of former government officials, and in some public places such as the parliament. Before the establishment of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab) in 1979, these committees were responsible for eliminating counterrevolutionary elements within Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, the revolutionary committees served on the front alongside Iran’s Army, Besiege and Revolutionary Guard Corps. In cities, they fought against the narcotics trade and worked as agents of the judiciary and security systems. The members of these committees were mostly uneducated, undisciplined revolutionaries.

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and during the first period of ‘Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s presidency, Iran’s police, gendarmerie, and revolutionary committees were merged, and a new organization, called the Disciplinary Force (Niru-ye entezami), was established. With this change, members of the revolutionary committees received formal ranks in the police staff, based on their experience.

See also Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Majid Moammadi

KUNTI, MUKHTAR AL- (1729–1811)

Al-Shaykh Sidi-Mukhtar al-Kabir al-Kunti was born in 1729 near Arawan north of Timbuktu. He was a descendant of a highly ramified Arabic-speaking tribe, the Kunta, that has become widely dispersed over the Southern Sahara, from Mauritania to the Adrar-n-Ifochas in Eastern Mali and beyond. The Kunta tribe claims descent from noble origins, specifically from the celebrated Qurashi Muslim commander ‘Uqba b. Nafi al-Fihri, who was the stepbrother of ‘Amr b. al-‘As al-Sahmi, the first governor of Muslim Egypt.

According to the so-called ta’rikh, Kunta Sidi ‘Ali, a descendant of ‘Uqba b. Nafi, married the daughter of Muhammad b. Kunta b. Zazam, who was chief of the Ibduluk (also called Abduluk), a subgroup of the Lamtuna Berbers, allegedly in the early fifteenth century. Their son, Muhammad, married into another Lamtuna group, as did also his son, Ahmad al-Bakka’i. Ahmad al-Bakka’i then had three sons of his own, from whom all the later branches of the Kunta were derived.

After the death of Sidi Ahmad-al-Bakka’i in the second half of the sixteenth century, a quarrel broke out between two of his sons, which is said to have caused the Kunta to split into two groups. The Western Kunta lived in and around the Hawd, today the southern part of Mauritania, and the Eastern Kunta lived in and around Azwad, the area of the Sahara immediately southwest of Tadmakka.

While a young man, Sidi al-Mukhtar gained a wide reputation as greatly gifted, intellectually, and as an outstanding Muslim scholar. When only twenty-five years old he was given the title of Shaykh al-tariqa al-Qadiriyya, making him a spiritual leader within the Qadiri order of Sufis. In this position he attracted many students, who came to study in the zawiya he established at al-Hilla in Azwad. His camp at al-Hilla rapidly became not only the center of studying the Qadiriyya teachings, but also the center from which a new Qadiri suborder was spread throughout the Sahara regions. This new suborder bore the name of Sidi al-Mukhtar, and its followers came to be known as al-Mukhtariyya.

Al-Kunti achieved a high degree of social and political influence among the active political players in the Sahara arena. He succeeded in healing the rift between the eastern and western branches of the Kunta, and he did much to help conclude a peaceful settlement between the Tuareg chiefs and Arab warrior groups in the area. He also mediated

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between the leadership of the city of Timbuktu and the Tuaregs, who were known to harass that city on several occasions, most notably in 1770–1771, when a siege of the town was lifted only after his intervention.

Al-Kunti furthered the use of peaceful means in spreading the Islamic faith among infidel groups in the Sahara. He also adopted tender and graceful methods for preaching and for the propagation of the Qadiriyya order, but although he restricted himself to this moderate approach, he nonetheless expressed his approval of the militant jihad employed by ‘Uthman dan Fodio in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar proclaimed himself a regenerator (mujaddid); in fact, he claimed to be the sole regenerator of the thirteenth century of the hijra.

Shaykh Sidi al-Mukhtar the Great died in 1811. His son, Sidi Muhammad (1765–1826), inherited his position as the Shaykh and leader of the Mukhtarriyya-Qadiriyya suborder. The wird, a phrase-patterned devotion used by the Mukhtarriyya order, became widely propagated in south Mauritania and in Hausaland in northern Nigeria, by the successive shaykhs of the Kunta tribe.

See also Africa, Islam in; Tariqa; Tassawuf; Timbuktu.

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Khalil Athamina
The emergence of Islamic law originates in a definition of human deeds as understood from a specifically Islamic viewpoint. This could only be developed over time, as notions of good and bad evolved according to the interpretation of the Qur’anic verses, Prophetic sayings, and the Islamic legacy as a whole. The evaluation of the goodness or badness of deeds according to the Islamic point of view was called fiqh (understanding), and the person holding the qualities of knowledge and competence to produce opinions in this respect was called faqih (the knowledgeable who understands well). The consideration of human actions within an Islamic religious context was encouraged by sayings of the Prophet, such as “He whom God favors with good, God makes him the one who understands in religion (faqib),” (Bukhari, Sahih, I, 25) and “there may be some narrators who may narrate the words to some of the receivers who may be able to understand better (afqah) than the narrators themselves” (Tirmidhi, Sunan, V, 34). In the Prophetic era and years immediately following, fiqh was not specifically about practical human deeds, but covered a general range of issues that were of religious concern, such as general religious knowledge and the understanding of the sacred texts. However, the day-to-day practice of Islam at this early stage of development was still being worked out, and fiqh came to be employed for the creation of legal definitions and interpretations of proper behavior. Over time, the role of fiqh was gradually narrowed to the consideration of legally relevant matters, dealing with both personal and public concerns.

Key concepts of Islamic law.

In the second century of Islam, a theoretical foundation for juridical thought evolved, leading to a properly constituted legal system. At this point, fiqh came to concern itself with codifying this theoretical understanding, while still dealing with issues relating to the proper conduct of worship ('ibadat). To complement the now more narrow scope of fiqh, a broader legal context, embodied in the concept of religious law (shari‘a), extended the formal Islamic legal order to all aspects of societal life.

Beginning with the initial concept of fiqh, Islamic law organizes the understanding and, thus, definition, of human deeds along a continuum. At one end are those behaviors deserving of the utmost prohibition, and at the other end are those deeds subject to the utmost imperative injunction. At the very center point of the continuum are found the behaviors deemed to be neutral, neither prohibited nor enjoined. Thus, the prohibited and the enjoined share the same quality of being mandatory, whereas acts falling between these two extremes become a matter of scholarly opinion and are therefore less binding.
In evaluating the potentially infinite range of human deeds, criteria of judgment (da'ili) were needed. There are two sources of these: the Qur'an and the prophetic sunna. The Muslim community was explicitly referred to these by the Prophet himself, who said, “I have left for you two principles; should you stick to them you will never err” (Malik, Muzatta, II, 899). These two principles were by no means the sole criteria offered by the Prophet. They were supplemented by the practice of shura, for example, which held that authorities should seek the counsel of the wise when running the affairs of the community. In addition, judges were enjoined to employ reasoning in order to make proper decisions. Moreover, legal decision-making had to be carried out within the larger context of Islamic tradition. Finally, the evolution of Islamic law was influenced by politics, war, and other societal events, which variously endorsed, transformed, or replaced traditional practices. All these factors provided the framework within which the development of Islamic society and law occurred during the time of the Prophet and, later, the prominent Companions (the immediate successors of the Prophet).

This early, emerging structure of Islamic society prevailed in the first century of Hijra, which covers the age of the Prophet and largely that of the Companions. The significance of this era was twofold. On the one hand, the Companions were concerned with the preservation of the Qur'anic texts, and were therefore conservative in their application of the Prophet’s sayings when substantial legal matters were at stake. On the other hand, the Companions' era was a time in which trends of legal thought and methodology were initiated for the forthcoming generation ofIslam's leading thinkers. In the first century of Islam, Medina was the main center for the development of Islamic knowledge and practice, but these were complemented by the work of other competent figures who were appointed to fulfill juridical and administrative duties elsewhere. Among these were Ibn Mas'ud, who served in Iraq, and Mu'az Ibn Jabal and Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, both of whom served in Yemen. In the late decades of the first century, in addition to the ruling political authorities, there were others living throughout the expanding Muslim world who made substantial contributions to juristic thought. Among those were Sa'id Ibn al-Musayyab (d. 713), 'Urwa Ibn al-Zabayr (d. 716), 'Ubaydullah Ibn 'Uthah (d. 717), and Abu Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (d. 713) in Medina; and 'Aqlamah Ibn Qays (d. 682), Shurayh Ibn al-Harith (d. 679), Masruq Ibn al-Ajda (d. 683), and Ibrahim al-Nakha'i (d. 714) in Kufa.

By the turn of the first century of Islam, the political authorities had already pursued two main policies relating to the use of the textual sources of Islamic law. First, the standardization of Qur'an began under the reign of Abu Bakr and was later finalized under the reign of 'Uthman. Second, the Umayyad caliph, 'Umar Ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, encouraged the collection of the sayings of the Prophet. In the early decades of the second century, scholarship regarding Islamic law was expanded, giving rise to two schools of juridical thought, one centered in Medina, the other in Kufa. The scholars of Medina included Rab'at al-Ra'y (d. 753) and al-Zuhri (d. 742), who were early proponents of the pro-hadith school (hadith refers to sayings of the Prophet). Leading scholars in Kufa included al-Nakha'i and his disciple Hammad Ibn Abu Sulayman (d. 738), followed by Abu Hanifa Nu'man Ibn al-Thabit (d. 757), who favored the reasoning approach. These legal trends are also known, respectively, as abd al-hadith (the people of the hadith line) and abd al-ra'y (the people of the pro-reasoning line). They were also called the schools of Hijaz and of Iraq, respectively, making reference to their geographical domains.

The line of distinction between these two early trends in legal thought was found in their perceptions of the hadith. For the school of Hijaz, hadith was the actual legacy of the Prophet, and was the ultimate source of both legitimacy and solutions to social problems. This approach was well suited for Medina, which provided a strong Islamic culture of practice starting from the exemplary Prophetic era. By contrast, Iraq was relatively new to Islam. In addition, Iraq was something of a gate for the eastward advancement of Islam, and thus was host to many travelers passing through, each with a competing understanding of the life of the Prophet. This gave rise to multiple hadith, leading to doubt about the accuracy of the narrations. To overcome such doubts, reasoning was applied. Thus, Abu Hanifa of Iraq understood hadith through applying his concept of dhabt (precise preservation). Dhabt was, in his view, the precise understanding of the juristic content of the hadith and its precise transmission. The narrator himself therefore needed to be faqih in order to understand the precise content of what he narrated. Here, the significance of reasoning prevails over the literal transmission of the texts.

Although Medina stood as the center of political power in Islam during the era of the Prophet and in the thirty years that followed, it was later transferred to Syria. There it remained for the entire duration of the Umayyad reign, and it was in Syria where the prominent and influential jurist 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i (d. 764) built his legal career in association with the Hijazi trend of law. Al-Awza'i is famous for his work, called al-Siyar, but this text has been lost to later generations. Nonetheless, it is known that this lost work marked the beginning of a literature that developed later and that dealt with issues of war and peace. It also influenced the work of Abu Yusuf, one of the prime disciples of Abu Hanifa of Iraq. Abu Yusuf wrote al-Radd 'ala siyar al-Awza'i (The response to the Siyar of Al-Awza'i), and from it one can glean not only Abu Yusuf's counterviews but also al-Awza'i's original theses.

Abu Yusuf's treatise provides insights into interregional activities and the flourishing state of legal thought. Medina, the birthplace of the Islamic society, had a special advantage for traditional Islam and remained a main center of gravity for
the Islamic legal scholarship. Medina’s dominance in this field is expressed in the concept of ‘amal abl al-Medina (the practice of the Medinese people), which served as an example of proper practice throughout the Islamic world. Jurists were thus enjoined to follow the Medina example when seeking a better understanding of Islamic laws. The vital role attributed to Medina attracted the scholarly attention of several important jurists, such as Shaybani (d. 804), and Shafi’i (d. 819), who eventually argued against it. Shaybani, who was a key jurist of the Iraqi school, studied the hadiths called al-Muwatta’, Malik’s collection of mainly legal content. In his own work, Shaybani often mentioned the disagreements of the Iraqi jurists with the views presented by Malik. Furthermore, Shaybani compiled an independent work called al-Hujjah ‘ala abl-al-Medina (The argument against the people of Medina).

Shafi’i, too, had studied the Medinese and the Iraqi notions of law. He took a position against both, arguing for the elimination of regional concepts and promoting instead an overarching, ecumenical system of legal thought. In Shafi’i’s point of view, the Iraqi concepts were inaccurate or inconsistent, while the Medina-based Hijazi school was too regionally specific. The diversities in legal thought that arose through these interregional argumentative dialogues gradually paved the way for the evolution of a supra-regional system of legal thought, an evolution inspired by Shafi’i’s leadership.

In the first half of the second century, the Iraqi-led legal trend was mostly identified with Abu Hanifa and, thus, with a more free use of reason. He recognized three sources of Islamic law: the Qur’an undisputedly came first, followed by the hadith of the Prophet and then the ijma’, which is the consensus of the Companions. Abu Hanifa had a relatively cautious and restrictive attitude toward accepting hadiths, giving greater weight to the juristic contents of the sayings than to the literal understanding of the words themselves. He treated the diverse opinions of the Companions as various options that needed to be evaluated before choosing one from among them. He held that the methodological key to this
evaluation was a methodology called *qiya*s (analogue reasoning), which required that a jurist look to previous cases for precedents when determining the outcome of a current case. Through this method of *qiya*s, the jurist could establish connections between the present and the past and thus produce systematic juristic opinions, but it sometimes failed, when similar cases could not be found, or their similarities were only superficial. At such times, Abu Hanifa would abandon *qiya*s and instead employ free reasoning, or *istihsan*. He described his approach to legal thought in the following terms:

What comes from the Companions [in disagreement] we do not abandon altogether... [we chose from among their varying opinions]; and what comes from the Successors we ignore them. (Ibn al-Qayyim, *F*Lam, IV, 123)

This statement shows Abu Hanifa’s lack of interest in the narrated opinions of the Successors of the Companions. It also demonstrates his confidence in the reasoning abilities of jurists of his own generation. This confidence in the reliability of free reasoning allowed Iraqi jurists to override textual or systematic limitations. Iraqi jurists also opposed the Umayyad political power based in Syria, which meant that they were not employed by the government and thus did not have to compromise their methodology to suit the practical limitations that such political affiliation might impose. However, this freedom from political constraint would not last for long.

In about 750 C.E., the Umayyads were overthrown by the Abbasid revolution, and the center of power in the Muslim world moved from Damascus to Baghdad. The new regime sought to bring a new order to Islamic society. This need for change was most felt by Ibn al-Mu`affa’ (d. 757), the chief advisor to the Abbasid caliph Abu Ja`far al-Mansur, who diagnosed an intolerable state of disorder in the judiciary and decried the injustices that the people were suffering. Ibn al-Mu`affa’ asked the caliph to take control of the matter by imposing consistency in judicial administration and a coherent system for the application of laws. He further urged the caliph to codify the law, making it possible to perpetuate the legal system. In addition, he advised the caliph on the selection of the team of jurists who should be assigned these tasks, making a strong case for the use of Iraqi scholars over those from other regions.

The Abbasid regime followed the recommendations of Ibn al Mu`affa’, and in time managed to overcome the reluctance of famous jurists to serve the government that had long characterized the scholars of the Iraqi school. Abu Yusuf was appointed to the newly created post of *qadi al-qudat* (chief judge) and was granted discretionary power over the administration of the entire judiciary. First among his tasks was the grand project of codifying the laws and policies of the new judicial and fiscal order, thus demanding a degree of textual orientation never previously confronted by the Iraqi school of law. Abu Yusuf’s thought on finance is contained in his *Kitab al-Athar*, which was written during the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid. (Abu Yusuf’s other main works are *Kitab al-Atbar*, *Ikhtilaf Abu Hanifa wa Ibn Abi Laila*, and *al-Radd `ala Siyar al-Awsa’i*).

Muhammad al-Shaybani, another preeminent disciple of Abu Hanifa, was also employed by the new Abbasid regime, serving as judge and as a teacher of jurisprudence. Shaybani, though lower in rank than Abu Yusuf, was a more prolific writer, and thus achieved more real advances for the Hanafi

### Early schools of law

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<tr>
<th>Founding father</th>
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<tr>
<td>al-Awza’i (d. 744)</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Abu Hanifa (d. 767)*</td>
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<td>Dawud b. Khalaf (d. 883)</td>
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*These schools became Sunni madhhabs (orthodox schools of law).

School of law. His main works, known collectively as *Zahir al-riwaya* (The reliable narrations), consist of the following titles: *al-Asl, al-Jami’ al-kabir, al-Jami’ al-saighir, al-Siyar al-kabir, al-Siyar al-saighir,* and *al-Ziyadat.* In general, these works cover a wide range of religious-legal issues, such as prayer, tax, marriage, divorce, commerce, and punishment, with the exception of *al-Siyar al-kabir* and *al-Siyar al-saighir,* which are thematic of laws of war and peace. Also, these works that represent early Hanafite legal thought were collected by al-Hakim al-Shahid al-Marwazi (d. 953) in the tenth century and presented under the title of *al-Kafi.* They were later reinterpreted and elaborated upon by Sarakhsi (d. 1090) under the title of *al-Mabsut.* Shaybani’s work, as well as Sarakhsi’s commentary, discloses the evolution of law in Iraq, starting with the free use of reason as championed by Abu Hanifa and his predecessors and moving toward greater textual orientation and structural regulation. This trend toward the institutionalization of juristic principles can be attributed to two factors: the accession of leading post-Abu Hanifa Iraqi jurists into the official power circles and, later, to the indelible impact of al-Shafi’i (d. 819).

Al-Shafi’i came to dominate the next phase of the evolution of Islamic legal theory. He limited the legitimate sources of juristic knowledge to four: the Qur'an, the sunna, *ijma,’* and *qiyas.* He utterly rejected the principle of *istihsan* that had been advanced by Abu Hanifa. Shafi’i’s approach to each of the four approved sources emphasized the development of a centralized perception of Islamic law, and rejected the validity of regional variations that contradicted this unitary conception of the law. Moreover, in his work titled *al-Risala,* he argued that the only language suitable for Islamic scholarship was Arabic: “[T]he entire book of God came down in none but the Arabic language” (Shafi’i, *Risala* 40).

Shafi’i’s emphasis on Arabic as the language of the Qur’an meant that translations of the Qur’an into other languages were not equivalent of the Qur’an. From this it follows that not only scripture and scholarship, but also the prayers of the faithful, must be in Arabic, for the language was held to be an essential element. This position was in outright contrast with that of Abu Hanifa, who approved of the recitation of the Qur’an in Persian in prayers. As Shafi’i’s literalist approach gained ascendency, Abu Hanifa’s disciples were forced to reinterpret their mentor’s position (that prayer in Persian was permissible) as exclusive and temporary, applicable only in certain exceptional cases until people could learn the proper Arabic recitation of the Qur’anic verses.

Shafi’i’s sunna of the Prophet was twofold. He considered the further sacralization of the Prophet, whose sayings were divinely inspired, and held that the authenticity of the sayings’ transmission through narrators was directly dependent upon the literal faithfulness of their narrations. In other words, it was the letter of the narration, rather than the content, that was paramount in determining the legitimacy of the narrations and recitations of the sunna. This approach contradicted the Medinese perception of the sunna which was more concerned with Medina tradition and practice as it reflected the legacy of the Prophet, and it differed from previous Iraqi legal trends, which judged the authenticity of hadiths on their content as distinct from their sole letter. Shafi’i’s literalist understanding had an enduring impact upon the Hafanite legal thought. For instance, Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 980) of the Hanafi School was forced to attempt to distinguish among the words of the Prophet, conceding that at least some of the Prophet’s utterances were divinely revealed or inspired, whereas others reflected his “ordinary” or more humanly derived opinion.

Shafi’i’s approach to the *ijma’* is perhaps the most polemic of all. In the Shafi’ite view, the *ijma’* should mean the consensus of the entire *umma* (community), and this is not possible unless it is with the participation of each and every Muslim individual. This perception of *ijma’* contrasts with the perception held by the Medinese jurists, who restricted their understanding of *ijma’* to the consensus of the scholars of Medina, as it was reflected in the practice of the Medinese people. It also contradicted earlier Iraqi perceptions of *ijma’,* which called for the consensus only of the jurists of the Iraqi legal trend. However, Shafi’i’s arguments were more explicitly directed against the views of his nearer contemporaries, the Iraqi jurists of the post-Abu Hanifa period.

Shafi’i’s argument boils down to the claim that true consensus of all Muslims or even merely of all jurists on a juristic personal opinion (*ijtibad*) cannot be reached. At best, it can only be apparent, because a verbalized consensus could easily mask silent disagreements. In his view, the only viable *ijma’* is to be found in the already existing acceptance, by each and every Muslim, of obligatory matters such as belief in the necessity of prayer. Obviously, this conception of *ijma’* is better suited to theological purposes governing elements of faith than to legal ones, which are more concerned with matters of behavior.

Shafi’i’s refutation of the *ijma’* of all jurists may be valid on grounds of logic, but it renders the concept irrelevant for legal purposes. Nonetheless, both al-Jassas and al-Sarakhsi were forced to contend with its implications. They responded by dividing the *ijma’* into two main types. The first follows Shafi’i’s formulation, including all Muslims, whereas the second refers specifically to consensus among the jurists alone.

Shafi’i’s approach to the *qiyas* rests in its rejection of *istihsan.* The legitimacy of *qiyas* arises from the fact that it relates new cases to previous ones. In this retrospective process, the *qiyas* ultimately draws the jurist back to the prime sources of juristic knowledge: the Qur’an, the sunna of the Prophet, and the *ijma’.* On the other hand, the Shafi’ite school of legal thought considers *istihsan* as disconnection.
from the letter of these three recognized sources of knowledge because, in contrast to *qiṣṣa*, it involves the use of free reason without reference to the legitimate origins of law. Also, there can be no legitimacy accorded to the free use of reason when consensus is restricted to the scope of the *nusus* (the sacred texts), as in *Furūḍ* and *Muharramat* (which are held to stem from a divine origin), the sunna of the Prophet (considered to be divinely inspired), and the Qur’an. Yielding to the pressure from the Shafi’ite position regarding the use of *istiḥsān*, and the Hanafite School eventually replaced the term *istiḥsān* with the designation “hidden *qiṣṣa*” to signify that *istiḥsān* was just another type of *qiṣṣa*.

Shafi’i rejected *istiḥsān* because it was the product of the human mind, rather than deriving from the *nusus*. This position attracted the attention and admiration of Dawud al-Isfahani (d. 883), because of the distinction it drew between divine and human decisions. Eventually, Dawud noticed that *qiṣṣa*, too, involved human reasoning. Thus, he took a radical step further than the Shafi’i, rejecting the *qiṣṣa* in addition to the *istiḥsān*. This line of legal thought is known as the Zahiri (literalist) School of Law, because its theory strives to prove that legitimacy in religious law is confined to the literal scope and contents of the *nusus* and the *ijma* that are in agreement with the Qur’an, and the hadiths, too, are held to be literal narratives of the acts and practice of the Prophet, devoid of interpretation. This line of thought is sharply opposed to the use of *ta’līl* (reasoning) in *sharīʿa* (legislation with religious overtones). The Zahiri School, zealously defended and systematized by Ibn Hazm, thus insists that human reason cannot be part of decision-making in religious law.

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), an admirer of Shafi’i for his emphasis upon the hadith, became an inspiring source for a distinctly hadith-oriented trend of law called the Hanbali School. Ibn Hanbal is famous for his nonconformist position against the official pressure of the “rationalist” Abbasid regime (particularly of al-Ma’mūn and al-Mu’tasim), which ordered him to speak in support of the theological belief that the Qur’an was *makhluq* (created). Ibn Hanbal was a respected hadith scholar, but he was not particularly famous as a jurist. Indeed, the hadiths he presents in his main work, *al-Musnad*, are overwhelmed by the citations of the names of their narrators. However, his position, and his focus on hadith, helped inspire a certain pro-hadith line of legal thought.

The Hanbali School of Law in proper terms was systematized in the great work of Ibn Qudame (d. 1223), *al-Mughni*. Prominent scholars belonging to this legal school include such jurists as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350). The Hanbali line of legal thought still holds enormous influence throughout most of Gulf region, and in Saudi Arabia, in particular.
Shafi'i's role in the development of Islamic legal theory was decisive in challenging the regional schools of law and their diverse methodologies, and in motivating them to evolve their concepts and terminology toward a centralized Islamic legal thought. In the formative period of Islamic law, the Medinese legal trend had been basically expressed by the Muwatta' of Malik and further substantiated by the voluminous work of Sahnun (d. 854), al-Mudawwana, which focused on the concept of Medinese practice. Meanwhile, the Iraqi legal trend evolved from being primarily rationalistic into being the gradually centralizing and relatively conservative Hanafi School of Law, in line with the prevalent Shafi'ite influence. The Hanbali School of Law was itself systematized long after the death of Ibn Hanbal, gaining a strong place in the history of Islamic law. The Zahiri legal trend, on the other hand, was denied legitimacy and was ultimately excluded from the Sunni arena of Islamic law, principally because of its rejection of qiyaṣ. In today's Islamic law, the four “legitimate sources” of juristic knowledge, set forth by Shafi'i, provide the minimum of the compulsory criteria to be satisfied for any legal trend to take place within the context of Sunni legal theory.

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Osman Tastan

**LEBANON**

Like many other states in the Middle East, the state in Lebanon was established in the early 1920s, following the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Greater Lebanon, as the new state was initially called, was formed out of a territorial nucleus, the Mutasarrifiyat of Mount Lebanon, established in 1861. A special political and legal arrangement devised after the 1860 civil strife and recognized by the six major European powers, the Mutasarrifiyat gave Mount Lebanon a semiautonomous status within the Ottoman empire, and succeeded the Imara (1516–1842), the political system that prevailed in Mount Lebanon since the early sixteenth century, after a short interval. While confessionism had its origins in the Ottoman millet system, the Mutasarrifiyat formalized political representation along confessional lines in an elected twelve-member body, the Administrative Council, headed by an Ottoman governor (Mutasarrif) of the Catholic faith and representing Mount Lebanon’s six major communities (four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Shi’i, one Sunni). Abolished by the Ottomans in 1914, the Mutasarrifiyat gave Mount Lebanon over fifty years of political stability and orderly confessional relations.

Under the French mandate (1920–1943), Lebanon’s 1926 constitution stipulated that representation in government office would be temporarily on a confessional basis. Confessionalism was institutionalized in post-1920 Lebanon, particularly in the personal status law of the seventeen recognized communities and in government office. The greatest beneficiary of the confessional system was the Shi’ite community whose Ja’fari jurisprudence was recognized by the state in 1926, a right that had been denied under Sunni Ottoman rule.
Although the 1932 census showed a slight Christian majority, the demographic structure in post-1920 Lebanon was radically transformed with the enlargement of the Mutasarrifiya to include territories with a Muslim majority. The Maronite community, for example, decreased from over 60 percent of Mount Lebanon’s population to nearly 30 percent in post-1920 Lebanon, while the Sunni community increased from about 5 percent in Mount Lebanon to nearly 25 percent after 1920. Similarly, the Shi’ite community increased from about 5 percent in Mount Lebanon to nearly 20 percent after 1920. Beginning in 1937, the custom of the Maronite presidency and Sunni premiership was established while the Shi’ite speakership continued to be contested until 1947 between the Shi’a, the Greek Orthodox, and the Greek Catholic communities.

Independence was achieved in 1943 not only because Lebanese from different communities opposed French rule but also because leaders, particularly those of the two influential communities, the Maronites and the Sunnis, reached an understanding on the basis of the National Pact. An unwritten agreement, the National Pact confirmed the distribution of government office along confessional lines and sought to situate Lebanon’s foreign policy on an equal distance between East, that is, the Arab world and particularly Syria, and West, particularly France.

Like other Arab countries shaken by the rise of Nasserism (pan-Arab populist movement led by Egyptian president Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser) in the mid-1950s during the height of cold war politics in the region, Lebanon witnessed a six-month armed conflict in 1958. Lebanon quickly recovered from the conflict and the decade 1958–1968 witnessed large-scale administrative reform, political stability, and economic prosperity, especially under President Fouad Chehab (1958–1964).

Once again, regional developments shaped the course of Lebanese politics: the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the emergence of a militant Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). From 1969, when Lebanon had to sign an agreement with the PLO (the Cairo Agreement) that allowed the PLO’s military action against Israel from Lebanese territory, until the outbreak of war in 1975, political crises and armed conflict hinged on the PLO’s armed presence. Confrontation between Lebanon’s raison d’état and the PLO’s raison de révolution was bound to occur, just as it did in Jordan in 1970–1971. But unlike Jordan’s authoritarian state, Lebanon’s openness, confessional democracy, and consensual politics did not enable the state to contain the PLO and to stop PLO-Israeli warfare in south Lebanon.

War broke out in April 1975 and ended in October 1990. It evolved in five phases; the most violent were the first and last two years of the war and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The war crippled government institutions, factionalized the army, and widened the sectarian divide. Political parties-turned-militias exercised power in areas under their control along with several non-Lebanese parties directly involved in the war: the PLO until 1982–1983, Syria before and after that date, Israel in the south from 1978 to 2000, and the Islamic Republic of Iran since the early 1980s.

The fifteen-year war ended with another act of war, when Syrian forces joined units of the Lebanese army to oust an interim premier, General Michel ‘Aoun, from office. Another development was the political settlement embodied in the Document of National Understanding, commonly called the Ta’if Agreement, which was signed on 22 October 1989 by Lebanese deputies in the Saudi city of Ta’if. One component of the Ta’if Agreement dealt with political reforms, the other with sovereignty. While the Ta’if Agreement preserved the custom of the Maronite presidency, the Sunni premiership, and the Shi’ite speakership, it greatly diminished the power of the president and enhanced that of the prime minister, the council of ministers, and the speaker. Ta’if also called for the abolition of political confessionalism according to a staged plan.

As for sovereignty, the Ta’if Agreement called for the redeployment of Syrian troops to specific areas two years after the incorporation of Ta’if’s provisions into the constitution in September 1990, and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the south in accordance with the 1978 United Nations resolutions 425 and 426. Israel withdrew its forces in May 2000 but Syrian troops did not redeploy. Ta’if also introduced the notion of “privileged relations” with Syria. Beginning in May 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed a series of bilateral agreements that tied Lebanese affairs ever closer to Syria in the political, security, economic, cultural, and commercial arenas. Since 1990, the political decision-making process in Lebanon has been very much in Syrian hands. The Shi’ite community was greatly affected by the war and by regional developments that unfolded during the war years. It underwent drastic political change: from the control of traditional leaders prior to the war, to the reformist platform of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the founder of the Amal Movement in the mid-1970s, to the radical Islamist agenda of Hizb Allah since the mid-1980s. In a period of two decades, Shi’ite politics have been greatly radicalized. Backed by Syria, Iran, and the Lebanese government, Hizbollah—the only Lebanese party that was not disarmed after the war—led the war against Israel in south Lebanon in the 1990s and is today the most mobilized and active political-cum-military organization in the country.

The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the south has reactivated the debate on the presence of about twenty-five thousand Syrian troops in the country. Although the sectarian divide is deeper in postwar Lebanon than prior to the war, a politically significant Christian-Muslim consensus emerged in 2000–2001 on the need to implement properly the Ta’if Agreement and to establish balanced relations between.
Lebanon and Syria. Consensus was confirmed by the formalization of the reconciliation between Christians and Druzes, following the historic visit of the Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Nasralla Sfeir, on 5 August 2001, to areas that were displaced during the war. The government’s response to these positive developments was a massive crackdown on Christian activists in August 2001. But the casualty this time was not only the growing intersectarian opposition to the Syrian-backed Lebanese authorities but to the country as a whole: government institutions, the rule of law, and the economy with a public debt that rose from over $1 billion in 1990 to over $25 billion in 2001.

See also Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn; Hizb Allah; Sadr, Musa al-.

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Farid el Khazen

LEXICOGRAPHY (ARABIC) See Grammar and Lexicography

LIBERALISM

Islamic liberalism may be defined as a movement to reconcile Islamic faith with liberal values such as democracy, rights, equality, and progress. Islamic liberalism forms one strand of Islamic modernism, which also encompasses modern values that are not associated with the liberal tradition, such as state-building and scientific authority.

Islamic liberalism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a response to the hypocrisy of European liberalism, which was introduced to the Islamic world by the highly illiberal means of imperial conquest. Since that time, conservatives have consistently accused Islamic liberalism of being overly enthralled with European traditions. Yet Islamic liberalism’s self-understanding centers on Islamic traditions, including the sacred sources that require or allow liberal practices and the precedents in Islamic history for tolerance and peaceful coexistence. In the late twentieth century, a new form of Islamic liberalism added the argument that human interpretation of revelation is inherently fallible and pluralistic. In this view, the repression of Islamic liberalism is an illegitimate exercise in hubris, because no mortal can presume to know the meaning of divine revelation with any certainty. Islamic liberalism has generally been a minority position in the Islamic world. Its representatives have sometimes fared well when elections are free and fair, though more frequently liberalism has been stymied by hostile responses of traditionalists, revivalists, and secularists.

See also Modern Thought.

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Charles Kurzman

LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN

The Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e azadi-ye Iran), or LMI (also called Iran Freedom Movement, or IFM), was established as a liberal Islamic opposition in May 1961. Its twelve founders, including Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, and Yadollah Sahabi, presented it as Muslim, Iranian, constitutionalist, and Mosaddeqist; that is, they claimed the ideological legacy of Mohammad Mosaddeq’s National Front. In 1963 the shah banned the LMI and imprisoned its leaders for a number of years.

LMI gained power during the Iranian revolution in 1978 and 1979. Its members formed the core of the postrevolutionary provisional government and on 5 February 1979, Mehdi Bazargan was appointed prime minister of the provisional government by Ayatollah Khomeini. He resigned in protest.
after the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran on 4 November.

Though formally banned by Khomeini in 1988, the LMI was generally tolerated, but not allowed to participate in elections. It openly criticized the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (i.e., the rule of the religious jurisprudent) as well as the executions, torture, and the ban of parties and free media. Although its members are mainly academic veterans of the opposition to the shah, since the 1990s LMI has also appealed to the young who admire Mosaddeq—the only democratically elected prime minister of Iran. The left wing of the LMI is represented by Ezzatollah Sahabi, who, in 1992 founded the magazine Iran-e farda.

After the death of Bazargan in 1995 and under its new chairman, Ebrahim Yazdi, the movement became more cautious. Nevertheless, in spring 2001, the revolutionary court ordered an end to all LMI activities. Although charged with conspiring against the Islamic system on 13 November 2001, Yazdi was not touched by the authorities. But more than thirty other members were sentenced to jail by the revolutionary court on 27 July 2002, among them Ezzatollah Sahabi. They were charged with a series of crimes, including seeking to topple the country’s government. The trials were held behind closed doors.

See also Bazargan, Mehdi; Iran, Islamic Republic of.

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Claudia Stodte

LIBRARIES

Several factors contributed to the prevalence of libraries in the medieval Islamic world. First, manuscript books were relatively cheap. Papermaking technology arrived in the Islamic world in the eighth century, providing Muslims with a material cheaper than the papyrus used previously in the Middle East and far cheaper than the parchment and vellum made from animal hides used in medieval Europe. Moreover, the Arabic script with its cursive forms and many ligatures could be written much faster than the medieval versions of the Roman alphabet. Second, the medieval Islamic world was a literate culture. Men and even women of the upper and middle classes were almost always literate. Both religious and secular literatures were popular, and scholarly and literary attainments were respected. Islamic rulers, constantly hungry for legitimacy, collected books for the same reason they built monuments and patronized scholars and poets—to acquire reputations as cultivated rulers. Libraries of elegant manuscripts and learned treatises were thus appropriate possessions for kings and those who imitated them, and it was not uncommon for Islamic rulers, military officers, and high officials to have well-earned reputations for literary taste and scholarship. Third, books were central to Islamic religious life. Despite a stress on oral learning in medieval Islam, books were necessary to record the masses of traditions of the Prophet, legal rulings, information concerning transmitters of religious lore, and linguistic lore that were the raw material of the Islamic sciences. Even the oral transmission of knowledge usually involved the production of a dictated book, so that studying a book involved producing a copy of it. Fourth, medieval Islamic bureaucrats were accustomed to use books: encyclopedias of useful information, literary manuals useful for producing elegant official documents, literature for amusement, and such things as manuals of occult sciences. Finally, the Islamic law of waqf, charitable endowments, allowed Muslim bibliophiles to donate their books to the libraries of mosques and madrasas with reasonable hope that their collections would be maintained intact.

The earliest Islamic libraries were the collections of Qur’ans that accumulated in mosques. Qur’an reading was an important Islamic devotional practice, and both copying Qur’ans and donating them to mosques were acts of piety. Larger mosques often acquired more diverse libraries, mostly through gifts. When a mosque was built or renovated, the donor often gave a collection of books as the basis of the library. Bibliophiles and scholars, particularly those who taught in a particular mosque, often willed their books to the mosque library. Books copied in class were often given to the mosque library. To this day, many of the most important collections of Islamic manuscripts are in mosque libraries—for example, al-Azhar in Cairo and Suleymaniyyeh in Istanbul.

There are records of royal libraries as early as Umayyad times, the earliest associated with the scholar Umayyad prince Khalid b. Yazid. The zenith of Islamic royal libraries was in the Abbasid period. The Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) founded the Bayt al-Hikma, the house of wisdom, which was the center for translation from Greek, Syriac, and Pahlavi and which was the basis of a caliphal library that survived for more than a century. The Umayyad royal library at Cordova, founded by al-Hakam II (r. 961–976), was supposed to have had 400,000 manuscripts. The greatest of the royal libraries was that of the Fatimids in Cairo, founded in 1004 by the caliph al-Hakim (r. 996–1021). It survived, despite some vicissitudes, until it was ordered closed by Saladin in the late twelfth century and its collections were dispersed and partly destroyed. The royal libraries sometimes had aggressive programs of commissioning both the copying and the composition of books. Both the Abbasid Bayt al-Hikma and the Mogul royal library in Delhi commissioned
extensive translations, in the latter case often of Sanskrit Hindu literature of all sorts. Most of the great illustrated and illuminated Islamic books are the product of royal commissions.

There were also public libraries known as dar al-‘ilm, houses of knowledge. These were more or less public libraries, often established for sectarian purposes. These institutions played a role in the establishment of madrasas, Islamic seminaries. With the rise of madrasas in the eleventh century, their libraries became increasingly important.

Size, Nature, and Organization of Premodern Islamic Libraries

Medieval accounts mention libraries containing hundreds of thousands or even millions of books, notably the royal libraries of Baghdad, Cairo, and Cordoba. Individual scholars are mentioned whose libraries consisted of some thousands of books. The higher numbers are scarcely credible. Istanbul, for example, has more than a hundred manuscript libraries or collections dating from Ottoman times, some four centuries old, yet in 1959 a careful survey indicated that there were only about 135,000 Islamic manuscripts in the city, the largest collection containing about ten thousand manuscripts. It certainly is credible, however, that the larger medieval Islamic libraries contained tens of thousands of manuscripts and that wealthy individual scholars and bibliophiles possessed libraries of several thousand volumes—collections dwarfing anything in Europe at the time.

At their finest, Islamic libraries were large, well-organized institutions with specially built facilities for book storage and reading, professional staff, regular budgets and endowments, catalogs, and even lodging and stipends for visiting scholars. Public access varied, depending on the nature of the libraries, but established scholars could generally gain access to most collections. Books were usually stored on shelves or in cabinets, stacked on their sides with a short title written on the upper and lower edge of the book to aid in finding it. (Traditional Islamic bookbindings do not usually contain the title or author.) Catalogs were either bound handlists, the waqf documents donating the books, or lists posted on the doors of the cabinet. Collections were organized by subject. Avicenna describes visiting the royal library in Bukhara, for example, where rooms were devoted to different subjects. Paper, pens, and ink were sometimes furnished for the use of patrons.

Smaller collections had less elaborate facilities. Most mosques and madrasas had libraries. Private libraries and individual books were often donated to such institutions as waqf, endowment, and the terms of the gift would be carefully recorded on the flyleaf. Donated collections were often kept as separate units. There were also family libraries. In a society where professions were often hereditary, some families produced scholars and clerics generation after generation for centuries. Not uncommonly a library would accumulate in the family home over many generations. Examples include the al-Husayni, al-Khalidi, and al-Budayri libraries in Jerusalem, each of which dates from the eighteenth century.

Destruction and Dispersal of Libraries

Islamic chronicles mention the destruction of many libraries, either deliberately or, more commonly, accidentally. Apart from a few places and times, warfare was endemic in the Islamic world and took its toll. Few surviving libraries in the Islamic world predate the older Istanbul libraries. While the story that the Muslim invaders burned the library of Alexandria has long been known to be false—it had been destroyed in Roman times—the sack of cities did often result in the destruction of libraries. Most of the major libraries of Abbasid Iraq were destroyed during the Mongol invasion. The Islamic library in Tripoli was destroyed when the city was sacked by the Franks during the First Crusade, beginning in 1095. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 apparently resulted in the destruction of much of the collection of the National Library in Baghdad.

Sometimes the destruction was ideologically motivated. Mahmud of Ghazna burned the heretical works in the library of the wazir Isma'il b. 'Abbad and confiscated the rest. The books on philosophy and the natural sciences in the library of al-Hakam II in Cordoba were burned by the orthodox during his son’s reign. The mass destruction of Arabic books was part of the Catholic kings’ program to suppress Islam in Spain, including the burning of Arabic books in Granada at the order of Cardinal Cisneros. There also was a curious tradition of scholars destroying their own books at their death, either to suppress embarrassing or incomplete works or to avoid unauthorized transmission of hadith and other texts that ought to be transmitted orally.

Finally, lack of supervision led to the decay of many libraries, with books stolen by readers or dishonest librarians or lost to damp and insects, the latter a particular menace in South and Southeast Asia, where insecticide is still sometimes sprinkled between the pages of books.

The destruction of libraries in wartime was not always, or even usually, deliberate. Books were valuable, and thus were better stolen than destroyed. There is a report that when Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, the sultan ordered the surviving Greek manuscripts in the city collected for the palace library, and there can be no doubt that the size and quality of the manuscript collections in Istanbul are in good part the result of the imperial reach of the Ottoman armies. Likewise, many of the Islamic manuscript collections in Europe were, to some extent, the product of colonial wars. The great Islamic manuscript collections in Russia are the product of the Russian expansion into Central Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The treasures of the Mogul royal library were dispersed after the 1857–1858 mutiny, and many of the finest items ended up in London.
Libraries in the Modern Islamic World
With some exceptions, the library situation in modern Islamic countries falls short of the glories of the medieval period. Some premodern libraries have survived and prospered. In Ottoman Turkey a stable bureaucratic tradition and internal stability meant that most of the old waqf libraries survived as functioning institutions until they were taken over by the modern Turkish state. Several of the larger Ottoman libraries in Istanbul are still functioning, and the collections of most of the smaller libraries have been gathered in a central library in the Suleymaniyyeh mosque. Al-Azhar University in Cairo has a library that has functioned for centuries in one form or another.

Most of the libraries of the Islamic world are of more recent date. These may be divided into two classes: libraries of traditional type founded in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and Western-style libraries founded by colonial administrations or modern independent Islamic states.

Even after the occupation of most of the Islamic world by European colonial powers and the establishment of modern nation states in the Islamic lands, libraries continued to be established that, despite occasional appurtenances of modern libraries and the prevalence of printed books, were indistinguishable in style and purposes from those established centuries earlier. The libraries of the Muslim rulers and nobility of princely states in British India were royal libraries of the old sort—for example, the Raza Library in Rampur, based on a collection started by the Rohilla Nawabs of Rampur in the eighteenth century, and the Salar Jung Museum Library in Hyderabad, Deccan. New mosques and madrasas had libraries indistinguishable from those of previous centuries, apart from the presence of printed books. A notable example is the Mar‘ashi library in Qom, founded by a bibliophilic grand ayatollah in the mid-twentieth century, which emerged as a major library after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

The colonial period marked a major change, with the introduction of European-style libraries intended to promote the diffusion of modern knowledge and to support the new systems of education and, to a lesser extent, to support modern industry. At the top of the pyramid are national libraries, supported by depository laws and national bibliographies. In some cases, such as Egypt and Iran, these libraries emerged from earlier royal libraries and are themselves important repositories of Islamic manuscripts. In other cases, such as Pakistan, they are new foundations rivaled or overshadowed by older university and traditional libraries. The introduction of modern educational systems led to the creation of school and university libraries. University libraries are well established across the Islamic world, though in general only a few of the older universities have really major libraries: Istanbul University, American University of Beirut, and Punjab University in Lahore, for example. Many newer universities have very limited library facilities. The high cost of foreign monographs and periodicals poses particular difficulties for academic libraries in the poorer Islamic countries, and the lack of such materials is one of the most difficult problems faced by academics in the Islamic world. The increasing importance of computers and electronic resources is an additional burden that few academic libraries in the Islamic world can afford.

Elementary and secondary school libraries are generally weak or nonexistent. Public library systems are also usually inadequate and rarely have much priority in competition for scarce public resources. Public libraries exist in major cities, but much less commonly in provincial cities or small towns. Translations of foreign works are relatively scarce. Cultural factors sometimes hinder progress. Where public libraries exist, there may be restrictions on circulation, subscription fees, or educational requirements that hinder free access, as is the case for the best public libraries in Pakistan. The Islamic world has not yet had its Andrew Carnegie, endowing mass self-education through free public libraries. As a result, foreign institutions such as the British Council still play a significant role in providing library facilities, despite their existing only in the largest cities. The new Alexandria Library being built in Egypt in emulation of the ancient library deserves mention, though it is far from clear that it will be able to achieve its goal to become a world-class research library.

There have also been challenges applying modern library techniques. The mixture of Arabic and Roman script books has posed problems for cataloging and computerization. The Dewey Decimal System has been widely adopted, despite the inadequacies of its treatment of Islamic and Middle Eastern topics.

See also Education; Ma‘mun.

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John Walbridge

LITERATURE See Arabic Literature; Persian Language and Literature; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry
MADANI, ‘ABBASI (1931– )

Algerian Islamic activist and opposition leader, ‘Abbasi Madani was born in 1931 in Sidi ‘Uqbah, in southeastern Algeria. An early member of the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, or FLN), Madani was imprisoned throughout the eight-year war against the French. After the independence in 1962, Madani joined the Qiyam (Islamic values) association and took a critical stance against the socialist and secular orientation of the FLN. He received a religious education, then studied philosophy and psychology, and in 1978 received a Ph.D. in education in Britain. Madani upheld the ideas of Algeria’s reformist movement and criticized the state’s secular policies, calling for Islamic revival and the Arabization of the predominantly francophone educational system.

Madani ascended the political ladder during anti-FLN riots in October 1988. The following year he founded the religiously inspired Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS), which quickly became the opposition party, representing the vast majority of the urban poor. Madani’s first electoral victory came in June 1990, during Algeria’s first multiparty municipal elections, and subsequently he emerged as the potential successor to the then-president Chadli Benjedid. In May 1991, Madani called for an indefinite general strike to protest against a new electoral legislation, but was arrested soon thereafter. During his incarceration, military intervention against FIS’s success in the first round of the December 1991 national elections resulted in the party’s ban and years of civil violence. He was freed in July 1997. Madani endorsed the beliefs of many Islamic modernists who call for an Islamic solution to the crisis of modernity and, through the FIS, brought Islam to the forefront of Algerian national identity.

See also Islamic Salvation Front; Political Organization; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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Claudia Gazzini

MADHhab

Lexically, the term madhab denotes a “way of going,” and by extension a “manner followed,” an “ideology” or “movement.” Most commonly, the term and its plural (madhahib) refer to the different “schools” of Islamic law.

The classical Sunni schools of law emerged in the late ninth and early tenth centuries C.E.; they were built on the legal opinions of certain local authorities from the late eighth and early ninth centuries. By the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, the legal opinions of scholars identified as “followers” (ashab) of people like Malik b. Anas, Abu Hanifa, and al-Shafi’i were condensed into compendia that represented the perspectives of the five main schools: Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali (following Ahmad b. Hanbal), and the Zahiri (following Da’ud b. Khalaif). The followers of local authorities such as al-Awza’i, Sufyan al-Thawri, and others, did not materialize into institutionalized schools of law beyond the tenth century though their opinions continued to play a role in the legal theory of the other schools.

Following the eleventh century, each school continued to develop distinct legal theory while maintaining constant interaction and dialogue with the other schools. Divisions among the schools were often characterized not only in terms of general approaches to the authoritative sources (usul) and
methods of interpretation, but also in terms of legal rulings on specific issues or practices.

The Hanafi madhab is sometimes called the “followers of opinion” (asbāb al-ra’y), denoting a perception of their greater reliance on logic and reasoning, as opposed to the label “followers of the hadith” (asbāb al-hadīth) applied to the Shafi’i and Hanbali madhabīn. Other schools, such as the Zahiri madhab, were known for their eschewing of reason and logic, relying instead on the “literal” interpretation of authoritative sources. The Maliki madhabīn asserted its authority as a continuation of the practices that originated with the prophet Muhammad at Medina. It was not uncommon, however, for individual jurists to belong to different madhabīn, such as Muhammad b. Khalaf (d. 1135), who was called “Hanfash” because he was first a Hanbali, then a Hanafi, and finally a Shafi’i.

It has been remarked that the later developments of the schools lacked innovation and fluidity, being too reliant on imitation of earlier legal opinions. Much of the postclassical scholarship did take the form of commentaries (sharḥ) upon earlier texts, and in both premodern and modern times there were attempts to codify the “law” of a particular madhab. The epistemological and methodological structure of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in conjunction with changing social circumstances seemed to require a continual rethinking and examination of the authoritative sources. Each madhab has its own distinct means for authorizing such change and for linking new legal opinions with past precedents.

In addition to the Sunni madhab, there are Shi’ite madhabīn that emerged at various times due to changes in the authority of certain Shi’ite imams. The best known of these Shi’ite madhabīn is the “Twelver” or “Imami” Shi’i madhab that was established after the greater occultation of the twelfth imam in 941. The Twelver Shi’ite madhab is characterized by greater juristic authority and formal hierarchy but conforms in many ways to the principles governing the shape of the Sunni madhabīn.

See also Abu Hanifa; Ibn Hanbal; Kalam; Law; Malik Ibn Anas; Shafi’i; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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Brannon M. Wheeler

MADRASA

Madrasa, is an Islamic college, literally a “place of instruction,” especially instruction in religious law. In medieval usage the term referred to an institution providing intermediate and advanced instruction in Islamic law and related subjects. This contrasted with elementary schools, which provided basic Qur’an instruction, and nonreligious institutions, which provided instruction in such subjects as medicine. In modern usage the term usually applies to schools offering Islamic religious instruction at any level. The madrasa can be considered as a building, as a legal entity, and as an educational institution. As a rule, the medieval madrasa served male students who were past the elementary level and who intended to acquire credentials as ulema, religious scholars. Elementary schools and schools offering vernacular or practical education were usually known by other names.

Description and Architecture

A typical Islamic madrasa contained rooms for students, a prayer hall, and classrooms and would likely also contain a residence for one or more professors, a library, and sanitary facilities. It was usually attached to a mosque, and large mosque complexes, such as those in Istanbul, might contain several madrasas. The typical Middle Eastern madrasa was a square building of one or two stories surrounding a courtyard. The student rooms opened onto the courtyard, and if the madrasa had two stories, the student rooms might be on the upper floor with classrooms and service rooms on the ground floor. Sometimes the central courtyard was replaced by a domed central hall. In their architecture madrasas are closely linked with other kinds of Islamic public buildings, notably mosques and caravansaries. There is, however, a great deal of variation in the design of madrasas. Some of the earliest surviving madrasas have few student rooms or none, perhaps because they served little more than a neighborhood, in contrast to great royal foundations that drew students from far away. Many madrasas, especially in Egypt, contain the mausoleums of their founders, with the madrasa proper being almost an afterthought. In crowded cities a cramped or irregular site often resulted in modification of the traditional plan. The fact that a madrasa’s prayer hall might serve as a neighborhood mosque sometimes resulted in the addition of a minaret and the separation of the student rooms from the rest of the madrasa. When, as in the great Ottoman mosque complexes, the madrasa was closely associated with a mosque, the prayer hall shrank to make room for other facilities. When a madrasa was intended for more than a single legal school, separate teaching facilities were provided for each professor, so that there are cruciform madrasas providing symmetrical facilities for professors of each of the four Sunni schools of law. Finally, a house or some other existing building might simply be used as a madrasa without any special modifications.
The Medieval Madrasa

The madrasa appears as an institution in about the eleventh century and evolved from the informal schools that operated in mosques or teachers’ homes. Islamic education was usually a distinctly personal and informal matter, and prior to the rise of the madrasa, as is still often the case, religious scholars would teach in a convenient mosque, perhaps teaching more advanced students, or controversial subjects, in their homes. It was customary for medieval Muslim students of the religious sciences to travel extensively to study with well-known teachers, and teachers also often traveled long distances seeking opportunities to teach, receive patronage, and further their own studies. A well-known hadith attributed to Muhammad says, “seek knowledge, even in China.” A mosque, however, was not a suitable place for professors or significant numbers of students to live for long stretches, so by the tenth-century **khatms**, inns, were being built adjacent to mosques. The first great burst of madrasa construction occurred in the eleventh century in the Seljuk empire and is associated with the name of the great wazir Nizam al-Mulk, who founded a number of madrasas known as Nizamiya, the most important of which, the Nizamiya in Baghdad, became one of the greatest educational institutions in the Islamic world. Whatever Nizam al-Mulk’s philanthropic goals may have been, he probably also intended his madrasas to combat the threat posed to Sunni Islam by various forms of more or less revolutionary Shi’ism. The institution of the madrasa soon spread across the Islamic world and became the dominant form of institution of higher learning. It was not the only form of educational institution; there were also Qur’anic schools for younger pupils; Sufi monasteries; hospitals; observatories; vernacular schools for the children of merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans; and various forms of private tuition for the children of government officials.

**Legal Status**

A madrasa was legally a **waqf**, a charitable endowment. The founder would donate property, from whose proceeds the madrasa was built and maintained. The income from the endowment supported one or more professors, various servants and functionaries, and the students, who received room, board, and perhaps a small stipend. The founder’s instructions governed such matters as the legal school to which the professor would belong. The extensive legal literature relating to madrasas deals with predictable problems of defining an adequate stipend, absentee professors, stipends for students who did not live at the madrasa, financial shortfalls, and responsibility for maintenance of the facilities. Madrasas as institutions did not issue degrees or diplomas. The closest counterpart to the Western degree was the **ijaza**, the license to teach a particular book or subject issued by an individual teacher. Madrasas had several advantages for donors. First, whereas the founder of a mosque had very little control after its establishment, the founder of a madrasa had a good deal of discretion in the terms of the endowment, so that in practice one could use the endowment of a madrasa to support one’s descendants. Second, a madrasa was less expensive to build and endow than a mosque, putting it within reach of those of more modest wealth or allowing a ruler to build a larger number of institutions. Finally, a madrasa could be an ideological tool, a way to help Islamize newly conquered territories or to combat the influence of a rival sect.

**Curriculum and Instruction**

The madrasa education was intended to teach the student how to deduce religious law from the authoritative Islamic texts. The students who went through the whole course were qualified to be judges and religious scholars, but most students doubtless dropped out earlier, becoming mosque imams or pursuing secular careers with the added prestige of a religious education. The method of instruction was scholastic and dialectical: intense debate about the interpretation and difficulties of a set of standard textbooks. Students came to the madrasa knowing the Qur’an by rote and a fair amount of Arabic. Students studied Arabic, logic, and the core subjects of the Islamic religious sciences: **fiqh** (Islamic law), Qur’an interpretation, and the hadith, sayings of the Prophet. Better students went on to study **usul al-fiqh** (jurisprudence), along with some theology, philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and sometimes medicine.

**Modern Developments**

The arrival of modern educational institutions was a major challenge to the madrasas. Colonial administrators, nationalists, and Islamic reformers alike dismissed the scholastic madrasa education as out-of-date. Traditional sources of income dried up. Talented students sought new opportunities in modern universities and professions. Islamic revivalists complained of the rationalist character of the traditional madrasa curriculum and its neglect of core religious subjects. Postcolonial governments sometimes attempted to close or co-opt madrasas, fearing that they might become centers of opposition. This was the case in Turkey, where Atatürk closed the madrasas, and Indonesia, where the government tried to reduce the influence of the madrasas, known there as **pesantrens**, by controlling the curriculum, giving teachers government salaries, and establishing rival institutions. In many cases, standards of instruction and numbers of students declined precipitously, though in most places the major institutions survived. The attempts of the Pahlavi regime in Iran to control the madrasas failed, creating bitter opposition to the government among the ulema.

The Islamic revival of the late twentieth century has resulted in the revival of madrasas in a number of countries. The Iranian revolution of 1978–1979 was organized by ulema, so after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran the Iranian madrasas, especially in Qom, received a huge influx of new students and financial support. Saudi Arabia, through both its government and wealthy individuals, has subsidized madrasas in many countries, thus increasing the influence of Saudi-style Wahhabi literalist Islam at the expense of both
rationalist and mystical approaches to Islam. In the subcontinent the major Islamic revivalist movements have competed through their educational institutions since the nineteenth century. The most important of these was the Deoband movement. Its founders established a large educational complex in Deoband, near Delhi, devoted to propagating a revived, hadith-oriented Islam. The Deobandis thus opposed not only the new European-style education system of British India and the modernist Islamic Aligarh Muslim University but also the traditional Islamic religious education of India associated with the Firingi-Mahall educational complex in Lucknow, which was strongly rationalist and also closely associated with Sufism. Religious competition through madrasas has been particularly pronounced in Pakistan, where various Islamic groups have established tens of thousands of madrasas on the elementary, secondary, and university level. The Taliban (lit. “students”) movement in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century was an outgrowth of madrasa training in Pakistan. These institutions are appealing to poor families, both because of the prestige of Islamic education and because, unlike the usually inadequate government schools, the madrasas provide room and board and charge no fees. Their quality varies tremendously and is, in general, quite poor. Finally, immigrant Islamic communities in Europe and North America have begun establishing their own religious schools, usually on the model of Sunday schools but sometimes as independent parochial schools. There are no schools training ulama outside of the Islamic world.

The madrasas have not kept their monopoly on training ulama. Increasingly, advanced Islamic education is taking place in modern universities. In the late nineteenth century the University of the Punjab in Lahore began granting Islamic clerical degrees. There are now faculties of theology in many universities in Islamic countries producing Islamic legal scholars and religious leaders. Finally, it is not uncommon for more talented madrasa students to go on for graduate degrees in secular universities in fields such as Arabic, Islamic studies, and philosophy.

See also Aligarh; Azhar, al-; Deoband; Education.

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John Walbridge

**MAGHAZI** See Military Raid

**MAHDI**

The Mahdi, meaning “the guided one,” is the honorary title of the expected deliverer or messianic figure in Islam. Although the term and concept is not found in the Qur’an, both Sunni and Shi’ite hadith collections mention it among the prophetic traditions concerning crises (*fitan*). These traditions often contain eschatological material, and frequently speak of a figure who will come at the end of time to combat the forces of evil led by the one-eyed Dajjal. This righteous individual is said to be one who “will fill the earth with justice after it has been filled with injustice and tyranny.” The Mahdi’s coming will lead the forces of good in a final apocalyptic battle, where the good will triumph. Jesus will also return to earth at this time, according to some reports, and fight alongside the Mahdi or rule after him. All of these events are predicted to take place shortly before Judgment Day.

In Twelver Shi’ite Islam, due to the community’s minority status and continuing sense of persecution and injustice, the Mahdi symbol developed into a powerful and central religious idea and became combined with the figure of the last of the twelve Imams, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who is believed to have disappeared around 874. He was born in Samarra, son of Hasan al-Askari and the lady Nargis. He is also known as the ruler of the time (*sahib al-zaman*), the one who will restore justice (*qa’im*), and the awaited one (*al-muntazar*).

Lists of the qualities of the expected one were drawn up, including his name being Muhammad, his descent from the Prophet, his appearance (*zubur*) or rising, his rule (for either seven, nine, or nineteen years), and his mission to restore justice on earth. After the last imam disappeared as a child, Shi’ite sources identified a lesser occultation (disappearance) of some seventy years, during which a series of four deputies was said to have consulted with him. After that time, the Mahdi, or Hidden Imam, entered the greater occultation that is still in force, remaining alive but not meeting with representatives. The fact that Shi’ite religious scholars are believed to continue to receive his blessings and guidance gives them a greater charisma and authority than their Sunni counterparts. Shi’ite political theory traditionally declared all temporal power illegitimate in the absence of the imam, only recently allowing the concept of a caretaker government of religious authorities (*wilayat al-faqih*) that underlies today’s Islamic republic in Iran.

Claimants to the role of the Mahdi have not been absent from Islamic history. The first was Muhammad al-Hanifiyya (d. 700), son of Ali from a wife other than Fatima, whose role as the Mahdi was promoted by al-Mukhtar (d. 687). Although al-Mukhtar was killed and his movement crushed, ideas that Muhammad al-Hanifiyya did not die and would one day return continued to circulate and later attached themselves to subsequent imamas. More recent claimants have arisen in both Shi’a and Sunni contexts, including Muhammad Mahdi of Jaunpur in India (d. 1504), whose followers continue as a separate Muslim sect, the Mahdavis, and the Sudanese Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad (d. 1885), who rose against the British occupiers and was killed at the battle of Omdurman. Contemporary Islamist or Sufi movements may occasionally evoke the anticipated return of the Mahdi as a means of encouraging millenarian expectations among their followers. In Shi’a Islam, expectation and eager anticipation of the Mahdi’s return is a central theme of piety and discourse.

See also *Fitna*; *Hadith*; *Imam*; *Mahdist State, Mahdiyya*; *Religious Beliefs*; Shi’a: Early; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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Marcia Hermansen

**MAHDI, SADIQ AL- (1936–)**

Sadiq al-Mahdi is a Sudanese political leader and intellectual, and a descendant of the nineteenth-century Islamic revolutionary known as “the Mahdi,” Muhammad Ahmad. Sadiq received a traditional Muslim education as well as a modern one, graduating from Oxford University in 1957. When his father, Siddiq al-Mahdi, died in 1961, Sadiq became the head of the Mahdist-supported Umma Party. He was prime minister of Sudan from 1966 to 1967, and following the military coup by Ja’far Numayri in 1969, Sadiq went into exile. He returned to Sudan during a national reconciliation in 1977,
but was jailed for his opposition to Numayri’s 1983 decrees imposing a form of Islamic law on the country. Following the overthrow of Numayri, Sadiq al-Mahdi was again prime minister (1986–1989), and his government was overthrown by Islamist military officers in 1989. He was a leader in the movements of opposition to the Islamist regime but, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Sadiq al-Mahdi engaged in efforts to reconcile government and opposition. He has written numerous books advocating effective jihād (independent reasoning) in understanding Islam’s message in the contemporary world. He is an advocate of democracy in an Islamic context and has provided a contemporary understanding of what messianic leadership (the mission of the Mahdi) means in the modern world.

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*John O. Voll*

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**MAHDIST STATE, MAHDIYYA**

The Sudanese Mahdi became known in the eastern Sudan (*bilad al-Sudan*) in June 1881 when he began to dispatch letters to local leaders proclaiming himself the Expected Mahdi. He was Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdallah and about forty years old. He had been a member of the Sammaniyya sufi *tariqa* in the north of the country, but due to dissatisfaction with one of his teachers he moved to the Nile River island of Abu, south of Khartoum. There he established himself with a small band of followers, among whom was his future successor, ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad.

The Sudan was then an Ottoman-Egyptian colony, and the regime was known locally as the *Turkiyya*. By the 1870s, however, the colonial state was thoroughly neglected by the rulers based in Egypt, creating opportunities for revolt. The administration and significant sectors of the colonial economy had substantial European participation right up to the level of governor. A few Sudanese were part of the government but most of the indigenous peoples resented their foreign rulers. The exclusion of Muslim Sudanese from leading roles in the colony, but the inclusion of non-Muslim Europeans, also disturbed pious Muslims such as the Mahdi. Slavery was under attack by the British, and abolition threatened the livelihoods of many northern Sudanese slave traders. These slave-traders threw their weight behind the mahdist movement.

The Mahdi came to address what he and his followers thought was an oppressive authority, and one that was contravening Islamic precepts. They challenged this situation and believed that a movement would emerge throughout the land to overthrow the regime. The Mahdi’s calculation, however, that a countrywide revolt would follow his calls was never realized. This political failure was offset by success in the sphere of religious influence. Much support for the Mahdi was based on the belief that he was a divinely inspired figure. The religious dimension of his mission was perhaps more significant than its political impact.

The Mahdiyya was an indigenous northern Sudanese phenomenon, but the Mahdi modeled himself and his movement on the early Islamic community of the Prophet of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. His followers were called *ansar* (helpers), just as the Prophet’s supporters in Medina were named. The Mahdi preached jihad against the infidels, collected *zakat* (tax on wealth) instead of the range of colonial taxes, and strove to impose *sbarī‘a* prohibitions and punishments. His successor, who was appointed when the Mahdi was on his deathbed, was given the title *khalīfa* (caliph), as was the Prophet’s successor. Indeed, Khalīfa ‘Abdullahi was named *khalīfa al-Siddiq*, the latter term usually associated with the first caliph of Islam, Abu Bakr.

For the first two years of his mission, the Mahdi was confined to the province of Kordofan, but soon his forces began to spread slowly to the north along the Nile River. Thereafter his supporters increased and brought large parts of the west and east of the country under their control. Important towns such as El-Obeid, the main city of Kordofan, fell in January 1883, and the defeat of the expedition of Colonel William Hicks at Shaykan in September of the same year bolstered the movement tremendously.

The already weak government in Cairo was unable to do much to stem the tide of the Mahdi’s success, and the British, who had recently occupied Egypt (in 1882), were hesitant to act. When General Charles Gordon was dispatched to the Sudan, he was sent with contradictory instructions: to restore “good government” and to evacuate the colony. When he reached Khartoum he wrote to the Mahdi, offering him the sultanship of Kordofan. The Mahdi rejected the offer, for he had much bigger ambitions that transcended mere political authority, especially when that authority was confined to an isolated province.

In October 1884 the Mahdi arrived on the banks of the Nile River opposite Khartoum and laid siege to the capital. In January of the following year Khartoum fell to the Mahdists. Instead of installing himself there, the Mahdi established a new capital, called Omdurman, opposite the old one. There he died in June 1885. His body was buried and a tomb was built over his gravesite. But the Mahdi’s tomb was destroyed, and his body disinterred in the reconquest of the Sudan by Sir Herbert Kitchener in 1898.

The reign of the Mahdi’s successor, Khalīfa ‘Abdullahi, opened with the new state’s armies engaged on multiple fronts: in the west to pacify the state of Dar Fur, on the Ethiopian marches against the Christian state, and on the
Egyptian border. Against the Ethiopian fighters the Mahdists were successful, but elsewhere they met defeat. The Khalifa also had to deal with a number of pretenders, “false mahdis” who sought to claim his position. Furthermore, internal schisms surfaced between various layers of supporters who were dissatisfied with the Khalifa’s policies. The *ashraf*, from the Mahdi’s own kinsmen, were dissatisfied with the hegemony of the Ta’aysha, the Khalifa’s clan. There were also a series of ecological challenges, including bad harvests and epidemics that led to famine between 1889 and 1990. As a result, by the early 1890s the Khalifa’s armies were easily beaten in numerous engagements. Their final defeat came at the hands of Lord Kitchener, beginning in August 1897 and continuing until the last battle at Karari, outside Omdurman, in September 1898. Thousands of Sudanese fighters were killed or wounded, whereas the Anglo-Egyptian losses numbered fewer than fifty dead and four hundred wounded.

This was the end of the Mahdiyya, but its influence did not end there nor in the Sudan. Rather, it spread throughout the *Bilad al-Sudan*. Right into the late 1920s the new colonial state had to deal with smaller mahdist revivals undertaken by local spiritual leaders (called *feks* in the Sudan), often done in the name of ‘Isa (Jesus). The religious idea in these uprisings was that *nabi ’Isa* (prophet Jesus) would appear after the death of the Mahdi, to herald the end of time.

In its short history the Mahdist state was able to put in place the foundations of a coherent and workable administration. There was a judiciary, and judgments were based on the
classical Islamic methods of juristic thought, although the Mahdi also sometimes relied on his own intuition as the Mahdi, a man with divinely inspired authority. There was a bayt al-mal (roughly, a Department of Finance or Treasury) which kept detailed records, taxed the subjects, and distributed wealth. The state minted its own coins for the local economy. In addition there was the military.

Under the Khalifa, the administration that had been put in place by the Mahdi lost its reputation and drifted into corruption. The Khalifa, for instance, acquired a private army for himself and a separate share of the bayt al-mal. However, the state under the Khalifa was not as wholly corrupt as it has sometimes been judged, although it did divert from the strictly puritanical path of its founder. The Mahdist state relied on local personnel and expertise and generated a huge body of correspondence, declarations, and other written material that has made it possible for historians to study this rare example of an African Muslim millennial movement and state.

See also Africa, Islam in; Islam and Other Religions; Mahdi; Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdullah; Zar.

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_Shamil Jeppie_

**MAHR**

_Mahr_ is a gift that the Muslim bridegroom offers the bride upon marriage. It is also called _sadaq_, an Arabic term that implies “friendship.” In English, _mahr_ has commonly been translated as “dower.” _Mahr_ is an integral part of every Islamic marriage contract: there can be no marriage without it. It becomes the exclusive property of the bride after marriage, and she can dispose of it in whatever way she wishes. The exact amount of _mahr_ is often agreed upon prior to marriage and is specified in the contract—_mahr_ al-musamma (definite _mahr_). If the amount is not specified, the bride is entitled to _mahr_ al-mithl (average _mahr_), which is determined on the basis of her personal qualities, her family position, and the prevailing _mahr_ among her people. _Mahr_ can also be divided into two portions, the “prompt” portion, which is paid at the time of marriage, and the “deferred” portion, which is payable only if the husband divorces his wife, or dies. If a man dies without paying his wife’s _mahr_, it is considered as a debt to be paid from his estate.

There is a general and implicit agreement among the different schools of Islamic law that _mahr_ is a corollary of the exchange element of the marriage contract. Classical jurists often speak of it as a price/compensation (_‘awad_, sometimes _‘ahad_) that the man pays for the exclusive right to the sexual and productive faculties of a woman, analogous to the price paid in the contract of sale. Modern writers, however, regard _mahr_ as an expression of honor for a woman’s worth and as a means of providing her with economic security during and after marriage. The rules regulating _mahr_ negate this view: It is linked merely to the act of consummation, not to any other aspect of the marriage contract. For example, a woman becomes entitled to _mahr_ only after the consummation of the marriage; at the same time, she can refrain from sexual submission unless she receives her _mahr_ in full.

Despite the uniformity among all schools of Islamic law on the definition of _mahr_ and the rules governing it, Muslim societies vary greatly as to its practice. In some countries, like Morocco, the bulk of the _mahr_ is paid to the father of the bride, who uses it to provide her with a trousseau for her wedding, and the deferred portion is nominal. In other countries, like Iran, no transfer of wealth takes place at the time of marriage and _mahr_ becomes payable only if and when divorce occurs: It is seen as a safeguard, and a woman can effectively use her _mahr_ as a negotiating card to obtain either a divorce or custody of her children in the event of the breakdown of the marriage. The value and practice of _mahr_ also varies with social class, and with the wealth of the families. As marriages are usually arranged by the parents of the spouses, they often agree on the amount of _mahr_. In many cases, a woman has no control over her _mahr_, as the entire amount is received by her father who might use it to secure brides for his sons. Throughout the Muslim world, moreover, there are a number of customary payments and exchanges made on the occasion of marriage, which bear little or no relation to the formal legal requirement of _mahr_.

See also Divorce; Law; Marriage.

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_Ziba Mir-Hosseini_
MAJLIS

The term majlis (assembly) has been used for elected parliaments in the Near and Middle East since the 1860s. The first modern constitution in the Muslim world, proclaimed by the bey of Tunis in 1861, provided for a grand assembly, but it was to be selected by the king and was intended for the supervision of administration and adjudication. The first elected majlis, which was inaugurated in Egypt in 1866, was purely consultative, but the Ottoman parliament was given some legislative power a decade later. The Ottoman parliament was created by the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and included representatives from the Balkan and Arab provinces, as well as the Turkish of the Ottoman Empire. It was dissolved, however, in less than two years. The ruler of Egypt was forced by constitutionalist parliamentarians to proclaim a more liberal constitution than the Ottoman one in 1882, but the effort came to naught with the British occupation of Egypt later that year.

The next wave of constitutionalism in the Middle East began with the revolution of 1906 in Iran, which forced the shah to proclaim a constitution that included a parliament with full legislative power. The Iranian National Consultative Assembly (Majles-e Shura-ye Melli) was elected in the same year. After the Islamic revolution, Iran was declared an Islamic Republic, but its new constitution of 1979 retained the majlis, and it was only after it met in 1980 that the majlis changed its name to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

In 1908, the Young Turks revolution forced the sultan to restore the Ottoman constitution. A year later, the constitution was amended to make ministers fully responsible to the parliament. After the Kemalist revolution, the last Ottoman parliament was dissolved by the sultan in 1920, and was replaced by the Grand National Assembly (Buyuk Millet Mejlisi) of Turkey, which passed the republican constitution of 1924.

In the period between the two world wars, constitutional monarchies with elected parliaments were established in independent Egypt (1923) and in Iraq (1925) and Jordan (1928) under the British mandate. In 1938, the emir of Kuwait proclaimed a five-article constitution. It included an assembly whose president was to have executive authority, but the assembly was soon dissolved and the experiment abandoned. A new Kuwaiti constitution was promulgated in 1962.

Republican constitutions came to force in Syria and Lebanon in 1943, Egypt in 1956, Tunisia in 1959, and Algeria and Yemen in 1962, whereas the Moroccan constitution of 1962 declared the nation to be a monarchy. Ministerial responsibility to parliament had been the main bone of contention between the executive branch of government and parliaments under constitutional monarchy, and parliaments had usually lost the contest. Securing meaningful accountability of the executive became even more difficult under the republican constitutions of the postcolonial era, which weakened the rights provisions by their commitment to the ideologies of socialism and nationalism and gave the presidents emergency powers and the right to rule by decree.

The Gulf states other than Kuwait gained their independence from Britain in the 1970s with constitutional documents, but usually without elected parliaments, except for Bahrain and, more recently, Qatar. Oman promulgated a constitution in 1991, and Saudi Arabia in 1992—sixty years after it had first been promised. A Palestinian parliament was set up in accordance with the 1993 Oslo Accords. With rare exceptions, Near and Middle Eastern parliaments have remained weak institutions, and have not succeeded in taking the initiative in legislation or in establishing enduring accountability of the executive branch of their respective governments.

See also Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Political Organization.

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MAJLISI, MUHAMMAD BAQIR (1627–1698)

Muhammad Baqir b. Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, known as the second Majlisi or the author of the Bibar, was a renowned Iranian Twelver Shi‘ite jurist of the late seventeenth century. Acting as the prayer leader and shaykh al-Islam of Isfahan under the Safavid monarchs, Shah Suleiman (r. 1666–1694) and Shah Sultan Husayn (r. 1694–1722), he suppressed philosophy and Sufism and reestablished clerical authority under his leadership. He devoted great efforts to the collection and translation of Shi‘ite hadith from Arabic into Persian to benefit the laity. He opposed the conventional reliance on Arabic as the main medium of instruction and publication for religious scholars and emphasized the need for doctrinal and legal works in Persian, which could be accessible to the public. He fervently upheld the concepts of “enjoining the good” and “prohibiting evil” and renewed the impetus for conversion from Sunnism to Shi‘ism. His legal method drew
Makassar, Shaykh Yusuf

Upon both the akhbari (traditionist) and usuli (rationalist) schools, as such accepting both the authority of Shi’ite traditions and the role of reason in arriving at a legal opinion. He is mostly known for his monumental work, a Shi’ite encyclopedia of hadith, Bihar al-Anwar, completed in 1692.

Rula Jardī Abisaab

Makassar, Shaykh Yusuf (c. 1626–1699)

Traditional Makassarese sources report that ‘Ali (Shaykh) Yusuf was born in 1626 to a princess of South Sulawesi and raised in the palace of the king of Tallo. He studied under some of the most prominent Arab Muslim scholars in Sulawesi before traveling to continue his education in Banten, Gujarat, the Yemen, Mecca, and Syria. In Damascus he was inducted into the Khalwatiyya order of Sufism, which he worked to spread in Southeast Asia after returning from the Middle East.

In 1664 he settled in Banten where he taught various branches of the Islamic sciences. In 1682 the sultan’s son rose against his father’s authority with the backing of the Dutch East India Company. Shaykh Yusuf took up an opposition campaign that he pursued for over a year until his capture by the Dutch. He was imprisoned in Batavia and later exiled to Sri Lanka, where he continued his role in advocating resistance against the Dutch via correspondence with the Muslim communities of Indonesia. In 1693 some of these communications were intercepted, and he was thus re-exiled to the Cape of Good Hope. He arrived there on 2 April 1694 and became a founding figure of the Muslim community in South Africa, where he remained until his death. In 1705 the ruler of Makassar petitioned for the repatriation of Shaykh Yusuf’s remains, and today his tombs in both Sulawesi and South Africa remain active centers of pilgrimage. Since the 1980s Shaykh Yusuf has become an increasingly popular figure in both Indonesia and South Africa, where Nelson Mandela hailed him as a hero in the history of struggles against oppression.

See also Africa, Islam in; Southeast Asia, Islam in; Tariqa.

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R. Michael Feener

Malcolm X (1925–1965)

An extraordinary orator, a self-taught intellectual, and a deeply spiritual man, Malcolm X was one of the most prominent African American political and religious leaders of the civil rights era. After being released from prison in 1952, where he had become a follower of Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm worked as a minister for the organization, most successfully in Harlem, New York. By the late 1950s, Malcolm had become Elijah Muhammad’s chief representative, helping to build the movement into black America’s most visible Muslim group. Famous for his fiery rhetoric, he was dubbed “America’s angriest Negro” as he sought to convert blacks to Elijah Muhammad’s separatist Islam. Malcolm also gained national attention as a critic of pro-integration civil rights leaders. In 1964, however, Malcolm left Elijah Muhammad’s movement and made the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, an occasion during which he publicly embraced Sunni Islam and distanced himself from Elijah Muhammad’s teachings. He also visited West Africa and became an advocate of pan-Africanism, the movement that called for the cultural and political unification of black persons around the world.

Until his brutal assassination in 1965, Malcolm worked as both a Sunni Muslim missionary in the United States and as founder of the Organization for Afro-American Unity, which espoused black solidarity. The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965), which was coauthored by Alex Haley, was published shortly after his death. Today, Muslims continue to debate the meaning of Malcolm’s life, often disagreeing about whether Malcolm overemphasized the importance of racial identity in his quest for black liberation.

See also American Culture and Islam; Conversion; Farrakhan, Louis; Muhammad, Elijah; Nation of Islam.

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Edward E. Curtis IV

Malik, Ibn Anas (c. 708–795)

Malik Ibn Anas, who was born between 708 and 716 C.E., was the most famous jurist from Medina by the time of his death in 795. Malik composed one of the first books of Islamic law, the Murwatta’.

Malik studied with several experts on Islamic tradition (hadith), some of whose parents knew the Prophet. He was
renowned for his knowledge of hadith, but his teachings were unique for his championing of the practice (sunna) of the inhabitants of Medina. Malik attracted students from all over the Islamic world, and the Muwatta' was taught in all medieval centers of learning, especially Egypt, Baghdad, North Africa, and Spain.

Under the caliph al-Mansur in 762 and 763 Malik was punished for his support of Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah, an ‘Alid pretender to the throne. But later in life the Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid tried to make the Muwatta’ the basis for a unified code of law. The sources agree, however, that these political intrigues were aberrations, and that Malik lived a simple life devoted to teaching, surrounded by a close group of devotees who collected his opinions on every conceivable subject.

The Muwatta’ has survived in several versions and includes hadith from the Prophet and his Companions as well as legal opinions of Malik and other famous scholars from Medina. It is organized in chapters and covers all aspects of ritual and social life. It is still part of the required curriculum of many Islamic universities today, especially in North and West Africa where the Maliki school (one of the four schools of Sunni law) predominates. Several other books, some recently uncovered, contain extensive collections of Malik’s opinions not found in the Muwatta’.

See also Africa, Islam in; Law; Madhhab.

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Jonathan E. Brockopp

MA’MUN, AL- (786–833)

Abu ‘l-‘Abbas ‘Abdallah al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) was the seventh caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty (750–1258). He came to power in the wake of Islam’s fourth civil war and is best known for his theological interests and for instituting an inquisition, the Mihna, on the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’ân.

During the reign of his father, Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), al-Ma’mun served as the governor of Khurasan, in northeastern Iran. He was appointed by al-Rashid as his second successor, after al-Ma’mun’s half-brother, Muhammad al-Amin (r. 809–813). But the relations between the two brothers deteriorated rapidly after the death of al-Rashid, which led to a protracted and destructive civil war and eventually to the defeat and death of al-Amin. Al-Ma’mun stayed in Khurasan for several more years after the civil war, before moving back to the Abbasid capital, Baghdad, in 818. The civil war was an episode of major proportions: The long siege of Baghdad and the unrest that followed its fall to al-Ma’mun’s troops left large parts of the city in ruins; and the killing of al-Amin, the first time in Abbasid history that a caliph had been murdered, cast a long shadow over the victorious caliph’s legitimist claims.

Al-Ma’mun’s reign is also noted for the distinctly pro-‘Alid policies he pursued. The ‘Alids, the descendants of the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), considered themselves to be the rightful claimants to the caliphate, and saw not just the Umayyads (661–750) but also the Abbasids as usurpers—claims viewed unfavorably by caliphs from both houses. While still in Khurasan, al-Ma’mun, in an unprecedented move that startled and dismayed many in his Abbasid clan, had in 817 nominated ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (d. 818) as his successor. This was justified by the caliph on grounds that al-Rida—“the acceptable one,” whom the later Twelver Shi’a reckon to be their eighth imam—was the person most qualified for the political leadership of the community. The caliph also adopted the ‘Alid green to replace black as the official color of the Abbasids. And later in his career, he had ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib publicly declared “the best” person after the prophet Muhammad, thus denying the superiority of Muhammad’s first two successors, Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, a point that was then evolving as a matter of dogma among the early Sunnis. ‘Ali al-Rida mysteriously died before al-Ma’mun’s return to Baghdad, though the caliph continued his pro-‘Alid stance until the end of his reign.

The episode, however, which left the most lasting impression on subsequent generations was neither the civil war nor the caliph’s pro-‘Alid sympathies. Nor was it even al-Ma’mun’s patronage of ancient Greek learning, which later came to be associated specifically with his name. Rather, what came to be remembered as the most famous, and controversial, facet of the caliph’s reign and of his legacy was the Mihna, an inquisition seeking to enforce the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’ân. This was a doctrine attributed in particular to two early theologians, Ja’d b. Dirham (d. 743) and Jahm b. Saifwan (d. 745), and to the latter’s putative followers, the Jahmîyya. The Mu’tazila—the most famous of Islam’s rationalist theologians, who enjoyed unprecedented political influence under al-Ma’mun and his two successors—espoused it as well; they were also closely associated, during the years of the Mihna (833–c. 851), with the abortive caliphal effort to implement this doctrine as a matter of state policy.

In 827, al-Ma’mun had publicly announced his support for the createdness of the Qur’ân. Five years later, and shortly before his death, he decreed that the judges and the scholars of hadith be made to publicly assent to it. A number of
explanations have been offered to explain this ultimately abortive venture into state sponsorship of a theological doctrine, but it appears that the caliph’s interest in asserting his position as the arbiter of right belief, and in thereby checking the increasing influence in society of the populist scholars of hadith, had much to do with the institution of the Mihna.

The caliph lived for only about four months after he had begun the Inquisition. He died in Tarsus in 833, while on a campaign against the Byzantines, and was succeeded by his brother al-Mu’tasim (r. 833–842). The Inquisition continued under him as well as under the latter’s successor, al-Wathiq (r. 842–847), and was finally brought to an end—along with the political influence of the Mu’tazila—during the reign of al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861). The debate on the theological controversies the Mihna had brought to the fore, as well as on the controversial caliph who had instituted it, continued for many centuries.

See also Caliphate; Fitna; Mihna; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila; Succession.

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Muhammad Qasim Zaman

MANAR, MANARA

At its simplest, a minaret (Ar. manar(a), mi’dhana, sawmad’a) is a raised structure attached to a mosque from which a muezzin gives the call to prayer, known in Arabic as the adhan. Minarets give a distinctive “Islamic” look to the skylines of cities in the Muslim world and indicate from afar the presence of a mosque below. Minarets are commonly tall and slender towers—sometimes polygonal or square but most often cylindrical—supporting one or more balconies for the muezzin. In some parts of the Muslim world, notably Upper Egypt, East Africa, and Kashmir, minarets were either unknown or took a more modest form.

In most times and places minarets were built only with mosques, but occasionally they were attached to other structures, such as the Taj Mahal, a magnificent seventeenth-century tomb at Agra in India, which is surrounded by four towers. Muslim architects have built minarets out of brick or stone or even wood; they have left them plain or covered them with tiles and carving bearing geometric, arabesque, and epigraphic motifs. They have placed them either singly, or in pairs, to flank a doorway or a facade, or in groups of four or more to surround an important building, such as the sanctuary around the Ka’ba in Mecca. The origins of the minaret have been sought in the monumental columns and lighthouses of the late antique Mediterranean lands, the ziggurats of ancient Mesopotamia, and the stupas and commemorative columns of India, but it seems most likely that the minaret was wholly an Islamic invention of the ninth century, meant to draw attention to the mosque as a center of religious life.

See also Adhan; Architecture; Masjid.

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Sheila S. Blair
Jonathan M. Bloom

MANICHEANISM

Manicheanism was a gnostic religious movement founded by Mani (c. 216–274 or 276), an Iranian religious figure who believed that he had received divine instruction from a spiritual “Twin.” The Twin revealed to him “the mystery of light and of darkness” and “the battle which darkness stirred up” when its demons attempted to invade the kingdom of light and entrapped light particles in material bodies. In 240, the Twin commanded him to become the apostle of a new religion and church. The Manichean community was composed of the Elect, whose rituals and strictly regulated behavior helped liberate light particles, and the Auditors, who led less austere lives and provided the Elect with nourishment. To this essentially dualistic religion, and in an attempt to create a truly universal faith, Mani and his followers deliberately added elements drawn from other religions they encountered, including Mithraism, Christianity, and Buddhism. Mani won the support of the Sassanian ruler Shahpur I (239–270) for his far-ranging missionary activities but aroused the enmity of the Zoroastrian clergy, led by the high-priest Kartir, who eventually persuaded Bahram I (271–274) to imprison Mani. Mani either died in prison or was executed. Manicheanism was thereafter ruthlessly suppressed both in the Sassanian East and the Christian West.
The Muslim conquests temporarily ended persecution of Manicheanism in the land of its birth. The Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf (d. 714), apparently sought to accord Manicheans protected (‘abimin) status and to regulate the affairs of their community through an archegos based in Ctesiphon (Mada'in). Efforts were also made to heal the sectarian schism that had developed between the Mesopotamian Manicheans and those in the east (known as the Dinawariyya). The Abbasid caliphs, however, were increasingly intolerant of religious diversity, and al-Mahdi (775–785) and al-Hadi (785–786) carried out a systematic purge of individuals suspected of zandaqa. This term was virtually a synonym for Manicheanism, and it is claimed that those accused of zandaqa had to prove their innocence by spitting on a portrait of Mani. Yet only one of the victims of this campaign has been shown to actually been a Manichean proper; the Abbasid repression was rather directed against Manichean tendencies in Islam and more generally against nominal Muslims suspected of holding Persianizing, dualistic, syncretistic, subversive, free-thinking, or atheistic ideas. It did make the practice of Manicheanism more difficult and led to a new migration of Manicheans from Iraq to Central Asia. According to al-Nadim, the last leader of the Manichean community in Iraq fled to Khurasan in the time of al-Muqtadir (908–932). He further indicates that he had personally known some three hundred “Zindiqs” in Baghdad during the time of the Buyid emir Mu’izz-al-Dawla (946–967), but this number had dwindled to less than five a quarter-century later.

Manicheanism was strongest in eastern Iran and Central Asia, where Sogdian merchants served as able missionaries for the faith. Its position was strengthened when, in about 762, it became the official religion of the Uighur khaghanate. According to al-Nadim, the “ruler of Khurasan” (presumably one of the Samanids) wanted to follow the Abbasid lead and exterminate the Manicheans in his kingdom but was restrained by the threats of the Uighur khaghan (“lord of the Tughuzghuz”) to retaliate against the Muslims in his lands. A Manichean text in Parthian from this period shows that Manicheans were attempting to assimilate the terminology and concepts of Islam, just as they had in the case of other religions. From the tenth century onward, Sufi missionaries, including al-Hallaj, actively proselytized among the Manichean and Turkish communities. By Mongol times, Manicheanism had been supplanted in Central Asia by either Islam or Buddhism.

An unresolved question is the extent to which Manicheans and Manichean tendencies (mixed with neo-Mazdakism) may have been involved in anti-Abbasid revolts in Central Asia. It is suggestive, for example, that the famous revolt of al-Muqanna‘ (c. 777–783) took place in Sogdia and was supported by the Turks; he and his followers were known as “wearers of white” (reminiscent of the traditional garb of the Manichean Elect), believed in the transmigration of souls, and made much use of the imagery of light. There is, however, no direct evidence linking the revolt to Manicheans, and the dietary and sexual practices attributed to the rebels were certainly non-Manichean.

Mani and Manicheanism are mentioned in numerous Islamic historical and literary texts. They sometimes depict Mani as a prototypical arch-heretic, but he is also often treated as a genuine religious leader and, especially in Persian works, remembered as an acclaimed artist (as he was in fact the founder of the rich Manichean tradition of illustrated manuscripts and fresco paintings).

See also Islam and Other Religions.

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Elton L. Daniel

Mansa Musa (? –1337)

One of the most famous emperors of the medieval Western Sudanic kingdom of Mali, Mansa Musa reigned from about 1312 to 1337. He extended the kingdom of Mali by bringing under its suzerainty many non-Mandingo people of the Sahel. Many sources, including the Arabic author al-‘Umari (1301–1394), described Mansa Musa as a pious Muslim, and as one of the medieval rulers whose contribution to the spread of Islam in the Western Sudan was the most significant.

One of the most noted events of Mansa Musa’s reign was his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1312. On his way, he visited Egypt during the reign of the Mamluk sultan, Nasir b. Qala’un.

Islam and the Muslim World

Elton L. Daniel
Mansa Musa, it has been reported, was accompanied by thousands of peoples and camels laden with gold. He gave huge quantities of gold to the sultan of Egypt. His stay in Egypt was one of the main events of the year 1312. He distributed so much gold that the price of this precious metal dropped. Perhaps because of the notoriety he gained by this pilgrimage, Mali started to appear in maps drawn by European cartographers. Mansa Musa’s reign supported a flowering in Malian scholarship and architecture. He commissioned al-Sahili, the Andalusian poet and man of letters, to design mosques and other buildings in Mali. Mansa Musa attracted scholars and brought back books of Islamic jurisprudence to the libraries Mali. He also began sending students to Islamic universities in North Africa. He built Qur’anic schools, and established the Friday congregational prayer in Mali.

See also Africa, Islam in.

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MAQASSARI, TAANTA SALMANKA AL- See Makasar, Shaykh Yusuf

MARJAʿ AL-TAQLID

Marjaʿ al-taqlid (Persian Marjaʿ-e taqlid) literally means “the source of imitation.” Marjaʿ al-taqlid is a title given to the highest-ranking cleric within Twelver Shiʿism. The conception of a single leading scholar who both directs and leads the ulema was not absent in Shiʿism, but the marjaʿ institution did not emerge until the nineteenth century. The first universally recognized marjaʿ was the influential mujtābi Murtada al-Ansari (d. 1864). He was followed by a series of scholars whose level of support as marjaʿ varied, and a number of scholars at the same time could be put forward as “sources” (marajī) simultaneously. There is no formal means whereby a marjaʿ is selected: it seems he emerges as the “most learned” (al-lamiyya). There is also much dispute of the level of his authority (as a spokesperson, or as an authority to be obeyed by other scholars and the community). In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini led a revolution in Iran arguing that a single “supreme jurist” should control both the religious and the political affairs of the Shiʿa. His success changed the institution of marjaʿ al-taqlid, politicizing it and making disobeying the orders of the supreme jurist similar to treason. After Khomeini died in 1989, there were political and religious disputes among the Shiʿa over the role of the marjaʿ al-taqlid. This dispute contributed to the declaration by the Iranian government, in 1994, that Ayatollah Sayyed ʿAli Khamaneʿi (a former close associate of Khomeini) was the single marjaʿ al-taqlid when the then undisputed marjaʿ Ayatollah Khūi died. This move was undoubtedly linked to the need to establish the position of “leader of the revolution” (rabbah) in Iran. Ayatollah Khameneʿi’s position as the Marjaʿ al-taqlid has, however, remained a matter of dispute.

See also Shiʿa: Imami (Twelver); Taqlid; Ulema.

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Robert Gleave

MARRIAGE

In Muslim societies marriage is a contract regulated by a code of law rooted in religious precepts—the šariʿa. The relations between the precepts and the law are complex, the interpretations of the law vary considerably, and the social practices of marriage constitute a major part of the rich cultural diversity of the Muslim world. Moreover, marriage rules and customs have been central to ongoing debates over issues of modernity and women’s status in Islam, starting with the anticolonial and nationalist movements of the early twentieth century. The codification and reform of šariʿa rules governing marriage in the first part of the century, and the more recent emergence of Islamist movements and their demand for a return to šariʿa, have highlighted the ideological dimension of the legal regulation of marriage.

Marriage in Islamic law is based on a strong patriarchal ethos, imbued with religious ideals and values. It is one of the few contracts that straddles the boundary between the two main categories: ʿibadat (spiritual/ritual acts) and muʿāmalat (social/private acts). In spirit, marriage belongs to ʿibadat, in that Muslim jurists define it as a religious duty. In form, it comes under the category of muʿāmalat, is defined as a civil contract, and is patterned after the contract of sale, which has served as a model for other contracts. In this respect, there is
no difference among the various schools: all share the same conception of marriage. If they differ, it is to the extent to which they translate this conception into legal rules.

In its legal structure, marriage (nikah) is a contract of exchange, with fixed terms and uniform legal effects. Its essential components are the offer (ijab), which is made by the woman or her guardian (wali), the acceptance (qabul) by the man, and the payment of dower (mahr or sadaq), a sum of money or any valuable that the husband pays or undertakes to pay to the bride before or after consummation. With the contract, a wife comes under her husband’s ‘isma (dominion and protection), entailing a set of defined rights and obligations for each party—some supported by legal force, others by moral sanction. Those with legal force revolve around the twin themes of sexual access and compensation, embodied in the concepts of tamkin (submission) and nafaqa (maintenance). Tamkin—defined as unhampered sexual access—is the husband’s right and thus the wife’s duty; whereas nafaqa—defined as shelter, food, and clothing—is the wife’s right and the husband’s duty. A wife is entitled to nafaqa only after consummation of the marriage, and she loses her claim if she is in a state of nushuq (disobedience).

The contract establishes neither a shared matrimonial regime nor identical rights and obligations between the spouses: The husband is sole provider and owner of matrimonial resources and the wife is possessor of mahr and her own wealth. The only shared space is that involving the procreation of children, and even here the wife is not legally compelled to suckle her child unless it is impossible to feed it otherwise. Likewise, only a man can enter more than one marriage at a time (four permanent contracts in Sunni schools of law; and, in Shi’a law, as many temporary ones as he desires or can afford). Only the husband can terminate each contract at will: He needs no grounds and neither the wife’s presence nor her consent. Wives can, however, through the insertion of stipulations in the contract, modify some of its terms and acquire, for example, the right to choose the place of residence or to work, or the delegated right to divorce if the husband contracts another marriage.

Muslim jurists claim that this construction of marriage, based on their readings of the sacred texts, is divinely ordained. But marriage as lived and experienced by Muslims involves a host of customary obligations and social relationships that have always gone far beyond juristic constructions. Some of these are rooted in the ideals of the shari’a and enjoy its moral support, though they are not reflected in legal rulings. In Muslim societies, marriage in practice not only creates a matrimonial regime but takes a wide range of forms, varying according to customary practices, individual inclinations and characters, the social origins (rural/urban, class) of the partners, and their economic resources. Men’s unconditional legal rights to divorce and polygamy are often checked in practice by social mores, the pressures of the extended family, and the stigma usually attached to both polygamy and divorce.

With the emergence of modern nation-states and the creation of modern legal systems in the early part of the twentieth century, the juristic rules of marriage were selectively reformed, codified, and grafted onto a unified legal system (as in most Middle Eastern and Asian Muslim countries) or were left intact to be applied by Islamic judges (as in most African and Persian Gulf countries). Turkey was the only state in the Muslim world to introduce a Western code to replace juristic rules, though these continued to govern marriages in rural areas and among religious groups. In most Muslim countries during the twentieth century, as women’s access to education and work, and consequently their aspirations for equality, increased, so did the gap between juristic and social notions of marriage widen. On the whole, until the rise of political Islam in the 1970s, marriage was acquiring a more egalitarian legal structure in the Muslim world. More recently, the patriarchal juristic model has been widely reassessed. Despite wide-ranging variations and changes in practice, the jurists’ notions continue to dominate both the reality of marriage in contemporary Muslim societies and debates about the issue. Not only do most Muslims believe the juristic conception to be divinely ordained, but it informs the legal rules in most Muslim countries.

An image of a young Muslim couple in traditional wedding attire appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Divorce; Gender; Law; Mahr.

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Ziba Mir-Hosseini

MARTYRDOM

The idea of martyrdom in Islam is rooted in the fact that from the beginning of the religion, Muslims died in the struggle to establish and expand the Islamic state, and their deaths in the course of this struggle were remembered and celebrated. The
Qur’an encourages martyrdom by assuring believers that death is illusory: “And say not of those slain in God’s way, ‘They are dead’; rather they are living, but you are not aware” (2:154).

God also promises ample rewards to those who die fi sabil Allah, “in the way of God”:

Count not those who were slain in God’s way as dead, but rather living with their Lord, by Him provided, rejoicing in the bounty God has given them, because no fear shall be on them, neither shall they sorrow, joyful in blessing and bounty from God, and that God leaves not to waste the wage of the believers. (3:169–171)

Other passages elevate death in the course of struggle for Islam (e.g. 3:157–158, 4:74; 9:20–22; 47:4–6; and 61:11).

Martyrdom in Early Islam
While the idea of martyrdom is clearly rooted in the Qur’an, the technical terms for martyr, shahid, and for martyrdom, shahada, arise from a different context. When the term shahid appears in the Qur’an, as it does frequently, it never means martyr, but only “witness,” in the legal sense or in the ordinary sense of “eyewitness.” The extension of the meaning of shahid to martyrdom was likely a borrowing from Syrian Christians for whom the connection of martyrdom with an act of witnessing was deep rooted and reflected in linguistic usage. The terms martyς in Greek and sḥda in Syriac both carried the dual meaning of witness and martyr, and A. J. Wensinck and Ignaz Goldziher plausibly argued that the Arabic shahid is borrowed from the Syriac.

This connection between martyrdom and witness made sense to Christians, for the Christian martyrs were those who witnessed by their manner of death to the reality of heaven and the inevitable victory of God. But for Muslims the connection was a stretch for the simple reason that the Qur’anic idea of death in the way of God required no act of witnessing. Muslims were thus left with the uncomfortable problem of discovering a link between the two ideas, and they came up with a variety of creative suggestions: Martyrs are called “witnesses” because their souls witness Paradise, their deaths are witnessed by angels, they will serve as witnesses against those who rejected God’s prophets, Muhammad will be a witness on their behalf at the Day of Judgment, or their wounds will testify to their exalted status in the afterlife. The awkwardness of these suggestions, as Keith Lewinstein points out, suggests that later Muslims had no idea why the two ideas came together and that the connection had to be invented to explain linguistic usage.

Early Islamic martyrdom, then, was an inevitable corollary not of witnessing to the truth but of struggling on its behalf. Thus jihad, or struggle, provides the chief context for the earliest ideas of martyrdom in Islam. Accounts of the earliest Muslim martyrs reflect this context. The martyrs most celebrated in biographies of the Prophet are those who threw themselves into battle with courage and abandon. Ibn Ishaq’s account of the Muslim victory at Badr (623/624 C.E.), for example, is peppered with accounts of martyrdom. In one account, ‘Umar was eating some dates when he heard the Prophet promise Paradise to any who died in battle. At this he immediately flung the dates aside and threw himself into the battle exclaiming, “Is there nothing between me and entering Paradise save to be killed by these men?” Another Muslim, ‘Asim, asked Muhammad, “What makes the Lord laugh with joy at His servant?” Muhammad answered, “When he plunges into the midst of the enemy without mail.” At this ‘Asim threw off his mail coat, plunged into the battle and was killed.

Incentives for this kind of battlefield martyrdom are colorfully elaborated in the tradition literature. Martyrs are first of all spared from the normal pain of death. They then proceed directly to the highest station in Paradise, without waiting for the Day of Judgment, and without enduring interrogation in the grave by the angels Munkar and Nakir. Once in Paradise they share the place closest to the throne of God with the prophets, wear jeweled crowns, and are each given seventy baris (virgins of paradise). Martyrs are purified of sin and do not require the Prophet’s intercession—indeed, according to some traditions, martyrs are themselves second only to the prophets as intercessors.

While fighting unbelievers on the battlefield has remained a basic and consistent emphasis in Muslim understandings of martyrdom, conflicts within the Muslim community took the idea in new directions. Martyrdom was an especially potent ideal among some Kharijite Muslims who called themselves shawat, or vendors, in reference to Qur’anic praise for those who sell their earthly lives in exchange for Paradise (4:74; 9:112). The idea of deliberately seeking martyrdom (talab al-shabatat) by “selling” one’s life came to be especially associated with Kharijites. One Kharijite ideologue, for instance, exhorts his followers to strive against “the unjust leaders of error, and to go out (khurur) from the Abode of Transience to the Abode of Eternity and join our believing, convinced brothers who have sold (ha’a) this world for the next, and spent their wealth in quest of God’s good pleasure in the final reckoning” (Lewinstein, 2002, p. 85). As this exhortation makes clear, the conflicts that provided the Kharijites with opportunities for martyrdom were not struggles against unbelievers, but struggles for justice and purity in the Muslim community. More importantly, martyrdom was not merely an inconvenient by-product of struggle for which the martyr needs to be compensated, but a goal worth pursuing in its own right.

The Shi‘a and Martyrdom
Internal struggles within the umma also shaped the construction of martyrdom among Shi‘ite Muslims, for whom the
death of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn became the defining event of their history as a community. Husayn was martyred in 680 at Karbala in Iraq when his small band, accompanied by women and children, was attacked and massacred by the army of the Umayyad ruler, Yazid. Shi’ite interpretations of Karbala took Muslim ideas of martyrdom in completely new directions. Husayn’s suffering and death came to be seen not just as an individual contribution to the struggle against injustice, meriting individual reward, but as a deliberate redemptive act of cosmic significance. By choosing martyrdom Husayn ensured the ultimate victory of his community and earned the place of mediator for his people. Martyrdom became such a central value for the Shi’a that all the Shi’ite imams were held to have been martyrs, and the major ritual and devotional expressions of Shi’ism are celebrations of martyrdom.

Types of Martyrdom

To celebrate martyrdom is not the same as to seek it, however. Shi’ite scholars were happy to revere Husayn but they resisted the impulse to emulate him. In this they were part of a broader scholarly tendency to dilute the value of martyrdom. In the hands of mainstream scholars, both Sunni and Shi’ite, the category of martyr was enlarged to include many kinds of death, including drowning, pleurisy, plague, or diarrhea. According to other traditions martyrs also include those who die in childbirth, those who die defending their property, those who are eaten by lions, and those who die of seasickness. A special category of martyr is made up of those who suffer the pangs of unexpressed and unrequited love, patiently keeping their passions concealed to death. The trend culminated in the transference of the value of martyrdom to other pious acts, so that death was no longer the most important prerequisite. The band of martyrs came to include anyone who conscientiously fulfills his or her religious obligations, those who engage in the “greater jihad” against their own evil tendencies, and, significantly, scholars who engage in the “jihad of the pen.” According to one well-known hadith, the ink of the scholars will outweigh the blood of the martyrs.

The incongruity of equating battlefield martyrs with victims of unrequited love or those who died quietly in bed did not go unnoticed by legal scholars. Thus battlefield martyrs are put in a special category as “martyrs in this world and the next” and are honored with special burial rites. The martyr’s body, in most circumstances, is not washed; he is to be buried in the clothes in which he was killed. Some hold that no prayers over the martyr are necessary since he is automatically purified from sin. The lesser categories of martyrs are “martyrs of the next world” meaning, chiefly, that they are not eligible for special burial rites but must be satisfied with divine approbation and the rewards of Paradise.

Even if battlefield martyrs retained a special status, however, the trend in medieval Muslim treatments of the subject was to render the major benefits of martyrdom common currency, readily available to any pious believer. Several characteristics of medieval Islam contributed to the trend: the pervasive influence of Sufism with its characteristic focus on the spiritual value of an act rather than its externals, scholarly quietism in reaction to the militancy of the Kharijites and other Islamic rebels, and the simple fact that opportunities for martyrdom in the struggle against unbelievers were severely diminished after the initial century of conquest.

Outside the definitions of martyrdom discussed in the legal literature, an independent tradition of martyrdom was kept alive among Sufis. The paradigmatic Sufi martyr was Ibn Mansur al-Hallaj (d. 922), who was crucified by Muslim authorities in Baghdad on the charge of blasphemy. Al-Hallaj, along with other Sufi martyr heroes like Suhrawai (d. 1168), ‘Ayn al-Qudat (d. 1131), and Ibn Sab’in (d. 1269), died the victim of his own inordinate love for the Divine, thus exemplifying the Sufi ideal of extinction in the Divine and acting out the tragedy of the mystic lover, caught between the conflicting demands of love and law. This style of martyrdom belonged to the spiritual virtuosi, however. For the ordinary Muslim, the benefits of martyrdom are only experienced secondhand, by visiting a martyr’s shrine, or masabha, or for Shi’a, by reenacting the passion of Husayn in ta’ziya celebrations during the month of Muharram.

Militancy and Martyrdom

The sublimation of the martyr ideal in pious devotion has continued in Muslim societies, but the modern experience has also given some Muslims abundant reason to revive more militant ideas of martyrdom. Modern Muslim treatments of martyrdom have been intertwined with changing attitudes toward jihad, and are shaped by reaction against the quietism of the medieval tradition. Whereas for medieval jurists both jihad and martyrdom were spiritualized and internalized, the colonial experience suddenly gave the idea of militant struggle new relevance. Thus a common early response to colonialism was the emergence of anticolonial jihad movements like that of Sayyid Ahmad in India. Nineteenth-century Muslim apologists and modernists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), Chiragh ‘Ali (1844–1895), and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) departed from the medieval tradition in a different way by reinterpreting jihad to accord with Western preconceptions. Jihad, the modernists argued, amounts to no more than the right of a state to defend itself against attack. The effect was to encourage a secularization of martyrdom whereby any soldier who died for his country could be counted a martyr.

Against both the quietism of medieval scholars and the apologetics of modernists, revivalists have called for a return to militant jihad and a revival of the ideals of physical martyrdom. Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and a celebrated martyr in his own right, offers a stirring invitation to martyrdom:
Brothers! God gives the umma that is skilled in the practice of death and that knows how to die a noble death an exalted life in this world and eternal felicity in the next. What is the fantasy that has reduced us to loving this world and hating death? If you gird yourselves for a lofty deed and yearn for death, life shall be given to you . . . Know, then, that death is inevitable, and that it can only happen once. If you suffer in the way of God, it will profit you in this world and bring you reward in the next. (Hasan al-Banna, 1978, p.156).

For al-Banna and other revivalists, waging jihad is held to be an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) of all Muslims. It is thus incumbent on every Muslim to prepare him- or herself for martyrdom, and it is on the basis of this duty that al-Banna calls on Muslims to become skilled at dying and to master “the art of death” (fann al-mawt). Since all must die, the wise will learn how to get the most benefit out of the exchange (Q. 4:74). Such advocacy of martyrdom echoes the ideology of the Kharijites and comes close to encouraging the seeking out of martyrdom, tabah al-shabada, a practice condemned in classical scholarship. The recent pattern of suicide bombings sponsored by militant Islamic movements, many of them offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, fits comfortably into the framework of the call of Hasan al-Banna to be “skilled in the practice of death.”

Modern Shi’ite treatments of martyrdom have tended to run along parallel lines, emphasizing the ideological value of martyrdom. When an individual gives his or her life for a cause, according to ‘Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977), this life becomes valuable in proportion to the value of the cause for which it is spent. A martyr expends his or her whole existence for an ideal, and that ideal is given life through martyrdom. Martyrs thus exchange their lives for something greater and more lasting, leaving behind a permanent and valuable legacy. Similarly, Ayatollah Taliqani (1910–1979) invokes the Sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273) to argue that martyrdom is part of a chain of sacrifice whereby the imperfect is perfected. Just as vegetation is eaten by a lamb and becomes flesh and blood, so a martyr loses his existence to partake in a higher cause.

These justifications for martyrdom are clearly modern in their emphasis on the ideological value of martyrdom. Such ideas have more than theoretical relevance. Modern conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, and Iran have produced a large crop of martyrs, along with a huge volume of popular literature celebrating their deeds. Consequently, activist and militant forms of martyrdom tend to be the most visible and dramatic expressions of the idea in the modern Islamic world. The prominence of such militant forms should not, however, be allowed to obscure the continued importance of other enduring expressions of martyrdom in popular devotion and especially in Shi’ite ritual.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Expansion; Husayn; ‘Ibadat; Imamate; Jihad; Kharijites, Khawarij; Ta’ziya.

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Daniel W. Brown

MARWA, MUHAMMAD (D. 1980)

Muhammad Marwa (Maitatsine) was a Qur’anic teacher from Cameroon in West Africa who followed shari’a (Islamic law). After he moved to Nigeria, his teachings inspired a religious, millenial revolt against the government in the northern province of Kano in 1980. A mystic, he resembled the Mahdi of Sudan in that he claimed revelatory knowledge, which supplemented, and even superseded, the teachings of the prophet Muhammad. In 1979, he apparently declared himself
a prophet greater than Muhammad. The movement, also known as Yan Tatsine (the followers of Maitatsine), was nominally Muslim but unorthodox, rejecting established authorities, both religious and secular. It had a strong element of political protest in it, attracting mostly the urban poor, young men who had moved to the city and could not fit in with established groups.

Marwa recruited from Qur'anic schools, rejecting the authority of all books aside from the Qur'an, including the hadiths. Followers kept their own mosques and schools. The movement was hostile to women, many of whom were kidnapped and kept in Marwa’s compound for months. Tensions with the government exploded in a series of riots, apparently instigated by attacks that Marwa’s followers made on members of the local Muslim community in December 1980 in Kano (resulting in 4,177 deaths) and again in 1982 in Kaduna and Maiduguri, after which the movement was suppressed. It was blamed for further uprisings in the early 1980s, which the government used as an excuse to increase state control. Marwa was among those killed in the 1980 riots.

See also Africa, Islam in; Kano; Mahdi.

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Paula Stiles

MARWAN (623–685 C.E.)

Marwan b. al-Hakam b. Abi al-‘As, Abu ‘Abd al-Malik, the eponym of the Marwanid branch of the Umayyads, reigned for several months in 684 and 685 C.E. He was one of the Companions of Muhammad and the cousin of ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan (r. 644–656), the third caliph of Islam. Marwan was appointed secretary to ‘Uthman during his caliphate because of his knowledge of the Qur’an and became the caliph’s closest advisor. He probably encouraged the caliph to compile the Qur’an. Much of Marwan’s wealth came from the rich plunder he obtained during an expedition to North Africa, which he invested in properties in Medina. Despite objection from many Medinans, Marwan influenced ‘Uthman to appoint his brother, Harith b. Hakam, to oversee the market of Medina.

Marwan was viewed as an ambitious man and his influence on the caliph was generally regarded as negative. When Egyptian malcontents negotiated a political settlement with ‘Uthman, Marwan is believed to have written a letter ordering the execution of the Egyptians concerned. It was the discovery of this letter by the Egyptians that led to ‘Uthman’s being besieged and murdered in his home in 656. This event is remembered as “the battle of the house,” or yawm al-dar. Marwan was wounded while trying to protect ‘Uthman. He later fought in the Battle of the Camel with ‘A’isha against ‘Ali, for ‘Ali would neither investigate nor punish the murderers of ‘Uthman. Later, Marwan swore allegiance to ‘Ali, but joined the ranks of Mu’awiya when ‘Ali was murdered. He was appointed governor of Medina by the caliph Mu’awiya b. Abi Sufyan (r. 661–680), and served in this capacity from 661 to 668 and again from 674 to 677.

Mu’awiya was succeeded by his son, Yazid, who died in 683, followed by Yazid’s son, Mu’awiya II, who died a few months later. Meanwhile, the hostility provoked by Yazid during his brief caliphate, which saw the death of Husayn b. ‘Ali, the battle of the Harra (a stronghold in Medina), and the onslaught against Mecca, had brought ‘Abdullah b. al-Zubayr great popularity. Al-Zubayr was acclaimed caliph of the region extending from the Hijaz (a region in western Saudi Arabia) to Iraq. The Umayyads were thus forced to look beyond the Sufyanid family for a leader.

At this point, frustrated by inadequate leadership, tribal loyalties that had been submerged by the uniting forces of Islam emerged once again. The faction led by Ibn Bahdul, chief of the Kalbi clan, proclaimed Marwan caliph, while the faction led by al-Dahhaq b. Ways al-Fihri supported Ibn al-Zubayr. When the two factions met at the battle of Marj Rahat it was Marwan who won the day.

Marwan immediately consolidated his position: He married Fakhita bt. Abi Hashim, the widow of Yazid, vowing that the latter’s son, Khalid b. Yazid, would be his successor. Once appointed caliph, however, he first replaced Egypt’s Zubayrid governor with his son, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Then, reneging on his promise to Fakhita, he named his eldest son, ‘Abd al-Malik, heir to the caliphate. Finally, having defeated Mus’ab b. al-Zubayr, the brother of his rival caliph in Mecca, he sent his general, ‘Ubayd Allah b. Ziyad, to capture Iraq.

Marwan died in 685, murdered by his wife, Fakhita, before Iraq was taken. His son, ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705), successfully consolidated the Umayyad caliphate under the Marwanid banner.

See also Caliphate; Succession.

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**MASCU-LINITIES**

The academic study of masculinity has recently emerged as a parallel to feminist strategies of deconstructing historical, cultural, class, religious, and other factors shaping notions of maleness. In the case of Islam and Muslim societies, elements contributing to masculinities are normative pronouncements of the religion, the models of the Prophet and his companions, as well as philosophical, ethical, and social discourses and practices.

The Qur’an seems to privilege the male as being “a degree higher” and gives him responsibility over females. Nonetheless, feminist scholars such as Asma Barlas have been trying to recover an underlying antipatriarchal ethos behind the stories of the sacred text, for example, in Abraham’s breaking with traditional models of patriarchy through rejecting his father’s gods. The Prophet himself embodied traits of strength and gentleness, and served both as a warrior and tender husband and father. ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, as a heroic male figure embodies both military prowess and spiritual wisdom, whereas ‘Umar, the second caliph, projects the harsh and uncompromising enforcement of social control while dispensing impartial justice.

Both pre- and post-Islamic Arabic cultures contain well-developed concepts of *muwaqqat*, or manliness, combining moral notions of integrity, fidelity, valor, chastity, and honor. In medieval Muslim societies and Sufi spheres, the ethical code of *futuwwa* (Arabic) or *jahannamard* (Persian) was enacted by societies or guild-like alliances of young men bonded around ethics of honor and companionship. A sort of Persian cult of male strength and chivalry is still performed in the *zurkhana*, or “house of strength,” where gymnastic exercises are carried out to the background of the chanted national epic, the *Shahnameh*.

Contemporary studies of film and literature from the Muslim world explore their themes of male competition, violence, and coming of age in a highly gendered social world. Certain tropes, such as the wily woman who deprives males of virility and the constant need to preserve and control female honor, play on male anxieties. Some anthropological and literary studies have highlighted the role of the wedding night in Arab societies, where in traditional contexts male sexual performance and female virginity were expected and verified, giving further clues into the psychological background of asserting male potency as a quasi-sacrificial blood ritual.

Further research analyzes how maleness is inculcated through rituals such as circumcision which, in certain Muslim societies such as Turkey, may be a prepuberty ritual accompanied by public display and celebration, including dressing the boy in a military-type uniform. The cultural significance of male attributes such as beards and mustaches, which may also have a religious or political valence, is another dimension of the Muslim embodiment of maleness. Variations in conceptions of the ideal masculine have also merited attention in terms of homosexual identities, black Muslim male embodiment, the effect of colonialism and the colonial gaze on Muslim constructions of the masculine, and so on.

*See also* Body, Significance of; Feminism; Gender; Homosexuality.

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Marcia Hermansen

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**MASHHAD**

Mashhad is a major city of Iran, and the capital of Khorasan, the country’s largest province with six million inhabitants. In 1996, 2.25 million of the province’s population lived in Mashhad. It is the country’s most important pilgrimage site, visited annually by over thirteen million pilgrims from Iran and abroad. The shrine of ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (Reza) (764–818 C.E.), the eighth and the only imam buried in Iran and abroad. The shrine of ‘Ali b. Musa al-Rida (Reza) (764–818 C.E.), the eighth and the only imam buried in Iran, is in Mashhad. The imam was buried in an orchard by the grave of the Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid at Sinabad, a hamlet near Nawghan, one of the districts of the city of Tus. The Mongol assault in the early thirteenth century, followed by the attack of the Timurid Miran Shah in 1385, were major blows that led to the gradual extinction of Tus, so much so that we find no mention of it in the sources since the middle of the fifteenth century. While Tus gradually disappeared, the hamlet of Sinabad grew into a town, first called Mashhad-e Razavi and then Mashhad-e Tus, as large numbers of Shi’a settled there because of the imam’s shrine, known for centuries as “Mashhad al-Razavi.”

The shrine and its upkeep received the attention of Samanid, Ghaznavid, and Seljuk rulers who held the Alawid in reverence despite their Sunni creed. Mashhad received special royal attention during the reign of the Timurid ruler Shahrukh. He visited the imam’s shrine for *ziyara* in 1406 and it was during his reign that the famous Gawharshad Mosque, completed for his wife in 1418, and other buildings in the shrine...
complex were constructed. After establishing Safavid control of Khorasan, Shah 'Abbas showed a special reverence for Mashhad and in 1601 made a pilgrimage on foot, having set out from Isfahan, to fulfill a vow. The shrine received greater patronage during the reign of the Safavids and the Qajars, and most of the inscriptions pertaining to the repairs and new construction are extant. A new plan for the extension of the shrine complex was put into effect in the years before the Islamic Revolution in the course of which bazaars and houses in a large surrounding area were demolished. New construction is still occurring in the open space around the shrine.

In the past the shrine’s upkeep and administration of the enormous endowments pertaining to it lay with an administrator (mutawalli), traditionally a sayyid from the descendants of Imam Reza appointed by royal decree. Since the Islamic Revolution, the appointment of the administrator lies within the jurisdiction of the supreme jurist (saliye fuqih). The shrine as an architectural complex consists of the central building and its gilded dome, which houses the mausoleum and a one-thousand-year-old mosque (Masjid Balasar), twenty-three halls, several courtyards of different sizes, eight minarets, and two towers, each with its own particular history. It also maintains a major library, one of the oldest in Iran and dating from tenth century, with 26,400 manuscripts, 2,820 Qur’ān manuscripts, and over 300,000 printed books now kept in a newly built structure (inaugurated in 1995), as well as a museum and several subsidiary buildings housing various facilities. The Astan-e Quds (Holy Threshold), the establishment which manages the shrine complex and the related endowments, is a huge conglomerate that administers, in addition to a university, scores of academic, cultural, and economic institutions that play an important role in the life of the province.

Mashhad has a center of learning (hawzah ‘ilmiyya) next only to that of the Qom in size and importance. Leading scholars of this hawzah have enjoyed a regional following as “sources of emulation” (marja’ al-taqlid).

See also Pilgrimage: Hajj; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

Rasool Ja’fariyan

**MASJID**

The term masjid refers to the customary place for performing the obligatory ritual prayer (salat) in the Muslim tradition. The Arabic verbal root s-j-d from which the noun derives, denotes the action of bowing down or prostration. Its close cognates in other Semitic languages, meaning a place of worship, predate Islam and allude to sacred venues belonging to other religions.

The Qur’an contains over twenty references to masjid, in singular and plural, offering ample evidence for the importance of this space in the life of Muslims from the time of the Prophet, although its form and its significance have undergone extensive elaboration as the Islamic civilization took shape and expanded. Thus a variety of related institutions have emerged that are embraced by this same term, normally rendered as mosque in English.

In the Qur’an, the word most frequently refers to the sanctuary at Mecca, al-masjid al-haram, indicating its uniqueness and centrality while several passages refer to the practices prescribed for it as a site of cult and pilgrimage (e.g., 2:196, 9:28, 48:27).

The first masjid built by Muhammad consisted of the enclosed empty courtyard of his house at Medina. Not only did his followers gather there for collective prayer and preaching, but for many other activities. As the effective seat of government, it served as the center of civil and military administration while also providing space for instruction, social gatherings, and hospitality to strangers. During the Prophet’s lifetime the establishment of other masjids for local use appears to have been infrequent as believers were encouraged to regard everyplace as available for the conduct of prayer, although later, masjids began to arise quickly, starting with those locales where it was remembered the Prophet had prayed.

With the spread of Islam beyond the Arabian Peninsula, new masjids arose, especially in the principal cities such as Kufa, Basra, Damascus, and Cairo, which sought to reproduce the model of Medina. Thus the seat of government and the space for collective prayer were closely conjoined. This architectural fusion of religious and secular functions, in conformity with Islamic teachings, was also represented in the nature of leadership. In time, however, the caliphs and their governors in the provinces ceased to preside at public prayer and to preach themselves, relegating these tasks to pious scholars instead, although these two realms of authority remained linked in Islamic theories of rule.

Hence, the preaching of the sermon (khutba) at the Friday noon prayer—which was initially restricted to one large central masjid in the major cities (a masjid of the type that came to be known as a jami’, or Friday Mosque)—always entailed the installation of a minbar, a raised platform or pulpit, which symbolically associated the preacher as the spokesman of the legitimate ruler. Later historical transformations, with profound effects on political organization and social structure, redefined this relationship such that today a gathering for the weekly congregational prayer and sermon may occur in almost any masjid. Nevertheless, the classical ideal envisaging a unity of sacred and civil order not only continues to inspire many Muslims, but it is formalized as law in most lands with a majority Muslim population.
In addition to the paradigm of Medina, a second key influence affecting the development of masjids derives from the example of the sanctuary at Mecca. This affiliation appears symbolically in the directional orientation of a masjid, namely the qibla, and in the placement of the empty niche or mihrab, which believers face when praying. But it also resonates in numerous ornamental motifs, such as Qur’anic calligraphy and in certain expressive patterns of devotion, including localized pilgrimage practices, that emphasize rituals of reverent recollection or dhikr, colorful festivals honoring saints, and a variety of spiritual exercises associated with Sufi teachings.

The construction styles and, to some degree, the uses of masjids have been adapted creatively over the centuries to conditions prevailing in the many settings where Islam was implanted and flourished. In the earlier period, many churches, synagogues, and temples that were converted into masjids contributed significant influences to aspects of subsequent masjid design, helping give rise to highly distinct indigenous idioms exhibited in the size, the shapes, and the lines of minarets, domes, facades, arcades, floor plans, portals, and the internal furnishings characteristic of such particular styles identified, for instance, as Arab, Andalusian, Persian, Mongol, Mamluk, or Ottoman. More recently, a variety of notable contemporary masjids have been erected, not only in the old Islamic heartlands and its periphery, but in Europe and America, often achieving a distinctive synthesis of modern and authentic form.

The rich history of Islamic intellectual life is also deeply rooted in masjids, which often served as schools in addition to their social, political, and religious functions. Frequently under the tutelage of a teacher also fulfilling the role of the local imam or designated prayer leader, masjids not only provided training for children, with a curriculum concentrated on the memorization of the Qur’an and the acquisition of basic literacy skills, but less formally these same institutions provided advanced instruction, legal counsel, and spiritual guidance to members of the community at large.

A related development inseparable from masjids involves their pivotal place in the establishment and the flourishing of the great medieval centers of learning throughout the Islamic world. This capacity to provide and to maintain fruitful settings for scholarship and inquiry owed much to the privileges traditionally accorded to masjids, which included various juridical protections of resources derived from donations, patronage, or endowments. Although modern schools in the Muslim world, including most universities, follow Western curricular models, masjids retain their distinctive impact in
the formation of religious professionals and others seeking to deepen their knowledge of the tradition.

In today’s world, most masjids have substantially reduced or shed the wide range of practical involvements that once integrated them on multiple levels into the whole fabric of society. Centralized bureaucracies under state authority have generally taken over the tasks of education, social welfare, the administration of justice, or the maintenance of order, designating specialized institutions and personnel as responsible for providing these services. In most cases, masjids have likewise tended to restrict their work to a more explicitly defined set of religious activities. This trend has been especially evident in traditional Islamic lands, where their construction and supervision is typically funded and managed by a government ministry that appoints those who hold positions in masjids and oversees their operations.

However, this widespread movement toward the incorporation of masjids into national regulatory systems has been accompanied by an array of elite and popular responses featuring the establishment of privately funded masjids, some locally sponsored, others affiliated with larger regional groupings or transnational organizations that may share resources and provide important forms of assistance not readily otherwise available. Many such independent masjids, evincing various ideological orientations and seeking to recover the active autonomy of masjids belonging to a prior era, have come to play a dynamic part in efforts to forge new bases of public participation, promote social improvement, religious renewal, and political reform.

See also ‘Ibadat; Khutba; Manar, Manara; Mihrab; Minbar (Mimbar); Religious Institutions.

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Maslaha

Maslaha is an Arabic term that, in law and social ethics, means “the common social good or welfare.” Medieval jurists and theologians defined maslaha in contrast to its antonym, mafsada, which means “that which causes or constitutes a harm.” According to historical and legal texts, it was the second caliph, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644), who applied the principle of pursuing public policies that contribute to the common good over those that do not, although he did not use the term maslaha, as such. The issue arose over the booty taken by Muslim militias during the conquest of Iraq and beyond during his reign: how should captured land be divided? In many cases, material goods and property taken in battle were distributed among the warriors as payment for their actions on behalf of Islam. The caliph ‘Umar ruled that, in the case of the rich alluvial land in southern Iraq between the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates, the land should remain under the control of the state, to serve as a source of tax income. This would allow a land tax (kharij) to be levied against owners, to be used for the general good (“umum al-naf”) of Muslim believers.

The medieval theologian and jurist, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), argued that maslaha is the main intent of sharī’a, the sacred law of Islam. It is the purpose of the law to offer guidance and governance in establishing a state in which the religious and material welfare of Muslim believers is maintained and preserved. Ghazali and other medieval theorists held that, while the general welfare of Muslims with respect to needs and improvements should be linked to the sharī’a through legal reasoning, that which was deemed in context to be necessary to the welfare of the community required no other justification for implementation.

The nineteenth-century Egyptian reformer and modernist theologian, Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), also found great value in the legal concept of maslaha. Like Ghazali eight centuries earlier, ‘Abduh was a seminal thinker who gave clear articulation to the intellectual currents of his age. In nineteenth-century Egypt and elsewhere, Western legal thought and colonial rule was having an enormous influence on Islamic laws and courts, in effect challenging their authority and relevance. ‘Abduh argued that the demands on Muslims to find religious guidance in the ever-changing social circumstances of modern society necessitated giving preference to those meanings which contributed to the common social good of the Muslim umma (community), thus following Ghazali and medieval jurists but for modernist purposes.

For ‘Abduh, maslaha took precedence over the sources of the law in cases of necessary social reform. He and other modernists took the concept of maslaha a step further by using it as an argument against prophetic traditions (hadith) and religious practices that were difficult to justify in modern times. Islamist critics of the modernists rejected the notion of permitting any principle other than those contained in the sharī’a to take precedence over the sources of the law. Nonetheless, the principle of maslaha remains of vital interest and discussion among Muslim jurists, theologians, and social theorists in contemporary Islamic thought.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Ethics and Social Issues; Ghazali, al-; Law; Sharī’a.

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Richard C. Martin

MATERIAL CULTURE

This article describes and discusses some aspects of the material culture of Islam to underscore and appreciate the diversities of Islamic societies and emphasize the ability of Islamic communities to use objects, artifacts, and forms of expression as media on and with which to express faith, identity, and status. The importance of sacred spaces, such as the mosque; aesthetic expressive forms like art and music; and identity types including dresses, garbs, and regalia, are discussed with a clear vision that their importance in Islamic societies emanates from their conformity with teachings on Islamic law, morality, theology, and mysticism.

The material culture of Islam includes objects, artifacts, and facets of Islamic arts created in diverse Islamic communities in the continents of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Comprising cultural products of spiritual reflections, they are embedded in the Muslim ethos and worldview but also function to facilitate learning and mediation of social interactions and relations. Broadly, the utility derived from such products and their performance is expected to conform to acceptable Islamic symbolism and communicative functions.

Architecture

The mosque or masjid is a center for community prayer throughout Muslim society that communicates sacred space or history as exemplified in the Ka’ba in Mecca. Mosques also
reveal a complexity of issues including the expressions of the diversity of faith and its practicality as manifest in the multiple identities in Muslim societies. Exemplifying Muslim aesthetics grounded in the religions, epistemology, the mosque is situated and created not as an obsolete innovation but as the product of the thoughts, experiences, and environments of its interlocutors. As works of art, mosques are not created ex nihilo but their sophistication in form and image represents the very essence and symbolism of Islamic cultures of sacred space.

Clothing
The religious symbolism expressed in sacred buildings also manifests in the material cultures exemplified and traced through clothing and adorned regalia. Muslim conventions of dress and garb form potent symbols of identification and lifestyles. Some historical apparel probably worn for special occasions was preserved in respectful memories of its genteel or famous owners, usually rulers and their progenitors. Other garbs are worn for their ascribed powers, especially their ability to protect the wearer and ward off evil. Famous in this category of protective regalia are the talismanic shirts worn by various sultans of the Ottoman Empire. Embroidered in expensive silks and calligraphic verses of the Qur’an and other paraphernalia, talismanic shirts were gowns and garbs attributed with sacred qualities, but they also embodied the very essence of mysticism and the magico-religious aspects of Islam. Sacred garbs also include the khirqa, literally meaning “a robe worn,” which are actually garments or specialized cloaks worn and revered by the ascetic class, the Sufi. In Sufism aspirants in stages of spiritual pedagogy were bestowed with baraka (blessing) once they were given the khirqa symbolizing that the wearer possesses special qualities from the master. The felt is a woolen fabric of great social significance that appeared in regions dominated by the Ottoman Empire; it played an important part in the lives of Turkomens, who traditionally lived in tents made of white and black felt to protect themselves from heat in summer and from cold and wet in winter. The most famous felt garment of all is the tall conical cap, sikke, made in the city of Konya in Turkey and worn by the Mevlevi dervishes.

The long-sleeved white gown (thob) and headcoverings (taqiyya and khaffiya) of the Arabian peninsula accompanied Islam as it spread and became almost hallmarks of Islamic identity. African Muslim communities have internalized and indigenized some of these gowns, including the East African loose caftan top for men, the kanza, and the cap, or kofia. The cap is the most visible communicator of identity and religious authority among male Muslims. A West African Muslim male would hardly venture outside without his kula, and the Swahili man is incomplete if he does not have his kofia during social occasions. Any Muslim may wear a cap but the position attributed to the individual is also gathered from the expressive importance of the quality of fabrics and the ornate designs of the kofia or buila. Those with intricate patterns like jari la mbazi (the green pea leaf), or chapaa miskiti (the mosque design), are the most adorned in East African Islam. Among Hijaz Arabs the ghutra (white scarf) is a modern innovation of official dress when topped with the ‘iqal, or black rope crown, while men in Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine usually wear a white or red- or black-checked kufiya with the ‘iqal. Historically, among urban men the most common form of headcovering was the taqiyya, a small cap, covered by an ‘imama, an embroidered silk scarf that was larger than the ghutra, and was wrapped tightly around the head. This practice largely died out as men started wearing fezzes in the twentieth century, and now most male city dwellers in Arab cities leave their heads bare.

Decorative Arts, Writing, and Music
Islamic material culture also embraces various facets of visual and decorative arts. These items have no ascribed tangible value but are useful in expressing and transmitting remembered emotions and have a role in evoking intense social reactions. For example, Turkish kilim (rugs) hanging on the walls of living rooms have no tangible meanings, except for the memory of a glorious past visit to Istanbul. The expression of wealth and power could be exhibited through panoplies of objects and repertoires of gestures showing privileged knowledge. The handheld staff, bakora, carried by members of Swahili communities, is usually made of wood. It may be engraved in gold or laced with ivory, and functions to negotiate and symbolize masculine power just as the sword displays authority in the process of negotiating for privileges and personal identity among Arab groups. In the spiritual realm, the handheld tasbibi (prayer beads) are a symbol of piety.

The material culture of Islam may include the written arts represented by a variety of script forms. Writing developed in Islamic societies because of the need to record every syllable of the revelation of the Qur’an. Thus, the written script was revered and its mastery became an accomplishment for any Muslim. In its nascent development as a liturgical script form, writing depended on Sufi expressions of piety as its calligraphic form became the manifestation of spirituality, that is, of inward perfection. Calligraphy attains levels of religious consecration because its production entails notions that purity of writing is purity of soul, thus making stern ascetic demands on the master calligrapher. Works of Islamic calligraphy are revered objects of material cultures, exhibited in museums, homes, and other places of historical preservation.

Various musical genres have developed in Islamic communities and one type, the taarab, is popular among Muslims.
in East Africa. Taarob, which means “to be moved, or agitated by the sound of music,” includes both vocal and instrumental forms like the bashraf, which is played with a variety of instruments, such as the nai, ndi, and zeeze.

The material culture of Islam ranges widely and represents a cross-fertilization of common ideas and religious expressions in global Islamic communities, nevertheless displaying unity in diversity.

See also African Culture and Islam; American Culture and Islam; Architecture; Art; Calligraphy; Central Asian Culture and Islam; Clothing; European Culture and Islam; Music; South Asian Culture and Islam; Southeast Asian Culture and Islam.

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Hassan Mwakimako

MATURIDI, AL- (?–944)

Al-Maturidi, a major figure among Hanafite scholars of the Transoxiana (Mawara al-nahr) region of Central Asia, and the founder of the Maturidite school of kalam, was known as Abu Mansur Muhammad b. Muhammad. He was born in Maturid (or Maturit), a neighborhood close to Samarqand, in present-day Uzbekistan, in the second half of ninth century and died there in 944. Sources name Abu Bakr Ahmad al-Juzjani and Abu Nasr Ahmad b. al-‘Abbas al-Iyadi among his teachers.

Al-Maturidi had an extensive knowledge of other beliefs and responded to views of Christians and Jews regarding the doctrines of trinity and prophecy, as well as to Dualists, Manichaens, Zoroastrians, and other ancient Persian or Indian religions. Moreover, al-Maturidi is a primary source
for modern researchers on some controversial thinkers in Islamic intellectual history such as Ibn al-Rawandi, Abu Isaa al-Waraq, and Muhammad b. Shabib.

He wrote many works, among which *Kitab al-ta’zibid* (On divine unity) is the main source of his theology. His Qur’anic commentary *Ta’wilat al-Qur’an* includes rational interpretations on theological and juridical verses. Among his lost books, *Kitab al-maqaalat* was about early Muslim theological groups, and *Ma’Khudh al-Shar’i* and *Kitab al-Jadal* were on Islamic legal methodology. Three of his other books in the list given by al-Nasafi are refutations of Abu’l-Qasim al-Balkhi’s works, who is known as al-Ka’bi; two are against the principles (*usul*) and derivations (*fiqh*) of al-Qaramita; one is against al-Bahili’s *Usul al-khamsa*; and another is against Mu’tazilism.

Al-Maturidi had a high standing among the Hanafite jurists of his age in Central Asia and their followers. He took a middle position between the Mu’tazila and the Ash’ariyya in some controversial subjects, such as free will, the attributes of God, and so on. His doctrine was in some cases more rationalist than Ash’ari’s and closer to Mu’tazilism. On the issue of predestination and human will, as the best examples of his thought, Maturidi tried to preserve both human freedom and divine omniscience without resorting to fatalism or a deistic approach. According to al-Maturidi, since the Qur’an gives moral responsibility to each person, human beings possess free will. There is no imposition by God on human actions, but human beings cannot create their actions or realize their potential without God’s will and permission, which is the difference between al-Maturidi and the Mu’tazilites on this issue. Maturidi’s formula about human actions was formed of free intention (*kasb*) of an action by a human and creation (*khalq*) of this action by God if He wills. Human acts are thus acts of God in one respect, yet in another aspect (in reality not metaphorically) humans’ acts are by their free choice (*ikhtiyar*). A person’s power to act is valid for opposite acts of right and wrong. God’s creation of human acts according to their own choice does not prevent human freedom, because human capacity (*istita’at*) is already limited.

Al-Maturidi’s school begins with his immediate follower, associate and student Abu ʿl-Ḥasan al-Rustūghfīnī (d. 956). Abu Nasr al-Iyāzī’s two sons, Abu Ahmad Nasr and Abu Bakr Muhammad, were both students of al-Maturidi’s and al-Rustūghfīnī. However, the outstanding followers of his school were from a later generation. Abu ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Pazdavī (d. 1099), a chief qadi of Samarkand at the end of the eleventh century and the author of *Usul al-din*, was the first among them. Another follower, Abu ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Nasfī (d. 1115), was considered the second founder of Maturidism, and his role in that school is compared to that of al-Baṣṭilī among Ash’arīs. Maturidite scholars differ from Ash’arīs, the other Sunni *kalam* school, on a few theological questions such as whether bringing into existence (*taqwa*) is a divine attribute, whether the actions of God are created, or whether good and bad are rationally known, and so on. But these differences are not major and are usually regarded as methodological.

See also Ash’arītes, Ash’āra; Central Asia, Islam in; Kalam; Mu’tazilites, Mu’tazila.

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M. Sait Özervarli

**MAUDUDI, ABU L-A’LA’ (1903–1979)**

It was in the 1930s that Abu l-A’la’ Maududi from Aurangabad, India formulated his political ideas about state and government, which had a great impact on the Muslim world. Maududi was, like many Islamists of his time, an autodidact and an intellectual. He started his career as a journalist working for the Deobandi-based political party Jam’iyyat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (JUH), but soon distanced from the party and in 1932 founded his own Urdu-language journal *Tarjuman al-Qur’an* in Hyderabad, India. In contrast to the JUH, which postulated composite nationalism (*muttabida gaamitiyat*), and also in contrast to Muhammad Iqbal’s idea of a Muslim state (territorial nationalism), Maududi postulated a third alternative when he began to Islamize the political discourse of the nationalists and freedom fighters: An Islamic state must correspond to the Islamic ideology through which the divine order can be realized on earth. A Muslim should believe in the sovereignty of God rather than in the idea of a government of the people, through the people, and for the people. Hence, Muslims did not represent a nation, but the party of God, which acts as God’s agent on earth (*khalifa*). For this aim, he considered self-purification a prerequisite. Toward the end of the 1930s he was convinced that the creation of a Muslim
state would not be the right method of reform, because the un-Islamic politicians were not able to create an Islamic state.

To put his ideas into practice, in 1941 the Islamic classicist Maududi founded the Jama’at-e Islami (Islamic Community)—which he led until 1972 as its president—and postulated the sovereignty of God on Earth (bakimiyat-e ilabi) in a universal, ideologically Islamic nation. After 1947, he tried to materialize this idea of an imagined community in the constitution of Pakistan, where he, along with the majority of his community, eventually emigrated. Hence he accepted the idea of a nation-state, which he had rejected formerly. His Jama’at won much influence, especially among young intellectuals and the middle class in the years to come.

Maududi was the first to work toward an Islamic constitution, and his endeavors were partly incorporated in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which was incorporated in turn into the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, according to which Pakistan was to be an Islamic state. His rather state-apologetic interpretation of Islam, on which he had elaborated in his Islamic Law and Constitution (1955), made him and his party collaborate with the government at several instances—for example, during the reign of Zia ul-Haq—though Maududi himself was imprisoned several times on the charge of being disloyal to Pakistan.

His argument was that the wrong interpretation of the Qur’an’s basic principles had led the people astray, which had resulted in the loss of religious and cultural identity, due to misguided mystics (Sufis) among others. It was important to leave the jabiliyya (the pre-Islamic state of ignorance) behind and return to the righteous society here and now. The reconstruction of an idealized pure Islamic society would guarantee the iteration of the original Muslim community (umma). This required Muslims to live according to the sunna of the Prophet, based on a transnational view of the golden age of the Prophet and the first generations. It implied a reinvention of tradition. With this argument Maududi created a new normative and formative past, and an absence of historical records allowed him to regard himself an exponent of the projected imagined Islamic society, or jama’at, as the avant-gardist, who considered himself authorized to establish renewal (tajdid). Ijtihad, for example, the maximum effort to ascertain, in a given problem or issue, the injunction of Islam and its real intent, was the proper channel for that process. The concept of history informed by the notion of constant decay, already developed in his Muslims and the Present Political Crisis (1937–1939), was the basic motivation for his activism, which he wanted to implement through education.

Maududi gained great fame throughout the Islamic world and became a member of several societies and a founding member of the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami in 1961.

See also Jama’at-e Islami; Political Islam.

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Jamal Malik

MAZALIM

The word “mazalim” is the plural of mazlma, which means iniquity, act of injustice, or wrong doing. In terms of Islamic judicial system, mazalim denotes a special type of court, where sessions for hearing cases of injustices are held or supervised by the supreme political authority, or by one of his close deputies or other high-ranking authority.

In the view of al-Mawardi (d. 1058), the institution of mazalim existed in the pre-Islamic Arab community and also under the Sassanid regime. Mawardi mentions Caliph ‘Umar Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz of the Umayyads, as well as caliphs al-Mahdi, al-Hadi, al-Rahsid, al-Ma’mun, and al-Muhtadi of the Abbasids as important leaders who employed hearings in the mazalim to distribute justice.

A session of mazalim requires the presence of five types of assistants. These are the guards, the qadis, the faqibs, the secretaries (to keep records), and the notaries (to witness). The jurisdiction of this court extends to the adjudication of abuse of power related cases involving both officials and non-officials. It also deals with the issues of restitution of properties taken by force, the supervision of warq (pious endoments), the enforcement of public order that exceeds ordinary internal security measures, the enforcement of judgments that exceed the authority of the ordinary judges, the enforcement of public duty issues such as Friday prayers, feasts, pilgrimage, jihad, and other extraordinary events. The mazalim is also called to provide arbitration between conflicting parties.

The main difference between the mazalim and the ordinary judicial courts is that the supervisor of mazalim (sabib al-mazalim or nazir al-mazalim) has extra discretionary power. The ordinary judge is bound by the limitations of conventional judicial system, whereas the supervisor of mazalim enjoys greater procedural latitude. For instance, he may obtain evidence in ways might be unacceptable to an ordinary court’s judge. The supervisor of the mazalim also is free to impose arbitral settlements that are binding on the contesting parties. This option is unavailable to the judge in an ordinary court. In other words, the uniqueness of the mazalim lies in the breadth of its supervisors’ discretionary power and political authority.

See also Caliphate; Law; Religious Institutions.
MAZRU'I, MAZRU'I

Although historically associated with the city of Mombasa, Kenya, originally the Mazrui (Ar. Mazru’i) were native to the Rustaq region of Oman. By the early eighteenth century, they began settling the coast of Kenya and Pemba Island until, altogether, fourteen Mazrui clans came to be represented in East Africa. Mazrui accounts claim that the imam of Oman sent Nasir bin ‘Abdallah Mazrui as his representative (liwali) in Mombasa soon after capturing Fort Jesus from the Portuguese in 1698. However, other sources suggest Nasir arrived around 1727.

Beginning with Nasir, the Mazrui administered Mombasa as its principal ruling family until the Busaidi sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid Sa’id bin Sultan, replaced them with his own representative in 1837. Altogether, the Mazrui provided Mombasa with a succession of eleven liwalis, which was terminated when Sa’id kidnapped and murdered Rashid bin Salim and twenty-four tribal elders. In 1741, Liwali Muhammad bin ‘Uthman Mazrui had refused to acknowledge the Busaidi tribe as the new imams of Oman. Further acts of Mazrui defiance damaged their already poor relations with the Busaidi, making a violent outcome inevitable.

Much remains controversial about Mazrui rule in Mombasa. A Mazrui history claims they exercised a true mastery over Mombasa’s affairs, and that their dominion extended over “most of the Swahili country.” However, a careful reading of all available sources indicates that their rule was totally contingent on support and alliances with Mombasa’s Swahili citizens and their Mijikenda neighbors. Loss of this support in 1835 quickly led to the Mazrui downfall. Imperialist ambitions to widen their influence through interference in the affairs of neighboring coastal states like Tanga, Wasin, and Pate were resented and frequently resisted. Also, the Mazrui not only allowed a considerable trade in slaves at Mombasa, but most probably participated in it. In later years, like many coastal Muslims, they exploited slave labor in the areas they settled around Mombasa and Takaungu.

Although they lost Mombasa, after 1837 the Mazrui continued to resist Omani and European imperialism and to play a significant part in the history of Kenya. To avoid Busaidi predominance in Mombasa, many resettled in Pemba, Gazi, and Takaungu after 1837. One, Mbaruk bin Rashid of Takaungu, never rendered tribute to the Busaidi, nor recognized their sovereignty over East Africa, and Busaidi attempts in the 1850s and the 1870s to force his submission were both failures. Active resistance ended when a final, pointless Mazrui uprising was defeated by British forces in 1896, forcing Mbaruk to end his days exiled in another colonial possession, German East Africa.

Even before Mbaruk’s defeat, some Mazrui had discovered intellectual resistance to be effective. Originally Ibadi Muslims, like the Busaidi and their Omani allies, in the 1800s many Mazrui converted to the Shafi’i sect prevalent in East Africa. One in particular, ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali, made the hajj and converted soon after 1837. His descendants, including ‘Ali b. ‘Abdallah and al-Amin bin Ali Mazrui, became some of the most influential Shafi’i qadis in Kenya. More recently, scions of this particular family have enjoyed considerable popularity in Africa and the United States as educators and modernizers of African institutions.

See also Africa, Islam in; Zanzibar, Sa’idi Sultanate of.

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Medicine in the Time of the Prophet

The tribes that inhabited what is now Saudi Arabia at the time of the prophet Muhammad had a great deal of traditional medicine. As medical thinking and knowledge became explanatory and inductive with the parallel development of scientific thought in general, much of this traditional knowledge was preserved and some of it expressed in religious thinking. At the same time, distinct medical traditions were well developed in India, Persia, China, and Greece. Early Islamic medicine drew upon all of these traditions. The Qur'an itself contains limited specific medical text, although there is important guidance in prescribing breastfeeding as the right of every child, in proscribing intoxicants and the meat of certain animals, and in commentary on the beneficial health effects of some natural foods. However, the hadith (authenticated sayings and deeds of the Prophet) and its interpretations contain rich and detailed material on preventive and curative medicine, dietetics, and spiritual health. Early in the Islamic tradition these sources were collected and eventually became known as al-Tibb al-Nabawi (Medicine of the Prophet, or Prophetic Medicine). These collections remained distinct from the Persian, Indian, and Greek sources that early Islamic physicians drew upon, although they interacted with these traditions through their work. The best-known version is that of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, writing in Damascus in the late eleventh century C.E. Translated into many languages and widely accessible to Muslims the world over, the Medicine of the Prophet forms the rationale for many aspects of everyday Muslim life in terms of health protection and promotion—for example, injunctions against overeating; prescriptions for the spiritual and psychological care of the bereaved and traumatized; encouragement of moderation in all things; and much specific instruction on everyday food, drink, rest, and sexual behavior.

The Development of Islamic Medicine

The schisms within European Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. paved the way for a shift of focus outside Europe for development of the profession. When Nestorius, the Patriarch of Byzantium, and his followers were forced out of Europe a large pool of intellectuals moved to the Middle East, many to Jund-e Shapur, a city in what is now southwestern Iran that was already home to a thriving intellectual community including Syrians, Persians, and Jews and where a medical school was well established. When Justinian I (527-565 C.E.) expelled “heathen philosophers” from Athens, the Hellenic medical tradition based on Galen and others was transplanted to the fertile soil of Jund-e Shapur where it thrived amid a community of scholars who translated the Greek medical works into Arabic either directly or through translations into Syriac. Manuscripts from other regions including India and China were also translated and when Islam expanded into Egypt, Greek manuscripts from Alexandria also became available. A short time before, the Persians had been conquered by Muslim armies under the first caliph, giving the Muslims access to Jund-e Shapur.

In 765 C.E., an eminent Christian physician who headed the medical school at Jund-e Shapur, Jurjis Bukhtishu, was invited to Baghdad by the caliph al-Mansur to treat him. He did this successfully, and was appointed to the court. Although he returned to Jund-e Shapur, his son migrated to Baghdad and set up a successful medical practice. Other prominent medical men and their offspring soon joined an emigration to Baghdad, which became a medical focal point with many hospitals and medical centers and a great deal of scientific and intellectual activity of all sorts, most of which drew on Greek intellectual tradition. That the medical experts of Jund-e Shapur and later of Baghdad were accomplished linguists who opened the Islamic empire to knowledge from the rest of the world and made Arabic the primary language of the time for documentation in medicine, science, philosophy, and many other fields.

During the several centuries that followed, hospitals and medical schools were established and thrived throughout the Islamic world, with the largest and most notable in Damascus, Cairo, and Cordoba. These facilities established traditions of treatment free of charge to the patient and acceptance of all in need of treatment without regard to means, religion, age, or gender. The development, enrichment, and encyclopedic documentation of medicine in the Islamic world of the time was led by a series of individuals, some of whom were true “Renaissance men” of their times. The guidance of several of these (al-Razi, al-Zahari, Ibn Sina) will be briefly mentioned, but they are among many other eminent contributors to medicine from this period.

Abu Bakr Mohammed ibn Zakariyya al-Razi (known as Rhazes in the West) was born near what is now Tehran in the middle of the seventh century C.E. Al-Razi was accomplished in many spheres, and came to the study of medicine relatively late in life after a visit to Baghdad and a hospital there, which he later directed. There are many stories about al-Razi’s skill as a practitioner. One famous account addresses his knack for environmental health. The story goes that he was asked at some time during his career to choose the location for a new hospital in Baghdad. He did this by observing fresh meat hanging in various parts of the city and choosing the area based on where the meat took the longest to spoil. He was a diligent teacher, a skilled diagnostician, and a prolific writer. His written works number in the hundreds. The largest, which is a huge compilation of case studies and notes edited and published by al-Razi’s students after his death, has been called al-Hawa (the Continent); a thirteenth-century Latin translation was entitled Continens. This work summarized essentially all of the medical writings preceding al-Razi’s time as well as his own observations. His most famous piece was a much shorter monograph in which he distinguished smallpox, chicken pox, and measles; this work translated to Latin was called de Pestilentia and formed the basis for much future work on these highly contagious diseases.
Several centuries later, the dual influence of al-Zahrawi in the West and Ibn Sina in the East were pivotal. Abu ’l-Qasim al-Zahrawi lived from about 930 to 1013 C.E. and was known as the “greatest surgeon of Islam.” Zahrawi lived in the western caliphate, near Cordoba, and attended the University of Cordoba. He is most famous for his command of analgesia and anesthesia, utilizing opium and other natural narcotics and depressants, and the theory and practice of surgery. He invented many surgical instruments and wrote what is no doubt the first textbook of surgery. Although ignored throughout most of the eastern part of the Islamic world at the time, his influence on Europe was very significant.

Ibn Sina (known as Avicenna in the West) lived just a bit later (980–1037 C.E.). He was born in Persia in what is now Isfahan, Iran. Like many medical men of his time, he was an intellectual in a complete sense, writing on philosophy, music, military strategy, mathematics, and other subjects as well as medicine. His greatest medical work was the Qanun fi al-tibb, a five-volume treatise based on Greek knowledge and including Ayurvedic writings from India, some Chinese medicine, and other available sources. The Qanun included discussions of almost all ailments imaginable, as well as health promotion focusing on diet, the environment, and climate; it also included a huge materia medica including many medicinal plants and the drugs that could be derived from them. His theory of infection by “traces,” together with the Prophet’s earlier injunction to avoid travel to or from places in which plague was present, led to the introduction of quarantine as a means of limiting the spread of infectious diseases. Although he also wrote in his native Persian, Ibn Sina’s medical works were penned in Arabic, which facilitated the reintroduction of scientific medicine in Europe as the Dark Ages gave way to the European Renaissance. This process paralleled a period of decline in Islamic influence and hegemony.

The Re-Introduction of Medical Science to Europe

The Arabic text of Ibn Sina’s Qanun was published in Rome in 1593, and was one of the first Arabic books to be printed. The entire text had been translated into Latin two centuries earlier. This encyclopedic work soon became the preeminent medical text in Europe and was depended upon for four hundred years by the major medical schools on the continent. It was published in no less than sixteen editions, in Milan, Padua, and Venice throughout the 1400s and 1500s; the last edition for textbook use was published in 1658. Ibn Sina’s writings, and the antecedent Islamic works on which he drew, thus formed the route by which the Arabic repository of Hellenic medicine, greatly expanded and enriched, was reintroduced to Europe. The subsequent major scientific advancements that came with Claude Bernard’s (quite compatible) theory of the internal milieu, van Leeuwenhoek’s discovery of the microscope, and other advances quickly pushed medicine to a secular, empirical basis and the importance of the contributions of the Arabic texts was largely forgotten.

Medicine in Contemporary Islam

Today, the infrastructure and content of medicine as it is practiced in the Islamic world is compatible with and even formed in the image of European and other Western models. Ironically, the only part of the world in which the corpus of (largely Greek) theory that constituted the medical knowledge of early Islamic history is still taught is in South Asia, where there are schools and licensure for practitioners of “Tibb Unani” (“Greek Medicine”). In most of the Muslim world, however, medical education and practice is largely consistent with that in the West, with a structure of specialties, supervisory responsibility and liability, curricula, and requirements for continuing medical education for practitioners. However, the last several decades have seen a movement toward development of consciously Muslim perspectives in medicine.

A notable recent change has been the reentry of women into medicine throughout the Muslim world. There has never been a prohibition on female physicians, nor on the treatment of patients of either gender by a male or female doctor. Aside from the doctrine that “necessity overrides prohibition,” the hadith states clearly that treatment should depend solely on the needs of the patient and the capability of the doctor. Indeed, the precedent for female doctors was set by the Prophet’s own entirely female medical corps that accompanied his armies into battle. As medicine became an intellectual pursuit requiring literacy and education, skills that were the province of men in most Muslim societies, the profession became almost entirely male. As education has more recently included women, they have moved back into medicine without formal barriers and with enthusiasm.

Recently there has been particularly active dialogue and introspection around issues of bioethics and the conduct of the Muslim medical practitioner in the religious context. Notable in this context is the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS) (<http://www.islamset.com>), established in 1984 in Kuwait with an objective of serving the entire Muslim world. In its brief history IOMS has held multiple conferences on the heritage of Islam in medicine, established a World Health Organization Collaborating Research Center focused on traditional medicinal plants, and published a number of works focusing on ethical issues including Muslim definitions of the beginning and end of life, the use of newer reproductive technologies, care of the aged, and, recently, the impact of globalization on health and health care in the Islamic world. An Islamic Oath of the Doctor was developed by an IOMS conference, and is now widely published and used.

An early anatomical drawing appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Body, Significance of; Ethics and Social Issues; Falsafa; Science, Islam and.
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Osman M. Galal

MEDINA See Holy Cities

MIHNA

“Mihna” is the Arabic term for a test or a trial. In its most common historical usage, Mihna refers to the inquisition launched by the seventh Abbasid caliph, al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833) toward the end of his reign to enforce the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an. The Mihna has loomed large in the way medieval historians represented the reign and the legacy of al-Ma’mun, and modern scholars have often seen the Mihna and its eventual failure as a major episode in the religious and political history of the first centuries of Islam.

History

In 833, while at Raqqa in northern Mesopotamia, al-Ma’mun wrote to his governor of Baghdad, ordering him to examine the views held by his judges and the scholars of hadith regarding the Qur’an. The caliph believed that, contrary to what “ignorant” people thought, the Qur’an was not eternally existent—for this was an attribute that belonged only to God—but created by Him, and that this was how God Himself had spoken of it. Therefore, al-Ma’mun believed, supposing the Qur’an to be uncreated and eternal threatened to compromise the unity (tawhid) of God, and thus to undermine the very foundations of religion. As he lamented in his letters to his governor, most people were too ignorant of the reality of religion to hold sound beliefs about it, and yet they—and the demagogues who aspired to their leadership—claimed to be the most assiduous followers of Muhammad’s normative example, the hadith. As one entrusted with knowledge, and with the obligation to uphold “God’s right[s],” al-Ma’mun wanted therefore to see to it that false beliefs about the Qur’an were rectified.

Most of those who were examined on the question of the Qur’an’s createdness—by al-Ma’mun’s governor of Baghdad, by the caliph himself, or by his officials in the provinces—ended up declaring their adherence to the caliphal position. The most famous dissenter, however, was the noted hadith scholar of Baghdad, Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 853). He, alongside another recalcitrant scholar, was sent to al-Ma’mun’s military camp in Tarsus to be interrogated, but the caliph died before he could attend to the matter and Ibn Hanbal was returned to Baghdad. This, however, was only the beginning of the Mihna, and of Ibn Hanbal’s long and much-celebrated ordeal.

In the history of Islamic theology, the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Qur’an (*khalaq al-Qur’an*) is associated primarily with the rationalist Mu’tazila school. However, several other theologians also held this position. These theologians have often been characterized in Islamic heresiography as the “Jahmiyya,” for their putative association with doctrines held by an early and much-maligned figure named Jahm b. Safwan (d. 745). Al-Ma’mun himself was not a Mu’tazili, for he did not share the Mu’tazila’s characteristic doctrine of free will, but he agreed with them on the createdness of the Qur’an. Already in 827, the caliph had publicly declared his support for this doctrine, though it was only in 833 that he went on to institute the Mihna.

On his deathbed, al-Ma’mun left instructions that his successor, Abu Ishaq al-Mu’tasim (r. 833–842), continue to uphold his position on the Qur’an. During the latter’s reign, Ibn Hanbal was interrogated and flogged for refusing to accept the Qur’an’s createdness. A central figure during the Mihna years was the Mu’tazili chief judge, Ahmad Ibn Abi Du’ad (d. 854), who is represented in Sunni historiography as being far more anxious to continue the Inquisition than the caliphal successors of al-Ma’mun themselves might have been. Later historians also lay much of the responsibility for the flogging of Ibn Hanbal on Ibn Abi Du’ad. For his part, Ibn Hanbal is reported to have remained steadfast despite the flogging, after which he was released and left alone by the prosecutors of the Mihna. His release is usually explained in Sunni historiography as being due to fears of popular commotion against his persecution, though some (largely unfavorable) sources claim the real reason for it to have been that he too had eventually capitulated to the authorities. This, however, seems unlikely, in view of the severity with which Ibn Hanbal himself later treated many of those who had acknowledged the doctrine of the Qur’an’s createdness during the Mihna.

The Inquisition continued under al-Mu’tasim’s successor, al-Wathiq (r. 842–847), who appears to have pursued it
rather more vigorously than had al-Mu'tasim. Indeed, he went so far as to interrogate Muslim prisoners in Byzantine captivity about their view of the Qur'an before deciding whether or not they were to be ransomed. The harshness of the state's inquisitorial policies led some people of Baghdad to attempt a revolt, but the plot failed and its leader, Ahmad ibn Nasr al-Khuza'i, who was closely associated with the scholars of hadith, was executed (c. 845–846). Soon, however, with the accession of a new caliph—al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861)—the Mihna itself began to unravel. In 849, this caliph forbade disputations about the Qur’an, and in the same year he ordered several leading scholars to narrate hadith to the people, refuting the doctrines of the Mu’tazila and the Jahmiyya. A more decisive demonstration of the shift in caliphal policy came when, in 851, the Mu’tazili chief judge, Ibn Abi Du’ad, and his son (also a judge in the then-Abbasid capital of Samarra) were removed from office and their property was confiscated. This, for practical purposes, signaled the end of the Mihna, though the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an would continue to be debated in theological circles for centuries.

Interpretations of the Mihna

Modern scholars have much debated the meaning and significance of the Mihna, and there is no consensus on why al-Ma’mun so insisted on the doctrine of the Qur’an’s createdness. Al-Ma’mun’s own explanation was that it was his calling, as caliph and imam, to provide guidance to his subjects and, in particular, to rectify their dangerously wayward beliefs about the Qur’an. Yet modern scholars have often discerned motives behind the Mihna which go beyond a specific theological controversy. In God’s Caliph, Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds have argued that al-Ma’mun was really trying, through the Mihna, to make a last-ditch effort to reclaim a religious authority that had belonged to earlier caliphs but which had been eroded by the growing influence of the scholars of hadith and of the ulema in general. To these scholars, religious authority was enshrined, not in the will or verdicts of the caliphs, but rather in the hadith of the Prophet, and of this the ulema claimed to be the sole interpreters. This position was unacceptable to al-Ma’mun, and the Mihna represented a vigorous if ultimately abortive effort to make the scholars subservient to the caliphs.

It is not clear, however, if the Abbasid caliphs prior to al-Ma’mun did claim the sort of overarching religious authority that Crone and Hinds impute to them. The Mihna is perhaps better interpreted not as the decisive culmination of a struggle over the form or locus of authoritative religious guidance but, instead, as a break with the evolving patterns of caliphal patronage under the early Abbasids. Rather than co-opt or draw close to the emerging scholars of hadith, al-Ma’mun sought to rein in their influence and assert his own authority as the arbiter of right belief. These scholars, best represented by Ibn Hanbal, were the principal target of the caliph’s ire and of his effort to assert his authority.

As the names of those interrogated indicate, however, scholars of hadith were not alone in their tribulation. Some of those examined also had a record of political opposition to the caliph, and this suggests that the Mihna’s uses extended beyond theological speculation and even beyond the caliph’s assertion of religious authority. For instance, several recent authors have observed that Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi was among those interrogated during the Mihna. Ibrahim was not a religious scholar but, rather, a prominent member of the Abbasid family and he had been declared caliph in Baghdad following the civil war between al-Amin and al-Ma’mun. Even some of the scholars who were questioned during the Mihna were suspect on political grounds. For instance, the widely respected scholar Abu Mushir al-Ghassani (d. 833) of Damascus had sided with an anti-Abbasid revolt in Syria. Ahmad b. Nasr al-Khuza’i’s execution during the reign of al-Wathiq owed more to his abortive revolt than to his views on the Qur’an, even though it was ostensibly for the latter that he was killed. In general, it seems fair to say that a variety of factors were involved in the institution and continuation of the Mihna, as well as in the choice of those who were interrogated during its course.

Modern scholarly interpretations of the larger significance of the Mihna are necessarily shaped by how it is seen in relation to Abbasid history, and to early Islamic history in general. If early Abbasid history is viewed as a continuing contest over religious authority between “God’s caliph” and the emerging ulema, then the Mihna assumes the character of a watershed event, the failure of which permanently divested the caliphs of any significant role in religious life and established a lasting “separation” between the political and the religious authorities. However, there is little evidence for such a contest between the caliphs and the ulema prior to al-Ma’mun, just as there are many indications of caliphal participation in the community’s religious life after the Mihna. Caliphs could still undertake the Qur’anic obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” The caliphs al-Qadir (r. 991–1031) and al-Qa’im (r. 1031–1075) led efforts to devise a theological creed against the Mu’tazila and other unwelcome groups; and caliphs could still participate in the deliberations of the jurists. It is also worth noting that, in his influential treatise on constitutional theory, al-Mawardi (d. 1058) should have listed juridical expertise among the necessary qualifications for the caliphate, for even if such a stipulation was more wishful thinking than a realistic expectation, it still reveals something about how jurists viewed the caliphate two centuries after the Mihna. It is true, of course, that as the ulema’s scholarly specializations evolved—a process already unmistakably underway before al-Ma’mun—there was progressively less space for caliphs to authoritatively shape religious discourses in the community over which they presided. Yet the constraining of that space is better analyzed not with reference to any decisive impact the Mihna itself may have had on it, but rather in light of the long and complex history of the ulema and, of course, that of the caliphate.
If the failure of the Mihna did not remove the caliphs from religious life, the entire protracted episode and its aftermath did nevertheless contribute to the vigor and identity of the emerging umma. The end of the Mihna brought to a close the political ascendancy of the Mu'tazilis theologians, who were replaced in caliphal favor by the scholars of hadith. Ibn Hanbal was much sought after by Caliph al-Mutawakkil and his officials; and though he is reported to have been much perturbed by what he saw as this unwanted attention, there can be little doubt that royal patronage was one of the factors contributing, in the succeeding generations, to the growing prominence of Ibn Hanbal's followers in the religious life of Baghdad. The scholars of hadith had already, during the Mihna, shown themselves to have considerable popular support. Indeed, such increasing prominence may, arguably, have provoked at least some of al-Ma'mun's suspicions of them in the first place. The end of the Mihna further deepened and extended the populist roots of early Sunnism and, in particular, of those adhering to the school of law that came to be identified with the name of Ahmad b. Hanbal.

In theological terms, a major facet of the Mihna's significance lies in its contribution to the articulation of the "orthodox" Sunni view on the nature of the Qur'an. Al-Ma'mun had accused his opponents of believing the Qur'an to be co-eternal with God but, as Madelung—following the medieval Hanbali jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328)—has observed, early hadith scholars had usually been content to characterize the Qur'an as God's speech and to leave the matter there. In response to the doctrine al-Ma'mun wanted to enforce, however, the traditionists came to hold that the Qur'an was indeed uncreated. This dogma then became a defining feature of Sunni theology, though there continued to be much disagreement, long after the Mihna, on its precise meaning and implications.

See also Caliphate; Disputation; Ibn Hanbal; Imamate; Ma'mun, al-; Mu'tazilites, Mu'tazila; Qur'an.

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**MIHRAB**

The semicircular niche in the wall of a mosque that faces Mecca is known as the mihrab. Introduced in the Prophet's mosque in Medina when it was rebuilt by the Umayyad caliph al-Walid I (r. 705–715), the mihrab may have been originally intended to commemorate the place of the Prophet, but it soon became ubiquitous and is generally understood to indicate the direction of prayer (*qibla*). The earliest complete example to survive is believed to be a monolithic marble mihrab dated to the mid-eighth century and reused in the Khassaki Mosque in Baghdad. Later examples were often made of other precious materials, including stone or glass mosaic, carved or joined wood, and glazed tile.

See also Architecture; Art; Devotional Life; Masjid.

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Sheila S. Blair
Jonathan M. Bloom

**MILITARY RAID**

The raid, which is essentially a form of brigandage, was viewed in the Bedouin pastoral milieu as one of the few manly occupations. Termed *ghazzawa,* (pl. *maghaziz,* in Arabic, its purpose was plunder, not bloodshed, and it was not permitted during the sacred months: Dhu-l-Qa‘da, Dhu-l-Hijja, and Muharram (the last two and first months of the year), which were set aside for religious observances, and Rajab (the fourth month), which was set aside for trade.
Islamic literature, however, when referring to the ghazwa of the prophet Muhammad, makes no distinction between battle and raid. Before attacking a community, the Muslims would first proclaim a da’wa or invitation, calling their opponents to accept Islam. Only those male polytheists who refused to convert were fought to the death; women and children were taken captive. “People of the book,” such as Jews and Christians, were permitted to practice their faith, if they agreed to pay a poll tax, or jizya.

The title Maghazi is given to compilations which tell of the numerous raids and battles that Muhammad undertook to establish Islam in Arabia. The term has thus come to represent the achievements of Muhammad, and become synonymous with his life’s work. Maghazi and ghazwa therefore are also used to signify events in the life of Muhammad. For example, “Ghazwat al-Hudaybiyya” concerns the conclusion of a peace agreement between Muhammad and the Meccans.

Muslim b. al-Hajjaj (d. 875), the famous compiler of hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet), listed the battles and raids of the Prophet under the title jihad, which literally means to struggle or strive in the path of God. Incorrectly translated as holy war, the term “jihad,” in fact, is best understood in a spiritual context and includes such activities as fasting, charity, and meditation. The term Fath (pl. Futuh) is more appropriately used for wars of expansion such as the Arab conquests of Egypt, Syria, and Persia.

Sermons and announcements delivered from the minbar assume greater consequence in part because the minbar is located next to the prayer niche (mihrab) in the most sacred part of the mosque. Minbars are composed of a platform with steps with a seat at the top and a balustrade, all usually made of wood and sometimes, in urban mosques, they may be elaborately carved and decorated.

See also Conflict and Violence; Da’wa; Expansion; Jihad.

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MINARET See Manar, Manara

MINBAR (MIMBAR)

The minbar is the elevated seat of honor in the mosque and it represents religio-political authority. It is similar, but not identical to, the place and function of the pulpit in Christian churches. Not only is the Muslim Friday sermon (khutba) delivered from its base by the local preacher, but important public pronouncements are also made from it. For instance, in the past the Qur’anic prohibition on wine was delivered from the minbar. Muslim rulers (caliphs), as well as provincial governors or their representatives sat on it and delivered the Friday sermon. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, preaching from the minbar has been used to oppose political authority as well as to support it. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, minbar sermons in local mosques critiquing the government have been taped and widely distributed. In 1979, minbar sermons were instrumental in mobilizing revolutionary activity against the shah of Iran. However, the main function of the minbar has always been ethical rather than political, with sermons providing guidance on worship, family life, education, and cordial human relations.

See also Masjid; Mihrab.

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Richard T. Antoun

MINORITIES

DHIMMIS

Patrick Franke

OFFSHOOTS OF ISLAM

Robert Gleave

DHIMMIS

From the beginning of Islam up to present day, many Islamic societies have been characterized by the presence of more or less numerous non-Muslim minorities. Whereas in practice the status and treatment of these minorities have varied greatly over time and space, Islamic law provides a certain theoretical framework that has remained quite constant.
throughout the time: According to this all non-Muslim people are considered infidels (kuffar, sing. kafir). However there is a basic distinction between the polytheists (mustrikan, sing. mushrik) on the one hand, with whom social intercourse is forbidden, and who were to be fought until they either converted or were killed or enslaved and the “people of the book” (ahl al-kitab) on the other, whose faith was founded on revelation, who were to be protected, and with whom social intercourse was allowed. Originally only Jews and Christians were conceived as abl al-kitab; later, however, this term was extended to a sect known as the Sabeans, the Zoroastrians, and, in India, even to Hindus. Concerning the legal status of these “people of the book,” Islamic law makes another distinction between the dhimmis living as a protected person in Islamic territory, the barbi who lives in non-Muslim lands (dar al-barbi), and the musta’min who as a foreigner is granted the temporary right of residence in an Islamic territory. The status of the dhimmis was secured by a legal institution called dhimma (“protection”), which guaranteed safety for their life, body, and property, as well as freedom of movement and religious practice on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam. This included the payment of various taxes, the most important being the so-called jizya, a poll-tax levied on all able-bodied free adult dhimmis males of sufficient means.

It is the attitude of the prophet Muhammad who, after the expansion of his authority across Arabia, concluded agreements of submission and protection with Jews and Christians of other localities which serves as precedent for the dhimma institution. In the course of the Arab conquests under the “rightly guided” caliphs similar agreements were reached with the non-Muslims of Mesopotamia, Syria, Persia, and North Africa who surrendered their cities to the Arab armies. Muslim jurists later compiled these individual treaties into a coherent, sophisticated legal system conceding to the dhimmis communities almost complete autonomy under their respective religious leaders. It has to be pointed out, however, that the doctors of Islamic law tended to draw rather distinct boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, and to interpret the subjection of dhimmis to Islamic authority as a justification for discriminating and humiliating measures imposed upon them. Thus, according to Islamic law, a Muslim could marry a dhimmi woman, but a dhimmi could not marry a Muslim woman; a Muslim could own a dhimmi slave, although the reverse was not allowed; at the frontier the dhimmi merchant would pay double the tariff rate paid by the Muslim (10% and 5%, respectively) and in criminal law it was commonly considered that the blood-wit (diya) for a dhimmi was less (one-half or two-thirds) than that for a Muslim; finally, the dhimmi had to wear distinguishing clothing, in particular the zunnar belt, and there were various limitations on the outward expressions of worship such as processions, the use of bells, and the construction and repair of religious buildings. A famous document authorizing many of these restrictions is the so-called “Covenant of ‘Umar,” a list of pledges allegedly given to the second “rightly-guided caliph,” ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644), by the Christians of the cities conquered by him.

In the classical centuries of Islam persecution of dhimmis was very rare: One single case has been recorded, that of the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim (r. 996–1021) who in 1009 ordered the destruction of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. In the late Middle Ages, however, there was a general hardening of attitudes against dhimmis in Muslim countries. In the West, the Almohads adopted an intolerant policy, while in the East the government of the Mamluk state could not resist the pressure of jurists, such as Ibn Taymiyya, who insisted on an increasingly vexatious interpretation of the law regarding dhimmis. It was the legal system of the expanding Ottoman Empire that in the sixteenth century restored the classical Islamo-dhimmis symbiosis. This lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century, when under strong European pressure the provisions of Islamic law were increasingly replaced by new legislations that were intended to free the non-Muslims from their inferior status of “protected people” and to make them full citizens. Today most written constitutions of Muslim states confirm the principle of equality of all citizens irrespective of religion, sex, and race. Certain militant Islamic groups, however, advocate the reimposition of the jizya and the dhimma regulations.

See also Minorities: Offshoots of Islam.

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Patrick Franke

OFFSHOOTS OF ISLAM

Defining where the boundaries of Islam can be drawn, and which groups can be placed outside of that boundary, is, of course, a normative procedure. In the history of Islam, a number of scholars and groups have been subjected to takfir—the declaration of unbelief—and hence might be classed as offshoots of Islam. If one takes a strict definition of right belief, such as that proposed by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, or in the more recent past, by Sayyid Qutb, many of those who call themselves Muslims do not deserve the term. Nonetheless, these groups, religious at base and tracing their origins to Islam, consider themselves Muslim despite the majority community refusing to accept them as such.
The emergence of radical alternatives to the dominant Sunni expression of Islam is normally located (by Sunni scholars at least) in the first civil war (fitna), during the caliphate of 'Ali (r. 656–661). Two alternative views of the nature of the Muslim community emerged at this time. First were the Shi‘ites, who themselves later divided into a variety of competing groups. The Shi‘ites not only considered ‘Ali as the rightful caliph, but also defended the doctrine that only the descendants of ‘Ali could be legitimate leaders of the Muslim community. Second were the Kharjites, who withdrew their support for ‘Ali following his willingness to negotiate with his opponent Mu‘awiya. The Kharjites (literally, “those who withdrew”) developed an exclusive view of Islamic identity, declaring all sinners to be non-Muslims. The mainstream of Sunni Islam took a more forgiving attitude toward those who failed to obey the law of Islam in every detail. The strict Kharjite view undoubtedly contributed to the relatively small number of Kharjites in Muslim history. Elements of Kharjite doctrine, however, survive today within the Ibadi community, which is restricted to Oman and small communities in North Africa. Both the Ibadi and the Shi‘ites have lived as minorities in Sunni-dominated milieux.

Many offshoots of Islam are centered upon the charismatic authority of a particular individual teacher. This charisma is at times successfully transferred to the leader’s successor. Perhaps the most enduring of these offshoots is the Druze religion, which has its roots in the doctrines of Muhammad al-Darazi (d. 1020) concerning the Fatimid (Shi‘ite) caliph of the time, al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (d. 996). Darazi, with other Ismaili Shi‘ite scholars, made claims of divinity for al-Hakim. This entailed an inevitable break with Islam, which has been maintained ever since. The modern-day Druze form a separate, non-Muslim religious community in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

In the modern period, the Ahmadiyya, a community based around the teachings of the Indian leader Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), provide an instructive example of individual charisma within Islam. Ahmad made a number of different claims regarding his theological status, including the assertion that he was the Promised Messiah of the Muslims. Though the community did maintain its unity after his death, it eventually divided in 1914 along theological lines. The different groups, which still exist today, claimed different levels of authority for Ahmad. Some viewed him as a prophet (nabi) while others tried to ameliorate the tension with mainstream Islam by calling Ahmad a mujaddid (renewer). The Ahmadiyya’s minority status as non-Muslims was confirmed in Pakistan by a 1984 decree that prevented them from using Islamic forms of worship and legalized their prosecution.

A similar pattern can be seen in Shi‘ite offshoots such as Babism and Baha‘ism. The former, led by ‘Ali Muhammad Shirazi (“the Bab,” executed in 1850), began in 1844, when Shirazi proclaimed himself the Gate to the Hidden Imam. He proceeded to establish a network of missionaries across Iran, who hoped to persuade the mainly Twelver Shi‘ite population to recognize the Bab. The Bab’s self-understanding developed further, and in 1848 he declared the advent of a new religion, with a new code of practice (which he controversially termed a shari‘a) to replace that of the prophet Muhammad. It is clear he adopted the role of a prophetic figure, though he was careful not classify himself as a nabi.

The Babis instigated a number of uprisings in the late 1840s, culminating in the Bab’s execution in 1850. The Baha‘i faith emerged out of the collapse of Babism. Baha‘allah Husayn ‘Ali Nuri, one of Shirazi’s closest companions, promoted himself as a messianic figure who had been foretold by the Bab. His message consisted of a bundle of doctrines, including the unity of all religions, the institution of a new covenant which abrogated Islam, pacifism and the desire for world peace, and the role of himself and his descendants as conduits for revelation, blessed with spiritual insights which were passed to the people through new revelatory texts. Elements of early Baha‘i doctrine are clearly influenced by Shi‘ite Muslim theology and law. However, the Baha‘is have incorporated Western notions of democracy and human rights into their belief system.

Baha‘is consider themselves to be quite distinct from their Muslim parent religion. The feeling is mutual, as Baha‘is are generally regarded as schismatic heretics by Shi‘ite Muslims. The success of Baha‘ism as an independent religion has, in the main, rested upon its ability to gain converts in Western Europe and North America. Undoubtedly, Baha‘is and perhaps even some Babis (called Azalis) continue to exist as minorities in Iran, although their numbers are difficult to estimate because open adherence brings inevitable discrimination and persecution.

Smaller groups, such as the Ahl-e haqq and the Yazidis (sometimes called “Devil-worshippers”), both based in Kurdistan, might also be classified as offshoots of Islam. Their theologies show a certain syncretism of the various mystical elements of the Middle Eastern milieu. The various Afro-American Muslim movements, such as the Nation of Islam, might also be considered as offshoots of Islam. These various offshoots display a variety of attitudes toward Islam, some wishing to be considered Muslims, while others prefer to be regarded as a separate from, and superior to, Islam.

See also Ahmadiyya; Ahmad, Babiyya; Bab, Sayyed ‘Ali Muhammad; Baha‘allah; Baha‘i Faith; Kharjites, Khawarij; Minorities: Dhimmis; Mirza Ghulam.

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Miracles


Robert Gleave

MIRACLES

Miracles in the Islamic tradition play less of an evidentiary role than in some other religions since the prophet Muhammad’s humanity is stressed. The miracles of prophets mentioned in the Qur’an are known there as signs (ayat) and include Abraham’s not being harmed by the fire he was thrown into (21:69), as well as Jesus’ speaking as a baby (19:30–33), bringing birds made of clay to life (3:49, 5:110), and healing powers (3:49). The Qur’an itself is often said to be the main miracle of Muhammad since an untutored or illiterate (ummi) person could not have been the source of this most compelling and eloquent message.

The sayings of the Prophet and his biography (sira), as they developed provide examples of various miraculous occurrences during the life of the Prophet including the childhood opening of his breast and cleansing of his internal organs by an angel, his night journey from Jerusalem through the seven heavens, his splitting of the moon, multiplication of food, and bestowal of blessings generally.

In later Muslim sources prophetic miracles were termed muq’izat, or “things which render the detractors or opponents incapable or overwhelmed.” In other words, acts incapable of being imitated as in the doctrine of the ijaaz al-Qur’an—its incomparable eloquence and content. In theological or philosophical discussions the term kharq al-’aynada—a break in God’s customary order of things—is used to indicate the miraculous. In the case of Sufi saints miracles are usually termed karamat (gifts or graces). They have the ambiguous role of both confirming spiritual attainments and potentially distracting from the ultimate goal of service of God. Classical authors struggled to differentiate prophetic and saintly miracles, and those who were inclined toward Sufism saw the saintly miracles as emerging and continuing the prophetic legacy. Al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. 930) argued that the signs of the prophets emanated from the divine power while the karamat of the saints emanated from the divine generosity. Other Sufi commentators differentiated the public nature of prophetic miracles from the secretive aspects of saintly powers. Later Sufis, however, did not hesitate to openly enumerate the graces they received as in the Lateif al-minan of al-Shar‘ani or the many accounts of saints performing miracles that led to mass conversions on the frontiers of Islamic expansion. South Asian saints’ lives often consecrate chapters to waq’at or “events” of a paranormal nature including mind reading and predicting future events.

More recent reformists and some classical theologians, such as the Mu’tazila, were more skeptical of miracle stories, given their rationalist proclivities, in some cases denying saintly miracles altogether. Debates over the physical reality of prophetic miracles such as the night journey or moon splitting still engage Muslim commentators.

A color plate of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Mi’raj; Muhammad; Prophets.

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Marcia Hermansen

MI’RAJ

Early Islamic sources preserve references to Muhammad’s extraordinary journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and/or from the earth to the heavens. The narrative of the night journey (isra’) and ascension (mi’raj) developed its own unique form in the hadith reports of the eighth and ninth centuries.

The Qur’anic proof-text for the Mi’raj is the elliptic opening verse of Sura 17: “Glorified be the one who caused his servant to journey by night from the sacred prayer-site to the furthest prayer-site whose precincts we have blessed in order to show him some of our signs. . . .” Muslim consensus reads the verse as a reference to Muhammad’s miraculous journey from the Ka’ba (“the sacred prayer-site”) to either the Temple in Jerusalem or a heavenly temple (“the furthest prayer-site”). The sound hadiths of Bukhari and Muslim show that both the terrestrial and the celestial night journeys were considered potentially authentic by early traditionists.

Early exegetes such as Muqatil b. Sulayman al-Balkhi (d. c. 767) and Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923) collated the “night journey verse” (17:1) with the visionary passage from the beginning of the Sura of the Star (53:1–18). The latter passage describes a pair of visions, one at “a distance of two bows or nearer,” the other at “the lote tree of the boundary.” Exegetes disagree about whether these verses describe Muhammad’s vision of God or of Gabriel, but they generally agree in placing the “lote tree of the boundary” in the heavens and thus in relating the passage to the Mi’raj.
At least some early Muslims considered the night journey and ascension to refer to two separate events. The biography of the Prophet by Ibn Ishaq (d. 767) in the recension of Ibn Hisham (d. 833) treats the two separately but in succession. The biographer Ibn Sa’d (d. 845) goes even further by attaching two different dates to the events. While the date of the journey(s) remained a source of controversy, the idea that the journey from Mecca to Jerusalem was immediately followed by the ascension from Jerusalem through the seven heavens became the majority opinion in the centuries that followed.

The night journey and ascension narrative begins typically with the Prophet asleep in Mecca and awakened by one or more angels. In some versions, these angels open the Prophet’s chest and cleanse his heart (94). Then the magical beast Buraq bears Muhammad to Jerusalem where he performs the prayer at the Temple in the company of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Muhammad is offered a choice of two or three cups of different drinks. He proves his right guidance by avoiding the wine and selecting the milk.

The angel Gabriel then takes Muhammad up through the heavens. At each level an angelic gatekeeper interrogates Gabriel before allowing entrance. In each Muhammad encounters one or more Abrahamic prophets, offers his greetings, and then departs for the next level. The typical order of encounter, already present in Ibn Hisham’s account, consists of Adam in the first heaven, Jesus and John the Baptist in the second, Joseph in the third, Enoch (Idris) in the fourth, Aaron in the fifth, Moses in the sixth, and Abraham in the seventh. After meeting Abraham in the seventh heaven near the celestial temple known as the frequented house (al-bayt al-mad’mur), Muhammad arrives at the lote tree, experiences a revelation, and receives the ritual duty to pray fifty times a day. He descends to Moses, who sends him back to request that the burden be reduced. God removes a portion of the duty, but Moses sends Muhammad back again and again until the number of daily ritual prayers is reduced to five. Some accounts include Muhammad’s return and his efforts to prove his experience to a skeptical Meccan community.

By the ninth century this spare narrative was amplified by storytellers. Evidence for this popular tradition can be found in the extended narratives preserved in the Qur’an commentaries on the “night journey verse” by al-Tabari and the early Shi’ite exegete ‘Ali b. Ibrahim al-Qummi (d. c. 919). The account of Muhammad’s young companion Ibn ‘Abbas (d. c. 687) circulated widely and remains highly popular.

The Mi’raj tradition served to bring various modes of Islamic literature into conversation. The pivotal Sufi traditionists Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sulami (d. 1021) and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Qushayri (d. 1072) each composed important works on the early mystical interpretations of Muhammad’s night journey and ascension. Mystics such as Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. c. 850), Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240), and Farid al-Din ‘Attar (d. c. 1220) made the Prophet’s journey into a paradigm for their own journey toward mystical union.

For philosopher Ibn Sina (d. 1037), the Mi’raj serves as a neoplatonic allegory. For the litterateur Abu ‘Ala’ al-Ma’arri (d. c. 1058) it stimulated an imaginative parody of contemporary attitudes toward literature, linguistics, and morality.

The Mi’raj also became a site of literary and cultural contestation and intercourse among different religious and geographical worlds. The thirteenth-century Latin and old French translations of the Liber Scale indicate the story’s influence among European intellectuals, including Dante. In the East, it was translated into Persian and Turkish and inspired numerous poetic works. A fifteenth-century eastern Turkish manuscript accompanied by stunning Persian miniatures illustrates the story’s influence on painting. At some point Muslims began to commemorate the night of the ascension during the month of Rajab, which has become an important popular holiday. Some Islamic Mi’raj material shows clear signs of engagement with other traditions. One Mi’raj narrative attributed to al-Bistami draws upon material from Jewish Merkava and Hekhalot ascent narratives of the Jewish mystics describing journeys through celestial palaces to the divine throne. Christian apocalyptic writings such as the Apocalypse of Paul also contain important parallels, as do inter-testamental and apocryphal texts such as the Ethiopic Book of Enoch. The initiatic features of the Mi’raj (e.g., ritual dismemberment, meeting past elders, receiving a divine commission) has led some to note similarities to patterns from shamanic tradition.

In general, the Mi’raj interpretation of the visions of Qur’an 53 offers a paradigm of “ascent” by the Prophet toward revelation in contrast to the dominant Qur’anic motif of “descent” (tanazzul) of the revelation toward the Prophet, two contrasting paradigms that were in similar play throughout late antiquity and the Middle Ages. One could read many Mi’raj traditions as expressions of a symbolic cosmology that served as a common cultural language for religious, philosophical, literary, and cultural contact and as a symbolic field that differing cultural worlds attempted to appropriate as their own.

An interpretation of Muhammad’s vision of ascension appears in the volume two color plates.

See also Buraq; Holy Cities; ‘Ibadat; Miracles.

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Islamic modernism justified each of these institutions as being more consistent with the original spirit of Islam than were the existing institutions of the Islamic world. In some regions Islamic modernism declined in the mid-twentieth century, losing popularity to revivalist and secularist movements. Yet it appeared to have revived in the late twentieth century, spurred in part by a dramatic global increase in modern education.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Iqbal, Muhammad; Liberalism, Islamic; Modern Thought; Rahman, Fazlur.

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Charles Kurzman

MODERNITY

The European penetration of the Near East and India and the decline of Muslim ascendency in these regions in the nineteenth century precipitated the crisis that defined the responses of Muslim intellectuals to European modernity. The key thinkers in the nineteenth century, who continue to influence contemporary attitudes in the Islamic world to modernity, were the so-called Islamic modernists, such as Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). Islamic modernism generated a series of novel institutions, including schools that combined Islamic education with modern subjects and pedagogies; newspapers that carried modernist Islamic ideas across continents; theaters, museums, novels, and other cultural forms that were adapted from European models; constitutions that sought to limit state power; and social welfare agencies that brought state power into ever more sectors of social life.

MODERNISM

Modernism is a movement to reconcile Islamic faith with modern values such as nationalism, democracy, rights, rationality, science, equality, and progress. Islamic modernism is distinguished from secularism by its insistence on the continuing importance of faith in public life; it is distinguished from other Islamic movements by its enthusiasm for contemporary European institutions. The movement emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century as a response to European imperialism, which pitched the Islamic world into crisis, but also—in the view of the modernists—offered solutions to the crisis. Influential early figures included Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). Islamic modernism generated a series of novel institutions, including schools that combined Islamic education with modern subjects and pedagogies; newspapers that carried modernist Islamic ideas across continents; theaters, museums, novels, and other cultural forms that were adapted from European models; constitutions that sought to limit state power; and social welfare agencies that brought state power into ever more sectors of social life.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Iqbal, Muhammad; Liberalism, Islamic; Modern Thought; Rahman, Fazlur.

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MODERNITY

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the technical and elaborate procedures of *tafsir*, in which the ulema trained in the traditional Islamic sciences were conversant.

These two tendencies in Islamic modernism also reflected in part the major impact of print on the Islamic world in the modern period. From the nineteenth century onward, the availability of the Qur'an in print, and its concurrent translation into local languages, struck at the very heart of the traditional system of the oral transmission of knowledge, in which the charisma of the teacher as a living embodiment of knowledge was crucial. The multiplication of texts through printing made unsupervised reading possible. This in turn meant that it was possible to engage with religious texts without the mediation of the formally trained ulema.

These tendencies in Islamic modernism, and the impact of print, lie behind the works of a number of important Muslim thinkers in the twentieth century, in which the engagement with European modernity was a key theme. It is particularly evident in the commentaries on the Qur'an by Sayyid Abu l-A'la' Maududi, the founder of the fundamentalist Jama'at-e Islami. Maududi himself was not a formally trained 'alim, but it is precisely because of this that his ideas and thought played a crucial role in the development of what is called Islamic fundamentalism. These tendencies are similarly evident in Muhammad Iqbal’s (1893–1938) *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1934). This work exemplifies Islamic modernism’s response to European modernity both in its style and its content. It purports to show how the Qur'an is entirely consonant with the major discoveries of European science, and it is wide-ranging in its eclectic use of European thinkers. Iqbal’s engagement with the Qur'an is singular and unmediated by any sense of *tafsir* in the traditional sense of the word.

Islam’s relationship with modernity has been the defining theme of the work of major Muslim thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The strategies of interpreting the Qur'an, and its relocation as a sacred text in the act of individual and unmediated reading, are in fact among the major consequences of the impact of modernity on Islam. However, the role of modernist thinkers as spokesmen for Islam vis-à-vis European modernity also points to some other features of the impact of modernity on the Islamic world.

First, it is clear that there are a multiplicity of Islamic voices engaging with European modernity. This in part is also a consequence of the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 by Ataturk, so that even symbolically there is no single figurehead in the Islamic world. This, together with the undermining of the authority of the formally trained ulema, has meant that there are competing voices for Islam with no clear procedures or authorities to adjudicate between them.

Secondly, Islamic engagements with modernity can be read in two overlapping ways. In part, the relationship of Islamic thought to European thought is mimetic; that is to say, in the work of Afghani, 'Abduh, Iqbal, and others, such as the poet Altaf Husayn Hali (1837–1914), Islam is refashioned into a mirror of European modernity. At the same time, though, Islamic modernism also teases out, generally unself-consciously, the contradictions in European modernity itself. Islamic engagements with modernity are at times ambivalent, rather than mimetic alone. As such, these engagements can be read alongside the works of European philosophers, such as those of the Frankfurt School and Michel Foucault, who have explored the tensions in modernity, arguing that it is less a narrative of progress than one of repression.

Thirdly, nowhere is this ambivalence to modernity more evident than in the attitude to the nation-state demonstrated by the thinkers mentioned above. There is an obvious tension between the modernist attempts to define a pan-Islamic, worldwide community, theoretically made possible through
innovations in technologies of communication, and the fundamental reality of the nation-state, some with Muslim populations that are hostile to each other. The very attempts by Afghani, ‘Abduh, Iqbal, and others to reinterpret Islamic law as a legal system in keeping with a modern state is indicative of the powerful reality of the nation-state as the organizing principle of the world in the twentieth century. Furthermore, given the fact that the nation-state tends toward monopolizing all sources of authority, as long as it remains in existence, it is unlikely that the ulema will recover the authority they enjoyed in the pre-modern Islamic world.

The engagement of Islam with modernity remains open-ended and multivocal. Having said that, it is important to note that no Muslim thinker has argued for rejecting European modernity in toto in the way that the famous Indian nationalist leader, Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), tried to do in his life’s work. Although there may be problems regarding the feasibility of Gandhi’s position, the fact that the possibility of any alternatives to European modernity has not been explored in any depth in Muslim thought is powerful testimony to the sway that European modernity has held over the Islamic world since the early nineteenth century.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Iqbal, Muhammad; Liberalism, Islamic; Maududi, Abu l-A’la’a; Modern Thought.

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Javed Majeed

MODERNIZATION, POLITICAL

ADMINISTRATIVE, MILITARY, AND JUDICIAL REFORM
Aslam Farouk-Alli

AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Claudia Stodte
Anne-Sophie Froehlich

CONSTITUTIONALISM
Sohail H. Hashmi

PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND PARTIES
Quantanamo Wiktorowicz

ADMINISTRATIVE, MILITARY, AND JUDICIAL REFORM
The modern states of the Middle East are remnants of the Ottoman (Turkish) and Safavid (Persian) dominions, the last of the great Muslim empires. These countries not only share common religious and historical legacies but have also experienced very similar colonial and postcolonial influences. The term “Middle East” in fact alludes to the colonial encounter and was coined by the Allied forces (the British, Free French, and Americans) during the Second World War to indicate a single military theater for operational and supply purposes. The area in question thus encompasses the Arab world as well as the non-Arab countries of Turkey and Iran. To fully appreciate developments in the post-independence period—after 1945—events that led to the modern state system must be briefly charted.

World War I resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of mandate territories run as colonies. This gave rise to strong anti-colonial, nationalist movements, especially in Turkey and Iran, which emerged as independent states in 1923 and 1921, respectively. Egypt gained independence in 1922, when the British withdrew from direct control, and Saudi Arabia attained sovereignty in 1926. The period after World War II was characterized by rapid independence, and between 1945 and 1946 Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan all witnessed the disappearance of the European presence. However, the authority of the West still weighed burdensomely upon the region and determined the manner in which these countries reconstituted themselves in light of modern developments. This influence continues to the present day.

Three of the most significant factors challenging reform and growth in the region have been the discovery of oil, the strengthening of the United States’ position after World War II, and the creation of the state of Israel. These factors had, and continue to have, a direct impact upon reform initiatives, manifesting themselves differently depending upon the social and cultural conditions of the individual countries of the region.

Iran
Reza Shah Pahlevi (1925–1941) was able to create a strongly centralized state by using the army, thereby leaving an enduring legacy of military intervention in Iranian politics right up to the Islamic revolution in 1979. Muhammad Reza, who succeeded his father in 1941, initially indulged party politics, but soon followed his father’s example and used his control over the army to re-establish royal authority. Prior to this however, Iranian politics (between 1945 and 1953) was extremely turbulent, due to both internal and external factors.
Throughout the 1940s, the political scene was driven by British, Soviet, and American interests competing for influence. The United States was able to forge close ties with the Iranian army, while Britain sought a privileged position for its oil interests. The placing of Iran’s economic and military development in the hands of foreigners created growing consternation among Iranian nationalists, and in 1950 a group of politicians led by Mohammed Mosaddeq were able to obtain sufficient support in the Majlis (parliament) to act against the Anglo-Iranian oil company, nationalizing its Iranian assets. In 1951 the Majlis nationalized the oil industry altogether, and also elected Mosaddeq as prime minister. However, his reform efforts were short-lived and he was overthrown in a U.S.-assisted coup in 1953, largely due to American fears of Soviet influence over Iran. Mosaddeq’s overthrow enabled the shah to create his royal dictatorship, and with the assistance of U.S. and Israeli advisors he formed SAVAK, his notorious secret police service.

From 1953 to 1979 there was absolutely no political freedom in Iran. In 1963 the shah was severely criticize by a then still-obscure member of the religious establishment, Ayaollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini was arrested by SAVAK in June 1963 and deported to Turkey in 1964. In the following year he was deported to Iraq, where he stayed, preaching and writing. In 1978 he was forced to go to France. However, Khomeini returned to Iran in triumph in 1979, as leader of one of the most spectacular and unexpected revolutions in modern history.

The shah’s dictatorial policies robbed Khomeini of all political legitimacy and were ultimately responsible for his downfall. Most of his 1961 to 1963 White Revolution reforms centered on huge military spending and benefits offered to appease the officer corps. By 1976 Iran had the fifth largest military force in the world. Khomeini’s efforts at economic and social development were miserable failures, with the exception of the literacy drive, which enjoyed measurable success. In 1975 he scrapped the two-party system and introduced the single National Resurgence Party. It was ultimately the shah’s brutal response to unarmed protests in 1978 that ignited the revolution. The clergy were able to effect large-scale uprisings, and emerged as the representatives of the masses.

The new government, under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, initially made efforts to include secular elements. Mehdi Bazargan, the secular reformist, was made the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ultimately, however, the idea that social, political, and economic change could only be achieved by the renewal of an Islamic order prevailed, ushering in the Khomeini era, in which Iran was transformed into a theocracy ruled by the clergy.

Khomeini died in 1989, and the post-Khomeini period has once again surprised analysts with the emergence of liberal-minded reformists. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Iran’s president, Mohammad Khatami, has even called for increased powers of the elected assembly over the ulama’s Council of Guardians, and he appears to be trying to reconcile a deeply religious political ethos with the principles of representative government.

Turkey

After independence in 1923, Turkish politics was dominated by the single-party rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s authoritarian Republican People’s Party (RPP). His successor, who assumed office in 1938, departed from Atatürk’s economic policies and lessened government sponsorship of industrial development. This was largely in response to pressure from the Turkish business sector, which sought more freedom for private entrepreneurial activity, and pressure from the peasantry, which was displeased with the government’s bias in favor of industrialization over agricultural development. Government also responded to pressure from intellectuals and politicians critical of the single-party dispensation by allowing greater political freedom. As a result, four members of the national assembly defected from the RPP in 1946 and formed a new party, called the Democratic Party (DP).

Although the democrats were only able to win sixty-five seats in the 1946 elections, they were able to extend their influence tremendously over the next four years and won 396 of the 465 seats in the national assembly in 1950. The DP showed greater sensitivity to religious sentiments and restored the public call to prayer in Arabic (which had previously been banned), maintained and developed mosques, and offered religious instruction to all Muslim students in primary schools on a voluntary basis. It still, however, strongly upheld the principal of secularism.

Economic policies instituted by the democrats were geared towards agricultural reform in order to appease their support-base among the peasantry, but when the economy began to suffer they came under severe public criticism. The government responded harshly by introducing extremely repressive restrictions against the press, and even brought in the army to quell violent protests. They further exploited ruling-party privilege by using the army to disrupt RPP campaign rallies. Such irresponsibility met with a severe backlash, and on 27 May 1960 the military stepped in to institute the first coup d’état.

Military intervention became commonplace in Turkish politics, but remains unique in that power was always handed back to civilian politicians. The military establishment was primarily concerned with upholding the principle of Kemalism, but equally committed to the system of multi-party politics. The 1960 intervention lasted for only eighteen months, in which time the constitution was revised to protect the rights of individuals and assert the principle of secularism.

The period between 1961 and 1983 witnessed the proliferation of political parties, with attendant political upheaval.
and instability. The military instituted two more coups, in 1971 and 1980, and further constitutional amendments were introduced. In addition to the rise and fall of various coalition governments, civil order was also threatened by Kurdish separatist aspirations and by the rise of Islamic revivalism, led by the National Salvation Party. Islamist parties have had to constantly re-invent themselves under different guises due to the military’s censure of “anti-secular” politics. This trend has set contemporary Turkish politics to sway between two poles: that of a re-emergent Islamist ideal versus a secular-liberal ideal seemingly on the wane. Just below the surface, however, lies the powerful military, which keeps the powers-that-be decisively in check.

In 1997 the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party’s leader was forced to step down due to pressure from the National Security Council, and the party itself was closed down the following year on charges of anti-secular activities. Refah reconstituted as the Fazilat Party, which was also banned in 2001. In spite of this, the 2002 elections were won by the Justice and Development Party, which emerged from the modernizing wing of the Fazilat Party. Although enjoying overwhelming support from the masses, the Justice and Development Party will have to constrain its constituency’s aspirations or face the fate of all its Islamist predecessors.

The Arab States

In contrast to the relatively effective constitutional regimes of Iran and Turkey, the Arab States of the Middle East are ruled by either monarchies or military dictators. It is important to note that the regions’ dictatorships are a result of the social and political processes of the twentieth century. The Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war and the changing structure of global politics due to Cold War competition were the main factors responsible for the polarization of the Arab states and the tempering of Arab Nationalist sentiments that were so strongly evoked by the Egyptian leader Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, especially between 1953 and 1967.

By 1945 the massive influx of wealth into the Arab states, primarily due to oil revenues, served as the single impetus for development, especially in terms of infrastructure and nation-building. However, progress was undermined by defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war from 1948 to 1949, as well the failure to cope with internal political, economic and social pressures. The resultant backlash brought about a series of military coups: in Syria in 1949, Egypt in 1952, Sudan and Iraq in 1958, North Yemen in 1962, and Libya in 1969. The remaining countries, including Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States, were all monarchies and effectively one-party states. The only exception was Lebanon, where the existence of parliamentary or party politics has been essential in order to balance the interests of both Christians and Muslims.

The sharp rise in oil prices in the early 1970s led to ambitious programs of social and economic development, and even had a positive impact upon the non-oil producing states like Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, which were able to benefit from the new wealth through workers’ remittances and financial aid. In the 1950s and 1960s, the military was seen as an instrument of modernization and change, but by the 1970s this image was severely damaged largely due to defeats on the battlefield and failed agrarian and industrialization reform policies.

The two major home-grown ideologies up to this point were Nasserism and Ba‘thism, impacting most significantly upon Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Egypt under Nasser embodied the aspirations of the Arab world, facing a future freed of the imperial past, newly independent and equally assertive. From the time of the Free Officers’ coup in 1952 up until the Arab-Israeli War in June of 1967, Nasser was seen as a dynamic president who had set in motion a positive process of national transformation. As a result Egypt exercised profound regional influence in this period.

However, Nasserism as a doctrine tried to satisfy too many conflicting aspirations. As such, it was able to position itself neither as religious nor secular, democratic nor authoritarian, socialist nor capitalist. It contained aspects of all but faltered in privileging any one of these as the most important. The defeat in 1967 marked the true end of Nasserism. Hereafter, Nasser allowed the Soviet Union to acquire dominant influence in the military. He dropped the quest for Arab unity and the hopes he had raised were finally shattered with his death in 1970. His successor, Anwar Sadat (1918–1981), was left to fill the void.

Although lacking the charisma of Nasser, Sadat was able to reorient Egyptian domestic and foreign policy in ways that were every bit as profound as Nasser’s. He realigned Egypt with the superpowers in favor of the United States by expelling Soviet military advisors and by courting peace with Israel, not before redeeming Egyptian honor by defeating the Israelis in the October 1973 war. Sadat’s U.S.-brokered treaty with Israel earned him the discontent of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. His clampdown on these groups ultimately led to his assassination on 6 October 1981.

Ba‘thism, in contrast to Nasserism, was characterized by a more sharply defined set of principles. Michel ‘Aflaq (1910–1989), the cofounder of the Ba‘th Party, defined its role in stirring and romantic language. The party was conceived of as an instrument of social justice and was supposed to be at the vanguard of Arab unity. It attracted young Arabs of the post-independence era eager to restore Arab dignity, especially in Syria and Iraq.

‘Aflaq was, however, in no way comparable to Nasser in terms of leadership qualities. Lacking a politician of ability to implement its vision, the party’s plans were thwarted as it divided into regional groupings and quarreling factions. Ambitious men like Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad (1930–2000) and Iraq’s Saddam Husayn (1937–) used the party’s apparatus and
ideology to serve their own ends. In the hands of al-Asad and Husayn the Ba‘th became a means of survival their respective regimes and they utilized it as an effective instrument of control and indoctrination.

As such, the party lost its pan-Arab mission and developed rival Syrian and Iraqi branches. Common to both, however, was severe political repression, although social reforms were in some instances significant. Syria still remains an authoritarian dictatorship under Bashar al-Asad (b. 1965), Hafiz al-Asad’s son and heir, whereas the political future of Iraq after the U.S.-led overthrow of Saddam Husayn in April of 2003 is uncertain.

In the 1980s, the biggest challenge that faced the Arab regimes was the re-emergence of Islamic reformism, which was greatly influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran. The Islamic reform movements were largely unsuccessful due to the foreign support offered to the various regimes in order to protect their own interests. A striking example is the overthrow of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria by the military after a landslide victory in the first round of parliamentary elections held in December 1991. Voters had rejected the National Liberation Front that had ruled the country as a single party for thirty years. The Islamic Salvation Front was poised to gain a decisive parliamentary majority, but the military intervened, declaring the elections null and void. A notable exception, however, was the successful establishment of an Islamic regime in Sudan in 1989.

The United States in the early twenty-first century exercises undisputed influence over the Middle East, and it is difficult to envisage the flourishing of any popular movement representative of the political aspirations and ambitions of the civilian populations in these countries. This is borne out by the United States’ heavy-handed policies towards countries with well-established systems of representative government, like Sudan and Iran, and its tolerance and open allegiance to repressive regimes like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, which are notorious for their gross violations of human rights. American support for Israel in terms of massive financial assistance and the turning of a blind eye to the occupation of Palestine also leaves little hope for resolving conflict and diffusing tensions in the region as a whole. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in April of 2003 only signals the perpetuation of the old colonial paradigm of political, military, and economic domination and exposes the divide between the vested interests of a powerful center and ultimate regional self-determination. These are but some of the major factors that hinder positive reform and progress in the Middle East.

Judicial Reform
The process of judicial reform in the Middle East had already begun in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Ottoman Empire and Egypt began appropriating Western legal codes that were mostly derived from French and British models. The immediate effect of these measures was the reduction of the scope of Islamic law or shari‘a, jurisdiction.

With the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the modern republic of Turkey, a fairly complete secularization of the law code was effected in that country, even in matters of personal status. The shari‘a was effectively purged from the new statute books. However, developments in the neighboring regions were far more gradual.

Iran, under Reza Shah Pahlevi, adopted a version the Swiss family law code that remained in effect until after the revolution. The shah’s obsession with Western models of development drove his reform initiatives, and some of the family protection laws instituted between 1967 and 1975 granted women greater legal equality within marriage. Unlike the case of Turkey and Tunisia, however, the shah did not abolish polygamy. However, the husband was required to take the consent of his current wife in order to marry another.

The most significant reform initiative in the Arab states was the introduction of the new Egyptian civil code, framed by ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri in 1949. Al-Sanhuri drew upon existing legislation, contemporary Western codes, and the shari‘a in formulating the code, although its final shape was more French than Islamic. Other Arab states also amended their codes and continued to increase the centralization of their courts. The Egyptian model inspired many of these efforts. Al-Sanhuri was also called upon to formulate the Iraqi and Kuwaiti codes later on.

A notable exception to the reform trend is seen in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Neither of these countries came under British protection and the early Ottoman reforms were not that far-reaching. As such, the pre-existing shari‘a system was never restricted. In more recent times Yemen has made efforts to centralize and codify its legal system, whereas in Saudi Arabia the shari‘a courts still retain general jurisdiction.

The period of malaise in the Middle East after 1967 prompted militants and ordinary citizens alike to express desire for the re-establishment of the shari‘a. Muslim intellectuals have generally favored the idea that rulers are subject to and must therefore enforce laws that are not entirely of their own making. This is but one strong inclination that ensures the continuing appeal for calls to re-introduce the shari‘a and its role in future legal reforms cannot be easily dismissed or discounted.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri; Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal; Iran, Islamic Republic of; Islamic Salvation Front; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Modernization, Political: Participation, Political Movements, and Parties; Mosaddeq, Mohammad; Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.
AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION

In the Middle East, liberal democracy is a rarity. There is no democracy in the Western sense, that is, characterized by the right to form political parties; the possibility of changing government by election; the freedoms of the press, belief, and association; the protection of individual rights; the separation of powers; and secularism.

One reason for the lack of democratic structures lies in the experience of colonialism and neocolonialism. Most Arab countries achieved independence only after World War II, and the borders were in many cases fixed by the colonial powers; therefore, the people in the new political entities did not necessarily share a national identity. For some decades there was a strong movement toward “Arab unity” or pan-Arabism. However, actual attempts to form a greater nation, like that of Egypt, Syria, and Yemen (1958–1961), came to nothing.

Even in countries that never were colonies, like Iran and Afghanistan, Western and Soviet interference, respectively, prevented democratic development. The success of the Iranian revolution of 1978 and 1979 is partly due to the repeated defeat of attempts at democratization. The ongoing Israeli–Arab conflict stymies liberalization, and plays into the hands of extremist groups.

Another reason for the lack of democratic structures lies within the extremely patriarchal Middle Eastern societies themselves and their tradition of authoritarianism. The latter has its roots in the patronage system of the tribal Arab societies as well as in the Islamic theory of power with its ideal of the just sovereign.

The political landscape since the 1970s has been dominated by two forms of governance: conservative monarchies and military or single-party republics. Even countries that established an ideologically founded republic (e.g., Algeria, Tunisia, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, or South Yemen) or abolished monarchy through military coups d’état (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, and Libya), later developed a highly authoritarian, personalized leadership. If presidential elections are held, people do not really have a choice between different candidates; the “presidential monarch” is usually reelected with close to 100 percent of the votes (e.g., in 1999: Yemen 96%, Egypt 94%, Tunisia 99%). Nowhere else do governors stay in power so long: The average reigning time for rulers in the Arab world was twenty-one years in 1998.

With many Arab societies still divided into tribes (most notably in Yemen) or sects (Lebanon), it is hard to establish political parties at all. Moreover, members of minority factions often prefer authoritarian regimes that protect their existing freedoms.

A possible exception to the failure of democracy is Turkey, defined as a secular republic in 1923—by the patriarchal rule of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). Since the end of the single-party system in 1945, there has been a wide range of political parties, and governments have been changed by elections. The democratic character of the republic is limited, however, by the strong position of the military, which took over power three times between 1960 and 1980. Its influence as well as the continuing violation of human rights are obstacles to Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union.

Other countries in the region are, at least to some extent, free and democratic. Since 1989 Jordan has developed a relatively unfettered press and has installed an elected parliament with real opposition parties, while remaining a hereditary monarchy. Morocco also established a parliament, although the real political power still lies with the king. In states like Egypt, Tunisia, and the reunited Yemen, there are parliaments and elections, but the presidents—relying on a strong secret service or military—determine most developments and still refuse to grant rights to political movements, parties, or groups.

Syria and Iraq, where branches of the socialist Ba’ath (Rebirth) party came to power in the 1960s, soon became extremely autocratic states with quasi-hereditary presidencies. The same thing happened to the political system created by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in Libya in 1969, combining elements of grassroots democracy and socialist ideas with a totally autocratic style of governance.

The oil-rich Arab kingdoms and emirates of the Persian Gulf combined economic modernization with strict autocratic governance. As if in compliance with the principle “no taxation without representation,” these wealthier states could
afford to keep their population calm without granting democratic rights. The United Arab Emirates have no parliamentary structures at all; Saudi Arabia suppresses all opposition by force.

Throughout the Middle East, the 1980s were characterized by the rise of political Islam. It evolved primarily according to domestic factors, often as a reaction against authoritarianism and corruption. Some states are trying to include the Islamists in their democratization efforts: In Jordan and Yemen the major opposition parties in parliament are Islamist. But most states consider them a fundamental threat to the political system. In Algeria the democratization process ended with the annulment of the relatively free elections in December 1991, when it became evident that the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was going to win most parliamentary seats. The army took over with international approval and a decade of savage civil strife ensued.

Other states made concessions to political Islam. They revived, for example, the principle of consultation (shura), which in reference to Qur'an passages 3:159 and 42:38 provides some kind of participation. Even Saudi Arabia has had a shura council since 1993; every four years its 120 members are appointed by the king. If broadly applied (as in Jordan), this principle of consultation can be helpful in achieving political participation and pluralization.

The Islamic Republic of Iran (1979) is an interesting case. Although an Islamic state, governed by the principle of velayat-e faqih (i.e., the absolute authority of the religious jurist), it has republican structures—a constitution, a parliament, and elections. Since 1997 the results of the elections, though still controlled, show a great demand for democracy, especially among women and young voters.

With the deaths of three veteran rulers in 1999 (the kings of Jordan and Morocco, and the emir of Bahrain) and of Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, a new generation of Arab leaders gained power, and more such changes will follow. These new rulers were partly educated in the West, and the aspirations for more democracy under their governance are high. They will probably not change the political systems completely, but they are taking steps to open their countries, economically and otherwise. Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who came to power in 1995, not only decreed that Qatar was to become a democracy, but also abolished censorship and launched al-Jazeera, the freest television channel in the Arab world. As one of its moderators put it, “the main obstacle to progress in the Middle East is the lack of free media. In our society, the rubbish has been swept under the carpet far too long.”

See also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Political Islam; Qadhafi, Mu’ammar al-; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Iran; Revolution, Modern.

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Claudia Stodte
Anne-Sophie Froeblich

CONSTITUTIONALISM

Virtually all the Arab countries, as well as Turkey and Iran, have promulgated formal, written constitutions. As they and other Muslim nations have learned, however, a constitutional document does not always reflect or ensure constitutionalism, just as constitutionalism does not always require a written constitution. Constitutionalism is the idea that political order ought to be subject to a higher authority beyond the arbitrary human will expressed through an autocrat, a minority faction, or a democratic mob. Although constitutionalism is commonly identified with liberal democracy, any regime that provides for limited and accountable government, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights to all its citizens may be said to be constitutionalist. Defined in this way, constitutionalism has had a troubled history in the countries of the Middle East, and no country has yet to date fully implemented constitutionalist principles.

The earliest constitutionalist experiments in Arab states occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. In 1857, under pressure from European governments, Muhammad Bey issued the ‘Abd al-Aman, or Fundamental Pact, under which all residents of Tunisia were granted equal rights of security, legal redress, and employment. In 1861, Tunisia promulgated the first constitution in the Muslim world, under which the legislative and judicial powers of the bey and his ministers were limited by the establishment of a Grand Assembly. The assembly consisted of sixty members, appointed by the bey for five-year terms, and all drawn from the country’s elite. The constitutional experiment lasted but three years, collapsing in 1864 in the wake of popular demonstrations in the provinces.

Constitutional reforms would not resume until 1955, as the French protectorate over Tunisia was nearing an end. The constitution promulgated in June 1959 declared Tunisia a republic, with executive power vested in a president and legislative power in a National Assembly, both elected by universal suffrage. The judiciary was declared to be independent. The constitution was significantly amended in 1988 to strengthen executive control over the legislature, and to
specify that the prime minister succeeds the president in case of death or disability.

Egyptian constitutionalism gained ground during the reign of the Khedive Isma'il, fueled mainly by the notables’ growing concern with Egyptian indebtedness to European powers. In 1866, Isma'il agreed to create the Consultative Assembly of Deputies, comprised of Egyptian notables, and in 1878 he formed the Council of Ministers, to which he transferred a great deal of executive authority. In 1882, when Isma'il's successor, Tawfiq, attempted to reverse his predecessor's concessions, the Assembly of Deputies pressured the khedive to approve their draft constitution. Under this document, the Assembly was to be an elective body whose members served five-year terms. Both it and the Council of Ministers could initiate legislation, subject to the final approval of the khedive. Most importantly, the prime minister could be summoned and questioned by the Assembly, and if a conflict arose between the two, the Assembly's will was to prevail.

The 1882 constitution was never fully implemented, and when the British occupied Egypt the same year, it was suspended. Shortly after independence, Egypt promulgated a new constitution in April 1923, which established the supremacy of the king over the cabinet and the parliament. Following the Free Officers' overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, a new constitutional charter was enacted in January 1956 that declared Egypt a republic, with most powers vested in the president. A new constitution was drafted in 1971, soon after Anwar Sadat's assumption of the presidency. This document retains a strong presidency but adds provisions for an expanded role for the judiciary, including the creation of a Supreme Constitutional Court. The courts' powers have effectively been curtailed, however, by the invocation of Emergency Laws by Hosni Mubarak, ostensibly to combat terrorism within the country.

Iraq's constitution was drafted and promulgated in 1925, while the country was still under a British mandate. It created a constitutional monarchy, with a strong king and a bicameral legislature. Once the British mandate ended, the king's authority over the cabinet was enhanced through constitutional amendments in 1943. The July 1958 revolution that ended monarchical rule effectively ended constitutionalism as well. From 1958 to 2003, the country was run by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC's authoritarian rule was formalized in the 1970 “interim” constitution adopted by the Ba'thists, which continued in place until it officially became Iraq's constitution in 1990. Amendments in 1995 made the election of the president subject to national plebiscite, but in effect bolstered the authoritarian rule of Saddam Husayn by eliminating the RCC's ability to dismiss the president.

The Lebanese constitution is among the most intriguing of all the Arab republics. Given the deep sectarian cleavages in the Greater Lebanon that was created under the French mandate, the 1943 National Covenant established a consociational democracy. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies were divided according to a 6:5 formula, giving the Christian population a permanent majority in the legislature over the Muslims. The president had to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament a Shi'ite Muslim. This “elite cartel” continued to function until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Under the Ta'if Agreement of 1989 that ended the civil war, the sectarian apportionment of high offices was retained, but the Christian-Muslim allocation of seats in the legislature was brought to parity and the powers of the prime minister relative to those of the president were substantially increased.

All of the extant Arab monarchies, including Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and the other emirates of the Persian Gulf, have adopted constitutional instruments that make token attempts at creating popularly elected legislatures, but which retain effective powers in the hands of the monarch. Kuwait is a notable, but qualified, exception; the emir has battled parliaments demanding a greater role since the 1960s. The parliament's authority was enhanced following the liberation
of Kuwait from Iraqi control in 1991. As for Saudi Arabia, no real constitutional document was enacted until 1992, when the Basic Laws codified the complete dominance of the Saudi ruling house in the country's administration. The king appoints the Consultative Council and heads the Council of Ministers.

Turkey’s experience with constitutionalism began with the Ottoman constitution of 1876, which formalized the central place of the sultan in the government of the empire, but created a bicameral parliament to share the sultan's legislative functions. Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II suspended this constitution within months of its enactment. It was revived, with modifications that enhanced executive powers, following the Young Turks revolt in 1908. Turkey’s transformation to a secular republic began with constitutional enactments passed by the Grand National Assembly following the empire's defeat in the First World War. In January 1921, the Law of Fundamental Organizations vested legislative authority in the Grand National Assembly. Another decree in November 1922 abolished the sultanate. Finally, on 20 April 1924, following the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, the constitution of the Turkish republic was announced.

By the 1950s, Turkey had evolved firm republican and what seemed to be strengthening democratic institutions, going so far as to see the triumph of an opposition party in the 1950 general elections. Increasing paralysis in the parliament caused by party differences led to the first military intervention in 1960. The military seized power again in 1971 and 1980, leading to the proclamation of a constitution that legitimated the military’s political role in 1982. In 1995, with Turkey attempting to join the European Union, constitutional amendments attempted to lessen the political profile of the military.

Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906 launched that country’s attempt at constitutional monarchy. In 1925, the constitution was amended to effectuate the transfer of monarchical authority from the Qajar dynasty to the new Pahlevi dynasty that was founded by the erstwhile minister of war, Reza Khan. The only period during the Pahlevi era when constitutional practices were even partially implemented was from 1941 to 1953, when the young Muhammad Reza Shah was not strong enough to exert his will against the Majlis, the national parliament. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, the shah’s rule became increasingly despoti.

In January 1979, the monarchy was overthrown in the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was enacted in December 1979. Its most notable feature was the implementation of direct rule by the Shi’ite religious scholars, chiefly in the institution of the vali-ye faqih, or the supreme religious guide of the nation. Significant amendments were made in 1989 to allow for a transfer of supreme authority after Khomeini’s impending death. The changes did nothing, however, to alleviate the fundamental tension built into the 1979 constitution, namely, the rivalry between two executive authorities, the president and the supreme religious guide.

See also Majlis; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform.

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Sobail H. Hashmi

**PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, AND PARTIES**

A profound tension has plagued attempts at political modernization and reform in the Middle East. On the one hand, leaders face enormous pressures to democratize. During the 1970s and 1980s, economic crises eroded regime legitimacy, creating grassroots demands for political rights and civil liberties. These local pressures coincided with growing international norms of democracy and human rights, supported by the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations. Accustomed to political control, however, leaders in the region feared that democracy would unleash hostile political movements and sweep the ruling elite from power. Pressures for democratization were thus pitted against a desire to remain in power.

In the first few decades after World War II, most regimes in the region were concerned with building new governments, asserting independence from Western countries, and securing hegemony over fractious societies. In an effort to establish control, a number of leaders asserted populist ideologies tied to socialist principles and Arab nationalism, which emphasizes the unity of Arabs irrespective of their country of residence. Perhaps the most central figure in the Arab nationalist camp was Jamal `Abd al-Nasser (d. 1970) of Egypt, who created the Arab Socialist Union in 1962 as a vehicle to mobilize the masses. Nasser’s charisma and powerful leadership inspired movements that threatened regime power in other countries. The fusion of Arab nationalism and socialism manifested itself in Syria and Iraq as well. Both countries spawned movements rooted in Ba’th ideology, which combines socialism and its emphasis on income redistribution and nationalization with visions about the glory of historical Arab unity. Ba’th parties in Syria and Iraq had to contend with strong communist movements but managed to consolidate power and gain control of government.
The influence of Arab nationalism waned during the 1970s and was replaced by the rapid ascendance of Islamic movements, which became a central force of opposition in the Middle East. The most spectacular Islamic challenge emerged in Iran in the late 1970s. Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi’s repression and failed modernization program prompted opposition from a wide consortium of social groups, which mobilized demonstrations under the leadership of the Islamic clergy in the late 1970s. The protest movement overthrew the shah, and an Islamic state was established in 1979.

The Iranian Revolution sent shock waves throughout the Middle East, and regimes became increasingly concerned about the rising power of Islamic movements. Because the growth of Islamic activism coincided with external and internal pressures for democratization, incumbent elites faced a conundrum—how to release some of the building societal pressure for political reform while preventing Islamic movements from taking power.

Two responses to this dilemma predominated. First, a number of regimes implemented an inclusionary model of controlled political liberalization. In this strategy, opposition movements, including Islamic groups, were allowed to participate in national elections, but the regime retained ultimate power and executive authority. In 1989, for example, King Hussein (d. 1999) of Jordan held elections to the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of parliament) for the first time since 1966. Although several political movements participated, the Islamic movement dominated the campaign and won thirty-four of the eighty seats, creating the single largest bloc in parliament. The movement later joined the government cabinet during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, formed a political party (the Islamic Action Front) in 1993, and supported democratic principles (even while boycotting elections in 1997). The monarch, however, remained the ultimate authority. A similar response occurred in Kuwait after the Gulf War in 1991. Because of considerable pressure from the international community and former Kuwaiti exiles, Shaykh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah held parliamentary elections in October 1992, the first since parliament was dissolved in 1986. Opposition movements openly contested the elections, and various Islamic factions won nineteen of the fifty seats in 1992, seventeen seats in 1996, and twenty in 1999. Despite this participation, the emir retained executive power.

But not all regimes gambled their political survival on the incorporation of Islamic groups through parties, elections, and political participation. Instead, they opted for an alternative exclusionary model. In this response, regimes enacted limited political liberalization measures and elections, but Islamic groups and other powerful political movements were excluded and repressed. This was the strategy in Egypt. Although the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood movement had long been prevented from forming a political party, it forged alliances with other parties and successfully won seats in parliament (eight seats in the 360-member parliament in 1984 and thirty-six in 1987). Under Hosni Mubarak in the mid-1990s, however, the regime initiated a crackdown against the movement and imprisoned fifty-four of its leading members, including many candidates who ran in the 1995 elections. Activists from more radical Islamic groups, such as the Jama’a Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and Islamic Jihad, attempted to form political parties in the late 1990s, but were denied permits.

Other regimes fluctuated between inclusionary and exclusionary responses to democratizing pressures and political movements. For example, following austerity riots in 1988, the Algerian regime initiated political reforms, including a number of policies that seemed to support the Islamic movement. A variety of Islamic factions reacted by forming the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, or FIS), which was legally recognized in 1989. In 1990, the FIS won stunning victories in municipal and regional races; although the regime subsequently repressed the movement, the FIS still dominated the 1991 parliamentary elections and was poised to control parliament with a comfortable majority. The regime quickly shifted to draconian exclusionary policies and canceled election results in early 1992, banned the FIS, and imprisoned Islamic leaders. The repression incited an Islamic rebellion that led to more than 150,000 deaths during the 1990s. A similar shift from inclusionary to exclusionary strategies can be seen in Turkey, where the Islamic-oriented Welfare Party installed its leader, Necmeddin Erbakan, as the prime minister in a coalition government in 1996. While this initially indicated an inclusionary strategy, the military eventually intervened and the coalition collapsed. The Welfare Party was subsequently closed and Erbakan was banned from politics for life. The Welfare Party and its successor, the Virtue Party, were banned. Yet a third reconstructed Islamic party, Justice and Development, won the largest number of seats in the Turkish parliament and formed a government in 2002. Such examples point to variation in strategies as leaders calculate the risks of political movement participation.

See also Communism; Erbakan, Necmeddin; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization; Nationalism: Arab; Nationalism: Iranian; Nationalism: Turkish; Pan-Islam; Political Islam; Socialism.

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Quintan Wiktorowicz

MODERN THOUGHT

A complex of ideologies that emerged unevenly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—including revivalism, rationalism, empiricism, pluralism, constitutionalism, and egalitarianism—drawing heavily on European inspirations and seeking to anchor itself in Islamic precedent.

Origins

Modern Islamic thought emerged during the period of European colonial expansion. Beginning in the eighteenth century, and accelerating in the nineteenth century, the Islamic world began to bear the brunt of this expansion. The Ottoman Empire and the Qajar dynasty in Iran lost territory and were forced to sign humiliating treaties of “capitulation” that granted extraterritorial and monopoly rights to Europeans. Other Islamic lands, from West Africa to Southeast Asia, were colonized outright. By the early twentieth century, virtually the entire Islamic world was in the grip of Europe.

Europe’s self-understanding at this time, notwithstanding variations and contradictions, involved the ideology of modernity. Indeed, this ideology had developed in part as an attempt to distance Christians from Muslims: Early modern political theorists contrasted the emerging constitutionalism in Europe with the “Oriental despotism” of the Islamic world; Enlightenment thinkers contrasted European religiosity with Muslim “fanaticism”; Orientalist scholars contrasted European science with Muslim “irrationality.”

In response to the threat posed by Europe, many Muslims sought to adopt aspects of modernity, to make modernity serve their interests rather than the interests of the colonizers. This process was not specific to the Islamic world—in Europe and elsewhere, interstate competition also spurred the development of modern institutions. The first institutions to be modernized were the militaries, whose reorganization, reoutfitting, and retraining—along European lines, often with European instructors—were ordered by rulers such as Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt (r.1805–1849), Mahmud II of the Ottoman Empire (r.1808–1839), and Ahmad Bey of Tunisia (r.1837–1855). A second wave of modernization involved the bureaucratization of other state institutions under reformist ministers such as Amir Kabir in Iran (1848–1851), Midhat Pasha in the Ottoman Empire (1860s–1870s), Khayr al-Din in Tunisia (1873–1877), and Abu Bakar of Johore in Malaya (1862–1895). Some of these reformers did not last long in office, but their project of state-building continued after their departure. A further wave of modernization involved economic institutions, which were transformed by their entry into the global economy. While some guilds were able to survive in their traditional forms, many peasants were forced from their lands and deposited in the modern capitalist workforce. Fortunes accumulated in the hands of Muslim industrialists, such as the Azerbaijani businessmen who collaborated and competed with European investors in the Islamic world’s first oil boom, in the 1870s in Baku.

These modern institutions sponsored, sometimes unintentionally, the creation of the new class of intellectuals associated with modern Islamic thought. Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, for example, sent students to study in France; the religious guide appointed for the group, Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (Egypt, 1801–1873), returned after five years to write an influential book extolling the virtues of French technology, society, and politics. State-run secular schools in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere generated modern-oriented graduates such as Ali Suavi (Turkey, 1839–1878), who incorporated Western concepts such as “democracy” and “constitutionalism” into the Islamic lexicon. Industrialists in Baku and throughout the Islamic world funded modern schools, newspapers, and cultural institutions that provided cadres, jobs, and audiences for the new breed of intellectuals.

Yet modernist thinkers, for all their novelty, also considered themselves to be authentic representatives of Islamic heritage. Modern Islamic thought appealed to aspects of this heritage that it viewed retroactively as precursors to modernity. In particular, modern movements framed their ideals as the recovery of the lost piety and glory of the early years of Islam.

Revivalism

The theme of revival—also termed renewal, rebirth, and reform—permeates much of modern Islamic thought. “There is no doubt that in the present age distress, misfortune, and weakness besiege all classes of Muslims from every side,” wrote Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Iran, 1838–1897), perhaps the most influential activist of the modernist Islamic movement. The Islamic world awaits a “sage and renewer” to “reform the minds and souls of the Muslims, repel the unforeseen corruption, and again educate them with a virtuous education. Perhaps through that good education they may return to their former joyful condition” (pp. 123–129). This joyful condition existed in the early years of Islam, before “complete intellectual confusion beset the Muslims,” according to Muhammad ‘Abdul (Egypt, 1849–1905), the most prominent student and collaborator of al-Afghani’s. Confusion can only be cured by returning to “the essential nature” of Islam, as “interpreted according to the understanding of those among whom it was sent down [from heaven] and to the way they put it into practice” (pp. 39, 153–154). “ Truly, we are in a dire need for renewal and renewers,” wrote Rashid Rida (Syria-Egypt, 1865–1935), ‘Abdul’s most prominent student and collaborator, citing the
saying of the Prophet, “God sends to this nation at the beginning of every century someone who renews its religion” (Kurzman et al., p. 78).

The most important precedent for the earliest modern renewers was Ibn Taymiyya (Syria, 1263–1328), who along with his student Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (Syria, 1292–1350) railed against the corrupt practices of Muslims of their era. While these figures remain important for modern revivalism, they have been eclipsed somewhat by the example of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Arabia, 1703–1787), the religious leader of a movement to purify Muslim practices—demolishing shrines, for example, which they took to represent false idols. Other Islamic movements of purification and renewal emerged about the same time in West Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China. Hostile observers often label revivalists “Wahhabia” to emphasize their premodern roots, while contemporary followers of such movements generally identify themselves as Muwahidun (Unitarians, or believers in divine unity) or Salafyyun (imitators of the ancestors, that is, the early generations of Muslims).

Yet modern revivalism differs significantly from its premodern predecessors. It emerged most often in regions that are highly modernized, including the Muslim diaspora in western Europe and North America. Its leaders frequently have modern educations—for example, Hasan al-Banna (Egypt, 1906–1949), the most prominent follower of Rida and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was trained as an educator, as was Sayyid Qutb (Egypt, 1902–1966), the Muslim Brotherhood’s most influential theoretician of radical revival. Usama bin Ladin (Saudi Arabia, born 1957), the most notorious revivalist of the present time, was trained in civil engineering. Al-Afghani and Abu I-Na‘a ‘Maududi (India-Pakistan, 1903–1979), the leading South Asian revivalist of the twentieth century, had seminary training but hid their traditional backgrounds, not wishing to be identified with such institutions (in al-Afghani’s case, because he attended Shi’a seminaries and later passed as a Sunni). In addition, modern revivalism presented itself as an ideology, comparable to other ideologies in the modern world (though preferable to them, according to its supporters). Revivalist slogans like “Neither East (that is, communism) nor West” and “Islam is the solution” placed Islamic revival within the field of global ideological debates, in a way that premodern revivalism did not. Finally, many revivalists also adopted other strands of modern thought, such as the ones discussed in the following sections.

In the first generations of modern Islamic thought, revivalism and these other strands were seamlessly woven together. By the 1930s, however, the seams had begun to show. Revivalism remains central in modern Islamic thought, but some revivalists downplay modern ideals, while some modernists downplay revivalist ideals. Today a distinction can be drawn between Islamic ideologies that approach modernity as a means toward revivalism, and those that approach revivalism as a means toward modernity.

Rationalism
Debates within modern Islamic thought take place on the ground of rationalism. Even thinkers who disagree with one another share the underlying premise that educated, informed Muslims should devise reasoned justifications for their positions, and may the best argument win. This premise differs from premodern limits on rationality (as opposed to faith), suspicion of novelty (vulnerable to accusations of heresy), and reliance on authority (particularly the genealogy of one’s spiritual teacher). The distinction is not absolute: Certainly novel arguments were developed in premodern times, and some modern thought denies that it does anything more than revive the insights of its predecessors. But in general, the distinction holds, demarcated symbolically by the concept of *ijtihad*.

The concept of *ijtihad*, derived from an Arabic root meaning "effort" or "struggle," was for centuries limited to a fairly technical meaning, referring to the intellectual effort of trained Islamic scholars to arrive at legal rulings on matters not covered in the sacred sources. The modernist Islamic movement of the nineteenth century adopted the term as a rallying cry, transforming its meaning into the more general task of “rational interpretation” that they held to be incumbent upon all educated Muslims. The opposite of *ijtihad*, in this view, was *taqlid*, literally “following,” which modernists took to mean “blind obedience to authority.” Al-Afghani, for example, urged Muslims to “shun submission to conjectures and not be content with mere *taqlid* of their ancestors. For if man believes in things without proof or reason, makes a practice of following unproven opinions, and is satisfied to imitate and follow his ancestors, his mind inevitably desists from intellectual movement, and little by little stupidity and imbecility overcome him—until his mind becomes completely idle and he becomes unable to perceive his own good and evil; and adversity and misfortune overtake him from all sides” (p. 171). ‘Abdul sought “to liberate thought from the shackles of *taqlid* to return, in the acquisition of religious knowledge, to its first sources, and to weigh them in the scales of human reason, which God has created in order to prevent excess or adulteration in religion” (Hourani, 140–141). Sayyid Ahmad Khan (India, 1817–1898), the chief organizer of the modernist Islamic movement in South Asia in the nineteenth century, argued that Islam is “in full correspondence with reason” (Troll, 257).

Modernists cited premodern precedents for this view. Ahmad Khan, for example, praised the broadened use of *ijtihad* by Shah Wali Allah (India, 1703–1762). Muhammad Iqbal (India, 1877–1938), the great poet and philosopher, relied on Shah Wali Allah, Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkan (Yemen, circa 1760–1839), and other, older theorists of
Modern Thought


Modern Islamic rationalism universalized such precedents. Whereas premodern thought had generally limited the use of *ijtihad* to qualified scholars, modernists consider all Muslims—or, in some theories, all educated Muslims—to be capable of rational interpretation. Modern thinkers nonetheless differ as to the matters to which rationalism may legitimately be applied, with some exempting matters whose treatment in the Qur’an and the precedent of the prophet Muhammad they consider to be unambiguous. Other thinkers, such as ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush (Iran, b. 1945), hold that even seemingly unambiguous revelation is subject to human—and thus variable and fallible—interpretation, and therefore that rational analysis is required on all matters.

**Empiricism**

In modern Islamic thought, rationalism is not limited to textual exegesis, but operates also on the empirical world. Scientific observation is required of Muslims, in this view, both for its own sake and for the benefits it can bestow upon the welfare of the Islamic world. Isma’il Bey Gasprinskii (Crimea, 1851–1914), one of the founders of modern Islamic thought in the Russian Empire, considered science to be crucial to the survival of Islam, which had fallen hundreds of years behind Europe, he argued, because of its failure to keep up with Western scientific advances. Rizaeddin bin Fakhreddin (Ar. Rida al-din bin Fakr al-din) (Tatarstan, 1858–1936), one of the chief seminary-trained collaborators of the Russian-educated Gasprinskii, likened the sciences in the Islamic world to “a factory standing idle,” and argued that “it is futile to resist machines and struggle against nature” (Kurzman, 239). Abdalrauf Fitrat (Ar. ‘Abad al-Ra’uf Fitrat) (Bukhara-Soviet Union, 1886–1938), who helped to bring Ottoman and Tatar modernism to Central Asia, urged Muslim schools to abandon “the nonsense of studying obscure points of Arabic grammar” in favor of “the new sciences, which produce rapid results and great benefits, [and which] the Christians possessed to make them victorious over you” (Kurzman, 245).

These figures and their colleagues were instrumental in reforming and founding Islamic schools—known as “New Method” (Usul-e Jadid) schools—throughout the Russian Empire to encourage the teaching of empirical subjects: natural sciences, particularly physics and chemistry; human sciences, particularly history and geography; and language arts, particularly literacy in Arabic and local languages. By the time the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, there were hundreds of such schools, only to be destroyed through the economic disasters, political purges, and civil conflicts of the early Soviet era. In other regions, however, similar school reform movements survived. Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Muhammadan College in Aligarh, India, was one of several new institutions that trained generations of modernist Muslims in South Asia. The Muhammadiyah movement in Southeast Asia established a network of new schools that exist to this day. Postcolonial states throughout the Islamic world have frequently required traditional schools to introduce scientific subjects, while also incorporating religious education as a subject in the new state-run educational systems. Empiricism has become widely entrenched both as a worldview and as a pedagogy.

The Islamic justification for empiricism cites both scriptural and historical grounds, as well as the pragmatic grounds of progress and survival. Modernists describe in glowing terms the scientific advances of the early centuries of Islam, including such figures as Abu Ja‘far al-Khwarrazmi (Baghdad, c. 800–847), who invented algebra; Ulugh Beg (Central Asia, 1394–1449), whose astronomical observations were used throughout the world for centuries; and Ibn Khaldun (Tunisia, 1332–1406), widely considered a precursor to modern historiography and social science. The relative lack of comparable paragons in later years poses the central problem for modern Islamic empiricism. Modernists have also collected numerous verses of the Qur’an and sayings of Muhammad in support of empirical study, including the saying, “Seek knowledge, even though it be in China.” Indeed, one strand of Islamic empiricism argues that all significant scientific discoveries were prefigured in the Qur’an—not only is scientific knowledge fully consistent with Islam, in this view, but Islam had it first.

**Egalitarianism**

Empirical claims, according to modern Islamic thought, are to be judged by their content, not by the social position of the speaker. In the words of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (Algeria-Syria, c. 1807–1883), an anticlonial military leader who turned to a modernist form of Sufism during his decades of retirement: “People should be measured according to the truth, not the truth according to [the reputation of] people” (Kurzman, 135).

Other modernists extended this egalitarian sentiment to many arenas of social life, for example, ethnicity. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (Syria, 1854–1902) and others criticized Ottoman Turkish discrimination against Arabs in governmental and social affairs; Syekh Ahmad Surkati (Sudan-Java, 1872–1943) and others objected to Arab discrimination
against Southeast Asians; Chandra Muzaffar (Malaysia, b. 1947) and others protested against Southeast Asians’ discrimination against non-Muslim communities in the region, such as the Chinese. In these and similar cases, egalitarianism sought to replace traditional forms of hierarchy with a new form of community, sometimes defined in religious terms (the umma, or Islamic community as a whole), but more frequently in national terms. Arab, Southeast Asian, and other nationalisms cast individuals as citizens with equal rights and responsibilities.

One of the most contentious aspects of egalitarianism involved the extension of this ideology to gender. At the turn of the twentieth century, feminists—both male and female—began to argue that patriarchal practices offended Islamic faith. Qasim Amin (Egypt, 1863–1908), the Islamic world’s most famous male feminist, argued that Islamic law originally treated men and women equally, with the exception of polygamy, granting women rights still not achieved by many Western women. Halide Edib Adivar (Turkey, 1882–1964), arguably the Islamic world’s most famous female feminist, argued the reverse, suggesting that Islamic family law was inherently anti-egalitarian on gender matters and had to be replaced with Western laws. The debate between these positions continues, with men and women on both sides of the fence. However, feminists have won near unanimity on several crucial points: that women have historically been oppressed by men; that this oppression has often been defended with misguided interpretations of Islam; that such justifications must be countered, either by the reform or removal of traditional laws and practices; and that women deserve, at the very least, equal access to education.

Another controversial extension of egalitarianism involves economic rights, especially those associated with the socialist movements that emerged in the Islamic world in the early twentieth century. In the Dutch East Indies—later Indonesia—the Islamic Union Party combined nationalist goals with redistributive ones, using an Islamic discourse of zakat, or tithing. To the left of this movement was an Islamic Communist Party, which criticized the Islamic Union Party and others on Islamic grounds, as in the comments of Hadji Mohammad Mishbach (Java, circa 1876–1940): “To be sure, they perform the precepts of the religion of Islam, but they pick and choose those precepts that suit their desire. Those that do not suit them they throw away. Put bluntly, they oppose or defy the commands of God—and rather fear and love the will of Satan—that Satan whose evil influence is apparent in this present age in [the system of] Capitalism” (Shiraiishi, 285). Socialist thought, drawing on Islamic and non-Islamic discourses, was embedded in the independence movement in Indonesia, as in Pakistan and several others around the Islamic world. In parts of the Middle East, Islamic socialism became particularly popular in the 1960s, expressing itself in both pro-Soviet and nonaligned manifestations. Soon thereafter—in the Islamic world as in the West—a counter-movement set in, with leftist sentiments ceding to dreams of individual and national capital accumulation.

Constitutionalism
A special case of egalitarianism involves political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law, all of which were bundled in the movement for constitutional government—mashrutiyat, a nineteenth-century neologism derived from the Arabic root shart (conditionality) and the French term chartes (constitution). Namik Kemal (Ottoman Turkey, 1840–1888), one of the leading activists in the constitutionalist movement of the 1860s and 1870s, quoted Qur’anic injunction such as, “And seek their council in the matter” (3:159), and concluded that “the salvation of the state today is dependent upon the adoption of the method of consultation” (Kurzman, 140). ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (Egypt, 1888–1966), a scholar at al-Azhar University in Cairo, took another tack, arguing that the sacred sources do not require democratic government, but rather permit it. The Qur’an and the precedent of the Prophet leave the form of government to human devising, “for the trusteeship of Muhammad, peace be upon him, over the believers is the trusteeship of the Message, untainted by anything that has to do with government” (Kurzman, 36). These novel arguments for constitutionalism were controversial in their day. Namik Kemal served on the Council of State that prepared the short-lived Ottoman constitution of 1876, but suffered banishments before and after that time. ‘Abd al-Raziq was fired from al-Azhar for his controversial views.

Yet constitutionalism gradually became the norm in Islamic lands. Egypt promulgated a constitutionalist document in 1860, and a fuller constitution in 1882; Tunisia briefly in 1861 and then, after the colonial interlude, in 1959; Iran briefly in 1906, then again in 1909; and so on. Upon decolonization, almost all countries in the Islamic world drew up constitutions, the last one to do so being Saudi Arabia, whose monarch announced a Basic Law modeled on Western constitutions in 1992. Some of these documents, including Saudi Arabia’s, provide far fewer rights and limits on state power than is common in Western constitutions of the same period. But it is indicative of the spread of modern thought that even traditional monarchs have felt the need to draw up a codified statement of rights and obligations. At the same time, states in the Islamic world often disregard the constitutions that are nominally in force. Many such regimes are secular in orientation, not Islamic, but a correlation persists between Muslim population and low levels of democracy.

In the face of ongoing repression, even some radical Islamic movements have adopted the discourse of constitutionalism. In Turkey, the Welfare Party—banned and reconstituted under several different names—portrayed itself as an “Islamic-Democrat” movement analogous to the Christian-Democrat parties in several western European
countries. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood began to mobilize on behalf of civil liberties in the 1980s, as did the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Renaissance movement in Tunisia, and the Justice and Charity movement in Morocco. Uncharitable observers have expressed skepticism about the sincerity of this discourse, but these movements have generated a substantial written record elaborating their constitutionalist ideologies in Islamic terms. These writings brought the radicals closer in some ways to Islamic liberalism.

**Pluralism**

Alongside political pluralism stands religious pluralism, the notion that multiple interpretations of the sacred are possible and legitimate. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, proponents of this approach emerged around the Islamic world. Among the most influential is the philosopher 'Abd al-Karim Sorush (Iran, born 1945): “Religion is divine, but its interpretation is thoroughly human and this-worldly,” Sorush wrote. “The text does not stand alone, it does not carry its own meaning on its shoulders, it needs to be situated in a context, it is theory-laden, its interpretation is in flux, and presuppositions are as actively at work here as elsewhere in the field of understanding. Religious texts are no exception” (Kurzman, 245). Similarly, the philosopher Hassan Hanafi (Egypt, b. 1935) argued, “There is no one interpretation of a text, but there are many interpretations given the difference in understanding between different interpreters. An interpretation of a text is essentially pluralistic. The text is only a vehicle for human interests and even passions” (Kurzman, 26). Fazlur Rahman, cited above, suggested that “To insist on absolute uniformity of interpretation is neither possible nor desirable” (144). Amina Wadud-Muhsin (United States, b. 1952) wrote that “when one individual reader with a particular world-view and specific prior text (the language and cultural context in which the text is read) asserts that his or her reading is the only possible or permissible one, it prevents readers in different contexts from coming to terms with their own relationship to the text” (Kurzman, 130). 'Abdullahi An-Na’im (Sudan, b. 1946) wrote that “there is no such thing as the only possible or valid understanding of the Qur’an, or conception of Islam, since each is informed by the individual and collective orientation of Muslims.” (An-Na’im, 233). Few if any of these authors had read one another’s work; pluralism sprouted independently in multiple locations.

Some writers consider the millennium of coexistence of multiple schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence to be precedent for contemporary pluralism. Others go back further, to the earliest years of Islam. Mohamed Talbi (Tunisia, born 1921) quoted Sura 5, Verse 51 of the Qur’an: “To each among you, have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. And if God had enforced His Will, He would have made of you all one people.” Muhammad Asad (Austria-Pakistan, 1900–1992) quoted the saying of the prophet Muhammad, “The differences of opinion among the learned within my community are [a sign of] God’s grace.” Farid Esack (South Africa, b. 1959) cited the words of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, Muhammad’s son-in-law and fourth successor: “this is the Qur’an, written in straight lines, between two boards [of its binding]; it does not speak with a tongue; it needs interpreters and interpreters are people.” Esack translates this into contemporary terms: “Every interpreter enters the process of interpretation with some preunderstanding of the questions addressed by the text—even of its silences—and brings with him or her certain conceptions as presuppositions of his or her exegesis” (p. 50). Leading pluralists have suffered threats and worse, as their arguments pose a challenge to other modern trends in Islamic thought that believe a single correct interpretation of Islam is achievable and ought to be enforced.

**Conclusion**

The contrast between pluralists and revivalists reminds one that modern thought is frequently self-contradictory. Constitutionalism is consistent with both authoritarianism and democracy. Empiricism breeds competing analyses. Socialism and capitalism are both modern phenomena, as are “third way” ideologies. Indeed, the label modern is sometimes used so elastically that virtually all ideas expressed in the past two centuries fall under this rubric. Other definitions, such as the one presented here, are more restrictive. Others leave the definition open, considering an idea as modern only if its authors consider it so.

Similar definitional dilemmas are associated with the term Islamic. Some of the writings quoted in this piece are not considered Islamic by other Muslims, even if their authors consider them so. A further body of thought is self-consciously non-Islamic, though its authors are Muslims.

At stake in these definitional disputes is the frame of reference for any given analysis. Calling something “modern” associates it with the entire package of modern institutions, an association that some Muslims desire and others abhor. Calling something “Islamic” associates it with the divine revelation and generations of followers of Islam, an association that some Muslims would like to monopolize. Bringing the two terms together, as in “modern Islamic thought,” suggests that the two frames overlap, and that Muslims have contributed to the construction of modernity.

See also ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Capitalism; Communism; Feminism; Gender; Iqbal, Muhammad; Liberalism, Islamic; Modernism; Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious; Pluralism: Political; Qutb, Sayyid; Rahman, Fazlur; Science, Islam and; Secularization; Shari‘ati, ‘Ali; Wali Allah, Shah.

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Charles Kurzman

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ

Mojahedin-e Khalq (Ar. Mujahidin; The People's Warriors) is a popular name for the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (Organization of the Iranian People's Religious Warriors), a group of Shi’ite Islamic-Marxist revolutionaryaries that formed in Iran during the 1960s in opposition to the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (r. 1953–1979).

The Mojahedin constituted one of several opposition movements, ranging from the Marxist left to the liberal center to the religious right, that led popular support against the transparent authoritarianism of the shah’s regime and its dependency on the United States, particularly after the shah’s violent repression of demonstrations against his program of economic and social modernization, known as the White Revolution, in June 1963. The Mojahedin drew its membership from the urban intelligentsia, mostly middle-class, college-educated young men with degrees in engineering. During the 1970s, it conducted a guerrilla war against the monarchy, but gradually declined in the face of internal divisions and external force. They experienced a resurgence, however, under the leadership of Mas‘ud Rajavi (b. 1947) after the 1978 and 1979 revolution, when they attacked Ayatollah Khomeini and his cadre of Shi’ite mullahs who were consolidating their control of the country. Nearly ten thousand Mojahedin members were exterminated by the Khomeini regime between 1981 and 1985. Saddam Husayn allowed surviving members to organize an armed Iranian opposition movement in Iraq, which subsequently fell under the control of American occupation forces there in April 2003.

Their ideology is based on a radical reinterpretation of traditional Shi’ite concepts in light of Marxist sociology and anticolonial rhetoric. Ervand Abrahamian notes that they transformed terms like jihad, mujahid, shahid (martyr), ta’wil (monotheism), and umma (community of believers) to mean “liberation struggle,” “freedom fighter,” “revolutionary hero,” “egalitarianism,” and “dynamic classless society,” respectively (1989, p. 96). They echoed many of the ideas of ‘Ali Shari’ati, widely considered the chief ideologue of the Iranian revolution after Khomeini.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Political Islam; Shari’ati, ‘Ali.

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Juan Eduardo Campo
MOJAHIDIN See Mujahidin

MOJTAHED-SHABESTARI, MOHAMMAD (1937– )

Born in 1937, Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari attended Qom Seminary at the age of fourteen. During his eighteen years of study in Qom, he was influenced by the new philosophical and theological currents that were gaining popularity among the younger generation of theologians. Subsequently, he expanded his learning to the conventional secular curriculum and independently studied contemporary Western philosophies and languages. In 1970, he moved to Germany where he later succeeded Ayatollah Beheshti as the director of the Hamburg Islamic Center, a post he held until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. After the revolution, he was elected to the first Islamic Consultative Assembly and is a faculty member of the School of Theology and Islamic Studies at the University of Tehran.

Mojtahed-Shabestari is one of the leading Iranian advocates of the hermeneutic approach to Islamic theology. In his book, Hermeneutik, Ketab Va Sumat (Hermeneutics, the Book and Tradition), he advances a theology largely extricated from earlier apologetic Islamic modernism. Influenced by the German theologian Paul Tillich and German phenomenology of religion, he argues that theological innovations emerge from the religious experiences of each generation of believers rather than from doctrinal debates. The interpretation of the divine text is mediated by history, society, body, and language. While a hermeneutic approach acknowledges these contingencies, it also endeavors to transcend them. However, this transcendence can never be total and, accordingly, truth-claims may never be absolute. Truth belongs to God and remains inaccessible to human faculties.

See also Ulema.

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Kamran Aghaie

MOLLABASHI

The Mollabashi was the head of the religious institution in Iran under the late Safavid rule. It is a synthetic title from the Arabic word, mawla, meaning “lord,” and the Turkish, bashi, or “head.” The title of Molla refers to any Muslim scholar who has acquired a certain degree of religious education. During the last years of the Safavid rule, the Mollabashi was the head of the religious institution and a leading member of the Safavid administration system. In the earlier period of the Safavid kings, this title belonged to the most learned scholar of the time, who was considered as the Mollabashi.

The office of Mollabashi was created by the Safavid shah Sultan Hosayn, who ascended the throne as king of Persia in 1694. He instituted the office during the last years of his...
rule. The Mollabashi was nominated by the king himself and held the post at the king’s will.

As the chief of the Mollas, during the royal assembly the Mollabashi had a definite place near the king, closer than that of any other religious scholar. The Mollabashi did not interfere in any state affairs except for soliciting pensions for religious students and scholars. The Mollabashi also pleaded to the king directly on behalf of the aggrieved and oppressed, and for individuals convicted of crimes.

After the collapse of the Safavid state and during the reign of the Afsharid dynasty, the prerogatives of the Mollabashi office increased because the Mollabashi was the most powerful figure in the court. But by the fall of the Afsharid state and during the reign of the Qajar dynasty, the role of the Mollabashi was limited to that of tutor of the royal princes.

See also Empires: Safavid and Qajar; Molla; Nader Shah Afshar; Ulema.

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Mansur Sefatgol

MONARCHY

Neither the Qur’an nor Muhammad made any specific provisions for the organization of government for the Islamic community. Muhammad’s successors, who ruled Arabia and a vast empire conquered by the Muslims during the quarter of century after the Prophet’s death, were called caliph (khalifah) and assumed the title of “Commander of the Faithful” (amir al-mu’minin). After a civil war that ended the period of the four “rightly-guided” caliphs in 661, the caliphate became hereditary in the Umayyad Dynasty until 750, and in the Abbasid Dynasty from 750 until 1258. The administrative and fiscal systems of the Byzantine (Roman) and Sassanian (Persian) empires were taken over by the caliphate. The bureaucratic class that carried out the fiscal and administrative tasks for the caliphs were eventually ordered to use Arabic instead of Persian and Greek in the closing decade of the seventh century, and some decades thereafter also began to translate Persian works on statecraft into Arabic. Through these translations, the idea of monarchy was absorbed into the public law and Arabic literature on statecraft, as can be seen in the Book of Sovereignty (Kitab al-sultan) by the famous ninth-century author, Ibn Qutayba.

This term first occurs as a substantive, meaning “authority” in the Qur’an, and came into usage with reference to the palaces housing the caliph’s central administration. In the latter part of the ninth century, independent royal dynasties were established in Iran and in Egypt and chose to remain under the suzerainty of the caliphs. In this period, we find the term sultan first used to refer to a specific person: the caliph’s brother, who was the commander of a special army. This haphazard use of the term to refer to a person became systematic when the Buyids (Buwayhids), Shi‘ite mercenaries from the Caspian region, captured Baghdad in the mid-tenth century, without, however, overthrowing the Abbasid caliphate. The Buyids became the first of a series of secular independent rulers to assume the title of sultan. The bifurcation of sovereignty into caliphate and sultanate became permanent, however, and underscored the new autonomy of monarchy from the caliphate.

In Iran, where the Buyids ruled independently of the caliph, they assumed the pre-Islamic Persian titles of shah (king), and even the imperial shahanshah (king of kings). The Turkish Seljuks, who replaced the Buyids in Baghdad in 1055 and proceeded to defeat the Byzantine emperor and create a vast empire from the Oxus to the Mediterranean, assumed the titles of both sultan and shahanshah. The subsequent Turkish dynasties, including the Ottomans, attached the title of sultan to their names, also using additional Persian terms such shah and its variant, padshah. Local rulers in Iran used the title of shah, and those in the Arab countries, the equivalent term malik (king). Turkish dynasties established a Muslim monarchy in northern Indian in the thirteenth century, with Delhi as its capital. The Dehi Sultanate lasted for some three centuries, until the Mogul conquest in 1526, which established a larger Muslim empire in India. The sultanate spread eastward into Asia, and survives to this day in the federal states of Malaysia and in Brunei. With the spread of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa, some of the Muslim local rulers assumed the title of sultan, and in 1841, the sultan of Oman transferred his court to Zanzibar across the Indian Ocean.

Monarchy (saltana[t], padshahi, mulk) was legitimated independently of the caliphate, and primarily on the basis of justice. The function of monarchy was the maintenance of order and ruling with justice. As such, monarchy was compared to prophecy, the function of which was the salvation of humankind. Kings were thus required by the divine constitution of cosmic order, just as were the prophets. As stated in a tradition (hadith) attributed to Muhammad, “the ruler (sultan) is the shadow of God on earth.” A distinct literary genre on political ethic and statecraft grew, grounding the legitimacy of monarchy in its justice. This literature absorbed a philosophical strand that idealized monarchy on the Platonic model of the philosopher-king. A major synthesis of the Persian and the philosophical traditions, written in the thirteenth century by Nasir al-Din Tusi, Akhlaq-e Nasiri, had many imitators and became the standard work on political ethic and statecraft in the great modern empires of the early modern period: the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mogul.
Moravids

This movement, which was to make Muslims in the Sahara and Spain more conscious of the distinctiveness of their religion, and which began a tradition of the Muslim scholar as militant reformer. The Moravid movement had its origins in the western Sahara in the 1030s when several tribes of camel breeding Sanhaja nomads broke their return journey from the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca to study in Cairouan—then the intellectual center of North Africa outside of Egypt. Greatly inspired by the teachings of the Sufi (mystic) and Maliki jurist, Abdullah b. Yasin, and by those of a former pupil of his, ‘Abdallah Ibn Yasin al-Jazuli (henceforth: Ibn Yasin), they decided, once back in the western Sahara, to establish a house of retreat (Ar. al-Murabitun) where they studied and trained to become scholars and efficient warriors in the name of Islam.

After the overthrow of the Abbasid caliphate by the Mongols in 1258, the rulers of Muslim lands typically added caliph to sultan as their titles, except in Mamluk Egypt (1260–1517), when a shadow Abbasid caliph was maintained by the Mamluk sultans. The Ottomans claimed the last Abbasid (shadow) caliph gave them the mantle of the Prophet and transferred the caliphate to them when they conquered Cairo in 1517.

The idea of constitutional monarchy was introduced into the Islamic world in the process of political modernization, with the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and the Iranian constitution of 1906. With the creation of the modern state of Turkey, the Ottoman sultanate was abolished in 1922, and the caliphate in 1924. In Iran, the monarchy was overthrown with the Islamic revolution of 1979. A number of Muslim monarchies have survived to the present, notably in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

See also Caliphate; Political Organization.

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Said Amir Arjomand

MORAVIDS

Visually impaired

This movement, which was to make Muslims in the Sahara and Spain more conscious of the distinctiveness of their religion, and which began a tradition of the Muslim scholar as militant reformer. The Moravid movement had its origins in the western Sahara in the 1030s when several tribes of camel breeding Sanhaja nomads broke their return journey from the pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca to study in Cairouan—then the intellectual center of North Africa outside of Egypt. Greatly inspired by the teachings of the Sufi (mystic) and Maliki jurist, Abdullah b. Yasin, and by those of a former pupil of his, ‘Abdallah Ibn Yasin al-Jazuli (henceforth: Ibn Yasin), they decided, once back in the western Sahara, to establish a house of retreat (Ar. al-Murabitun) where they studied and trained to become scholars and efficient warriors in the name of Islam.

By the mid-1050s a militant Almoravid movement swearing allegiance to the caliphs of Baghdad, and under the leadership of Abu Bakr ibn ‘Umar, who took the title of emir (supreme leader, c. 1055–1108), rapidly extended its control outward from its new capital Marrakesh, over much of Morocco and modern Algeria. Sections of the movement pushed further southward across the Sahara and waged jihad, possibly unsuccessfully, against the Soninke of the kingdom of Ancient Ghana. Some historians believe that these incursions laid the foundations of a tradition of jihad that was to become a marked feature of Senegambian Islam in centuries to come and particularly from the late seventeenth century to the present. The Almoravid movement is also thought to have made its way eastward across the Sahel to Aier.

Invited to Spain in 1086 by the Muslim rulers of al-Andalus, the Almoravids, led by Yusuf ibn Tashufin, defeated the army of Alphonso VI at Zalaqa. Yusuf returned to Spain in 1090 and took control of al-Andalus before extending Muslim rule further north over the important Christian strongholds of Badajoz (1094), Valencia (1102), and Saragossa (1112).

Almoravid success in Spain was short-lived. By 1118 Saragossa had been retaken by Alfonso I of Aragon and this was followed by successful excursions further south. Popular rebellions in 1144 and 1145 ended Almoravid rule in Spain.

See also Andalus, al-.

Peter B. Clarke
MOSADDEQ, MOHAMMAD
(1882–1967)

Mohammad Mosaddeq was an Iranian liberal-nationalist prime minister (1951–1953) overthrown by an Anglo-American-sponsored coup d’état. Born into a prominent family of notables and educated in Tehran, France, and Switzerland, where he gained a doctorate in law, Mosaddeq returned to Iran in 1914 where he taught, occupied various ministerial and other high-ranking posts, and achieved national prominence as a nationalist and constitutionalist parliamentarian. His opposition to the autocracy of Reza Khan (later shah) resulted in his exclusion from political life and virtual house arrest from 1936 onward.

Following Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941, Mosaddeq returned to the political scene to represent Tehran twice in the parliament, receiving the highest number of votes cast in the capital. The failure of negotiations to revise the British oil concession eventually resulted in the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The leadership of Mosaddeq and the National Front, formed by him in this process, led to his premiership in late April 1951.

Vehemently opposed to Mosaddeq and his oil policy, the British concentrated on destabilizing his government, while the shah refused to accept the role of constitutional monarch as defined by the premier. The relentless opposition of pro-British and royalist elements and the shah’s refusal to transfer the War Ministry to the prime minister resulted in Mosaddeq’s resignation in July 1952, but a popular uprising returned him to power a few days later. The intractable oil question continued, however, to aggravate the government’s problems. Some of its supporters joined the opposition, while the activities of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party enabled the government’s opponents, including the religious forces, to claim that a communist takeover was imminent. The British and American secret services, aided by Mosaddeq’s domestic opponents, eventually engineered his downfall in August 1953.

Following three years of imprisonment, Mosaddeq was confined for the rest of his life to his country home away from the capital. While cognizant of the place of Islam in the inherited culture of Iran, Mosaddeq was primarily a secular democrat and a civic nationalist, dedicated to promoting Iranian national sovereignty.

See also Nationalism: Iranian.

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MOTAHHARI, MORTAZA
(1920–1979)

Born in Iran in 1920, Mortaza Motahhari was assassinated on 1 May 1979 by members of Forqan, a radical Muslim anticlerical group. He attended the prestigious Mashhad seminary and in 1936 moved to Qom to pursue his interest in Islamic philosophy. However, philosophical issues were seldom discussed in Shi’ite seminaries. Both philosophy and mysticism were subjects marginalized in favor of jurisprudence. In 1944, he studied jurisprudence with Ayatollah Borujerdi; one year later he embarked on studying seminal philosophical texts with Ayatollah Khomeini; and finally he attended ‘Allama Tabataba’i’s seminars on the philosophies of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina.

Motahhari is considered to be one of the most influential modernist clerics in contemporary Iran. Although Motahhari was a disciple of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and one of his closest aides during the first months of the Islamic revolution, he remained critical of Khomeini’s juridical conception of velayat-e faqih. He emphasized the role of reason in the comprehension and practice of religion, and admonished traditional jurists for their promotion of a blind imitative faith. Motahhari believed that the orthodoxy that dominated Shi’ite seminaries alienated pensive youth from religion and created a fertile soil for the growth of Marxism. Accordingly, he intended to advance a Shi’ite philosophical rationalism, which engaged contemporary issues and was accessible to modern intellectuals.

See also Khomeini, Ruholla; Reform: Iran; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran; Velayat-e Faqih.

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MU‘AWIYA (?–680)

Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan was the first Umayyad caliph (661–680 C.E.). Mu‘awiyah’s father, Sakhr ibn Harb ibn Umayyah—popularly known as Abu Sufyan—led the Quraysh army against the Prophet in the battles of Uhud and Khandaq. He later embraced Islam. His mother, Hind, the daughter of a prominent Quraysh chief, ‘Utba ibn Rabi‘a, was also hostile to Muhammad before her conversion to Islam.

Some sources suggest that Mu‘awiyah accepted Islam before the conquest of Mecca in 630 but concealed it until later; the general view is that he accepted Islam after the conquest. This explains why he is included among the tulaqa‘ (those who were pardoned by the Prophet after the conquest).

Mu‘awiyah and his father, Abu Sufyan, were also included among what Qur’an refers to as the mu’alafat al-qulub (those to whom the Prophet gave alms as a way of reconciling their hearts to Islam). The fact that Mu‘awiyah was literate ensured his appointment by the Prophet as his scribe.

In 634 the first caliph of Islam, Abu Bakr, sent Mu‘awiyah to Syria, where he was appointed as a commander of one division of the army led by his brother, Yazid, against the Byzantines. On Yazid’s death in 639, the second caliph, ‘Umar, appointed him as commander of the army, collector of taxes, and governor of Damascus.

The third caliph, ‘Uthman, confirmed Mu‘awiyah’s appointment as governor of Syria, which became an important front for the defense of the caliphate against the Byzantines. Mu‘awiyah established garrisons all along the coast and for the first time Muslims engaged in naval warfare.

When ‘Uthman was besieged in Medina by dissidents who demanded the instatement of ‘Ali as caliph, he requested assistance from Mu‘awiyah. As soon as he assumed the caliphate after the assassination of ‘Uthman, ‘Ali sought to dismiss Mu‘awiyah, who refused to pay allegiance to him until ‘Uthman’s murderers had been punished.

The deadlock between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiyah led to the Battle of Siffin in 657 C.E. The battle was brought to an end when Mu‘awiyah, whose army was on the verge of defeat, proposed that the conflict be resolved through negotiation. The two parties agreed to arbitration (tahkim).

The decision of the arbiters that both ‘Ali and Mu‘awiyah be relieved of their posts did not resolve the conflict. ‘Ali’s supporters, in particular, rejected the outcome of the arbitration.

In the meanwhile, Mu‘awiyah had succeeded in gaining the support of the Syrians. In 658 he dispatched ‘Amr ibn al-‘As to conquer Egypt on his behalf. While Mu‘awiyah’s position was strengthened by the conquest of Egypt, ‘Ali’s position in Iraq (where his capital was based) was considerably weakened.

After ‘Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite dissident in 661, he was briefly succeeded by his son Hasan. Soon Mu‘awiyah convinced him to accept compensation for abdicating in his favor; thereby inaugurating Umayyad rule in 661. The seat of the caliphate was transferred to Damascus.

Mu‘awiyah’s rule, according to most historians, was characterized by peace and justice. Governors were granted full civil and military authority. However, toward the end of his life, he nominated his son Yazid to succeed him. This move met with a great deal of opposition, especially from ‘Abdallah ibn Zubayr and ‘Ali’s son, Husayn ibn ‘Ali.

Mu‘awiyah was accused of turning the caliphate into a kingship. The legitimacy of Yazid’s succession was debated and contested by many, including Husayn ibn ‘Ali. Husayn’s march with his followers to challenge Yazid met a tragic end at Karbala, an event that is commemorated to this day by the Shi‘a as well as many Sunni Muslims.

Mu‘awiyah has been held responsible for the emergence of the first schisms in Islam. His refusal to acknowledge ‘Ali’s caliphate and his appointment of Yazid as heir not only resulted in the introduction of hereditary succession in Muslim polity, but also in the emergence of the Khawarij and consolidation of the Shi‘a.

While Mu‘awiyah has been vilified by Shi‘a throughout Muslim history, Sunni Muslims respect his political sagacity, justice, impartiality, forbearance, and resolution of character. It is said that he granted his subjects free access to him as well as freedom of expression. He was reputed for his oratory and his ability to turn adversaries into allies.

See also Caliphate; Karbala; Kharijites, Khawarij; Succession.

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Suleman Dangor
The mufti, or jurisconsult, stands between man and God, and issues opinions (fatwa, pl. fatawa or fatwas) to a petitioner (mustafti) either with regard to the laws of God or the deeds of man. In early Islam the mufti operated as a privately funded, free agent who was independent of state control. As successor to Muhammad in his role as jurist, the mufti was to exemplify sound juridical wisdom and moral rectitude. His knowledge of the Arabic language, the Qur’anic sciences, and hadith traditions had to be thorough, as did his grasp of legal reasoning. Such idealized standards eventually yielded to societal needs, until, by the turn of the tenth century, the office of the mufti required that he be thoroughly grounded in no more than juridical precedent within a given school of law.

A mufti is distinct from a judge (qadi) in several ways. The judge’s authority is generally delegated by the state, whereas the mufti’s is delegated by his peers; the judge’s ruling is final, or subject to limited appeal, whereas that of a mufti is but one of many competing juridical opinions; and the mufti rules most often on questions of law, whereas the qadi rules on fact.

A mufti must always appear dignified and neatly dressed, for he serves as a model of good behavior in public. He must avoid delivering opinions when angry, ill, or weary, and also when there appears to be a conflict of interests.

See also Fatwa; Qadi (Kadi, Kazi).

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Muhammad’s migration to Yathrib (Medina). XNR PRODUCTIONS/GALE

MUHAMMAD (570–632 C.E.)

Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn (henceforth b. meaning the son of) ’Abdullah b. ‘Abd al-Muttalib, of the clan of Hashim, of the tribe of Quraysh, is acknowledged by more than one billion Muslims as the last messenger of God. It was through him that the Qur’anic passages, which his followers believe present the word of God, had been revealed to guide the nascent community through its predicaments. The religion that Muhammad preached is called Islam, meaning submission to God; its creed asserts that there is but one God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God.

The Life of Muhammad
Recognized before his prophethood as al-Amin (the trustworthy), the Prophet of Islam is largely known to us through the lore of the early Muslim community from oral traditions (hadiths) that were later written down. Though not always in agreement, these traditions come together to tell us about an Arab who was born around the end of the sixth century in the oasis of Mecca, a sanctuary town built around a cubical “house of God,” the Ka’ba. He was nursed in his infancy by Halima, a Bedouin woman of the Banu Sa’d, as was customary among the Quraysh. Muhammad lost his mother, Amina bint (henceforth bt. meaning daughter of) Wahb, a few years after he was reunited with her at the age of six. He was then cared for by his grandfather ‘Abd al-Muttalib and, then by his uncle Abu Talib, who granted him protection and stood by him in troubled times. Interestingly, Abu Talib never converted to Islam.

It was Abu Talib who introduced Muhammad to the camel-caravan trade, which became his occupation. This, in turn, led him to employment by a wealthy widow Khadija bt. Khuwaylid, who, though older than him, was impressed by his personality and subsequently married him. She bore him two sons who died in infancy, and four daughters: Zaynab, Ruqayya, Fatima (who alone survived her father), and Umm Kulthum.

Around age forty (610 C.E.), increasingly troubled by the social conditions of his fellow Meccans, Muhammad began to make regular trips to Mount Hira’ for prayer and meditation. On one such occasion, he claimed the angel Gabriel came to him with words written upon a banner of brocade. “Recite!” commanded the angel, and Muhammad, feeling an enormous pressure upon his chest, finally pronounced the words:

Recite in the name of the Lord who created
Man from blood coagulated.
Recite! Thy Lord is wondrous kind
Who by the pen has taught mankind
Things they knew not. (96)

When Muhammad awoke from this vision, the words seemed to be etched in his heart and he feared he was possessed. For a brief moment he contemplated suicide, but then a voice came to him from the skies, hailing him as the apostle of God. Returning home, Muhammad informed Khadija of what had happened. With the help of her Christian cousin, Waraqa b. Nawfal, who interpreted Muhammad’s vision as a spiritual experience, Khadija persuaded Muhammad to have faith in himself.

At first Muhammad communicated his message only to those very close to him: Khadija; his young cousin, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib; his adopted son, Zayd; and Abu Bakr b. Abi Quhafa, a merchant and friend. They are believed to have been the first Muslims. A few years later, Muhammad took his message to the people of Mecca informing them of a life after death and of a just and fair God who would reward humans according to their deeds in this world. ‘Umar b. al-Khattab and ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan were two important Meccans who accepted his teachings at this time, though generally it was the less well-to-do youth who were attracted to his call. Most Meccans, however, resented the depreciation of their gods, the gods of their forefathers, and the rejection of their beliefs by the youth that Muhammad’s teachings encouraged. Moreover, the Meccans depended on the income derived from worship at the Ka‘ba and feared that Muhammad would destroy the numerous idols that brought the pilgrims there. They opposed Muhammad, and made plans to kill him. Muhammad knew he had to leave Mecca when, in approximately 619 C.E., Abu ‘Talib and Khadija passed away within a year of each other and there was no one left who was willing to grant him the protection and moral support he required.

Meanwhile, the people of Yathrib, unable to reconcile their differences and learning of Muhammad’s fair and honest ways, decided to invite him to live among them as their judge and arbitrator. Muhammad immediately seized the opportunity to leave Mecca, and after sending his followers ahead, secretly followed them with Abu Bakr as his companion. This event, known as the hijra, is believed to have taken place in 622 C.E., a date that was later adopted as the beginning of the Muslim calendar. For Muslims, it marks the dawn of the “Age of Islam,” as distinct from pre-Islamic times, which were termed the “Age of Ignorance,” or jabiliyya. Muhammad now asserted leadership over a community based, not on tribal ties, but on its shared faith in One God. Jews, too, were included in this community. Soon, Yathrib came to be known as Medinat al-nabi (the city of the Prophet) or Medina. The Meccans who emigrated with Muhammad became known as Muhajirun, and the Medinans who welcomed and helped them as the Ansar.

Muhammad was encouraged in his immigration to Medina by the presence of Jews, who, he hoped, as monotheists would approve of his teachings. Even before arriving in Medina, Muhammad explained that he too worshipped the God of Moses and Jesus, and turned to face Jerusalem in prayer. Such was his reverence for Jerusalem that he had a mystical experience that had led him there. When the Jews of Medina rejected his teachings, however, Muhammad decided to distinguish his community from theirs, and changed the direction of prayer towards the Meccan Ka‘ba. Then he fought a series of battles against the Meccans and as well as the Medinan Jews, until finally Islam was secure in Medina.

At the same time, Muhammad established Medina as his home. He married as many as fourteen wives, and Muhammad’s situation was more complex than the number suggests. Among his wives were ‘A’isha, daughter of Abu Bakr, the only virgin he ever married; Hafsa, the widowed daughter of ‘Umar (an early Meccan companion); and Zaynab, bt. Jahsh, a divorcee, previously married to his adopted son, Zayd. Tradition also mentions a concubine, Maria the copt, who bore him a son who died in infancy. It is worth noting that while Muhammad permitted four wives to every man—provided he treats them all equally—it also informs us that the Prophet was permitted more wives because of his special circumstances. Yet, we are told that Muhammad asked ‘Ali, husband to his daughter, Fatima, to refrain from taking a second wife. Polygamy had complex meaning and was not established as a pattern based on the Prophet’s example.

Muhammad decided to venture back to Mecca on pilgrimage to the Ka‘ba, which he believed had originally been consecrated by Abraham. At first, Meccan resistance led Muhammad to secure a peace treaty at al-Hudaybiyya (628 C.E.) for a period of ten years. By the terms of this treaty Muhammad agreed to let the Meccans trade freely, while the Meccans consented to let him make the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca (‘umrah) in the following year. The peace enabled Muhammad to conquer the Jewish fortresses of Khaybar and to conclude a treaty whereby the surrendering Jews handed over all their property in exchange for their lives. They were permitted to continue farming the land in return for half of their produce. The Qur‘anic verse 9:29 corroborates Muhammad’s decision; it commands that monotheist abl al-kitab (people of the book) be permitted to practice their faith in Islamic lands, on payment of a poll tax.

The following year, Muhammad, learning that Bedouin allies of the Meccans had attacked some of his followers, determined to lead an army against Mecca. Because the Jews were no longer available as allies, the Meccans decided to surrender, and Abu Sufyan, the Qurayshi leader of the Meccans, and his wife Hind, finally acknowledged that Muhammad was
God’s prophet. A few weeks later, when several tribes led by the Hawazin decided to challenge Muhammad at Hunayn, the newly converted Meccans joined with Muhammad to defeat them.

Around 632 c.e., Muhammad, having established his authority over the Arabian Peninsula, made the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, circumambulating the Ka’ba, and established the ritual according to which Muslims to this day perform the hajj. It is recognized as the Farewell Pilgrimage. Muhammad died a few days later in Medina, in the house of A’isha, where he was buried. Muslims suffered a great loss when Muhammad died. Their deep love and gratitude are reflected in the blessings (taṣliya) they ask God to shower upon him whenever they mention his name.

Religious and Political Influence of Muhammad

The religion that Muhammad taught was called Islam, meaning submission to God. Asserting that “there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His prophet,” it commanded that every believer pray five times daily; fast during the month of Ramadan; contribute an annual tithe, or zakat, for the benefit of the poor; and, if possible, make the hajj pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime. Mindful of the ethical purpose of monotheism, it also denied believers the addictive pleasures of alcohol and gambling that had such disastrous effects on family life. Traditions also convey Muhammad’s respect for the ease of the larger community. For example, he wore perfume when he went to the mosque and refrained from taking garlic before attending a gathering.

Muhammad preached that Islam was the original religion brought by Moses and Jesus, but that it had become corrupted by the people. He taught that Jews should recognize Jesus as a prophet, and that Christians should understand that Jesus was neither God, nor His son but, rather, a prophet. Nevertheless, Muhammad held that all monotheists must be permitted to practice their faith, as long as they paid a tax in acknowledgment of Islam’s political dominance. The activism of Islam that was demonstrated by Muhammad in both words and deeds requires a careful investigation as to when aggression might be justified. Importantly, the justification for holy war (often identified with jihad, which means to strive), is usually understood to be defensive. The Qur’anic declaration, “There is no compulsion in religion” (2:256) suggests an attitude of tolerance.

By acknowledging God’s unique otherness, Muhammad claimed that all humankind, of whatever race, ethnicity, tribe, or color was equal before the Lord, and that each would be judged justly according to his or her deeds at the end of time. While slavery and concubinage were recognized, it was recommended that such persons be set free. Nevertheless, women were not considered equal to men. This is exemplified through the Qur’anic requirement that the testimony of two women is required to challenge that of one man (2:282).

Just as troubling is the permission given to men to reprimand their wives, affirming their dominance.

Islam’s paternalistic attitude towards women is an issue of contention, particularly in the context of today’s feminism. Nevertheless, the consideration granted by Islam to women, in the context of seventh century Arabia, was significant: Islam permitted women to keep control of their property even after marriage and inheritance rights were granted to wives, daughters, mothers, and aunts. Women were not only given a say in their marriages, but their sexual needs and desires were acknowledged. It is perhaps surprising to find listed among the inadequacies of men, for instance, the act of having intercourse with one’s wife “before talking to her and gaining her intimacy, and satisfying his need from her before she satisfied her need from him” (Daylamī, Musnad al-firdaws).

Muhammad’s influence on subsequent religious and political life was significant. He had brought monotheism to the Arab world. Both Judaism and Christianity had already visited the Arabian Peninsula, but neither had ever quite captured it. Neither the Old nor the New Testament was in Arabic, nor had they yet been translated into Arabic. Moreover, Orthodox, Byzantine Christianity rejected the Arab Monophysites and Nestorians as heretics, and as for Judaism, there is no evidence of any communication between the rabbinical schools and the Jews of Arabia.

In contrast, the Qur’an brought by Muhammad was in Arabic; it delivered a message that the people of the region could understand, through a prophet who was one of them. It united the fractious tribes of Arabia, providing them with the political will to go far beyond their boundaries, to travel into North Africa and Spain in the west, and through Syria, Iraq, Persia, and into India, in the east. In a sense, Muhammad had provided the Arabs with inspiration for the making of an Arab empire, within which, for several centuries, Jews, Christians, and Muslims would make Arab culture their own.

Muhammad’s Succession

There was, however, a problem. The Prophet had never overtly proclaimed his heir. There were two choices. One possibility was Muhammad’s young cousin, ‘Ali, roughly thirty years of age, who had lived with the Prophet ever since ‘Ali’s father, Abu Talib, had fallen into financial difficulties. ‘Ali had fought bravely at the Prophet’s side and, as husband to Fatima, was also father to Muhammad’s beloved grandsons, Hasan and Husayn. Significantly, Muhammad chose ‘Ali to pronounce the Qur’an verses of Bara’a, at the conclusion of the pilgrimage in 631 c.e., which put an end to polytheist pilgrimages to the Ka’ba. Unfortunately, ‘Ali, who had spent most of his adult years in Medina, had little recognition from the Meccan Quraysh.

The alternative was Muhammad’s dear friend and father-in-law, Abu Bakr, roughly two years his junior, whom Muhammad had sought to lead the prayers during his last illness. The
tradition of Ghadir Khumm, cited in the Musnad of Sunni scholar Ibn Hanbal, has the Prophet declare, “Of whomsoever I am lord, then ‘Ali is also his lord.” The Shi’ites claim that this indicates Muhammad’s appointment of ‘Ali as his successor. The Sunnis insist, however, that it was merely the Prophet’s way of reconciling ‘Ali, who was extremely unpopular at the time, with the community.

At Muhammad’s death (632 C.E.), Abu Bakr, with the support of ‘Umar, went forward to be selected as successor to the Prophet (khalifat rasul Allah). The appointment had political ramifications and family ties were rejected as a basis for succession. The precedent that the caliph should be a companion of the Prophet, of the tribe of the Quraysh, and approved by them, was established at that time. Thus, Abu Bakr appointed ‘Umar as his successor, and ‘Umar designated a group of twelve to select one among themselves as his successor.

More serious, however, was Abu Bakr’s insistence that Muhammad had stated that he left no heirs and his rejection of Fatima’s claims to her father’s property. The act effectively isolated Fatima and led her husband, ‘Ali, to refuse his consent to Abu Bakr’s authority until after Fatima’s death six months later. This is probably what led to the formation of the Shi’at ‘Ali, the partisans of ‘Ali, a significant minority who asserted that Abu Bakr’s leadership was illegitimate. It was the cause of a rent so deep in the Muslim community that even today mediation between the two communities is difficult.

The Denominations of Islam and Their Images of Muhammad

On the basis of Muhammad’s teachings, three broad denominations emerged after his death. The largest group call themselves the ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’a (also called “Sunni”). They accept the legitimacy of the succession from the Prophet as it developed historically and thus believe in the legitimacy of the prophetic legacy, as preserved by those who succeeded him, as a source for knowing God. The common Sunni position that has evolved regarding Muhammad is that prophets are free from the sins that provoke repugnance and error in the transmission of divine revelation. (Prophets are considered to be susceptible to error in matters unrelated to revelation, however.) Most Sunnis believe that Muhammad did not appoint a successor before his death and they do not give recognition to a priesthood. An imam, for the Sunni, may be a political leader, but he is generally someone who merely leads the community in prayer. The position of Abu Bakr as successor to Muhammad was, importantly, not vested with religious authority.

For the Shi’ites, Muhammad’s position came to be closely linked to that of ‘Ali. According to the Imami Shi’ites of Iran, for instance, “Two thousand years before creation, Muhammad and ‘Ali were one light before God.” ‘Ali is significant not only as successor to the Prophet, but also as the one from whom the Shi’ite imams, who provide religious guidance to the community, descend. The imams alone can interpret the Qur’an with any degree of certitude. Moreover, special powers of infallibility, sinlessness, and wisdom are believed to have been inherited from, or granted by, God to ‘Ali and the imams who succeeded him. Importantly, the Shi’ite traditions usually rely only on the words or actions of one of their imams (Momen, 1985, p. 173).

Finally, the Sufis, or mystics, claim that God is an intimate presence in all of His creation. While Sufism is not incompatible with being either Sunni or Shi’ite, the mindset of the Sufi is quite different—more tolerant, and less legalistic. Sufis believe that humans have an innate knowledge of God within and that the Divine may be experienced through jihad (spiritual striving), such as meditation or by the ritual repetition of God’s names and attributes (dhikr). One who has achieved this goal is known as wali-Allah (friend of God), and through him or her the ordinary believer might hope to negotiate with God. This has led to prayers of intercession at the graves of significant Sufis, including the Prophet, an activity that is condemned by non-Sufis as polytheistic. Like the Sunnis, the Sufis acknowledge the caliphs of the Rashidun (the Rightly Guided), i.e., Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali. The first three of these were rejected and even cursed by the Imami Shi’ites. But like the Shi’ites, the Sufis believe that the Qur’an has both an exoteric and an esoteric message.

Biographical Literature and the Changing Image of Muhammad

During his lifetime, Muhammad probably did not exaggerate the significance of his person. Certainly, he claimed to be a prophet, indeed, he claimed to be the last of the prophets of God: Kbatam al-anbiya’. But there was a fear that his followers might deify him. Thus, theologians emphasized that Muhammad was but a man and that his only miracle was the Qur’an. To establish the miraculous nature of this achievement the Qur’anic description of Muhammad as “ummi” (7:157; 7:158; 62:2) was explained by exegetes as meaning that he was illiterate. Moreover, the fallibility of the Prophet is suggested by the Qur’anic verses that insinuate that he had faltered, as when he turned away from the blind man (80). Another example cited to show his fallibility is more controversial and comes from the tradition narrated by al-Tabari. According to this tradition, Muhammad agreed, for just a brief moment, to acknowledge the goddesses of the Meccans, al-Manat, al-Lat, and al-‘Uzza, as subordinate deities.

There is also the tradition that recalls ‘Umar’s words denying that Muhammad had died, although he was immediately corrected by Abu Bakr. Many early traditions convey the miraculous happenings that punctuated the Prophet’s life. Although the Qur’an points to Muhammad’s fallibility, it also includes signs that God interfered on his behalf quite readily. Incidents supporting this view include the splitting of the moon (54:1), the journey to the farthest place of prayer
As time passed, veneration for the Prophet gradually increased. This is reflected in the several steps taken by those in authority to preserve his memory. During the reign of ‘Uthman (r. 644–656 c.e.), the Qur’an was compiled; during the reign of ‘Umar II (r. 717–720 c.e.) traditions (hadiths) concerning the Prophet and the early Muslim community, which had thus far been communicated orally, were also written down and compiled. By the time of al-Shaﬁ’i (d. 820 c.e.), the practices of the Prophet (conveyed by traditions) were being considered as significant a source as the Qur’an for the making of Islamic law.

While private collections of traditions from and about the Prophet were probably made during his lifetime, many appear to have been put together according to subject rather than chronology. With the rise of the Abbasids (750 c.e.), who encouraged polemical exchanges with Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, the Muslims had become acutely aware of the lacuna that existed in the recorded life of their prophet. Al-Mansur (r. 755–775 c.e.) therefore commanded Ibn Ishaq (d. c. 773 c.e.) to establish a biography of the Prophet, which in the recension of Ibn Hisham (d. 833 c.e.), under the title *Sirat rasul Allah*, is the only version that is extant in its entirety today. Ibn Ishaq compiled a narrative that informs us of the life of Muhammad as it unfolded, from his birth until his death. He soon became the most recognized biographer of the Prophet throughout the empire. Selecting traditions that would endorse a prophetic career, Ibn Ishaq shaped a narrative that presented al-Muhammad as the last and best of Qur’anic prophets. Placing Muhammad’s birth in the Year of the Elephant (570 c.e.), the compiler affirmed his early life in sixth century Arabia. Intertwining moments of revelation throughout the Prophet’s career, Ibn Ishaq endorses the community’s view that it was through Muhammad alone that the Qur’an was revealed. According to Ibn Ishaq, an important aspect of his prophetic personality was his performance of miracles.

Ibn Ishaq had to take political factors into consideration as well. Al-Mansur, who was of the Sunni denomination, had come to power through a revolution. He therefore desired legitimation of his authority among Muslims, for whom association with the family of the Prophet was required, but also among the numerous Jews and Christians whose One God, the Muslims claimed, had chosen Muhammad as His last prophet. Ibn Ishaq tackled the problem by presenting al-‘Abbas, the eponym of the Abbasids and an uncle of Muhammad, as one for whom the Prophet had a deep affection and by including hagiographic traditions on Muhammad that paralleled the representation of prophets and patriarchs in the Bible.

Although Muhammad had his first revelation when he was around forty years of age (610 c.e.), we are told that even at his birth there were signs of his prophetic mission. Muhammad is said to have had the “seal” of prophethood on his back, and to have been followed by clouds that sheltered him from the burning sun. Indicating Muhammad’s place in the larger scheme of monotheism, Ibn Ishaq establishes Muhammad’s connection to the family of Abraham through Abraham’s son, Isma’il, and demonstrates similarities between the families of Abraham and Muhammad. Thus, ‘Abd al-Muttalib (Muhammad’s grandfather), like Abraham before him, was released from his vow (made when he faced opposition from the Quraysh to his reclaiming of the well named Zamzam) to sacrifice his son. Instead he sacrificed several camels. Muhammad, like Jacob, “dreamed” he ascended a ladder (*mi’raj*) to the heavens where he met with God. Like the biblical prophets, Muhammad also performed miracles such turning a handful of dates into a quantity sufficient to feed several companions and healing the foot of one and the eye of another.

One of Ibn Ishaq’s significant contributions is the information concerning a “Constitution of Medina,” according to which the Muslims of Mecca and Medina, along with their Jewish allies in Medina, agreed to support Muhammad and help him against the Meccan polytheists who opposed him. When the Jews broke their agreement, Muhammad not only fought the Meccans, but also considerably reduced the Jewish presence in Medina. The tale regarding the Jews of the Banu Qurayza, whose adult men were executed after their surrender (while their wives and children were sold into slavery), is notorious in this regard. For Ibn Ishaq, the narrative follows the biblical pattern establishing God’s destruction of those who oppose His prophets.

Ibn Ishaq is careful, however. Much of the information on miraculous occurrences is qualified by phrases such as “it is alleged,” or “God only knows.” In the case of Muhammad’s miraculous journey from Mecca to Jerusalem, Ibn Ishaq directs the reader to a tradition from ‘A’isha in which it was said that only Muhammad’s spirit had journeyed to “the distant place of prayer.” With the passage of time, however, these miracles were revisited without such caution, as in the compilations of al-Tabari (d. 923 c.e.) and Ibn Kathir (d. 1387 c.e.), which indicated an increasing veneration of the Prophet.

A growing devotion could also be seen in the activity of the Muslims. Around 780 c.e. for instance, Kahyzuran, the Queen of al-Mahdi (775–785 c.e.), consecrated the birthplace of Muhammad as a mosque. A few years later Qur’anic scholar al-Naqqas (d. 962 c.e.) mentioned it as a place where a personal prayer of request would be satisfactorily answered by noon each Monday. (Monday was the day of the week on which the Prophet is supposed to have been born, received the first revelation, and emigrated to Medina.) The tomb of the Prophet was visited with similar intent. It compared with the Sufi practice of prayer at tombs of saints or “friends of God,” who were solicited for such benefits as a recovery from...
illness or the birth of a son. Muhammad’s role as intercessor was clearly seen to be an active one.

The timely protest of Ibn Taymiyya, who recognized in such negotiations a contamination of monotheism, was followed several centuries later by the more radical approach of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1791), who feared a “regression into unbelief.” His cause was taken up by Sa’ud b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Such activity did not affect the rest of the Muslim world (Egypt, India, Turkey, and the like). In those places, Sufi practices and the celebration of the maulid continue to take place to this day. The oil revenues that accrued in Saudi Arabia in the twentieth century have, however, enabled the export of Wahhabism to the developing world, gradually eroding the latter’s more Sufi-istic heritage.

Biographical literature on Muhammad in the twentieth century has been more concerned with issues of science and modernization. The representations of Muhammad by three biographers who belong to different nations and generations—Haykal (1888–1956) an Egyptian journalist; Dashti (1896–1982) an Iranian engineer; and Mernissi (b. 1940) a Moroccan sociologist—exemplify a variety of appreciations of the Prophet’s life.

In The Life of Muhammad, Haykal’s concern is to combat nineteenth-century western critics of Islam who portray the Prophet sometimes as an epileptic and at others as a fraud. Haykal insists that the Qur’an is God’s word, not Muhammad’s, and justifies his belief by claiming that Muhammad was illiterate. Asserting that the Prophet performed no miracles, he explains Muhammad’s journey to Jerusalem, and from there to the heavens, as an experience of the mind rather than the body. As for the story concerning the “satanic verses,” Haykal rejects it, explaining that Muhammad was, as a prophet of God, “infallible,” and therefore not prone to such error.

Regarding the Prophet’s marriages, Haykal is apologetic and unrealistic. He insists that these were not inspired by love but, rather, required by political and social circumstances. Muhammad’s marriage to Zaynab, who was previously married to Zayd, his adopted son, is justified on the grounds that the marriage was conducted to make the point that an “adopted” son is not a blood relative, and to establish an inclusive approach to divorces. More interesting is Haykal’s rejection of polygamy on the basis of Qur’an (4:123), which requires that a man treat all his wives with equality. For Haykal this was impossible and clearly meant that monogamy is what the Qur’an advocates.

For Dashti, Muhammad is inexorably human. To him, the Qur’an is Muhammad’s creation. His interpretation of the satanic verses and his weakness for women are simply the marks of human frailty. According to Dashti, Muhammad’s relations with his wives are a private concern, and should not be included in an evaluation of his leadership. Moreover, the battles of Medina against the polytheists and Jews were necessary, for Islam would not have emerged as it did from Medina if Muhammad had remained the visionary that he was in Mecca. The portrait Dashti paints of Muhammad in Twenty Three Years is one of an extraordinary man concerned for his fellow men.

According to Fatima Mernissi, “being a prophet means pushing people to the utmost, toward an ideal society.” In The Veil and the Male Elite she recognizes that the Prophet, despite his endeavors, held back from granting women equality with men by recommending that women hide their sexuality when going out into the streets and by giving husbands authority over them. These decrees are explained, however, as the consequence of the warring milieu and the chauvinistic attitude of the Prophet’s companions.

Displaying a keen understanding of hadith criticism, Mernissi examines the misogynistic opinions reflected in the Sabib of al-Bukhari, and explains that these were not the opinions of the Prophet, but of al-Bukhari. According to Mernissi, the Prophet, despite his “weakness,” respected women and consulted them in moments of crisis.

Finally, it is important to recognize that Muhammad is not merely the quest of believers, but of historians as well. In this regard a word of caution must be offered concerning the nature of the sources. The hijra (Muslim calendar) was established only during the caliphate of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–644 C.E.). Before the hijra, events in Arab life were remembered in relation to more significant happenings of the recent past, such as raids and battles or through the mnemonic of numbers. Traditions in biographical literature that provide a chronology and sequence to the events that constitute the life of Muhammad are therefore suspect. Moreover the Qur’an, which is not compiled in the sequence in which it was revealed, mentions Muhammad only four times. It gives no information regarding his place of birth or death or the names of his parents, wives, and children. As for archeological remains, the Ka’ba and the Mosque of Medina were completely rebuilt within a hundred years of the Prophet’s death; and, tragically, all buildings consecrated to the memory of the Prophet in Mecca were destroyed by Sa’ud b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (r. 1803–1814).

Scholarship has moved on, nevertheless. Where once the challenge had been to query the divine authorship of the Qur’an, today it has shifted to a recognition of its various threads that apparently indicate a composite structure. Where once the Qur’an seemed to be the inspiration of Muhammad, it is now believed by some to have been the inspiration for Muhammad. Many centuries ago, the bewildered believer came to terms with Muhammad’s death by emphasizing his faith in God. This could well be his response even today. Perhaps more documentation will come to light in the future.
### The Tribe of Quraysh (5th–8th centuries, C.E.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Members</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qusayy</td>
<td>'Abd-Manaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashim (clan)</td>
<td>'Abd al-Muttalib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muttalib (clan</td>
<td>'Abd-Shams (clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nawfal (clan)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Abu Talib**
- **Abu Lahab**
- **'Abdallah—Amina**
- **'Abbas**
- **Zaynab**
- **Umm-Kulthum and Ruqayyah**
- **'Abd al-Malik**
- **Yazid**

People influential in Muhammad’s life, or who later became influential figures, are set in boldfaced type. Most of the men in the geneology had sons not mentioned here due to space considerations.


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**See also** Arabia, Pre-Islamic; Biography and Hagiography; Caliphate; Hadith; Holy Cities; Mi'raj; Qur'an; Shi'a: Early; Succession; Sunna; Tasawwuf.

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MUHAMMAD AHMAD IBN ‘ABDULLAH (1844–1885)

Muhammad Ahmad b. ‘Abdullah, known as al-Mahdi, was born in 1844 in northern Sudan and died on 22 June 1885 in Omdurman. He did not follow his family’s profession of boat building, embarking instead on a religious and political career. He studied Qur’anic and other religious sciences and joined the Samanniyya mystical brotherhood. Besides his religious and ascetic fervor, he was imbued with a strong sense of social justice and reform-mindedness that filled him with a firm commitment to eradicate the colonial Turco-Egyptian regime and establish an Islamic state (1820–1885).

The regime’s oppression and injustices, the loss of the class of religious sbaykhs (masters) of the privileged status they had hitherto enjoyed, and the discontent of the influential northern merchant class, all contributed to the creation of a revolutionary situation. Furthermore, there was an eschatological expectation among many people of the imminent coming of a mahdi (the guided one).

Muhammad Ahmad’s declaration of his Mahdism in June 1881 sparked off a relentless series of battles against the Turco-Egyptian regime that culminated in the fall of Khartoum in January 1885. Shortly afterward, al-Mahdi died before realizing his dream of carrying his Mahdist revolution beyond Sudan.

Muhammad Ahmad legitimized his Mahdism by a claim of a prophetic sanction based on a vision of the Prophet in a colloquy (badra). He perceived his career as corresponding to that of the Prophet’s and his mission as a universal one. He asserted that his Mahdist entailed the abolition of all juristic schools and mystical orders. His movement did not succeed in uprooting these expressions of Islam but instead led to the birth of a new politico-religious brotherhood—the Ansar (the followers of the Mahdi).

See also Mahdi.

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still needed to answer to British superiors. Caught between the vise of British authority and the king’s unassailable right to dissolve parliament, the “liberal experiment” quickly soured. Farouk (Faruq) (r. 1936–1952) acceded to the throne with great fanfare, a charismatic, seemingly pious, socially conscious youth who, many hoped, might stabilize the discredited order. But he quickly disappointed, becoming ultimately a caricature: the obese gambler and sordid playboy, a modern Nero. His second wife, a commoner, bore him a son, Ahmad Fu’ad, who inherited the throne under a regency when Farouk abdicated and left Egypt at the insistence of the military in July 1952. However, in June 1953 the Nasser regime abolished the monarchy, proclaiming a republic. Farouk, ever the butt of popular satire, died abroad in 1965; the officers allowed him to be buried in Egypt, although not alongside his predecessors.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization; Nationalism: Arab; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Revolution: Modern.

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MUHAMMAD AL-NAFS AL-ZAKIYYA (D. 762 C.E.)

Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah b. al-Hasan al-Muthanna died in 762 C.E. Due to his gentle disposition, he was known as al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, which means “the pure soul.” At a gathering of the Hashimites held at al-Abwa’ during the Umayyad dynasty, Muhammad’s father, ‘Abdallah, urged those present to accept his son as a claimant to the caliphate and the Mahdi (messiah). With the exception of Ja’far al-Sadiq, the sixth Shi’ite Imam, most of those present agreed. When the Abbasids came to power they installed Abu ‘l-‘Abbas (known as al-Saffah) as the new ruler, but Muhammad refused to acknowledge his authority.

With his brother Ibrahim, Muhammad instigated a revolt by seeking popular support against the new regime. The two brothers traveled extensively in Islamic lands, enlisting followers. In a desperate attempt at capturing these two renegades, al-Saffah’s successor, al-Mansur, imprisoned their aged father and other family members. Since Muhammad was a descendant of the Prophet (through the Prophet’s grandson, al-Hasan), many, including the famous jurist Malik b. Anas and the ‘Alids, supported his cause. Muhammad began his revolt against the caliph al-Mansur (d. 775) in Medina, where he had considerable support, while his brother Ibrahim began his revolt in Basra later on. Due to his political activism, many Zaydi Shi’ites supported Muhammad’s movement. At one point Muhammad took over Mecca, anchoring his claims on descent from Fatima, daughter of the Prophet. With only three hundred men, Muhammad was killed in Medina by al-Mansur’s greater forces, who were led by ‘Isa b. Musa in 762. Extremist groups such as the Mughiriyya refused to accept his death, believing him to be the eschatological messiah.

See also Ahl al-Bayt; Imamate; Mahdi; Succession.

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Liyakatali Takim

MUHAMMAD, ELIJAH (1897–1975)

From the 1930s until his death, Elijah Muhammad was the leader of the Nation of Islam, the most prominent African-American Muslim organization of the post–World War II era. A black migrant from Georgia who settled in Detroit and then Chicago, Muhammad became known among thousands of followers as the “Messenger of God.” He spread his ideas through popular public lectures, the widely distributed Muhammad Speaks newspaper, and works like The Supreme Wisdom (1957) and Message to the Blackman in America (1965). His teachings combined Sunni Islamic elements with traditions of black self-determination and black closeness (the idea that blacks, like the ancient Israelites, were God’s chosen people). Elijah Muhammad encouraged African Americans to convert to Islam, follow a strict moral and ethical code, and work for economic and political self-sufficiency. He also taught that blacks were the earth’s original inhabitants who had become enslaved by a devilish race of white men. God, he said, had chosen him to “mentally resurrect” black people and prepare them for Judgment Day, when God would dispense with whites and reestablish a golden age of black splendor. This doctrine, called the Myth of Yacub by some outside the movement, drew criticism from many black civil rights leaders and Muslims, who deemed it un-Islamic. Elijah Muhammad’s separatist Islam nevertheless found a sympathetic ear among members of the urban black working class, especially black men in prison. His emphasis on black self-determination
and pride during the postwar period foreshadowed and inspired the black power movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

After his death in 1975, his son, Wallace D. (or Warith Deen) Muhammad, took over the Nation of Islam, leading the movement toward a more Sunni interpretation of Islam. But in the late 1970s, Minister Louis Farrakhan, a former aide to Elijah Muhammad, broke with the younger Muhammad, reconstituting a Nation of Islam that continued to rely on Elijah Muhammad’s original teachings.

See also American Culture and Islam; Americas, Islam in the; Farrakhan, Louis; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Warith Deen; Nation of Islam.

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Edward E. Curtis IV

MUHAMMADIYYA (MUHAMMADIYAH)

The second largest of Indonesia’s Muslim social associations, the Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Java, by Ahmad Dahlan, a cloth merchant and minor court official who had studied in Mecca. The organization quickly gained additional followers among Sumatran traders. With its multiethnic urban base, the movement spread rapidly, reaching even remote towns in eastern Indonesia by the late 1920s.

The Muhammadiyah eschewed formal politics, concentrating on social welfare and religious education. In contrast to traditional Qur’anic schools (pesantren), Muhammadiyah madrasas had age grades, modeled directly on mission schools. Curricula included science, mathematics, and geography, in addition to religious study. These emphases showed the organization’s twin ambitions of urging Muslims to respond to the scientific and political challenge of the West while encouraging individual responsibility in devotion. Muhammadiyah also stressed women’s education. Its women’s branch, Aisyiyah, remains the largest organization of its kind in the world.

Muhammadiyah has based its success on steering clear of formal politics. The regime of Indonesian president Suharto (1966–1998) sought to nurture a conservative faction in the organization, but the mainstream leadership guarded its independence. Although still solidly middle class, Muhammadiyah today is more intellectually diverse than at any point in history. In recent years the organization has experienced heated debates over Islamic law, women’s rights, and religious tolerance.

See also Reform: Southeast Asia.

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Robert W. Hefner

MUHAMMAD REZA SHAH PAHLEVI (1919–1980)

Muhammad Reza, son of Reza Khan, was born on 26 October 1919 and was the second and last shah of the Pahlevi dynasty. He died in exile in Cairo on 27 July 1980.

At the coronation of his father, on 25 April 1926, Muhammad Reza was invested as crown prince. On 16 September 1941, Reza Shah abdicated following the Allied invasion of Iran, and Muhammad Reza Shah succeeded to the throne. The first twelve years of his reign, between 1941 and 1953, were marked by a continuing struggle for power between the monarch and a variety of other political forces. This peaked in 1951 when opponents of the shah, led by prime minister Muhammad Mosaddeq, nationalized the oil industry. Following two years of political crisis and radicalization, the shah fled to Rome. He returned on 19 August, however, after a coup. Muhammad Reza Shah then embarked on the consolidation of a royal dictatorship, crushing all opposition. Between 1961 and 1963 he promulgated by decree a series of reforms known as the White Revolution, which included land reform and female enfranchisement. The land reform liquidated the large absentee landlords and thus had a major impact on the social structure of Iran. However, the lack of democratic freedoms continued to provoke opposition and major unrest broke out in 1963. After his exile from Iran in 1964, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini assumed the leadership of the Islamic opposition to the shah.

From the time of the 1953 coup, Muhammad Reza Shah had become increasingly reliant on American support. The quadrupling of oil prices after 1973 allowed the shah to embark on a program of rapid industrialization as well as on a massive weapons’ purchasing program.

Both secular and religious opposition burgeoned during the 1970s. Massive political demonstrations forced the shah
to leave Iran on 16 January 1979; on 1 February 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran.

See also Khomeini, Ruhollah; Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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MUHAMMAD, WARITH DEEN (1933– )

Arguably the most important black Sunni Muslim leader in the history of African American Islam, Warith Deen Muhammad (b. 1933) was brought up as a member of Elijah Muhammad's “royal family.” From the 1950s through the 1970s, Warith Deen served on and off as a minister in his father's Nation of Islam ( NOI), but was constantly in trouble as he questioned the Islamic legitimacy of his father's teachings. Even so, when Elijah Muhammad died in 1975, Warith Deen emerged as movement leader. In the course of a few short years, he radically altered the official religious doctrines of the NOI, instructing members to observe the traditional five pillars of Islamic practice.

During this period, Warith Deen Muhammad led more African Americans toward Sunni Islam than any other person in history, before or after. He also reorganized the NOI, eventually disbanding it in favor of a decentralized national network of mosques. As Warith Deen led his followers toward Sunni Islam and away from his father's black religious separatism, however, he also insisted that African American Muslims continue to take pride in their ethnic heritage, work for improvement in the quality of black life, and interpret Sunni Islam in light of African-American historical circumstances. In 1992, Warith Deen became the first Muslim to offer the opening prayer before a session of the U.S. Senate. Now addressed as imam (leader) by thousands of followers across the country, he actively participates in interfaith dialogue and maintains strong ties to Muslim leaders both in the United States and abroad.

See also American Culture and Islam; Farrakhan, Louis; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Elijah; Nation of Islam; United States, Islam in the.

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Edward E. Curtis IV

MUHARRAM

The first month of the Islamic year, Muharram, is the focus of annual lamentation rituals performed especially by Shi’a Muslims in honor of Husayn b. ‘Ali, the prophet Muhammad’s grandson, who died in battle in 680 C.E. at Karbala (Iraq). Besieged by soldiers loyal to the caliph Yazid b. Mu’awiya, who sought to prevent Husayn from gaining political power, Husayn died on ‘Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram. Family members accompanying him were killed or subjected to imprisonment and humiliation. Commemoration of the Karbala martyrs’ sufferings during the yearly mourning season (from the first of Muharram to the twentieth of the month of Safar, with ‘Ashura comprising the focal date) serves to help define Shi’a communal identity.

Muharram observances vary throughout the Islamic world. Iran is famous for the ta’ziya, a dramatic enactment of the Karbala battle. Localities in Pakistan and India stage ‘Ashura processions featuring a stallion caparisoned as Zuljenah, the horse ridden into combat by Husayn. In Hyderabad, India, matami guruhan (Shi’a lamentation associations) sponsor the group performance of matam (gestures of grief ranging from rhythmic chestbeating to self-flagellation with razors and chains). Matam is performed in time to the chanting of nauhas (poems commemorating the Karbala martyrs).

In 1994 a fatwa by Sayyed ‘Ali Khamene’i, spiritual leader of Iran, forbade the public performance of self-flagellation or other forms of bloody matam. This decree continues a policy promulgated by Khamenei’s predecessor, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who advocated taqrib or Sunni-Shi’a rapprochement for the sake of pan-Islamic cooperation in international affairs. Sunnis have frequently condemned as un-Islamic the bloodier forms of Muharram mourning.

The most common form of Muharram ritual, however, is the majlis al-’azza or “lamentation gathering,” where a preacher recounts the Karbala martyrs’ sufferings to stimulate grief among congregants. While lamentation rituals for Husayn have been documented as early as tenth-century Baghdad, Shi’a authorities trace the history of the majlis al-’azza to Zaynab bint ‘Ali, Husayn’s sister, who was present at Karbala and who is believed to have held the first majlis to mourn Husayn while a captive in Yazid’s palace. Traditional Shi’a belief holds that weeping for the Karbala martyrs gains mourners access to Husayn’s intercession for the forgiveness...
of sins. But recent Shi’a thinking emphasizes the political dimension of Muharram ritual as a form of communal assertiveness and revolutionary activism.

Muharram rituals are not limited to the Shi’a. In Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir, India), where Muslims are a minority in a predominantly Buddhist region, Sunnis cooperate with the Shi’a in staging Zuljenah processions to demonstrate Islamic solidarity. In Andhra Pradesh (India), Hindus visit Shi’a shrines during Muharram. And in Darjeeling (West Bengal), where most Muslims are Sunnis, ‘Ashura takes on an air of carnival, with competitions involving drumming and stickfighting.

See also Husayn; Karbala; Ritual; Shi’a: Early; Ta’ziya (Ta’ziye).

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Harith ibn Asad al-Muhasibi of Baghdad was a master of Sufi ethics and the father of Sufi psychology. He is most famous for his theory of the three-part nature of the human soul. His nickname, “al-Muhasibi,” refers to his practice of muhasaba, the critical examination of actions, motives, and spiritual states. He was an exemplar of ethical conduct and refused to allow any form of self-deception. He taught his disciples to follow reason and avoid emotionalism. His major opponent was Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855). Ibn Hanbal criticized al-Muhasibi for his rationalism and his use of dialectical reasoning. He incited his followers in Baghdad to intimidate al-Muhasibi and prevent people from attending his lessons.

Al-Muhasibi’s theory of the soul is contained in al-Ri’aya li-buqay Allāb wa al-qiyam biha (How to observe and abide by the rights of God). He called his theory the “science of hearts.” The “heart” is a metaphor for the soul. It includes the conscience (siir), which is the spiritual center of the soul, and the nafs, which is the “psyche,” “self,” or “ego.” Although the nafs is necessary for human existence, its desire for self-gratification undermines the spiritual nature of the soul. Using a term from the Qur’an, al-Muhasibi calls the ego-centered soul the “commanding nafs” (al-nafs al-ammara). The key to taming the “commanding nafs” is self-examination (muhasaba). Through self-examination, the “commanding nafs” is transformed into the “self-blaming nafs” (al-nafs al-lawwama). At this stage, one becomes aware of the damage that has been done to oneself and others by allowing the nafs to control one’s life. But the “self-blaming nafs” is still ego-obsessed. Its overly critical attitude can lead to self-hatred and even suicide. Only by transcending the ego entirely is it possible to attain the third and final stage of self-awareness, the “nafs at peace” (al-nafs al-mutma’inna). In this final stage, the soul is at peace because it has transcended the human ego and is now controlled by God. This is the meaning of al-Muhasibi’s aphorism, “Be God’s or be nothing.”

See also Ibn Hanbal; Tasawwuf.

Rkia E. Cornell

MUHTASIB

The term muhtasib has primarily been used to designate a person who has been appointed by the political power (sultan or imam) to police the enforcement of Islamic law in a


David Pinault
particular area. In works of law, the *muhtasib* is described as being responsible for ensuring that the activities of the Muslims in an area conform with the *shari‘a*. This is particularly the case with regard to commerce and supervision of the marketplace. In later times (after 1500 C.E.), the *muhtasib* was almost exclusively responsible for ensuring that the weights and measures used in the market were fair and consistent. He alerted the judge (*qadi*) of cases of infringement, though he had the power to act without the judge’s express permission. One finds the official position of *muhtasib* for towns mentioned in sources from most periods of classical Islam (from the Abbasids through the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals). The position appears to have disappeared in the nineteenth century, as law enforcement across the Muslim world underwent modernization. It can be argued that all Muslims should, in a sense, be *muhtasibs*, since a *muhtasib* is one who enforces “public order” (*bista‘*), and because all Muslims have this responsibility under the general obligation to “command what is approved and forbid what is reprehensible” (for example Q 3:104), and the law books allow for “voluntary” *muhtasibs* to enforce public morals.

*See also* Hisba; Political Organization.

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Robert Gleave

**MUJAHIDIN**

*Mujahidin* (*mosajhidin*) is the plural form of the Arabic term *mosajhid*, who is a person who wages jihad. According to doctrinal and historical applications of Islamic law, jihad indicates military action for the defense or expansion of Islam. While in the course of Islamic history the term *mosajhid* has been used by different groups to identify their struggles to defend Islam, the term gained global currency in the latter decades of the twentieth century after the leftist coup d’état in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978. The resistance groups first opposed the Afghan communist regime, declaring it atheist. They then turned their attention to the Soviet Union when it invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Fighting the Soviet Red Army, they collectively referred to themselves as *mosajhid* waging jihad against a communist power occupying an Islamic land.

The Afghan *mosajhid* were divided into two main groups: (1) those based in and backed by Pakistan with substantial financial and military assistance from Saudi Arabia and the United States, who mainly represented the Sunni majority; and (2) those based in and supported by Iran, representing the Shi‘ite minority. The Pakistan-based group of *mosajhid* included Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement), Hizb-e Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Hizb-e Islami led by Muhammad Yunus Khalis. Hikmatyar and Khalis initially jointly led the Hizb-e Islami, but later split the party, both retaining the same name. Ithtad-e Islami (Islamic Union), Jam‘iyat-e Islami (Islamic Society), Jaba‘-e Nijat-e Milli-ye Afghanistan (National Liberation Front of Afghanistan), and Mahaz-e Milli-ye Islami-ye Afghan-istan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan).

In 1988, the Afghan Interim Government (AIG)—a loose alliance of the seven groups listed above—was achieved through pressure by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. However, various attempts to unite these and other smaller Pakistan-based *mosajhid* groups ultimately resulted in failure. In Iran, there were a multitude of *mosajhid* groups until 1989, when, owing to Iranian pressure, they united into a single party, Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan).

In February 1989, the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghan-istan and on 28 April 1992, the Afghan *mosajhid* finally achieved their main objective by capturing the capital, Kabul. Sibghatalallah Mujaddidi, leader of Jaba‘-e Nijat-e Milli, was proclaimed president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for a two-month period, to be followed by a four-month presidency of Burhan al-Din Rabbani, the leader of Jam‘iyat-e Islami. Thereafter, elections were to be held. However, Rabbani refused to leave office, barred elections, and ruled in Kabul until 27 September 1996, when a splinter *mosajhid* group, the Taliban, captured the city.

From 1992 to 1996, various *mosajhid* groups battled each other in every corner of Afghanistan. In the ever-shifting alliances and frontlines, the country was transformed into decentralized fiefdoms ruled with increasing brutality by warlords. Moreover, with the absence of a common enemy, the jihad gave way to an ethno-sectarian war. Another legacy of the Afghan *mosajhid* was the influx of foreign fighters, mainly from Pakistan and Arab states. After the *mosajhid* victory in 1992, most of these groups reorganized and became involved in places such as Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Kashmir.

Beginning in 1989, Pakistan supported and organized the transfer of Afghan and Pakistani *mosajhid* groups to Kashmir, in order to have more direct control over the militants that were fighting for either the valley’s independence from India or for union with Pakistan. The largest of these groups were Harakat al-Ansar (Movement of the Ansar—Helpers of prophet Muhammad in Medina), Hizb al-Mojahidin (Party of Mojahidin), and Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of Pure). The involvement of these and other *mosajhid* heightened the religious dimension of the Kashmiri conflict. By 1993, the largest and most popular Kashmiri insurgent group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which advocated independence and secularism for Kashmir, lost its military
edge to the Hizb al-Mojahidin, which advocated either the establishment of an Islamic Kashmiri republic or union with Pakistan.

In the case of the Afghan resistance in the 1978–1992 period, the term mujahidin gained popularity, as did the groups themselves, not only in Islamic countries but also in the West. In the Islamic context, the Afghans waged a true jihad; and in Western minds, they were a liberation army fighting Soviet expansionism. Since 1992, however, the term mujahidin lost its religious and political currency internationally, as the Afghan mujahidin became associated with international terrorist figures who had once fought in their ranks, such as Usama bin Ladin. In the Kashmiri case, the groups claiming the title of mujahidin did not enjoy support in most Muslim countries, with the exception of Pakistan, and were seen in the West as either terrorist or rebel organizations.

See also Political Islam; Taliban.

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Amin Tarzi

MUJAHIDUN See Mujahidin

MULLA SADRA (C. 1572–1640)

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim Shirazi, commonly known as Mulla Sadra and also given the honorific title Sadr al-muta’allahin, was born around 1572 in Shiraz, Persia, to a politically powerful and wealthy family, and he died in Basra in 1640. The most famous of the later Islamic philosophers of Persia, he carried out his early studies in Shiraz and then went to Esfahān for more advanced studies especially in the field of philosophy. There he became a student of Baha’ al-Din al-Amili and Mir Muhammad Baqir Damad, the founder of the School of Esfahan. Mulla Sadra soon became a celebrated philosopher himself but because of the opposition of some religious scholars decided to leave Esfahān. He spent many years in Kahak, a village near Qom, in meditation and spiritual seclusion but finally returned to public life when the Khan School was built in Shiraz for him. He spent some three decades of the last part of his life in that city where he trained many students and wrote most of his works.
Mulla Sadra composed more than forty books, all but one in Arabic, concerning both the religious sciences and philosophy, his most famous work being al-Asfar al-arba’ā (The four journeys). He was deeply rooted in the teachings of Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Ibn al-’Arabi as well as being well-versed in the study of Qur’anic commentaries, the hadith and traditions of Shi’ite imams and Islamic theology. He created a synthesis between the purely religious thought of Islam in general, Islamic peripatetic (malabsha’si) philosophy, the School of Illumination (ishraq), and doctrinal Sufism of the School of Ibn ’Arabi. He believed that authentic bikma or philosophy/ theosophy could only be attained by combing revealed knowledge, inner illumination, and ratiocination and he called this integral bikma “The transcendent philosophy/theosophy” (al-bikma al-muta’aliyya). His teachings soon spread throughout Persia and Muslim India and he has been without doubt the most influential Islamic philosopher of the past few centuries. He is the figure around whom the revival of Islamic philosophy has taken place during the second half of the twentieth century, especially in Persia itself.

See also Falsafa; Ibn ‘Arabi; Ibn Sina; Ishraqi School.

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Seyyed Hossein Nasr

MURJI’ITES, MURJI’A

The participle murji’ derives from irja’, the most profound meanings of which are “giving hope” and “postponing.” The first meaning indicates that there is a hope for salvation when someone dies with faith albeit he or she has done grave sins. The second and perhaps the earliest meaning of this religious-political label was that the judgment about those involved in the conflict between ‘Uthman, ‘Ali, and al-Zubayr is “postponed” until the Last Day.

Historically, the Murji’ite sect, which is considered an extreme contrast to the Kharijite, was founded by ‘Ali’s grandson al-Hasan b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya as a response to the fanatical Kharijite and Shi’ite sects. While Kharijites hold the view that the third caliph, ‘Uthman, was a grave sinner and hence an unbeliever, and Muslims are not bound to his leadership, the Murji’ites were very much interested in the preservation of the unity of Muslim community rather than pronouncing judgment on whether or not ‘Uthman and ‘Ali were believers. As a consequence, Murji’ites postpone their judgment and give ‘Uthman and ‘Ali a temporary status of believers and accept their leadership. Any attempt to rebel against legitimate leadership is therefore unacceptable. Murji’ites also hold the view that a (grave) sinner should be punished but should not be excluded from the community, since punishment by exclusion can mean loss of security, life, or property. Another point of difference concerns the eternity of punishment. While the Kharijites strongly hold that a grave sinner is doomed in Hell forever, the Murji’ites gives the possibility of forgiveness by God’s will and grace.

The Murji’ite interpretation does not belong specifically to the Shi’a or the Sunnis. Some Shi’is followed the Murji’ites in postponing their judgment of ‘Uthman’s and his adversaries’ affairs while Sunnis adopt the Murji’ite view that no sin, other than shirk (idolatry or God’s partnership with other than Himself) and kufr (infidelity), can make one an unbeliever.

See also Kharijites, Khawarij.

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Shalahudin Kafrawi

MUSIC

While the history of music in Islam covers at least fifteen centuries, with orally transmitted repertoire and no significant notation system, its geography and distinct musical cultures include many diverse regions in the world. By necessity, this article excludes many folk musical traditions, popular musics, and other local styles; instead, it focuses on some of the universal aspects of music within the Islamic world.

The Concept of Music

While a word of Greek origin, musiki, was used in many theoretical works, an Arabic term, ghina (song), has been used also for music in secular contexts. Other terms, as well, are used for what a Westerner might call music in folk and sacred contexts—for example, kü is used for song or music in the Kazakh epic tradition and ir is used for both song and poetry in certain Turkic languages. The terms qa’wawal (one who says), and ‘asbq (lover), are used in Pakistan and Azerbaijan, respectively, for certain types of musicians. “Singing” is never used in describing Qur’anic cantillation; instead, the term “reading” is used in both Arabic and other main languages spoken in Islam.

An article by Lois Ibsen al-Faruqi, based on a modern interpretation of historical sources, includes an illustration of a hierarchy of “sound architecture” (bandasat al-sawr). In this hierarchy, genres are placed on continua between music and nonmusic, and legitimate and illegitimate. Consequently,
“sensuous music associated with unacceptable contexts” is considered illegitimate (baram), and is labeled as music. Qur’anic chant (qira’), other religious chants, such as the adhan, chanted poetry with noble themes (shi’r), family and celebration music (lullabies, women’s songs, wedding songs, etc.), “occupational” music (caravan chants, shepherd’s tunes, work songs, etc.), and military music are all considered legitimate (balaat), and labeled as nonmusic. Then again, while vocal and instrumental improvisations, serious metered songs, instrumental music, and music related to pre-Islamic or non-Islamic origins are considered music, their legitimacy remains controversial, either forbidden or discouraged in Islamic law (al-Faruqi, 1985). Based mostly on al-Ghazali’s (d. 1111) Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din (Revivification of the religious sciences), Al-Faruqi makes the case that the status of any haddasat al-satt genre depends on its context. Nonetheless, attitudes for this kind of labeling change in different countries. Two contrasting views may be observed in Turkey and Egypt.

In Turkey, Qur’anic recitation is considered to be music and imams, or leaders of religious services in mosques, are formally educated in music theory and practice at special state high schools and universities. As recently as 2002 the State Directorship of Religious Affairs organized a mandatory camp of intensive courses in musical theory and practice for mosque employees. However, Turkish scholars distinguish between mosque music (cemi musique) and Sufi music (Taravuf musikisi) and, as in the rest of the Islamic world, musical instruments are not permitted in mosques. Many performers operate in both domains. Furthermore, some Turkish performers of Qur’anic recitation function in both religious and secular contexts. For example, Kani Karaca (b. 1930), a celebrated singer of the sacred Ayin of the Mevlevi (Sufi order), the Mevlid, and a Qur’anic reciter, is also recognized as an exceptional artist in the secular Ottoman classical tradition.

In Egypt, on the other hand, an ideal Qur’anic recitation is considered nonmusic. While Egyptians expect the reciter to demonstrate tasteful aesthetic skills, they also consider that the act of listening to the Qur’an (sama’) should not engage a musical perception because of music’s association with worldly and even blasphemous irreligious contexts. Hence, in the context of Qur’anic recitation, the practice of “musical” composition is learned not through straightforward melodic exercises, but through providing a learning environment for individuals where there is no direct teaching of musical melodies.

National and local competitions of Qur’anic recitation for men, women, and children, like the Musabaqah Tilawati Qur’an in Indonesia, and instructional and commercial recordings (especially in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) help to perpetuate certain styles, and a net of artistic and spiritual critics protects the balance between the music as an enhancer of spirituality and the meaning in the text. Qur’anic Recitation

Two equally complex systems with specific sets of rules control most aspects of the Qur’anic recitation throughout the Islamic world. While a melodic modal system (maqam) helps to shape the melodic progression of a recitation (see below), the tajwid determines the exact pronunciation of the text.

The rules of tajwid have been transmitted orally generation after generation throughout the centuries. Properties of sound and rhythm are clearly articulated in the rules of tajwid. Some of the specific performance instructions include, for example, appropriate places for taking a breath, when to repeat a word or section, relative length of a syllable or phoneme, and so on. The degree of tajwid’s effect over the recitation varies in the two main styles: murattal and muwashshad.

Murattal (also known as tartil) is plainer and it emphasizes the meaning of the text itself. The pitch material of a maqam used in this style is often limited—usually within a fourth or a fifth—and elaborate melismatic contours where there is more than one musical pitch per syllable are considered inappropriate in that they obscure the meaning. Accordingly, there are no maqam modulations. Similar to the European recitative style, the tempo of murattal is relatively fast.
Since it does not demand any musical training, many practitioners of murattal are nonprofessionals and include both women and children. Professional woman reciters, whether they perform for a mixed audience or only females, often perform in the less ostentatious murattal. They are especially encouraged to recite in murattal since a woman’s voice with elaborate melodic creations is believed to distract male listeners from the meaning of the text. On the other hand, professionals of the more elaborate mujawwad style are almost always men.

The mujawwad style—also known as tilaww (and more problematically as tartil and tajwid)—came out of Egypt during the first half of the twentieth century through recordings of such reciters as Shaykh Mustafa Isma’il and more notably Shaykh ‘Abd al-Basit ‘Abd al-Samad. Many reciters outside of Egypt emulated the mujawwad style from these recordings and other performances from the powerful Egyptian radio broadcasts. The mujawwad style gives more importance to musical composition and the emotional intensity of the melody.

Call to Prayer
Perhaps, the most familiar sound in the world of Islam is the voice of a muezzin (Ar., mu’addibin) reciting the adhan, or call to prayer. Wherever there is a mosque one may hear the adhan regularly five times a day from a minaret or a loudspeaker attached to the main building. People may also experience the adhan in other contexts: broadcast on radio or television, or from a recording on an alarm clock.

Each adhan is semi-improvised within a maqam (melodic mode) in a rather plain style. Unlike murattal style, certain syllables of the fixed text of the adhan may incite a melodic melisma within a particular maqam. Muezzins are often professionals employed by a mosque. However, they may have additional duties in the mosque. During the Ottoman Empire (1299–1918) palace muezzins were among the highest-paid employees.

Theory
Music, along with mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy, was one of the main scientific fields studied by the early Islamic scholars and today it remains one of the most studied art forms in the Islamic world. A number of scientific and philosophical treatises by ancient Greek scholars like Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and Archimedes were translated into Arabic starting with the second and third centuries of Islam (700–800 C.E.). These works provided a model for later studies by Islamic scholars with their contents on cosmological associations of music, the healing affects of music, instruments, and other technical specifics such as tuning systems and melodic (maqam) and rhythmic modes (iqa).

An international congress on Arab music held in Cairo in 1932 renewed attention to many theoretical issues within the Islamic world—including Turkish and Persian—and resulted in a number of recordings by eminent musicians from the Middle East and a significant six-volume publication on music theory in French by Baron Rodolphe d’Erlanger, *La musique arabe* (1930–1959).

Melody
Theory, in general, provides a shared vocabulary of concepts and technical aspects of music for communication. Therefore, knowledge of maqam (melodic mode) theory has been essential for musicians’ education in the art of both composition and improvisation. A maqam articulates a number of rules in a musical composition regardless of whether the piece is composed or improvised, the most important of which are:

- pitch material (scale);
- melodic progression (shape and direction);
- modulations (to other maqams);
- and stereotypical melodic cells.

There are many maqams and each maqam has its own set of rules. These rules are deduced from a large body of existing compositions. The number of maqams used (Ar. maqamat, Turkish, makamlar, Moroccan Ar. tubuh) varies from country to country and from one period to another; also, they may go in and out of fashion. Understanding the intricacies of maqam might secure a high status among musicians; in the same way, inappropriate use of a maqam in an improvisation, for example, could lower a musician’s status significantly.

Even in the twenty-first century, musicians continue to invent new maqams and compose new pieces in these complex modal entities.

Rhythm
Most early Islamic treatises included sections on the rhythmic modes (usul or iqa’). An usul, the counterpart of maqam, is a fixed rhythmic pattern and used to measure individual compositions. There may be one or more usuls in a given number of beats; for example, there are four known nine-beat usuls. Similar to the Indian rhythmic modal system tala, special nonlexical syllables like dūmm, tākk, or tek-ka are used to articulate usul. There is often a direct correlation between usul and form. For example, the nine-beat usul Ézfer is always used for the second section (velam) in a Mevlevi ayin composition; and the ten-beat Georgina (Turk. Aksak Semai) is used for the instrumental Same’i (Turk. Saz Semai). Rhythmic modulation is an important compositional tool used by the composers.

Form and Genre
The suite form appears to be a significant genre in many religious, classical, and military musical traditions of the Middle East and Central Asia. The cyclical structure of these musical traditions goes back to the early centuries of Islam, and descriptions of early suite forms may be found in the writings of Islamic scholars such as Isfahani and Meraghi as...
early as the tenth century. A suite tradition often has a fixed body of repertoire, and shorter individual compositions are selected for performances. A specific order of pieces is determined by their rhythmic patterns (usul) and form.

An unmeasured solo instrumental improvisation, like Turkish and Arab taqsim or Persian daramad, appears in most suite traditions. A taqsim may be played at several points in a performance, for example, as an introduction to a suite in a given maqam, or as a transition between pieces. Although it is improvised, a taqsim follows the rules of the maqam and has a definable form. A Turkish taksim usually falls into three sections. The introduction shows the main pitches and other characteristics of the mode, and demonstrates the performer's mastery of a particular makam. The next section shows the performer's ability to modulate to other makams within the rigid aesthetic rules of the tradition. Finally, the performer recapitulates and summarizes the original makam.

Arab layali and qasida, Turkish gazel, and Persian avaz are some of the vocal counterparts of taqsim that are often set to a secular poetry with additional words and other nonlexical syllables, for example, aman, ef, zar, yale, and so on.

The Moroccan Andalusian tradition also includes a quasi-improvised orchestral taqsim, known as bugha. While they follow a slow-moving specific main melody in a highly heterophonic texture, performance of bugha usually accommodates individual performers with some freedom to improvise. The origins of bugha possibly go back to a solo improvisation.

Na‘at and durak may be shown as examples of unmeasured pre-composed genres whose text praises the prophet Mohammed. The best-known na‘at is the Rast Na‘at-e Mevlana, which is fixed as part of the ayin suite performed during the rituals of the Mevlevis, also known in the West as the Whirling Dervishes.

Some of the main Islamic suite traditions begin with a composed instrumental form performed by the entire ensemble. The persav for example, appears in Turkish Melevi ayin, fasil, and military mehter performances. Measured in large rhythmic patterns, persavs (Ar. basraf) consist of four independent sections (bane) and a refrain (teslim) following each section. The Arab basraf, Moroccan Andalusian tusbia, and Persian pishdaramad similarly occur at the beginning of each respective suite.

A sama‘i, on the other hand, is the last instrumental composition of the traditional Egyptian and Syrian suite wasla. The basic structure of the sama‘i is identical to the basraf, that is, four sections (bane) with a refrain (teslim). The standard rhythmic pattern (usul) of this genre, however, is a short one, Georjina (3+2+2+3). In the final bane the meter typically modulates to Darij (3+3). The Turkish fasil and Mevlevi ayin also include an instrumental semai at the end.

Mevlevis typically use a compound musical form (ayin) during their rituals (sema), mixing the fixed Rast na‘at-e Mevlana, several taqsim, a persav, a four-section vocal composition with a text chosen from Jalaluddin Rumi’s poems, instrumental interludes, various hymns, and Qur’anic recitation. A sequence of Son persav and Son yuruk semai is the last instrumental section played by the Melevi ensemble (mutraj). Turkish classical musicians frequently perform this particular form and certain other instrumental selections from the ayin form in secular concerts.

Dbikr (remembrance) is one of the most common forms performed by worshippers at Sufi gatherings of different sects. It is performed through formulized repetitions of words or short phrases in highly rhythmic specific patterns—“Allah” (God) or “la ilaha illallah” (There is no God but Allah), for example. Specialists or volunteers from the congregation may perform on frame drums or other percussion instruments during dbikr. Qur’anic recitation, hymns, and vocal improvisations with religious texts are often included into the ritual.

Education
Starting in the nineteenth century, the adoption of the Western system of musical notation in certain parts of the Islamic world changed the nature of music education in the classical genres, and, consequently, sheet music replaced memory for many in the younger generation of musicians. Conservatories and other music schools in countries like Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Iraq produced literate musicians with high technical skills during the twentieth century. The famous Iraqi oud virtuoso Munir Bashir may be given as an example.

In most Islamic countries oral transmission between the master and pupil was broadened with the advancement of the recording technologies during the twentieth century, and recordings of masters on radio, television, cassettes, compact discs, videos, and even CD-ROMs became virtual teachers for young performers. Consequently, regardless of whether it is sacred or secular, listening to the great performers remains the principal way to reach the level of mastery.

Instruments
In most locations, musical instruments are not allowed in mosques. A certain kind of inclusiveness and tolerance, on the other hand, makes it possible for a variety of musical instruments and dance to be incorporated into Sufi rituals. Most notably, the Mevlevi order, both in Turkey and Syria, features a large orchestra with classical instruments like oud, ney, and rebab, to name a few. The most commonly used instrument among Sufis is the drum. While the shapes and names of drums may change from one culture to another, the most common Sufi drum is a frame drum. Some peripheral countries with Muslim populations (e.g., Indonesia, Ghana), furthermore, use indigenous instruments in their Islamic rituals.
Muslim Brotherhood

See also Arabic Literature; Persian Language and Literature; Qur'an; Umm Kulthum; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD See Ikhwan al-Muslimin

MUSLIM IBN AL-HAJJAJ (C. 817–875)

Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, compiler of the second most important collection of sound hadiths, was born in Neyshabur, Persia, between 817 and 821 and died there in 875 C.E. In order to collect hadiths (traditions), he traveled at an early age to Iraq, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and Syria, where he heard traditions from well-known authorities, such as the jurist Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855) and Harmala, a student of the earlier legal scholar al-Shafi’i (d. 820). Of the 300,000 traditions that he is said to have amassed, only four thousand (or three thousand if one does not count the repetitions) were included in his collection, which was entitled *al-Jami‘ al-sahih* (The sound compendium), *al-Sabib* for short. Compared with al-Bukhari, Muslim pays meticulous attention to the *isnads* ("chain of transmission") for the hadiths he recorded, listing all the variant *isnads* known to him for a particular tradition, before listing their common *matn* or text. These different *isnads* are indicated by the Arabic letter *b* which stood for *tabwil* or *hawala*, Arabic for change. On account of this arrangement, he has been justly praised by both medieval and modern scholars; the latter in particular have found these "clusters" of *matn* produced in this manner especially useful for the analysis of hadiths and their dating. Another important feature of Muslim’s *al-Sahib* is its introduction, which deals with the subject of *ilm al-badith* ("the science of tradition"). The medieval sources list other works by Muslim on *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and hadith transmitters, none of which appears to be extant.

See also Bukhari, al-; Hadith.

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MUSLIM STUDENT ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA

Muslim students in universities across the United States formally inaugurated the Muslim Student Association in a national conference held in Urbana, Illinois, on 1 January 1963. The participants in this first conference represented immigrant students from all over the Muslim world. On almost every major college campus where there were Muslim students (about two hundred in all), a MSA was established as part of a network of local chapters with regional and zonal structures. The central organization was run by an executive committee, as was each local chapter, and a general national meeting was held every year in a different city.

In September 1975, the MSA established a general secretariat and a headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana. Accordingly, departments were created to oversee the dissemination of Islamic education and publications, training, public relations, finance, and administration. As members graduated, they remained active and some made the organization their life’s work. By February 1977 the MSA had become the largest, best-organized, most active, financially stable, and influential American Muslim organization. It had also come to be dominated in leadership and membership by Muslim students from Southeast Asia. Since 1977 the numbers of MSAs
has grown and although immigrant Muslim students from all over participate, South Asians predominate in the leadership roles.

One immediate result of the organization and influence of this group was criticism for expanding that influence to community affairs. Though students were naturally members of various communities, they had competition in the leadership of community affairs. This tension caused the emergence of the Muslim Community Association. The two groups were then organized in 1981 under an umbrella organization, The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Today, almost everywhere there are Muslim students there continues to exist an MSA to serve their needs on campus.

See also Islamic Society of North America; United States, Islam in the; Youth Movements.

Aminah Beverly McCloud

MU'TAZILITES, MU'TAZILA

The most prevalent tradition has it that the name Mu'tazila was used to refer to someone or a group of people who withdrew (tazala, from which the term Mu'tazila derives) from an eighth-century circle of majority on whether a grave sinner was a believer or unbeliever. Later on, the term Mu'tazila was used to designate a school of Islamic theology that follows certain rules known as the five principles (al-usul al-khamsa).

This theological school is one of the most progressive schools in the history of Islamic theology and has to a high degree contributed to the development of Islamic thought. This school is theological due to its starting point that God is unquestionably regarded as the ultimate source of its worldview. However, its emphasis on the use of reason in its theological quest and its assimilation of some Greek ideas and methods of arguments with Islamic principles have contributed to a great extent to the development and flourishing of rationalism in early Islamic thought.

The seeds of Mu'tazilite views disseminated by its early figures such as Wasil b. 'Atta, 'Amr b. 'Ubayd, and Abu l-Hudhayl eventually got formulated and adopted as five Mu'tazilite principles. The principle of unity (tazbid) suggests God's unity against any resemblance to Him. Under this principle, Mu'tazilites deny the eternity of the Qur'an, God's attributes, and any form of anthropomorphism. The principle of justice (adl) is associated with the theory of determination (qadar), in which it is maintained that God is just and that human beings are free to choose and to act. The principle of promise and threats holds that God is truthful and bound in keeping His promise of heavenly reward and threat of hellfire. As He promised, for example, a great sinner will forever be in hell unless s/he repents. The principle of intermediate position (manzila bayn al-mazilatayn) indicates that a Muslim who does great sin is regarded as neither a believer (mu'min) nor an unbeliever (kafir). The principle of commanding the right and forbidding the wrong (al-amr bi al-ma'rif wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar) instructs every Mu'tazilite to apply this principle to the social world when he or she has the power to do it.

See also 'Abd al-Jabbar; Ma'mun, al-; Mihna.

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Shalahudin Kafrawi

MUTHANNA, MUHAMMAD IBN 'ABDALLAH, AL- See Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya
NADER SHAH AFSHAR (1688–1747)

Nader Shah Afshar was the ruler of Iran from 1736 until 1747. Born Nader-qoli Beg of the Afshar Turkmen in northeastern Iran in 1688, he rose to power by espousing the cause of Tahmasb Mirza, scion of the Safavid dynasty who had escaped from the invading Afghans. Under the name of Tahmasb-qoli Khan, Nader led an Iranian army to victory over the Afghans in 1729. In 1732 he had Tahmasb deposed and replaced by his infant son ‘Abbas, with himself as regent. Having recovered the border territories occupied by Ottoman Turkey and Russia, in 1736 he engineered his own election as king, under the name of Nader Shah.

Nader signed a treaty with the Ottomans, proposing that the Iranians renounce Shi’ism (a major cause of enmity with the Turks, as champions of Sunni Islam) if the Turks agreed to recognize their Ja’fari madhhab (school of religious law) as a fifth rite of Sunni law. This compromise was likely seen by Nader as a stepping-stone to a larger Asiatic empire, as his enrichment of the Shi’ite shrine in his capital of Mashhad was calculated to win support at home. The Turks were unconvinced, and the religious clauses were never ratified. In 1739 Nader invaded India, defeated the Mughal army, and sacked Delhi; he returned by way of Central Asia, subduing Bukhara and Khiva. His son Reza-qoli Mirza, viceroy in Iran during the Indian campaign, was accused of ordering a failed assassination of his father, and blinded.

Exorbitant requisitions for his renewed campaigns provoked widespread rebellions. Nader became increasingly paranoid and cruelly punished all opposition, erecting towers of severed heads in his wake. His reliance on (Sunni) Afghan and Uzbek troops alienated his own (Shi’ite) Afshar and Qajar officers, who in 1747 assassinated him in his camp in Khorasan. His army disintegrated; he was succeeded briefly by a nephew, ‘Adel Shah, then by his grandson Shahrokh Shah (1748–1796), but their rule did not extend much beyond Mashhad.

See also Abbas I, Shah; Madhhab.

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John R. Perry

NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU)

The organization of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars), or NU, was founded on 31 January 1926 as a countermovement to the increasingly successful reformist Muhammadiyah organization. NU is a mass-based socioreligious Islamic organization under the leadership of ulama, and it is the largest in Indonesia with around thirty-five million members. NU activities include the religious, social, educational, economic, and political. Its founders were Ulama (called kiyai in Indonesia) who led rural Islamic boarding schools, pesantren. They represented traditionalist Muslims, those who practice Islamic mysticism (tasawwuf; Ar. tasawwuf), and are not against indigenous rituals and beliefs as long as they do not contradict the normative teachings of Islam. The two most prominent founding ulama were Hasyim Asy’ari, and Abdul Wahab Chasbullah.

NU members refer to themselves as Aswaja: “ahlus sunnah wal jama’a,” (Ar., ahl al-sunna wal-jama’a) people of sunna and community, who base their religious reference on the hadith, the sunna, and the adat (local practices, Ar., ‘ada). They follow the Shi’i school of jurisprudence and in their interpretation of religious texts include the opinions of the great ulama in unbroken chains that reach back to the prophet Muhammad. Pesantren are considered the heart of
NU tradition. Here students learn the essentials of traditionalist Islam in order to maintain and spread this interpretation.

NU’s history can be divided into four phases:

1. The initial years NU served as a socioreligious organization.
2. From the late 1930s until 1984 it became involved in political activities. From 1952–1971 it had its own political party and participated in the national cabinet.
3. When the Suharto government rendered all political parties ineffective with its suppressive regulations NU decided to leave politics. This was expressed in the 1984 watershed event called kembali ke khittab, a return to the original charter of 1926.
4. In 1998, after the fall of Suharto, NU again became involved in national politics. It initiated the National Awakening Party (PKB) while its national chair, Abdurrahman Wahid, was elected Indonesia’s fourth president for a brief period (1999–2001).

The return to its socioreligious activities in 1984 not only meant withdrawal from politics, but a total refocus on education, community welfare, mission, social, and economic development. Through its new role, NU became active in guiding large numbers of Indonesian Muslims in adapting to social change and modernity. Various institutions related to NU started multilevel dialogue about issues of social justice, human rights, democracy, and the rights of women and children. This made NU an active codeveloper of a model for civil society, suitable for the Indonesian context.

Over the years, several divisions were founded within the NU structure. Among others, there are divisions for youth (Ansor), women (Muslimat NU), young women (Fatayat NU), and male and female students (IPNU and IPPNU). Apart from these divisions, NU comprises institutions for education, family affairs, agriculture, economic development, and Islamic banking. The membership of ulema and lay people is reflected in a two-tiered structure of councils that reach from the national to the local level: the syuriah (Ar. shura), the religious council, which has only ulema as members who develop and monitor the NU activities; and the Tanfidziah, which is the executive council where ulema and lay members supervise the daily affairs. It is characteristic for NU that decisions taken at the highest level are not binding for the lower levels. This is based on a tradition of the Prophet’s saying that “disagreement among the ulema is a blessing from God for humanity.”

See also Southeast Asian Culture and Islam; Southeast Asia, Islam in.

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Nelly van Doorn-Harder

NA’INI, MOHAMMAD HOSAYN (1860–1936)

Mohammad Hosayn Na’ini was a leading Shi’ite scholar, theoretician of constitutionalism, and a precursor of Islamic modernism in Iran. Born into a family of scholars, Na’ini first studied with Mohammad Baqer Esfahani and Mohammad Taqi (Aqa Najafi). Then he went to Iraq where he studied with Mohammad Hasan Shirazi and Mohammad Kazim Khorasani. In Iraq, Na’ini became actively involved in the anti-British independence movement after World War I. He was arrested and expelled from Karbala and returned to Tehran in 1923. He joined the anti-Qajar forces, supported Reza Khan’s accession to the throne, and maintained cordial relationship with him until his death in Najaf in 1936.

Na’ini wrote the most important treatise in support of constitutional government from a Shi’ite viewpoint; in it he presented an Islamic justification for a secular and Western model constitutional government. In Tanbih al-umma wa tanzib al-milla dar Asas Usul-i Masbruttiyyat (An admonishment to the [community of] believers and an exposition to the nation concerning the principles of constitutional government), Na’ini attempted to reconcile the need for an efficient government in Iran that would respect certain tenets of a democratic system of government with the need to recognize the legitimacy of the rule of the Hidden Imam, and defend the precepts of Shi’ite Islam. It is said that when Na’ini became disillusioned with the constitutional revolution, he withdrew his book and threw it into the Tigris River.

See also Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Nationalism: Iranian.


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*Mohammad H. Faghoory*

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**NAJAF**

Najaf is one of several shrine cities and a major learning center for Shi‘a Muslims. Located south of Baghdad, Iraq, on a trade route between Basra and Baghdad, Najaf has existed since the reign of Harun al-Rashid. Imam ‘Ali was buried here, and a shrine was built around ‘Ali’s tomb in 979.

The city of Najaf began as a learning center in 1056, when Shaykh al-Ta‘ifa al-Tusi moved here after the Seljuks took over Baghdad. He advanced the work of his predecessors in the emerging rationalist school of Shi‘ite thought. During the Ilkhanid period (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) its prominence was reduced with the emergence of Hilla and Aleppo as centers of Shi‘ite learning. In sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Najaf, Isfahan, and Mashhad were competing over prominence as shrine cities. The rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth century and their rivalry with the Ottoman Empire for hegemony over the shrine cities escalated. Safavids ruled over the shrine cities in 1508–1533 and 1622–1638, but for political reasons maintained Isfahan and Mashhad as the most important shrine centers.

The eighteenth century was a turning point in the history of the shrine cities. First, the fall of the Safavids in Iran drove many ulema to Najaf. Secondly, the shrine cities became economically more independent of the Ottomans and the subsequent rulers of Iran, and the number of pilgrims increased. Najaf, in particular, was positively affected by the pan-Islamic policies of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid after he came to power in 1876. Migrant Islamic scholars in Najaf gained prominence.

Around this same period, the Qajars of Iran were giving in to British and Russian colonial powers. While the Iranian religious centers were actively involved in everyday politics, centers in Iraq, such as Najaf, were not. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Najaf was drawn to the British and the 1905 Constitutional Revolution in Iran which limited the power of the Qajar monarchs.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Najaf had grown to a city of 30,000 inhabitants, with a large community of learned people who came from all over the Islamic world. The formation of a patronage system, which consisted of a network of students and funding sources across political boundaries, increased the flow of funds, making it more independent of the governments. In the twentieth century, Najaf regained prominence when one of its ulema, Ayatollah Tahataba‘i Yazdi (d. 1919), wrote al-‘Urza al-wuthqa, a major work in applied Shi‘ite law which reflected the contemporary social and political condition and, with Qom, once again became an important center of Shi‘ite scholarship during the period from 1900 through 1979.

When the shah of Iran exiled Ayatollah Khomeini to Najaf in 1964, the city became an important political center as well. Najaf and Qom, however, were rivals for importance, as Khomeini praised Qom for being more active in the social life of the Shi‘a, and chided Najaf for its relative passivity. Violent repression by Saddam Hussein during and after the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) forced many of the Shi‘ite ulema to leave Najaf and has resulted in its eclipse as a center of Shi‘ite learning.

*See also Holy Cities; Karbala; Mashhad.*

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*Mazyar Lotfalian*

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**NAMES, ISLAMIC** *See Genealogy*

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**NAR**

Nar (from al-nar, Ar. “the fire”) is the common designation for hell in Islam—a blazing abode where God punishes unbelievers and wrongdoers. Muslims use nar synonymously with jannah, and they juxtapose both terms to janna (“garden”), the blissful home of the righteous in the hereafter. The idea of a place of punishment and suffering in the afterlife is found in many religions, but the Islamic concept is actually an outgrowth of centuries of religious reflection about the afterlife rooted in the cultures of the ancient Near East, rabbinic Judaism, early Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. Early Arabian poetic imagery contributed to its assimilation into Islamic eschatological discourse. Nar is also the element from which Satan was fashioned, in juxtaposition to God’s light (nur), and the clay used in Adam’s creation (Q. 38:76–77).

According to Islamic eschatological doctrine, al-nar is not just a natural element, but also a real place where humans...
experience horrendous bodily torments at the hands of angels and demonic creatures. In the Qur’an, it is described as an evil “home” or “dwelling,” where wrongdoers don garments of fire, drink boiling water, eat the fruit of an infernal tree, and are dragged about by iron hooks (37:62-68, 22:19-21). This imagery complements Qur’anic discourses about the bliss of the righteous in paradise, and it was elaborated with gruesome detail in the hadith, theological tracts, and visionary literature during the Middle Ages. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) wrote that in hell the damned “are thrust down upon their faces, chained and fettered, with hellfire (nar) above them, hellfire beneath them, hellfire on their right and hellfire on their left so that they drown in a sea of fire” (al-Ghazali, The Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife, p. 221). Hell was also conceived as a hierarchy of seven levels, each assigned a different name derived from the Qur’an (for example, “abyss,” “blaze,” and “furnace”), to which different classes of unbelievers and wrongdoers will be consigned in the afterlife. The angel Malik and his deputies, the Zabaniyya, will help administer their punishments. In some accounts, hell was portrayed as a monstrous creature with thousands of heads and mouths. Theologians debated whether the damned would suffer there for eternity, but many invoked the Qur’an (11:107, 78:23) in favor of the opinion that its torments were purgatorial, and that eventually many would be admitted to paradise.

Pious Muslims have invoked hell to promote mindfulness of God and the life of the hereafter, against the distractions of mundane existence. Sufis, however, taught that both the fear of hell and desire for paradise were distractions for wayfarers seeking intimate union with God. Some, like Jalaluddin Rumi (d. 1273), used hellfire as a metaphor for the evil inclinations of the self that can only be quelled by divine light or the water of mercy that flows from the virtuous heart. Others equated it to the burning passion of the lover that leads to annihilation of the self in God the beloved, or to the torment experienced in separation from God. Since the twentieth century, Muslim modernists have posited that both hell and paradise are psychological or spiritual states of being rather than actual places in the hereafter. Today, however, traditional understandings continue to have a compelling influence on Muslim beliefs and practices, often with politicized overtones. The Jama’a-t-e Islami of Bangladesh, for example, has threatened that Muslim women who fail to support this radical organization will be condemned to hell.

See also Death; Ghazali, al-; Jahannam; Janna; Muhammad; Qur’an; Tafsir.

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NASA’I, AL- (830–915)

Al-Nasa’i, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman Ahmad b. ‘Ali b. Shu’ayb, a compiler of one of the six authoritative Sunni hadith collections, lived between 830 and 915. Unfortunately, very little is known of his early life, but like the other compilers, he was known to have traveled extensively “in search of knowledge” (Ar. talab al-‘ilm) in order to hear traditions from the prominent traditionists of his time. He settled for a while in Egypt and then later made his way to Damascus, where he was reportedly ill-treated on account of his pro-‘Alid and anti-Umayyad sentiments. Some sources suggest that the venue was instead Ramla, in Palestine. Because of his untimely death, he has been regarded as a martyr. His collection, Kitab al-Sunan, contains over five thousand hadiths. Unlike the other five collections, al-Nasa’i’s Sunan does not include a chapter on the excellences of the Qur’an (Ar. fada’il al-Qur’an), although he composed an independent treatise on the topic. Also lacking in his Sunan are eschatological traditions. Al-Nasa’i is credited with nine other works, among which are a compilation of hadiths on the virtues of ‘Ali and a rijal work that assessed the reliability of various hadith transmitters.

See also Hadith.

Asma Asfaruddin

NASSER, JAMAL See ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal

NATIONALISM

ARAB

Nancy L. Stockdale

IRANIAN

Fakhreddin Azimi

TURKISH

A. Uner Turgay

ARAB

Ideals of Arab nationalism were extremely influential in the Middle East in the twentieth century. Emerging from nineteenth-century debates about the role of Islam in the
modern world and crystallized by anti-imperialist movements after the First World War, Arab nationalists shaped the political ideologies of newly independent nations as they struggled to forge a postcolonial identity for the Middle East.

Pan-Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905) were early inspirations for the emergent Arab nationalist ideology. Afghani despaired at the increased dominance of European empires in the Muslim world, but believed that Islamic governments could counteract Western influence if it was stripped of corruption and instilled with the values of Muslim unity, using the early caliphate as a model of success. ‘Abduh, al-Afghani’s most famous student, furthered his mentor’s ideas with his book Risalah al-tawhid (A treatise on the oneness of God), asserting the compatibility of Islam with the modern world. By founding the Salafiya movement and reopening the doors of ijihad, ‘Abduh challenged Muslims to stand up to their governments if they believed the values of Islam were being crushed. At the same time, modern technologies and Western-style reforms were acceptable if interpreted as benefiting Muslim society.

These pan-Islamic thinkers inspired others to think in more local terms. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902), the author of The Nature of Despotism and The Mother of Cities, Mecca, was a Syrian journalist and student of ‘Abduh who believed that the decline of the Middle East to the West was due to the Ottoman Empire and the fact that non-Arabs had taken control of the region. Because Islam was revealed to the Arabs in the Arabic language, al-Kawakibi saw the Middle East as being at its zenith when Arabs ruled. He promoted the idea that Arab leadership was perfect and argued that, if it were to be restored, the region would revive morally and politically. This became the basis of several independence movements, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War.

Faced with the end of Turkish rule but the continuance of French and British rule in the Arab world, many Arab thinkers formulated programs for nationalist liberation based on ethnic identity. One of the most important was the Syrian Satî’ al-Husri (1880–1968). Al-Husri wrote three influential tracts: Arabism First, On Arab Nationalism, and What is Nationalism? These pamphlets asked all Arabs—both Muslim and Christian—to unite under one state, privileging shared language and culture as the bond between them all. Al-Husri hoped that by focusing on the great past of the Arab world rather than only Islam, Christian and Muslim Arabs would join together to fight against foreign imperialism.

Fellow Syrians Michel ‘Aflaq (1912–1989) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1911–1980) followed al-Husri’s lead by merging socialist anti-imperialist thought with pan-Arabist ideals. Founders of the Ba‘th (“resurrection”) movement in the 1940s, ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar drew on the past of the Arabs as leaders of the Islamic world and called for a revival of unity to overthrow foreign oppression and implement social justice. Two major events concurrent with the establishment of the Ba‘th movement—the creation of Israel and the subsequent displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and the emergence of a fully independent Egypt in the 1950s—catapulted the ideas of Arab nationalism into political reality.

Devastated by the losses of the Arab forces to Israel and the massive crisis of Palestinian refugees, members of the Arab League (founded in 1945) looked to Egypt to lead the Arab world to greatness. With the successful 1952 revolution against the monarchy led by Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (1918–1970), Egypt did become the center of Arab nationalist rhetoric and action. Nasser’s leadership in the nonalignment movement against the Baghdad Pact of 1954 and his successful nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 made the world take notice of the ideals of Arab strength and national unity. In the 1960s, the Ba‘th movement came to power and ruled in Syria and Iraq through Revolutionary Command Councils.

However, the failed union between Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic (1958–1961), the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies against the Israelis in the war of 1967, and the split between the Ba‘th regimes in Syria and Iraq underscored the real difficulties of creating a gigantic Arab super-state. Although leaders in the 1970s and 1980s tried to rally their populations behind Arab nationalist rhetoric, the Gulf War of 1991, which pitted Arab nations against each other, destroyed the dreams of Arab nationalists. This left the people of the Arab world searching for viable alternatives to the ideals that had seemed so promising earlier in the century.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; ‘Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi; ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Arab League; Ba‘th Party; Nationalism: Iranian; Nationalism: Turkish; Pan-Arabism; Pan-Islam; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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Nancy L. Stockdale

IRANIAN
Despite the existence of various forms of primordial loyalties, a persistent sense of national consciousness or cultural distinctness was by no means absent from premodern Iran. It was sustained by a shared cultural heritage, and above all by the Persian language. From the sixteenth century it was reinforced by Shi‘ism. In the nineteenth century, Iran became an arena of rivalry between imperial Russia and the British Empire and lost territory, particularly to the Russians, in two humiliating wars. The ruling Qajar dynasty tried to
maintain the country’s precarious independence by exploiting Anglo-Russian rivalry. The growing influence and presence of Europeans in the country created resentment, while European ideas enabled the Iranian intelligentsia to articulate their diagnosis of the country’s ills in nationalist terms. They came to view meaningful national self-determination as the prerequisite of national regeneration. The burgeoning nationalism manifested itself in the Constitutional Revolution from 1905 to 1911, which signaled a crucial stage in the transformation of the country into a nation-state and sought to create a modern state structure and establish institutions that embodied the will and sovereignty of the nation.

Following the coup of 1921, which eventually established the Pahlevi dynasty, nationalism became the guiding ideology of the centralizing state and grew as a result its educational and other modernizing policies. Manifestations of the prevailing nationalism ranged from the architecture of state buildings to the attempted purification of the Persian language. In the vein of its nineteenth-century predecessors, the nationalism of the era of Reza Shah Pahlevi invoked the pre-Islamic period of Iranian history as the locus of an authentic Iranian national identity and pride.

The outbreak of the Second World War and the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941 again underlined national vulnerability and enhanced foreign influence. Toward the end of the war, Iranian resistance to the Soviet demand for an oil concession in northern Iran resulted in the refusal of the Soviet government to withdraw its forces from the country and its encouragement of autonomy movements in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. Iranian efforts and international pressure eventually resulted in the Soviet evacuation and the collapse of the autonomy movements.

Public attention then turned to the British oil concession in Iran and the preponderant position of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The failure of negotiations to extract from the company a greater share of the oil revenues for Iran strengthened a nationalist movement, led by the veteran parliamentarian Mohammad Mosaddeq, who had spearheaded the Iranian refusal to grant an oil concession to the Soviets. The movement resulted in the nationalization of the AIOC and the premiership of Mosaddeq. Mosaddeq pursued an anti-imperialist, civic nationalism that embraced liberal democratic values and was inclusive of all Iranians, regardless of ethnicity, language, or religion. He saw the nationalization of the oil industry as a legitimate move that expressed and strengthened Iranian national sovereignty, facilitated popular self-determination, and provided the needed resources for national regeneration and modernization.

The overthrow of Mosaddeq’s government through the Anglo-American sponsored coup of August 1953 dealt a severe blow to Iranian civic nationalism. Iran abandoned her neutralism and, in 1955, formally joined a pro-Western alliance. Seeking to refute the charges of dependence on Anglo-American support, the shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, advocated “positive” nationalism, in contrast to what he characterized as the “negative” nationalism of Mosaddeq. However, in 1964 the issue of granting immunities to the American forces stationed in Iran was seen by the opponents of the regime as a clear affront to Iranian national dignity and sovereignty.

Like his father, Muhammad Reza Shah promoted a cultural nationalism that tended to glorify Iran’s pre-Islamic past. A notable instance of this was the replacement, in March 1976, of the Islamic calendar by an imperial one. This and similar measures antagonized the religious establishment and the pious middle classes, contributing to the revolution of 1978 and 1979 and the overthrow of the monarchy.

Following the revolution, despite the declared ecumenical objectives of the emerging Islamic regime, nationalism continued to be a major force in Iran’s social, political, and cultural life, as well as its foreign policy. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980 to 1988 saw the rekindling of strong nationalist sentiments, and the regime was gradually forced to come to terms with or even embrace the Iranian cultural nationalism that it had tried to suppress. Similarly, civic nationalist aspirations for popular sovereignty, political equality, and meaningful citizenship continued to grow.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Mosaddeq, Mohammad; Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi; Nationalism: Arab; Nationalism: Turkish; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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Fakhrreddin Azimi

TURKISH
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the multiethnic, multireligious Ottoman Empire was transformed into a collection of nation-states in the Balkans and the Middle East. This was the result of social and economic developments and cultural changes brought about by internal and external forces at work in the empire. Although the reforms of the Tanzimat era (1839–1876) streamlined the empire’s administrative and financial institutions and established new ones, it also inadvertently helped advance ethnic awareness.
The policies of Ottomanism pursued during the 1870s and 1880s, with the concept of citizenship replacing an individual’s status as subject of the sultan, were unable to retain the loyalty of the various ethnic groups in the European provinces of the empire. After the loss of most of the Balkan territories and increasing European political and financial control of the Ottoman government’s affairs, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II’s (1876–1909) policies were affected accordingly. With the influx of Muslims into the empire, mostly from the Caucasus, and the influence of Muslim intellectuals both at home and abroad, pan-Islam replaced Ottomanism. Islam became the social and political basis of the empire, and the Sultan emphasized his role as caliph, identifying with the anti-imperialist tendencies of Islam.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought about fundamental changes. The Union and Progress Party, in charge of the newly established parliament and controlled by the Young Turks, pursued secular and—in some important areas, such as education—pro-Turkish policies. The Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Istanbul government during the First World War clearly directed the course of nationalism in the Middle East. The nationalist movements of non-Turkish Muslims, Albanians, and Arabs gave impetus to Turkish nationalism. They influenced the emergence of a Turkish nationalism with secular tendencies, which received intellectual nourishment from its chief ideologue, Ziya Gokalp (1876–1924). Gokalp took a deep interest in the history of the ancient Turks and argued that the basis of nationality was culture (bars). This included all feelings, judgments, and ideals, as distinct from civilization (medeniyet) which encompassed rational and scientific knowledge and technology. Through his poems and essays, Gokalp sought a national revival of Turkish history and language. This, along with his search for new values, led to his movement of Turkism (Turkuluk). Thus, he in effect underwrote the ideals of Turkish nationalism.

During the War of Independence (1919–1922), the National Pact (1919), with its territorial definitions and populist expressions, set the agenda for the formation in 1923 of the Republic of Turkey. The first two decades of the Turkish Republic were a period of political and cultural consolidation under its first president, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk). The government relied heavily on Turkey’s past to bolster national pride and integration. Kemal blamed the religious leaders for opposing the spirit of Islam, and effectively reinterpreted religion and its role in the society according to nationalist ideas. Being aware of the symbolic powers of organized institutions, the government methodically disestablished the then-existing political, legal, and educational institutions of Islam, replacing them with adaptations of Western models. Turkish nationalism substituted itself for all loyalties and values earlier expressed through religion, and thus became the ideology of the Republic.

See also Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal; Balkans, Islam in the; Empires: Ottoman; Nur Movement; Nursi, Said; Pan-Islam; Young Ottomans; Young Turks.

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A. Uner Turgay

NATION OF ISLAM

The Nation of Islam in concept was founded in the teachings of Master Fard Muhammad in 1930 with the lectures of this urban trader to the “so-called Negro” community in Detroit, Michigan. At the center of these lectures was the teaching that a large number of Africans enslaved in the Americas were Muslims and that Islam was the “true religion” of these people. With knowledge of their Islamic heritage, clean living, and a demand for freedom, justice, and equality, these Muslims would regain their humanity that had been lost in slavery. In practice, the Nation of Islam was cemented as a religious community under the leadership and guidance of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad by 1934.

Members of the Nation of Islam believe in “the One God whose proper name is Allah, in the Holy Qur’an and in the Scriptures of all the Prophets of God,” according to Elijah Muhammad (Message of the Blackman, 1965). Initially there was a belief in a mental resurrection of the dead to which has been added the Islamic belief in the Day of Judgment. Concurrent with these beliefs the leadership aims at the reformation of the character of the African-American community. As with all Muslims, members refrain from drinking alcohol, gambling, and eating pork. Additionally, they avoid narcotics, cigarettes, slang, and profanity and use language that encourages courtesy and good manners.

Malcolm X was a member of the Nation of Islam from 1952 until his ouster in 1964. Malcolm X was known as a charismatic national spokesman for the Nation of Islam. His unauthorized comments on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy precipitated his ouster. Pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, inspired him to permanently leave the Nation of Islam to become an orthodox Sunni Muslim. Warith Deen Muhammad inherited the leadership of the Nation of Islam upon the death of his father, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, in 1975. He moved the majority of the community from a black nationalist philosophy into orthodox Sunni Islam. Since that time he has become a well-respected leader in American Islam. In the 1990s Louis Farrakhan led the Nation of Islam toward stricter observance of Islamic rituals and
practice. In the twenty-first century this development complements a continuing focus on the plight of African Americans.

See also Farrakhan, Louis; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Elijah; Muhammad, Warith Deen; United States, Islam in the.

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Aminah Beverly McCloud

NAWRUZ

Nawruz, literally "new day," is the Iranian holiday that celebrates the beginning of spring. Nawruz was observed in Zoroastrian Persia and has long been celebrated in areas influenced by Persian culture. Nawruz begins at the vernal equinox on the first day of Farvardin, the first month of the Iranian solar calendar, and lasts thirteen days. Renewal of home and of social ties are evident in the housecleaning that precedes Nawruz and in the visits paid to relatives and friends, in order of seniority, throughout the holiday. People wear new clothes at Nawruz, and children receive presents of money.

Central to the Nawruz celebration in Iran is the sofreh-e baft sin, or "cloth of the seven s’s"—a decorative arrangement of seven objects whose names in Persian begin with the letter s. These are usually sumac (sona), hyacinth (sonbol), garlic (sir), vinegar (serkeb), apple (siy), sorb tree berry (senjed), and sprouted wheat or other greens (salz), all of which are displayed together with a mirror, candles, colored eggs, a goldfish in a bowl, and the holy book of the family that is celebrating the holiday.

Nawruz is a national Iranian holiday, celebrated by members of all religious groups, and a marker of ethnic identity among groups associated with Persian culture outside Iran. Nawruz ends with a picnic (sizdah be dar—"thirteenth outside"), at which each family’s sabzi is tossed away, preferably into running water, to take with it any lingering unhappiness of the past year.

See also Ibadat; Ritual; Vernacular Islam.

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Anne H. Betteridge

NAZZAM, AL- (782–C. 840)

Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Sayyar al-Nazzam was an early Mu'tazilite thinker. He was born in 782 c.e. and grew up in Basra, was trained by his maternal uncle Abu 'l-Hudhayl al-'Allaf, and took part in scholarly debates there in his early youth. He moved to Baghdad in the early 820s, where he received the support of the Abbasid caliphs until his death sometime between 835 and 845. He taught many Mu'tazilite scholars of the ninth century, among whom was his follower al-Jahiz.

In addition to his skills as a poet, Nazzam was interested in Greek philosophy and ancient Iranian culture. Though he had various discussions with Muslim scholars, most of his work was directed against Christians, Jews, dualists, and naturalists. He wrote many books (estimated at thirty-nine), all of which are lost with the exception of some fragments, mostly relating to scientific or philosophical issues, including a refutation of Aristotelian logic.

Nazzam disagreed with Abu 'l-Hudayl's atomist theory of physics by rejecting the existence of isolated particles within the created bodies, and their change through accidents. Changes occur in bodies, according to Nazzam, with the appearance of hidden (kumun) interior components by a leap of motions (tafra). Acting bodies are subjected to infinite divisions by their created nature (khibiya), though not all motions are perceptible. Nazzam did not focus on the attributes of God in his theological system. Regarding the protection of Qur'anic revelation, he developed the theory of its being prevented (sarfa) from challenges of unbelievers by God rather than earlier theories about the linguistic impossibility (i'jaz) of its being imitated. He also recommended a critical approach toward the acceptance of transmitted reports and traditions (akhab). The original views of Nazzam gained support and elicited reactions both inside and outside of his school. Thus, he created an intellectual liveliness in the Muslim scholarship of that era.

See also Kalam; Mu'tazilites; Mu'tazila.

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M. Sait Özervarlı

NETWORKS, MUSLIM

Muslim networks, like all networks, are decentralized circuits of communication and exchange that depend on mutual trust and reciprocal need. Muslim networks are very old, dating back to the seventh century. They embrace the pre-Muslim networks of pagan Arabia, trading networks that linked a merchant named Muhammad to the city world of Mesopotamia and beyond.

Early History
Trading networks include travel in search of knowledge, pilgrimage on behalf of faith, and proselytizing networks to spread the faith. The fourteenth-century network of the famous traveler Ibn Battuta reveals a vast Islamic world that extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Malay Peninsula. It included Muslim polities and communities set within large clusters of non-Muslim cultures and populations, each linked to one another through port cities upon which they depended for sea trade and the transportation of both people and goods. The annual pilgrimage, or hajj, presupposed overland and sea connections to the Hijaz region on the Red Sea in western Arabia, even as pilgrimage, in turn, expanded and reinforced these same networks.

Proselytizing often occurred through Sufi orders, organized male brotherhoods that traced their roots back to the period of the prophet Muhammad and expressed Islamic loyalty through devotion to saintly persons and pursuit of inner purity. The role of Sufi orders was as inextricable from local politics as it was from transregional commerce, and nowhere is that role more evident than in the expansion of Islam from South Asia to Southeast Asia through Indian Ocean networks of trade, travel, and proselytization.

The Case of Acheh
Acheh, a port city situated at the northern tip of Sumatra astride the Strait of Malacca, exemplifies the ways in which major nodes in the various networks of the early Muslim empires worked. Acheh was the first area of modern-day Indonesia in which a Muslim kingdom was established. Marco Polo observed a Muslim king on the north coast of Sumatra in 1292, over a half-century before the oceanic voyage of Ibn Battuta landed him further to the south on the same island.

Ibn Battuta had traveled throughout the Muslim world from port cities in the Mediterranean to Arabia to India before finally arriving at Acheh in the Malay Peninsula. He found the sultan of Acheh to be an orthodox Muslim who presided over a vast system of constant exchange and negotiation. The sultan was a Muslim networker par excellence. The wealth of his tiny court depended on tribute levied from neighboring regions, but also from the ships that used the harbor at Acheh. Later, in the sixteenth century, the sultan of Acheh fought, with initial success, against the invading Portuguese, who were using the Indian Ocean to establish their own trading network. However, he was never able to consolidate his own regional power beyond Acheh, due in part to the emergence of other like-minded Muslim sultanates in neighboring port-city states that were strewed along the vast Malay archipelago.

Later sultans of Acheh were able to benefit from expanded networks that linked them to powerful overseas Muslim allies, both in India (the Moguls) and Turkey (the Ottomans). Because he served as the common overlord of others, the prince carried the title of sultan. This was so even though the sultans never subdued the interior of the island, and even though Acheh itself was divided into many smaller districts, each governed by hereditary chiefs.

The office of sultan marks both the power and limits of Muslim networks. Its persistence from India to Indonesia demonstrates the cultural diffusion of a major Islamic political institution. Even the seal of the sultan of Acheh was ninefold, paralleling that of the Mogul emperors, and like his Mogul counterpart, the sultan of Acheh claimed to be the shadow of God on Earth. Yet the two seals applied to very different polities. While the shadow of God on earth projected the great Mogul as the semi-divine lord of a vast realm, the sultan of Acheh ruled a domain no bigger than Goa, the Portuguese enclave of western India. At the same time, the ninefold Mogul seal competed with another local emblem, the fivefold seal used by the hereditary chiefs of Acheh. The latter signified the hand as a symbol of power, and meant the ability not only to project power over others, but also to protect one’s own possessions and territory. By retaining both seals, the Achenese sultan sought to proclaim both his Malay and his Mogul identity as equally authoritative, yet he remained a local ruler with aspirations that far exceeded his practical resources and actual options.

The greater force of Indian Ocean networks may have been in the religious rather than the political realm. In the sultanate of Acheh, as in Mogul India, Islamic devotion was often linked to the mediating power of Muslim saints. Just as Muslim traders came to the Malay Peninsula seeking expanded markets, spiritual leaders who were identified with institutional Sufi brotherhoods came with them, but seeking different markets. These Sufi masters exemplified the appeal of the Muhammadan Way, and Islamic loyalty is often identified with them—specifically with the tomb cults that pervade Acheh. While the actual Achenese tombs are less grand than those of their precursors in Mughal India, both reflect the persistent tradition of visiting saintly tombs. And...
the purpose of such local pilgrimages is functionally similar in India, Indonesia, and throughout the Indian Ocean. Whatever their background or status, pilgrims came to these tombs with gifts and vows, seeking the spiritual favor of saints for material or medical relief.

Two other features of all Muslim networks are evident in the case of Acheh: internal difference and external limits. The relation of formal religious authorities (ulema) to representatives of indigenous traditions was marked by tension, negotiation, and compromise. An oft-repeated dyad pits pre-conversionary (pre-Muhammad) disbelief (jubiliyya) against divinely revealed faith (iman/Islam). It evokes a radical experiential break between the old and the new, the impure and the pure, the false and the true. In Southeast Asian Islam the dyad is framed as adat (Ar. ‘ada) and bukum (Ar. bukm), where adat refers to all that stands outside juridical Islam, and bukum means “laws,” or the announced guidelines of Islamic collective life. Yet the distinction is less observed in practice than it is proclaimed in theory. For Achenese Muslims, the two polar extremes of social identity can, and did, merge. Social relations between so-called representatives of adat, the hereditary chiefs, and the champions of bukum, the ulema, were more often marked by at least tacit politeness and often mutual respect. Muslim networks in Acheh, as elsewhere, inscribed difference even when they celebrated transnational solidarity.

Colonial History

From the seventeenth century on a major challenge to Muslim networks came through the imposition of colonial rule. Dutch and Portuguese, then British and French commercial empires not only expanded overseas by oceanic routes, they also incorporated and then transformed the preexisting Muslim networks. As Kenneth McPherson has observed, in his essay “Port Cities as Nodal Points of Change,” throughout the Indian Ocean region some ports became centers of European political, economic, and military power, while others declined or vanished. “The great European-controlled ports such as Karachi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Rangoon, Penang, Singapore, and Jakarta grew at the expense of other ports in Gujarat, Bengal, southern India, the Malay Peninsula, and Java, which either declined or refocused their economies to become feeder points for these great ports or enclaves of local maritime activity.”

The fate of Acheh was poignant. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the harbor king, the sultan of Acheh, was able to keep his maritime polity cohesive by subsuming hereditary chiefs under his authority, at the same time as he waged war against the Dutch. When the Dutch finally subdued the Achenese, after more than thirty-five years of warfare, they shifted the reins of political power to Java. A bloody guerilla campaign against Indonesian forces persisted until 1956, when Acheh was recognized as an autonomous province yet made subservient to the Javanese state. In effect, the Muslim networks of modern-day Indonesia mirror the politically centrist power of the colonial, then postcolonial state. The nodes were not equivalent; but all of the separate provinces, from Acheh to Timor, came to reflect the pre-eminence of Java, and its capital city, Jakarta.

Beyond Southeast Asia, networks of colonization and migration proliferated throughout the Muslim world, from the Indian Ocean to the shores of the Atlantic. Though decentralized, they were marked by the same transregional logic of mutual trust and reciprocal need. A notable example is the new strand of Shi’ite loyalty that emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at the same time as the Mogul and Safavid empires were experiencing internal revolt and foreign invasion. From Karbala and Najaf, shrine cities in the Shi’ite heartland of Iraq, to commercial centers in Iran, to princely courts in northern India, there emerged a Shi’ite network of scholarly and also familial connections. The traffic was two-way, providing material as well as spiritual benefit to all nodes on this extensive transregional circuit. While juridical scholars of Iraq and Iran received large sums from their wealthy Indian coreligionists, the scholars of India benefited from the prestige of their northern neighbors. Each of them found that the pursuit of rational sciences, along with the traditional religious sciences, not only enforced their own sense of academic prominence but also allowed them to engage European science.

Though wary of rational sciences, the Sunni world also expanded its networks of learning, through the travel and exchange of reform-minded scholars. From the Arabian Peninsula, whether the ritual heartland of the Hijaz or the strategic port cities of Yemen, to the east coast of Africa and to the Asian archipelago, Muslim reformers responded to the European colonial incursions by forming their own scholarly networks, committed to reviving and expanding the textual core of Islamic subjects. More than a few of these Sunni networks were motivated by loyalty to institutional Sufism, and to one of the most socially active of Sufi orders, the Naqshbandiyya. They promoted Islamic revitalization at all levels, and they also advocated a double jihad, militarily against European imperialism and intellectually against imitative Westernization.

Muslim Networks in the Information Age

The revolution in communications that marked the late twentieth-century global economy also transformed the nature of Muslim networks. Cassette tapes helped foster the Iranian Revolution. Satellite TV overtakes governmental controls on local TV stations to beam alternative Muslim messages, including cleric talk shows, fatwa workshops, and a variety of Islamic entertainment to Arabic-speaking audiences. Since 1997, a major alternative to CNN-style global news has been provided through the Gulf-based Al-Jazeera. CD-ROMs, too, have become popular, circulating both literary texts and visual artifacts to broad Muslim audiences.
Finally, there is the Internet, which offers many networking options, from chat groups to websites, and, of course, e-mail. All these options for expanded exchange and alternative authorities rely on access and speed but, even more, on the need for new criteria of trust.

These new conditions for the exchange of information have generated new kinds of networks, most notably transnational alliances of women who are working for conflict resolution, human security, and justice at the local and global levels. Since the 1980s, and particularly since the 1985 United Nations conference on women in Nairobi, networks of Muslim women have been fighting for their rights in a newly Islamizing political context where women’s rights and roles are highly contested. Some of these women’s networks are local, like the ones that have appeared in Pakistan, Sudan, and Algeria; others have a global reach, like the Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), whose Islamic feminist agenda is to empower women to seek their rights as observant Muslims, and it includes the exchange of information about ways to deal with gender discrimination and also transnational collaboration to reform Muslim Personal Law to make it more friendly to women.

In the current era, as in preceding phases of rapid change, networks remain pivotal yet ambivalent. The war that inaugurated the twenty-first century was the U.S.–led attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The administration of President George W. Bush marked terrorism as, above all, Muslim inspired, even while proclaiming that Islam itself was not to blame, just certain Muslims. Many news groups have referred to al-Qa’ida, the guerrilla organization linked to the Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin and cofounded by the Egyptian doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, as a terrorist network. It is terrorist because it intends to destroy Western, specifically American, targets wherever it can find them. And it is a network precisely because it is structured around nodes that communicate with one another in nonlinear space, relying on neither a hierarchical chain of command nor conventional rules of engagement. Al-Qa’ida might be best defined as a coalition of dispersed network nodes intent on waging asymmetrical warfare. Like Colombian and Mexican drug cartels, they feature small, nimble, and dispersed units capable of penetrating and disrupting, with the intent to destroy, massive structures. Often they elude pursuit and evade capture, although in the case of al-Qa’ida, its operatives kill themselves, or are killed by others, in each nodal attack on a fixed target or group.

While the case of al-Qa’ida has become compelling in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there is another case that demonstrates the long-term organizational power of modern-day Islamic networking. The women of Afghanistan became a subject of intense scrutiny after the U.S.–led invasion in
October 2001. Much media footage was devoted to the oppression of veiled, secluded, and often brutalized Afghan women, yet decades before 11 September 2001 a network of Afghan women had mobilized, and also projected themselves, their history, and their cause, via the Internet. RAWA, or the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, predated the Internet. It was founded in 1977, even before the Soviet invasion, and it worked to defeat the Soviets but also to provide help for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It was a network of transnational cooperation and multilithed resistance throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Now its pivotal role on behalf of Afghan women has been dramatized through its website at www.rawa.org, where RAWA advocates strive to maintain a distance both from the Taliban and their would-be successors, the Northern Alliance. RAWA, even more than al-Qa’ida, demonstrates not just the persistence but the resilience of Muslim networks as a major form of social and political organization.

Muslim networks are no longer primarily male-dominated structures. They include women and others who resist oppression and who participate in horizontal alliances that project Muslim values of justice. Above all, they seek to build structures that are at once democratic and capitalist, yet not coeval with Euro-American imperialism. While it is too early to gauge their impact, it is impossible to ignore either their novelty or their determination.

See also Globalization; Ibn Battuta; Internet; Qa’ida, al-; Travel and Travelers.

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Miriam Cooke

NIKAH

Literally the act of sexual intercourse, nikah is the term by which marriage is referred to in the Qur’an. Islamic law defines nikah as a civil contract whose main function is to render sexual relations between a man and woman licit. Any sexual relations outside the nikah contract constitute the crime of zina (illicit sexual relations) and are subject to punishment. In practice, nikah is enacted in a ceremony intertwined with religious symbolism and rituals such as the recitation of al-Fatiha, the first verse of the Qur’an, usually performed by religious functionaries, although Islamic law does not positively prescribe any service.

See also Marriage.

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Ziba Mir-Hosseini

NI‘MATOLLAHI SUFI ORDER

See Tasawwuf

NIYABAT-E ‘AMMA

Niyabat-e ‘amma (Ar., niyabat al-‘amma) is a term most commonly used in Imami jurisprudence to refer to the “general delegation” of religious authorities and to the Imami ulema in the absence of the imam. In early Shi’ism, there was an acceptance that the imams, when present, designated a particular individual (na‘ib) to perform particular tasks on behalf of the imam. With the imam’s absence (ghayba), a notion that the scholars (and more specifically the jurists) were delegated (niyaba), as a class, to perform certain functions normally reserved for the imam developed in the juristic writings of scholars such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277) and his influential pupil al-‘Allama al-Hilli (d. 1325). The delegation was eventually extended, through a series of reinterpretations of the imams’ words, to refer to a “general delegation” of the scholarly class to take the place of the imam.
in those areas of the law where his presence is normally essential. The work of ‘Ali al-Karaki (d. 1533) and al-Shahid al-Thani (d. 1588) in this area represent the earliest expressions of this doctrine. These areas of law included duties such as the distribution of the religious levies, zakat and khums, the leading of Friday prayer and, eventually, the waging of the jihad. The “general delegation” theory provided the basis for the more directly political theory of wilayat al-faqih (Ar., velayat-e faqih) developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1960s and 1970s.

See also Hilli, ‘Allama al-; Hilli, Muhhaqqiq al-; Shi‘a: Imam (Twelver); Ulema; Velayat-e Faqih.

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NIZAM AL-MULK (C.1018–1092)

Nizam al-Mulk (“good order of the kingdom”) is the title by which the Seljuk wazir Hasan b. ‘Ali b. Ishaq al-Tusi is most commonly known. Nizam al-Mulk rose to prominence serving Sultan Alp Arslan (1063–1072), and for much of the reign of Sultan Malik Shah (1072–1092) he was ruler in all but name. Nizam al-Mulk was an individual of many talents: administrator, patron, military man, and author, as well as a skilled and occasionally ruthless competitor in court intrigues. An ardent supporter of the Sunni ulema, he constructed and endowed a number of madrasas (centers for the study of Islamic law) in Iran and Iraq, which were called Nizamiyyas after him, the most famous being the Nizamiyya in Baghdad, which opened in 1067. His reasons for doing this are not explicitly known, but these institutions certainly contributed to the subsequent intellectual and political revival seen in Sunnism. In the last years of his life, Nizam al-Mulk wrote a model for princes known alternatively as the Siyasat-name or Siyar al-muluk. This Persian-language work is noteworthy for its frank discussion of the steps necessary for an absolute ruler to administer his realm, and is sprinkled with references to philosophers and pre-Islamic kings as well as to Islamic concepts. The reforms it urged were never implemented, no doubt due to the deaths of the author and shortly thereafter its immediate intended reader, Malik Shah. Nizam al-Mulk’s assassination in 1092 was linked by contemporaries (and near-contemporaries) to either the Assassins, the sultan Malik Shah, or both.

See also Assassins; Education; Madrasa.

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Warren C. Schultz

NIZARI

The Nizari, or more properly the Nizari Isma‘ili Muslims, like other Shi‘i communities, acknowledge ‘Ali as imam after the Prophet. The Nizari Isma‘ilis have continued to give allegiance to imams descended from ‘Ali, on the basis of the principle of designation (nass) by the imam of the time. As of 2002, His Highness the Aga Khan, Shah Karim al-Husayni, is the forty-ninth hereditary imam.

Following the decline of the Fatimid Isma‘ili dynasty and the death of Imam al-Mustansir Billah in 1094, one group of Isma‘ilis continued to give allegiance to the previously designated imam, al-Nizar (hence their name), and moved their headquarters to Iran and Syria, where they established independent principalities. Though under constant threat, their centers flourished under the imams as important places of learning, international trade, and diplomacy for almost two hundred years, before being destroyed during the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century.

Faced by new challenges of reorganization, often in the face of hostile opposition, the Nizaris gained control of several strategically located mountain centers in Iran and Syria led, respectively, by Hasan-e-Sabbah and Rashid al-din Sinan, two leading da‘isis (representatives of the imam) of the time. These provided defensible centers from where to organize a decentralized and scattered community. They were continually attacked by successive Seljuk rulers but were able to offer a strong defense from their inaccessible castles. One legend that labeled them “assassins,” which was developed by their enemies and embellished by Marco Polo, became current in popular writings. However, modern scholarship has shown these stories to be largely fabrications that owed more to religious bigotry, prejudice, and sheer invention than historical reality.

During the next five centuries after the destruction of the centers in Iran in 1258, the Nizaris, though scattered and often persecuted, sustained their religious, intellectual, and community traditions in Iran, Syria, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. They maintained contacts with the imam of the time living in Iran, and they further developed the Isma‘ili intellectual heritage in Arabic, Persian, and the vernacular Central Asian and Indian languages that has survived in written as well as oral forms.
In the nineteenth century, the Nizari Isma’ili imamat moved from Iran to India and then to Europe. Many followers migrated in the later part of the twentieth century to Africa, Europe, America, and Canada, where they have also been joined by a small number of Nizari Isma’ili migrants from Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria. In the early twenty-first century, this community of diverse backgrounds is found in all five continents and some thirty countries.

The imamat (office of the imam) and the heritage of Islam, as expressed within Nizari Isma’ili Shi’ism, continues to be at the heart of the modern emergence of the community. It is guided in the respective national contexts by constitutions that bring a common pattern of practice and governance, and a strong ethos of voluntarism and development in social, educational, and economic spheres. Spiritual and devotional life is maintained in the Jamaatkhana, spaces of gathering, in each major place of Isma’ili settlement, which in some cases are buildings of outstanding Muslim design and architecture.

See also Aga Khan; Khojas; Shi’a: Isma’ili.

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Azim Nanji

NURCU See Nur Movement

NUR MOVEMENT

The Nur Movement (Nurçuluk) is a Turkish Islamic movement inspired by a modern reinterpretation of the Qur’an in the volumes Risale-i Nur (Epistle of light). The risales (epistles) of the leader of the movement, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960), were first published in 1926. The Nur is not a sect but a social movement mainly because it does not have a formal structure and procedures for membership. Like a school, Nur has students. The followers of Nur constitute an Islamic community movement that can be seen as a set of effective personal networks.

The primary goal of the movement is to revitalize faith under the conditions of modernization. The movement aspires to reconcile several apparent contradictions such as those between modernity and tradition, religion and rationality, faith and science, belief and doubt, and the West and Islam. This middle ground positioning of the movement manifests itself in its vision of the ideal society, one that is a moral yet educated and scientifically competitive collectivity. The message is disseminated by its followers through an increasing use of modern technologies of mass communication. However, adherents of the Nur movement are selective in their openness to modernity. The movement is also a critique of several characteristics of modernity. Nursi’s teachings challenge individualism. As Serif Mardin points out, Said Nursi’s primary aim was always to “repersonalize Turkish society through the personalized stamp of the Risale-i Nur” (p. 12). This was an attempt to preserve strong communal ties against the individualistic tendencies of modernization.

The movement has been largely a product of the tension between Islamization and secularization, which originated in the late nineteenth century when the Young Ottomans tried to reconcile Islam and Western constitutionalism during the late Ottoman period. Said Nursi suggested compromises in order to deal with this tension under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. He challenged the division of education into three separate streams: medrese (Ar., madrasa, religious school), tekke (Sufi hospice), and secular education. His suggestion was the reintroduction of religious studies to secular schools. His aim was to incorporate competent ulema into the tekke. After the fall of the empire, Said Nursi visited the new parliament in Ankara once in 1922. Being frustrated by the cold reception and tension, he withdrew from politics for good. After the consolidation of the secular Turkish Republic in 1923, the tension between secularizing and Islamizing forces never ceased. Aiming at a radical break from the Ottoman Empire, the founding father, Ataturk, initiated a series of secularizing reforms that relegated Islam to the private sphere and de-Islamized the public sphere, (for example, the ban of the fez and veil). When the sects were banned in 1926, the Nur movement continued to expand rapidly and soon after was seen as a threat to the secular state. The pendulum swung from repression to tolerance for Islam, when a multiparty system was inititated in the 1950s.

The Nur movement remained suspicious of politics. Some followers became close to certain parties and state bureaucrats. The movement was known for its sympathy for and strong ties to the Democrat Party in the 1950s. Later, some Nur followers were associated with Necmeddin Erbakan and his religious party, National Salvation (1973–1981). However, the strong faith and national feelings mobilized by the movement did not become a part of a separate political party.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the political disagreements and economic differences among the followers of Nur led to fragmentation. The largest and most effective group that emerged out of Nur is the Gulen Community movement, led by Fethullah Gulen. Beginning in the early 1990s, it became organized and institutionalized not only in Turkey but also internationally, particularly in the new states of
Central Asia. Although the Gulen movement inherited the nationalist and modernist orientation of Nur, it deviated from its forefathers by the engagements with the secular state, and its expansion to the international realm.

See also Erbakan, Necmeddin; Nursi, Said; Secularization; Young Ottomans.

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Berna Turam

NURI, FAZLALLAH (1843–1909)
Hajj Shaykh Fazlallah b. Mulla ‘Abbas Mazandarani Tehrani, commonly known as Fazlallah Nuri, was born in the village of Nur in Mazandaran. He was a prominent Iranian Shi‘ite scholar and the marja‘-e taqlid (source of emulation) of Tehran at the turn of the twentieth century. He studied in Najaf with Mohammad Hasan Shirazi and reached the rank of mujtahid at a young age.

Nuri actively participated in the constitutional revolution of 1905–1906. He played a controversial role in the events of the revolution, first supporting and then turning against constitutional government. Nuri agreed with his opponents on the necessity of the rule of law and restrictions on the tyrannical power of the king. Being cognizant of the dangers of a secular constitution to Islam and the Shi‘ite ulema, however, he declared constitutionalism incompatible with Islam. Instead, he advocated the mashrutah-ye mashru‘ayn (constitution based on the laws of Islam).

Nuri published his argument against constitutional government in several treatises including Nizam nameh-ye islami (Islamic constitution), Tadkbirat al-gbafil wa irsbad al-jabil (A reminder to the negligent and guidance for the ignorant), and Lawayib (Letters) in which he argued that mashrutab (constitution) was against the precepts of Shi‘ite Islam. He became the most outspoken critic of the constitution of 1906–1907 and the most ardent opponent of the constitutionalists. Nuri’s agitation against constitutionalist forces brought him into conflict with them, who captured and finally hanged him in Tehran in July 1909.

See also Reform: Iran; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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NURSI, SAID (1876–1960)
Said Nursi (also known as Bediuzzaman, or Light of the Times) was born in Bitlis in eastern Turkey. He received his early education at various religious schools in the region, mostly under the direction of the teachers who belonged to the Naqshbandi order (an orthodox Sufi order). In 1907 and 1908 in Istanbul and Salonica, he advocated the establishment of a university in Erzurum where physical sciences would be taught alongside religious topics, and supported the Young Turks’s constitutional revolution.

Although he supported Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), he was arrested in 1925 and exiled to Barla in the province of Isparta for his alleged participation in the Shaikh Said (Ar., Shaykh Sa‘id) revolt in eastern Turkey. Here he began writing his Risale-i Nur (Epistle of light), the basis for the religious-intellectual movement known as Nurculuk.

Distrusted and opposed for his religious views by the Kemalist state, Said Nursi was arrested, imprisoned, and exiled to various Anatolian cities, although the accusations were never proved. During the elections of the 1950s he supported the newly formed Democratic Party. It was at this time that his major works were published in Latin script. After a brief illness he died in Urfa in southeastern Turkey. Later in the same year his grave was moved to an unknown location in Isparta.

Through his writings Said Nursi argued that religion reflects the social and human environment and that Islam could be interpreted according to the current needs of society. His Risale-i Nur, a commentary on the Qur’an, explains and expounds the “truth” in the Holy Book. There he also argues that materialistic philosophy challenges Islamic ethics and the concepts of social and economic justice.

See also Nur Movement; Young Ottomans; Young Turks.

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A. Uner Turgay
ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Since the nineteenth century, Muslim thinkers have proposed pan-Islamic ideas of uniting the Islamic community with common political, economic, and social goals. After the creation of modern independent states in the Muslim world, which were primarily governed by secularist, nationalists, and socialist ideologies, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia desired to counteract the trend of secularization by cooperating with other Muslim leaders to create the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The formation of the OIC coincided with the successive military defeats in the Arab-Israeli wars and the loss of holy sites in Jerusalem like the Al-Aqsa Mosque. As a result, leaders of Islamic nations were compelled to meet in Rabat to establish the OIC in May 1971.

According to the OIC charter, the organization seeks to preserve Islamic social and economic values; promote solidarity among member states; increase cooperation in social, economic, cultural, scientific, and political areas; support international peace and security; and advance education, particularly in the fields of science and technology. In recent years the OIC evolved from a sectarian group solely focused on issues related to Muslim nations to an organization involved with global politics and U.N. global security issues, such as the Iraq-Iran war, the Persian Gulf war, the U.N.’s peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

See also Pan-Islam.

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Qamar-ul Huda

ORIENTALISM

Orientalism as a field of scholarship that first emerged in the eighteenth century, when European scholars of the Enlightenment period consciously studied Asian languages and cultures to gain a richer understanding of the Middle Eastern literary and historical environment in which Judaism and, ultimately, Christianity, emerged. Some of the major French, English, and German scholars engaged in this endeavor were Armand-Pierre Caussin de Perceval (1795–1871), Ernest Renan (1823–1892), Edward W. Lane (1801–1876), Franz Bopp (1791–1867), Heinrich L. Fleischer (1801–1888), and Julian Wellhausen (1844–1918). Immediately following World War II, academic interest in Orientalism underwent a transformation, ultimately splitting out into specialized area studies across a variety of disciplines, including philology, literature, economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, gender studies, history, and religious studies. The field of Orientalism was no longer based in any one department or discipline, and this is credited to such illustrious scholars as Phillip Hitti, Gustave von Grunebaum, and Hamilton Gibb, who developed Orientalism curricula and divisions in major universities in the United States.

Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) was a powerful critique of the of the field, and its origins. In this volume, Said sought to illustrate how the study of Asian and Islamic cultures was connected to European imperialism and its goal of maintaining power and hegemony over non-Europeans. He argued that the Orient has historically served as a symbolic marker of European superiority and modern cultural identity. For Said, historical Orientalist literature was never interested in Islam
as it is viewed and practiced by Muslims. Rather, it was an
exercise in self-identity created by means of defining the
“other.” In other words, Said suggested that Orientalists
treated others—in this case, Muslims and Asians—as objects
defined not in terms of their own discourses, but solely in
terms of standards and definitions imposed on them from
outside. Among the influences underlying these definitions
was, in Said’s view, a long-standing Western concern with
presenting Islam as opposed to Christianity.

In exploring the relationship of knowledge, power, and
colonialism, Said is in agreement with Jean-Paul Sartre and
Franz Fannon that from the time of pre-Crusader rallies,
Christian writers were consumed with attacking Islam and
the prophet Muhammad in order to earn legitimacy with
fellow Christians. Polemical literature against Islam, like
John of Damascus, concentrated on how the Prophet falsified
revelation, had multiple marriages, had used violence in his
lifetime, and experienced self-delusional spiritual visions.
The polemical literature created a cycle of hate and promoted
Islam as an evil religion with a demonically possessed prophet.

According to Said, Renaissance scholars like John Gagnier
d.1740) and Edward Pocock (c.1650) began translating Islamic
sources into European languages not to enhance opportuni-
ties for crosscultural dialogue, but rather to assess the value
of knowledge production in Islam. Notable scholars like Tho-
mass Carlyle, Immanuel Kant, and Liebnitz viewed Islam as a
rational and reasonable religion, but were more interested in
pursuing the psychological makeup of the Muslims and
learning how they went about constructing and sustaining a
religious tradition. Said argued that Orientalists of the Ren-
aissance were driven to understand Muslims only to prove
that Islam was a false religion and stood in the way of truth. By
targeting the deficiencies of the Prophet and of Islam,
Orientalist literature was connected to evangelical purposes,
used to create a sense of Christian superiority and to ulti-
ately delegitimize the tradition of “the other”: Islam.

For Said, the field of Orientalism is thus the net result of a
historical vision of Islam rooted in the Christian European
imagination. In the terms of this imagination, Islam could
only be viewed as monolithic, scornful of human life, un-
changing, uncreative, authoritarian, and intrinsically factitious.

Critics of Edward Said’s work often come from the field of
Middle Eastern and South Asian studies. They assert that he
is unaware of contemporary methodologies and trends in
scholarship. For instance, one of the major arguments against
Said’s Orientalism is that current scholars in the field are not
involved with any imperialistic agenda; that they are not
interested in proving the superiority of the Western culture
over non-Western cultures or in enhancing the self-identity
of Western culture. According to many of these critics, Said
may have contributed to a historical analysis of Orientalist
literature, but he is unaware of the astonishingly creative ways
in which cultures and religious traditions are explored within
current scholarship. They argue that he has erroneously
juxtaposed a disturbing past of scholarship with the works of
modern scholars, without considering the immense achieve-
ments that were accomplished in the field.

“Orientalism” is rarely used in the academy today, except
for a few centers and journals that have retained the title.
Instead, the field is identified by its component areas of study,
such as Middle Eastern Studies, North African Studies,
Iranian Studies, or South Asian Studies. In each area study,
scholars employ a wide variety of interdisciplinary approaches
and methodologies. For example, scholars who are trained in
literature find it acceptable to incorporate gender studies,
history, comparative studies, and other related forms of
knowledge as part of their work. Most recently, theoretical
approaches such as post-colonial theory or subaltern studies
have played an important role in scholarly research.

See also Colonialism.

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Qamar-ul Huda
PAKISTAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

Pakistan secured independence on 14 August 1947 with the breakup of the British Indian Empire into two countries, India and Pakistan. The idea behind the creation of Pakistan was to provide a separate homeland for India’s Muslims, who were concentrated in the eastern and western parts of the empire. The new country consisted of two parts, separated from each other by the Indian landmass; these became known as East Pakistan and West Pakistan, respectively. The two wings had different languages, cultures, and social structures. The only binding force between them was Islam and political aspirations to seek independence from Britain and separateness from the Hindu majority in India. Founders of the new states were sanguine about their ability to create common political and economic networks that would further strengthen the idea of Muslim state and nationhood.

Constitutional and democratic processes that could have formed the foundations on which the two wings might base solidarity suffered immediately after the founder of the country, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, died on 11 September 1948. His successors and the Muslim League, the party that he led, failed to pursue his vision of a liberal, moderate, progressive democratic Pakistan. With repeated failure to develop understanding between East and West Pakistan on the questions of provincial autonomy and representation in the federal legislature and bureaucracy, constitution-making was delayed. It was only after nine years that, in 1956, the first constitution was promulgated. By that time much harm had been done to the tradition of parliamentary democracy, which Pakistan had inherited from the British colonial rule in India.

With the decline of political discipline in the political parties, their shifting alliances, and the failure to hold elections for the national legislature, the political influence of the civilian bureaucracy and the military increased. The military gained further influence because of the dispute with India over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan’s entry into American-sponsored defense alliances: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTRO). After playing political games behind the scene for years, the military took direct power by declaring martial law in October 1958. General Ayub Khan introduced basic democracy, a form of local government, and a presidential constitution. His idea was that democratic participation must be guided and controlled, and that national energies must be concentrated on economic development.

Under the first military regime (1958–1969), Pakistan made substantial economic progress and achieved a high degree of modernization. During the cold war, Pakistan followed a foreign policy of alliance with the West and benefited greatly in economic and military assistance. In 1965, however, the country went to war with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir, a move which destabilized it politically and undermined its economic growth. Popular discontent and nationwide agitation against president Ayub led to a second imposition of martial law in 1969. The new military leader, General Yahya Khan, abrogated Ayub’s 1962 constitution and decided to hold the first general elections on the basis of one man one vote in 1970. The mandate of this election was split between the West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The Awami League party from East Pakistan swept the elections and obtained a clear majority in the federal government. Denying the party its right to dominate led to a civil war. Military intervention by India resulted in the military defeat of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh out of what was East Pakistan.

With this military debacle, Pakistan returned to civilian rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a populist and charismatic leader (1971–1977). He introduced socialist reforms and gave the country its first constitution to be drafted by elected representatives of the people. He faced agitation by the opposition parties in 1977 over disputed election results and
was overthrown by the army chief of staff, General Zia ul Haq. General Zia promised fresh elections within ninety days, as stipulated by the 1973 constitution, and put the country back on the road to democracy. It took him eight years to do so. In the meantime, he used a controversial murder conviction to order the execution of former prime minister Bhutto. His rule for eleven years (1977–1988) was further marred by the bitter legacy of the Soviet war in Afghanistan: rising religious extremism, Islamic militancy, and political confrontation. Pakistan became an ally of the Western powers as a front-line state against Moscow’s Afghan misadventure. It did better economically under Zia and developed nuclear capability during the Afghan war years.

Zia was the first ruler of Pakistan who tried zealously to Islamize the state and society, although the nation had taken the designation of “Islamic Republic” under its first constitution, in 1956. It is debatable whether this was the result of his personal religious beliefs, or if he was using religion as a source of political legitimation. Whatever the reason, Zia interpreted the movement for the creation of Pakistan in purely Islamic terms and asserted that Islamization was the best way to secure and stabilize Pakistani society. He took drastic measures for building Pakistan as an Islamic society. He introduced Islamic taxes like zakat and ‘usbr, and replaced centuries-old British laws relating with Islamic penalties for offenses such as theft, robbery, adultery, and false accusation of adultery. He made the drinking of alcohol by Muslims an offence punishable by six months’ imprisonment and fine of 5,000 rupees. He established a separate federal Shari’at (Islamic law) Court to hear appeals against convictions under the Islamic laws. Most of these laws and the Islamization process of the Zia regime have been controversial, but Zia’s legacy in this regard lingers on.

The death of Zia in a plane crash returned the country to democracy in 1988. The elections in October of that year resulted in a divided mandate between the Pakistan Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto and the Muslim League. Benazir became the first women prime minister of Pakistan and was the first to head up a democratic government in eleven years. The Punjab, the largest province in the Pakistani federation, had a Muslim League government headed by Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, a former political ally of Zia. The political confrontation between the rival political parties, and the president’s willingness to use her powers to dismiss elected members of parliament, provincial assemblies, and governments at the center and in the provinces kept the country unstable. Four elected governments, two of the Pakistan Peoples Party and two of the Muslim League, were dismissed between 1988 and 1996, followed, each time, by new elections. The military continued to play a role in these dismissals from behind the scenes. Ultimately, the various political parties in the parliament closed their ranks and, in 1997, passed the thirteenth amendment to the constitution, which stripped the president of the power to dismiss future elected governments.

This collaboration between the government of Nawaz Sharif and the opposition parties didn’t last very long. Sharif had a two-thirds majority in the parliament and was equipped with tremendous executive powers, and he began to act in an arbitrary manner. The opposition dubbed him as a civilian dictator. He forced a sitting president, a chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, and an army chief of staff to resign. When he removed General Pervez Musharraf from office in October 1999, the military took over power for a fourth time, through a bloodless coup. General Musharraf designated himself as the chief executive of the country, suspended the constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, and promised social and national reforms to return the country to a workable democracy. His coup, like previous ones, was endorsed by Pakistan’s Supreme Court, but with the injunction that he would hold elections and hand over power to the elected assemblies within three years. National elections were set to be held on 10 October 2002, but Musharraf held a national referendum in April 2002 and got himself elected as president for a five-year term.

An image of the Badsahi mosque in Lahore, Pakistan, appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Awami League; Jinnah, Muhammad ‘Ali; South Asia, Islam in.

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Rasul Bakhsh Rais

PAN-ARABISM

Also known as Arab nationalism, pan-Arabism is the ideology that calls for the political unity of Arab peoples and states. By consensus, Arabness is defined not by religion or geographic origin, but, as Sati’ al-Husri proposed, by language. Arabs are those whose mother tongue is Arabic and who identify with the history and culture associated with it.

Although some scholars trace its origins to nineteenth-century state builders such as Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, or religious reform movements such as the Wahhabiyya, or intellectuals such as ‘Abdallah al-Nadim and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, pan-Arabism developed as a coherent ideology and political movement at the time of the First World War. It arose as a response to both European imperialism and to the mismanagement and pan-Turkic ideology associated with the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire.

518 Islam and the Muslim World
When the Hashemite-led revolt against Ottoman rule began in 1915, Sharif Husayn and his sons had managed to gain support not only in the Hijaz where they were based, but also in Syria. Husayn thought he had assurances from the British government, represented by the high commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, that he and his sons would govern all Arab territories freed from Turkish control. Yet, despite the efforts of Husayn’s son Faysal and T. E. Lawrence at the Versailles conference, the postwar mandate system awarded Lebanon and Syria to France and Iraq and Palestine to Britain. The future of Palestine was particularly uncertain because in November 1917 the British had issued the Balfour Declaration promising favorable consideration for the creation of a Jewish homeland there. The Hashemite project for Arab unity was dealt a final blow when the Hijaz was conquered by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud in 1924 and Husayn was sent into exile in Cyprus, leaving only two of his sons as rulers of British-backed monarchies: ‘Abdallah in Transjordan and Faysal in Iraq.

Following the Second World War, Arab nationalism found two, initially cooperative, but later conflicting, expressions. The first was religious, as articulated by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin), which saw the unity of the Arabs as the first step in pan-Islamic solidarity. The second was secular, as articulated by the Ba‘th Party led by Michel Aflaq and later by the Nasserists. The common enemy for both was the lingering legacy of British and French imperialism in the Arab world, signified by compliant Arab elites, military bases, economic concessions, and the state of Israel.

Soon after coming to power in Egypt in July 1952, Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser began transforming Egypt into a revolutionary nucleus around which Arab unity would progress. He first crushed the religious groups that had supported the Free Officer revolt against the Egyptian monarchy and had quickly become disillusioned with his secularism. He then turned his attention to the conservative Arab monarchies.

The zenith of secular pan-Arabism came in 1958 when Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). Syria withdrew from the union in 1961, however, because of growing dissatisfaction with Nasser’s repressive and pro-Egyptian policies. Subsequent efforts in 1963 to revive the UAR, this time with Iraqi participation following a Ba‘thist coup there, proved unsuccessful.

Since the abortive UAR experiment, a number of events have allegedly marked the demise of pan-Arabism, including the crushing Israeli defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 war, Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet, Arab nationalism is still very much alive rhetorically, now once again tinged with strong religious overtones, as in the manifestos of fundamentalist groups and even in the propaganda of secular dictators like Saddam Husayn, who repeatedly invoked religion to rally Arabs during the 1991 Gulf War and in the months leading to the 2003 Iraq war that ousted him from power. More importantly, perhaps, Arab nationalism today finds institutional expression in the continued existence of the Arab League, formed in 1945, and now consisting of twenty-two members, as well as in continuing efforts to create subregional organizations, the most successful being the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formed in 1981 and comprising the six Arab states that border the Persian Gulf.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; Arabic Language; Arab League; Ba‘th Party; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Nationalism: Arab; Pan-Islam; Pan-Turanism; Revolution: Modern.

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Sobail H. Hashmi

PAN-ISLAM

Pan-Islam is the ideology that calls for the unity and cooperation of Muslims worldwide on the basis of their shared Islamic identity. Apart from this general description, the idea of pan-Islam has been formulated in myriad ways and used for various political ends during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The term “pan-Islam” is of nineteenth-century European origin and was used primarily to describe Ottoman attempts at promoting Muslim unity to counter European imperialism. Yet, the central premise of pan-Islam, that all Muslims form a single community of believers (ummah) that ideally should be united politically as well as spiritually, may be traced to the very origins of Islam itself. Several Qur’anic verses refer to the Muslims as constituting a single community (e.g., 2:143, 3:110). Others warn against the dangers of fragmentation and internal strife (e.g., 3:103, 105). The prophet Muhammad clearly tried to forge a sense of Muslim communal solidarity that transcended the traditional tribal loyalties of the Arabs, as in the famous example of the “Constitution of Medina,” in which the migrants from Mecca and the newly converted tribes of Medina are described as “a single ummah apart from all other men.” Although the political unity of the ummah was shattered soon after the Prophet’s death, the ideal continued to linger for several centuries afterwards, as best demonstrated in the reluctance of political...
theorists to accept the legitimacy of multiple, simultaneous caliphs.

Numerous attempts to unite Muslims through a revival of Islamic faith may be found in Islamic history. But given the far expanse of Islamic civilization, all of these were confined geographically. Many factors converged in the nineteenth century to allow a far more universal scope for attempts to unite Muslims: the steady loss of Ottoman territories in Europe, the advance of European colonialism into Muslim states in Africa and Asia, and the spread of mass communication media. Pan-Islam developed primarily as a defense mechanism to counter the military and political advance of European powers, primarily Britain, France, and Russia. The Ottoman Empire, the largest and most centrally located Sunni state, and the guardian of the holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, was best suited to exploit rising concerns with European imperialism and to initiate pan-Islamic responses.

Two men, more than any others, shaped the development of pan-Islam during the late nineteenth century: the Ottoman sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II (1842–1918) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897). ‘Abd al-Hamid cultivated the pan-Islamic sentiments that had emerged during the 1860s and 1870s under the impact of German and Italian unification during the reign of his predecessor, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1830–1876), and gave them the status of an official ideology. As it did for ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, pan-Islam provided ‘Abd al-Hamid a rallying cry against both European powers and internal modernizers and critics of the sultanate.

Central to ‘Abd al-Hamid’s pan-Islam was the claim that the Ottoman sultan was the caliph of Islam, or at least of Sunni Islam. The Ottoman caliphate dates back centuries, but under ‘Abd al-Hamid the title was asserted with far greater vigor than it had been before within the empire, and for the first time serious attempts were made to win the loyalty of Muslims beyond the Ottoman realm. Inside the empire, the sultan’s pan-Islam meant the cultivation of Muslim interests over those of Christian and other non-Muslim minorities as well as increased state support for Islamic courts, schools, and religious orders. Outside the empire, a propaganda campaign was launched, using print media and emissaries or spies, to spread an image of the sultan as a pious Muslim ruler, the only one capable of effectively uniting Muslims against Christian colonizers.

‘Abd al-Hamid’s claims to the caliphate were challenged immediately, and the general failure of his pan-Islamic campaign partly contributed to his deposition following the Young Turk revolt of 1908. Still, the fruits of ‘Abd al-Hamid’s propaganda may be seen in the Indian Muslim agitation over the fate of the Ottoman caliphate following the First World War.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s early career emphasized the need for reform within particular Muslim countries, under the leadership of their own rulers. By the 1870s, Afghani’s activism had assumed a decidedly pan-Islamic emphasis. He suggested that the only way to ameliorate the weakness of individual Muslim states was to form a bloc of semi-autonomous states, all recognizing the suzerainty of the Ottoman caliph. Afghani thus sought to combine nationalism and pan-Islam, apparently seeing no contradictions between the two.

Afghani proposed to ‘Abd al-Hamid as early as the late 1870s that he be sent as an emissary to Afghanistan to rally support for the sultan’s claims to the caliphate. The sultan, suspicious of Afghani’s motivations, responded by encouraging him to continue his agitation from abroad but doing little to assist him. In 1892, ‘Abd al-Hamid invited Afghani to settle in Istanbul. Afghani would die there four years later, disillusioned and complaining that he was a prisoner of the sultan.

Pan-Islamic appeals continued to be heard in the period before and immediately after the First World War, as in the Ottoman jihad proclamation of 1914, but increasingly they were made in the service of Turkish, Arab, or Indian Muslim nationalism. The issue that most stirred pan-Islamic loyalties was the fate of the Ottoman caliphate, particularly among the Muslims of British India. Ulema of the Deoband school led Indian Muslim opposition to the Arab revolt against the Ottomans, seeing in it a British ploy to seize control of the central Islamic lands. When Constantinople was occupied by the Allies at the end of the war, Indian nationalist leaders, chief among them the journalist Muhammad ‘Ali, launched the Khilafat Movement to lobby the British government for the Ottoman caliph’s retention of sovereignty over the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Iraq, and Anatolia, the “spiritual heartland” of Islam. Meanwhile, in 1919, groups of Indian ulema organized the hijra (migration) of Muslims from the subcontinent to Afghanistan, arguing that Muslims could no longer remain in a territory ruled by Great Britain while it was attempting to destroy the caliphate. Approximately 18,000, mostly poor, Muslims trekked to the Afghan border, only to be denied entry by the Afghan government. Thousands lost their lives to disease and hunger in the process. By the time the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, the Khilafat agitation had already diminished because of disillusionment and internal squabbles. Hopes that a reconstituted caliphate might reinvigorate pan-Islamic sentiments died when two conferences held in 1926, one in Cairo, the other in Mecca, ended in bitter disagreements over who should assume the title. A third conference held in 1931 in Jerusalem called only for solidarity and cooperation among Muslim peoples.

Muslim solidarity and international cooperation, rather than any supranational unity, is the way pan-Islam has generally been articulated in the years since the Second World War. Even those Muslim intellectuals who challenge the legitimacy of separate Muslim nation-states according to
Islamic values do not propose any meaningful political union of Muslim states and in fact generally focus their activism on gaining control of a particular state.

The most prominent manifestation of pan-Islam today is in the host of transnational nongovernmental and intergovernmental Islamic organizations. During the 1950s, Pakistan initiated the creation of the Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami, but disagreements with secular Arab governments over the organization’s purpose led to its failure. During the 1960s, the campaign to create pan-Islamic organizations was revived by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. With his backing, the Habitat al-'Alam al-Islami was created in 1962 to provide a nongovernmental forum for the discussion and dissemination of Islamic viewpoints on issues facing Muslims around the world. In 1969, following Israel’s capture of Jerusalem in the Six Day War, twenty-four Muslim states voted to form the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In 2003 the OIC consisted of fifty-seven members, and though it is frequently criticized for its ineffectiveness, it remains the most important and universal expression of pan-Islamic political aspirations since the abolition of the caliphate.

See also Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Caliphate; Empires: Ottoman; Khilafat Movement; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Pan-Arabism; Pan-Turanism; Young Turks.

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Sohail H. Hashmi

PAN-TURANISM

Pan-Turanism is an ideology that originated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and propagated a strong cultural attachment among all Turkic peoples. Although pan-Turanism is correlated to pan-Turkism, its adherents differ. While historically pan-Turkism was chiefly confined to the Turks living in the Ottoman Empire and its borderlands, pan-Turanism had broader pretensions. Pan-Turanism aimed at joining all Turkic peoples that claimed descent from Turan, including the Mongols. The name Turan is connected to a mythological plateau in Central Asia. In Avesta the people called Tura were represented as the enemies of the true religion, namely the people who did not accept Zoroastrianism. However, later the term Turan commonly referred to the land north of the Amu Darya River (the Oxus River of antiquity), where the non-Iranians of Central Asia and chiefly the nomadic Turkic peoples lived.

In the late nineteenth century the tsarist empire, by invading the Caucasus and Central Asia, incorporated a vast number of Turkic peoples into its realm. The Russification policy adopted by tsarist Russia in this region caused a number of local elites to promote an alternative to Russian pan-Slavism. However, their activities prior to the First World War were mainly confined to organizing all of Russia’s Muslim congresses and the publication of certain periodicals such as Yeni Fuyuzat (New abundance) and Shelale (Cascade) in Baku or Turan in Tashkent.

The growing solidarity among Russia’s Turkic peoples was welcomed in the Ottoman Empire, which was suffering from a long-lasting and humiliating decline. Among the leaders of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman Empire were personalities such as Enver Pasha, who aspired to forge a Turanian empire that would bring Turkic peoples together and result in gains in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War was partly motivated by such a desire. The Ottoman propaganda campaign in the First World War was dominated by two distinctive trends of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism. While pan-Turanism aimed at the Turkic peoples of the Balkan peninsula, the Caucasus, northern Iran, and Central Asia, the pan-Islamist propaganda was still largely directed at the peoples of the Near and Middle East, and even as far as the Indian subcontinent. In Iran and Central Asia, with their diverse ethnic composition, the Ottomans employed a combination of pan-Turanism and pan-Islamism resulted.

With the end of the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there were only a handful of political adventurers that still pursued pan-Turanism, among them Enver Pasha, who was killed in 1922 while fighting the Bolsheviks in Central Asia.

In the Republic of Turkey, while local nationalism with pan-Turkish allusions was tolerated and even encouraged, pan-Turanism never became a significant political trend. It was only with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the call for unity among the Turkic peoples was once more heard. Although this call was promoted by the cooperation pacts realized among the new independent Turkic republics of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Turkey, the profound rivalries both on the regional as well as the international level nevertheless hampered any noteworthy achievements.

See also Balkans, Islam in the; Central Asia, Islam in; Empires: Ottoman; Pan-Arabism; Pan-Islam.
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Touraj Atabaki

PASDARAN

The Pasdaran (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) was established under a decree issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini, as leader of the Islamic revolution, on 5 May 1979. The corps of Revolutionary Guards were intended to guard the revolution and to assist the ruling clerics in the day-to-day enforcement of the government’s Islamic codes and morality. The Pasdaran, as the guardians of the revolution, would counter the threat posed by either the leftist guerrillas or the officers suspected of continued loyalty to the shah. The revolution also needed to rely on a force of its own rather than borrowing the monarchic regime’s tainted forces, however disorganized and undertrained such a force might be in the first years of establishment. The Pasdaran, along with its political counterpart, Crusade for Reconstruction, brought a new order to the Islamic Republic of Iran entrusted the regular army with guarding Iran’s territorial integrity and political independence. Thus the Revolutionary Guards could only have the responsibility of guarding the revolution. Involvement in politics is a part of the Revolutionary Guards’ mission to defend Islamic authority. Despite differences, the Pasdaran and the regular armed forces have cooperated on military matters.

By the end of the war between Iran and Iraq in 1986, the Pasdaran consisted of 400,000 personnel organized in battalion-size units that operated either independently or with units of the regular armed forces. In 1984 the Pasdaran acquired a small navy and elements of an air force. Until 1988, up to three million volunteers were organized under the control of the Revolutionary Guards as the Mobilization (Basij) Corps. Since the end of the war this number has decreased, as those units are used to control the internal situation or to strengthen one political faction above another and battle to quell civil disorder. The Basij allegedly also monitor the activities of citizens, and harass or arrest women and men who violate the dress code.

The Pasdaran have maintained an intelligence branch to monitor the regime’s domestic adversaries and to participate in their arrests and trials. Khomeini demonstrated his acceptance of the Revolutionary Guards’ involvement in intelligence when he congratulated them on the arrest of Iranian Communist (Tudeh) leaders. Not only did the Pasdaran function as an intelligence organization, both within and outside the country, but they also exerted considerable influence on government policies.

The Pasdaran have been quite active in Lebanon. By the summer of 1982, shortly after the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Pasdaran had nearly one thousand personnel deployed in the predominantly Shi’ite Bqa’ Valley. From their headquarters near Baalbek, the Pasdaran have provided consistent support to Islamic Amal, a breakaway faction of the mainstream Amal organization, and then Hizb Allah, which contemplate the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.

See also Iran, Islamic Republic of; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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Majid Mohammadi

PERSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Persian has historically been, after Arabic, the most prestigious literary language in the Muslim world and a vehicle of cultural expression in Ottoman Turkey, Central Asia, Mogul India and, of course, Persia (greater Iran). The influence of Persian literature and Persicate culture therefore covered a wide region, from the Balkans to Bangladesh, and from the Persian Gulf to north of the Jaxartes River in Central Asia. Today Persian is the official language of Iran and Tajikistan, and one of the two official languages of Afghanistan (along with Pashto). Persian is also spoken by small residual communities in neighboring countries, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf states, and Iraq, as well as in newly established enclaves abroad: Persian-speaking Jewish immigrants to Israel, and the diaspora to North America, Europe, and Australia that resulted from the political upheavals and wars in Iran and Afghanistan during the 1970s and the 1980s.

Note that in recent decades the term “Farsi” has erroneously gained currency in English in place of Persian. Linguistically speaking, the nomenclatures “Farsi,” “Dari,” and
“Tajiki” denote varieties of Persian spoken in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, respectively, just as one might describe English as consisting of American, Australian, and British varieties. Though distinctive regional accents and some differences in vocabulary or even grammar exist, the spoken varieties of Persian are united by a common literary and cultural heritage and are mutually understood by speakers across the Persian linguistic continuum. Nevertheless, Persian literature has been developing in distinctive and even divergent directions in modern Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan since each country became a centralized nation-state. This is especially true of Tajikistan, where the written form of Persian was radically altered in the Soviet period by the adoption first of the Roman (1928) and shortly thereafter the Cyrillic (1940) script in place of the traditional Arabic script, used in Afghanistan and Iran. Tajikistan was therefore oriented toward Russian, as well as Turkic Central Asia, in its recent cultural and linguistic development, whereas Afghanistan has been in the cultural orbit of Pakistan and India, as well as the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the twentieth century, and of the Taliban in the first years of the twenty-first, along with technological innovations (such as Persian-language programs broadcast by Internet radio and satellite television across the region) have, however, brought increased opportunities for cultural interchange across the Persian speaking countries, and begun to reverse the isolation of previous decades.

Language History
Persian is classified as a member of the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Indeed, it was partly from his knowledge of Persian and its similarity to Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit that Sir William Jones (1746–1794) postulated the existence of an Indo-European proto-language from which the modern languages of Europe, India, and Iran devolved. As such, many modern Persian words (for example, madar, baradar) share a common root with their modern German (mutter, brüder) or English (mother, brother) equivalents, and the verbal systems exhibit similar features. However, the neighboring Semitic languages, especially Aramaic and Arabic, which functioned in different eras as lingua francs of the Near and Middle East, have made an enormous impact on Persian, in terms not only of vocabulary and script, but also of literary forms.

The Persian language is divided into three historical stages: Old Persian, Middle Persian, and Persian. Old Persian survives chiefly in cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaemenid kings, written in the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.E., but it has bequeathed few if any direct literary traces to the modern language. On the other hand, a large body of literature survives in Middle Persian, much of it subsequently translated or adapted into Arabic or Persian during the Islamic period. Most of this was written in the Sassanian period (226–652 C.E.), though Zoroastrians continued to use it to write new works or compilations of a religious nature until the ninth century C.E. The larger part of surviving Middle Persian literature consists of translations or glosses on Avestan-language Zoroastrian texts, along with other Zoroastrian literature. It also includes “books of counsel” (pand namak), or wisdom literature providing moral or ethical precepts and advice, as in the “Wise Maxims of Bozorgmehr.” Other texts include a few poems, the versification principles of which have been disputed, and “royal songs” (srot-i khurrazanik) that were reportedly performed with musical accompaniment by well-known minstrels at the Sassanian court.

The cultural exchange with India was quite strong, as evidenced by a Middle Persian treatise on chess and a number of translations of works of Indian origin, including Kalila wa Dimna (from the tales of Bidpai), Barlaam and Josaphat, and the Sindbad nameh. The frametale structure is thus borrowed from India, but the bulk of the Middle Persian Hazar Afsanak (“Thousand tales”), the main source of stories for the Arabic “Thousand and One Nights” cycle (Alf Layla wa layla), seem to be of Persian origin.

Although spoken Persian continued to evolve grammatically into something like what we now recognize as new Persian, Zoroastrian works continued to be composed in Middle Persian until at least the ninth century, by which time the majority of Iranians had become Muslim. Many religious, literary, and scientific works written in Arabic at the same time were penned by men of Iranian, or half-Iranian parentage, including Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. 760), translator of Kalila wa Dimna from Middle Persian to Arabic; the poet Abu Nuwas (d. 810), who includes a few words of Persian in his poetry; the historian and Qur’an commentator, Tabari (d. 923); and the physician Rhazes (Zakariyya al-Razi, d. 925). Indeed, many authors of the tenth through twelfth centuries who lived in Persian-speaking milieus and would have had the option to write in Persian nevertheless chose to write their most important works in Arabic. This was the case for, among others, al-Biruni, who was born in Khwarazm in 973 and died in 1051 in Ghazna; Ibn Sina (Avicenna), born near Bukhara in 980, died in Hamadan in 1037; and Mohammad al-Ghazali, of Tus, who lived from 1058 to 1111.

By the tenth century, however, some three hundred years after the Arab conquest of Persia, the spoken Persian language had re-emerged as a language of literary standing in its own right, suitable for use in discussion of science, philosophy, and religion, as well. It was now written in the Arabic alphabet, which was easier to read than the Middle Persian script, and which also derived from a Semitic alphabet, Aramaic.

Persian Poetry
The earliest Persian poetry of the Islamic period is in dialect form (fablaviyat), probably based on accentual or syllable-count meters. Evidence of some prosodic experimentation
and variation is discernible in the earliest recorded specimens of Persian verse, though it seems that the Persian poetry of the ninth century was already following quite different principles of versification from Middle Persian poetry, notably rhyme and quantitative metrics. Some Persian meters are borrowed from Arabic, or at least they are explained according to Arabic models by the Persian manuals of prosody and rhetoric written in the twelfth century. However, Persian poets rarely employed some very common Arabic meters (such as 
*tazil* and *basit*), whereas some of the frequently occurring meters in Persian poetry (such as *mutagareb* and the *roba‘i* meter) seem quite uncommon in Arabic poetry of the same period. Persian poetry is furthermore fond of including a refrain (*radif*, which can be several syllables in length) after the rhyming syllable. We may conclude, therefore, that in addition to the influence of Arabic, native Persian phonology and prosody also played a distinctive role in shaping the new system of versification.

The privileged literary mode in Persian was poetry, or rhymed and metered “speech.” It was composed and performed in a variety of milieus for various social functions, acquiring the greatest prestige and widest publicity through the patronage of the royal court, including sultans/shahs but also wazirs or other men of state, army commanders, and regional governors. It might also be commissioned by the landed gentry, or alternatively, circulated through Sufi networks.

Most dynasties of the Persian-speaking world considered it the duty of a civilized ruler to cultivate science and literature, and doing so increased the ruler’s prestige. Some rulers even dabbled in composing poetry of their own, as a literate person was expected to be able to compose some amount of formal verse, lines of which were used as proof texts to illustrate points and conclude arguments in letters, homilies, and in conversation. Not only aspiring poets, but also secretaries and men of letters, were expected to have a huge repertoire of poetry at the tip of their tongues, and were sometimes called upon to compose extemporaneously at court. The work of successful professional poets was circulated in albums dedicated to particular patrons or particular themes. These albums would later be collected into *divans*, though often not by the poet himself. Early poetry *divans* were organized thematically, but from the sixteenth century onward they were usually divided into sections according to verse form (*qasideh*, *ghazal*, *get‘eb*, strophic poems, and *roba‘i*) and then further organized alphabetically according to the final letter of the rhyme or refrain.

Themes were largely conventional, and the poets usually presented a persona rather than a personal biography, though this in no way deterred critics from reading biographical data into the poems. The imagery grew in hyperbole and complexity over the centuries, and technical virtuosity was greatly admired, so that rhetorical ornamentation could become a justification in and of itself. Metaphors, tropes, and symbols (for instance, the rose and nightingale, the bow of the beloved’s eyebrow firing the arrows of his or her eyelashes, the ringlets of the beloved’s hair as polo sticks sending the lover’s heart skittering over the ground, and the like) were repeated from generation to generation, though subtle variation and innovations applied to the conventions have always been greatly admired. The stylistic trends have been described as evolving from heavy rhythms, rhetorical directness, and sparse use of Arabic in the tenth-century poetry, to the more mellifluous and rhetorically ornamented poetry (internal rhyme, play on words, display of Arabic erudition) associated with the flowering of the *ghazal*, and the era of the great classical poets such as *Sa‘di* (d. 1292), *Rumi* (d. 1273), *Hafez* (d. 1390), and *Jami* (d. 1492). Poetry of the “Indian style” (sixteenth through eighteenth centuries) continued the focus on the *ghazal*, which became conceptually more abstract and philosophical, even *reberebe‘*, with a distinctive taste for the subtle conceit and imagism. The neo-classical “return” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rejected this trend in favor of a simpler more direct prose style, and an imitation of the past masters. This gradually gave way to the influence of European letters in the twentieth century and led to the development of a significantly new, modernist poetic.

**Quatrains (Roba‘iyyat)**

The quatrain (*do-bayti*, *taraneh*, and later *roba‘i*), rhyming according to the pattern *a-a-b-a* and conforming to a special meter of its own, emerged from a popular milieu to become a literary genre unto its own, the *roba‘iyyat*. *Roba‘is* can treat amorous themes or commemorate a historical occasion (such as the death of a famous person), but most famously deliver a mystical or philosophical apothegm. The eleventh-century “naked” hermit, Baba Taher, sang quatrains of human love and devotion to God in impromptu quatrains, some of which are preserved in their original Hamadani dialect form. Another poet known exclusively for *roba‘is* is Mahsati of Ganja (fl. 12th century), one of the few classical poets with a uniquely feminine voice, and a far from chaste perspective on love.

The most famous practitioner of this genre is the mathematician and astronomer ‘Omar Khayyam of Nishapur (d. 1121), thanks in no small part to Edward FitzGerald’s immensely successful 1859 English translation/adaptation, *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*. Khayyam acquired a posthumous reputation as a composer of *roba‘iyyat* of a materialist or agnostic temperament, some of them quite blasphemous, although the actual evidence for him as author is rather flimsy. What is clear is that over the centuries, the corpus of quatrains attributed to Khayyam grew suspiciously, so that scholars in the twentieth century sought text-critical principles, to separate the forgeries from the real Khayyam. The *divans* of most subsequent poets include numerous *roba‘is*; Rumi’s, for example, has nearly 2000.
Court Poetry

Panegyrics in Arabic by the great poets had conveyed prestige and authority on the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs, so that Persian princes on the eastern edges of Persia naturally gravitated toward the practice as they began realizing their practical independence from the Abbasids. In cities like Nishapur (near modern Mashhad), Balkh (in modern Afghanistan), Samarkand, and Bukhara (in modern Uzbekistan), panegyrics in Persian were presented to the ruler or men of state on ceremonial occasions: Iranian seasonal festivals like Nawruz or Mehregan, Islamic holy days, royal investitures, victory celebrations, wine drinking parties, and the like. Poems for such occasions typically took the form of a qaṣīdah, a long mono-rhyme (a-a-b-a-c-a-d-a), usually between 40 and 100 lines, typically beginning with an encomium on the arrival of spring, on the beloved, or on wine. This would then segue into an enumeration of the virtues and glories of the ruler, encouraging him in the process to uphold principles of generosity, forbearance and just governance.

The greatest of the early Persian poets, Rudaki (d. 940), who was also a musician, composed many narrative poems, of which precious little has survived. Many examples of his fine, thoughtful lyric poems (not yet clearly differentiated in form as ghazals or qaṣīdahs), in a clear and unornamented style characteristic of early Persian prose and verse, must have been performed at the court in Bukhara, for the Samanid prince Amir Nasr II (r. 914–943). In these poems, Rudaki praised the ruler and his capital, rhapsodized on the process of making wine, or meditated on the decrepitude brought by age. This latter, rather melancholy, idea afforded early poets the occasion to draw the moral that life is short, so live right. This is then interpreted in either ethical terms, to do good works (since your name, good or ill, is all that will live on), or in epicurean terms, to live happy and well (for the opportunities for pleasure are limited). The lack of appeal to the Qur’an and outwardly religious sentiment may reflect the survival of Persian religion and philosophy.

The classical form of the Persian qaṣīdah was created at the court of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (in modern Afghanistan), who gathered a number of great poets to his court in the first half of the eleventh century. Among these were the poet laureate Onsori (d. 1040); Farrokh (d. 1038), who delighted in the description of spring and the celebration of musical wine soirees; and Manuchehri (d. 1041), famous for his adaptation of classical Arabic qaṣīdahs. The rival Seljuk court to the north and west also supported its poets, among them Amir Mo’ezzi (d. 1127), “prince of poets” to sultans Malik Shah and Sanjar, and Anvari (1126–c.1189), generally acknowledged as the ultimate qaṣīdah poet for his erudite, ornamented yet fluid style. Panegyrical poets were richly rewarded and got to travel with the court, yet the profession could be a hazardous one. Mas’ud Sa’d Salman (d. 1121) was imprisoned for long periods on suspicion of treason; Emir Mo’ezzi was accidentally shot and seriously wounded by prince Sanjar’s arrow; and Adib-e Saber was drowned by the Khwarazm shah as a spy of Sanjar.

Courts in the west of Iran also cultivated Persian poetry. In Azerbaijan, Qatran (d. 1072) wrote for numerous patrons, including a poem on the major earthquake in Tabriz in 1042, and many strophic poems. When Naser Khosrow, a poet from eastern Persia, came to Tabriz in 1046, he wrote in his fascinating travelog that Qatran was a good poet, who, however, did not fully understand Persian. This shows that, though dialectical variation must have existed, Persian was widely spoken and written by the mid-eleventh century. Khaqani of Shirvan (d. 1199) wrote ghazals and panegyrics, but is best known for his elegies on the death of his son and on the ruins of a Sassanian palace. Although a declared follower of Sana’i of Ghazna in the religious/didactic themes of his verse, he incorporated Christian themes in his poetry. His mother was a convert from Nestorian Christianity, and his travels brought him into close contact with Christians in Georgia and Constantinople.

Epic Poetry

Ferdausi of Tus (near modern Mashhad) has often been credited with rescuing the Persian language from virtual extinction with his monumental work, the Shab naṭemeh, or “Book of kings,” begun about 975 and, dedicated in its final form to Mahmud of Ghazna, in about 1010. This hyperbolic view ignores the half-century of court poetry that preceded Ferdausi’s work, including some earlier treatments of episodes from the national epic. Ferdausi himself incorporated a thousand lines from the story of Zoroaster as versified by Daqiq (d. 981 or before) in his own work. Nevertheless, Ferdausi’s Shab neṭemeh would play a central role not only in Iranian national consciousness, but even in the self-identity of non-Iranian rulers, especially Turks and Mongols, who adopted Persianate culture and traditions of kingship.

Ferdausi alludes to various sources for his account of events, including a learned Zoroastrian priest and a member of the Persian landed gentry. The existence of a tradition of professional reciters orally recounting stories from the Iranian national epic in a popular (sub-literary) context has led to heated scholarly debate about possible oral sources for Ferdausi. However, Ferdausi did have an established written tradition to draw from, and appears to have studied the matter and carefully crafted his tale. Various versions of the Persian “Book of kings” (Khodaye naṭemeh) were already written down in Middle Persian in the sixth and seventh centuries, and several of these had been translated into Arabic in the eighth and ninth centuries, as part of the discourse of shu‘abiyūya, or ethnic pride among non-Arabs, especially Iranians. At the initiative of Abu Mansur, a committee had translated the work from Middle Persian to Persian prose in 957.

The poem covers the mythical era of kingship in Iran, during which the rites and ceremonies of kingship were
established, the demons were subdued, cooking and clothing were introduced, cultivation of the soil begun, fire was discovered, metal worked, the social castes created, and the celebration of Nawruz (the spring equinox and Iranian new year) initiated. Death enters this idyllic realm due to the hubris of the king, Jamshid, and Zahhak comes to tyrannize the land. Accursed by Satan’s kiss, Zahhak has a snake growing from each of his shoulders, each of which must feed daily on the brain of an Iranian youth. Feridun eventually snatches the throne from Zahhak and restores justice, dividing his realm between his three sons before he dies. The two sons who inherit the lands to the east and west of Iran grow jealous of their brother, who has inherited the realm of Iran. They conspire to murder him, and this engenders generations of internecine conflict between Iran and her eastern neighbor, Turan.

This sets the stage for many sagas and adventures, which revolve thematically around the question of fate and free will, and the tragic forces that impel kings to conflict with their enemies, their sons and the champion warriors to whom they owe their throne. The father-son conflict usually ends poorly for the son (Rostam and Sohrab, Kay Kavus and Siyavash, Goshtasp and Esfandiyar), and the king is far less frequently wise and just (as in the tale of Kei Khosrau, in which the king abdicates and disappears) than tragically flawed or impetuous (as in the case of Kay Kavus).

The *Shah nameh* is not aware of the great Achaemenid kings Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, as it takes notice of the historical era only as Iran is about to be conquered by Alexander. It mostly ignores the successors of Alexander, fast-forwarding to the Sassanian rulers, whom it covers in some detail, both historical and legendary. The 50,000-line epic comes to a close with the Arab conquest of Persia, a sad fate indeed, even though Ferdausi writes as a Muslim with Shi‘i loyalties.

The tremendous success of the *Shah nameh* led other authors to elaborate on portions of the epic cycle (transmitted in oral renditions by popular professional reciters) which Ferdausi either passed over in silence or did not fully develop. These focused on elaborating and embellishing the story of various champions, as in the “Book of Garshasp,” written in 1066 by Asadi of Tus (also the author of an important early dictionary of Persian), about a hero even more outlandishly strong than Rostam; or the legendary history of the Iranian prophet Zoroaster, told by the Zoroastrian priest Zartosht Bahram Pazhdzu in 1278. The influence of Ferdausi is apparent even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in works like the *Shahanshah nameh* (The king of king’s book) by Saba (1765–1823), describing a victory by the Qajar king, Fath-‘Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834) over the Russians in the same archaic terms found in the *Shah nameh*, or in the verse history *Shahnameh ye baqiqat*, written by Mojrem (1871–1920) of the leaders of the Ahl-e Haqq sect in Kurdistan. All of these, however, remained quite tangential to the main canon of Persian literature, in contrast to Ferdusi’s *Shah nameh*, for which the creation of large, sumptuously illustrated manuscripts in royal ateliers became common during the Mongol period and later. In fact it was almost de rigueur for each successive Safavid monarch to commission such a royal copy, the most famous of which was the copy made for Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–1576), which was subsequently given as a gift of state to the Ottomans, and eventually found its way to Europe and the art dealer Houghton, but has now been repatriated (at least the surviving illustrated folios) to Iran.

**Romance Literature**

Also spun-off from the *Shah nameh* are a number of romances, although the Persian narrative verse tradition is also fed by other sources. To have an authoritative or popular source seems to have been an important prerequisite to undertaking a narrative poem of several thousand lines (variably in the rhyming couplet form of the *mathnawi*), which might either be commissioned by a patron, or presented to one with a dedication in the introduction in hopes of a reward. Trying one’s hand at an original imaginative story could be somewhat risky under these circumstances; in any case, there were many classical stories reflecting the glorious culture of pre-Islamic Iran from which to draw inspiration. These include a poem of Parthian origins, *Vis and Ramin*, versified by Fakhr al-Din Gorgani circa 1054 for the governor of Isfahan from a Middle Persian version. It tells the story of Vis, promised in marriage before her birth to King Mohad. The latter’s younger brother, Ramin, falls in love at the first sight of her, and eventually wins her over. Through the help of Vis’s nurse, the pair escapes from Mohad and are eventually united as king and queen, in a saga not without similarities to that of Tristan.

Other tales of stymied love include “Varqa and Golshah,” based upon an Arabic story, and versified in Persian in the *motaqareb* meter during the first decades of the eleventh century by ‘Ayyuqi. This pair never unites, except through a chaste ideal love that they take with them to the grave. A similar story, both in its outcome and in its Arab origins, is Nezami’s version of the star-crossed lovers Layli and Majnun, in a poem of 4,000 lines written in 1188. This tale was told and retold by subsequent Persian poets (most successfully by Maktabí of Shiraz in 1490), as well as by imitators writing in Turkish and Urdu. The retellings usually resolve the powerful psychological ambiguity in Nezami’s work and rarely match his masterful ability with language. In addition to a very fine *divan* of shorter poems, Nezami (d. 1209) also authored four other long narrative *mathnavis*, including an ethico-didactic poem modeled on Sana‘i, a Persian version of the Alexander romance (*Sikandar Nama*), and two poems set in the Sassanian period. The first of these is *Khosrau and Shirin*, a legend about King Khosrau Parviz (r. 590–628) and
his Armenian bride, Shirin, who is loved devotedly by Farhad, who moves a mountain to attain her, but is tricked by Khosrau into thinking she is dead. The other is Haft Paykar, about Bahram (r. 421–439) and the seven beautiful princesses from the seven climes with whom he enjoys a variety of adventures. The five narrative poems by Nezami were often bound together in one volume and frequently illustrated. Such was Nezami’s achievement that many later poets tried their hand at composing a similar quintet, following his model. This tended to limit the initiative of later poets in creating new material, but Jami (d. 1492) introduced two new stories to the traditional subjects of romance: the mystical reworking of the Joseph and Zoleikha story (very loosely based on Qur’an, sura 12), and the story of Salaman and Absal, about a Greek king who has a magician genetically engineer him a perfect son, who, however, is seduced by his beautiful nurse.

Religious and Mystical poetry

The extensive literature of imaginative poetry and prose, as well as commentaries that address various aspects of religion and spirituality is immense. All long poems, from the Shab nameb to romances, inevitably begin with a doxology and lines in praise of the prophet Muhammad, as well as frequently a description of his journey to heaven. Though the majority of classical Persian poets were Sunnis of the Hanafi or Shafi’i school, there are some vociferously Shi’ite poets in the early period, notably Naser Khosrow (1003–1060), an Isma’ili poet, and Qavami of Rayy (fl. 12th century).

It was the mystics, however, who created the most successful poetry of religious expression, reaching its pinnacle in the mystico-didactic poetry of the matbnavi form. Sana’i (d. 1135) initiated the genre with his Hadiqat al-haqiqat, a compendium of tales, some humorous, that were used to educate homilies and moral injunctions, and which focus chiefly upon control of the baser passions and correctly understanding the interior meaning of the Qur’an. Farid al-Din ‘Attar (d. 1221) perfected the story-telling element of the mystical matbnavi genre, juxtaposing within a frame-tale structure various unrelated anecdotes and vignettes of an entertaining or inspiring nature to illustrate an overarching theme (as was also common in the European literature of the period). The best known of these include the Elabi nameb, in which a king and father passes life wisdom to his sons, and the Manteq al-Tayr, a poem of mystical psychology about a band of birds in search of their spiritual king, the mythical Simorgh, which was completed in 1177.

Modeled on these, but less thematically structured, is the “Spiritual Couplets” of Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273), composed piecemeal in six books through the 1260s. Its opening plaint of the reed pipe, severed from its spiritual home, remains the single most influential expression of mystical theology in Persian, perhaps in the entire Islamic world, having been studied and taught throughout the Ottoman domains, across Iran, and into the Indian subcontinent.

The love imagery of the ghazal, beginning with Sana’i, was also turned into a vehicle of mystical expression. Rumi continued the project of the mystical ghazal, conceiving his spiritual mentor Shams (d. after 1247) as the object of love, indeed adopting the voice of his absent master in a huge body of ghazals that almost always point to transcendent significance. Other poets, such as Sa’di of Shiraz (d. 1292), continued to address ghazals to both amorous and mystical objects of love. This creates room for much ambiguity in the ghazals of Hafez of Shiraz (d. 1390), who intertwined mystical and physical love in a sublime fashion that is difficult to unravel, and is generally regarded as the ultimate achievement in Persian lyrical poetry, though this often fails to come through in English translation, as the translators typically try to reduce him to one thing or the other. Goethe and the German Romantic poets derived much inspiration from Hafez.

Prose Genres

Continuing the Sassanian tradition of advice books, the Qabus nameb, written in 1082 by Kay Kavus b. Voshmgir, a local prince on the Caspian shore of Iran, provides instruction to his son in the arts of government, social graces, and the enjoyment of life. About the same time Nezam al-Molk (Ar. Nizam al-Mulk; d. 1092), after whom the first university in the Muslim world is named, composed his Siyawat nameb to instruct the Seljuk Turks, to whom he served as wazir, in the proper ways of Iranian kingship. Both of these charming books are written in a straightforward prose, whereas Nasr Allah Monshi’s version of Kalilah wa Dimna (written between 1143 and 1145), which set the prose standard for later authors to match, used animal characters to convey its lessons. This volume requires more work to grasp because of its erudition and its taste for the rhetorical artifices made possible by Arabic morphology. These tales, derived ultimately (via Arabic, via Middle Persian) from the Panchatantra, were brought to then-contemporary style in 1505 by Hosein Va’ez-e Kashefi (d. 1505) as Anwar-e Sobehi.

Along with many other such collections of tales in prose or verse, a huge body of prose literature, including the serial adventures of picaresque heroes, manuals for writers, lives of the poets, local and world histories, as well as literary anthologies, mystical disquisitions, and philosophical texts, exists in Persian, much of it delightful to read. The prose work with which Persian literature is preeminently associated is, however, the Golestan of Sa’di, written in 1258 and loosely organized in eight chapters by theme (kingship, dervishes, youth, contentment, and so on). Throughout it one encounters entertaining anecdotes, wittily expressed, that advocate a practical, situational ethics. It weaves together simple, undorned prose with rhymed prose and verse to create a new, unified literary idiom that set the future standard of emulation. Frequently imitated, the Golestan became a textbook of
Persian language and Islamic ethics for Turkish speakers, as the many Turkish commentaries and translations of the sixteenth and subsequent centuries attest. It was also used as a textbook for Persian instruction in India, where Persian, and then Urdu, commentaries were written on it. It was also used for British students of Persian to study the language in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. European translations of the work had been circulating since the mid-seventeenth century and caught the attention of La Fontaine and Voltaire, among others.

Persian in India

It was under the Ghaznavids and their aggressive policy of conquest in South Asia that the first wave of Persian poets moved toward the sub-continent. Mas‘ud Sa’d Salman (d. 1121) lived in Lahore, and his contemporary, Abu al-Faraj Runi, was born there. Of Indo-Turkic parentage, Emir Khusrow of Delhi (1253–1325) was a competent imitator of the quintet of Nezami and of well-received ghazals. He popularized Persian poetry at the Muslim courts in India, and also among the Sufis. The poetry of Rumi and ‘Iraqi (d. 1289) was also popular among South Asian Sufis. Timur enjoyed Persian books and Babur composed Persian poetry of his own. The Moguls made Persian the language of government in 1582, commissioning their court histories in Persian. Akbar (1556–1605) actively enticed a whole series of the best Persian poets of the era to come to Delhi from Iran and also encouraged translations of Hindu works to Persian. Dara Shokuh (1615–1659), son of Shahjahan, and Zib al-Nesa Makhfi (1639–1703), daughter of Aurangzib, both composed excellent Persian poems of mystical and ecumenical bent. Bidel of Patna (d. 1720) was the last major representative of the Indian style, and he remains more appreciated in Afghanistand India than in Iran.

Urdu eventually replaced Persian as the primary literary language of South Asian Muslims, but some Urdu poets, such as Ghalib (1796–1869), also wrote in Persian, while Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), the intellectual father of Pakistan, wrote major poems, such as his Javid Nama, in Persian, a more widely understood language in the Muslim world.

Modern Literature

The twentieth century saw a sea-change in Persian language and literature, as modernization, revolution, centralization and Marxist-Leninism greatly altered Tajikistan and Iran, in particular. First of all, with the advent of lithography and printing in the nineteenth century, books became more affordable, and more importantly, the appearance of newspapers created a different and wider audience for literature. For various short periods of time, the press became relatively free, and there were a number of journals published in Persian outside Iran, which made it possible to openly advocate reform or political opposition to the crown.

In Afghanistan, Mahmud Tarzi helped to introduce translations of European literature and radically new modern literary forms in his journal Seraj al-Akbabar (1911–1918). The Iranian poet-singer ‘Aref (1882–1934) turned his back on a court career to compose populist political ballads, ghazals, and song lyrics, which reached a mass audience when he sang them in concert. Reform was urged also from within the aristocratic class, many of whom learned foreign languages or studied abroad, such as Iraj Mirza (1874–1926), who held a post in the Qajar government but was noted for his biting satirical indictment of the custom of veiling of women.

Political agitation did not always turn out well. The poet Mirzadeh ‘Eshqi was assassinated after satirically caricaturing Reza Shah in 1924. Abu ‘l-Qasem Lahuti was obliged to flee from Tabriz in 1922, after leading an unsuccessful revolt there. He settled in Dushanbe, in the Soviet Union, where he wrote Persian poetry for a Tajiki audience, modernizing classical themes and celebrating the socialist enterprise. The fiction writer Bozorg ‘Alavi also fled Iran for East Germany, as a result of his Communist Party membership. In Tajikistan, authors managed to champion the Central Asian peasants and collectives, as well as the creation of a new society, in artistically successful ways, especially Mirza Torsonzadeh (1911–1977) in poetry and Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954) in fiction.

Poets continued to compose in the traditional forms, but introduced modern themes and imagery, including descriptions of modern inventions, as in some of the poems of the literary scholar and parliamentarian, Mohammad Taqi Bahar (1880–1951). The monazerat (debate poems) of Parvin E’tesami (1910–1941), the first of three important women poets of the century, championed the cause of the poor and downtrodden. In Afghanistan, Khalil Allah Khalili (b. Kabul, 1909, d. Pakistan, 1987) carried on the classical tradition in a convincing modern voice.

The ghazal retained its thematics of love, but became slightly more personal and more modern in its sentiments, tinged with European romanticism, but developing toward a contemporary idiom, as in the poems of Simin Behbehani, who headed the Iranian Writer’s Congress. Poets, however, also began to separate poetry from traditional verse. First came an effort to break down the classical meters into their constituent feet and combine these feet in new patterns. The first experiment in this direction came in the early 1920s with Afshaneh (Romance) by Nima Yushij (1895–1960), who developed toward free verse in the following decade. Though some poets, such as Mehdi Akhavan-e Sales (1928–1990), continued to compose in both free verse and traditional meters, the most outstanding achievements in the post–World War II era were by poets working in free verse, foremost among whom stands Ahmad Shamlu (1926–2001), whose work demonstrates a commitment and capability to uphold political and
artistic values simultaneously in his best poems. Forugh Farrokhzad (1935–1967) pushed poetry toward inner authenticity by infusing it with personal experience and focusing on everyday topics, such as sexuality, sometimes from an explicitly female point of view. She was rewarded for her sincerity with public condemnation as an “immoral” woman. Her poetry, however, speaks eloquently and profoundly for itself. Meanwhile, painter and nature poet, Sohrab Sepehri (1928–1981) beautifully adapted the mystical perspective of Persian poetry to modern modes of expression.

The modernist literary idiom was entirely secular, and often political, yet allusive enough to elude the censors. Poetry played an important role in creating political symbols of freedom (dawn, day) as opposed to those of oppression (night, winter), and in inspiring revolutionary sentiment against the shah of Iran in the 1970s. Part of this process involved purging Persian poetry from its classical themes and dynamics, and creating believable characters. In prose literature, Mohammad-‘Ali Jamalzadih (1892–1997) forged a new idiom for imaginative prose literature with his short stories, as did Sadeq Hedayat (1903–1951), whose novel The Blind Owl (1969) remains the best known modern Persian work abroad, in part because of the author’s connections with expressionist and existentialist writers in Europe, and his suicide in Paris. Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969, husband of Simin Daneshvar) wrote short stories and novels, The School Principal (1974) being the most interesting, but he is best known in the Muslim world for his 1962 attack on the hegemony of Western culture, Gharbzadegi. Several historical novels also deal with the theme of Western, especially British, imperialism in Iran: Sadeq Chubak’s Tangir (1963), based on a true event in southern Iran; Simin Daneshvar’s Sacushan (1990), a political love story told from the woman’s point of view; and the ten-volume novel Kelidar (1978–1983) by Mahmoud Dowlatabadi. In the 1970s and the post-Revolution period, female prose writers have achieved popular and critical success (among them, Mahshid Amirshahi, Goli Tarqapi, and Fattaneh Hajj Sayyed Javadi). Others, like Shahrnush Parsipur and Moniru Ravanipur, succeeded in introducing magical realism to Iran.

An image of a 1650 Persian manuscript appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Arabic Language; Arabic Literature; Biography and Hagiography; Biruni, al-; Ghazali, al-; Grammar and Lexicography; Hadith; Historical Writing; Ibn Sina; Iqbal, Muhammad; Libraries; Rumi, Jalaluddin; Tabari, al-; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry; Vernacular Islam.

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Franklin D. Lewis

PHILOSOPHY See Ethics and Social Issues; Kalam; Knowledge; Science, Islam and

PILGRIMAGE

HAJJ
Kathryn Kaeney

ZIYARA
Richard C. Martin

HAJJ
The Islamic hajj refers specifically to the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, Arafat, and Mina during the second week of the Dhu l-Hijja, the final month of the Islamic lunar calendar. Called a duty of humankind to Allah in the Qur’an (3:97), and the fifth of the five pillars of Islam, in recent years the hajj has attracted about two million Muslims annually from approximately 160
countries. All adult Muslims with proper intentions (niya), adequate resources, good health, and sound mind are required to perform this duty once during their lifetimes. Other pilgrimages exist in Islam, including visitations to saints’ shrines (ziyara), but these are not officially sanctioned.

The Ka’ba, the focal point of the hajj with its heavenly black stone, was a pilgrimage site long before the time of Muhammad. Shortly before his death, Muhammad claimed this site for Islam, and determined a sequence of symbolic rituals to be performed around it by all Muslims. These rituals reenact events in the lives of Ibrahim (Abraham), the archetype for Islam as founder of monotheism (bani‘iyya) and builder of the Ka’ba, his wife Hagar, and their son Isma’il (Ishmael). Collective and individual rites at this site not only replicate the actions of Muhammad, but also recall the sacred movements of pious biblical prophets who predate Islam.

Prior to the hajj, pilgrims undergo a ritual cleansing that separates them from their profane individual and cultural identities, and allows them to enter sacred space and time as a unified group of believers before God. Men wear a simple white garment to symbolize their unity as Muslims; women wear customary dress, which demonstrates the meeting of diverse cultures on the common holy ground of Mecca. The initial rite of the hajj (tawaf), which includes a sevenfold circumambulation of the Ka’ba, is followed by the “running” (a’r) of pilgrims between two hills. This action recalls Hagar’s frantic search for water. The apex of the hajj is the “standing” of all pilgrims on Mount Arafat from noon until sunset as they pray individually and collectively to their one God. After sundown, all spend the night at Muzdalifa before the next day’s ritual performances of the “stoning” and the “sacrifice” at Mina. Both actions reenact the sacred drama of Ibrahim’s attempted sacrifice of Isma’il. Pilgrims throw seven stones at a pillar representing Satan who tried to divert Ibrahim from God’s command to sacrifice his son; they sacrifice to celebrate God’s substitution of a ram for Isma’il. This sacrificial rite is embraced simultaneously by pilgrims and Muslims all over the world in gratitude for God’s mercy. After the sacrifice, pilgrims may perform another tawaf and sa’i, and then gradually reenter profane space by cutting or shaving their hair and assuming regular dress.

The Islamic pilgrimage preserves, elevates, and reinforces collective and individual Muslim identities in a constantly changing world. Collectively, pilgrims confirm the basic tenets of Islam, including the affirmation of God’s oneness, obedience to God, the necessity for a global Muslim community, and the importance of their prophetic past. Many pilgrims return to their homes with the sense they are connected to a greater, transcendent whole, a seamless religious community that surpasses economic, racial, and cultural differences. As Malcolm X pronounced in his autobiography (1990, p. 338), “The brotherhood. The people of all races, colors, from all over the world coming together as one! It has proved to me the power of the One God.” In reality, distinctions among pilgrims exist, as illustrated by the vastly different services and accommodations enjoyed by those of diverse nationalities and classes. In perception, the community reflects unchallenged unity and equality.

Individually, pilgrimage acts as a rite of passage for Muslims who confront major transitions in their lives, including marriage, retirement, illness, or death. As a rite of passage, it also functions as a symbolic affirmation of faith for converts or those who are returning to or renewing their beliefs. In some societies, the hajj transforms ordinary individuals into extraordinary pious exemplars, or social elites. In parts of Egypt, those who have completed the hajj receive an elevated status close to that of a saint. As possessors of blessings (baraka) extracted from the holy land, returning pilgrims become saintly individuals reborn free of sin, deserving of paradise. Having successfully navigated the difficult journey to Mecca and back, pilgrims are likened to Muhammad who also made the tough trek to Jerusalem and paradise in the middle of the night. Hhaus Nigerians use the pilgrimage to export local healing practices (involving spirits) into orthodox Saudi culture, for which they are greatly but clandestinely compensated. These healers return home to enjoy loftier social and economic positions as a result of their craft. In both Egyptian and Nigerian examples, the hajj accentuates local Muslim practices that challenge the orthodoxy and sense of monolithic communal unity asserted through collective ritual.

The hajj serves both as a spiritual and political arena. Nineteenth-century Muslim anti-imperialist movements were inspired by the hajj. In 1822 and 1823, Sayyid Ahmad performed the pilgrimage, and then launched a jihad against British influence in Egypt. Imam Shamil of Daghestan and Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qadir of Algeria met during the hajj to discuss the French presence in North Africa and the Russians in the Caucasus. Recent global controversies are played out on the pilgrimage stage, since control of the hajj is directly associated with leadership in the Islamic world. In 1935, an attempt was made to assassinate Ibn Sa’ud during the hajj, in protest of Wahhabi control of the shrines. Recent Saudi control over the hajj has bred resentment and favoritism among those billion Muslims who now have access to the hajj through the rapid air, land, and sea travel of the modern age. In 1986, when King Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared himself to be custodian of the holy sites, Iran challenged his authority by delivering sets of revolutionary sermons condemning America, Israel, and other enemies of Islam (including the Saudi government). The Libyan leader Mu’amar al-Qaddafi bypassed Saudi authority when he invoked independent judgment (ijtihad) to deny the hajj as an essential pillar of Islam. In 2002, the Iraqi government provoked the Saudis to take action when they sent civilian planes to transport pilgrims to the holy land without prior notification of the United Nations Security Council, a direct violation of a 1999 agreement. Through increased media coverage of the hajj, along
Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca

One day is measured from sunset to sunset.

DAY 1: 8TH DHU-1-HIJJA
Yaum al-Tarwiyah (Day of Deliberation)
TAWAF al-QUDUM: The initial circumambulation of the Ka'bah is performed
Personal prayer is made (du'a)
Prayer is made at the station of Abraham (MAQAM IBRAHIM)
The pilgrim drinks the water of ZAMZAM
The pilgrim performs the SA'Y or courses between SAFA and MARWA
The pilgrim spends the night at MIZDALIFA

DAY 2: 9TH DHU-1-HIJJA
Yaum Arafat (Day of Arafat)
WUQUF (a presence, like the multitudes on the Day of Judgement, between noon and sunset on the plain of Arafat or on the "Mount of Mercy" (JABAL RAHMA)
Frequent recitation of the Abrahamic TALBIYA ("Here I am, O Lord...")
After sunset the IFADAH ("overflowing") or NAFRA ("rush") takes place; this is a rapid departure for MUZDALIFA
Night prayers (ISHA) are combined with the delayed sunset prayer (MAGHRIB) and performed near the MASH'AR al-HARAM, a station of the pilgrimage in Muzdalifah
The pilgrims spend the night at MUZDALIFA

DAY 3: 10TH DHU-1-HIJJA
Yaum an-Nahr (Day of Sacrifice)
The pilgrim prays the dawn prayer (SUBH) and visits the MASH'AR al-HARAM
The pilgrims gather 49 or 70 pebbles at Muzdalifah to stone the JAMARAT
They go to MINA via WADI MUHASSAR
They cast seven stones (RAMI-I-JIMAR) at the JAMARAT al-AQABA
The animal sacrifice is made between now and day 6
A lock of hair can be clipped terminating most of the conditions of consecration (IHRAM) between now and the final day
The pilgrims return to Mecca and circumambulate the Ka'ba (TAWAF al-WADA)

DAYS 4, 5, 6: 11TH, 12TH, 13TH DHU-1-HIJJA
Ayyam al-Tashriq (Days of Drying Meat, that is, taking provision)
The pilgrims stay at MINA, and each day between sunset and sunrise throw seven stones at each of the 3 JAMARAT
It is permissible to terminate the Pilgrimage on the 12th if departure takes place by sunset
A new covering (kiwza) is put on the Ka'ba
Upon departure, a final circumambulation of the Ka'ba is made: TAWAF al-WADA ("circumambulation of farewell")


Illustration of the pilgrim’s trek to Mecca.

with computer access to the virtual hajj, these tensions among the many conflicting faces of Islam will only increase, as will efforts to make the hajj a venue for common Muslim religious identity around the world.

An image of pilgrims praying at Mount of Mercy appears in the volume two color insert.

See also 'Ibadat; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Ritual.
Grand Mosque floorplan

1. The well of Zamzam
2. The Maqam (station of) Ibrahim
3. The Hatim, or semi-circular wall round the Hijr Isma’il where Isma’il and Hajar’s Hagra are buried
4. The Mataf, or open circumambulation area round the Ka’ba
5. The Ka’ba
6. The door to the Ka’ba. The Multazam (“the place of holding”) is the area between the door and the Black Stone
7. The Black Stone
8. The Mas’ā (the place of running back and forth) between Safa and Marwa
9. Steps down to Zamzam faucets
10. The portion of the Sa’y which is run, not walked
11. Safa (the hill is enclosed in the Mosque)
12. King Abd al-Aziz Gate
13. Marwa (the hill is enclosed in the Mosque)
14. Gate of the ‘Uumra
15. Salam Gate

Note: Mutawwifs (Guides) can be found near the Maqam Ibrahim and near Safa. Wheelchairs and litters can also be found near Safa.

ZIYARA

In and Shi‘ite Islam, the concept of ziyara is found in many diverse parts of the Muslim world, especially those parts for which Sufism was the main agency for the spread of Islam. The chief exception to the tolerance of ziyara historically is found in those regions where the Hanbali school of law has predominated. Since the eighteenth century this has been primarily in the Arabian Peninsula under the influence of Wahhabi and Salafi forms of Islamic Puritanism, which shuns all innovations in worship that were not clearly sanctioned by the Prophet.

Nonetheless, throughout most of Africa, Anatolia, as well as West, Central, South and Southeast Asia, pilgrims have visited shrines for centuries, with many local variations in architecture and ritual performance. The mazars are visited by pilgrims throughout the year, to seek blessing (baraka) from the saint buried at the shrine tomb. Often, one or two “deputies” or respected followers of the saint will be buried in the same complex. The anniversary of the death of the saint (‘urs, which also means “wedding”), is the occasion of a major visitation and celebration by his devotees. For major saints ‘urs was an occasion for a ziyara marked by joyous celebration, dancing, and ritual orations.

Although many reform-minded local religious elites (ulema) have argued that visitation to Sufi shrines was an un-Islamic innovation (bid‘a) and thus forbidden, many others have accepted such practices as local expressions of Muslim piety. Ziyara rituals and performances often attract Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious communities who live among or near the Muslims who visit the shrines, thus making the ziyara a ritual negotiation of communal inclusiveness in areas where Muslims and non-Muslims live with soft boundaries between their communities. This differentiates the practice of ziyara from the religious duty of hajj. Yet for many Muslims over the centuries, both forms of pilgrimage have been practiced. For example, in premodern times of overland travel, pilgrims from Spain and North Africa on their way to Mecca to perform the hajj would often plan a stop in Tanta, in the Egyptian Delta, to visit the shrine of Ahmad al-Badawi (1199–1276). Although such rituals are traditional and premodern in their origins, modern urban Muslims in regions where ziyara pilgrimage is customary and deeply rooted in local practice are often seen among the pilgrims celebrating the anniversaries of these saints.

See also Ibn Hanbal; Pilgrimage; Hajj; Saint; Tasawwuf.

Richard C. Martin

PLURALISM

LEGAL AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS
Irene Schneider

POLITICAL
Gudrun Krämer

LEGAL AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS

Several Qur’anic verses as well as hadiths seem to confirm the acceptance of ethnic and religious diversity or pluralism. One such example is found at 49:13, which reads: “O people! We have created you from a male and female; and we have made upon you in confederacies and tribes so that you might come to know one another. The noblest among you in the eyes of God is the most pious, for God is omniscient and well-informed.” This verse offers no prejudice, but rather expresses a consciousness of difference and emphasizes that piety is more important than the birth. Ethnic pluralism, that is the existence of groups defined primarily by race, language, or other cultural, historical, and in some sense geographical criteria was thus accepted from the beginning in Islam. However, the unity of the Islamic umma (community of believers) was emphasized and was thought of as a kind of superstructure upon which other identities, whether tribal or ethnic, were hung.

The Spread of Islam to Other Cultures

From the time of the first conquests, Muslims spread out from the Arabian Peninsula to people who neither spoke Arabic nor could claim Arab descent. Different ethnic groups, as well as different religions, were incorporated into the new empire. The integration of people from other races and cultures did not pose great legal or religious problems, although in the first two centuries, the institution of ‘wala’
(clienthood) was used to affiliate non-Arab Muslims to the developing Muslim society. This reflects the struggle between the pure-Arab, conquering aristocracy, who claimed ethnic and social superiority, and the Muslim converts among the conquered, who could claim neither ethnic nor familial advantage. Thus, the cohabitation of different ethnicities and races was never without problems. The idea of racial innocence and total racial (and ethnic) harmony in Islam is, in other words, a Western creation, as Bernard Lewis argues in his 1990 volume, Race and Slavery in the Middle East.

**Accommodating Other Religious Practices**

Religious pluralism, on the other hand, must be dealt with on several levels. Whereas the acceptance of the “people of the book” (comprising Muslims, Christians, and Jews) was stated from the beginning, and whereas Christians and Jews had an acknowledged (but not equal) position in the Muslim society, people belonging to other, “non-book” religions were required to convert to Islam. However, even within Islam, belief itself is not and cannot be considered monolithic. Pluralism existed in Islamic formal theology as well as in popular belief.

The common belief in Islam is based on the acknowledgment of the unity of God, and Muhammad being the prophet of God. It also requires the acknowledgment of the other four pillars of faith: prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and the payment of alms. Those who did not accept these basic tenets were considered to be unbelievers. On the other hand, within this framework, a wide range of different forms of religiosity developed, as evidenced by the rise of the mystic orders, especially since the fifteenth century.

Theological controversies centered around several different issues, including the analysis of the concept of God, the ontological and cosmological proofs, and the politics of the application of divine rule to the community. Different theological schools came into existence, such as the Muṣriʿa, the Qadiriyya, and the Muʿtazila. These have been complemented by diverse approaches to mystical and philosophical theology and, more recently, by a theology that reflected the confrontation with Western colonial powers.

Religious pluralism on both the normative and the social level must be looked at in a historical perspective, taking into consideration Islam’s adaptation to the manifold political, economical, regional, and social conditions, and the different cultural backgrounds and separate historical developments that prevailed in the vast areas into which it spread. There is, however, a limitation to tolerance, a turning point where different beliefs must be judged as unbelief (kufr). Just where this turning point occurs is still under discussion today, and transgressions are still prosecuted. An example is the case of Nasr Abu Zaid (b. 1943), who was considered an unbeliever for his interpretation of the Qur’an. As punishment, he was forced to divorce his wife in 1995 (although the marriage was later reinstated).

**Legal Pluralism**

Islamic law can also be called pluralistic. It derives its norms, rules, and judgements from the holy texts (Qurʾan, sunna), but in cases where these sources provide no clear rules, they are derived through the method of analogy (qiṣṣa). Rules and judgements derived in this way were then gradually accepted through the consensus of the jurists (ijmaʿ), which, however, was not institutionalized. Thus, from the beginning, there existed a wide range of acceptable legal resolutions to problems. Over time these were derived from the texts by the jurists (fiqhā) and laid down in the legal literature. This process of derivation was based on the independent juristic interpretation of the texts, called ijtihat. Codification of law only began in modern times, starting in the Ottoman Empire with the mecelle in 1877. The methodological tool of ijtihat and the pluralism of different legal norms and rules have always supplied Islamic Law with a certain flexibility.

Four major legal schools have emerged over time. These are the Maliki, Hanafi, the Shafiʿi, and the Hanbali. In addition there are the Sh'i schools of law, the most important of which being the school of the Twelver Shi'a. On the institutional level, this pluralism led the rulers of the Mamluk Empire, in Egypt in the thirteenth century, to create the offices of the four judges, each associated with one of the four Sunni schools of law.

Nonetheless, the application of Islamic law has always been restricted to the Muslim community, and the legal independence of the Jewish and Christian communities was accepted to a certain degree. Thus, Islamic law could be defined as a personal law and not as the law of a territory. In the Ottoman Empire, the millet system began as a coexistence of religious communities, each with its own administrative autonomy and jurisdiction. This system finally led to a change whereby the personal law became more territorial, ultimately becoming a law applicable to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire and not only to the Muslim community.

Legal pluralism describes the (legal) situation observed in the Islamic countries today, but it is by no means exclusive to them. From the lawyer’s point of view, legal pluralism denotes a state’s recognition of the existence of a multiplicity of legal sources that constitute its legislation: international treaties, customary law, religious law, and the like. From the sociological point of view, legal pluralism can be defined more broadly, to acknowledge that a plurality of sometimes interactive social fields produce norms of legitimate behavior. For Islam, the term not only recognizes the coexistence of modern, secular modern laws alongside shariʿa norms, but also the existence of customary practice beside, or even in opposition to state law.

Throughout its history, the legal structures of Islamic society have made room not only for the coexistence of shariʿa and qanun (that is, religious and secular law), but also for customary practice (urf). An example of this is the so-called...
“secular justice” of the mazalim, an institution dealing with grievances that not only is rooted deeply in the theory of Islamic constitution but which has also been practiced through centuries. The problem of accommodating multiple sources of the law, however, gained special importance under the influence of modern, secular Western law in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In response to the growing importance of Western law in Muslim societies, a powerful political Islam arose in the 1970s that was rooted in the belief of the necessary implementation of Islamic law. Thus, Islamic law was rediscovered as a national legal tradition, and was held up in opposition to the influence of the Western law.

Kilian Bälz, a turn of the twenty-first-century legal scholar whose work has focused on the problem of the legal pluralism in Muslim society, has argued that the coexistence and relation between the modern Western law and the shari’a has always been discussed in this context of influence. He has shown that in Egypt, as in many other Islamic countries, the constitution holds the principles of shari’a to be the primary source of legislation. In 1994, however, Egypt’s highest court defended the autonomy of the secular legal order by taking control of the interpretation of Islamic law. As Bälz reports, the court reserves to itself the right to interpret Islamic rules, and it reconstructs Islamic law on the basis of secular paradigms. This is, however, nothing new. The interpretation of shari’a has historically been flexible, as can be seen in the existence of several different schools of law (ikhlasaf) and through the practice of ijtihab, which is the legal interpretation of the Qur’an and other textual sources by jurists. Thus, Islamic legal pluralism refers not only to multiple sources of the law (religious or secular), but also to multiple interpretations of any given law.

Also important to the analysis of Islamic legal pluralism is an examination of rules, other than those enacted by the state, which govern and shape social conduct. Social norms and customary practices can in no way be considered uniform throughout the lands of Islam, yet they operate within or alongside of formal legal structures. An important example of this is the baqqa al-arab, a form of conflict resolution in modern Egypt (and other Muslim countries), that operates outside of both religious and formal secular law, yet enjoys at least partial official recognition.

See also ‘Ada; Hadith; Law; Qur’an; Shari’a; Sunna.

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Irene Schneider

POLITICAL

Contemporary positions as formulated by Islamic thinkers and activists can be roughly divided into two opposing views: one deeply suspicious of pluralism as menacing Muslim power and unity, the other supporting pluralism as contributing to Muslim strength and creativity. In a kind of political tawhid (the theological doctrine of the oneness of God), the first gives priority to the unity of the community, which figures so prominently in the Qur’an and sunna of the Prophet. This corresponds to the concept of ijma’, that is, the consensus of the Muslim community as expressed by its religious scholars in juridical theory (usul al-fiqh) to which modern authors frequently refer when trying to ground their notions in the Islamic tradition. Taken to its extremes, the emphasis on unity can imply the rejection of all divergence of opinions, or any kind of criticism or opposition to the dominant doctrines and practices, which are denounced as fitna, that is, a menace to, and sin against, not just the given sociopolitical system but the divinely ordained order at large.

If there is only one truth, and if it can be identified without doubt or mistake, there is no room for free debate, political competition and institutionalized pluralism, for there are only two “parties” (or rather groups or communities): the party of God (biza al-lubah) and the party of the devil (biza al-shaytan). Political parties represent particularistic interests at the expense of the common good (al-maslaha al-l’aamma), dividing and thereby weakening the community.

Quoting a well-known Qur’anic verse (Sura 49:13) and an equally famous Prophetic saying (hadith) according to which the “diversity of opinion [ikhlasaf] among my community is a blessing,” advocates of the alternative viewpoint point to the elements of diversity and pluralism in the religious, legal, and historical heritage of the Muslim community (including most notably the different Sunni and Shi’ite schools of law, sing., maddhab) as one of the very sources of its flowering, resilience, and attractiveness. Even though there is only one truth, there is no guarantee that humans will be able to find it with infallible certainty. Free debate is therefore both legitimate and necessary, and given the conditions of modern mass society, political pluralism may have to be institutionalized in political parties and associations to become effective.

However, there are clear limits to legitimate diversity and pluralism from the Islamic viewpoint: they are defined by God’s law and revelation. Debate must fall short of any radical critique of religion, or its dominant interpretations, which is readily denounced as blasphemy, heresy (kufur), or apostasy (ridda). The crucial issues of religious authority and effective power of definition are largely left unaddressed. As long as the religious categories of truth and falsehood, right
and wrong, licit and illicit are used to evaluate political opinions and decisions, political pluralism remains confined to what the powers-that-be define as consistent with the public order, which in its turn can be identified with prevalent understandings of religion, custom and morals.

See also Pluralism: Legal and Ethno-Religious.

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Gudrun Krämer

POETRY, LITERATURE See Arabic Literature; Persian Language and Literature; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry

POLITICAL ISLAM

Political Islam is the phrase used to denote a wide range of individuals and associations dedicated to the transformation of state and society so as to make them “Islamic.” The term also refers to Islam conceived as a set of beliefs, a code of conduct, or a repertory of images and metaphors relevant to politics, as well as to various attempts to define an “Islamic state” or “Islamic order.”

The “Islamic Trend”

Like any other term that is used to define the broad and heterogeneous “Islamic trend,” such as Islamism, integralism, and even more so, fundamentalism, the term “political Islam” is problematic and contested. “Islamism,” as the most comprehensive term, has the benefit of being largely value-free. It describes the fact that “Islamists” advocate the establishment of an “Islamic order” (nizam Islami) that is usually defined by the “application of the shari'a,” that is, the implementation of Islam’s divinely ordained moral and legal code regulating all human activity, including the organization of state and society. It does not indicate how they intend to establish such an order. For example, it does not specify whether they consider the use of force to be legitimate, nor does it say whether they would use, or even privilege, the political sphere in their activities. It also says nothing specific about their concept of shari'a, or about the precise nature of the Islamic state or system they wish to establish. While the term is mostly applied to groups and associations, including political parties, individuals can also be labeled Islamists. To the extent that Islamists engage in politics, they are part of political Islam. An alternative term, “integralism,” is derived from the French, where it is more commonly used than Islamism. Both terms are, by and large, synonymous.

On the other hand, “fundamentalism” generally carries highly negative connotations, reflecting a whole set of traits and attitudes. Chief among these is a literalist, or scripturalist, reading of the normative texts (scripture or revelation; in the present case, the Qur'an and sunna) that tends to reject all kinds of allegorical, mythical, mystical, or modernist exegesis as fundamentally wrong and illegitimate. The term also implies a common assumption that not only is there only one truth, but that the fundamentalists have a monopoly of this truth; a lack of tolerance of different opinions and interpretations flowing from this conviction; and a propensity to resort to violence if their reading of scripture and, more generally, their understanding of the faith, is challenged or threatened, be it from within the community or from without. In view of this cluster of negative attributes, it should be emphasized that a fundamentalist understanding of the faith need not be accompanied by militancy, nor does it necessarily entail political activism. In other words, fundamentalists can be either activist or quietist. If reserved for those Islamists who advocate a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, irrespective of their stand on politics in general and violence in particular, “fundamentalism” can serve as a meaningful analytical term in an Islamic as well as in any other context.

“Political Islam” designates that particular segment of the broader Islamist trend (Ar. al-tayyar al-islami) that is active in the political sphere. Political Islam is not synonymous with violent, radical, or extremist Islamism, and it is not restricted to opposition groups. The spectrum ranges from advocates of an Islamic republic to sympathizers of an Islamic monarchy or a resuscitated caliphate, and from self-declared liberals to uncompromising conservatives. Some Islamists are commonly classified as moderate or pragmatic, others as radical, militant, or extremist. For practical reasons, the term is best used for organized groups, movements, and parties, keeping in mind that there may be considerable numbers of individuals who share the basic objectives and assumptions of political Islam without being affiliated to any particular group or party.

Intellectual Origins: The Salafiyya

Political Islam is one of the most conspicuous, and at the same time most controversial, phenomena of modern Muslim societies. It builds on earlier reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which in their turn took up core concerns of major reformers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The reformers included Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762), Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab...
displaced by a triumphant West only because of its superior material power.

As an intellectual force, the Salafiyya exerted considerable influence on (Sunni) Muslim reformers from Morocco to Hadramaut, India, Turkestan, and Java. Organizationally speaking, however, it was a weak, loosely connected group of urban scholars and intellectuals based in the major cities of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, as well as their colleagues, friends, and family. Major figures in the movement included Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935). The Salafiyya made systematic use of the newly emerging press and book market, disseminating their writings over much of the Islamic world within a relatively short period of time. However, they were not linked to any formal association or party, and consequently there was no mass support for the ideas and ideals that they espoused.

**Ideologues of Political Islam: al-Banna, Maududi, and Qutb**

Political Islam proper came into existence after the First World War, with the emergence of organized movements that reached beyond the limited circles of Muslim scholars, writers, and journalists. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was among the most influential of these movements, and its leader, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), became one of the best-known representatives of political Islam. Founded in 1928 in the Egyptian provincial town of Ismailiya, the Muslim Brotherhood (jama‘at al-ikhwan al-muslimin) grew from a rather insignificant association dedicated to moral reform into a broad-based mass movement that made a considerable impact on Egyptian society and politics. Over a period of several decades, it also expanded into several Arab countries, from Sudan to Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Hasan al-Banna excelled as the charismatic leader of his organization, but he was not an innovative thinker, and is mostly remembered for his activism, not for his contribution to Islamic thought.

The opposite could be said of two of the most prominent figures of political Islam of the interwar and the post-World War II period: Abu l-A`la` Maududi (1903–1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Both of these men were prolific writers, journalists, and to a lesser extent also political activists, the former in his native India and Pakistan, the latter in Egypt. Their major works continue to be read all over the Islamic world. Living under very different circumstances, in societies that had little in common except for having been under British colonial rule, these men nevertheless shared certain convictions concerning modern society, and they introduced certain key terms that have since become part and parcel of the Islamist vocabulary.

Perhaps foremost of these terms was their conception of sovereignty, which they attributed exclusively to God (hakimiyya). From His sovereign authority flows the moral
and legal code that regulates human affairs. This is the *shari‘a*, as it is contained in the Qur’an and sunna. Every Muslim believer is, thus, able to discover God’s law by studying revelation, and is obligated to apply this law to his or her own life. From this perspective, it follows that all human attempts to create rules and laws of their own design are not only futile, but are also illegitimate. Such attempts constitute a heinous sin, for they manifest the human will to set oneself up as God’s equal, if not as God’s rival. Making and following laws other than the *shari‘a* is therefore a sign of heresy and polytheism (*shirk*) and must be dealt with as such. For both Maududi and Qutb, contemporary Muslims had neglected their religious duties to such an extent that they had fallen back into a state of (religious) ignorance (*jabiliyya*). If this ignorance could be excused at the time before revelation, it is no longer forgivable, for all men and women are now capable of hearing the truth and obeying the Lord. Contemporary Muslims therefore are Muslims by name only. In reality, they have renounced Islam and have reverted to unbelief (*kufr*).

Both Maududi and Qutb spoke of the possibility to practice *takfir*, that is, to exclude (“nominal”) Muslims from the community of believers (often described as “excommunication”). Yet they were much more reluctant than many of their followers to call for violent measures against these defective Muslims, and were similarly reluctant to propagate *takfir* and jihad against society as a whole. They did, however, declare un-Islamic any government that imposed laws and practices not exclusively based on the *shari‘a* and insisted on the duty of all true Muslims to fight with all their might for the establishment of an Islamic order based on the *shari‘a*.

The radical stand taken by Sayyid Qutb in the late 1950s and early 1960s is often explained by the ruthless suppression that the Muslim Brotherhood in general, and Qutb in particular, suffered at the hands of the Free Officer regime. The Free Officer movement came to power in Egypt in July 1952 and quickly turned against all potential critics and rivals, including the Muslim Brothers who had initially supported their coup. The Brotherhood likened its experience of persecution, torture, and exile to the trial and tribulations (*mi‘barra*) suffered by such venerated figures as Ahmad b. Hanbal (780–855) at the hands of Muslim rulers in earlier times, and they left a lasting imprint on both the collective memory and the individuals concerned. Qutb’s vastly influential book, *Mā‘lim fi l-tarīq* (Signposts), was written in prison, and Qutb himself was executed in 1966, becoming a martyr to his cause. Maududi, from whom Qutb had adopted and adapted the notions of *bakimiyya*, *jabiliyya*, and *takfir* had been fortunate enough to work under much more auspicious circumstances, for he endured no such hardships. State persecution can thus help to explain the attractiveness of militant Islamism to certain parts of the public, as evidenced by Qutb’s radicalization, but Maududi’s example shows that radical positions cannot be reduced to the effects of persecution.

Under Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s regime (1952–1970), the Muslim Brotherhood was severely suppressed inside Egypt. In Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, by contrast, sister organizations were mostly able to function within the given political framework. In the 1970s, Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (1918–1981) revised Nasser’s course in favor of a more open Egyptian political economy. After rapprochement with the United States and ultimately peace with Israel, the Muslim Brothers were able to reorganize, though they were never granted official recognition. Their past experience of violent confrontations with the government had resulted in terrible losses, and the majority of activists opted for a return to a reformist strategy. The new focus was to be on spreading the message of Islam (*da‘wa*) by all possible means and in all possible arenas. The Brotherhood began to use the media and the educational system more effectively, and to engage in social and charitable work, in professional syndicates, trade unions, and other associations of “civil society.” Muslim Brothers also participated in local and national elections, and for that purpose even entered into coalitions with legally recognized political parties. They did not attempt to found a political party of their own, however, even though Islamists in other parts of the Muslim world—from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to Turkey, Pakistan, and Malaysia—were willing and able to do so.

The Islamic Revolution and Its Aftermath

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 had an enormous impact on the Muslim world, and on Islamist activists more particularly. It seemed to prove that in spite of the Egyptian experience, a system as powerful and repressive as the Iranian monarchy could be overthrown and replaced by an Islamic republic, provided that the Islamist movement had strong leadership, an effective organization, and the support of the masses. For accomplishing this feat, the revolutionaries led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) were admired well beyond Islamist circles. Still, Khomeini’s theory of the “guardianship of the jurisconsultant” (*velayat-e faqīh*) that vested the most qualified Shi‘ite cleric with political power, remained controversial among the highest-ranking Shi‘ite scholars, and entirely unacceptable to their Sunni counterparts. Islamists drew inspiration from the initial success of the Iranian revolution, hoping to follow its example in their own countries. However, with the exception of certain Shi‘ite organizations like Hizb Allah in Lebanon, which initially propagated *velayat-e faqīh* but later adopted different models of an “Islamic order,” most Islamists generally avoided comment on the Iranian model of government, declaring it to be suited to Shi‘ite traditions perhaps, but not to Sunni Islam.

In the wake of the Iranian revolution, Islamist opposition groups and movements grew more active even in those parts of the Muslim world where previously they had not been very prominent or visible. They arose or became stronger in the Maghrib, Lebanon and Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and different parts of Central and Southeast Asia. If previously there had
been individuals and associations advocating an “Islamic solution” to the ills of state, culture, and society in all of these areas, they had not engaged in the same kind of organized, and often militant, activity that became the hallmark of the 1980s. Yet even after 1979, political Islam remained highly diversified in terms of ideology, strategy, and organization. At no point did there emerge an Islamist “International” capable of coordinating Islamist activities around the globe. While there clearly existed cross-links between various groups and individuals, individual groups mostly continued to operate within a regional order that was defined by the existing state boundaries.

In the 1980s, militant Islam was on the rise and receiving much attention. The assassination of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981; the abortive Islamic uprising in Syria in 1982; violent clashes between Islamist activists and the state authorities in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Pakistan, and other parts of the Islamic world; the formation of Hizb Allah and HAMAS in Lebanon and Palestine, respectively, all contributed to the impression that the Islamic world might be swept by a revolutionary tide originating in Iran. It did not happen. Even in the 1980s, militant Islamism constituted only one segment of the ever-broadening “Islamic trend.” The majority of Islamists continued to follow a pragmatic path, combining energetic activities in the public sphere (da’wa) with grassroots social work as well as economic and political activities of various kinds, including local and national politics. The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, the National Islamic Front in Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Reform Movement in Yemen, the Salvation Party in Turkey, the Jama’at-i Islami in Pakistan, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia, and numerous other organizations advocated a pragmatic strategy of nonviolence without completely excluding the use of force where and when it was deemed necessary.

These organizations did not necessarily shrink from using pressure or even intimidation in order to implement their ideas of proper conduct. Such measures were mostly directed against women, artists, and intellectuals. At the same time, they condemned takfir of Muslims and armed jihad against the government. Despite serious setbacks in the 1990s, when Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front was prevented from winning an electoral majority in 1992, and Turkey’s Salvation Party was forced by the military establishment to dissolve and reorganize under a different name, the pragmatic or “moderate” strategy was upheld by most Islamists throughout the final two decades of the twentieth century.

The same seemed to hold true for the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The terrorist attack revealed the existence of a new kind of transnational Islamist network that was able to recruit and operate within the Islamic world as well as outside of it. Its links to existing Islamist leaders and organizations have yet to be systematically explored. What can be said is that, within the Muslim world, and not just among Islamists, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were admired by many for their sheer boldness and unprecedented effectiveness. At the same time, even radical Islamists were appalled by the loss of life, condemning the indiscriminate use of violence against innocent men and women as utterly un-Islamic.

The Islamic Alternative: Visions of an “Islamic Order”

Political Islam draws much of its strength and support from its critique of the existing power relations, blatant injustices, and rampant corruption both within the various Muslim states and societies and globally. More particularly, Islamists present Islam as the only alternative to the world’s existing powers and ideologies, from capitalism to communism, and from liberalism to fascism. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and the West more generally have been identified as the most powerful external enemy of Islam. Within the Muslim world, secularism is singled out as the most dangerous internal threat to Muslim identity and authenticity, notions that have high priority on the Islamist agenda. Most of the themes and slogans put forth by Islamists have to be judged within the framework of this competition with other powers and ideologies, both within the Muslim world and beyond. With the spread and intensification of globalization, however, distinctions between internal and external trends and elements have become increasingly difficult to make.

With the exception of Iran and Afghanistan, Islamist opposition movements have not been able to overthrow the ruling regimes under which they have arisen, nor to replace such regimes with Islamic republics. The 1989 military coup in Sudan may have been staged with the help of the National Islamic Front led by Hasan al-Turabi (b.1932), but the resultant government was not controlled by the Islamists. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which in several respects conforms to Islamist ideas, was founded as a result of dynastic conquest, not of an Islamic revolution. In most other states with significant Muslim populations, or a Muslim majority, Islamist groups and parties have been kept under close state control and restrained as much as possible as autonomous political actors. In national elections Islamists in several instances have been able to win as much as twelve to twenty percent of the vote, but as a rule they have not been allowed to play an independent role in parliament, let alone to join the government. Turkey, Morocco, Kuwait, Yemen, and Lebanon are among the few exceptions here. The fact that Islamists outside of Iran have proved unable to stage a revolution and to capture power in the aftermath of 1979, combined with the fact that in both Iran and Afghanistan their performance fell well short of expectations, has led a number of observers to declare the “failure of political Islam.”

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Political Islam may well have failed, at least when politics is narrowly defined, but such a judgement completely ignores the very deep impact Islamist themes, demands, and activities have had on public debates, social behavior and legal practices all over the Muslim world and among expatriate Muslim communities. Islamist activists may have been prevented from playing an independent political role in most of their home countries, but their concerns have been adapted in various ways by the ruling elites, whether as consciously employed “Islamic” language, symbols, and imagery (using Islamic formula in their public speeches, building mosques and Islamic schools, restoring Islamic monuments, and so on), or as acts of ostentatious piety (praying in front of TV cameras, going on pilgrimage, or giving up trivial pursuits and “immoral” entertainment or alcohol) to present themselves as devout Muslims.

In a significant number of states (including Pakistan, Egypt, and Sudan, as well as individual member states of Malaysia and Nigeria), the *shari‘a*, or rather legal codes presented as such, were introduced in the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Women protesting the introduction of discriminating “Islamic” legislation in the sphere of family law were threatened by radical Islamists, including conservative ulema, and insufficiently protected by their governments. Critical intellectuals and academics were silenced and their works were either censored or banned by governments fearing Islamist challenges to their Islamic credentials. The adoption of so-called Islamic dress spread widely, even against deliberate government attempts to ban its use in schools, universities, and public administration. Religious practices from fasting to prayer and the hajj intensified in many areas and social milieux. In light of these developments, which affected the public as much as the private domains, Islamism in general and political Islam in particular have been tremendously successful.

This was possible because, contrary to widespread perceptions, Islamist ideas have not been restricted to militant opposition movements, but have been shared by a considerable portion of the broader Muslim public. With its combination of catchy slogans (“Islam is the solution,” “application of the *shari‘a*,” “the Qur’an is our constitution,” and the like), its commitment to social and charitable work, and its occasional application of pressure and intimidation, Islamism has appealed not just to the young, the desperate, and the uneducated, but also to many members of the urban middle class. It has found a sympathetic hearing from government officials as well as the well-educated, affluent, and widely traveled professionals, academics, and businesspeople, including active representatives of civil society. The term “political Islam” is, for practical reasons, mostly applied to organized movements, which as a rule have to work in opposition to the regimes in power, but the ideas and demands implicit in the phrase have permeated large sections of society, and have even influenced government policies, at least in the legal and social fields. Foreign policy and security affairs have been less affected by Islamist concerns, which tend to focus on Islamic solidarity, a vociferous critique of the West, and hostility to Israel. It is in domestic politics that the Islamist impact has been most deeply felt. It remains to be seen to what extent the failure of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the unimpressive economic and social record of the Islamic Republic of Iran will reduce the appeal of political Islam in other parts of the world.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Fundamentalism; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Islam and Islamic Law; Maududi, Abu l-A‘la‘; Qutb, Sayyid; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran; Salafiyya; Secularization; Shari‘a.

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_Gudrun Krämer_

**POLITICAL ORGANIZATION**

The primary model for Muslim political organization has been the early Muslim community in Medina, ruled by the prophet Muhammad, whose foundation in 622 C.E. marks the year 1 of the Muslim calendar. Rather than maintaining the segmentary system of tribal organization, it demanded that all residents submit to the authority of the Apostle of the Faith and accorded second-class status to non-Muslims. Muslims tend to evaluate all further political developments according to how closely they replicate Muhammad’s precepts, example, and the life of the early community. Many political changes have occurred since then, but they have been legitimized by their congruity with Medinan precedents.
The enormous conquests of the first Muslim century created two new problems: the nature of leadership in the absence of the Prophet, and the relationship between the few Muslims and the vastly more numerous and sophisticated conquered peoples. The first problem was solved rather simply, by the institution of a monarchy (khilāfah; “caliphate”), initially elective and subsequently hereditary. Disputes over qualifications and selection processes generated divisions in the community: Kharijites wanted to select on merit, choosing the best Muslim as leader, Shi’ites demanded a ruler from the Prophet’s family who shared his charisma; while the majority Sunnis settled for whoever could maintain order in the community, by force if necessary.

The caliphs adopted many characteristics of non-Muslim monarchs but were legitimated by their claims to relationship with Muhammad and by their enforcement of the law of God. Over time the caliphs were weakened and finally eliminated (1258), but at first they were assisted, then dominated, by warlords who used the titles emir and sultan. These warlords eventually took the title of caliph for themselves. The elimination of the caliphate caused political unity to disappear, but cultural relations continued to unite the Muslim world. In the twelfth century some sultans became kings, while others were replaced by presidents and premiers. Ideologically, some Muslims see only the caliphs as legitimate political successors to Muhammad, but most believe that the politics of the community that arose immediately after Muhammad’s death were not binding on future generations. Substitutes for Muhammad’s religious leadership are found in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s example (sunna) and their interpreters, the ulema.

The second problem, the relationship with non-Muslims, was less tractable. Political subjugation of non-Muslims was accomplished through disarmament, discriminatory taxation (jizya, kharaj), and the imposition of civil disabilities. Non-Muslims were afforded a legitimate, if secondary, status in Islamic administration; they could serve as government bureaucrats, tax farmers (private contractors for tax collection), or auxiliary troops, but could not hold primary power. If they bore arms, they were excused from jizya. Since most non-Muslims were accustomed to subject status in imperial systems, this was not a difficult transition for them.

Culturally, however, this order of subordination was reversed. Non-Arabs and non-Muslims, having been fully literate for centuries, even millennia, surpassed their conquerors in most fields: agricultural and craft techniques; urbanization and social stratification; cooking and building; literature, art, music, and dance; theological and legal argumentation; administration and record-keeping; royal governance; and court protocol. Three Arab achievements drew general admiration, however. These were poetry, which became the model for non-Arabic poetry as well; military prowess, at least in the first century; and the revelation of Islam, which trumped all the rest.

The cultural assimilation of Arabs to non-Arab civilization, accompanied by resistance from purists, became an entrenched cultural pattern in Muslim society from the first. This conflict shaped the atmosphere in which political development took place. Since the purists held the high moral ground, every step toward the adoption of sophisticated governmental techniques that had not been practiced in Medina was disguised, awkwardly over-justified, and incessantly challenged.

Medieval Islamic Government
Initially, convinced Muslims were few. To achieve his conquests, the caliph ‘Umar (634–644) recruited nominal converts and Christian Arabs into the army, but rewarded Muslim fighters by establishing a salary register (diwan) that listed combatants (plus dependents and the Prophet’s relatives) in order of conversion with the earliest Muslim converts receiving the most pay. When the caliph ‘Uthman (644–656) reversed this order in favor of members of the Quraysh tribe because of their administrative expertise, Islam’s great civil war was ignited, leading to the split between the Sunni and Shi’ite factions. Greater administrative development was the work of the Umayyads (661–750). They adopted the Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies and their land and tax records, which were translated into in Arabic beginning in 697 C.E. They developed an Islamic coinage, replacing images of kings with sacred texts. They created a standing army whose commanders became provincial governors responsible for political, military, fiscal, and religious duties. As their conquests grew more extensive, they raised the caliph from tribal chief to emperor and adopted imperial court protocol and organization. The main palace official, the chamberlain or bajib was responsible for guarding the curtain separating the caliph from his subjects, thus regulating access to the ruler.

The revolution ushering in the Abbasid dynasty (750–945) was based in part on religious resistance to the adoption of “foreign” political practices, but such practices nevertheless continued. The Abbasids were famed for their pomp and splendor, based on the wealth of Iraq, which they made their capital region. They presided over the development of Islamic law and court systems, co-opting the ulema into the bureaucracy and imposing upon them responsibilities for urban administration and taxation, despite the ulema’s own misgivings about serving secular rulers. A second governmental element, the scribes, were organized in bureaus (also called diwans) headed by the wazir (prime minister). The scribes were often non-Arab and were influenced by non-Muslim culture. Pre-Islamic political thought provided models for imperial governance, and provincial scribes employed pre-Islamic forms of taxation and reporting. A scribal culture of encyclopedic knowledge and cosmopolitan politesse developed at court, conveyed in the literature of adab, which
blended Islamic and non-Islamic influences. The third administrative element was the military. Military commanders held provincial governorships and ministerial posts, while their subordinates governed local areas.

Imperial organization, court protocol, and standardized taxation were justified in Islamic terms with quotations from the Qur'an and from the Muslim tradition as embodied in the Kitab al-ğabaraj (Book of taxation) of Abu Yusuf (d. 798). Conversion and settlement altered the early system, in which conquered non-Muslims paid taxes to the ruling Arab Muslims. As more people converted to Islam, political distinctions between Arab and non-Arab Muslims were eliminated. All Muslims, regardless of origin, paid tithe (’usbr) unless they acquired non-Muslims' lands. In that case, they paid the non-Muslims' higher land tax (kbaraj). Jizya, initially a communal tribute, became a poll tax paid by military-age non-Muslim males in lieu of service. Non-Muslim groups retained their communal structure and personal law (administered by the clergy) but used Islamic courts for state-related purposes, although their testimony was supposedly invalid. Islamic law (sbr’at) in its various schools (madhab) systematized the interpretation of Qur’an and sunna and was administered in Islamic courts under Muslim judges (qadis). Royal courts (mazalim), administered by the ruler, adjudicated problems outside Islamic law, such as treason and governmental corruption, carrying on an ancient tradition of justice based on custom and rulers' edicts ('urf).

In the Abbasid period the Arab military force united by religious and tribal ties was replaced by a standing army of Khurasanian troops and a caliphal bodyguard of slave (mamluk, gbulam) soldiers, mainly of Turkish origin. At the same time, taxation became politicized, that is, the right to collect certain taxes became a political reward. This system, called iqtat (“division,” apportionment of revenues), was soon used to reward the military forces, allowing the new military groups access to money and land and creating a new aristocracy (not quite feudal, as the new “aristocrats” had no responsibility for the lands or people from which their revenues came). Iqtat holders lived in the cities, patronizing culture and religion. They collected revenue in the countryside but left peasant producers to their own devices, widening the gap between urban and rural cultures.

Members of this aristocracy became provincial governors uncontrollable by Abbasid civil administration, and independent emirates soon emerged, such as the Samanids in Transoxiana (874–999). These local dynasties sent no revenues to the caliph, even if they acknowledged his nominal authority, but they copied the Abbasids’ administration and slave army. In 945 C.E., even the capital, Baghdad, was captured by Shi’ite warlords, the Buyid emirs (945–1055); nearly simultaneously Cairo was taken by rival Isma’ilis caliphs, the Fatimids (969–1171). The Abbasid caliph became a figurehead, dispensing legitimation for the warlords, who held the actual power. They multiplied their followers by broadening the iqtat system. The military bureaus of the administration expanded to manage iqtat’s, and provincial bureaucracies developed.

The Impact of Nomad Invasions

The replacement of the Buyids by a series of nomadic Turkish and Mongol dynasties was facilitated by their adoption of Buyid-style iqtat’s and Abbasid-style bureaucratic government. Speaking no Arabic and little Persian, the invaders replaced local iqtat holders with their own men, but they depended on indigenous administrators, sbr’at courts, and local authorities to govern the realm. This pattern lasted through numerous invasions and replacements of governing regimes until the modern period.

Politics at the center became a matter of competition for the throne among members of the royal house and jostling for power and wealth among the dynasty’s supporters. As the historian Ibn Khaldun observed, during and immediately after the initial takeover the ruling group was united in pursuit of conquest and control, but over time fragmentation of power and competition from other interests weakened group cohesion, permitting conquest from outside or internal takeovers. In the tug-of-war between cohesion and dissolution, centrifugal forces included hereditary devolution of office or iqtat, tribal disaffection, unjust treatment and consequent loss of loyalty, and neglect of irrigation or blockage of trade routes, leading to decreases in revenue. Conversely, rulers exercised control by building up revenue in their own treasuries, rewarding their followers generously, maintaining the infrastructure, putting down crime and rebellion, ensuring the proper functioning of administrative and legal systems, and supporting the symbols of religion: the caliph (until 1258), the ulema, and Islamic law. Equally important was the relationship between the regime’s officials and local authorities who were respected by the common people.

Peasants, tribemen, and city-dwellers were insulated from dynastic and court politics by a layer of local notables (a’yân). These men—large landholders, rich merchants, ulema, members of old elites superseded by new conquerors—acted as intermediaries between the government and the people, presenting the people’s needs to the new rulers, providing information on local conditions and revenues, and interpreting royal decrees locally. The a’yân were connected by family, educational and sectarian commonalities, marriage relations, and patronage. Patronage also built vertical hierarchies with the people of town and village, and with members of the ruling elite.

Provincial politics was largely based upon patron-client relations passed down through generations, within which marital politics had an important part. Although women possessed no political rights in medieval Muslim society, they played a significant political role through creating family alliances, transmitting information, and preserving property.
within the family. In rural areas these relations were compounded by debt patronage, as large landholders and urban tax farmers loaned money, seed, and draft animals to peasant farmers, using the future crop as collateral. Tribal clientage, ever-shifting and based on power and wealth, determined nomadic politics. These relations, and the local power struggles to which they gave rise, continued independently of whoever held the capital or sat on the throne. Since they were inseparable from the revenue-producing system, they were only disturbed from above when the revenue stream was interrupted by oppression or diverted by corruption, or when the fortunes of war brought battling armies to a particular location.

The Seljuk Turks, who conquered Baghdad in 1055, ruled Iraq, Iran, and Syria for a century and dominated Asia Minor for two. Despite their origin as Central Asian tribal nomads (considered rude and barbarous by contemporaries), they wove all these disparate political elements into a single system. As Sunni Muslims, they supported the caliph and the religious establishment, unlike the Buyids and Fatimids, whose Shi’ism ran counter to the dominant religious trend.

The Seljuks also employed a professional scribal staff, which expanded as the regime split into several autonomous kingdoms. The scribal cadre’s ideas on governance, derived from Abbasid and even pre-Islamic precedents, harnessed imperial and tribal ideologies and practices to an Islamic vision of governance and the creation of a just Muslim society. These ideas were expressed in the wazir Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasat-nama (The Book of Governance) and the teacher al-Ghazali’s Nasibat al-Muluk (Counsel for Kings), and were made the basis of administration at all levels through dissemination to governors and officials in royal edicts. An official called emir-e dad presided over the mazalim court, dispensing justice on issues outside Islamic law. The Seljuks replaced their tribal military forces with a salaried slave bodyguard and a standing army supported by iqta’s, giving iqta’ holders greater responsibility for security and prosperity on their iqta’s and granting military commanders important positions as governors and tutors of royal princes. They also presided over a restoration of agriculture through irrigation works, reversing temporarily the economic decline of the central Islamic lands. They recruited Sunni ulema to serve as administrators and judges, and their construction of mosques and Islamic colleges (madrasas) and expansion of pious foundations (waqff) gave the ulema employment and financial security.

A letter attributed to the wazir Nizam al-Mulk recommended care for irrigation systems and water sources so that blessing and abundance would not depart from the world. The wazir under the Seljuks advanced from head finance officer and bureaucrat to become a kind of co-ruler, the highest ranking of the non-Turks. He headed an administration modeled on that of the Abbasids and their successors, the Samanids and the Ghaznavids of Afghanistan (976–1186). The Seljuks abolished the barid, but probably later reinstated it. Both the Abbasids and Samanids also had a bureau for the “crown lands” that went under various names (diya, khass). The Samanids had separate bureaus for the market inspector (mufradat) and pious foundations (awqaf); the Seljuks developed separate bureaus for iqta’s (mugnad’at) and confiscations (mufradat).

The central government’s administrative bureaus included a diwan al-a’la, bureau of the wazir; diwan al-kharaj or diwan al-istifa’, finance bureau; diwan al-insha’ or diwan al-ughra, correspondence bureau; diwan al-ibraf, bureau of inspection; and diwan al-arid, bureau of the army. The Ghaznavids had a bureau for the royal household (wikala). The Abbasids and Samanids had a bureau for the post system (barid), which also encompassed a system of spies, whose job was to notify the ruler if the powerful were oppressing the weak. The chief officials besides the wazir were the treasurer (mustazufi) and the chamberlain, keeper of the royal household (wakil or emir al-hajib); civil bureau heads were paralleled by the heads of military contingents and guard corps. Some provinces were bureaucratically governed; others remained under their own local dynasties. The offices of provincial governor and treasurer were sometimes combined, but more often they were separated for firmer central control. The few civil officials in the province were outnumbered by the military, which was dispersed throughout the province both for security purposes and for pasturage for their horses.

The administration of the Seljuks was admired and imitated by all their successor states, from the Ayyubids of Egypt (1171–1250) to the Khwarazmshahs of Transoxiana (1150–1220). The most important initiators were the Ilkhanids (1258–1335) and the Mamluks (1250–1517).

The Mongol Ilkhanids ruled the northern Middle East from Anatolia to Iran and Central Asia. They initially exploited this territory as a reservoir of resources, but under several great Persian wazirs they adopted an organization like that of the Seljuks. Originally all officials had Mongol supervisors and all taxes were sent to Mongolia, but later the region became administratively independent from the Mongol homeland. Since its terrain would not support the Mongols’ nomadic economy, iqta’s were assigned to the military forces. Persian, Mongol, Chinese, Armenian, and Jewish administrators kept records in Persian and drew up manuals for government secretaries that became models of bureaucratic procedure for future generations.

Although the Mongol Empire soon fragmented, the successor states preserved Ilkhanid organization on a smaller scale; Jalayirid and Akkoyulu copies of Ilkhanid secretarial and finance manuals still exist in Turkish libraries. As for the Mamluks, their fiscal administration was unique due to the peculiarities of Nile Valley agriculture, but their secretarial and judicial organizations show Seljuk influences. They too produced influential correspondence and finance manuals,
compiling traditions of the past and changes introduced by the Mamluk regime.

The Early Modern Period

Beginning in the sixteenth century, Ilkhanid and Mamluk administrative traditions were combined in the three major empires of the early modern Middle East: Ottoman (1299–1923), Safavid (1501–1732), and Mogul (1526–1857). The sixteenth century was a time of population growth, urbanization, monetarization of the economy, and technological advancement; it was also a time of political and commercial expansion and increased governmental stability. Like contemporary European countries, the Ottomans, Safavids, and Moguls expanded through conquest and trade, creating stable empires that lasted centuries rather than decades. Long-lived ruling families traded the charisma of military prowess for dynastic legitimacy, proclaiming absolute rule but actually sharing power with family members and top administrators. The palace and harem replaced the military camp as centers of power. Women became political actors in their roles as rulers’ wives and mothers, and as guardians of minor heirs. Administrators and courtiers grew in influence, and rebels and rivals were co-opted and incorporated through power-sharing. Court politics became not just a struggle for power but a contest over policies.

The greatest development of bureaucratic administration came under the Ottoman timar system. In the late fourteenth century, timars succeeded iqta’s as economic support for the cavalry forces. Timars were individual land revenue assignments whose sizes reflected the ranks of the holders and were determined by a revenue survey held once every generation. Sultanic agents recorded all revenue sources—crops, herds, mills, fisheries, mines, manufactories, jizya and extraordinary levies, commercial taxes—and the names and obligations of all taxpayers. Survey results were recorded in registers of taxes assessed (mujflasal defters) and timars allocated (ijm at defters), and timar holders were authorized to collect only the amounts recorded in the registers, plus some fees and fines. They were also responsible for police duties in their timars and could be mustered for military service during the campaigning season.

Timars were reassigned regularly to prevent formation of local ties and could be revoked for transgressing the registers or local regulations (qanun). Qanuns were compilations of sultanic decrees and local customs or conditions (especially tax rates) in force when an area was conquered; over time they were modified to accord with Islamic law. They were administered locally by qadis (officially appointed judges), working together with provincial governors whose soldiers enforced the judges’ decisions. Qanun and defter thus governed the state’s relationship with both timar holders and peasants, and their imposition marked an area’s incorporation into the Ottoman system.

Urban areas were also surveyed, but their revenues were usually assigned to provincial governors (beylerbey) or district governors (sanjakbey), who supported their retinues from these larger allocations (khass). The retinues performed police and guard duties. Governors also commanded provincial or district troops on campaign. Subordinate officers received medium-sized timars called zameets. The sultan’s khass until the mid-sixteenth century comprised half of the empire’s revenues and paid the expenses of the palace, harem, and janissaries and other elements of the standing army and palace guard. Collection of urban revenues such as market taxes, tolls, customs dues, and manufacturing taxes was managed by agents or farmed out to wealthy merchants or moneylenders. Timar records show that the military forces and administrative cadres were diverse in origin, with members from many religions and ethnicities. All were united by a common culture called “the Ottoman way,” comprising religion, language, and etiquette, acquired through decades-long training in the palace, administration, or military service.

Besides organizing the timars, qanuns regulated the palace organization from at least the era of Mehmed the Conqueror. These qanuns and those regarding timars were updated by subsequent rulers. Suleyman the Magnificent was called “The Lawgiver” because in his reign the qanuns were reconciled with Islamic law and issued throughout the empire. Modifications continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, legitimized by reference to Mehmed and Suleyman. The judges administering them had a hierarchy of posts; top posts were reserved for those who had attended and taught at the best madrasas. The highest religious official (shaykh al-Islam), who oversaw the legal and educational hierarchies, also advised the sultan on the religious legitimacy of his decisions. He appointed preachers and guided the empire’s Sunni Muslim orientation.

In the late sixteenth century, gunpowder weapons initiated a military transformation from a cavalry aristocracy to an infantry recruited from the lower classes. Recruits were paid in cash rather than land grants, and increasingly taxes were collected in cash rather than kind. They could therefore be collected by government agents or private contractors rather than cavalry members, and administration gradually became demilitarized. In other strata, too, changing recruitment patterns altered traditional relationships. Troops recruited for the campaigning season and then discharged staged a series of rebellions, the “Jalali revolts,” and were defeated and co-opted only with difficulty. Janissaries stationed in the empire’s cities engaged in commerce, and urban merchants were recruited into the corps. Palace cavalrymen became tax farmers, commoners and slaves became scribes, and Muslim children entered the palace school for slaves. Simultaneously, economic distress struck the empire; rapid inflation and currency devaluation played havoc with state budgets and salaries. Old ways had to change, but traditional practices still legitimated the ruler and maintained the elite. Attempting to
alter too much too fast, as Osman II (1618–1622) did, risked violent resistance and deposition. Instead, devolution of power created political factions around statesmen satisfying the needs of elite groups, while sultans were reduced to arbitrating between these factions.

The dominance of the Köprülü faction after 1656 permitted administrative reform but led directly to war in 1683. Fiscal reforms in the 1690s instituted new jizya allotments and lifetime tax farms. These innovations improved government finances, but war revealed the empire’s military inadequacy. Eighteenth-century sultans adopted policies of reform, becoming in the process leaders of their own pro-change factions. Reform, however, came in Western dress, and anti-reform factions clung to traditionalism and Ottoman patriotism. Reforms were often more successful in the provinces, as governors far from Istanbul modernized their military forces and engaged in capitalist agriculture outside imperial oversight. This conflict of interests contributed to the provinces’ growing autonomy, as did an accumulation of wealth in the provinces.

The Safavid state, based on Shi’ite Islam, consisted of Turkish warriors, Persian administrators, and a bureaucratized religious hierarchy under a ruler (shah) who was also a spiritual master. The warriors, called Qizilbash, were followers of the Safavid Sufi order that conquered Iran and instituted the Shi’ite state. Defeat by the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514 shattered the myth of Safavid invincibility and world conquest. Over time, the shah’s charismatic authority and the Qizilbash’s political influence decreased, while the palace personnel and a slave army of Georgians, Circassians, and Armenians gained power. A council of officials conducted government business; law was administered by religious judges. Royal workshops produced goods for sale as well as artistic products, augmenting royal income. Provincial taxation followed traditional norms, but in provinces under direct royal control (whose number grew in the seventeenth century), the farming out of taxes to nongovernmental collectors led to overextraction and impoverishment. By the eighteenth century, military weakness permitted conquest by Afghan tribesmen who made themselves heirs of the Safavid system.

The Mughal dynasty of India was perhaps least affected by these trends. Muslims, though the rulers, were always a minority in the state, forcing emperors to balance imposition of Islamic governance against the need to conciliate Hindu officials and officers. By the 1570s Islamic-style bureaucratic administration gained prominence, but it administered less of the country’s revenue than elsewhere (about 60%), and that indirectly. In the mansabdari system, counterpart of the timar system, military administrators collected land revenues to cover their expenses, but between them and the peasants stood a layer of zamindars (large landholders and former nobility), who administered the land itself. Islamic law courts were provided by the state, but they shared legal jurisdiction with non-Islamic village, caste, and clan councils. Imperial politics was overwhelmingly a politics of the nobility, a competition among the religious, ethnic, and factional demands of the state’s powerful servants. Some rulers’ unwillingness to incorporate non-Muslim elites and/or their inability to provide care and protection to productive groups alienated their loyalties and contributed to state fragmentation and British takeover. Apparently, only the Ottoman state was both powerful enough and close enough to Islamic political norms to receive the caliphal title in the nineteenth century.

See also Caliphate; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Byzantine; Empires: Mongol and Il-Khanid; Empires: Mogul; Empires: Ottoman; Empires: Safavid and Qajar; Empires: Sassanian; Empires: Timurid; Empires: Umayyad; Qanun; Sultanates: Delhi; Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Sultanates: Mamluk; Sultanates: Seljuk.

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Linda T. Darling

POLITICAL THOUGHT

During the premodern period, Islamic political thought found expression in a diverse group of writings such as legal compendia, theological treatises, philosophical writings, literary works on the subject of statecraft, wisdom literature, historiography, and even poetry. In the modern period,
political thought may be found in some of these branches of literature, but also in separate works directly concerned with political topics, such as the nation state, government, constitutionalism, law, human rights, and the Islamic state.

The diffusion that characterizes the wide range of premodern political thinking results from many factors, two of which deserve particular mention. First, writers in the premodern period often treated aspects of politics and government not in isolation from other topics but in the context of larger subjects and a variety of intellectual disciplines. Second, the early Muslim community rapidly found itself dispersed among a culturally diverse set of peoples, and Muslims became heirs to the varied political cultures of the larger Middle East; these cultures contributed to the shaping and expression of the range of Islamic political ideas. In the wake of the conquests, and with the formation of an Islamic imperial order, Muslim polities had at their disposal, as Aziz al-Azmeh has put it, a “floating repertoire of immensely ancient and awesomely persistent institutions, metaphors, iconographies, and propositions concerning power, and most particularly concerning power in relation to the sacred, which they welded into distinctive forms.” (al-Azmeh 1997, p. 10)

The close association between religion and politics in much of the Islamic tradition, and the diversity of ways in which this association has been interpreted in Islamic history are also worthy of note. Much political thinking in the Islamic tradition takes as its point of departure the view that all sovereignty belongs to God, who alone governs the universe. (His is the “sovereignty over the heavens and the earth,” as the Qur’an states repeatedly.) Many Muslim thinkers came to agree that the role of human government was to ensure that God’s will, as expressed in the divine law, was enacted on earth. The ideal earthly ruler, called an imam, was a leader who ruled according to God’s laws and who was consequently entitled to the loyalty and obedience of his community. While these ideals have been widely expressed, Muslims have naturally differed in their understandings of the implications of the relationship between the religious and political realms. In fact, the historical experience of Muslim societies has generated a large repertoire of political ideas, many of which assume or accommodate themselves to certain premises or coalesce around certain themes, but which collectively constitute a wide-ranging body of thought.

The Qur’an
While the Qur’an, like other scriptures, does not treat political topics in a comprehensive way, it refers in several places to power and those who exercise it. The Qur’an presents sovereignty as a divine prerogative, and all forms of earthly authority (prophetic or political) are wholly dependent on God’s dispensation (see, for example, 3:26). This emphasis on the relativity of human forms of authority in relation to the divine reality is one that has left an imprint on many areas of the Islamic tradition, into the modern period. The most frequently invoked Qur’anic passage, in discussions of political matters, is 4:59: “Obey God, obey the Prophet, and those in authority among you.” This verse has been interpreted in some quarters as an injunction to obey rulers even if they are unjust, while other commentators have regarded the phrase “those in authority among you” as a reference only to holders of religious or religio-political authority. For a number of Sunni scholars, the Qur’anic phrase refers to religious scholars or ulema; in Shi’ite tradition, it refers to the imams. On the earthly plane, kingship is depicted as a great but sometimes treacherous boon that human beings are often predisposed to covet. Satan seeks to tempt Adam with the prospect of imperishable sovereignty (20:120); the Children of Israel were sometimes favored with both prophethood and kingship (for example, 5:20; 38:20); and Solomon prays for kingship (38:35). For those whom God leads astray, however, kingship is associated with overweening pride; Nimrod argues with Abraham over it (2:258), and Pharaoh boasts of his claim to the kingdom of Egypt (43:51).

Early Political Developments
Islamic political thought, as expressed in Qur’anic exegesis and elsewhere, evolved in conjunction with Muslims’ historical experiences. The history of the early Muslim community is one of extraordinary political success. After facing initial adversity, the prophet Muhammad went on to unify Arabia and to create a state based largely on ties of common religious allegiance. Muhammad was the leader of this early community (the ummah), and hence his role as God’s messenger was integrally linked with his role as political head of state. The early Islamic polity, moreover, continued to grow in the decades following the Prophet’s death in 632. It rapidly expanded to comprise the regions of the northern Middle East (Syria-Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran), and from there it spread across North Africa and into Spain, and eastwards into northern India. Although the pace of the expansion did not remain constant, Islamic political thought, like other branches of the Islamic tradition, was inevitably shaped by the experience of a success which seemed to validate the new dispensation and to attest divine favor towards the Muslim community. The construction on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem of the Dome of the Rock, completed under the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik in 691, suggests a striking confidence on the part of the city’s rulers in the stability and endurance of the Islamic polity.

In the period immediately following the death of the Prophet in 632, issues such as the nature of political leadership and the identity of the rightful holder of political authority were much disputed. The leaders who succeeded the Prophet were addressed as Commander of the Faithful (amir al-mu’minin) and bore the title of caliph (khalifa), a term which came to be understood as meaning deputy of, or successor to, the Prophet of God. The Prophet himself had
exercised both religious and political authority, the continuing conjoining of which formed the basis of the religio-political ideals of the Shi’ites. The early debates and struggles over leadership eventually crystallized in the emergence of distinct sectarian communities (generally grouped as Kharjijites, Shi’ites, and, eventually, Sunnis).

The Role of the Ulema

The institution that emerged most successfully from, or in the face of, these disagreements was that of the caliphate, exercised first by a series of respected individuals who had surrounded the Prophet, and, following the conclusion of the first civil war in 661, by dynastic families: the Umayyads (661–750) and, after a revolution, the ‘Abbasids (750–1258). It has been suggested that the early caliphs, including the Umayyads and early ‘Abbasids, may have expected to wield not only political authority but also some degree of religious authority as part of their office. The caliphs’ claims to religious authority encountered resistance, however, with the emergence of numbers of religious specialists, who came to be known collectively as the ulema (scholars) or “those possessed of religious learning” (‘ilm). As the Islamic polity grew in extent and in the diversity of its population, the claim of this new intellectual elite to religious leadership and authority among the Muslims of the empire was itself contested by some individuals who held that such authority should be centralized and held by the ruler, rather than by a number of loosely associated specialists over whom the ruler had little control. An argument for limiting the power of the ulema in favor of the caliph was advanced by the Persian convert Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d. c. 756), whose apparently unsolicited warnings to the caliph al-Mansur (754–775) went unheeded and were rarely repeated so plainly in later periods. One last attempt to wrest religious authority from the ulema was made under successive caliphs in the first half of the ninth century, in the course of the mihna, an inquisition during which prominent religious scholars were interrogated in order to establish their adherence or lack thereof to a particular theological doctrine; this attempt too failed, and its failure marked the voluntary or involuntary ceding of religious authority to the ulema.

The scholars formulated the religious law, the shari’a, with only incidental reference to the state, and it was chiefly when the political power located in the institution of the caliphate could no longer be taken for granted that jurists began to address larger political questions concerning the state and government. The collectivity of the Muslim community was invested with certain duties and responsibilities that could, under certain conditions or in times of political crisis, operate regardless of, or even in opposition to, the workings of the state. One such collective (and occasionally, individual) duty is that of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” (al-amr bil-ma’ruf wal-nabi’y an al-munkar), a duty that in the view of many Muslims fell, ideally, to the imam, but which could also require or justify rebellion against a ruler, as well as action taken by one Muslim against another without any involvement on the part of the state.

A related area of ambivalence towards the role of the state concerns the extent of the duty of obedience. Many medieval Sunni thinkers held that obedience was incumbent on Muslims, regardless of whether the ruler was just or tyrannical, pious or irreligious, as long as such obedience did not involve the subject in transgression of the shari’a. In this connection, it is important to note that many scholars held themselves aloof from political power. While some of the most influential political thinkers served the state as judges and in other capacities (for example, Abu Yusuf, Ibn al-Murtada, al-Mawardi), the refusal to serve the holders of political power retained prestige and was widely regarded as morally preferable, as numerous historical incidents, anecdotes and folk tales demonstrate.

The Formation of Shi’ite, Kharjijite, and Sunni Views of Political Leadership

The mainstream Shi’ite view of political leadership, subsumed in the doctrine of the imamate, regards certain Qur’anic texts and acts of the Prophet recorded in hadiths as proofs that the Prophet, contrary to most Sunni opinions, nominated as his successor his cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali. ‘Ali, however, had, according to Shi’ites, been wrongfully deprived of the position that was his due, with the result that the community had fallen into error. Following ‘Ali’s death in 661, Shi’ites held that only descendants of ‘Ali could claim the imamate. (Partly in order to distinguish between the rightful holders of authority and the actual ruling powers, Shi’ites refer to the persons whom they regard as their leaders as imams rather than as caliphs.) During the first two centuries of Islamic history, many Shi’ite groups attempted to seize power for their imams. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful (as was the case, most famously, with the challenge to Umayyad rule mounted by Husayn, a grandson of the Prophet, who was killed in 680), and Shi’ites were often ruthlessly suppressed.

In the course of the eighth century, most Shi’ites adopted a politically quietist stance, and they abandoned the attempt to establish general leadership for their imams, whom they continued to follow as leaders within their own communities. Shi’ites gradually developed a distinctive body of political ideas based on the concept of the imamate, which they came to regard as comprising both religious and political authority. Most Shi’ites belong to the Imami community, and believe that the last of their imams is now hidden, and therefore inaccessible to the vast majority of his followers. Even during the period of the presence of the imams, however, there appears to have been some dispute among Imami Shi’ites as to the extent of the imams’ authority. As the work of Hossein Modarressi suggests, the power of the imams was limited not only by the adverse conditions that confronted them and their followers, but also by the view held by some of their...
prominent supporters that the scope of their powers should be limited in theory as well as in practice.

Gradually, however, Imami Shi‘ites reached a consensus, agreeing that the role of the imamate was to provide comprehensive leadership over religious and worldly matters. Thus, under the leadership of the imam, the realms of religion and state were indistinguishable. The imam was not only the rightful political leader of the community, but he also possessed immunity from sin and error (‘isma). Accordingly, he was the rightful collector and distributor of religious taxes and the only legitimate leader of jihad, and, as heir to the knowledge of the Prophet, he possessed a complete and perfect knowledge of the religious law. After the onset of the occultation in the late ninth century (when the imam became hidden), however, Imami Shi‘ites could no longer turn to their imam directly, and they, like Sunnis, turned increasingly to their religious scholars for guidance in religious matters.

The Kharijites were hostile to both the Umayyad (and, later, to the ‘Abbaspd) and the Shi‘ite positions, and held that leadership belonged to the most excellent member of the community, regardless of his genealogy or background. A few believed that the office of the imamate could be held by a woman. Most Kharijites held that the imamate was obligatory, although some, most notably the Najdiyya, did not consider an imam necessary if the community were able to function in accordance with justice without one. (Some Mu‘tazilis and other thinkers similarly denied the obligatory nature of the imamate.) If the imam violated the divine law, most Kharijites held that he forfeited his legitimacy and had even lapsed into unbelief. The Kharijites continued to challenge the power of the Umayyads and the ‘Abbaspd for at least two centuries before those groups that survived retreated to remote areas and lived as separate, but generally quietist, communities.

The mainstream Sunni conception of the caliphate, consensus on which emerged gradually over the first four centuries of Islamic history, held that the Qur’an provided no specific injunctions regarding the leadership of the community after the Prophet’s death, and (although some prominent Sunni thinkers dissented from this position) that the Prophet had left no precise instructions on the matter. According to the mainstream view, the first Muslims responded to the Prophet’s death by recognizing one of their own members, Abu Bakr (d. 634), as the first caliph. He was to assume the functions of leading the Muslim community, but he was in no sense an heir to the Prophet’s religious authority; he was acclaimed by the bay‘a, an act by which his fellow Muslims acknowledged his leadership and pledged their allegiance. Abu Bakr was followed by three further individuals who had enjoyed close personal ties to the Prophet, after the last of whom, ‘Ali, a dynastic principle was adopted with the establishment of the Umayyad caliphate.

Sunny thinkers distinguished between the caliphate of these first four “rightly guided” caliphs and later holders of the office, many of whom degraded it to kingship (mulk) and were sometimes oppressive. Yet while later Islamic leadership may not have been perfect, it remained legitimate, and the community, as a result, remained within the confines of the law. In the gradual emergence of this consensus, Sunni thinkers adopted the principles of certain earlier groups, whose first priority had been the preservation of the unity of the community; accordingly, it was preferable to accept shortcomings in the political life of the community than to risk further schism and discord.

The Political Thought of the Classical Sunni and Shi‘i Jurists

Most famously among Sunni jurists, al-Mawardi (d. 1058) formulated what came to be regarded as the classical Sunni position on the caliphate. By the eleventh century, the caliphate had been weakened by its subservience to a succession of military leaders who had taken over some of its territories and established poilgies of their own. When al-Mawardi came to write his treatise, al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya (The ordinances of government), however, the caliphate was for the moment enjoying a certain reascendancy, which the jurist sought to enhance through his exposition of the legal status of the office. Al-Mawardi asserted that the imamate is obligatory by revelation, not by reason, and he listed seven necessary qualities for the imam: descent from Quraysh; possession of religious knowledge; probity; soundness and maturity of body and mind; and the capacity to execute the political and military duties of the office.

Of al-Mawardi’s stipulated qualities, descent from Quraysh may be the most significant, since it allows for the legitimacy of all the Sunni caliphs, while it does not limit legitimacy to descent from the Prophet himself; but the same criterion excludes most other rulers, such as the Buyids, who controlled Baghdad during al-Mawardi’s lifetime. At the same time, al-Mawardi argued that rule by military emirs was legitimate as long as such rulers acknowledged the authority of the caliphs and implemented Islamic law. The caliph himself was responsible for the performance of specific duties, such as the protection of religion against heterodoxy, enforcing the law and dispensing justice, executing the statutory penalties (budud), ensuring peace in the territory of Islam and defending the realm against external enemies, the prosecution of jihad, receipt of the legal alms, and a fifth of all booty gained in combat on behalf of the community, distribution of revenue according to the law, and the appointment of reliable and trustworthy men in delegating authority.

Al-Mawardi’s book, together with the identically titled work of his contemporary, Abu Ya‘la b. al-Farra’ (d. 1066), contributed to a gradual change in the perception of the caliphate. From the early ninth century onwards, the caliph’s
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authority had coexisted with the reality of political fragmentation, and the office ceased to connote supreme political power. Instead, it came to assume a more symbolic role, whereby the caliphate came to represent the unity of the Muslim community regardless of the division of political power.

Almost three centuries later, following the execution in 1258 by the Mongol conqueror Hulegu of the Abbasid caliph and the establishment of the Mongol empire over much of the eastern Islamic world, the Syrian Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) asserted with vigor the supremacy of the shari’a as the means to ensure the exercise of divine sovereignty on Earth. By extension, Ibn Taymiyya declared the illegitimacy of any ruler who failed to uphold the law. In the context of the demise of the ‘Abbasid caliphate and against the loss of even the symbolism of political unity, Ibn Taymiyya emphasized the ideological unity that he believed could be achieved through proper observance of the shari’a. His political perspective, often referred to after the title of one of his books as al-siyasa al-shari’yya (government according to the religious law), has been influential among some modern thinkers.

Ibn Taymiyya sought to elevate the condition of both the state and society through upholding the law, and held that a leader who promoted increased observance of the law was owed obedience by his subjects. Ibn ‘Arabi and his contemporary, Ibn Jama’a (d. 1333), who likewise spent his life in Syria and Egypt, emphasized the role of the religious scholars as counselors to the holders of political power. Furthermore, Ibn Jama’a recognized two kinds of imamate, arrived at through election and force respectively. He noted that the latter form of imamate, based on the exercise of might, was the only form that existed in his own time.

After the beginning of the imam’s occultation in the latter half of the twentieth century, Shi’ite jurists gradually developed a political theory in which Shi’ite scholars might assume some of the imam’s responsibilities. In all likelihood, the historical imams themselves allowed some of their followers to participate in some of the imam’s responsibilities. The idea of deputyship to the imam was developed further in the writings of leading Imami thinkers, such as al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022), who indicated that throughout his occultation the imam remained God’s proof (al-wal’u) on Earth. At that point, the absence, the imam could appoint a deputy or deputies.

Like many Imami jurists, al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277) noted that, in the imam’s absence, Shi’ites should fulfill their religious obligation of charity (zakat) by delivering it to a reliable jurist (muqaddim), since the latter was in possession of the necessary knowledge to ensure its proper disbursement. The same jurist, and still more notably his pupil Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (d. 1325), adopted the principle of ijtihad, according to which each Shi’ite jurist was obliged to undertake an investigation of the legal sources in order to reach his own conclusions in legal matters. As this practice of ijtihad became accepted among Shi’ites, it contributed to an increase in the authority of the Shi’ite ulama. Despite this gradual enhancement in the stature of the Imami scholars, most of them continued to emphasize the qualitative difference between the authority enjoyed by imams and prophets, to whom, on account of their immunity from sin and error, unconditional obedience was due, and that of any other leader to whom certain functions may have been delegated.

Some Imami scholars of the Usuli school, which developed in the mid-eighteenth century and became dominant by the middle of the nineteenth century, claimed that the Shi’ite scholars had in fact assumed the position of general vice-regent (na’ib ‘amm) of the absent imam. In the Usuli view, the right to interpret Islamic law rested solely with mujtahids, scholars who were recognized as qualified to exercise their independent judgment, or ijtihad. Ordinary Muslims were obliged to follow an eminent mujtahid as a model of emulation (malek al-ta’lid). Some scholars asserted further that the office of marja’ represented the imam’s authority not only in matters of religion, but also in worldly affairs. This idea was developed most notably by Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989) in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Sultans and Kings

While the classical juristic literature deals with political thought within the context of the topics of imamate and caliphate, and refers to the sultanate primarily in connection with these institutions, other branches of literary expression treat the institution of the sultanate, or kingship, in its own right. Sultans and other dynastic rulers whose power was sometimes local but sometimes very far-reaching were often the recipients of literary gifts, such as works offering advice (nashaf) on the art of government, or “mirrors for princes,” in which the ruler’s duties and his subjects’ needs were discussed, and the monarch’s own justice was invariably praised. Occasionally, such books were commissioned by a ruler, as seems to have been the case with the famous Siyasat-namah (Book of government) composed by the wazir Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) and presented to the Seljuq monarch, Malik-Shah (1073–1092).

In such books of advice for Muslim rulers, as indeed in many other cultural contexts, the king (or caliph) is often likened to a physician healing a body, or a shepherd guarding his flock. He is also, as in ancient Middle Eastern traditions, described as “the Shadow of God on earth.” Some authors adopt the old Iranian concept of farr, the aura or nimbus that signifies the charisma of kingship. Most directly, these ideas and many others reached Islamic culture through the translation into Arabic of literary works composed in Middle Persian (Pahlavi) under the Sassanians (226–651). In Islamic times, authors adapted and developed many of these ancient Middle Eastern notions according to the regions and conditions in which they lived.
The understanding of kingship articulated in most works of nasiha rests on the premise of royal absolutism, which is closely associated with the concept of justice (‘adl), the maintenance of which is presented as the ruler’s foremost responsibility. This set of concepts is expressed clearly in the widely recorded “circle of justice,” according to which the king’s rule is dependent on the army, which in turn depends on wealth, which is generated through agriculture (and sometimes trade), which in turn flourishes under the king’s effective exercise of his royal authority. The ruler is thus depicted as central to the preservation of the natural and social orders. The fertility and productivity of the land, and the well-being of the peasants who worked it, depended directly on the king’s justice. Furthermore, royal justice was necessary to prevent the various groups within society from coalescing in such a way that any particular set of interests outweighed others. If such a process were allowed to occur, it would cause a social imbalance that was considered contrary to justice and tantamount to injustice (zulm).

In order to prevent such disequilibrium, it was the ruler’s task, by virtue of his own position above and outside any of the social categories, to ensure that each individual remained in the place appropriate to his station. Among writers belonging to this intellectual tradition, society was often visualized in terms of a quadripartite hierarchy consisting of men of the pen, men of the sword, men of transactions, and men of agriculture, as described, for example, in the famous formulation of Nasir al-Din Tusi, 1201–1274. This model was adopted by numerous later writers, and was especially important to many Ottoman thinkers.

Such traditions of kingship came to be widely disseminated and formed a base for many kinds of courtly literature across the linguistic and cultural range of the medieval Islamic world. As this dissemination occurred, the view of royal justice expressed in this courtly literature was often linked to the upholding of the şarri’a, and, with the establishment of Turkish and Turko-Mongol dynasties in much of the Islamic world, many of these Perso-Islamic concepts of government also became fused with Central Asian concepts.

Political Philosophy

Another important branch of premodern political thought is found in the works of the Muslim philosophers, among whom the most influential was al-Farabi (d. 950). Al-Farabi’s thought was based on the common premise that it was natural for human beings to live in association with others, since on the one hand they were incapable of supplying all of their own needs and were therefore obliged to co-operate with one another, and, on the other hand, humankind was, in Aristotle’s phrase, a political animal, disposed by nature to communal living. The goal of human existence, moreover, was happiness (sa’āda), which could only be achieved through living in a community. Communities differed in size and in type, some being “perfect” or complete, and others being imperfect and incomplete. Happiness was best attained by living in a “virtuous polity” (al-madina al-fadila), which al-Farabi defined as one led by learned and excellent men, and one in which the inhabitants co-operated in striving for ultimate happiness. Human beings were connected by a chain of authority, which was based on their degree of knowledge and understanding. In this chain, each individual was in a position of both learning from and governance by those above him, and of instructing and exercising authority over those below him, down to the level of those who were fit only for service. The man who had nothing to learn from anyone was the person best suited to perform the duties of the supreme leader (al-ra’is al-aswal), whose purpose, according to al-Farabi, was to promote the attainment of happiness by his community.

Several of the political ideas of al-Farabi were shared and further developed by Ibn Sina (d. 1037), who himself had extensive experience in the practical workings of government and had served on several occasions as a wazir. Ibn Sina emphasized the roles of law and justice, and the need for their enforcement by a legislator and preserver of justice, as the basis for the necessary social transactions among people. In al-Andalus, Ibn Bajja (d. 1138) held that it was the ruler’s responsibility to assign tasks to the inhabitants of the city, and to ensure that each man undertook the most excellent task of which he was capable. He argued furthermore that, if no virtuous polity to which a philosopher might immigrate existed, the philosopher should seclude himself from society as far as possible.

Nasir al-Din Tusi, who adopted many of the political views of al-Farabi, held that although it was the diversity among people that rendered co-operation among them possible, this co-operation could only be achieved through firm administration, without the restraining force of which, men might destroy one another. Government was necessary to ensure that each man was content with the station appropriate to him, that he received his due, and that others did not violate his rights. One of the main purposes of government, then, was to maintain order in society and to ensure the harmonious functioning of its component groups.

One of the most remarkable political theoreticians of the medieval Islamic world was Ibn Khaldun (d. 1332), who spent most of his life in North Africa and Egypt, and whose writings describe his perceptions of the historical workings of power. Ibn Khaldun shares many of the premises of earlier philosophers, and reaches the conclusion that kingship (mulk) is a natural and necessary human phenomenon for the regulation and restraint of human conduct. As part of his analysis of societies, Ibn Khaldun argues that ruling families whose ties of solidarity (‘asabiyya) are strongest are best situated to impose their dominion over others in a process that gives rise to conquest and expansion. In order to create stable polities, however, it is necessary for such strength of communal ties to
be conjoined with religious law, which provides a more lasting focus of communal solidarity than kinship and affiliation alone. Ibn Khaldun goes on to describe the stages through which a polity comes into existence, consolidates its power, reaches maturity, and eventually declines.

Modern Developments

Reconsiderations of the nature and responsibilities of the state have a continuous history in the Islamic world. The historical context for such reconsiderations has evolved particularly rapidly, however, over the course of the past two centuries. The vast transformations of the modern period have seen the creation in the Islamic world, as elsewhere, of modern states, in which the relationships between individuals and governments have changed dramatically from those characteristic of premodern times, and the integration of much of the Islamic world into a global economic system. Like much of the rest of the world, Muslim countries have, over the past two centuries or longer, been forced to accommodate themselves to the disproportionate power (economic, military, political, cultural) enjoyed by Western countries: the European colonial powers, the former Soviet Union, and, beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States of America.

Modern Islamic political thought thus represents the continuation of a long-standing discourse, but in circumstances that compel reckoning with the actual and theoretical aspects of Western politics. Among the many responses manifested in modern political thought, we may refer to the ideas of certain thinkers whose vision included both preservation of a redefined Muslim identity and the adoption of certain foreign institutions, such as the nation-state, democratic representation, constitutionalism, and so on; and to the ideas of thinkers who assert an Islamic form of politics that, in theory at least, is independent of Western models. The spectrum between these two poles, and the variety within them, are naturally extensive.

In the modern era, the word *dawla*, which in premodern times tended to denote a period of dynastic rule, has come to signify a state, in the sense that this concept had acquired in Europe between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries. The term, and its referent, have come to play a central role in modern political discourse. Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) employed the term *watani* (corresponding to the French *patrie*) to denote the territorial aspect of the concept of the state; but he did not reject the concept of the pan-Islamic *umma*. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), a highly influential commentator on political matters throughout much of the Islamic world during the nineteenth century, insisted that the Islamic religion was compatible with the exercise of human reason, and was thus compatible with the kind of scientific inquiry and technological development that had flourished in modern Europe. At the same time, al-Afghani absolutely rejected Muslim rulers’ subservience to Western political power. Al-Afghani, for whom the period of the Rashidun was the period of perfected Muslim government, seems to have regarded regional nationalisms as possible steps towards the reconstitution of the Islamic *umma*. Many of the political ideas of al-Afghani were further developed in the Arab world by Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905).

Among the thinkers whose ideas have been most influential in the twentieth-century Arab world are Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who regarded al-Mawardi’s work as formative to the Islamic tradition, and ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (d. 1966). The twentieth-century concept of the Islamic state emerged in the context of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the abandonment of the Ottoman caliphate, which followed the formation of the modern Turkish nation-state. The final abolition of the Ottoman caliphate was briefly preceded by an interim period during which the Turkish authorities reduced the office to a purely spiritual one. Rashid Rida opposed this reduction in the role of the caliphate, and argued instead for a caliphate that combined religious and political authority and that was “a caliphate of necessity,” to be situated in the Arab world. In the same era, some Indian Muslims formed the Khilafat Movement, and, along with other groups, the Khilafats took up the assertion that Islam is both a religion and a state (*al-Islam din wa dawla*). This idea shapes much of the discourse of contemporary Islamists. ‘Abd al-Raziq, on the other hand, faced strong opposition to his explicit rejection of the view that Islam necessarily combined the realms of religion and state, and argued that the institution of the caliphate was not required by religion.

The separation of state and religion, while supported by ‘Abd al-Raziq and other secularists, is rejected by Islamists, for whom Muslims’ primary allegiance should be to the religious community (the *umma*) and for whom an Islamic order necessarily embraces the political as well as the personal religious realms. Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder in 1928 of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, emphasized the all-embracing nature of Islam in human affairs. His intellectual successors, such as Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), Abu 1-‘A’la’ Maududi (1903–1979) and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), have argued that the prophet Muhammad himself combined religion and state, and that this combination established a lasting model. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, composed many of his most influential works while imprisoned under Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Central to Sayyid Qutb’s thought was the concept of neo-Jahiliyya, according to which contemporary societies, including those that were nominally Muslim, had fallen into pagan ignorance, a lapse that could only be rectified by struggle (jihad) to overturn the secular state and install in its place an Islamic order, in which human laws would give way to God-given laws. In practice, as the case of postrevolutionary Iran demonstrates, such ideas need not preclude the adoption of such principles as constitutionalism, the separation of powers, and popular sovereignty.
As India struggled for its independence from Great Britain, Maududi, founder in 1941 of the Jama’at-e Islami, opposed the forms of nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress on the one hand and by the Muslim League on the other. Instead, he argued in favor of the restoration of an Islamic order in India. Despite his opposition to the Muslim League, however, Maududi moved to the new state of Pakistan following its creation in 1947. Maududi asserted strongly the idea that Pakistan should be not merely a state for Muslims but an Islamic state. For Maududi, an Islamic state was one in which all areas of public and private life were regulated in accordance with the unchanging shari’a. His idea of the Islamic state was based on neither nationalism nor democracy. Although highly controversial in Pakistan, Maududi’s books and pamphlets have been translated into many languages and are widely read throughout the Islamic world.

In the Shi’ite world, Khomeini contributed significantly to the increased emphasis on political activism in modern times through his reinterpretations of several important features of earlier Imami Shi’ite thought. For example, Shi’ites had traditionally looked to the hidden imam to establish justice on earth at the time of his eventual return; this belief had long been conducive to political quietism. Khomeini, however, took the view that Muslims need wait no longer. Instead, they could hasten the return of the imam by acting themselves to resist injustice and to establish an Islamic political order in the here and now. Furthermore, Khomeini expressed the view that the mujtahids were responsible for the execution of all the religious and worldly duties that the Prophet himself had performed. These responsibilities should be exercised not through the collective body of qualified scholars but through a single jurist. This doctrine, known as “the guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih), remains a subject of debate among Imami scholars. In the decades since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as a result of which Iran successfully extricated itself from Western intervention and rejected a politics conditioned by the interests of the West, a number of Iranian thinkers, such as ‘Abd al-Karim Soroush, have been among the most notable contributors to a contemporary renewal and broadening of Islamic political thought along lines that emphasize individual rights and freedoms, and democracy.

See also Caliphate; Imamate; Iran, Islamic Republic of; Law; Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Monarchy; Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; Political Islam; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Iran; Shi’ite: Imami (Twelver); Shari’a; Succession; Ulema.

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Louise Marlow

POLYGAMY

Islamic law allows only men to enter more than one marriage at a time, justifying it by reference to the Qur’an (4:3, 24, 25) and the marriages of the prophet Mohammad. Although polygamy (strictly, “polygyny”) has never been common in Muslim societies, in many areas it was always rare, and incidence has diminished in modern times. In the twentieth century, men’s right to contract plural marriages became one of the contentious issues in debates over women’s rights in Islam. Not only did the practice become stigmatized but its religious legitimacy began to be challenged by new readings of Islamic sacred texts and the introduction of notions of equality and justice in gender rights. In contrast to classical Muslim jurists, modern jurists tend to argue that interdiction of the practice, rather than its sanction, can be deduced from the Qur’an verses, and that polygamy should be allowed only in exceptional circumstances and under limited conditions. Likewise, in some Muslim countries plural marriages are either outlawed (as in Turkey and Tunisia), or the registration of such marriages is allowed only by means of a court order that either requires the first wife’s consent or grants her the right to divorce (as in Jordan, Malaysia, Iran, Iraq, and

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Muslim world are often contracted in secret.

See also Gender; Marriage.

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Ziba Mir-Hosseini

PRAYER, CALL TO See ‘Ibadat

PREACHING See Khutba

PROPERTY

A source of conflict in the pre-Islamic Middle East, the concept of property remained controversial after the rise of Islam. From the seventh century to the modern era, Islamic rulings, opinions, and institutions designed to broaden private ownership rights coexisted with policies that undermined them. Initially, the consequent material insecurity was nothing unusual by the prevailing global standards. However, the gradual strengthening of private property rights in Western Europe caused the Islamic world to sink below the standards of the day.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries European travelers to the Middle East found signs of weak property rights, such as residential styles designed to conceal wealth. For their part, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Middle Eastern visitors to the West were favorably impressed by the material security afforded to individual Europeans. Significantly, the Middle East’s magnificent architectural heritage consists almost exclusively of communal structures. Had the region made early progress in broadening the scope of property rights, its surviving premodern structures would have included many private residences, as in western Europe.

Islam has influenced the evolution of ownership rights through several mechanisms, some of which operated at cross-purposes. Verse 7:128 of the Qur’an, which holds that all property belongs to God, would seem to rule out all forms of private ownership. In keeping with this implication, from the early caliphs to monarchs of the nineteenth century, successive Muslim rulers routinely confiscated uncultivated lands. Though frequently defended in Islamic terms, these expropriations also accorded with Hellenic and Persian traditions that treated the state as the ultimate owner of all land.

Like rulers everywhere, premodern Muslim rulers generally understood that threats to the material security of individuals, including confiscations and arbitrary taxation, reduced government revenue by harming incentives to produce. So Islamic history offers many examples of rulers alleviating the tax burden of a region or class of subjects with the express purpose of stimulating economic activity. However, not until modern times have there existed effective legal safeguards against state-initiated or condoned predation. A ruler urgently in need of resources to run a military campaign or overcome a political challenge could generally prey on his subjects without legal hindrance. Muslim writers of the medieval Middle East, including Maqrizi and Ibn Khalidun, observe that distressed rulers made it a habit of grabbing the visible possessions of the wealthy, including estates of the deceased. Such expropriations were often carried out under the pretext that the seized assets had been acquired illegally.

From the fact that rulers felt a need to justify their predatory acts, one may infer that subjects expected them to respect established use rights. This expectation was based partly on the principle that individuals are entitled to private ownership (mil克). Though at odds with the principle of divine ownership, private ownership thus remained a concept recognized by Islamic law. Moreover, even as Muslim rulers pursued policies harmful to material security, Islamic courts routinely enforced individual property rights.

Another mechanism through which Islam weakened private ownership rights was grounded in zakat, an institution designed to prevent opportunistic taxation. Mentioned in the Qur’an and implemented by the Prophet, the zakat system imposed fixed tax rates that varied across income and wealth categories. For example, the rate on agricultural income was 10 percent in naturally irrigated areas but 5 percent in areas irrigated artificially. During the Prophet’s lifetime, this fixity served to block attempts at radical redistribution. At the same time, it precluded the establishment of general principles for amending zakat rates and broadening the system’s coverage. Consequently, the zakat system soon became outdated, allowing later rulers to impose taxes arbitrarily and opportunistically. The rate schedule of the agricultural tax known as ‘usbr, though patterned after the zakat requirements on land, has varied greatly across time and space. In any case, this tax has often been accompanied by sundry other taxes without any basis in Islam’s traditional sources of authority. In facilitating the variability of taxation, the zakat system unintentionally contributed to the precariousness of individual property rights.
A creative and effective response to the weakness of these rights was the **waqf** system. A **waqf** is an unincorporated trust established under Islamic law by an individual for the provision of a designated service in perpetuity. Its assets are considered sacred. From the eighth century onward, it served as an increasingly popular device to protect personal wealth by diminishing the likelihood of confiscation. Right up to modern times, Muslim rulers were much less likely to seize **waqf**-owned assets than they were to confiscate private property, for they sought to avoid developing a reputation for impiety.

Although establishing a **waqf** usually required a commitment to provide social services, it came with the privilege of appointing oneself as its **mutawalli** (trustee and manager). At some cost, therefore, a **waqf** founder was able to secure a portion of his wealth for his own and his family’s benefit. If the **waqf** system became much more important to the premodern Middle Eastern economy than trusts were to the economies of western Europe, the reason is that in the Middle East private property rights were clearly weaker and, hence, the need for wealthy shelters measurably greater.

A salient characteristic of Middle Eastern history is the absence of broad movements to strengthen private property rights. It offers nothing akin to the protracted European movements that limited the economic powers of kings and queens. The very availability of the **waqf** option helps to explain this difference. It dampened collective action on the part of wealth holders likely to benefit from stronger property rights. Formal property rights arrived in the Middle East in the nineteenth century through sweeping economic reforms based largely on European models. Property rights are broadly recognized in the modern civil codes of Middle Eastern countries.

See also Economy and Economic Institutions; Waqf.

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Timur Kuran

**PROPHETS**

According to Muslim interpretation of the Qur’an, the prophet Muhammad is considered to be the “seal of the prophets,” the culmination of a line of prophets stretching back through Jesus, Moses, and Abraham to Adam. Many but not all of the prophets preceding Muhammad are mentioned in the Qur’an, and later Muslim traditions attach great importance to certain beliefs and practices associated with all the prophets.

The Qur’an itself (2:136, 3:84, 4:136, 42:13) and later Muslim creeds stipulate belief in all the prophets and the books revealed to them without making distinctions among them. The *Fiqh al-akbar* (art. 8), traditionally attributed to the jurist Abu Hanifa, states that Muslims should believe that Moses and Jesus were prophets, perhaps in reference to 2:285 and 4:152. The so-called *Fiqh al-akbar II* (art. 20), the *Wasiyat Abi Hanifa* (art. 25) and the ‘Agida of Ahmad b. Ja’far al-Tahawi (art. 5) all state the belief in the intercession of the prophets for their followers on the Day of Judgment.

Some Muslim scholars distinguish between a generic “prophet” (**nabi**), and a “messenger” or “apostle” (**rasul**), maintaining that only a select few of the many prophets were messengers, supposed to have brought a revealed book to their people. Within the Qur’an, other terms are used to refer to prophets, including “messiah” or “Christ” (**masih**) with reference exclusively to Jesus. Ibn Sa’d (d. 230) reports that the number of **rasul** including the prophet Muhammad is 315, and the total number of prophets is one thousand. Other Muslim sources list the total number of prophets as 224,000.

The stories of the prophets are written up in a significant portion of the Qur’an, but the Qur’an does not mention the names of all the prophets claimed by some Muslim scholars. By name there are twenty-five prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, though there are some disagreements concerning the individual identities of all these. Among those mentioned by name are: Adam (mentioned 25 times by name), Idris (1), Nah (Noah; 43), Hud (7), Salih (10), Ibrahim (Abraham; 69), Isma’il (Ismael; 12), Ishaq (Isaac; 17), Ya’qub (Jacob; 16), Lot (Lot; 27), Yusuf (Joseph; 27), Shu’ayb (11), Ayyub (Job; 4), Dhu-l-Kifl (2), Musa (Moses; 137), Harun (Aaron; 20), Dawud (David; 16), Sulayman (Solomon; 17), Ilyas (Elijah; 1), Alisa (Elisha; 2), Yunus (Jonah; 4), Zakariyya (Zechariah; 7), Yahya (John; 5), ‘Issa (Jesus; 25), and Muhammad (4).

Other passages in the Qur’an refer to prophets without mentioning names, but Muslim tradition identifies the prophets by name such as: Khidr, Ezekiel, Samuel, Jeremiah, and Daniel. In some cases, such as the case of the prophet sent to the People of the Well (25:38, 50:12) and to the People of the City mentioned in Sura Ya-Sin (36:13–29), the names are not identified by name in the Qur’an, and the names given to the prophets are not well known outside of Muslim exegesis. There are also important characters, mentioned by name in the Qur’an, such as Luqman and Dhu al-Qarnayn, who are not considered prophets but whose stories are nevertheless included in the later Muslim stories of the prophets.

revealed books. A hadith report given on the authority of Abu Dharr states that scriptures were revealed to Adam, Seth, Idris, and Abraham in addition to the revelation of the Torah to Moses, the Psalms to David, the Gospel to Jesus, and the Qur’an to Muhammad. According to al-Tabari, the “first scriptures” mentioned in Q 20:133 and 87:18 are the scriptures revealed to Seth and Idris.

Muslim tradition also mentions the relics of prophets, some of which are venerated in shrines and are the focus of seasonal rituals. Muslims perform pilgrimages to the tombs of certain prophets such as that of Hud in the Hadramawt and Shu’ayb in Yemen. According to the Arab geographer Yaqut, the tomb of Adam is said to be in Mecca, and Muslim pilgrimages visit the tomb of Muhammad in Medina. Artifacts of the prophets are also attested such as the Ark of the Covenant, a mirror and ring that belonged to Solomon, the ring and book of Daniel, and a number of items closely associated with Muhammad including his hair and fingernails. The footprints of prophets, including Abraham, Moses, and Muhammad, are also preserved in religious institutions and museums along with articles of clothing and weapons.

In addition to the standard Qur’an commentaries that were written according to the order of the suras and verses in the Qur’an, Muslim scholars also compiled “stories of the prophets,” which excerpted and commented on the large parts of the Qur’an concerned with the prophets leading up to Muhammad. These works organized the Qur’an passages in narrative order beginning with Adam and ending with Muhammad, roughly paralleling the biblical chronology of these same figures. Best known for their stories of the prophets were Thalab and Ibn Kathir, and stories of the prophets made up significant parts of universal histories such as those compiled by Tabari, Ya’qubi, Ibn al-Athir, and in the biography of the prophet Muhammad by Ibn Ishaq.

The prophet-by-prophet and overall chronological structure of these story collections contributed to a more accessible and less piecemeal interpretation of the Qur’an. The genre of “stories of the prophets” has been more closely associated with sermons and popular Qur’an interpretation, and it is likely that some of the earliest Qur’an interpretations, like those attributed to Wahb b. Munabbih, Ka’b al-Ahbar, and Ibn ‘Abbas, originated as sermons or stories of the prophets. Later works devoted to the stories of the prophets, especially in Persian, were richly illustrated, picturing the prophets in certain well-known scenes from the popular stories. In the Muslim world today, one of the most popular formats for presentation of the Qur’an to children is through books and videos illustrating the stories of the prophets.

Most of the prophets in the Qur’an as well as those mentioned by name in later Muslim interpretation parallel characters from the Bible and its interpretation in Jewish and Christian traditions. Muslim scholars have seen these parallels as evidence of the shared origins of these religions and their revealed scriptures, and largely embrace the diversity of the various “versions” of different stories focusing on the common veneration of certain recognized figures such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.

See also Islam and Other Religions; Muhammad; Qur’an.

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*Brannon M. Wheeler*

**PULPIT** See Minbar (Mimbar)

**PURDAH**

*Purdah*, from the Persian word for curtain, *pardah*, refers to the custom of veiling and secluding women in Islamic societies. The Arabic term is *hijab*. The custom derives from references in the Qur’an to speaking with women from behind a curtain (33:53) and to hadith enjoining modest behavior for Muslims of both sexes. *Purdah* is observed in a variety of ways, all of them involving some form of sexual...
segregation. In its most extreme form, women are confined to their homes; alternatively, it involves male social interaction and schooling with other males and similarly segregated social activities and schooling for females. Usually, purdah involves various forms of modest dress in order to keep women from being seen by unrelated males. These range from all-enveloping garments to scarves that cover the hair.

While the custom is associated with the religion of Islam, purdah is also a form of cultural and political symbolism. During the period of rapid modernization in the early twentieth century, many middle-class, urban Muslim women gave up the veil. In more recent times, movements of cultural pride and religious reassertion have prompted many Muslim women to don it again. Purdah observation varies according to region, culture, and class. In Iran, the chador became the emblem of the Islamic revolution, symbolic of the rejection of the West and of westernization. In Afghanistan, the all-enveloping burqa was required by the Taliban government, though it also provided symbolic protection for women in politically unstable situations. In Pakistan and India, Muslim women wear a variety of veil forms: the chaddar—a large shawl that hides the feminine form, the burqa—a coatlike garment with an adjustable head piece, the dupatta—a sheer stole that adorns the shoulders, but can be put over the hair when necessary.

Controversy exists over the meaning of renewed purdah observance in recent times. It can be seen as the oppressive imposition of social segregation upon women, or as a matter of choice, in which the use of the veil expresses a woman’s faith and cultural identity. Indicative of this latter phenomenon is the fact that wearing a head scarf is becoming more common as Muslims migrate to non-Muslim countries.

See also Gender; Harem; Veiling.

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Gail Minault
**QADHDHAFI, MU‘MAR AL- (1943– )**

Mu‘mar al-Qadhdhafi was the most dominant Libyan leader in the second half of the twentieth century. His childhood and political ideology were influenced by his family’s tribal values, anticolonial Islam, and Arab nationalism during the upheavals of the Egyptian revolution (1952) and the Algerian anticolonial revolution (1954–1965). As the sole leader of Libya since 1969, he has changed the socioeconomic and political structures of that nation. He created and led a self-declared revolutionary state governed by an organization of popular committees and congresses with a rich oil-based rentier economy.

Qadhdhafi was born in 1943 (other sources say he was born earlier) in a tent to a poor itinerant Bedouin family that belonged to the Qadhafa tribe. In 1965, Qadhdhafi and some of his friends entered the military academy and began to recruit other officers in his revolutionary organization, the Free Unionist Officers Movement.

Qadhdhafi’s ideology stresses Arab nationalism, Islam, self-determination, social justice, and denounced the corruption of the old regime. He theorizes that historical change is caused by religion and nationalism. Qadhdhafi advocates opening the gates of *ijtihad* (free reason of Islamic law) and hence accepts only the Qur’an as the main basis of Islamic law. Such views place him on the side of reformist Islamic traditions. He was also anticommunist, which brought him international recognition from the Nixon administration in the United States. After consolidating his power and crushed the opposition in 1975, Qadhdhafi began to apply his ideas, which were presented in his *Green Book* (1976, 1980). He advocated what he called the Third Universal Theory, a third way between capitalism and Marxism based on the direct democracy of popular organization of congresses and committees.

Qadhdhafi’s leadership of Libya during the first decade after 1969 brought many changes to ordinary Libyans such as providing free medical care, building the infrastructure of the country, and expanding education especially for Libyan women. However, secular and Islamic opposition were repressed. Since the early 1980s, the Libyan economy has grown more dependent on oil for its revenues than it was under the old regime, and agriculture continues to decline despite large and expensive projects. Despite these mixed legacies, the Libyan revolution under Qadhdhafi’s leadership is a turning point in the making of modern Libya in the twentieth century.

*See also* Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization.

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Ali Abdullatif Ahmida

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**QADI (KADI, KAZI)**

A *qadi* is the term for a Muslim judge who issues definitive rulings in cases brought by disputants for resolution. The word *qadi* is derived from the root word *q-d-y*, meaning “to resolve,” “to settle,” “to decide.”

Judicial practice is seen as an extension of the function of the ruler and is thus indirectly linked to orderly governance. Muslim political theory advocates the appointment of an executive ruler (caliph/imam) as a moral obligation (*fard*)
premised on religious authority. The appointment of judges is thus in keeping with the fulfillment of an obligation according to the classical Sunni legal authorities. Early Shi’ite authorities argue that the implementation of the rules of the revealed law (shari’a) is an obligation not subject to rational scrutiny (ta’akkub) and can only be fulfilled by the designated hereditary religious leader (imam) or his delegated appointees. Only those judges appointed by the legitimate political leader can be deemed to have worthy credentials as appointees to the office of judgeship.

According to the Sunni scholar al-Ghazali, the role of the judiciary (qad’ah) is similar to the process of issuing juridical responsa (fatwa, pl. fat’awā), where academic jurists offer learned opinions to questions about the moral status of practices. There is of course a crucial difference between a jurisconsult (mufti) and a judge (qadi). The former only provides information to the questioner as to what the juridical-moral status or value (bukhm) of a specific act is, while the primary purpose of the latter is to apply and enforce the established rules by means of the coercive authority held by the ruler, or later devolved upon the modern state.

Across the spectrum of Muslim law schools treatises detailing the ethics of judgeship are in abundance. A high bar is set for qualification as a qadi, requiring candidates to meet an extensive list of prerequisites. The most important of these pre-requisites are that qadis should be knowledgeable of the law and its cognitive disciplines, as well as display moral rectitude as individuals with impeccable credentials within their society. Classical Muslim authorities see an intimate link between qualification as a judge and possessing the credentials of being a reliable witness (shabūda). Those who pass the test to serve as credible witnesses, also in theory qualify as having the credentials to serve as qadis.

Among the earliest judges delegated by the prophet Muhammad to serve in certain regions were the companions Mu’adh ibn Jabal, who was sent to Yemen, and ‘Itab b. Usayd, who was sent to Mecca. Later successors, notably ‘Umar b. Al-Khattab, gave particular attention to the development of a proto-judicial system. He appointed the famous Sharayh b. al-Harith al-Kindi (d. c. 699/700) as qadi of Kufa. Sharayh was affirmed by the caliph/imam ‘Ali who held him in high esteem, provided him with a monthly stipend, even though he fired him for issuing a wrong judgment, but ‘Ali also later reinstated him. ‘Umar’s famous letter to Abu Musa al-Ash’ari is held out as a model document that enshrines the ideals of judgeship in Islam in which he pledges for equity for all people, rich or poor, and warns against the miscarriage of justice.

Historically, the profession has been dominated by males. Most of the law schools make maleness a prerequisite for being a judge. However, in theory at least, some of the classical schools permit women to be judges, while barring them from deciding cases involving criminal penalties (bndud). However, since there is no explicit directive in the Qur’an or prophetic tradition that prevents women from holding the office of a qadi, the early juristic viewpoint on this matter reflects the social conditions of patriarchy, where the religious norm is colored by social context.

The situation in modern Muslim nation-states from the twentieth century onward is somewhat different. In many societies where a version of Islamic law is still practiced, such as family law, women do perform the role of qadis. However, the advancement of women to high levels in the profession of judgeship still remains an ongoing struggle.

According to the classical authorities, non-Muslim qadis can only have jurisdiction over fellow non-Muslims, but do not have jurisdiction over Muslim petitioners. Sunni and Shi’ite authorities do not accept the testimony of non-Muslims against Muslims. Given the parallels between judgeship and testimony, non-Muslim qadis are not viewed as qualified to give verdicts over Muslims. While these practices stem from assumptions of Islamic power and empire, this rule is often ignored in modern multireligious and multiethnic societies that include significant Muslim populations such as India, Malaysia, and Nigeria. Irrespective of Muslim majority or minority contexts, non-Muslim judges do issue binding rulings on Muslim petitioners with little objection from the traditional religious scholars (ulema).

In the premodern period qadis had jurisdiction over an entire gamut of laws ranging from administrative law, torts, and commercial law to criminal law. In several places, especially in North Africa, there were also courts of appeals. However, with the displacement of Islamic law by secular and Western legal codes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the jurisdiction of the qadi is in many instances limited to family law matters; in many places the office has been abolished. On the other hand, in some countries where Islamic law has been reintroduced as the main source of law in the twentieth century, the office of the qadi has been revived.

See also Fatwa; Law; Mufti; Religious Institutions.

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Ebrahim Moosa
The name of the radical organization al-Qa'ida (also spelled al-Qaeda) has the literal meaning of “the foundation” or “the base.” The organization arose in the last quarter of the twentieth century to oppose the military and economic intervention of non-Muslim states in predominantly Muslim lands. It came to the attention of the public in the United States and around the world on 11 September 2001, immediately following the deadly attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., that killed more than three thousand people and terrified those who witnessed the well-covered event on television. The broader association of al-Qa'ida and its leader, Usama bin Ladin, with terrorism was immediate and pervasive in media coverage and political discourse in America and elsewhere.

Al-Qa'ida was the first of the militant Islamist organizations to operate on a global scale. It did so in part by adopting many of the technologies and communications methods of the very global organization whose famous twin-tower buildings in New York it allegedly destroyed on 11 September 2001. Although a considerable amount of data on al-Qa'ida and its operatives has been gathered and published by governmental security agencies and investigative reporters, as of 2003 a thorough academic study of the organization or, more properly speaking, of the cluster of radical Muslim organizations going by the name of al-Qa'ida, had yet to be undertaken by specialists on Islam.

The ideological founder of al-Qa'ida (sometimes al-Qa'ida al-sulba: “the solid foundations”) was 'Abdallah 'Azzam, a Palestinian born in 1941. 'Azzam grew up under Israeli occupation of his homeland. He earned a doctorate in shari'a studies at al-Azhar University in Cairo, after which he taught in various Middle Eastern universities. He was dismissed from his teaching post at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Saudi Arabia in 1979 for engaging in Islamist activism. He then went to Pakistan on the eve of the invasion of Afghanistan by armed forces of the Soviet Union. There he met and became a religious mentor to Usama bin Ladin, who brought to the growing anti-Soviet effort (jihad) considerable financing and experience in building the kind of infrastructure needed to conduct effective counterattacks.

In 1984 'Azzam and bin Ladin established the Afghan Service Bureau Front, known by its Arabic acronym M.A.K. (mektub al-khidma li-l-mujahin al-'arab, literally, office for services for Arab freedom fighters). Among the services they provided was keeping track of young Muslim males who joined the cause from countries around the world, particularly from Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and they apparently provided relief services to those who were wounded and to the families of those killed in battle. Very soon thereafter M.A.K. began to recruit, indoctrinate, and train its volunteers in effective resistance methods, including terrorist tactics. 'Azzam held a particularly hard-line doctrine of jihad, which, according to his understanding of the Qur’an and sunna of the prophet Muhammad, required militant opposition to Islam’s perceived enemies. This view was adopted by Usama bin Ladin, although at what point is not clear. Another important influence in the al-Qa'ida network of organizations is Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951–), an Egyptian physician who joined the radical al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and affiliated with bin Ladin during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

During the Afghan war against the Soviet military, the organized resistance efforts of M.A.K. also became known as al-Qa'ida. Other names were adopted by Usama bin Ladin, such as “The Islamic Global Front for Combating Jews and Crusaders [Christians].” Indeed, such names, including al-Qa'ida, do not refer to a single organization with a single central command headquartered in a known place, but rather to a cluster or complex of organizations and movements whose affiliations and organizational structure are not yet well known or understood. In the 1980s al-Qa'ida functioned as an ally of United States against the Soviet Union, receiving covert funds through the C.I.A. When the war wound down with the defeat of the Soviets in 1988, the organization’s interests expanded globally, to include other Muslim fronts that suffered non-Muslim interventions, including Chechnya, the Balkans, Central Asia, Africa, and Indonesia. This new, more global involvement included an attempt to blow up one of the towers of the World Trade center in New York (23 February 1993), simultaneous lethal bomb blasts at two U.S. embassies in east Africa (1998), an attack on the U.S.S. Cole as it came into port in the Yemen (2000), and suicidal attacks using commandeered airplanes against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001.

Many well-meaning Muslims and non-Muslims have regarded al-Qa'ida, its leaders and operatives, as beyond the pale of the Islamic faith because of the extreme and violent methods they advocate using against moderate Muslim governments and non-Muslim states. Yet it is clear that ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, Usama bin Ladin and other leaders and mentors of al-Qa'ida regarded themselves as good Muslims, as being among the vanguard of reformers who aim to restore the true faith of the founding generations of Islam (the salaf), and as followers of a legitimate Sunni school of interpretation in Islam, the Wahhabi-Hanbali school that predominates in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf states. They proposed a radical Islamic response to modernism and to the constraining military and political forces of non-Muslim states and their secular agendas, basing that response on interpretations of Islam that were already circulating in the mid-twentieth century.

Islam and the Muslim World
Chief among these interpretations are the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), whose books and pamphlets continue to be widely read and appreciated throughout the Muslim world, even by moderate Muslims who regard their faith as greatly misunderstood by non-Muslims and under assault by secular modernity. Thus, while willful, murderous acts against innocent victims is regarded as morally reprehensible by most Muslims and non-Muslims alike, many scholars believe that the Islamic self-understanding promoted by the leadership and ranks of al-Qa’ida members must also be analyzed without the attempt to classify them as authentic or inauthentic religious beliefs. Other scholars see al-Qa’ida as a forceful response to Western imperialism during the colonial and post-colonial periods and to the rapid globalization of market capitalism and secularism since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Most scholars of Islam warn against an ill-founded tendency on the part of some religious leaders and media commentators to equate al-Qa’ida with Islam, that is, to define and grasp Islam in terms of the public manifestations of al-Qa’ida and similar radical groups.

See also Bin Ladin, Usama; Fundamentalism; Qutb, Sayyid; Terrorism.

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Richard C. Martin

QANUN

Qanun (pl. qawwān) is a word that apparently entered into Arabic from Greek, although according to some reports it might have been borrowed from Persian or Latin or have meant the “way to something” or its measurement in old Arabic. The word, however, has come to have broad meanings including a particular musical instrument, known simply as al-qanun, tax assessments, state taxes and tariffs, registers and lists, land measurements, and also rules and regulations.

In modern times, qanun generally refers to state law, although the word is often used to signify guiding rules, customs, and principles. In both premodern and modern times, qanun often referred to secular laws and administrative rules, as opposed to religious laws or shari’a. The word was often used in the titles of books written as early as the tenth century. The titles of some of these books included: al-Qawwān al-sharīʿa (The principles of shariʿa), Qawwān al-akbām al-sharīʿa (The principles of Islamic law), Tashrīḥ al-qanūn (The explanation of the law), Qawwān al-siyasa (The rules of governance), Qanūn al-saʿāda (Rules of conduct and principles of happiness), Qanūn al-adab (Rules of good character), Qanūn al-balagha (Rules of eloquence), Qanūn fi al-tibb (Avicenna’s book on medicine), and Qawwān al-riyada (Principles of mathematics). All of these books were written between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, indicating that the word had passed into common Arabic usage, and was taken to mean the rules or principles of something.

From the earliest centuries of Islam and onward, the word was used in a more specialized context to refer to tax registers and lists, especially of land taxes, as in qanūn al-kharaj, and the regulations and assessments of land taxes, as in al-qawwān al-muqarrara. In addition, a large number of texts written on the rules of public administration or the administration of the ruler’s office were titled qanūn al-rasa’il and qanūn al-diwān. In the sixteenth century, Ghiyath al-Din Khwand Amir wrote Qanun-e-Humayuni, which recorded the rules and ordinances established by the emperor Humayun, and some of the building erected by his order.

From the Umayyad period, and especially during the Ottoman era, the word qanun also referred to state regulations, imperial decrees, or edicts that were based on public interest and executive discretion, instead of the jurist-based shariʿa law. Such regulations were considered temporal in nature, and therefore, they remained in effect as long as they were decreed by a ruler. Upon the death or removal of a ruler, such regulations had to be confirmed or continued by a successor. These regulations were not limited to the field of taxation, but often covered matters related to court procedure, commercial law, and criminal law as well. They also canonized customary practices especially for professional guilds and merchants. As far as Muslim jurists were concerned, these regulations were described as executive laws (qawwān urfiyya) that could be mandated by public interests, but such regulations were not considered part of the divinely based shariʿa law. Therefore, such decrees and regulations were documented, publicized, and enforced by state functionaries, including judges, but they were not memorialized in the books of classical Islamic jurisprudence. From the perspective of Muslim jurists, the legitimacy of such regulations depended on the extent to which they served the public interest, and the interests of justice, and also to the extent they did not conflict with the jurist-made shariʿa law.

The degree to which consecutive Muslim governments relied on qanun, as executive regulations, at the expense of the jurist-based shariʿa law varied widely. Muslim jurists did not always oppose the imposition of administrative laws or regulations by the state, and, in fact, in tracts written on politics, jurists often acknowledged that such regulations are a functional necessity. However, since the Umayyad period, there was a pronounced tension between state functionaries and bureaucrats, and the juristic class. The jurists, as the shariʿa experts, were suspicious, and often defensive, toward attempts by bureaucrats to systematize and centralize the law by limiting the discretionary powers of the jurists. Nonetheless, in the period following the Mongol invasions, various dynasties resorted to increased executive lawmaking, often
resulting in aggravating the tensions between the juristic class
and the state.

The usage of the term qanun, in the sense of secular
laws, became particularly pronounced in the Ottoman era
(1218–1924). The Ottoman caliph Mehmed II “the Con-
queror” (r. 1451–1481) promulgated his famous qanun-nama
as a systematic codified set of laws covering various aspects
of administrative law, commercial law, and criminal law. Jurists
at the time were not always supportive of such attempts at
centralization and codification of the laws, and often
perceived it as an infringement on the integrity of the Islamic
common law, as interpreted and developed by jurists. The
opposition of jurists of centralized state-based laws reached a
point that in 1696 Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703), by decree,
forbade the use of the word qanun in conjunction with
the word shari’a. This was induced by the efforts of the jurists to
make clear that state-issued qanun be separate and apart from
shari’a law.

With the age of colonialism, the jurisdiction of shari’a law
in most Muslim countries had become progressively re-
stricted and, eventually, confined mostly to personal laws
dealing with marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Most Mus-
lam countries adopted a code-based system of law modeled
after the French civil law system. In that respect, most
Muslim countries adopted civil and criminal law codes, titled
“the qanun of such and such.” For instance, in most Arabic-
speaking countries one will find the following: al-qanun al-
madani (the civil law code), al-qanun al-jina’i (the criminal law
code), qanun al-ijra’at (code of legal procedures), and al-
qanun al-tujari (the commercial code). In such countries, even
in the field of personal law, where shari’a still enjoys the
dominant influence, matters relating to marriage, divorce,
and inheritance have been codified in codes known as qanun
al-ahwal al-shakhsiyya (the personal law code). In the modern
age, state regulations or executive decrees, as opposed to
codes, are often referred to as qararat, bayanat, laza’ib, or
marasim. Some Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have
not adopted a civil law system, and, instead, rely on the shari’a
common law, and on executive decrees issued on specific
matters such as banking, foreign investments, and labor and
employment regulations. Although the word qanun today is
used in a technical sense to refer to enacted codes of law, it is
still used in the more expansive sense of law in general,
including Islamic law.

See also Law; Modernization, Political: Administrative,
Military, and Judicial Reform; Political Organization;
Shari’a.

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Khaled Abou El-Fadl

QOM

The place toward which Muslim worshippers direct them-

selves for prayer, the qibla, has always been an important
Islamic identity marker. The Ka’ba and the Holy City of
Mecca play a very important role as symbolic center in several
kinds of religious behavior. The salat (prayer) is performed
with the face in the direction of Mecca; the deceased is buried
lying on his right side, facing Mecca, and it is also advised to
take the qibla into account in a positive or negative way in
various other activities. Discourse about the qibla is often
embedded in notions of power and tradition. For example,
the divide among the Javanese communities in present-day
Surinam and the Netherlands between East-keblat people and
West-keblat are closely related to reformist versus tradition-
alist ideas, respectively. The traditionalist West keblat people
keep to their pre-diaspora Javanese customs, identity, and
their original Indonesian prayer direction to the West. Reform-
ists argue that it should be altered. Similar discussions take
place elsewhere.

Recent historical research by Uri Rubin indicates that the
first qibla the Muslims used in Mecca was the Ka’ba, in
agreement with the local bunafa’ (monotheists), who saw the
Ka’ba as the qibla of Ibrahim and his son Isma’il. Shortly
before the hijra to Medina, and possibly associated with the
revelation of the isra’ (Muhammad’s night journey, from
Mecca to Jerusalem), the qibla was altered toward Jerusalem.
The Meccan sanctuary became the qibla again in 624 C.E. (cf.
Q. 2: 136ff) when an important change in Muhammad’s attitude toward the Jews occurred.

See also Devotional Life; Law; Science, Islam and.

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Gerard Wiegers

QIBLA

A provincial capital since June 1996, 140 kilometers south of
Tehran, Qom is the biggest center of Shi’ite religious studies
and a pilgrimage site next only to Mashhad in importance. A
village before it was settled in the seventh and eighth decades of the seventh century by the Ash’aris, a Shi’ite Yemenite tribe that had migrated from Iraq due to differences with Sunni Umayyad rulers, it became, in contrast to the predominantly Sunni towns of the region, a major Shi’ite academic center in the following centuries. Many of the names of authors in al-Najashi’s eleventh-century list of Shi’ite compilers, as well as those of many narrators of traditions in Shi’ite compendia of hadith, pertain to the Ash’aris of Qom (not to be confused with the Ash’ari theological school).

Qom’s fame as an academy seems to have disappeared after the eleventh century, as the center of Shi’ite learning in Iran shifted to Rey and other northern towns. Although such figures as Fayz Kashani (d. 1681) and Molla Mohammad Tahir Qomni (d. 1686) lived here during the Safavid era, Qom’s partial reemergence as an academy was due to the patronage of the Qajars. The presence of Mirza-ye Qomni (d. 1816), who enjoyed the patronage of Fath ‘Ali Shah (1797–1834), is considered a point of departure in the history of Qom as an academy. However, a new era began with the arrival of Ayatollah Ha’eri (1859–1936) in 1921. He established the present center of learning (bawza-ye ‘ilmiyiya) during a period when the Qajar regime was passing away and the Pahlavi regime was taking shape. From the times of Ayatollah Borujerdi (d. 1961) onward, the bawza began its rapid growth. At the end of Reza Shah’s reign the number of seminary students was about 500. It was above 6,000 in 1975, and above 23,000 in 1991, and presently students from Iran and abroad make up more than 36,000. Under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, a pupil of Ayatollah Ha’eri, Qom played a key role in leading the opposition to the Pahlavi regime in the events of 1964. It was here that on 9 January 1978 the confrontation with the Shah’s security forces occurred, an event that triggered off the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Qom’s political importance as a spiritual and academic center of the Shi’ite clergy has grown enormously following the Islamic Revolution. From being a small town with a population of 96,499 in 1956, Qom itself has grown rapidly to become one of the major cities of Iran, with a population of 825,627 in 2000.

Qom’s fame as a pilgrimage spot visited by millions from Iran and abroad is mainly due to the shrine of Fatimah, the Infallible (ma’ṣumah) (d. 816), daughter of Musa b. Ja’far, the seventh imam. On the way to visiting her brother, Imam ‘Ali b. Musa al-Reza, who was at Marv at the time, she died after a brief illness at Qom. Since then her shrine has been a pilgrimage spot, whose sacred precincts have served as a site for royal and noble mausoleums as well as a favored burial ground of the faithful since the Safavid and Qajar periods. Although the city and the shrine received some royal attention during the rule of the Buwayhid (tenth century), Seljuk (eleventh century), Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu (sixteenth century) regimes, the present structure dates partly from the Safavid and largely from the Qajar era. Other sites visited for pilgrimage (ziyara) are the graves of numerous Alavite personages in and around Qom (about 400 ‘imamzadahs, or descendents of the imams, are said to be buried in the city and surrounding hamlets). A third major attraction is the Jamkaran Mosque, located five kilometers from the city. Visited by more than an estimated ten million people annually, it is believed to have been built at the order of the Twelfth Imam. These shrines in conjunction with numerous traditions related from the imams concerning the station of Qom as a Shi’ite sanctuary and stronghold make it Iran’s second holiest city after Mashhad.

See also Mashhad; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran.

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**QUR’AN**

Muslim housewives commence cooking by reciting a verse from the Qur’an in order to ensure that more people are able to enjoy the meal. On spotting an approaching dog, Muslims will hastily read any memorized verse to deflect its possible ill-intentions. The die-hard Marxists of the Baluchistan Communist Party in Pakistan commenced their annual conference with a recitation from the Qur’an. In Cape Town, the local rugby club will organize a cover-to-cover recitation of it to celebrate its fiftieth jubilee. In California, the international Muslim homosexual organization takes its name, Al-Fatiha, from the name of the Qur’an’s first chapter.

The Qur’an is memorized in small parts by virtually all Muslims, recited in the daily prayers, or rehearsed at funerals and memorial rituals, chanted at the side of the newly born, the sick, or the dying. After death it is recited to ease the passage of the departed soul into the next and to provide comfort for those left behind; as if to say “Whatever, be assured God is here; just listen to His speech!” Any inmate of a Dubai prison who memorizes it entirely can get complete remission from his or her sentence, and a memorization of each thirtieth part is rewarded by an equivalent amount off one’s sentence.

An immediate end can be brought to many an argument by resorting to: “But God says . . .!” Virtually every Muslim home is adorned with some verse from it in various forms of calligraphy, as a means of both beautifying one’s home and protecting it (with the inhabitants seldom knowing the meaning of the framed piece of calligraphy). Passages from it are used as amulets to protect from illness or the evil eye. A few verses containing the prayer that the Qur’an suggests Noah offered when he entered the ark are stuck on the windscreens of vehicles from Chicago to Jakarta to provide protection for the driver and passengers. Palatial mansions in many Muslim countries have the verse “This is [an outcome] of my Sustainer’s
bounty” (27:40) stuck on the gates or walls to ward off any evil intention. As for its inhabitants, they believe that protection is offered by pasting a few verses, known as the Verses of the Throne (Ayat al-Kursi), behind the front door. Written texts conform to or deviate from a language and its rules; in the case of this text, the development of the language is based on it and its rules are rooted primarily in the text.

This is the Qur’an. It fulfills many of the same functions in the lives of Muslims as the Bible does for Christians, but most importantly, it represents to Muslims what Jesus Christ represents for devout Christians or the Torah, the eternal law of God, for Jews. Similarly, the history of theological controversy about the nature of the Qur’an, which flourished from the early days of Islam until orthodoxy finally settled the issue of the “true dogma,” is not unlike the early controversies about the nature of Jesus Christ and his relationship to the Father, which was finally settled for the Christian world by the Council of Nicaea in 325. In the same manner that small remnants of the dissenting opinions about the nature of the Qur’an survived in Islam.

For Muslims the Qur’an is alive and has a quasi-human personality. Muslims believe that it watches over them and will intercede with God on the Day of Judgment. The Qur’an is possessed of enormous power; “Had We bestowed this Qur’an from on high upon a mountain, you would indeed see it [the mountain] humbling itself, breaking asunder for awe of God” (59:21).

The Qur’an as Oral Discourse
The oral dimensions of the Qur’an were important in a society where poetry and the spoken or recited word were highly valued. It is also evident that the activity of committing the Qur’an or sections thereof to memory and reciting it were important parts of the religious life of the earliest Muslims, and regarded as acts of great spiritual merit. The Prophet himself would often recite from the Qur’an and at times ask others to read for him. ‘Abdallah b. Mas’ud (d. 652) reported that the Prophet told him: “Read [from] the Qur’an for me.’ I [b. Mas’ud] said: ‘Shall I read it for you when it was revealed unto you?’ He said: ‘I love listening to it from someone else.’”

The overwhelming importance of the Qur’an as recited speech in contrast with it as written or read text is found in the meaning of the word Qur’an itself, in the way the earliest Muslims viewed the text, and in several verses of the Qur’an. The proper-noun sense of the term qur’an, as used in reference to the scripture, is that of a fundamentally oral and certainly an active ongoing reality, rather than that of a written and closed codex such as it later came to be, represented by the [masabif] written copies, sing. musabif).

From the Arabic root qara’a (to read), or qara’ana (to gather or collect), the word qur’an is used in the Qur’an in the sense of reading (17:93), recital (75:18) and a collection (75:17). The Qur’an also describes itself as “a guide for humankind” and “a clear exposition of guidance,” “a distinguisher” (25:1), “a reminder” (15:9), “ordinance in the Arabic tongue” (13:37), “a healer” (10:57), “the admonition” (10:57), “the light” (7:157), and “the truth” (17:81). From this literal meaning, it refers to a revealed oral discourse that unfolded over a period of twenty-three years as seemingly a part of God’s response to the requirements of society. Only toward the end of this process is the Qur’an presented as scripture rather than a recitation or discourse. The word qur’an is thus used in two distinct senses: first, as the designation of a portion or portions of revelation; and, second, as the name of the entire collection of revelations to Muhammad. This twin meaning of qur’an, as both a collection and as a book, makes for fascinating questions about the nature of revelation. Is it a collection of divine responses to earthly events or is it a pre-existing canon according to which events must play out in order that its narratives, injunctions, and exhortations can acquire flesh and blood?

The Qur’an as Written Word
For outsiders, the Qur’an exists primarily as a literary text (al-kitab); for Muslims, however, it continues to function as both a written text (mushaf) and an oral one (al-qur’an), with an organic relationship existing between these two modes. Most of critical scholarship has focused on the written dimensions of the text without reflecting too carefully on its message, and has failed to appreciate that its centrality to Muslims transcends this textual form. Thus, questions are raised by critical scholars about, for example, the identity of Mary, whom the Qur’an describes as the sister of Aaron, and the seeming discrepancy between this description and one in which Mary is credited with being the mother of Jesus.

Such questions generally fail to appreciate that the Qur’an is essentially evocative to Muslims and that it is often informative through its being evocative. While exegetes would go to great lengths to resolve the difficulties presented by the portrayal of Mary as both the mother of Jesus and the sister of Aaron, the “fact” of God having stated this remains unshaken. Thus while it may not make any cognitive sense, the response of the believer downplays cognition, and comprehension, and ignores the question of which Mary is being referred to. This understanding as devotion rather than as cognition is how the believer approaches the Qur’an. In other words, comprehension can follow from the emotive and intuitive response that is evoked in the hearer and reciter rather than a study of its contents.

The Structure of the Qur’an
Modern editions of the Qur’an include a heading that provides some basic information at the beginning of each sura (chapter) such as its name, the number of ayat (verses) it contains, and whether it is regarded as having been revealed in Mecca or Medina. The Egyptian print version, the one most widely used in the Muslim world today, also suggests...
which verses are exceptions; that is, which verses occurring in a Medinan text were actually revealed in Mecca and vice versa. There are two major divisions in the Qur’an, *suras* (chapters) and *ajzaʿ* (parts), and each *sura* contains a number of verses (*ayat*).

From the singular *aya* (lit. signs, indications, or wonders), *ayat* are the shortest divisions of the Qur’an and the term is usually rendered as “verses,” although it may also be understood as phrases or passages. A collection of *ayat*, usually distinguishable from one another by the occurrence of rhythm, rhyme, or assonance, comprise a *sura*. However, this technical meaning of the word *aya* (or *ayat*) is not the only, or even the primary, meaning with which it is used in the Qur’an. It frequently occurs in the sense of the signs of God’s presence in the universe. Muslims, however, believe that, given its miraculous and inimitable nature, the Qur’an and all of its constituent parts are signs of the presence of God in the world.

The Qur’an comprises 114 *suras*, each of which is divided into *ayat*. The word *sura* literally means row or fence, and seems to denote both a section or chapter and revelation itself. Muslims believe that the contents of the Qur’an were arranged by the Prophet in his lifetime, and that this was done annually under the guidance of the angel Gabriel. After *al-Fatihah* ("The Opening") the chapters are arranged roughly in order of descending size, beginning with *al-Baqara* ("The Cow") and concluding with *al-Nas* ("Humankind"). These *suras* are of unequal length, the shortest, "The Fountain," consisting of three *ayat*, the longest, "The Cow," containing 286. With one exception, *al-Ta’ārah* ("The Repentance"), all *suras* commence with “In the name of God, the Gracious, the Dispenser of Grace.” This formula is known as the *basmala* and was initially used to denote the boundaries between two *suras*. Muslims suggest that the omission of the *basmala* at the head of the *sura* *al-Ta’ārah* was intentional because this *sura* commences with God’s disavowal of the rejecters and a declaration of war on them. Others, however, suggest that because this *sura* was revealed toward the end of the Prophet’s earthly life, he simply did not have the time to insert the *basmala*.

All *suras* have names, and some are known by more than one. These names are based on diverse criteria with no obvious pattern to their naming. A number of hadith refer to specific *suras* by name, thus indicating that they were named by the Prophet. Given that this is a matter directly relating to the Qur’an, Muslims believe that it was a case where “He does not speak of his own whim,” (53:3) that is, Muhammad was guided by God in this. Some have, however, suggested that these names do not belong to the Qur’an proper, but rather have been introduced by later scholars and editors for convenience of reference. Twenty-nine of the *suras* have a sequence of Arabic letters that follow immediately after the *basmala*. Known as the disjointed letters, these are meaningless in the literal sense, and their presence has intrigued both confessional and traditional scholarship. With the exception of the second and third *suras*, they occur exclusively in *suras* belonging to the later Meccan period. There are fourteen of these disjointed letters in all, and the *suras* that contain them may have anywhere from a single letter to a cluster of five.

Another fascinating element of the Qur’an is its division into thirty equal parts, each called a *juz’* (pl. *ajzaʿ*). These divisions are intended to facilitate the recitation of the Qur’an in a month, particularly the month of Ramadan. The *ajzaʿ* are further divided into four neatly divided sections that are marked along the edges of the text. For reading on a daily basis, each *juzʿ* is divided into seven parts, called *manazil* (sing. *manzil*, lit. stage). It is significant that none of these divisions, pivotal to Muslim usage of the Qur’an, bears any relation to the meaning of the text.

The current arrangement of the Qur’an is neither chronological nor thematic. To those accustomed to reading in a linear or sequential fashion, this can prove tedious and frustrating. With the exception of story of Joseph, the Qur’an also does not have a clear narrative pattern within which its stories neatly unfold. While there is unanimity around the placement of the *ayat* within a *sura*, traditional scholars have differed as to whether the sequence of all, or only some, of the *suras* were divinely ordained. Most Muslims have accepted this arrangement although there have been a number of attempts to offer structural explanations for the way that the *suras* are laid out.

**Language**

Both Muslim and critical scholarship hold that the Qur’an first appeared in the Arabic language. Traditional Muslim scholarship holds that the Qur’an was written in the dialect of the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet, for it was also the classical language known to and understood by all the Arabs. Some Western scholars have argued that the Arabic of the Qur’an was not peculiar to any tribe, but was a kind of hochsprache (high speech) that was understood by all the peoples of Hijaz. Christoph Luxenberg, in his *Die Syro-Aramäische Lesart des Koran—Ein Beitrag zur Entschlüsselung der Koransprache* (2000), argues that a Syriac rendition of numerous words that would normally be rendered in Arabic can provide linguistic insights on texts that scholars have had difficulty trying to understand. Through a careful process of alternately replacing obscure Qur’anic Arabic words or phrases with Syriac homonyms, changing the diacritical marks (on the assumption that they were possibly misplaced by the editors), or retranslating portions of text into Syriac, Luxenberg discovers radically different meanings for a number of texts. This method differs greatly from the established reading of the Qur’an, which is premised on the idea that it is essentially an Arabic text.

**Content**

The Qur’an describes its contents as an “exposition of everything, a guidance, a blessing and glad tidings for those who
submit” (16:89) and declares that “no single thing have We neglected in the Book” (6:38). The Qur’an places an extraordinary emphasis on the binding relationship between faith and practice.

**God.** Belief in the existence of one transcendent creator and the struggle to live alongside all the implications of that belief may be said to be at the core of the Qur’an’s message, and that Creator is arguably the single most important subject of the Qur’an. The Qur’an uses the word Allâh approximately 2,500 times to refer to the Transcendent. God remains free from not only the confines of biology and paternity, but also from the confines of human language. “No vision can encompass Him, whereas He encompasses all vision, for He alone is unfathomable, all-aware” (6:103). The Qur’an portrays God as a deity who stands above the religious community that serves Him and who is greater than the law. God exists in and by Himself, and any association with Him is rejected by the Qur’an. Ascribing paternity to God is abominable, as is any notion of a shared divinity. Much of the Qur’an is devoted to the praise of God; the Qur’an holds that the entire universe is engaged in extolling the praises of God.

**Prophethood.** The second fundamental doctrine of the Qur’an is that of the historical continuity of revelation, whereby God sent a series of messengers to every nation in order to guide them to the path of righteousness. All of these messengers came with an identical message (41:43)—that of submission to the will of God—and all of humankind is required to believe in the veracity of each one of them. The Qur’an uses two terms to denote prophethood: rasûl (pl. rasûlûn) and nabiyy (pl. nabiyyûn). Rasûl seems to denote a messenger who received revelations and who actually headed his community, whereas nabiyy seems to denote an apostle who did not necessarily come with a new revelation or law: “...God elects whomsoever He will from among His Apostles...” (3:179). Anbiyya’ derive their authority solely from God; they cannot “bring forth a miracle other than by God’s leave.” Prophets are always chosen from among their own communities (7:35, 10:74 and 39:17) and are responsible only for conveying God’s messages (16:35).

The Qur’an contains a number of narratives involving prophets, often told with the intention of consoling Muhammed in the face of rejection by the Quraysh and recipients of earlier revelation. The Qur’an presents these narratives as moral lessons for humankind on the consequences of disobeying God. All of the prophets referred to in the Qur’an are men. While Mary was the recipient of revelation, nowhere is there any indication that she was expected to play the socio-religious role of Warner or the bearer of good tidings, or that she ever did so.

**The resurrection and ultimate accountability.** The Qur’an speaks repeatedly about the ultimate accountability of all human beings to God. It insists that all of life and its affairs, having originated with God are in a continuous state of purposeful reversion to a just and merciful Creator, Sustainer, and Judge. Physical death is thus not the end of life but merely evolution into another form. Human beings are placed on the earth for a predetermined period before they enter the akhîra (hereafter).

The terms dunyâ (“the world”) and akhîra (lit. next, or last) are related both to time and space and to two moral alternatives. Dunyâ is the geographical space and the present where humankind is meant to prepare for akhîra, yet this abode of preparation can also be good and fulfilling by itself. From the Qur’an, it would appear that there is a particular moment in time when the resurrection and judgment will begin, and that hour will commence with the sounding of the heavenly trumpet. When the resurrection begins, bodies will be reunited with their spirits and brought into the presence of God for the ultimate reckoning.

The Qur’an suggests that this resurrection is a bodily one, yet it is also a day when the earth shall be changed into non-earth (14:48). The Qur’an is explicit about two alternatives for each person in the hereafter—janna (paradise), or jâbannam (hell)—and spells out the deeds that will earn one a place in the one or the other. In Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection (1981), Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith point out that “Many of the details of the Fire, as of the Garden, are reminiscent of the New Testament; others reflect on occasions the tone of early Arabic poetry. On the whole, however, the picture afforded by the Qur’an is uniquely its own, articulated in a generally consistent and always awe-inspiring fashion.”

The Qur’an, at various junctures, indicates the sins that will earn a person consignment to hell. These include lying, dishonesty, corruption, ignoring God or God’s revelations, denying the resurrection, refusing to feed the poor, indulgence in opulence and ostentation, the economic exploitation of others, and social oppression. The fires of hell, however, are not the only consequence that wrongdoers will face on the Day of Judgment: “And those who earned evil, the punishment of evil is the like thereof, and abasement will cover them—they will have none to protect them from God—as if their faces had been covered with slices of dense darkness of night” (10:27). Denial of water (7:50) and of light (57:13) are also spoken of as forms of punishment for the inhabitants of hell.

**Righteous conduct.** The bulk of the Qur’anic message contains exhortations dealing with righteous conduct, and the consequences of following or ignoring them. These are framed within the backdrop of the all-pervading presence of God and humankind’s ultimate accountability to Him. The Qur’an regards the human being as a carrier of the spirit of God and a sacred trust from Him, and that all humans are in a continuous state of journeying toward Him. This sanctity
comes from humankind being the recipients of God’s own spirit from the moments of humankind’s creation. Returning to God entails a ceaseless struggle to prepare for the ultimate encounter. The Qur’an, while demanding that Muslims strive to fulfill all the requirements of virtuous behavior, nevertheless acknowledges that living up to such a commitment is exceptionally difficult.

The most important obligation that the Qur’an places on the believer is probably that of pursuing the pleasure of God and of desiring the ultimate encounter with Him. This is attained by cultivating a direct relationship of love with God and adoration of God, as well as by leading one’s life in such a way as to fulfill His commandments. In addition to setting forth the appropriate rituals, the Qur’an often speaks of the adoration of God as an important part of a Muslim’s ideal life and persona. The emphasis that the Qur’an places on God as the focus and objective of a believer’s life has led many a contemplative Muslim to regard the law as merely a means of facilitating closeness to God in the same way that railings may help one to climb up a flight of stairs.

Although the Qur’an cautions against excess and wasteful consumption, it nevertheless encourages a sense of joyful living. It asks believers not to impose unwarranted burdens upon themselves (5:87). The Qur’an also refers to physical cleanliness and sexual pleasure as two other dimensions of personal well-being (2:222, 30:21).

The Qur’an places great emphasis on knowledge, and the pursuit thereof, as valuable (49:9), but links the intellectual well-being of people to a profound awareness of God and justice, and emphasizes the compatibility of knowledge with faith (35:28, 58:11). The Qur’an often gives the impression that there is a certain essential body of truth, “the knowledge” (al-ilm), that is to be acquired. In numerous other verses, though, humankind is challenged to reflect, ponder, and meditate—all qualities more closely associated to heuristic and tentativeness than to certainty. Nonetheless, these qualities are usually regarded as the basis of wisdom (2:269). The Qur’anic assumption seems to be that knowledge and reflection will invariably and inevitably lead to God (39:9).

Truth. Postmodernist notions of tentativeness as a value have little place in the Qur’an, which moves from the premise that there is an absolute, single, and knowable Truth. The Qur’an speaks about the light in the singular and darkneses in the plural, making it convenient for traditional or fundamentalist scholars to claim that there is only one truth. Believers are called upon to uphold the spirit of truthfulness by staying in the company of other truthful people (9:19), and to speak the truth in the face of falsehood. Concealing the truth is prohibited (2:42) as is distorting it with falsehood (2:42). Hypocrisy is condemned in the strongest terms, and believers are enjoined to ensure that their deeds correspond to their words (61:2–3).

Social and economic relations. Notwithstanding the scriptural requirement that believers must disturb the peace whenever their silence would conceal the demons of injustice and oppression, the Qur’an also asks believers to lead lives free of pointless argumentation and quarreling (25:63). In the face of the all-pervading grace of God, the Qur’an requires believers to remain hopeful and never to despair. In fact, it describes deep pessimism as a sign of kufr (rejection) (12:87). A good Muslim upholds the truth and justice “and is not afraid of the reproaches of those who find fault” (5:54). The Qur’an encourages and even commands believers to lead an austere life. It is contemptuous of those who are attached to wealth beyond the requirements of one’s daily subsistence. Such attachment distracts one from following the path that leads to God and provides one with an illusionary sense of eternity. The notion of sustenance being properly earned is key to the Qur’an’s approach to wealth. It singles out for denunciation a number of unlawful means of acquiring money or property, including priests and monks devouring the property of people (9:34), gambling (5:90), and theft (60:12).

The Qur’an rejects all forms of sexual immodesty and speaks approvingly of only two kinds of relationship for sexual fulfillment: heterosexual marriage, or concubinage. The Qur’an also praises “... those [believers] who shun all vain activity” (23:3), and applauds those who, “when they pass by some vain activity, they pass it by with dignified [avoidance]” (25:72).

All of human life is sacred, for “verily We [God] have honored the Children of Adam” (17:70), and no one is allowed to take anyone else’s life “except in truth” (6:151). This is usually interpreted to mean that killing is permissible only during a just war, in self-defense, or in retribution after due legal process within a just social system. The Qur’an holds that all of humankind is diminished by the murder of a single person (5:32). While infanticide (more specifically, female infanticide) is condemned, the Qur’an is silent on the rights of the fetus. In accordance with the social practices of pre-Islamic Arabia, the Qur’an sanctions retaliation in the case of murder and physical injury. However, it emphasizes that this must be done justly, and that the remission of the death sentence is a source of “mercy from God” (2:178).

Overt theft is condemned (60:12), as are other, more covert forms of depriving others of their property, such as depriving someone of his or her inheritance, failing to return something entrusted to one for safekeeping (4:58), and cheating when weighing goods for sale (17:35). The Qur’an is particularly vehement in its denunciation of usury. The Qur’an sanctions notions of personal property with individuals being the rightful owners thereof, but condemns individuals who seek to keep secret the extent of their wealth and to be sole arbiters of how to dispense with it.

All wealth is regarded as a trust from God. Greed is condemned and those who live their lives free from greed are
regarded as “the successful ones.” In contrast to those who hoard, Muslims who “spend of their wealth by night and by day, in secret and in public” are promised that they “shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve” (2:274). The Qur’an takes the position that “in the possessions of the wealthy there is a right due to the poor” (51:19, 70:24–15) and places great merit on giving beyond the mandatory, institutionalized wealth tax known as zakat. Such giving will purify one’s soul, particularly if one gives away those things that are particularly dear (3:92), and does one’s giving quietly (2:71). Giving to the poor can be done “day and night, in secret or in public,” but it must not be followed by words of injury that make the recipient feel a sense of obligation to the benefactor.

Justice and human rights. The Qur’an takes the position that everyone is equal in the eyes of God and of the law. No human being has any inherent claim to superiority over another on the basis of lineage or race. It does, however, recognize and condone distinction, differentiation, or discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, knowledge, and piety. It is questionable whether one can really use the Qur’an as the standard to justify contemporary Islamic understandings of social equality or universal human rights. However, in the context of seventh-century Arabia, it can be viewed as having encouraged a sense of gender justice, as well as compassion toward victims of all kinds of oppression. There is a strong egalitarian trend in the Qur’an’s handling of ethico-religious responsibilities, but there is an undeniable discriminatory treatment of the social and legal obligations that have to do with women. Still, on this subject the Qur’an is somewhat contradictory. Gender statements can be found that affirm gender equality, and others can be found that deny it. However, when specific injunctions are mentioned, these are generally discriminatory to women.

Justice assumes such prominence in the Qur’an that it is regarded as one of the reasons why God created the earth. The demands that the Qur’an makes upon individuals to uphold justice is extraordinary, transcending all social bonds. While justice is something that one demands for oneself, more importantly, it is something to be fulfilled for others, regardless of the cost to oneself and one’s own community.

The Qur’an provides two notions that are said to govern social relations. The first is huquq (rights), which are defined as the obligations one owes to society, and which must be defended. The other is ibtan, understood to mean “generosity beyond obligation.” The basic principle of rights and duties is contained in the verse “Do not wrong and be not wronged” (2:279). In social conduct this covers the need for one to be reliable and trustworthy in one’s undertakings or promises (4:105, 8:27, 16:91) and economic dealings (93:1–3); to present truthful evidence in any matter or dispute (25:72); to refrain from concealing evidence (2:283), defaming others (49:6), backbiting, and slander (49:12), hypocrisy (2:8–19), and exploiting the vulnerability of others (2:275–276).

The Qur’an also condemns more subtle forms of injury to others, for they also detract from the humanity of the perpetrator. These injuries include suspicion (49:12), mocking others or the objects of their worship (49:11), and using derogatory nicknames (49:11). These injunctions apply to everyone who participates in a society founded upon Qur’anic principles, but the Qur’an recognizes that such a society may contain religiously diverse communities within it. The Qur’an is explicit about the importance of maintaining harmonious relationships with all those who are not engaged in warfare against the Muslims (60:8), the permissibility of the food slaughtered by the people of the book, and of marriage by Muslim males to their women (5:5).

The Qur’an encourages such generally recognized virtues as expressing gratitude (22:38), showing compassion (90:17), and speaking gently (2:83). It is also explicit about the means by which Muslims can “go the extra mile,” recommending that they share their wealth, care for orphans, and free their slaves. The Qur’an treats orphans, in particular, with an enormous amount of compassion. Muslims are instructed honor them (99:17–18), to treat them gently (93:9 and 4:36), to set aside wealth for the care of orphans (4:8), and to deal justly with their property (4:3). The Qur’an regards those who reject orphans as people who have rejected the faith itself (107:1–3).

There is no direct reference in the Qur’an to any notion of an Islamic state, but there are a few injunctions regarding obedience to authority. The Qur’an contains several references to the sovereignty of God, and this has been interpreted by Islamist ideologues to refer to an Islamic theocracy. The duties of the Muslim leadership include waging jihad in defense of the faith or in response to aggression, collecting and distributing zakat, and enacting punishment for a very limited array of sins or crimes, of which the following are mentioned: slander (24:4–9), adultery (24:2–3, 15:16), theft (5:41), robbery, treason, and armed insurrection (5:36–37), and murder and bodily mutilation (2:178–179).

Religious practices. Only three formal religious rituals or institutionalized practices receive any significant attention in the Qur’an: the formal prayers (salat), fasting in the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca (haji).

There are, on the other hand, numerous references in the Qur’an to prayers and its importance. Its significance can be gauged from the fact that the Qur’an outlines ways of deviating from the normal pattern of the ritual during a state of fear (2:238) or in the midst of actual physical combat during jihad (4:101). Other than in the case of illness, menstruation, or frailty, prayer is an obligation that can never be shirked. The Qur’an leaves the exact times of the prayers somewhat unclear; their times are rather fixed by interpretation of some
ambigious verses. As for the manner in which the prayer is to be conducted, the Qur'an refers only to bowing (ruku’) and prostration (sujud), and says that one should quietly recite “whatever of the Qur’an has been made easy for one” (73:20). A commitment of the mind and the heart is, of course, indispensable for prayer, and those who pray in a slothful and lazy fashion are regarded as being among the hypocrites (4:142, 9:54).

The Qur’an refers to fasting in two distinct contexts. One is the month of Ramadan, when fasting is performed as an act of worship. The other context, which is not linked to any special time or place, is when a believer feels the need to expiate a sin of or a lapse in a specific religious duty. The only objective of fasting stipulated in the Qur’an is that of acquiring taqwa—self-restraint arising from the awareness that one is always in the presence of God and ultimately accountable to Him. Fasting requires abstention from all food, drink, and sexual intercourse from the first sign that night is ending until just after sunset.

The hajj is obligatory for all of those of the Muslim faith who are capable of finding their way to Mecca (3:96). It occurs in the first ten days of the month of Dhu-l-Hijjah (the month of Hajj, which is twelfth month of the Hijri calendar). The time is specified in the Qur’an (2:189). As for the rites associated with the hajj, the Qur’an goes into somewhat greater detail for these than it does for any of the other formal acts of devotions.

Two samples of Qur’anic calligraphy appear in the volume two color insert.

See also Allah; Calligraphy; Devotional Life; Ethics and Social Issues; Human Rights; 'Ibadat; Jahannam; Janna; Law; Mi'rna; Muhammad; Pilgrimage: Hajj; Prophets; Ritual.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Farid Esack

QUTB, SAYYID (1906–1966)

Sayyid Qutb was an Islamic activist and one of the principal ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin). Qutb was born in a village near Asyut in Upper Egypt. He left for higher studies in Cairo around 1919 or 1920, and received a B.A. in education in 1933 from Dar al-‘Ulum. The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, had graduated from the same institution six years earlier and had moved the Brotherhood’s headquarters to Cairo just before Qutb’s graduation.

In the early part of his career, Qutb demonstrated little interest in religious activism. He focused primarily upon his work with the Ministry of Education, where he was employed
from 1933 to 1951, and his literary pursuits. His early writings, consisting primarily of literary criticism and works of fiction and poetry, brought him to the attention of Egypt’s cultural elite, including Taha Husayn. Later, Qutb would renounce much of his modernist views from this period.

By the late 1930s Qutb’s interests were turning increasingly toward political and social concerns. He associated with a number of nationalist political parties opposed to the Egyptian monarchy and British colonialism. His first major essay along religious lines, *al-‘Adala al-ijtima‘iyya fi'l-Islam* (Social justice in Islam), was published in 1949.

In 1948, perhaps to mollify his criticism, the education ministry sent Qutb to study Western methods of education, first in Washington, D.C., then in Colorado, and finally in California. He left the United States in 1950 and traveled through England, Switzerland, and Italy before returning to Egypt in 1951. Far from dissuading him from his growing activism, Qutb’s sojourn in the United States and Europe only intensified and radicalized it. He was appalled by what he saw as the dominant features of Western (especially American) culture: materialism, racism, and sexual permissiveness. He also became convinced that both the United States and the Soviet Union, despite their cold war posturing, were equally unconcerned with the aspirations of Arab and Islamic countries, and prepared to exploit them for their own gains. The fact that both superpowers had supported the creation of Israel in Palestine was, for Qutb, the strongest possible confirmation of their imperialistic aims.

Qutb became actively involved with the Muslim Brotherhood immediately upon his return, although he may not have formally joined until 1953. He served as a liaison between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers who overthrew the monarchy in July 1952, perhaps expecting cooperation between the military leadership and the Brotherhood in establishing an Islamic state. When it became clear that Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and the military leadership intended to create a secular state, Qutb and the Brotherhood distanced themselves from the new government.

In January 1954, the government banned the Brotherhood and imprisoned many of its key figures, including Qutb, because of their increasing criticism of the regime’s domestic and foreign policies. The decree was rescinded three months later. In October 1954, following an assassination attempt on Nasser by a member of the Brotherhood, Qutb was again arrested and severely tortured, despite his frail health. In July 1955 he was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

Qutb wrote the two works for which he is best known while in prison. He began his voluminous Qur’anic commentary, *Fi zilal al-Qur’an* (In the shade of the Qur’an), in 1962. In 1964 his supporters published a collection of his letters under the name *Milestone* (Milestones), in which he argues that jihad, entailing armed struggle, not just peaceful preaching, is necessary to overturn the corrupted state of Muslim societies (the new ignorance or neo-jahiliyya) and establish a true Islamic order based on God’s laws (*shari‘a*).

Qutb was released from prison in December 1964, probably due to ill health. But as Milestones’ circulation spread rapidly, he was rearrested in August 1965 and sentenced to death for sedition. Despite international appeals to spare his life, he was hanged on 29 August 1966. Since his death, his influence has steadily grown through the translation and proliferation of his work.

See also Banna, Hasan al-; Ikhwan al-Muslimin.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


*Sohail H. Hashmi*
Rabi’A OF BASRA (C. 714–801)

Rabi’a of Basra, also known as Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya, is regarded as a paradigm for Sufi women. An ascetic whose life spanned the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, her biographical image is a mosaic created by later writers. There are as many versions of Rabi’a’s hagiographic persona as there are accounts of her. She has been portrayed as a second Mary, a miracle worker, and the originator of the concept of divine love. Hanbali writers respect her extreme asceticism and otherworldliness, and modern historians consider her the quintessential saint of Islam.

Little objective information is known about Rabi’a. She was a client of the Arab tribe of Banu ‘Adi. Popular accounts state that she was sold into slavery during a drought, but her sanctity secured her freedom and she retired to a life of seclusion and celibacy, first in the desert and then on the outskirts of Basra, where she taught both male and female disciples. One of her male disciples was the jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 777). Rabi’a was the culminating figure in a series of Basran female ascetics, starting with Mu’adh b. ‘Adawiyah (d. 719). Her teacher may have been named Hayyuna. Many stories and poems attributed to Rabi’a actually belong to her students or to other Sufi women with similar names, such as her contemporary Rabi’a al-Azdiyya of Basra, and Rabi’a bint Isma’il of Damascus (d. before 850). The Sufi biographer al-Sulami (d. 1021) portrays Rabi’a as a contemplative and rational thinker. Later writers portray her as a more emotional and legendary figure.

See also Saint; Tasawwuf.

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RAHM, FAZLUR (1919–1988)

Fazlur Rahman was a notable scholar of Islamic philosophy and an important liberal Muslim thinker of the twentieth century. Born into a scholarly family in what is now Pakistan, he first studied Arabic at Punjab University in Lahore. He then won a scholarship that permitted him to attend Oxford University, where he received his Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy in 1949. His area of specialization was the work of Ibn Sina (Avicenna).

After spending some years teaching in the West, Rahman returned to Pakistan at the request of then–prime minister Ayyub Khan to direct the new Institute of Islamic Research. He provoked the ire of conservative Islamist movements during this volatile period, particularly with his progressive fatwas and two important interpretive studies, Islamic Metholodology in History (1965) and Islam (1966), in which he tackled some of the difficult issues of historical critical understandings of revelation. In the face of such opposition, Rahman left Pakistan for the United States. He settled into a distinguished career at the University of Chicago, where he served on the faculty from 1969 until his death. He contributed further important studies, including his Major Themes of the
RASHID, HARUN AL- (C. 763 OR 766–809)

Harun al-Rashid (Aaron “The Rightly-Guided”) was the fifth Abbasid caliph, who ruled the great Islamic empire from 786 to 809 during its zenith. A patron of learning and culture, he is known to the world through the tales of The Arabian Nights, which portray his court in Baghdad as a place of wealth and splendor.

Harun al-Rashid was born in 763 (or 766) in the city of al-Rayy, south of today’s Tehran, the third son of the caliph Muhammad al-Mahdi (“the Well-Guided”). Harun’s mother, al-Khayzuran, and his wife, Zubayda, played influential roles during his reign. Harun had eleven sons and twelve daughters; his sons al-Amin, al-Ma’mun, and al-Mu’tasim each in his turn became caliph.

Already as a teenager, Harun had led two military expeditions against the Byzantines. For his success on the battlefield, he was appointed governor of the provinces of northwest Africa (Ifrīqiya), Egypt, Syria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, although his tutor Yahya al-Barmaki was actually administrator. Harun then faced serious intrigues by his older half-brother and rival for the throne, Musa al-Hadi (Moses “the Guide”). After their father died, al-Hadi became ruler, but he died mysteriously after only one year in power. Al-Hadi’s son was forced at the point of a sword to renounce the caliphate; Harun—still in his early twenties—received the ring of the caliphate and was proclaimed caliph. Following the advice of his mother, he entrusted the administration to his Iranian tutor, Yahya al-Barmaki, and the latter’s family. The Barmakides assisted Harun in controlling his political rivals and Shi’ite opponents, and in defeating major risings in the provinces: in Syria (796), Egypt (788, 794–795), northwest Africa (786, 794–795, 797), and the Yemen (795–804). However, the administrative body formed by the Barmakides soon became a state within the state, promoting the “Iranization” of the, until then, Arab-Islamic caliphate.

Throughout his reign, Harun personally led many military campaigns against the Byzantines and established a Muslim naval power (with raids on Cyprus in 805 and Rhodes in 807). He granted the request of the Roman emperor, Charles the Great (Charlemagne; r. 800–814), to ameliorate the conditions for European Christian visitors to Jerusalem and the Holy Land and exchanged embassies and precious gifts with him: For example, Harun sent Charles an elephant and a water-clock of curious design. In the last periods of his reign, Harun seems to have lacked the competence and energy he showed in earlier years. Deteriorated in health, Harun al-Rashid died on 24 March 809.

The picture that medieval Arabic scholarship presents of Harun is somewhat contradictory: pious, statesmanlike, and of remarkably mild countenances, on the one hand; and dissolute, incompetent, and lacking modesty in enjoying wine and other privileges claimed by the upper class, on the other. Nevertheless, the development of Islamic society benefited from Harun’s enlightenment: He promoted commercial activities (as far as China), fine arts, poetry, literature, music, architecture, and the natural sciences. He reinforced law and order, secured state finances, and conducted major public construction projects. Yet, his reign marked a turning point for the Abbasid caliphate because the efficiency of administration began to decline and the political unity of the empire to disintegrate: Harun’s diplomacy eventually failed to neutralize provincial dynasties and local rulers, and his decision to apportion the empire among three of his sons virtually precipitated its political decline.

See also Caliphate; Empires: Abbasid.

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The Rashidun, or al-khulafa’ al-rashidun, the “rightly guided” caliphs, is the designation in Sunni Islam for the first four successors of the prophet Muhammad (d. 632). In their order of succession to Muhammad, these caliphs are: Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644), ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (r. 644–656), and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661).

According to the Sunni view of Islam’s earliest history, the prophet Muhammad did not designate anyone to succeed him. Muhammad having been the last of God’s prophets, the question, in any case, was of succession to the polity he had founded in Medina, not to his prophetic office. It was therefore left to the community to decide on his successor, and after some discussion and uncertainty a number of the Prophet’s Companions elected Abu Bakr, a leading member of the community and Muhammad’s father-in-law, as the first caliph. Before his death two years later (634 C.E.), Abu Bakr nominated ‘Umar as his successor, a choice which, like Abu Bakr’s own, was accepted by the Muslim community. For his part, ‘Umar, when mortally wounded by an assassin after a reign of twelve years, left the choice of caliph to a committee of six leading figures. This committee chose ‘Uthman after he pledged to follow the example of his two immediate predecessors—a guarantee that the other major contender, ‘Ali, was not willing to give. The latter half of ‘Uthman’s reign saw strong disaffection in his capital, Medina, in the garrison towns of Kufa and Basra, and in Egypt against the policies of the caliph, who was eventually murdered in Medina by the rebels. These rebels then supported the accession of ‘Ali, but he was never recognized as a legitimate caliph by the entire community of Muslims. In particular, Mu’awiya b. Abu Sufyan, the governor of Syria and a kinsman of ‘Uthman, demanded that ‘Ali first punish the killers of his predecessor, and a number of the Prophet’s Companions, including his wife ‘A’isha, made similar demands. There was dissension in ‘Ali’s own camp also, with some of his followers, who came to be known as the Khawarij, seceding from him on grounds that it was improper to negotiate with rebels like Mu’awiya. ‘Ali was eventually murdered by one of the Khawarij, and his death, and the rise of the Umayyads to power under Mu’awiya (r. 661–680), marked the end of the Rashidun caliphate.

The events of the latter half of ‘Uthman’s reign and the entirety of ‘Ali’s disputed caliphate—known to modern scholars as the First Civil War—are remembered in Islamic religious and political history as the “Fītna”—a time of chaos, division, and tribulation. No other period in the history of Islam has been the subject of greater debate than the events of the Fītna. For the Sunnis, the Companions are second only to the Prophet as sources of religious guidance, and yet during the civil war they were ranged on opposite sides and bitterly fought each other. Which of the parties to the conflict was in the right, whether ‘Uthman and ‘Ali were legitimate caliphs, and whether someone who was a grave sinner continued to be a member of the Muslim community were questions that were to divide the Muslim community for centuries. Indeed, it is to the events of the First Civil War that the origins of the major religio-political schisms in Islam are datable.

A distinctive doctrine of those who, in the ninth century, emerged as the Sunnis was that all four of the Prophet’s immediate successors were equally righteous, and that the historical sequence of their succession was also the order of their religious ranking. Agreement on this position did not come about easily. While the Khawarij did not recognize either ‘Uthman or ‘Ali as legitimate, and most of the Shi’as considered none but ‘Ali as a true caliph and imam, many of the asbāb al-suma’a of the late eighth century, who together with the asbab al-badīth later emerged as the first Sunnis, themselves had reservations about the legitimacy of ‘Ali’s caliphate. By the time of the hadith scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), many of those recognizable as early Sunnis had come to acknowledge all four of the Prophet’s successors as equally righteous. It was also in the late eighth and early ninth centuries that a tradition of the Prophet, according to which the “caliphate” would last only thirty years after his death—that is, only for the duration of the reigns of his first four successors—became widely current. Though the Umayyads and the Abbasids claimed, of course, to be caliphs and were recognized as such by the Sunni religious scholars, a position such as that enshrined in the “thirty years” hadith signaled that the age of the Rashidun was to be set apart from all subsequent eras. For the Sunnis, that age has continued to be seen as a time, indeed the only time, when Islamic ideals were truly implemented. As such, invocations of the Rashidun have continued to be part of the religio-political discourse in the Sunni Islamic world to the present.

See also Abu Bakr; ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib; ‘A’thman ibn ‘Affan; Fītna; Imam; ‘Umar.

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Refah united marginalized people around Islamic identity, morality in government, a domestic policy favoring the lower and middle classes, and a pro-Middle East/Asian and anti-Western/Israel foreign policy. After capturing Istanbul’s and Ankara’s mayoralties, the Refah Party won the 1995 national election with 21 percent of the vote and formed a coalition with Tansu Ciller’s center-right True Path Party. This uneasy partnership achieved some domestic change and a more balanced foreign policy, but government corruption remained high.

Refah presented an alternative to mainstream parties mired in stagnation and corruption, appealing to disenfranchised small businessmen, impoverished workers, young professionals and students, women, and new export-oriented capitalists. Its Islamism sought to replace traditional Kemalism’s heavy-handed secularism, statist economics, and pro-Westernism. Its religious agenda countered ethnic conflict, social dislocation, and organized crime; its Middle East agenda offered commercial profits and employment in technical fields; and its welfare plans inspired those at the bottom of the income scale. Inconsistent policies toward women and a human-rights agenda that excluded opponents frightened secularists and Kemalists. The Refah government was forced from power in 1997, and the party was closed down in February 1998.

See also Erbakan, Necmeddin; Modernization, Political: Participation, Political Movements, and Parties.

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REFORM

ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Revivalist movements and reformist thinkers have arisen throughout Islamic history. Since the early nineteenth century, two intellectual strands have evolved among the Arabic-speaking populations of Southwest Asia and North Africa, each in its own way calling for Islamic renewal (tajdid) and reform (islah) against the status-quo traditionalists among the ulema on the one hand and Western-style secularists on the other. One of these strands is variously dubbed conservative, fundamentalist, and more recently Islamist; the other is generally known as modernist or liberal. Neither strand, it should be emphasized, advocates reform of Islamic dogma itself, which would obviously open it to charges of illicit innovation (bid’a). Rather, Islamic reformism is limited to correcting the interpretations and practices of Muslims, allegedly in order to better reflect the true Islam. A number of different understandings of the means and ends of reform could be accommodated within such a broad aspiration.

The Wahhabi movement that began in late eighteenth-century Arabia was the last significant reformist effort in the era before European imperialism. It erupted out of the potent mixture of the fiery religious appeal of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) and the political and military acumen of the Sa’ud family. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab called for a return to the strict monotheism (tawhid) that he claimed underlay the mission of the prophet Muhammad. In his view, the society around him had departed in many regards from this pure Islam, neglecting, for example, the enforcement of Islamic punishments for such things as adultery and theft and absorbing such un-Islamic practices as the building of tombs for the dead and saint worship. When the Wahhabiyya succeeded in conquering most of Arabia in the early nineteenth century, the first Saudi state set about implementing Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s vision of an ideal Islamic society, grounded in a strict, literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Prophetic hadith that he considered to be authentic. Although this state was crushed by an Egyptian army in 1818, the conservative reformist message of Wahhabism spread to other Muslim areas, and its influence upon other reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is incontrovertible.

Wahhabi forces were checked by the army of Muhammad ‘Ali (c. 1769–1849), the founder of a new dynasty in Egypt and the initiator of modernization in the Arab world. Having seen the technological superiority of Napoleon’s army when it invaded and occupied Egypt from 1798 to 1801, Muhammad ‘Ali launched a program to reform the Egyptian military and civil administration, after becoming the Ottoman governor of the province in 1805. Educational missions were dispatched to Europe, mainly France, for scientific and technological training, beginning as early as 1809. The students returned with ideas of how to reform Egyptian politics, culture, and education as well. The origins of modernist Muslim thought in the Arab world are often traced to Rifaa’al-Tahtawi (1801–1873). As the religious advisor traveling with an Egyptian student delegation to Paris in 1826, Tahtawi immersed himself in European history, geography, politics, literature, and science, learning French in order to do so. Upon returning to Cairo in 1831, he became Muhammad ‘Ali’s chief supporter among the ulema for the modernizing reforms the pasha had initiated. In his writings, Tahtawi expounded a theme that would engross later modernist thinkers: reform of Islamic law based on the needs of the modern age. To begin such legal reform, he argued, the education of the law’s interpreters, the ulema, had to be overhauled. Tahtawi’s most important contribution to educational reform, and his greatest influence upon later generations of reformers, was exerted through the School of Languages, of which he was appointed director in 1837. The school educated Egyptian students in European languages and translated key European texts into Arabic.

Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (c. 1822–1890), prime minister first to the bey of Tunis and later to the Ottoman sultan, called much more directly than Tahtawi for political reforms to accompany legal and educational changes. Khayr al-Din argued that Europe’s military prowess was an outgrowth of the development of effective and accountable governments. For Muslims to borrow constitutional principles from Europeans would not be innovation at all, he wrote, but merely a return to the true principles of government established by the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs.

Despite the modernization efforts in states such as Egypt and Tunisia—limited mainly to small-scale educational and bureaucratic reforms, with no serious legal or political changes—Muslim power relative to that of Europe steadily declined during the first half of the nineteenth century, and by the century’s end, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt had passed under direct French and British rule. The beginning of formal European imperialism produced among Arabs a more profound intellectual search for the causes of Muslim decline and the means for its reversal.

The broad term designating the movement for Islamic reform that emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth century is Salafiyya. Exactly when the Salafiyya movement began and who should be included among its adherents remain controversial issues. The name is derived from the phrase salaf al-salihin, which refers to the first three generations of Muslims and various pious figures in subsequent generations who best understood and applied the “true” Islam. Its proponents argue for a return by Muslims to the practice of these, Islam’s forebears. As such, the Wahhabiyya could be and sometimes are considered a Salafi movement.

The figure most widely considered as the architect of Salafi principles, however, is Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Three basic principles underlie ‘Abduh’s reformism. First, he
### Muslim reform and renewal movements (18th to 20th century)

**Arabia**
- Reform teaching in Mecca and Medina
  - Wahhabiyya—founded by Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792); allied with Ibn Sa’ud to create Saudi state
  - Idrisiyya—founded in Mecca by Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837)

**Caucasus**
- Naqshbandiyya—1785–present, anti-Russian resistance

**Inner Asia**
- Naqshbandiyya—reform-oriented Sufi tariqa leads Muslim resistance to Russia and China
  - New teaching, 1761–1877—offspring of Naqshbandiyya, late-eighteenth- and late-nineteenth-century resistance to Chinese rule
  - Yunnan, 1856–1877—rebellion against Chinese rule and effort to establish a Muslim state
  - Usul-e jadid—Kazan, Crimean, and Bukharan intellectuals, notably Isma’iil Gasprinskii (1851–1914), sponsor new schools, combined Muslim and Russian education; modernization of Muslim peoples

**India**
- Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762)
- Shah ‘Abd al-Aziz (1746–1824)
- Muhammad Isma’iil (1781–1831)
- Sayyid Ahmad Bareli (1785–1831) unites Pathans to resist British and Sikhs
  - Patna-Maulana Walayat ‘Ali
  - Maulana Karamat ‘Ali
  - Delhi School
  - Deoband—founded 1876. Muslim college combined hadith studies and Sufism and spawned satellite schools
  - Tablighi Islam—founded 1927 by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas

**Southeast Asia**
- Padri Movement—Sumatra 1803–1837
  - Dipanegara leads revolt on Java, 1825–1830
  - Banten, West Java revolts, nineteenth century
  - Kaum Muda—Sumatra and Malaya movement for reform and modernization
  - Aceh—1873–1908 ulama-led resistance to Dutch occupation
  - Muhammadadiyya—1912; educational and social reform

**Egypt and North Africa**
- Salafiyya—founded by Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), influenced islah and national movements in North Africa; Tunisia, Young Tunisians; Algeria, Ben Badis; Morocco, ‘Alai al-Fasi
  - ‘Abd al-Qadir—Qadiriyya chieftain attempts to establish Algerian State, defeated by the French
  - Rahmaniyya—religious brotherhood uses networks of zawiya in Algeria and Tunisia to resist French occupation
  - Tijaniyya—reform Sufi order inspires West and North African jihad and resistance movements
  - Sanusiyya—reformist brotherhood creates ‘state’ structure in Libya, founded by Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Sanusi (d. 1859); resists Italian occupation
  - Khalwatiyya—reformist Sufi brotherhood

**East Africa**
- Idrisiyya spawned Rashidiyya in Algeria; Amiringhaniyya in Sudan and Nubia; Sanusiyya in Libya
- Sudan—Sammaniyya gives rise to Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Mahdi (d. 1998)
- Somalia—Muhammad ‘Abdallah Hasan leads resistance to British, 1899–1920

**West Africa**
- Jihad of ‘Uthman Dan Fadio (1754–1817)—Northern Nigerian reformist opposition to Hausa states
  - Sokoto Caliphate (1809–1903) and related jihads in Adamawa and Masina
  - Al-Hajj Umar (1797–1864)—jihad state in region of Mali and Senegal
  - Bundu, Futa Jallon, and Futa Toro, reform Muslim states in the Senegambian region
  - Ma Ba—nineteenth-century jihad in Senegal
  - Samory (1860s–1898)—Muslim adventurer founds West African State

rejected predestination and the fatalism and intellectual torpor that he believed resulted from it. Second, he emphasized the compatibility of revelation with reason. In other words, he argued that religion does not impose unduly on what reason demands as scientific or moral truths and, conversely, that human rational faculties are capable of confirming most, if not all, the spiritual truths illuminated by religion. Finally, ‘Abduh asserted a claim to renewed interpretation (ijtihad) of Islamic law based on the requirements of social justice (maslahah) of his own era.

‘Abduh did not directly advocate a political program, implying only that Islamic principles of accountable and limited government supported the idea of liberal parliamentary democracy. Later reformers appealed, explicitly or implicitly, to his writings to justify their own, sometimes opposite views. The most bitter controversy erupted when ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raji’iq (1888–1966) published a treatise arguing that the mixture of religion and politics in the institution of the caliphate was a perversion of the Prophet’s teachings and practice. Rashid Rida (1865–1935) denounced ‘Abd al-Rajiiq’s arguments, which opened secular possibilities within Islamic political thought, as a perversion of Islamic teachings and history. Another disciple of ‘Abduh’s, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (c. 1849–1902), had earlier written on the need to revive the Arab caliphate as a precursor to Islamic revival worldwide.

‘Abduh expressed his views prolifically in the pages of the journal al-Manar. He also tried to implement his reform program by issuing progressive fatwas in his capacity as Grand Mufti of Egypt, and through his efforts at reorganizing the education of Egyptian religious scholars at al-Azhar University and other institutions. Many Arab nationalists would attempt to incorporate his progressive, moderate, and flexible interpretations of Islam into their political ideologies, but generally failed to produce a true synthesis of theory and practice once independence was achieved.

‘Abduh’s reform agenda was carried on by Rashid Rida, but Rida brought to it a greater conservatism in philosophical outlook and methodology, relying primarily on Hanbali jurisprudence, whereas his mentor had advocated free borrowing from all Sunni schools of law. He was also much more politically oriented than ‘Abduh, seeing the institution of an Islamic state as the precursor to the application of Islamic law and the promotion of Islamic social mores. Rida thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand of Salafi reformism, one that is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The reformism of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the principal ideologues of the Brotherhood, reflects Rida’s influence in its advocacy of a holistic conception of Islamic state and society, where shari’a regulates all spheres of life. In this regard, the Brotherhood’s Salafism is similar in approach to that of the Wahhabiyya, although their views on specific points of Qur’anic interpretation and Islamic law may vary.

By the early years of the twenty-first century, Islamic reform in the Arab world remained a highly contested discourse. In terms of political mobilization, the conservative Islamist agenda seemed to have triumphed over the liberal modernist project. Conservative reformers such as Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917–1996) in Egypt and Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932) in Sudan had attracted much larger public followings than their modernist counterparts. Arab modernists had thus far failed to form a mass-based organization to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood and its many, more radical offshoots. Still, the work of such modernist intellectuals as Tariq al-Bishri and Hasan Hanafi (b. 1935) in Egypt and Muhammad Shahrur in Syria, and the political activism of Rachid al-Ghanoushi (b. 1941) in Tunisia have demonstrated the continuing relevance and development of modernism.

See also ‘Abd al-Rahman Kawakibi; ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad Ibn; ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Banna, Hasan al-; Ghazali, Muhammad al-; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Qutb, Sayyid; Rida, Rashid; Salafiyya; Tajdid; Turabi, Hasan al-; Wahhabiyya.

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Sobail H. Hashmi

IRAN

The reform and reconstruction of Islamic doctrine in Iran, aimed at striking a stable balance with contemporary requirements, exhibits important and at times idiosyncratic characteristics. Iran is the largest non-Arab Islamic country where the greater majority of the population adheres to Shi’ite principles. Unlike most Islamic countries, throughout Western colonial and imperialist expansions Iran has enjoyed unbroken, if at times fragile, native sovereignty, and this has led to a peculiar dynamic of perception and interaction with the West. The outbreak of the Islamic Revolution (1979), in a rapidly but unevenly modernizing nation-state, together with the turbulent evolution of the Iranian society ever since, further mark the Iranian experience as unique.

The roots of Islamist reform in Iran are commonly traced back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 to 1908.
However, for at least two generations prior to that turning point in modern Iranian history, emerging social and intellectual forces had grappled with new questions regarding Islamic, Iranian, and “progressive” identities. The enigmatic reformist Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–1897), for example, had won a sizable following in Iran, one among whom ended up assassinating the Qajar sovereign, Naser al-Din Shah, in 1896.

Beginning in the years prior to the Constitutional Revolution, and continuing throughout the twentieth century, groups of clerics, teachers, journalists, government officials, and lay professionals attempted to flesh out a “progressive” discourse by way of molding such modern concepts as the nation (mellat), or a representative assembly (majlis shura), into historically more familiar native contexts. The discourse of Islamic reform in Iran is best understood by demarcating its pre- and postrevolutionary phases, with reference to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In its prerevolutionary phase, the reformist discourse tended to be nativist-apologetic, maximalist, utopian, and “progressive.” It also embraced, or at least condoned, militant violence as a legitimate means. Prerevolutionary reformists in Iran further called for universal Islamic union or integration, in the face of non-Muslim adversaries. The burgeoning postrevolutionary discourse, in contrast, while maintaining its “progressive” stance, exhibits eclectic-critical, minimalist, pragmatic, and pluralistic tendencies and it increasingly downplays the purported efficacy of violent tactics.

Prerevolutionary Islamic reform proceeded from the fundamental premise that Islam, as a comprehensive system, should aptly offer answers to every conceivable question of human concern, at individual and societal levels, as well as in both temporal and spiritual spheres. The discourse was maximalist in its aiming to bring an ever-expansive domain under an Islamic umbrella. Reformists, from the 1920s onward, unflinchingly formulated “nativist” Islamic solutions for issues raised by the secularizing government agenda, as well as for those put forward by Marxist activists in Iran. Reformists took on the daunting task of spelling out the proper Islamic ways for approaching a plethora of issues, from such mundane matters as personal hygiene and dietary practice to the intricate workings of the economy and international diplomacy. Pamphlets and books with formulaic titles such as “Islam and . . .,” and “. . . in Islam,” proliferated. As a result of its maximalist-nativist character, reformist discourse was prone to indulge in apologetics. In an effort to present a view of the Islamic tradition that was in tune with the manners of the time, reformists did not hesitate to denounce portions of it as “superstitious.” Some, like the cleric Shari’at-Shangelaji (1890/2–1943), had to face ostracism, perhaps for jettisoning too much. In general, a collective penchant developed among reformists for doing away with what they deemed spurious, and for restoring the undulterated, primordial Islam (eslam rastin) that transcended the vicissitudes of history. This tendency in Iran bore close kinship to the salafiyya movement in Egypt.

‘Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977), a prolific intellectual of an unfathomable range of influence, best exemplified the utopian tendency. He not only shared in the maximalist outlook, but consciously hailed the transformation of the dormant Islamic culture into a potent ideology imparting clear-cut instructions for political struggle, as a most urgent and significant accomplishment.

The maximalist-utopian ideal, culminating in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, provided the exponents of Islamist reform, such as Mehdi Bazargan (1902–1994), Sayyed Mahmud Taleqani (d. 1979), and Morteza Mutahhari (1919–1979), with an opportunity to put into practice what they had preached for decades. The radical doctrine of “Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist” (vilayat feqtge faqih), expounded by Ayatollah Khomeini, rendered absolute discretion into the hands of the religious elite, and boosted the maximalist program. A full-blown, yet ostensibly inadequate, juridical (feqtge) approach toward complex issues of the state alienated among others surviving pioneers of Islamist reform, such as Bazargan, who had throughout their careers vouched for a humanely tolerant view of Islam and had foreseen more inclusive methods of governance.

Beginning in 1988, the publication of a sequence of critical essays sparked new debate and led Islamist reform in Iran toward a turning point. ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush (b. 1945), an academic thinker with impeccable prerevolutionary credentials, contended that Islamic doctrine lies inevitably subject to historic expansion and contraction. The body of knowledge standing outside the proper domain of “Islam,” according to Sorush, inexorably influences the way questions are framed and solutions formulated within it. The recognition of a set of inalienable rights for human beings irrespective of religious affiliation, for example, should lead to a reconsideration of the primarily “duty-bound” conception of man hitherto propounded in Islamic texts. Religious texts, Sorosh contends, should be interpreted in light of the broader extrareligious context. Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabestari (b. 1936), an articulate reformist cleric, further elaborates on this hermeneutic approach, making room for alternative yet rational interpretations or “readings” of Islam. Mojtahed-Shabestari urges that true religious faith thrives on social liberty, and he earnestly criticizes the officially enforced interpretation of Islam advocated by the state in Iran.

The new discourse of Islamic reform, exemplified in the work of Soroush, and manifested in the writings of Mojtahed-Shabestari and a few others, defined a nascent group of religious intellectuals (rowshanfekran dini), retrospectively including in its ancestry such thinkers as Bazargan and Shari’ati. During the 1990s, a group of these religious intellectuals, sometimes referred to as the Kiyan Circle (balde Kiyan),
expressed their views in the important periodical Kiyan (officially closed down by court decree in 2000). This forum raised crucial questions with regard to Islamic reform, including issues of democratic governance, Islamic law, and faith, and probed into the fields of epistemology and ethics.

The election of Mohammad Khatami as the president of the Islamic Republic in 1997 signaled a potential triumph for postrevolutionary Islamic reformism. An advocate of religious intellectualism himself, Khatami incorporated key elements of the burgeoning discourse in his campaign slogans and called for increased social pluralism and a move toward civil society. In practice, however, theoretical as well as functional shortcomings seem to have stifled this particular promise. Nevertheless, Islamic reformism persists as an ongoing and evolving project in contemporary Iran.

Iranian reformers, more often than not, have formulated ideological or doctrinal questions in purely epistemic terms, and have shown conspicuously less concern for sociohistorical processes constituting religion in general and Islam in particular.

See also ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush; Afghani, Jamal al-Din; Bazargan, Mehdi; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Mojahed-Shabestari, Muhammad; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Muslim Communities of the Russian Empire; Reform: South Asia; Shari'ati, ‘Ali.

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Hosein Kamaly

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
Jadidism was an intellectual current among the Muslims of the Russian empire that emerged in the 1880s, and it remained active into the first decade of Soviet rule. Although Jadidism is commonly defined as a manifestation of Islamic reformism, it would be more correct to label it as a form of Islamic modernism. The word “jadidism” is derived from the term usul-e jadid, signifying “new method,” and initially first came to prominence as an educational reform movement. However, during and after the 1905 revolution the movement became increasingly politicized, and its adherents, known as jadids, began to articulate a political agenda increasingly and variously influenced by pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, and nationalist ideas. At the same time, as actors in the political life of Russia as a whole, the jadids were not politically unified and were to be found among several of the empire’s radical, liberal, and even conservative political parties. Following the Russian Revolution (1917), jadids were active in the various factions engaged in the Russian Civil War, notably among the various Muslim nationalist movements, within the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and among the Bolsheviks. Following the Bolshevik victory, jadids became increasingly politically marginalized, as their vision of secularized Muslim communities, and their ability to effect political change, were rapidly eclipsed by revolutionary social change and secularization that became the hallmark of Soviet rule. Furthermore, their association with nationalism, pan-Turkic, and pan-Islamic ideas resulted in the complete purging of active jadids from political and even social life during the rule of Stalin, which ended the jadidist movement in Russia.

The ideological founder of jadidism is usually identified as Isma’il Bey Gasprinskii (1851–1914), a Crimean Tatar from the town of Bakhchesaray in the Crimea. Having studied and lived in Paris and Istanbul in the 1870s, where he came under the influence of French liberals, the Young Turks, and the pan-Islamist ideas of al-Afghani, Gasprinskii returned to the Crimea, where in 1883 he founded the newspaper Tarjuman (The interpreter). Until the 1905 revolution, this publication was the sole Turkic-language newspaper in the Russian empire, and a major platform for disseminating Gasprinskii’s jadidist ideas. An avowed monarchist, Gasprinskii sought to unify the Turkic peoples of Russia (who constituted the vast majority of Russia’s Muslim population) and facilitate their integration into the economic and civic life of imperial Russian society. To this end, Gasprinskii championed the creation of a common Turkic literary language and, most significantly, sought to reform Muslim education to make it conform more to Western models. Gasprinskii especially championed the teaching of Russian language, arithmetic, geography, and the sciences. In addition, he is credited with introducing a phonetic system of reading for pupils to learn to read faster. Gasprinskii opened the first jadidist school in Bakhchesaray in 1884.

As an educational reform movement, jadidism grew steadily from the 1880s to 1917. It was received most enthusiastically among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia’s Volga-Ural region. The urban elites of these Muslim communities were relatively well integrated into Russian economic life, and it was precisely the Tatar urban bourgeoisie who were the most active backers of jadidist educational institutions. While jadidist schools could be found throughout the Russian Empire’s Muslim regions, it was mainly brought to outlying regions by Tatar colonists. Yet jadidist schools were viewed with suspicion among traditional Muslim elites, particularly in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, but even in the Volga-Ural region as well.
**Jadids**, including numerous graduates of *jadid* madrasas, had a substantial impact on the growth of nationalist, pan-Turkic, and pan-Islamic political activity following the 1905 revolution, especially in the emergence of Muslim nationalism. At the same time, *jadids* also came into conflict with conservative and traditionalist elements within their own societies. This conflict between the *jadids* and the traditionalists is often depicted as simply a conflict between “reaction and reform,” but in fact was in large measure a political struggle mirroring the conflict in Russia between political conservatives and increasingly radical proponents of social and political change within the Russian Empire. In the Volga-Ural region, this conflict was characterized by a politicization of the religious debate between *jadids* and conservatives; in Central Asia, where local adherents of jadidism were far fewer, it was even more restrictive than in Russia proper. Both native rulers and Russian administrators were openly hostile to jadidist activity.

During the period from 1905 to 1917 the jadidist movement remained ideologically heterogeneous, although many *jadids* became increasingly secular and radicalized, as the Russian Empire drifted toward revolution. At this time, especially after 1910, many *jadids* began making an ideological shift from Muslim nationalism to local nationalisms. This process was most evident in the Volga-Ural region, Azerbaijan, and to a lesser extent among the Kazakhs. With the outbreak of civil war following the 1917 revolution, *jadids* played important political roles in Muslim nationalist movements, particularly in Azerbaijan, in the short-lived Idel-Ural Republic in the Volga-Ural region, and in the Qoqand Autonomy in Turkestan. Other more radical *jadids*, who rejected nationalism in favor of class struggle, joined the Communist Party or allied themselves with the Bolsheviks. In Central Asia, Bolsheviks briefly installed local *jadids* as the rulers of the short-lived People’s Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm.

The historical legacy of jadidism remains debated both in the West and in the former Soviet Union. As Muslims, the *jadids* were certainly the first members of imperial Russia’s Muslim societies to coherently articulate a vision of secularized Muslim community integrated within the Russian Empire and, by extension, into European society. Indeed they sought to harmonize, and actually alter, Islamic culture to function within a European framework. In fact, the transition from pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic jadidism to jadidist-inspired Muslim nationalism, and even ethnic nationalism, was a relatively seamless one. Some modern Tatar nationalists, for instance, depict jadidism as a manifestation of Tatar national identity, and national genius. However, other scholars, especially those who have examined jadidism within the context of Islamic intellectual and cultural history as a whole, have depicted jadidism as a rather marginal movement within Islamic society, especially in comparison to existing traditional institutions and ideas, not only in Central Asia, but in the Volga-Ural region as well.

See also Gasprinskii, Isma’il Bay; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Iran; Reform: South Asia.

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*Allen J. Frank*

**SOUTH ASIA**

Reform, in the context of South Asian Islam, can acquire two different, indeed contradictory, meanings and objectives. It can refer to the liberalizing tendencies encompassing a rational, scientific, “enlightenment” orientation to Islam, or it may signify traditionalist movements seeking to restore Islam to its more orthodox, pristine, “original” form. The first is intended to ensure the progress of Muslims in the modern world, the second to revive a glorious past. Islamic reformism in South Asia has usually struggled within this awkward dialectic.

It is noteworthy that South Asia’s initial encounters with Islam were relatively benign and accommodative. When Muhammad bin Qasim landed in Sind in 712 C.E., he was instructed through a legal opinion to treat the local non-Muslims with justice. Similarly, in spite of successive waves of Muslim invasions, it was the Sufi saints (charismatic mystics) who were largely instrumental in converting the vast majority of the population to Islam through example and persuasion. And finally, while the distinctions with the Hindus were profound and obvious, the poorer classes of both communities were brought together by their poverty, agrarian existence and the syncretistic compulsions of “popular” or “folk” religion. Therefore, Hindus were seldom the dreadful “other” against whom reform movements were directed.

It is perhaps Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762) who can claim the status of being one of the first influential theologian-revivalists in the subcontinent. He belonged to the Naqshbandiya *tariqa* (a Sufi order), and represented a combination of both rationalism and traditionalism. He suggested that Muslims should practice *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) to reach conclusions relevant to the times. And while he did not subscribe to the same puritanical rigidity of his contemporary, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab of Arabia, he did criticize many un-Islamic accretions that South Asian Islam had acquired. Because of the range, eclecticism, and power of his writings, many reformists of different persuasions claim him as part of their intellectual heritage.

The gradual displacement of the Muslims from their position of privilege and authority owing to the impact of
Reform

British commercial and imperial ambitions, and the increasing fear of British intrusion into their religious practices, generated an edginess and militancy within later reformists. Anti-British sentiment was fused with ideas of religious self-preservation and purification causing Wali Allah’s son to declare territories under British control as dar-ul-barb (land of war). Some of his followers such as Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi and Syed Ismail Shahid died in western India fighting against the Sikhs and British in 1831. In the eastern province of Bengal, other followers such as Haji Shariatullah (1781–1840) and his son Dudu Mian (1819–1862) combined class and religious sensitivities to launch the faraidi movement (implying that which is religiously mandated), against the British indigo planters and Hindu landowners.

The aftermath of the Mutiny, or the First Indian War of Independence, in 1857, radically altered the direction of reformism in South Asia. It was felt by some that the deteriorating condition of the Muslims resulted from their sullen attitude toward the British, and their inability or unwillingness to take advantage of the opportunities for advancement that British rule provided. None perceived this more clearly, or expressed himself as emphatically, as Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). He preached loyalty to the British, promoted Western language and education to overcome Muslim backwardness, developed an exegetical rationalism in his writings on Islam, warned against the stultifying influence of the reactionary ulama (religious leaders), and called upon Muslims to stay away from Hindu political organizations. Aligarh University, which he founded in 1875, was emblematic of his approach and interests.

The Aligarh model faced challenges from scholars associated with the Firangi Mahal in Lucknow (established in the 1690s) and the theological seminary at Deoband, where classes began in 1867. Most scholars associated with these schools were opposed to the Aligarh brand of unabashed eagerness for Western knowledge, demanded greater concern for Islamic identity and heritage, bristled at the perceived subservience to the British, and sought deeper engagement with both pan-Islamist and nationalist tendencies that were gradually evolving.

In the twentieth century, Islamic reform and political activism became inextricably intertwined. It was Aligarh modernism, and its logical corollary expressed as Muslim separatism, that eventually culminated in the formation of Pakistan in 1947. It is intriguing to note that orthodox Muslim leaders like Abu l-A’la Maududi and Maulana Madani, and nationalist/populist leaders like Abul Kalam Azad, Hakim Akmal Khan, and Abul al-Ghaffar Khan, opposed the idea of Pakistan while it was a very Westernized, secular, legalistically oriented leadership (Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah) that championed it. At the time, it was assumed that Pakistan would be a home for Muslims, but not necessarily a theocratic Muslim state.

However, in independent Pakistan a tension developed between the ulama, who demanded a preeminent role for Islam in the new state, and the powerful military and bureaucratic elite who were unenthusiastic. Reform, in either modernist or orthodox directions, followed the vicissitudes of temporary political arrangements. The 1956 constitution referred to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; the 1962 constitution dropped the word Islamic; the 1973 constitution reincorporated it in principle. The liberal Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961, which sought to reform marriage and divorce laws in the country, was all but gutted in the 1980s through various enactments on the punishment, inheritance, and laws of evidence relating to women. Moreover, the establishment of shari’ah courts to adjudicate matters according to strict Islamic principles, the declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslims, the self-conscious courtship of Arab countries through emphasizing its Islamic credentials, and the injection of a heightened sensibility about religious matters on public issues (including education and entertainment), all appeared to indicate a swing back toward traditional premises in the 1980s and 1990s.

The separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 seemed to demonstrate the primacy of language and culture as more important markers for identity and destiny than religion. Initially the country adopted a determinedly indifferent posture toward religion. However, in spite of a gradual institutionalization of democracy, political developments since the early 1980s have compelled Bangladesh to drop the word “secular” from its constitution, declare Islam to be the state religion, patronize parochial schools, and insist on outward expressions of religious zeal and commitment from its leaders.

In both countries, it is obvious that conservative religious parties do not command a large following in electoral competitions. However, it is also clear that these forces are formidable enough to drive the discourse in directions they seek. The modernist agenda—with its emphasis on women’s rights, minority protections, and civil liberties—appears to face rather daunting challenges, perhaps a little more so in Pakistan than in Bangladesh.

See also Ahmad Khan, (Sir) Sayyid; Wali Allah, Shah.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Islamic Southeast Asia the concept of “reform” is the subject of a highly contested discourse. Self-proclaimed “reformists” range from the Malaysian feminist organization Sisters in Islam, which advocates changes in Islamic family law that increase the rights and power of women, to the Indonesian Lakshar Jihad, which advocates the establishment of a conservative form of Islamic law to act as the basis of an Islamic state combining Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines.

Reformist movements in Southeast Asia emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century as responses to British, Dutch, and American colonial rule. They were also responses to intellectual developments in the broader Muslim world. Early reformists were influenced by the writings of the Egyptian reformers Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida and by the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. They attributed the decline of Muslim political and economic power to the impure state of early twentieth-century Islam. The rejection of Sufism and elements of popular religion—including the veneration of the tombs of saints, ritual meals, and the celebration of the birth of the prophet Muhammad—are among the hallmarks of Southeast Asian reformism. These and other aspects of popular Islam were (and are) denounced as innovation and unbelief by these reformists. In Indonesia reformists argued that the prayers of traditional Muslims were invalid because supplicants face directly west instead of northwest, which is the actual direction of Mecca.

The reformists advocated strict enforcement of shari’ah. They denied the authority of classical legal texts that formed the core of the curriculum in traditional Islamic schools. Like salafiyah reformers elsewhere, they maintained that the Qur’an and hadith are the only allowable sources of legal decisions. This presented a major challenge to the traditional ulema. Throughout the twentieth century disputes between modernists and reformists were extremely bitter. Because of the profound implications of these religious disputes—each party describes the other as heretics bound for hell—it is unlikely that the cavernous divide between traditional and reformist communities can be closed.

Early reformists combined this religious agenda with calls for social and educational reform. They argued that the acquisition of technical and scientific knowledge is a religious obligation. The Javanese scholar Ahmad Dahlan and the Malay Tahir Jalal al-Din wrote and preached that there is an important link between the two components of the reform agenda. They taught that Islam is the religion of rationality and that the acquisition of modern skills and knowledge is a religious duty. They also encouraged participation in the emerging modern economic system. Reformists adopted strategies similar to those of Christian missionaries. Organizations such as Muhammadiyya in Indonesia and al-Islam in Malaya established schools that combined a salafiyah understanding of Islam with modern (Western) subjects. They established schools for girls as well as women’s and youth organizations. Muhammadiyya and other reformist organizations now maintain extensive systems of schools, universities, and hospitals. The provision of social and educational services contributed significantly to the spread of modernism, especially in urban areas.

In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore a basic distinction can be drawn between reformist movements that seek to transform culture and society and those that seek to employ the political process to establish Islamic states. In the Philippines the distinction is that between those who would establish a Muslim state in the southern region and others who

Megawati Sukarnoputri, front, the leader and presidential candidate of the Indonesia Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P) and her husband, Taufik Kimas, cast their ballots in Jakarta in 1999, in Indonesia’s first free elections since 1955. Although her party won the election, she was forced to accept the position of vice-president. In 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid was forced to resign and Sukharhoputri became the president of Indonesia. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
envision the Muslim community as a component of a pluralistic state. Muslims in southern Thailand have been influenced by Malaysian reformists and have organized to protect and expand the rights of Muslims in an overwhelmingly Buddhist society. In Southeast Asian states where Muslims are small minorities—Burma, Cambodia, and Vietnam—Islamic reformism did not emerge until after the Second World War. In these countries reformism is a religious movement of little political significance.

In the colonial era reformist movements advocating the establishment of Islamic states were subject to serious repression. Postcolonial governments have continued these policies, but have also attempted to include reformist Muslims in the political process. In Malaysia reformist political parties compete in parliamentary elections and govern in several states. In Indonesia there has been a constant tension between traditionalist Muslims, who have generally avoided political action, reformists who have attempted to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state, and other reformists, including the majority of the Muhammadiya community, who seek to build a salafiyya-oriented Muslim community while avoiding overt political activity. The collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 contributed to the repoliticization of Indonesian reformism. Political parties based on reformist ideologies emerged as important voices in Indonesia’s new democracy. Other, more radical, groups reject the democratic orientation of the political parties and advocate the use of force to establish a salafiyya state.

In Southeast Asia, and particularly in Indonesia, there have also been attempts to develop Islamic theologies emphasizing tolerance, interreligious discourse, and democratic politics. This variety of reformism differs fundamentally from earlier salafiyya movements. This variety of reformism began to develop in the 1980s and has come to be known as liberal Islam. In Indonesia it was initially sponsored by the government as an antidote for fundamentalism. Most of the participants in this course come from traditionalist backgrounds and are conversant with classic Arabic theological, legal, and mystical texts. The central institutional location of Islamic liberalism is the State Islamic Studies Institute. Many graduates from these programs continue their studies abroad. In the 1990s, liberalism emerged as a major force for political, social, and economic change. Liberal reformists reject the notion of an Islamic state. They are active in development-oriented NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), promote interfaith understanding and cooperation, and are advocates for human rights and gender equality. In Indonesia they played a major role in the Reformasi (reformation) movement that brought an end to the “New Order” regime of President Suharto.

See also Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Iran.

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Mark R. Woodward

OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY
See Empires: Ottoman; Kemal, Namik; Modernization, Political; Nur Movement; Nursi, Said; Young Ottomans.

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
While Islam has historically eschewed authoritative bodies for issuing creeds with the authority of an ecclesiastical order, several statements of orthodox belief have, over time, come to be recognized as defining Sunni faith (iman). From these creeds six central beliefs have been distilled that have come to define orthodox belief. Belief in God and his attributes, prophets, angels, sacred books, the Last Day, and predestination has, by Sunni consensus, come to define normative Islam.

Belief in God and his attributes refers to the concepts of tawhid (divine unity) and sifat Allah (the attributive characteristics of God). Tawhid means that God is omnipotent, that he needs no helpers, and has no partners. Associating partners with God is referred to as kirk, and is considered a serious sin. This concept has been extended by some Muslim thinkers to mean that submission to God’s unity means the absolute adherence to God’s rules, as described in the Qur’an and hadith. Failing to adhere to God’s rules indicates that the individual places his or her own judgment equal to God’s, and thus becomes God’s associate. The attributes of God refer to God’s abilities and characteristics as they are defined in the Qur’an. There are generally held to be ninety-nine characteristics that are reflected in the ninety-nine names of God.

Belief in prophets, angels, and sacred books is based on Surah 2:285. This verse equates faith with the belief that God has sent many prophets prior to Muhammad. It also indicates the larger concept that Muhammad was the end of a chain of prophetic succession beginning with Adam and continuing through the twenty-five prophets mentioned in the Qur’an.
Belief in angels is central to both the belief in prophets and in sacred books. The angel Jibril, according to Muslim tradition, conveyed the revelation from God to Muhammad and other prophets. Angels also figure prominently in a variety of beliefs, including those surrounding Munkar and Nakir, angels who interrogate the dead in their graves, and Michael, who was commissioned by God to oversee the natural world.

Muslims believe that many prophets have received sacred textual revelations similar to the Qur’an but that these revelations became corrupt over time. Thus while Christians and Jews are considered “people of the book” due to their reception of textual revelations, their religions fell into error, thus necessitating Muhammad’s mission.

The Last Day refers to the belief that the world will be destroyed by God and will be followed by a Day of Resurrection on which all people will be required to account for their deeds. Those who obeyed the commands of God will go to paradise, while those who did not will go to hell. Many Muslim theologians have held that everyone will eventually be released from hell after they have suffered sufficient punishment. Some Sufis have gone so far as to include Iblis (leader of jinn, who rebelled against God after the creation of Adam) in this category.

Predestination means that God has total power over all of creation and therefore determines the course of all events. Paradoxically, humans have the ability to obey or disobey the commands of God. This ambiguity has never been settled fully and reached a compromise position with the concept of kasb, which asserts that God creates acts that humans then acquire or own, thus involving their culpability for action or inaction.

See also Angels; Kalam.

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R. Kevin Jaques

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religious institutions are the visible and organized manifestations of practices and beliefs in particular social and historical contexts. Like human emotions and attitudes, religious beliefs and practices project outward unto the social and historical plan. They create identities and representations, and determine attitudes, emotions, and behavior. These manifestations and outward projections originate from beliefs and practices, but they are also limited by historical contexts. Geographical, social, and political considerations modify attitudes and practices. Religious institutions, then, take shape in relation to both religious impulses and contextual configurations. The following entry suggests some of the enduring and changing features of religious institutions in Islam in broad historical strokes.

Religious beliefs and practices have been noticeably expressed in key institutions constructed uniquely different social and historical contexts. The caliphate as a universal political and social order was the key institution developed in the early period of Islam. This was followed by more clearly religious institutions like the school of law (madhhab) and Sufi order (tariqa). The modern period has witnessed the emergence of various forms of religious states together with the independent religious association in secular contexts.

Early Islam

The early period of Islamic history begins with the life of the prophet Muhammad and ends with the weakening of the Abbasid Empire. Following Marshall Hodgson, we can use the year 945 as a significant point in that history when the independence of the caliphate was finally shattered. A general of a regional power, the Buyids, occupied Baghdad and laid to rest the more than two hundred years of a universal political authority. The eventual failure notwithstanding, early Islam laid the foundation of the caliphate as a vital religious institution that moved and inspired Muslims. It is also an institution that has provided considerable inspiration for subsequent political and social movements in diverse cultural and historical contexts up to the present time. The caliphal order was the most important religious institution the Muslims created during this period. The word “order” is used to include the political system and ideas themselves, as well as the related notions of self, society, and others. Early Islam was a period of intense political conflicts, many of which raged particularly over the nature and shape of this political order and its related issues. At the same time, these conflicts and disagreements created opportunities for great creativity that inspired legal, theological, philosophical, and literary productions in support of one or the other conceptions of the political order.

Who must be the caliph? After the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632, one of the first questions that needed to be answered was that of his succession. Would it be someone close to him from the beginning? Would it mean the split of the Muslim community between its Meccan and Medinan followers? Or would it be someone from his family? Or would the community simply choose one among equals? In time, these political questions were answered in religious and theological terms. The history of religious ideas of early
Islam revolves around questions and answers about the identity, nature, and authority of the caliphate.

One of the close associates of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, was selected as his immediate successor in a tense political context. Soon, members of the Prophet’s own clan, the Banu Hashim, and their supporters claimed that they had been deprived of rightful leadership granted by the Prophet to ‘Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and his legitimate successors. Thus emerged the first glimmer of a religio-political faction, the party of ‘Ali (Ar. Shi’a), that developed into a full-fledged religious and theological group within Islam. Even though it remained a minority, and the various factions were hardly unanimous on the particular descendant of ‘Ali as the rightful successor, the Shi’a produced notions of legitimate and rightful leadership for religious leadership in general. The prophetically chosen one was divinely guided, and ready to go into battle against injustice and usurpation. Such a notion of a religious leader became the cornerstone of other religious groups and political parties. Mystical schools took on the notion of direct or indirect divine assistance, and leaders of political and religious movements followed the inspiration of its revolutionary aspects. In light of this particular discussion, such a notion of religious and political leadership is an important part of the religious institution of the caliphate of early Islam.

Another important aspect of this institution was the nature of the community and its boundaries. Shi’ite protest against the reigning caliphs sowed the seeds for a degree of elitism within the community of believers. The family of the Prophet would enjoy a level of recognition and respect above ordinary believers. However, the egalitarian message of earlier biblical religions found a profound resonance in Islam as well. The first group to raise this issue on the political sphere was the Khariji, who took a position diametrically opposed to the Shi’a. For them, the political leader was an equal in the community of believers, and open to censure and removal if he failed to live by the teachings of the Qur’an. According to traditional Muslim historiography, the Kharijis emerged precisely during the reign of the fourth caliph, ‘Ali, the first imam of the Shi’a, when they rejected his compromising stand in war. They claimed that he had ignored a fundamental teaching of the Qur’an by agreeing to negotiate with a usurper, and no longer deserved the allegiance of the Muslim community. The Kharijis developed another philosophy of
revolution against authority. Unlike the Shi’ite ideas, it harbored a radical egalitarianism.

Standing between the Shi’i and the Khariji, other theological schools emerged to define the boundaries of Muslim identities. The first theological questions emerged directly from the issues raised by these early groups. Islamic theology, for example, asked to what extent the wrongdoing of a reigning caliph could be tolerated. From the Shi’a point of view, the absence of a rightful imam was sufficient ground for launching a revolt against the caliph, while the Kharijis declared that any person guilty of a grave sin should be deposed. Against them, the Mu’tazila argued that such a person did not automatically relinquish his faith and could not be summarily dismissed. But they said that such a person was suspended between belief and disbelief. The majority of the scholars gravitated toward a more accommodationist position, and argued that grave acts or sins by themselves do not declare a person a non-Muslim. The theological arguments were the first political arguments concerning the identity of the caliph, but it is quite clear that they contributed in no small part to the definition of a Muslim against disbelief. And the early theological debates among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and other religious groups in the Near East established the boundaries and identity of Islam and Muslims.

The identity of Muslims also raised the issue of the Arabs and Arabic. As Islam spread from Arabia and embraced many different cultures and traditions, it confronted the question of the relationship between Arabs and non-Arabs, and between Arab culture and local languages and cultures. The spread of Islamic power went hand in hand with Arabization. The first dynasty of Islam that followed the reign of ‘Ali, the Umayyads, played a leading role in ensuring that the Arab nature of the conquest and its new administration were not lost. Against this hegemony of Arab authority, the Islamic impulse favored a greater sense of egalitarianism between Arabs and non-Arabs. One of the main factors that supported the Abbasid revolution (750) against the Umayyads was the alliance between Arab and non-Arab forces. The victory of the Abbassids meant the victory for universalism in the house of Islam. But the position of the Arabs and Arabic was not abandoned. The Arabic language, as the language of divine revelation par excellence, took on an elevated position in society in general and in religious scholarship in particular, and became the lingua franca of aspiring religious teachers and scholars. The genius of the Arabs lay not so much in their intrinsic ethnic worth, but on the role and eminence of the Qur’an and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad. Social movements that favored anti-Arab sentiments, like the Shu’ubiyya, remained in the society, but could never dislodge the lofty status of the Arabic language as the language of revelation. Legal, exegetical, and philological studies emphasized the indispensability of Arabic even while keeping the door open to conversions.

The boundaries of the community against outsiders were more clearly drawn, even though not always consistently applied. The caliphate was justified on the basis of a universal and expanding empire that engaged the reigning superpowers of the day. The Sassanian Empire of the Persians fell early, and the Byzantine Empire was dislodged from its territories in Palestine and North Africa. The latter remained a major adversary and target until its capital, Constantinople, fell in 1453. A condition of war between the caliphate and other political orders was accepted as the norm, even though such a norm could be temporarily regulated by treaties. The relationship with other religions followed this political norm. The expanding caliphate tolerated no polytheistic religious communities. They had to abandon their religions, and accept Islam. In contrast, Christians and Jews were recognized as People of the Book and were tolerated in the caliphate order.

But still, the caliphate was a political institution driven by the interests of those who were able to command power. Various factions of Arab tribes played a dominant role in the balance of power during the Umayyad period and the early Abbasid period, and the history and success of conquest created significant opportunities for others. The religious character of the caliphate was reinforced by the ideological claims made by various parties, from the Shi’as who declared their support for the divinely inspired leadership of the imams, to the Kharijis who lived by the letter of the Qur’an. The religious element was reinforced through the development of a religious literature on the legacy of the Prophetic period. In particular, the compilation of the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet and his associates provided the foundations for a religious discourse of power, authority, and community. As an institution, then, the political and religious elements of the caliphate were not so easily separated. And yet, in spite of the inseparability of the political from the religious, the production of a literary tradition provided the basis for the emergence of religious learning (‘ilm) and its prestige. Those who possessed this knowledge, the ulema, were distinct from those who wielded power and from the mass of followers, even though they did not always form a distinctive institution that bound them to each other on the public plain. Sometimes one gets the impression that, in the earliest period of conquest, those who wielded brute force disdained such men of learning. But the accumulation of scholarly tradition could not be ignored in the administration of justice, the bureaucracy, and in the general legitimization of the political order itself.

In the latter half of the Ummayad and the early part of the Abbasid caliphates, the accumulation of the teachings of the Prophet and the early Muslims began in the important towns and cities such as Medina, Mecca, Kufa, and Basra. The most well known of these teachings were from prominent individuals who later came to be associated with schools of law like Abu Hanifa (d. 767), Malik b. Anas (d. 796), Muhammad b.
Religious Institutions

Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 820), and Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855). Their discussions on issues such as criminal justice, evidence, military warfare, and slavery provided the political and social foundations for the caliphate. At the same time, and of more lasting significance, they founded the basic framework for a religious way of life by defining and specifying the way in which to fulfill the religious duties in Islam. Theological discussions defined the boundaries of belief and membership, juridical discussions elaborated the performance of ritual practices, and mystical notions explored religious experience with the Divine.

Eventually, the apparatus of scholarship inscribed a distinct zone of authority that the caliphs and other political rulers could not access through the exercise of military means. One of the most interesting episodes in Abbasid history illustrates the limits of political authority against the authority of religious scholarship. In 833, the Abbasid caliph Ma’mun instituted an inquisition (mubahah) to force all notable scholars to accept the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur’an as state policy. A celebrated and most popular teacher of hadith, Ahmad b. Hanbal, refused to embrace the doctrine. The state policy continued for some time after the death of Ma’mun, but was finally rescinded by al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861). The event reinforced the authority of the religious scholars and their role in society. Some have seen in this episode the divergence of political from religious authority in Islam.

The caliphate was a religious institution created and established in early Islam. It defined a religious order of power and authority that included the meaning of the self, community, and the Other. The history of the caliphate during this period indicates that the precise details of the order were determined by the historical exigencies of internal disputes, and conflict with the Other. The beginnings of the accumulation of the teachings of the Prophet, the Qur’an, and the legacy of the earliest Muslim community provided the scholarly foundations for these conceptions, which by themselves were not always presented in one fully developed theory. In general, however, the caliphate bequeathed to Muslims the idea of a universal egalitarian community (umma) with a special place for the Arabic language and the family of the Prophet; an expanding political order and hegemony over Jews, Christians, and other recognized religious communities; complete dominance over polytheistic communities; and a religious authority based on knowledge of the revelations received by the prophet Muhammad.

The Middle Period

The universal caliphate faced daunting challenges from the outset, and finally collapsed as an effective political authority. The middle period refers to the time when the caliphs lost effective power to regional authorities until the modern period. One can also point to 1453 as a quasi midpoint of this period, when the Ottoman Empire conquered Constantinople and became the model of extensive, but not universal, Muslim empires until the emergence of nation-states. As challengers from religious and political groups were regular features of the caliphate, individual caliphs relied more and more on slave soldiers and generals for their personal rule and effective control. The Abbasid revolution unleashed the force of regional powers, particularly in the areas previously controlled by the Sassanian Empire. From the tenth century these regions witnessed the emergence of powerful governors and generals who wielded more power than the central government. In this same century, challenges to the universality of the institution also became apparent. A rival caliphate was established in the West by survivors of the Umayyad family who fled to North Africa and southern Spain. One of their descendants, ‘Abd al-Rahman III (912–961), declared himself a caliph in 929, challenging the theory of the single political authority of Baghdad. In contrast, the Shi’a, in spite of their differences, were able to rise to prominence. The Buyids took effective control of Baghdad in 945, even though they did not completely replace the caliph with a recognized imam. But another Shi’a movement was even more ambitious. The Fatimids, with the support of Berber clans in North Africa, lay claim to the universal caliphate from Spain to India. They occupied Cairo in 969 and went on to become the largest and longest surviving political order until the 1170s, when they were defeated by the Seljuks, another group of Turkish military adventurers. The dominance of regional powers, and direct religious challenges from the Shi’a both helped to lay to rest the effective authority of the universal caliphate. The rival caliphates from both Sunni (Spanish Andalusian) and Shi’ite (Buyid and Fatimid) claims shook the institution and myth of the single universal caliphate.

The religious elements developed during the early caliphate did not completely disappear, but they were transformed in the context of these new social and political experiences. The idea of a universal community of believers (umma) persisted through the political breakdown of the empire, but a political unity became impossible. The place and role of the Qur’an and the prophet Muhammad reinforced this unity and this identity on social, religious, and commercial levels. Moreover, the foundation of the religious discourse during the caliphate was now employed in the production of new institutions. The juridical, theological, and mystical ideas that emerged during the late Umayyad and Abbasid periods were developed, and slowly produced institutions like the schools of law and theology, and mystical orders. It is precisely the latter institutions that were a dominant feature of the Middle Period of Islam. The caliphate gave way to more clearly definable religious institutions that expressed the emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of Muslims.

Before elaborating on the religious institutions of the legal schools (madhhab) and the Sufi orders (tariqas), a brief note on the political situation is essential. In comparison with the
caliphs, the governors and generals who wielded power in the Middle Period were less justified through religious theology. In light of the early conceptions of the caliphate, they would simply be regarded as usurpers. But scholarly articulation of the political order recognized and accepted the realpolitick on the ground, and provided some space and recognition for these adventurers. One of the most significant theorists to take up this task was the Baghdadian al-Mawardi (d. 1058), whose work on the caliphate has been widely acclaimed. He recognized the new realities of the political space, and tried to articulate justice as an organizing principle for public and private life. The new rulers may come to power by virtue of their strength, according to al-Mawardi, but they were duty-bound to uphold justice in their realms. The *shari’a*, as elaborated by the religious scholars, played an important role in the administration of justice, apart from its more significant role of outlining more personal religious duties. Al-Mawardi emphasized the requirement for justice in their political behavior (*‘iyana*). Such theories did not always temper the political ambitions of the men of power, but they provided a new model of political life.

In light of such a broad justification, the generals and rulers often obtained support from one of the schools of law, theology, or mystical orders. Buyid support for Shi‘ite teachings was followed by a series of Sunni-inclined rulers. The Seljukid and Ayyubid rulers were prominent examples who promoted Sunni Islamic thought and life. In this period, perhaps as a result of their lesser religious roles, the generals were more inclined to shore their regimes with the support of religious tendencies. They supported the building of schools for legal and theological groups, and also embarked upon extensive architectural projects of mosques, mausoleums, and Sufi lodges. Mottahedeh’s analysis has suggested that support for the religious projects was not motivated only by insecurity, or deep religious feelings and convictions. He argued that in this period the system of land grants (*‘iqtad*) to governors and soldiers made this the most important means of acquiring and cultivating land. In this context, pious endowments (*waqff*) made by wealthy and political elites created a relatively autonomous space that escaped these land grants, and were therefore favored by wealthy patrons of religious life in general, and religious institutions in particular. Through the *waqff* then, religious practices were granted a degree of autonomy and independence in a period of often-great military conflict.

As mentioned already, Islamic juridical thought originated early during the caliphate. Shi‘ite imams and other teachers started outlining rules and conditions for the performance of personal religious duties and the application of public law. During the Middle Period, the elaboration and articulation of legal theory and practices continued. But now distinct identities emerged around prominent scholars and their students. In Sunni Islam, the Middle Period witnessed the consolidation of four legal schools, linking themselves to Abu Hanifa, Malik b. Anas, al-Shafi‘i, and Ahmad b. Hanbal. Genealogies of students linking the founders were formulated, founding texts and commentaries identified, more or less coherent theories outlined, and positions were founded against others. Makdisi has shown how the practice of commentaries and notation on earlier works played a leading role in the development of consensus within each of the schools. The schools were in no small measure supported by the foundation of the madrasa, a school established to teach one or another school of law. The first to introduce the madrasa as an institution for teaching were the Shi‘a, but it quickly became a distinct way of consolidating and promoting the teachings of Sunni schools as well. The madrasa did not replace the networks around individual teachers, but provided a basis for their further consolidation. In Sunni Islam, then, the four schools of law took their shape during the Middle Period. It was also this period that saw the consolidation of Shi‘ism as a rival scholarly vision of Islam, as the foundation of a complete political order, or as a school of law, theology, and mysticism.

In addition to the schools of law, this period also witnessed the emergence of Sufi orders (*tariqas*). Like the schools of law, the earliest ideas on mystical life had also emerged in the early caliphate. With the Middle Period, Sufi ideas were similarly consolidated. Compendia were compiled, biographies (or hagiographies) were collected of the early Sufis, and then, in the twelfth century, the first order was developed around the teachings of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166) of Baghdad. A highly respected and popular preacher, al-Jilani introduced a large number of people to the simple insights of Sufi experience. His order has become the most widespread in the Muslim world, and many others have followed it in form. The orders in general grew out of the strong relationship between a Sufi teacher and his disciple, and the additional rites prescribed to experience God through remembrance (*dhikr*).

But both legal schools and Sufi orders exemplified the chief religious institutions in this period. Both the school of law (*madhhab*) and Sufi order (*tariqa*) became complementary ways of being a Muslim in the Middle Period. Not every Muslim would belong to a Sufi order as they would adopt a school or a jurist, but Sufism became a prevalent badge of identity as well. The legal school and *tariqa* were the prominent institutions that gave shape to religious life in the Middle Period. Both assumed the presence of a political authority that supported Islamic law, even though not always very consistently. But the legal schools and the orders gave shape to the religious spheres that were created in the early caliphate.

**Modern Period**

The next major transformation of religious institutions occurred with the impact of Western (European) hegemony. The armies of the generals and the sultans first lost to the
Europeans on the battlefields, followed by direct occupation and widespread cultural and political influence. This latest period of Islamic history has also spawned its unique institutions, continuing from the past in some sense and inventing new features in the new political contexts.

In the central lands of Islam (the Ottoman sultanate, Iran, and Egypt) the modern period witnessed an intense conflict between the political rulers and the ulema. The former wanted to modernize the state and society as quickly as possible in order to emulate and compete with the Western powers that were defeating them on the battlefields, while the latter regarded most of these changes as a direct threat to their own positions in society and to Islam as a way of life. In the nineteenth century, individual religious scholars supported some aspects of modernization, and promoted some form of reformist interpretation of Islam. But the ulema as a class of scholars lost their unique place in the new political orders. Sometimes they were violently suppressed in the process, and the pious foundations over which they maintained control and through which they enjoyed some independence were confiscated or nationalized. In varying degrees, what emerged in the modern period was a political space occupied entirely by generals, rulers, and later politicians.

In this context, the state in Islamic society was transformed into a powerful entity that controlled all aspects of life, including religion. Religion, in this case Islam, became an instrument to bring about change and modernization, and to keep the incumbents in power. With its long history of religious politics, the new state could employ symbols and instruments to further its goals. And yet the new state was neither a continuation of the caliphate nor the military sultanates of the Middle Period. The new state accepted the rights, privileges, boundaries, and limitations of a modern state, and, like other modern states, it used religion for its particular political purposes. The new state could be a monarchy based on the prestige of the family of the Prophet (Jordan and Morocco) or a revivalist religious movement (Saudi Arabia), a socialist or capitalist one-party state (Iraq, Syria, and Egypt), or a secular republic based on universal suffrage (Turkey). In spite of their diversity, the acceptance of the modern state system, and the instrumentalization of Islam for legitimacy, united them.

In the second half of the twentieth century, most of the states witnessed opposition movements that demanded a greater degree of Islamization. But the opposing positions have not been based so much on the absence of religion in the modern states, but on their inappropriate practice and interpretation. So, the demand for an Islamic state to replace the older modern state is based on a more complete adoption of Islamic teachings in both the state and society. In particular, there is a demand that the *shari‘a* developed by the legal schools in the Middle Period play a central and dominant role in the legal systems of the new states. But the central idea of the modern state is not rejected, and the greater degree of instrumentalization of religion in the state is not questioned. By and large, the idea of the Islamic state is a marriage between the modern state and the sultanates of the Middle Period. The modern Muslim state, advocating a greater or lesser degree of Islamization, is a unique religious institution. It is neither completely free from the influence of traditional Islamic patterns and institutions, the caliphate and the legal schools, nor from modern notions of state. So far the first and most successful of such states has been the Islamic Republic of Iran (established 1979).

But the modern period has also given rise to a different kind of religious institution in Islam. Such institutions are a product of secular states, and are most clearly noticeable in countries of minority Muslim contexts such as India, Africa south of the Sahara, and more recently Europe and America. In the secular context, religion is relatively free from direct state influence, and vice versa. In such conditions, Muslims have established anew or transformed their mosques, schools, pious endowments, and burial grounds into more independent religious institutions. The development of these institutions has been closely tied with local historical contexts, but has drawn on resources and patterns of autonomy in the Middle Period of Islam. More recently, with the emergence of new technologies of communication (the radio, Internet, and satellite), such independent institutions have proliferated. Once their role in secular pluralist societies is identified, they become easily recognized in Muslim majority countries as well. Such institutions are not always easily visible in majority Muslim states, but they play an important role in the practice of Muslims. Only the political control and monopoly of Islam in the modern state prevents their explosive proliferation.

See also Arabic Language; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Sassanian; Empires: Umayyad; ‘Ibadat; Identity, Muslim; Islam and Islamic; Khirqah; Khutba; Masjid; Material Culture.

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The Republican Brothers is a Sudanese organization advocating Islamic reformation that follows the teachings of Mahmud Muhammad Taha (d. 1985). Taha originally established a small political party advocating Sudanese independence in 1945, but following a profound religious experience in 1951, he gradually transformed the Republican Party into a reformist brotherhood. Taha called for a comprehensive rethinking of the nature of Islamic law, giving emphasis to gender equality and religious pluralism, and a new vision of what Islamic society should be. This vision came to be called “The Second Message of Islam.” The Republican Brothers were not politically activist. They did not establish a political party during the eras of parliamentary politics in Sudan (1956–1958, 1964–1969, 1985–1989) and were not active in opposition to the military regimes. However, in 1983 Taha opposed the imposition of a form of Islamic law by the military regime of President Ja’far al-Numayri, a position for which he was executed in 1985. Although the Republican Brothers became organizationally weak following the execution of their leader, Taha’s teachings gained increasing visibility among Muslims around the world. The leading representative of this school of thought is Abdullahi An-Na’im, one of Taha’s students who, as an expatriate, developed Taha’s thinking further and became a prominent Muslim scholar in the field of human rights and international law.

See also Modernity; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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John O. Voll

REPUBLICAN BROTHERS

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CLASSICAL ISLAM

Saïd A. Arjomand

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN

Kristian P. Alexander

MODERN

Saïd A. Arjomand

CLASSICAL ISLAM

The concept that comes closest to revolution in early Islam is fitna (civil strife), used in reference to three civil wars that occurred in the first 125 years of Islamic history. The first civil war (556–561) began with the murder of the third caliph, ‘Uthman, and ended after the assassination of the fourth caliph, ‘Ali. Its consequence was the transfer of the caliphate to Mu’awiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. The second fitna (680–692) began after the death of Mu’awiya and ended with the victory of the Marwanid branch of his dynasty. The third civil war began within the Umayyad dynasty, with the rebellion of Yazid III against Walid II in 744, and continued until the defeat of Marwan II and the overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in 750. The rise of the Abbasids was viewed as a new turn (dawla) in power. That term, dawla, came to mean the state as the Abbasid rule continued for centuries. Modern scholarship concurs that this change of dynasty in the mid-eighth century was of fundamental importance and generally refers to it as the Abbasid revolution.

If revolution is taken to mean a fundamental change in the political order and its social base, then the rise of Islam itself can be considered a revolution. The rise of Islam (622–632) was primarily a religious revolution that saw itself as the realization of Messianism, but it entailed a political revolution in Arabia and immediate expansion into the Roman and Persian empires. Muhammad succeeded in creating a unified community and state out of the segmentary tribal society of Arabia. He mobilized those who accepted Islam as a new monotheistic religion for “struggle (jihad) in the path of God,” and unified the refractory tribes of Arabia on the basis of the acceptance of his Prophecy. Immediately upon completing the unification of Arabia after his death, his successors, the caliphs, redirected the energy the Prophet had thus...
mobilized, turning their attention toward the conquest of the Byzantine and Persian empires. The result of their efforts was the exportation of Islam and its gradual spread through vast conquered lands, from North Africa to Central Asia and northern India.

The subject populations of these conquered lands were converted to Islam only very gradually. Under the Umayyads (660–750), the Muslim empire remained an Arab empire. The non-Arabs who converted to Islam became the clients (mawali) of the Arabs, and did not have a share in political power. As the number of people in the client class grew in the second quarter of the eighth century, so did their demand for equal treatment as fellow believers in Islam. A movement with this as its aim gained momentum among the converts of Islam in Khurasan and Central Asia, whose adherents later became known as the Murji‘a, but in fact called themselves “the people for equality.”

The Shi‘ite sects took advantage of the discontent among the mawali to form underground revolutionary organizations on behalf of different branches of the House of the Prophet, raising these as alternatives to the ruling Umayyads. These clandestine revolutionaries made messianic claims for their leaders as the Mahdi, the reviver of religion and redeemer of the world. They remained united, however, by not naming their messianic leader. Rather, he was anonymously referred to as the one to be agreed upon (al-rida) from the House of Muhammad.

The Shi‘ites favored the House of ‘Ali (the Prophet’s son-in-law) and were mostly active in Medina and Kufa. But the party of the House of ‘Abbas (the Prophet’s uncle) began proselytizing in Khurasan. The Abbasid leader, Abu Muslim, began his open rebellion in Khurasan while the Umayyad Empire was torn by an internecine civil war after a period of military overextension in North Africa. An army recruited by Abu Muslim defeated the governor of Khurasan and several Umayyad armies in Iran, and, finally, the last Umayyad caliph, Marwan II, near the river Zab in northern Mesopotamia in 750. The Khurasanian army proceeded to Kufa, brought the Abbasid family out of hiding, and proclaimed one of them, Abu ‘l-‘Abas ‘Abd Allah b. Muhammad, the new caliph over the objection of the Kufan revolutionary elite. The revolutionary power struggle continued under Abu ‘l-‘Abbas (750–754), and the real consolidation of Abbasid power took place under his brother and successor, Abu Ja‘far, who later assumed the title of al-Mansur (754–775).

The first step in the consolidation of Abbasid power was the elimination of Abu Muslim, in 755. Then came Abu Ja‘far’s break with Shi‘ism and his other former revolutionary partners. Descendants of the House of ‘Ali were not only excluded from power but also persecuted. Abu Ja‘far’s former allies, who claimed he had in fact pledged allegiance to their Mahdi, Muhammad b. ‘Abdallah b. al-Hasan, finally rose under the latter’s leadership in 762, but their rebellion was suppressed with much bloodshed.

Effects of the Abbasid Revolution
The Abbasid revolution was the social revolution of Islam, and created a more integrated polity defined in terms of Islam. The subject populations became integrated into the Abbasid Empire as Muslims in their own right, and no longer lived as disprivileged clients of the Arabs. The Abbasid caliphs embarked on an empirewide recruitment of the new political elite from the local notable families as well as the Arab tribal aristocracy, and opened their bureaucracy more widely to Iranians and Nestorian Christians. Military careers were opened to Iranian and, later, Turkish converts. Non-Arab Muslims were not only integrated into the Abbasid imperial administration and armies but also fully participated in the cultural elaboration of Islam as a universalist religion of salvation, making major contributions to the collection of the traditions of the Prophet (hadith) and the development of Islamic law, and even to the development of the Arabic language as Islam’s lingua franca.

After the second civil war, which ended in 692, the caliphate had gradually been transformed from a regime of patriarchal rule over a coalition of nomadic conquerors into an imperial government employing Arab-speaking clients into its bureaucracy. This process was completed after the Abbasid revolution, and an elaborate central government emerged, divided into a number of departments (diwan): a chancery, an imperial postal and inspection service, and taxation and army bureaus, each functioning under a wazir. Thus, like modern social revolutions, the Abbasid revolution resulted in the centralization of administration and concentration of power, inaugurating an era of caliphal absolutism.

See also Assassins; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Umayyad; Fitna; Shi‘a: Early; Succession.

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Said A. Arjomand

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN
The Iranian Revolution, which occurred between 1978 and 1979, has been called the last major revolution of the twentieth century. It marked the end of the rule of monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi and the beginning of the establishment of a theocratic state in Iran. It was urban based, meaning that
During the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, mass demonstrations rather than a concerted military effort brought the end of the rule of monarch Reza Shah Pahlavi. Here, with posters of the Ayatollah Khomeini (who replaced the shah after the Revolution), the Iranian army shows its solidarity with street protesters. Getty Images

many of the revolutionary groups were from the city and not peasants from the periphery. The main political instruments that brought down the shah’s regime were strikes and mass demonstrations and not a concerted military action. Although the overarching ideology of the revolution was that of Shi’ite Islam cloaked in third-world sentiments, it was in actuality a multiclass coalition of widely disparate groups, from liberal nationalists to Islamic radicals, that finally overthrew the shah. The anti-shah movement was also largely detached from the international context, with little direct military or political support from outside Iran. The Iranian Revolution was so spontaneous and unexpected that it took many analysts and observers by surprise. In fact, as late as August and September of 1978, U.S. intelligence reports still indicated that opposition groups did not pose a threat to the shah’s regime.

The Failure of the Pahlevi Regime

The shah’s autocratic rule is widely viewed to be an important factor contributing to the rise of revolutionary action. The shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, maintained total control over the Majlis (national assembly), the cabinet, the bureaucracy, and Iran’s political parties. Restricted freedom, arbitrary decisions, and political repression by the Ministry of Security (known as SAVAK), as well as widespread corruption, cronyism, and bureaucratic inefficiency, are all cited by many observers as the ultimate forces that finally led to the downfall of the shah.

In addition, the Pahlevi dynasty’s claim to legitimacy was irreparably damaged after the August 1953 coup, which was organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British intelligence, overthrew the democratically elected government of then–prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and reinstated the young shah to the throne. In the mid-1970s, human rights organizations and the Western press started a campaign against violations of human rights in Iran and criticized the shah for the mistreatment of political prisoners. The administration of U.S. president Jimmy Carter sought to compel the shah to be more observant of human
rights, but hoped to avoid destabilizing Iran or jeopardizing the close ties between the two countries. Responding to increasing criticism, the shah decided to permit a limited amount of public discourse. Unfortunately, the public perceived the shah's liberalization process as a sign of weakness. Further exacerbating the situation was the shah's massive modernization program (the so-called White Revolution of 1962) and his embrace of westernization, both of which alienated large parts of Iranian society. The White Revolution embodied a variety of economic and social initiatives, including land reform, public ownership of industries, enfranchisement of women, profit-sharing for workers, and a literacy corps to implement compulsory education in rural areas. However, it was opposed by landowners, who were afraid that they would lose the main source of their wealth, and by the ulema, who were alarmed by the spread of secular education and the propagation of anti-Islamic values.

Heedless of his subjects' growing dissatisfaction, the shah set forth to westernize Iranian society, patterning it along American lines. This process of the Americanization of Iranian society was undertaken with the help of American planners. Military personnel and U.S. advisors were granted legal latitude so broad as to constitute personal immunity from prosecution. The shah failed to realize that his plans for modernization, intended to foster a political environment capable of sustaining the nation's political and economic growth, neglected to recognize the importance of religion and culture in Iranian society.

The Rise of the Ayatollah

The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini denounced the shah's modernization program, focusing his attacks on the new electoral law enfranchising women and the referendum that endorsed the White Revolution. He declared the new electoral law un-Islamic and the referendum unconstituted. Khomeini called upon his followers to protest, leading to the riots that erupted in 1963, but such public demonstrations were brutally crushed by the shah. Khomeini was arrested and detained in Tehran for two months. In late 1964, when the shah extended diplomatic immunity to his American military advisors, Khomeini accused the ruler of betraying Iran and endangering Islam.

This time Khomeini was deported to Turkey, from where he subsequently moved to the holy city of Najaf, in Iraq. In his years in exile he continued to attack the shah's policies, denounced the whole institution of monarchy, confronted the religious establishment through a series of lectures condemning the ulema as apolitical, and organized his growing cadre of supporters. It was during those years that he produced his most famous handbook, Velayat-e faqih bokumat-e Islami (The jurist's guardianship: Islamic government), in which he argued that the shah's monarchy was incompatible with Islam and that true Muslims must strive for an Islamic government under the leadership of the faqih, or Muslim jurist. In the early 1970s, Khomeini moved to Paris, which had a growing population of Iranian expatriots. There he gathered other exiled opposition leaders around him.

Two social groups were very much disaffected by the shah's rule/policies, the bazaaris (merchants) and the ulema. These established close ties with one another, and proved to be a formidable alliance, in which the bazaaris provided financial support to the ulema through the payment of tithes. In return for this financial support, the religious community provided the leadership and organizational backbone for the antigovernment alliance.

Iran's estimated 8,000 mosques provided an efficient nationwide communication network. The mosques served as centers for dissent, political organization, agitation, and sanctuary. In this context, revolutionary Shi'te Islam was rapidly transformed into a discursive ideology that transcended class differences and social divisions and provided an effective channel of communication between dissident leaders and their followers. When the shah's minister of information planted an article in a daily newspaper attacking Khomeini and attempting to discredit him, protesting religious students in Qom staged sit-ins, which in turn led to violent repression from the shah. Some time later, several hundred demonstrators were killed during the government suppression of non-violent protests, an event that came to be known as the “Black Friday massacre” and “Jahleh square massacre.”

The deaths of the demonstrators were used to inspire a further round of protests. Mourning processions were staged to commemorate the protestors, hailing them as heroes and martyrs. Ayatollah Khomeini himself was viewed by many as the charismatic leader and provided the inspiration for the revolutionary movement. He was one of half a dozen Shi'a marjia'-e taqlid (source of emulation), a position that permitted him to widely publicize his views, but it was his pre-exile vehemence against the shah that garnered him his most fervent followers. Indeed, his vehement political stand against the shah, which led to his exile in 1964. Khomeini was also credited with expounding the theory of government that claimed that during the Mahdi's absence the community could only be governed by a velayat-e faqih. He could be the only person to execute God's will on behalf of the Hidden Imam, an agency with the mandate to rule both politically and spiritually. His conceptual reformulation of the originally quietist precept was innovative.

Postrevolutionary Government

Although antimodernization and anti-Western sentiment played an important role in the downfall of the Pahlevi dynasty, economic factors were also important. Industrial development did take place in Iran, but it proceeded very unevenly and was dependent on the state, oil revenues, and
external technology. The oil sector expanded or contracted primarily in response to the world market, rather than to domestic economic needs. Partially as a result of this, Iran experienced a phase of hyperinflation, growing unemployment, a rising cost of living, and an erosion of business confidence. All of this resulted in a decline in private investment and in massive capital flight, totaling more than $100 million a month in 1975 and 1976. Strikes by oil workers and bank employees further devastated the economy of the shah’s regime.

In the aftermath of the revolution, the political situation was inflamed by the struggle between secular and religious forces, by the existence of rival bases of power, and the emergence of autonomous revolutionary organizations. As the central state disintegrated, local, self-appointed committees (komitehs) were formed to carry out the basic tasks of security and administration. In February 1979, revolutionary tribunals staffed by religious judges were set up to pass sentence on former officials of the shah’s regime, as well as on private individuals who were accused of counterrevolutionary activities. In May 1979, Khomeini ordered the formation of the Pasdaran, an armed force that was distinct from the regular army and deployed against opponents of the revolution. In an attempt to provide an organizational structure to the ideology of the Islamic revolution, a group of ayatollahs close to Khomeini formed the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in mid-1979. The IRP sought to mobilize popular support for the Islamic Republic and to discredit the secular moderates.

The religious forces, led by Khomeini, used political maneuvering, propaganda, and terror to eliminate all opposition. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (an anticlerical opposition organization) were forced underground, and members of the Tudeh Party (Labor-Communist Party) and the Fedayin-e Islam (Devotees of Islam, a religio-political organization) were either jailed or executed. Throughout this period of consolidation, clerics and their supporters effectively eliminated the secular nationalist faction and other opponents to their rule. The chaotic postrevolutionary situation was ultimately clarified by a national referendum on the future of Iran that resulted in an overwhelming victory for Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic Republic. Elections for a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a constitution for the Islamic Republic were also won by Khomeini’s supporters and further consolidated the authority of the religious forces. The resultant constitution institutionalized the principle of the velayat-e faqih (rule by a supreme religious leader). The constitution also created a 270-seat Majlis to write and pass new laws subject to the faqih’s (that is, Khomeini’s) approval. The Assembly of Experts—an elected body of seventy to eighty eminent Islamic scholars—was made responsible for such high matters of state as revising the constitution and selecting a successor to the faqih. A twelve-member Council of Guardian, selected by the faqih and the Majlis, was created to screen and, if necessary, modify all legislation issued from the Majlis before passing it on to the faqih for his approval, and to ensure that all candidates for Iran’s newly established presidency possessed the proper Islamic credentials. It is the faqih and the Majlis that select the members of the council. The first presidential and legislative elections were held in early 1980, and again resulted in sweeping victories for Khomeini’s handpicked candidates.

See also Imamate; Iran, Islamic Republic of; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Majlis; Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi; Velayat-e Faqih.

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Kristian P. Alexander
MODERN

Modern revolutions are generally viewed as part of the process of political modernization. Although marking a breakdown in the process of state-building and constituting a radical rupture with the past, they are often caused by obstacles in the path of political modernization and can result in far-reaching political transformation. The first wave of modern revolutions in the Islamic world occurred in the first decade of the twentieth century, in reaction to the suspension or frustration of the attempts at political reform.

Early-Twentieth-Century Constitutional Revolutions

Popular agitation for reform in Iran began in 1905, and forced the shah to order elections for a parliament and to grant Iran a constitution in 1906. It is therefore appropriately called the “Constitutional Revolution.” The ailing Mozaffar al-Din Shah died shortly after signing the constitution at the end of December 1906. No sooner had the second part of the constitution (the Supplementary Fundamental Law) taken effect in October 1907 than serious trouble began between the constitutionalists and his successor. The Shi’ite religious leaders had been prominent in mobilizing popular agitation for the constitution, but were split when the secularizing implications of parliamentary legislation became clear to them. The young Muhammad ‘Ali Shah formed an alliance with the Shi’ite traditionalists, suspended the constitution, and restored autocratic rule in 1908. Constitutional government was restored, however, after his defeat and ouster in July 1909.

The Turkish revolution of 1908 was also the result of a constitutionalist movement, this time led by the Young Turks and organized by their Committee of Union and Progress. It began with scattered revolts of military units led by army officers who belonged to the movement. They ultimately forced Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid (1842–1918) to restore the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, after a thirty-year gap. The Committee of Union and Progress won a decisive majority in the parliamentary elections of that year. In April 1909, however, the sultan instigated an abortive counterrevolutionary uprising in Istanbul among traditionalist religious students and officers who had been purged from the old army corps. This uprising, similar to the traditional counterrevolution in Iran a year earlier, ultimately failed, and the sultan was deposed in favor of his brother. The Young Turks amended the constitution and strengthened the power of parliament, and remained in power until the end of the First World War in 1918. During their tenure, however, they carried out a program of administrative reform and military modernization.

The Arab World After the Second World War

The modern revolutions of the Arab Middle East occurred after the end of the Second World War. Following the fashion of the time, especially in Latin America, military officers carried out coups d’état in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in the 1950s, and in Yemen, Libya, and the Sudan in the 1960s, proclaiming them to be revolutions. These events became understood as a revolutionary wave washing across the Arab world, and were primarily motivated by Arab nationalism. Of these regime changes by the military, the two cases with the strongest claim to being considered modern revolutions are the July 1952 revolution in Egypt and the July 1958 revolution in Iraq, both of which overthrew monarchies and established republics.

Army officers were among the first groups to receive a modern, Westernized education in the Middle East. Imbued with ideas of nationalism and modernization of the state, they were considered “intellectuals in uniform” in the 1950s. In July 1952, a group of Egyptian officers of the rank of colonel or below, who called themselves the Free Officers, overthrew the ruling monarchy of the descendants of Muhammad ‘Ali (1804–1841). They proclaimed a republic and named a respected army general its president. The real power, however, was in the hands of the leader of the Free Officers, Col. Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (1918–1970), who abolished all political parties in 1953 and proscribed the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. In its place he created the Liberation Rally, followed by the National Union in 1956, which became the Arab Socialist Union after Nasser’s adoption of socialism as the ideology of the Egyptian state in 1961. Nasser immediately championed pan-Arab nationalism, which became so closely identified with him that it was sometimes called “Nasserism.” He succeeded in bringing about a United Arab Republic, to which Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya adhered for brief periods. The war against Israel in 1967 was primarily justified in terms of Arab nationalism, and the defeat of the Arab coalition was taken as a clear signal of its failure and of the failure of socialism as a modernizing ideology.

In July 1958, the Iraqi Free Officers overthrew the Hashimite monarchy that had been established under the British protectorate in 1921. They declared Iraq a republic, with General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–1963) as its prime minister. The revolution set in motion an intense competition for popular mobilization between the Iraqi Communist Party and the pan-Arab Ba’th Party. This competition culminated in an insurrection that brought the Ba’th party into power in February 1963, and General Qasim was executed that year.

Nationalism was the defining feature of the Egyptian and Iraqi revolutions, and it was most clearly reflected in the foreign policies of these countries. The idea of social reform was not absent, and both regimes carried out land reforms. The main impact of the respective revolutions on their economies and societies was, however, the result of the adoption of socialism and a wave of nationalizations in Egypt in 1961, and the coming to power of the Ba’th Party in Iraq in 1963.
The Iranian Experiment

The most important revolution in the twentieth-century Middle East, and the one with the greatest social and international impact, was the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. Although it fits the pattern of revolution as part of the process of modernization of the state, its unique feature was the replacement of Islam for constitutionalism, nationalism, and socialism as the ideology of revolutionary transformation.

See also Modernization, Political: Constitutionalism; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Revolution: Islamic Revolution in Iran; Young Turks.

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Said A. Arjomand

REZA SHAH (1878–1944)

Shah Reza Khan was the founder and first shah of the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran. The exact date of his birth is uncertain but has been fixed officially as 16 March 1878. He died in exile in South Africa on 26 July 1944.

Reza was born into a family of modest means in Alasht in Mazandaran, Iran, and joined the Russian-officered Iranian Cossack Brigade. In 1920 the British officer Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside organized the removal of the Russian officers and placed Reza Khan in command of the Iranian cossacks at Qazvin. From Qazvin, Reza Khan, in partnership with the pro-British journalist, Sayyed Ziya al-Din Tabataba’i, launched a coup, taking control of Tehran on 21 February 1921.

After the coup, Reza Khan received the title of Sardar-e Sipah (army commander) and in May became Minister of War. In October 1923 he became Prime Minister. He organized the deposition of the reigning monarch, Ahmad Shah Qajar, and ascended the throne in April 1926.

Immediately after the coup, Reza Khan began the task of constructing a modern army and, using this army, he then proceeded to suppress the autonomy of the tribes and the regional magnates, later he adopted a policy of enforced sedentarization of the nomadic tribes. In the late 1920s, a number of radical, centralizing reforms were introduced, including the secularization of the judicial system, as well as a series of etatiste economic measures. In 1935, following a visit to Ataturk’s Turkey, he banned female veiling.

The regime that was headed by the semiliterate Reza Shah became increasingly authoritarian and finally dictatorial. His brutality, which included the murder of many of his closest supporters, and his mania for land acquisition, through which he had become the largest landowner in the country, made his regime increasingly unpopular. He was unable to preserve his country’s independence after the outbreak of the Second World War, and on 25 August 1941 British and Soviet armies invaded Iran. On 16 September he was obliged to abdicate in order to secure the succession for his son. Reza Shah went into exile in South Africa.

See also Modernization, Political: Authoritarianism and Democratization.

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Stephanie Cronin

RIBA

Of all the economic proscriptions in the Qur’an, the most controversial has been the ban on ṭabaṭa, the pre-Islamic lending practice held responsible for pushing destitute Arab borrowers into enslavement. According to some early Muslims, this ban was meant to cover all interest, regardless of form, context, or magnitude; for others, the ban’s intended scope was limited to exorbitant interest charges. Although the restrictive definition triumphed, as a matter of practice the giving and taking of interest continued, at times through the use of legal fuses (biyaḥ), often more or less openly.

The latest chapter of this old controversy was ignited in the 1940s by the emergence of “Islamic economics,” a school of thought that aims to purge interest from all economic operations. The accomplishments of this school include the establishment of Islamic banks in over seventy countries and the banning of interest in three of them: Pakistan, Iran, and the Sudan. Islamic banks claim that they avoid giving or
taking interest, but they have found it impractical to obey their own charters. Interest is disguised under a variety of charges.

Various critics of Islamic economics, including secular economists and Islamic modernists, believe that the goal of eradicating interest is both misguided and unfeasible. Distinguishing between *riba* and ordinary interest, these critics hold that interest is indispensable to any complex economy, that competitive financial markets limit interest charges, and that bankruptcy laws now exist to protect borrowers against the horrors once produced by *riba*.

See also Economy and Economic Institutions.

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Rida, Rashid (1865–1935)

Rashid Rida was the most prominent disciple of Muhammad ‘Abduh and one of the most influential scholars and jurists of his generation. Rida was born near Tripoli, in present-day Lebanon. His early education consisted of training in traditional Islamic subjects and a brief, disenchanting exposure to the secular curriculum of the Ottoman government school in Tripoli. His reformist views began to form in 1884–1885 when he was first exposed to Jamal al-Din Afghani’s and ‘Abduh’s journal *al-‘Urwa al-zubara* (The firmest grip). In 1897, Rida left Syria for Cairo to collaborate with ‘Abduh. The following year he launched *al-Manar*, first a weekly and then a monthly journal comprising Qur’anic commentary (begun by ‘Abduh, continued by Rida, but never completed) and opinions on pressing legal, political, and social issues of the day. Like ‘Abduh, Rida based his reformist principles on the argument that the *shari‘a* consists of *ibadat* (worship) and *mut‘amalat* (social relations). Human reason has little scope in the former and Muslims should adhere to the dictates of the Qur’an and hadith. The laws governing *mut‘amalat* should conform to Islamic ethics but on specific points may be continually reassessed according to changing conditions of different generations and societies. Unlike ‘Abduh, Rida narrowed the *salaf* (the “pious ancestors” as authoritative interpreters of Islamic tradition) to include only the Prophet’s companions and immediate successors.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad.

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Sohail H. Hashmi

**RITUAL**

Ritual is a term that indicates more or less fixed acts and actions that take place at certain recurrent moments and in which certain bodily gestures, words, music, and material objects may play a role.

**Theories**

In the past, the word ritual referred to religious ritual acts and to the rules regarding these acts. Therefore, the Roman Catholic *Rituale Romanum* (1614) and the famous Islamic work on Islamic ritual and law, the *Mukhtasar* of the Malikite scholar Khalil ibn Ishaq al-Jundi (b. c. 1374), are comparable phenomena in the sense that they both prescribe rituals. Early twentieth-century scholars of religion such as Sigmund Freud and the biologist Julian Huxley began to use the word ritual in a much broader meaning. Freud used it to describe compulsive acts and movements of neurotic patients, and Huxley for certain animal acts and behaviors. Since then there has been a tendency to use ritual in a broad sense. Hence, rituals can no longer be associated solely with the domain of religion. They play an important role in many fields of public and private life; for example, in political life, war, festivals, and feasts.

Many nineteenth-century students of religion, particularly those educated in the tradition of liberal, modern theology and later the phenomenologists of religion, tended to view ritual as merely an illustration of religious beliefs and myths. At the other end of the spectrum, scholars such as William Robertson-Smith and Émile Durkheim held the opposite view, namely that ritual is more basic than beliefs. Later scholars have tried to overcome the belief-action dichotomy by formulating notions such as habitus (learned techniques, including such basic activities as running, etc.) and discourse/discursive practice (Talal Asad) which stresses the embodied nature of beliefs or the unity of actions and beliefs. Four brief theoretical observations should be made.

1. In the course of time, rituals may change. In general, they tend to become more complex. Therefore, in many religions (including Islam) ritual specialists exist. These ritual specialists have different names in different parts of the world and in different religious settings. The pilgrimage to
Mecca, a very complex ritual, is guided by specialists as well.

2. The meaning of rites may be subject to reinterpretation. For example, according to modernist interpretations, purity rules have their background in hygiene, that is, they claim that the original meaning of these regulations has its base in conceptions of clean and dirty, thereby diminishing their religious, symbolic, meaning. For example, in traditional Islam, a menstruating woman is not allowed to perform the salat (ritual prayer) because she is ritually unclean. The modernists argue that it is permitted to her not to do so, on account of her being ill. Such interpretations are for obvious reasons called “medical materialism.” They attempt to give a modern, “scientific” explanation.

3. In many periods of Islamic history, reformists have criticized ritual behavior that deviated from orthodox norms and values. This criticism is especially apparent in the orthodox reform movement of the end of the nineteenth century (Muhammad ‘Abduh [1849–1905], Muhammad Rashid Rida [1865–1935]), but we also come across it in the work of the neo-modernist Fazlur Rahman (1910–1988). He sharply criticizes forms of Sufism for teaching superstitionism, miracle mongering, tomb-worship, mass-hysteria and, of course, charlatanism (Islam, p. 246).

4. The existence of historical meanings does not mean that all participants in rituals are fully aware of these meanings. Muslims in the Netherlands, when asked about the meaning of shaving one’s hair on the occasion of the ‘aqiqah ritual (see below), simply answered that it was part of their religion, or that by doing so, the hair would become thicker (Dessing, p. 30ff). In other words, rituals may drift out of meaning or acquire new meaning in changed circumstances, for example, as a result of “transplantation” to a Western country, or as result of the secularization of rituals.

Catherine Bell distinguishes six major categories of rites: rites of passage or “life crisis” rituals; calendrical or commemorative rites; rites of exchange and communion; rites of affliction; rites of feasting, fasting and festivals; and, finally, political rites. These categories will be applied here to the major Islamic rites. I have added a seventh category, rites of communication.

**Rites of Communication**

This type of rite mainly serves to communicate with God, jinn and zar spirits, or with deceased humans (saints, prophets). The most important example is the salat, or ritual prayer. According to Islam, it is a human obligation to communicate with God in prayer, or as Sura 51:56 has it: “Jinn and humans are created only to worship God.” In the salat, the Qur’an is to be recited as if it were revealed onto the believer’s heart. The performance of the salat includes a number of more or less fixed bodily movements, which express core religious values. According to tradition, during the salat the believer speaks with his Lord. In the salat, there is also space for saying invocations of a personal nature, du’a’. Prayer as well as other Islamic rituals, for example those involved in saint veneration, are in one way or the other related to notions of purity. A well-known tradition says, “Purity is half the faith.” The overall term for these notions is tabara, which means purity.

**Rites of Passage or Life Cycle Rituals**

Rites of passage mark the biological and spatial transitions in human life and give them cultural meaning. Sometimes the rites occur at the same time as the biological transition themselves, but they may occur earlier or later. Important steps towards a theory of ritual structures have been made by Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner. Van Gennep noted the threefold structure of rites of passage in the life cycle and territorial passages. Each rite of passage is marked by phases of separation, transition (the so-called liminal phase, from the Latin word limen, threshold), and incorporation or reaggregation.

The most important rites of passage in Muslim religious life are: the naming and birth ritual (inbu’, ’aqiqah), circumcision, marriage, funerary rites, and the commemorative mourning rites that follow at certain fixed periods.

Depending on the stages in life, these three stages get different values, for example, by the complexity of the rites to be performed. One example is a child’s initiation ritual in Islam, which is carried out on the seventh day after birth. The rite involves three interrelated elements: sacrifice of an animal (usually a sheep, ’aqiqah), the name-giving rite, and shaving the hair of the baby.

An instance of a separation rite preceding these three acts is the bathing of the child, performed in some parts of the world at the beginning of the ritual. The bath symbolizes the separation from the mother (who had kept the child near her until then) and the introduction of the child to the natural world. The naming ritual, which confers an Islamic identity (often in accordance with the Prophet’s injunction to the believers to call themselves by graceful names), and expresses its membership in the community, is closely connected to the sacrifice. Shaving and sacrifice may be seen as liminal rites, whereas the festive meal that often concludes the ritual and to which the family is invited, is an aggregation ritual.

Marriage is an important social, juridical event as well as a life cycle ritual with a number of fixed elements. At many ritual occasions, including marriage rituals, a festive meal (walima) is held.
Calendrical Rituals

Calendrical rituals include seasonal (often agricultural) rites and commemorative rites. They are meant to give meaningful social definitions to the passage of time. The first rites are closely connected to the changes in the seasons. The second commemorative rites recall certain important events. As is explained in the article on the ‘ibadat, rituals such as the ‘umra and the hajj are seasonal rites in origin. Because of the abolishment of the intercalation in 31 C.E., Islamic rites are no longer tied to the solar calendar, and hence no longer tied to the changes of the seasons. The determination of the new months, by sighting the new moon, acquired ritual significance, especially in connection with the beginning and end of the fast in the month of Ramadan. In Islam, the narrative component in this ritual cycle is perhaps less present than in some other religions; nevertheless it appears, for example, in a very outspoken way in the poems about the birth and life of the Prophet, which are recited at various occasions.

The ritual cycle opens with ‘Ashura on 10 Muharram. ‘Ashura had been a fasting day before the revelation of the Ramadan fast, and it has remained a voluntary fasting day in Sunnite Islam until the present day. For Shīite Muslims ‘Ashura is the day on which the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet, al-Husayn, at Karbala in 680 C.E., is commemorated by emotional and at times violent mourning rituals.

On 12 Rabi’ I, the third month, the birthday of the Prophet is celebrated. On 27 Rajab, the Laylat al-Mi’raj, or ascension of the Prophet to the Heavens, is celebrated. The ascension of the Prophet to Heaven via Jerusalem (Isra’-Mi’raj) is one of the great symbols of Islam that serves as a (mystical) symbol of the ascension of the believer toward God. This is when the number of daily salats was fixed at five. Elements of the ritual celebration may include recitation of Surat al-Isra’ (Sura 17), followed by commentaries, singing, and the recitation of religious poems.

The popularity of the celebration of the fifteenth middle night of Sha’ban can be explained by its age-old associations with the Divine which is believed to be made on that night with regard to those who will die the next year.

The month of Ramadan is marked by the fast and by Laylat al-Qadr (27 Ramadan). On 1 Shawwal, the Day of the Breaking of the Fast (‘Id al-Fitr) is celebrated.

On 10 Dhu-l-Hijja, the twelfth month of the Islamic year, ‘Id al-Adha is celebrated. This ritual marks the end of the year, but in fact it does not represent the end of the ritual cycle, since there is a clear connection between the ‘id (feast day) and the ‘Ashura rituals. The pilgrimage itself can also be seen as a rite of passage, in the sense that pilgrims set out for a
place “out there,” from which they return with a higher religious status, that is to say, as hajjis.

Rites of Exchange and Communion
The central element in these rites is an offering (sacrifice) or a gift. Major Islamic rites that can be mentioned are the 'aqiqa and the sacrifice at the occasion of 'Id al-Adha. Moreover, sacrifice can also take place in other settings, such as possession cults (see under rites of affliction). Votive offering may also be included here. Such offerings happen at the graves of the saints.

Rites of Affliction
These rituals heal, exorcise, protect, and purify. In Islam, they occur, for example, in the context of saint veneration, where people seek healing, and in possession cults. Possession cults are marked by public and private gatherings where sacrifice, dance and trance are central elements. Those who suffer from particular mental, social or physical problems seek healing by establishing contact with the spiritual world of the jinn and other meta-empirical beings such as the zar. Other examples of (public) rites of affliction are the special salats to be performed at times of drought, or the recitation of Surat Ya Sin (Sura 36) in times of distress.

Rites of Feasting, Fasting and Festivals
These rites display both the hierarchical prestige social system and the interdependence or unity of human and divine worlds. The two major “canonical” festivals are 'Id al-Fitr and 'Id al-Adha (another name for the great feast, al-'Id al-Kabir). 'Id al-Adha marks the end of Ramadan fast. Ramadan is the sacred month par excellence. This has to do with the communal aspects of the fast, which expresses a number of basic values of the Muslim community. As various scholars have argued, fasting may extol fundamental distinctions, lauding the power of the spiritual realm, while acknowledging the subordination of the physical realm. According to popular beliefs, the devils (shayatin) and jinn are powerless, while God is nearer than during other months. This increased religious awareness culminates in Laylat al-Qadr, when, as some people believe, the gates of heaven are opened. After the salat al-'id, people will pay visits to relatives, which often includes visits to the graves (ziyarat al-qubur).

'Id al-Adha on 10 Dhu-l-Hijja, commemorating Ibrahim’s readiness to sacrifice his son, marks the end of the pilgrimage (the hajj). Another major festival, the Mawlid al-Nabi, grew out of the Fatimid Shiite ritual practice (11th century C.E.). Nowadays, although it is celebrated nearly everywhere (although exceptions, such as Saudi Arabia, exist), its status as a feast has nevertheless remained controversial until the present time.

In Morocco, 'Ashura is a festival honoring the dead, and during which the participants give alms, eat dried fruit, and buy toys for their children. It is marked by reversal and carnival-like rituals such as masquerades, processions, and theater (Hammoudi 1993).

Political Rituals
These rites construct, display, and promote the power of political institutions. The early history of Islamic rituals has partly been determined by their relationship to politics. For example, the salat al-jum'a (Friday prayers) originally had political connotations as a medium to convey messages to the body politic. Muhammad’s birthday festival also came into being in highly political surroundings, that is, as a palace ritual. It was meant to enhance the position of the Fatimid ruler. It stressed his bond with the prophet Muhammad and his family in particular. By giving presents to his most faithful servants, the ruler stressed the existing hierarchy in the Fatimid state. Later in the Middle East and the Islamic West, the celebration often continued to be a court ceremony, but became a popular festival as well. The Islamic world knows numerous truly political rites, such as, for example, the celebration of the accession to the throne in Morocco, or the anniversary of the death of well-known political figures, such as (again in Morocco) that of King Muhammad V.

See also Circumcision; Death; 'Ibadat; Khutba; Law; Marriage; Pilgrimage: Hajj.

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Jalaluddin Rumi is the name by which the Persian poet Jalal al-Din Mohammad-e Balkhi is conventionally known in the West. In the Muslim world he is generally called Maulavi or Maulana (Mevlana in Turkish), meaning, respectively, “my master” or “our master,” a title reflecting the veneration in which he was held by his followers, who formed the Mevlevi (Mevlaviyya) order of dervishes around his writings and example.

Life

The hagiographical sources portray Rumi’s father, Baha’ al-Din-e Valad, as one of the most important Hanafi scholars and theologians of his day, placing his family origins in Balkh (near Mazar-e Sharif in modern Afghanistan), one of the four great urban centers of the eastern Iranian cultural sphere in the pre-Mongol period. When Rumi was born in 1207, however, Baha’ al-Din was living in Vakhsh, a small town located in what is now Tajikistan, acting as an itinerant preacher (ca‘ee) and religious scholar. It does not appear that Baha’ al-Din belonged to any established Sufi order though a small group of disciples seems to have gathered around him. Inspired by dreams, Baha’ al-Din began to sign his fateus as “Sultan al-ulema” (“King of the Clerics,” or scholars of religion), an unauthorized title that the local religious judge (qadi) in Vakhsh would erase. The resulting conflict, which can be dated to about 1208—as well perhaps as larger questions of political instability in the region—led Baha’ al-Din to move to Samarkand, where Rumi recalls living during the Khwarazmshah’s siege of the city, circa 1212.

Baha’ al-Din left eastern Persia (Khorasan) with much of his family by about 1216, eventually obtaining positions as preacher or teacher in provincial Anatolia, where Persian was the court language. While the family was in Karaman (Larende), Rumi’s mother, Mo’mena Khatun, died, and Rumi, at the age of about seventeen, married Gauhar Khatun, with whom he had two sons, including Sultan Valad (1226–1312), who would later play an instrumental role in founding the Mevlevi order. By 1229, Baha’ al-Din had been invited by Sultan /aynAla al-Din Keiqobad (r. 1219–1237) to transfer to the Seljuk capital in Konya, where he taught until his death two years later. In 1232, Baha’ al-Din’s protégé, Borhan al-Din Mohaqeq, arrived from Termez to take over the leadership of the Mevlevi order. By 1229, Baha’ al-Din had been invited by Sultan /Ala al-Din Keiqobad (r. 1219–1237) to transfer to the Seljuk capital in Konya, where he taught until his death two years later. In 1232, Baha’ al-Din’s protégé, Borhan al-Din Mohaqeq, arrived from Termez to take over the leadership of the Mevlevi order. By the
time Borhan al-Din died in 1241, Rumi had assumed leadership of Baha’-al-Din’s classes and the circle of disciples in Konya.

Rumi’s teaching and spiritual praxis were noticeably altered under the influence of Shams al-Din Tabrizi, an itinerant religious scholar and mystic who came to Konya in 1244. It was perhaps under Shams’s influence that Rumi began composing poetry. Shams’s talks (preserved in Maqalat-e Shams-e Tabrizi) demonstrate his strong desire to create an authentic form of spirituality that dispensed with pretensions and imitative piety. This attitude possibly detracted from Rumi’s reputation as a pious preacher, even though the ostensible goal of Shams’s spirituality was to closely follow the example of the prophet Muhammad. The curtailment of Rumi’s teaching activities to devote more attention to Shams also led to resentment on the part of some of his disciples. Apparently in response to this situation, Shams left Konya abruptly in the spring of 1246, sending Rumi into a state of despair during which he ceased composing poetry. After about a year’s absence, Sultan Valad found Shams in Syria and convinced him to return to Konya. Shams, despite a marriage to a member of Rumi’s extended household, soon disappeared again (c. 1248), never again to return to Konya. Rumi searched desperately for Shams, expressing his deep sense of loss in frenetic poems (mostly ghazals) that cast Shams in the role of spiritual guide, and were indeed frequently spoken through the persona of Shams of Tabriz. Eventually Rumi found his own voice, after internalizing what he had learned from Shams, and even addressed other individuals without any knowledge of the original Persian.

The Mevlevi (Maulaviyya) order of “whirling dervishes,” founded in the last quarter of the thirteenth century through the efforts of Sultan Valad, bases itself on Rumi’s poetry and his practice of “turning” to music and verse (sama’). Rumi’s mausoleum in Konya, though now a museum, has functioned as a shrine and center of the Mevlevi order, which has been particularly influential in the history of Sufism in Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Levant. Though this order was not active in South Asia, Rumi’s poetry was widely read in the subcontinent and frequently commented upon by Sufis of other orders. Rumi’s poetry and teachings have continued to exert an important influence on the thinking of Islamic modernists, such as Muhammad Iqbal in Pakistan, and ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush in Iran.

Works
Rumi composed his Masnavi-ye ma’tnavi (Spiritual couplets; or Couplets of true meaning), a lengthy mystical-didactic poem of some 25,000 lines, over several years, beginning circa 1262. It consists of a series of versified anecdotes and tales, often amusing and occasionally quite ribald, varying widely in length, style, and subject matter, and rather loosely organized into six books. The Masnavi illustrates a practical mysticism drawing from the Persian Sufi tradition, provides a poetic commentary on the meaning of the Qur’an and hadith, and expounds Rumi’s views on many of the theological cruxes of Islam. It is arguably the most widely read and frequently glossed poem in the Muslim world, from Bosnia to Bengal.

The Divan-e kabir, or Kolliyat-e Shams-e Tabrizi, collects Rumi’s lyrical poems, including some 3300 ghazals, qasidas, and strophic poems, along with just under two thousand quatrains (rubaiyat). These poems are characterized by an intense sense of transcendent longing or loss; a frequently conversational, though philosophically rich, style; and a captivating rhythmic musicality (many of the poems seem indeed to have been composed, and are often performed, to instrumental accompaniment). German adaptations by Friedrich Rückert of some of these poems made an impression on the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and initially gave Europeans the impression that Rumi was a pantheist. Subsequently, especially after Reynold Nicholson’s complete explanatory translation of the Masnavi into English, Rumi became synonymous in the West of a deep and tolerant Islamic spirituality. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, dozens of popular versions and “translations” of Rumi’s poems appeared in English free verse, many by individuals without any knowledge of the original Persian.

Rumi’s prose works include the notes recorded by his disciples during lectures, informal sermons, and classes (Fihe ma fih, or Discourses); seven sermons delivered on formal occasions (Majales-e sab’a); and a number of letters (Maktubat).

See also Persian Language and Literature.

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Salman Rushdie is a novelist and critic who became a household name after his fictional work, The Satanic Verses, was protested by numerous Muslims and Muslim groups. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa (legal opinion) sentencing Rushdie to death, and as a result Rushdie was forced into hiding in England from 1989 to 1998. In later years he moved to the United States, dividing his time between Los Angeles and New York City.

Rushdie was born to Muslim parents in Bombay, India, and was educated at the Cathedral School. In 1961, he left India to attend Rugby, a prestigious boarding school in England. Rushdie then attended King’s College, Cambridge, where he wrote a paper on Muhammad and the origins of Islam for part of his honors examination in history. Early literary influences on Rushdie were the Thousand and One Nights and the Urdu poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a family friend.

Rushdie’s first novel, Grimus (1975), was a variation of the medieval Sufi poet Farid al Din ‘Attar’s The Conference of the Birds. It was a commercial failure. His second novel, Midnight’s Children (1981), was about the lives of 1001 children born at the stroke of midnight on India’s independence from Britain. This book won him critical acclaim, including the 1981 Booker Prize. However, Rushdie’s satirical portrayal of Indira Gandhi resulted in a lawsuit that was resolved only after a sentence considered particularly hurtful by Gandhi was omitted from subsequent editions. His third novel, Shame (1983), satirized Pakistani politics and politicians, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia al-Haqq, in the way that its predecessor had satirized Indian politics. Clearly, Rushdie knew much about Islam, Muslims, and South Asian politics and culture.

The Satanic Verses (1988) was Rushdie’s fourth novel, and dealt with the themes of migration, of being a member of a dark-skinned minority in England, and of the multiple identities that come with being Asian in London. The main character is Gibreel Farishta, an Urdu name that translated into English as “the Angel Gabriel.” Beginning with the second chapter of the book, Gibreel has a series of dreams. The first of these features a character named Mahound, who is an orphan, a businessman living in a city named Jahilia, who through revelation begins to preach a religion called “Submission.” This religion is, of course, Islam. In another chapter, Gibreel has a series of encounters with an exile known simply as “the Imam,” who is intended to be recognized as the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The book was first banned in India on 5 October 1988 at the urging of several Indian Muslim politicians. Subsequently, the book was banned in South Africa (24 November 1988), burned publicly in Bradford, England (14 January 1989), and protested against in Islamabad (where six people died during a riot on 12 February 1989) and Bombay (with twelve people killed in a riot on 24 February 1989). On 14 February 1989, Khomeini pronounced his death sentence on Rushdie. While distancing itself from Khomeini’s death sentence, the eleventh session of the Islamic Law Academy of the Muslim World League (held in Mecca from 10 to 26 February 1989), issued a statement declaring Rushdie an apostate and recommending that he be prosecuted in a British court, and tried in absentia under the shari’a laws of an Islamic country.

On the whole, North American responses were much more muted and peaceful than in other countries. To take the case of Toronto, the city with the largest population of Canada’s Muslims, there was a deliberate effort made by various Muslim communities to keep the protests nonviolent. The protests in Toronto were not used for political purposes, in the same way that they were used in, for example, Iran or India, and there was even some sympathy and tolerance expressed for Rushdie.

See also Arabic Literature; Persian Language and Literature; South Asia, Islam in; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.
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Amir Hussain
SADAT, ANWAR AL- (1918–1981)

The future president of Egypt, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, was born on 25 December 1918 in a Nile Delta town, the son of an army clerk. Sadat grew up in Cairo and entered the military academy in 1938. In the army he joined a Muslim Brotherhood cell; there he met Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and other future Free Officers. Patriotic, yet reckless, he contacted German agents and conspired in the murder of a pro-British pasha. Recommissioned after eventual acquittal, he regained contact with dissident officers who seized power in July 1952.

A fellow conspirator, Sadat served the Nasser regime in various capacities. Vice president in 1970, he succeeded Nasser, supported by power brokers who thought to dominate him. Instead, he purged Nasserist foes in May 1971, then threw his support to Islamist activists, releasing jailed Muslim Brothers and allowing others to return from exile. In October 1973 he initiated war against Israel, scoring a political victory that led ultimately to normal relations. In 1974 he proclaimed an “opening” to Western investment and diminution of the public sector. For several years Sadat reaped glory as “hero of the crossing,” a reference to his army’s initial success in breaching Israeli defenses across the Suez Canal. In November 1977, after a stunning public declaration, he traveled to Jerusalem and addressed the Israeli Knesset. The following year he accepted an invitation from American president Jimmy Carter to join Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin at Camp David. The talks paved the way for a peace treaty in 1979.

Sadat became an international celebrity, but economic troubles, anti-Israeli sentiment, a surge of intercommunal violence, and his growing aloofness shattered public optimism at home. In uncharacteristic fashion, Sadat now turned against opponents from all political tendencies, secular and religious. In September 1981 he ordered sweeping arrests of political foes. On 6 October 1981, at a parade marking his October victory, he was assassinated by Islamist extremists. Sadat remains a controversial figure at home, and a balanced assessment of him still remains impossible twenty years later.

See also ‘Abd al-Nasser, Jamal; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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Joel Gordon

SADIQ, JA‘FAR AL- See Ja‘far al-Sadiq

SADR

Dating from eleventh-century Transoxiana in Central Asia, by the Timurid period (fourteenth century) the sadr referred to the chief, government-appointed officer who oversaw the management of state and private religious endowments (awqaf); the appointment of mosque, madrasa, and other religious personnel; and cared for the poor, needy, and orphans. Up until the late sixteenth century, the first Safavid century, provincial sadrs also existed, but they were not always under the direct authority of the central-government sadr.

The Safavids also formalized the Timurid practice of dividing the responsibilities of the post between two figures, one overseeing the endowments bequeathed by the shah and the other those left by private individuals, with the former seemingly the preeminent figure, and gradually also divided the authority of the two along geographical lines. As befit the highly personalized nature of Safavid politics, however, one individual might hold both posts, and an individual holding
another post at court might also be appointed sadr. The post was nearly always held by a religious scholar, a sayyid (descendent of the Prophet), in both Timurid and Safavid times.

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Andrew J. Newman

SADR, MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL- (1930–1980)

Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was a scholar and revered figure of Shi’a in Iraq. He wrote widely on matters of Islamic economics and modern logic and philosophy. His books were bibles of Islamic modernists, Sunni and Shi’ite alike, throughout the Muslim world. Some of his works, including Falsafatuna (Our philosophy) and Iqtisaduna (Our economics), are used as textbooks in Shi’ite seminaries. Most of his writings and teaching concentrated on renewal of principles of jurisprudence in Islamic tradition. He attempted to reconcile the traditions and strictures of Islam with the ideas and practices of the West. He was one the most enlightened Shi’ite legists and inspired much devotion among the people of Iraq.

Al-Sadr’s orientation was not excessively political. Nevertheless, there were many people in Iraq who were receptive to Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Therefore, when Iraq’s Shi’ite community began to look to al-Sadr for political leadership, and when Iran’s Arabic radio broadcasts repeatedly referred to him as the “Khomeini of Iraq,” he became a threat to the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, whose base of support consisted of Sunni military officers and functionaries. As a consequence, both al-Sadr and his sister were executed on the orders of Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein.

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Majid Mohammadi

SAHARA

Once a lush and fertile environment sustaining a diversified human population, fauna, and flora, the Sahara experienced an irreversible process of desertification from 3000 B.C.E. onward. Since then, two events significantly marked the history of the Sahara: the introduction of camels, sometime after the second century, and the spread of Islam, starting in the eighth century. The adoption of camels, the “vessels of the desert,” revolutionized the nature of transportation in endurance, volume, and efficiency. Adherence to Islam, its philosophy, and code of law, favored the development of successful commercial and scholarly networks connecting Muslims across the Sahara desert and beyond. In time, the majority of Saharans would become Muslim.

Although Islam arrived at least two centuries earlier, the Almoravid movement in the eleventh century was the first organized attempt at religious reform in the Sahara. To be sure, the Almoravids were interested in controlling a share of the gold trade as much as they were motivated to spread their Muslim faith. From then onward, trans-Saharan trade flourished. In the first half of the fourteenth century, the ostentatious pilgrimage to Mecca of the emperor of Mali, Kankan Mansa Musa, alerted the Muslim world to the gold riches of Western Africa, and consequently would attract many more Muslim visitors to Saharan towns such as Timbuktu and Gao.

Andrew J. Newman

SADR, MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL- (1928–1978?)

Musa al-Sadr, who was born in Qom, Iran, was a politically active and controversial cleric. Al-Sadr arrived in Lebanon in 1959, and by 1969 he was the chairman of the Higher Shi’ite Council, which he had helped to create in that same year. Al-Sadr led and tried to transform the people of the historically quiescent Shi’ite community of Lebanon, who needed courage to stake out a claim in their fractured country. He advanced the notion of ideological Islam, and proposed that the leader in Lebanon should be an imam, much like ‘Ali Shari’ati, a religious intellectual, had advocated in Iran before the Islamic revolution.

Al-Sadr was a political moderate who was considered a reformer by his followers. The title of imam was applied to only two individuals in the Shi’ite tradition: It was given to Musa al-Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader, by their followers and subsequently accepted by the high-ranking clerics. Sadr disappeared in Libya while on a visit to Libya’s ruler, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, in 1978. He and two companions, a cleric and a journalist, were never heard from again.

See also Imamate; Lebanon; Political Islam; Revolution: Modern.

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Majid Mohammadi
By the seventeenth century, Saharan towns were well-established markets and centers of Islamic learning. The reputations of notable scholars of Timbuktu, Walata, and Shingiti extended all the way to North Africa and the Middle East. Saharan scholars regularly organized caravans to perform the pilgrimage. They built mosques, developed libraries, and established schools. One cannot underestimate the significance of trans-Saharan trade and the development of scholarly networks to the spread of Islamic knowledge and Arabic literacy in the region. Caravans relied on their literacy skills for correspondence, accounting, accountability, and for drawing contractual agreements, all in accordance with Islamic law.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that scholars often performed as traders and vice versa in Saharan commercial centers such as Shingiti, Tishit, Walata, Timbuktu, and Ghadames. To uphold the law, traders relied upon the services of scholars of Islamic law or judges. Moreover, until European colonization, Saharan towns tended to be governed by Muslim scholars who performed as regional judges ruling on all matters, civil, commercial, or political. These sedentary scholarly communities maintained alliances with nomadic groups who provided protection services to both town dwellers and trans-Saharan travelers.

The late nineteenth century saw the end of the great camel caravan. European conquest redirected trade toward new centers of control located along the Atlantic coast and in key colonial outposts in the interior. Consequently, the Sahara became a contested terrain and home to pockets of resistance to French, and later Moroccan, overrule. Not surprisingly, Saharans presented the greatest challenge to European conquest. This was due to the shrewdness of Muslim leaders as much as the ruggedness of the terrain. It was not until the 1930s that the French could claim control over the whole region, connecting Morocco and Algeria to their West African colonies. Later, when the Spanish relinquished their Western Saharan colony in 1975, both Morocco and Mauritania fought the Saharan independence movement, or Polisario, for claims over the contested region. To date, the fate of the Western Sahara has not been sealed, as a UN referendum is repeatedly postponed.

An image of Saharan desert landscape appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Globalization; Networks, Muslim.

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F. Ghislaine Lydon

SAINT

Wali, the word roughly defined as “saint,” which is derived from the Arabic root w-l-y and has a root meaning of proximity, generally is found in the construct wali Allah, that is, someone who is close or intimate with God. It is a designation that Muslims use to define a holy person, and can refer to overlapping categories of pious people, religious scholars, Sufis, and Shi’i imams. In English wali is translated variously as protegé, intimate, friend of God, or “saint.” A wali who has power over others has wilya (being a protector or intercessor) while a wali with walaya focuses on the closeness or nearness to God (being a friend of God). Both of these meanings can be harmonized with interpretations of Qur’anic usage. Except for hairsplitting grammatical discussions, popular usage conflates these meanings since one close to God has power to protect and intercede and vice versa.

The popular idea of wali, an heir of the Prophet, is a post-Qur’anic development whose first textual source, the writings of al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. c. 910), dates to the second half of the ninth century. Tirmidhi proposed a “seal of God’s friends” that was later claimed and subsequently popularized by Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240). This “seal” corresponds to the creedal notion of Muhammad as the final prophet or the “seal of the prophets,” while assiduously subordinating awliya’ (plural of wali) to prophets. The developing doctrine of wali accounts for non-prophetic expressions of the sacred, for example, ibam (non-prophetic divine inspiration) versus wahy (prophetic revelation) in a way that explained extraordinary phenomena without violating creedal dictates.

The contemporary theological war over legitimate religious authority, often initiated and funded by scripturalist groups such as Salafis or Wahhabis, denies that anyone can be a friend of God. Instead, they assert that all Muslims have equal access to God through the written scriptural sources of Qur’an and hadith, absolutely undercutting any possibility of intercession or of spiritual hierarchy. Presently a growing minority of Muslims shares this scripturalist perspective. They are mostly concentrated in Arabic-speaking countries and in countries like the United States, which are influenced by Salafi interpretations of Islam.

On one hand, wali is a socially constructed concept based upon a recognizable community consensus. Generally Muslims recognize a wali Allah on the basis of four overlapping
sources of authority: spiritual/genealogical lineage, religious experience (spiritual traveling), acquisition of transmitted religious knowledge, and exemplary behavior in harmony with the Prophetic sunna. Hagiographic literature has established a narrative paradigm that reinforces these sources of authority in the popular imagination. On the other hand, in the Sufi environment wali is a technical term based on consensually verified phenomena allowing specialists to classify types of proximity to God.

In terms of religious practice, the concept of wali provides a basis for the development of shrine rituals at the tombs of deceased saints located throughout the Islamic world. Often at these shrines the descendants of the deceased holy person, considered to be walis, act as mediating shaykhs who “pass requests to God” instead of acting as spiritual masters teaching a person how to arrive close to God through a set of contemplative practices. Although the legitimacy of these shrine rituals is strongly denied by scripturally oriented Muslims, these shrines provide meaningful religious experiences for many pious visitors. Functionally, the multivalent concept of wali varies historically and geographically so as to include scholars, saints, spiritual mentors, counselors, healers, and intercessors, both living and deceased.

See also Ibn ‘Arabi; Mi’raj; Silsila; Sunna; Tasawwuf; Tariqa; Ulema.

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Arthur F. Buehler

**SALADIN (1137 OR 1138–1193)**

Salah al-Din Yusuf b. Ayyub (d. 1193), who became known in the West as Saladin, was a Kurdish warrior renowned for his victories over the Crusaders and as the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt, Syria, and upper Iraq. Saladin’s defeat of the Crusaders at the Horns of Hattin (4 July 1187) in northern Palestine led to the Muslim reconquest of Jerusalem and the near elimination of the Franks in the Levant. His success in jihad against the Crusaders was celebrated by his court biographers. Not surprisingly, Saladin’s name and example are powerful symbols in the modern Middle East. His subsequent struggles against the forces of the Third Crusade (1189–1192) and King Richard I of England became the stuff of romance in European literature, where Saladin and Richard emerge as rival chivalrous foes.

Saladin’s career began in the armies of Nur al-Din b. Zangi, ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, and himself a famous counter-crusader. Saladin went to Egypt in early 1169 in a contingent of Nur al-Din’s army sent to assist the Fatimid Caliphate, which in late 1168 had been attacked by Crusader forces. Saladin subsequently removed the Fatimids from power, and made himself ruler in Egypt, subservient to Nur al-Din. Upon the latter’s death in 1174, Saladin moved against Nur al-Din’s heirs and began to bring the Muslim cities of Syria under his command. He then used the combined resources of Egypt and Syria to attack the Crusaders. By forcibly uniting Muslim territory prior to assaulting the Franks, he followed the pattern of Nur al-Din and Zangi. The same strategy would be used by the Mamluks in their final elimination of the Latin states in 1291.

See also Crusades.

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Warren C. Schultz

**SALAFIYYA**

Salafiyya is the name given to those who follow the ideas and practices of the righteous ancestors (al-salaf al-salih). This “salafi” approach rejects later traditions and schools of thought, calling for a return to the Qur’an and the sunna as the authentic basis for Muslim life. The salafi approach emphasizes the application of *ijtihad* (independent, informed judgment) and rejects *taqlid* (adherence to established precedents and conformity with existing traditional interpretations and institutions).

The “righteous ancestors,” or salaf, are usually considered to be the first three generations of Muslims, including the immediate companions of the Prophet. Because of the closeness of these salaf to Muhammad, later Muslims regarded the former’s transmissions of the Prophet’s traditions, their informed practice as believers, as having special authority.
Major figures in the definition of the salafi perspective and approach are Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), the founder of the Hanbali school, and Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328).

The fundamental concern of modern Salafiyya, who recognize that Muslim power and influence is in decline relative to the West, is the relationship between Islam and modernity. The goal of the movement is to make Islam a dynamic force in the contemporary world. The modern Salafiyya invoked the classic themes: a call for a return to the Qur’an and the sunna, a rejection of the medieval authorities (taqlid), and an affirmation of the necessity of independent, informed thinking (ijtihad). In the modern context, this involved an emphasis on the compatibility of reason with revelation, and of Islam with modern science. It also entailed a call for moral social reform. However, by the end of the twentieth century, the term Salafiyya also came to be applied to extremist movements that advocated violent jihad against existing regimes and social orders, both Muslim and non-Muslim, and that did not adhere to a rigid and literalist understanding of the Qur’an and sunna. This new Salafiyya often differed from the time-honored salafi approach of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya by rejecting independent analysis (ijtihad).

Among those involved in the definition and establishment of the modern Salafiyya, the best-known are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). ‘Abduh created the broad intellectual foundations for modern Salafiyya. First in exile and then as Grand Mufti of Egypt, he shaped the thinking of generations of Muslim intellectuals. The theological core was an emphasis on tawhid, which is the assertion of the singleness of God and the comprehensive unity of God’s message. Tawhid was the basis for showing the compatibility of Islam with modern science and revelation with modern reason. Consistent with the earlier Salafiyya, ‘Abduh advocated the informed, independent analysis of the Qur’an and sunna.

The new Salafiyya did not involve direct opposition to European imperial rule over Muslims. Rather, it saw internal Islamic reform as the first priority, and the key to the implementation of its goals was education and scholarship. ‘Abduh provided the inspiration for many educational reforms and al-Manar, the journal published by his follower and associate, Rashid Rida (1865–1939), was read throughout the Muslim world. Following ‘Abduh’s death, Rashid Rida became the most visible international articulator of Salafi thought, becoming active in organizing Pan-Islamic congresses and, after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, in working for the establishment of a modern Arab caliphate. He came to view the efforts of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa’ud to create a state in the Arabian Peninsula based on the puritanical reform traditions of the Wahhabiyya as representing an important manifestation of the reforms necessary for all Muslim societies.

Other important Salafi-modernist movements developed in the late nineteenth century, sometimes relatively independently and sometimes in close coordination with the group around ‘Abduh. In South Asia, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) emphasized the importance of understanding nature as a reflection of God’s revelation in his teachings, and established the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College (which later became Aligarh Muslim University). As the Russian Empire completed its conquest of Muslim areas in the nineteenth century, another Islamic modernist movement, “Jadidism,” developed there under the leadership of Isma’il Gasprinskii (1851–1914). He created a new school curriculum for Muslim children, and his journal, Tarjuman, was important in creating a modern, cohesive sense of identity among Muslims living in Russia.

Many movements throughout the Muslim world were directly inspired by the ‘Abduh tradition, and were in communication with it. In North Africa, Salafis organized movements like the Association of Algerian Ulema under ‘Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis (1889–1940). Salafi intellectuals and organizations became important parts of Muslim life in Syria and Iraq as well, and in Egypt and many other parts of the Muslim world. In Southeast Asia, the Shi’a Imami, which became one of the largest organizations in the Muslim world, was formed in 1912 to advocate specifically Salafi-style reform, especially through education.

Throughout the twentieth century, individuals and groups built on and developed the modernist Salafi traditions in many different directions. In South Asia, the work of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) provided a critical synthesis of modern and Islamic thought in his book, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, and other works. At the same time, he worked for the creation of Pakistan. Some forms of nationalism were presented in Salafi form, as in the development of the Dustour Party in Tunisia and the drive toward liberal nationalism in Egypt in the first half of the century. Later, Mahmod Shaltut (1893–1963), as shaykh of al-Azhar University, confirmed the ‘Abduh tradition at the heart of the Islamic scholarly establishment, and scholars like Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) further developed modernist methodologies in historical and philosophical studies.

By the end of the twentieth century, the term Salafi came to be applied to a very different type of Islamic revivalism. When an ideology of violent jihad against existing Muslim societies and secular modernity developed, it started with a Salafi-style call for a return to the purity of faith exemplified by the righteous ancestors. As this message was developed by later activists, however, the emphasis was placed on militant action, rather than on intellectual effort. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the term was widely applied to advocates of violent jihad. Terrorists like those who destroyed the World Trade Center, along with Usama bin
Ladin and his organization, al-Qa’ida, are called Salafi, as are militants throughout the Muslim world.

The older style of Salafi modernism was also significant at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The intellectual content of curricula in Islamic schools and international Islamic universities around the world reflects much of the tradition of ‘Abduh, while organizations like the Muhammadia in Indonesia remain a significant part of political and social life.

See also ‘Abduh, Muhammad; Ijtihad; Muhammadia (Muhammadiah); Nationalism: Arab; Wahhabiyya.

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John O. Voll

SALEH BIN ALLAWI (C. 1844–1935)

Saleh bin Allawi (Ar. Salih bin ‘Alawi) was a renowned scholar and founder of the Riyada mosque college in Lamu. He was of Yemenite origin and born in the Comoro Islands. From there he migrated to Lamu sometime between 1876 and 1885. He belonged to the Jamal al Layl Sharif lineage (one of the Sharif lineages and descendants of the Prophet), whose members have been responsible for the dissemination of Islam and its intellectual tradition in East Africa. In fact, much of Islam as it is taught and practiced in East Africa bears the stamp of Yemenite influence. Descendants of these families were born of African mothers, and this factor facilitated their easy integration into the Swahili community.

Allawi’s membership in the Alawi tariqa (Sufi order) enabled him to side with and patronize the slaves and the poor of Lamu Island, who became the main focus of his religious efforts. Before this time religious education in Lamu was monopolized by or restricted to descendants of the Prophet and select other families. It was to the credit of Allawi both as an outsider to Lamu and as a member of the Alawi tariqa (that emphasized education and training of scholars) that he began to teach people previously denied this education. When he began to teach them Qur’anic exegesis, he angered the town’s elitist traditional scholars. Eventually he established his own madrasa (Islamic school) in Langoni (a district in the southern part of Lamu Island). There he taught the slaves and recent immigrants to the island. This madrasa became the famous Riyada mosque-college, which attracted students from all over East Africa, and spread his fame as a scholar and saint.

See also Africa, Islam in; Tariqa.

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Abdin Chande

SALEH BIN ALLAWI

SAUDI DYNASTY

The ruling family of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi dynasty, is known as the House (al) of Sa’ud. Founding of the dynasty is conventionally dated in 1744, when the ruler of the small oasis town Dir’iyya (south of Riyadh), Muhammad ibn Sa’ud, made an alliance with the reformist religious activist Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Muhammad ibn Sa’ud accepted the strict, puritanical interpretation of Islam propounded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as the basis for his state, and the latter pledged his support for the expansion of the former’s domains. Two Saudi realms in Arabia (1744–1818, 1824–1891), destroyed by Ottoman intervention and internal strife, preceded the foundation of the current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sa’ud (known in the West as Ibn Saud) at the outset of the twentieth
century. By 1934, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz had expanded the kingdom to its current boundaries. He has been succeeded as ruler by a number of his thirty-six sons: Sa‘ud (1953–1964), Faysal (1964–1975), Khalid (1975–1982) and Fahd (1982–present). Including the direct descendants of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the descendants of his brothers, and significant cadet branches of the family, the number of princes in the Saudi royal family is estimated now at between five and eight thousand.

F. Gregory Gause III

SAYYID

The word sayyid is derived from the Arabic root “to be lord over, to rule” and is commonly used to refer to a descendant of the prophet Muhammad (normally through his grandson al-Husayn), but can also, more generally, signify a holy person (also called wali). Descendants of the Prophet are accorded respect, particularly in Shi‘ism, but also in Sunni Islam. In Shi‘ism, respect is generally preserved for descendants of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, through her marriage to Imam ‘Ali. In Twelver Shi‘ism, sayyids gain this respect through their genealogy, including relation to one of the Twelve Imams, and many contemporary Shi‘ite families claim sayyid status. In Zaydi Shi‘ism, the leader of the community must be a descendant of the Prophet for his rule to be legitimate. In Sunni Islam, sayyids have certain legal privileges over non-sayyids. In all these branches of Islam, the privileged status of sayyids is perhaps most obvious in the rules concerning marriage, where a sayyida (female descendant) should marry only a sayyid to preserve the “equity” (kafa‘a) status in the marriage. In popular religion, descendants of the Prophet in all branches of Islam are often viewed as channels for divine blessing (baraka). The colloquial term sidi, derived from sayyid, is used as an honorific before Muslim saints, especially in North Africa. It does not always imply that the saint is a descendant of the Prophet.

See also Sharif.

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Robert Gleave

SCIENCE, ISLAM AND

The concept of ‘ilm, “science,” has been an important one in the history of Islamicate civilization and has gone a long way to giving this civilization, and all those who participated in it regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, a distinctive shape. Mention is frequently made of several sayings (hadith) of the Prophet that state “seek ‘ilm, even in China."

The Arabic term ‘ilm (pl. ‘ilumin) refers more broadly to “knowledge” and its antonym is considered to be “ignorance” (jabh). In its various verbal forms, ‘ilm is found frequently in the Qur’an. At a fairly early date, however, the concept of ‘ilm was differentiated from that of ma‘rifah. The latter refers to a form of knowledge derived from personal experience or intuition, whereas the former is contingent upon the observation and discovery of first principles. This is not to say, however, that all of the primary sources make a sharp distinction between these two modes of knowledge.

The concept of science in Islam is a vast subject. Historically, Arabs and Persians who were interested in explaining the natural world around them first introduced Greek scientific treatises to the Arabic-speaking world during the eighth century. From the ninth century on, scholars traveled from one end of the empire to the other, carrying books and ideas, thereby insuring what some have called the cultural and intellectual unity of the Islamic world. Since this time, countless Muslims from all over the world throughout the course of many centuries have been involved in scientific developments.

Yet, almost immediately there is a conceptual and taxonomical difficulty. How exactly is the term “Islamic science” defined? Ostensibly, “science” is a universal term that knows no linguistic or ethnic bounds; yet, the adjective “Islamic” implies a particular language by a definable group of people. Does “Islamic science,” then, refer to a particular “Islamic” take on science? Or, does it refer to science done by individuals who identify themselves as Muslims? This entry assumes the latter assertion.

An equally difficult hermeneutical problem presents itself: When Arabic speakers use the term ‘ilm did they mean by it something similar to what today is called science? Because the Arabic term is not identical to the Western concept of hard science, it is often used in a number of theological and mystical contexts. For instance, early Muslim hadith criticism was known as ‘ilm al-rijal (lit., “the science of the men” who made up the chain of transmitters, or isnad). Despite the employment of the term ‘ilm there was nothing particularly scientific about it. Likewise, even theology (‘ilm al-kalam) was regarded as a science with its own demonstrative method derived from first principles. These principles, however, were not derived from syllogistic reasoning, but the Qur’an. A more recent trend has fundamentalists arguing that the Qur’an predicts many important scientific discoveries, thereby validating the Qur’anic miracle for the believers.

Premodern Scientific Developments

A momentous impetus was given to the development of science in the Islamic world with the accession of the Abbasid
caliphate to power and the subsequent foundation of Baghdad as its capital in 762. This resulted in a translation movement that saw, by the end of the tenth century, virtually all of the scientific and philosophical secular Greek works that were available in the Late Antique period (fourth to seventh centuries C.E.) translated into Arabic. These works included many diverse topics such as astrology, alchemy, physics, mathematics, medicine, and the various branches of philosophy. The great majority of these texts were translated from Greek into Arabic by way of Syriac. Furthermore, many of the earliest translators were Christians, many of whom were employed in the renowned bayt al-hikma (“House of Wisdom”). This functioned as the official institute and library for translation and research. The caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833) sent emissaries throughout the Mediterranean world to seek out and purchase books on “ancient learning,” which were subsequently brought back to Baghdad and translated into Arabic by a panel of scholars. The result was an impressive official library that included many of the most important scientific and philosophical works produced in the ancient world. These works would form the foundation for medieval science, not only in the Islamic world, but also subsequently in the Christian world.

The earliest Greek works translated into Arabic were often made for purely pragmatic reasons. This is why treatises devoted to astrology, mathematics, and alchemy represent some of the earliest scientific works in Arabic. A useful list of the treatises translated into Arabic and when and by whom can be found in the account given by the biographer of Islamic writings, Ibn al-Nadim (d. 995).

A common, though incorrect, assumption has it that the Greeks invented the sciences, the Arabs rescued them from disappearing in the “Dark Ages,” and subsequently passed them untouched and uncommented upon to the Renaissance period. This ignores the fact that many people living in the Islamic world wrote commentaries to the works of important individuals such as Aristotle, Galen, and Ptolemy. The genre of the commentary was not a slavish recapitulation of a text, but often a creative way of writing about science and philosophy in the medieval period. Rather than regard commentaries as uncreative, they often allowed scholars to think about scientific matters in such a way that they could validate their claims by putting them in the mouths of ancient sages. In fact, many commentators often used ancient authors to argue the very opposite of what these ancient authors had intended in the first place. So although the Arabs worked within the parameters of science as established by the Greeks, they made many important developments in the Western scientific tradition.

Classification of the Sciences
Many of the medieval philosophers compiled various “lists of the sciences” (ibsa’ ‘ulum) and “classifications of the sciences” (maratib al-‘ulum). One of the most famous examples of this is the Enumeration of the Sciences, by al-Farabi (870–950). In the preface to this work, al-Farabi states that his intention is to give an enumeration of all the sciences of his day and provide descriptions of their themes and subject matter. He divides the sciences into those dealing with (1) language, (2) logic, (3) mathematics, (4) physics and metaphysics, and (5) political science, jurisprudence, and dialectical theology. Other lists were compiled by the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa’), Ibn al-Nadim, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Ghazali, and Ibn Khaldun. Ghazali’s list is interesting in that he divides all of the sciences into those that are either praiseworthy (mabmuda) or blameworthy (madhumma).

Such lists, however, are by no means a medieval phenomenon. In 1980 at the Second World Conference on Muslim Education, sponsored by the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jiddah and the Quaid-i Azam University in Islamabad, delegates adopted a similar list. The main difference between their enumeration and that of someone like al-Farabi was that theirs begins with the memorization of the Qur’an and ends with the practical sciences.

Highlights
Two caveats must be made at the beginning. First, the Muslims did not invent any of the sciences. Rather, as mentioned, they received texts from the Greeks (especially those of Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Euclid) and, in the process, adopted and adapted their theories as they saw fit (e.g., in order to reconcile them with monotheistic sensibilities or with new advances made in observation). Second, the term Arabic science might be better than Islamic science, because there was nothing particular religious about science, and many of the scientists spoke Arabic, even though religiously they might have been Christian or Jewish.

Muslims made many important innovations in a great majority of the sciences. In astronomy (‘ilm al-bay’a; lit. “the science of the figure”), for example, Muslim thinkers made important advancements, following on the heels of Ptolemy, in discerning the laws governing the periodic motions of the celestial bodies. One of the most famous of the Islamic astronomers was al-Battani (Albategnius). He compiled a catalog of the stars for the year 880, in which he determined the various astronomical coefficients with renowned accuracy. He was also responsible for discovering the motion of the solar apsides. In addition, he also wrote an important introductory treatise that was used in European universities until the sixteenth century. Gradually, in order to reconcile perceived observation of the universe, Muslim thinkers, disagreeing with Aristotle, posited the existence of epicycles that revolved not around the earth, but around the various celestial spheres. This movement away from Aristotle greatly bothered the Andalusi thinkers, especially Ibn Bajja and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), who decided to remove the epicycles. This
created almost as many problems as it solved. In the thirteenth century, however, at the observatory in Maragha, scientists explained the motions of the heavenly spheres as the combination of uniform circular motions. This is the model that was eventually adopted by European astronomers, such as Copernicus.

Mathematics (‘ilm al-bi‘ah; lit. “the science of reckoning”) was, according to al-Farabi’s classification, divided into seven branches. Furthermore, he divided mathematics into two types: practical (amāli) and theoretical (nazarī). The former is concerned with numbers as they pertain to numbered things such as tables or humans. The latter, in contrast, is concerned with numbers in the abstract, including the properties that numbers acquire when related to one another or when combined with or separated from one another. In the tenth century, Nichomachus’s Introduction was translated from Greek into Arabic. This resulted in the acquaintance of mathematics with other subjects, such as geometry, astronomy, and music. Another important mathematician, and probably the most important Arab physicist, was Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen; d. 1039). Among other things, he attempted, without success, to regulate the flow of the Nile. He also composed over a hundred different scientific treatises, most devoted to medicine, mathematics, and physics. Furthermore, he was responsible for establishing the theorem of the cotangent, in addition to resolving the problem of optics (the intersection of an equilateral hyperbola with a circle) that still bears his name.

In the field of medicine, probably the most important name is Ibn Sina (Avicenna; d. 1037). In his autobiography he informs us that medicine (tibb) was not one of the difficult sciences and he claims to have mastered it by the age of sixteen. Throughout his life he engaged in medical experiments and wrote various treatises on specific topics. He also composed a medical encyclopedia, Qanun fi ‘l-Tibb (The canon of medicine), that became the standard textbook on the subject not only in the Islamic world, but also in the West for over five hundred years.

Mention should also be made of two disciplines that medieval scholars considered to be sciences, but which are not thought of in that way today: astrology and alchemy. Both of these sciences provided important sources for an empirical and experimental approach to nature. Whereas Aristotelianism offered an explanatory framework for understanding the physical world, astrology and astral magic supplemented this by providing explanations (and prognostications) for the phenomena of this world in the heavens. Both astrology and astral magic presupposed a thorough knowledge of mathematics and astronomy. In like manner, alchemy (al-kīmiyyah) was concerned with the transmutation of base metals into precious ones. Although most often associated with the attempt to “create” gold, many regarded it as an important part of natural philosophy.

**Islamic Law**

Science, as is to be expected, was a very malleable term. It referred not only to those disciplines (e.g., physics, mathematics) that today are considered to be the purview of science, but also to other disciplines whose scientific veracity is rather difficult to ascertain. The Muslims had a tendency to consider every potential discipline as a science, and as a result tried to articulate first principles for them. Important in this regard is the science of law or fiqh. For the practitioners of fiqh, known as the fuqaha, the law was a science and consisted of the proper knowledge of the Qur’an and the sunna.

In its developed form, the science of Islamic legal theory recognized a variety of sources and methods (usul al-fiqh) by which to derive the law. The first principle was the Qur’an, followed by the sunna which, though second in importance, provided the overwhelming majority of material from which the law was derived. The third principle is consensus (ijma) of the legal scholars in the name of the entire community. The fourth principle is known as human reasoning (qiyas). These four principles became the means whereby legal scholars could, in their opinion, scientifically determine the legal effects of the textual sources of Islam.

The supreme Muslim science was considered to be religious law as opposed to theology as it was in the scholastic world. This had important repercussions: Because scholastic theologians also did work on logic and medicine, they contended that God could not do what was logically impossible. Islamic fiqh, in contrast, were not interested in deducing religious principles from reason or explaining them rationally.

Having surveyed some of the major features and trajectories of science within the orbit of Islam, the question arises: Why did Islam not carry out a scientific revolution in the same manner that the Europeans did? After all, Islam practiced the various sciences long before Europe and remained ahead of the Europeans until the thirteenth century.

The primary difference resides in the fact that, whereas European scholastics succeeded in developing the modern physical sciences, Islam created a metaphysics that was more interested in mysticism. According to the analysis suggested by John Walbridge in The Leaven of the Ancients (2000), this was the result of several features. First, the Muslim philosophers consistently held the position that the world existed without a temporal beginning and were thus more interested in ontological hierarchies than temporal chains of causality. As a result, they tended to speculate about metaphysics and ontology as opposed to the natural sciences. Second, Muslim theologians (mutakallimin) developed an extreme occasionalism that refused to bind God in any way to the natural order. At its most extreme, even a philosopher such as Ghazali, who believed in the truth of mathematics, argued that God destroyed and created the universe in every instant in accordance with His arbitrary Will. God’s law, in other
words, was regarded as totally arbitrary and, thus, the notion of natural law was for the most part foreign to Islam. Third, the discovery of mysticism by the Islamic philosophers (beginning with Ibn al-`Arabi in the thirteenth century) coincided with the almost complete lack of interest in natural philosophy, especially physics and mathematics. The end result was that by the thirteenth century, philosophy increasingly was reduced to metaphysics with the primary tools of its discovery being intuition and mystical experience as opposed to deduction and scientific observation. And so it remained until the modern period when Muslims who engage in scientific discovery use, for the most part, models and paradigms developed by Europeans.

Modern Approaches
For sake of convenience, there are essentially three main trajectories. The first trajectory is that of the “fundamentalists.” Many think that the Qur’an predicts modern science. This approach is based on the assumption that the Qur’an in its nontechnical language actually refers to modern scientific data (e.g., embryology, geology). This is impossible to verify, yet it is taken by the faithful as proof of the authenticity of their religion. A second attempt to bring science and Islam together is based on, for lack of a better term, apologetics. According to this approach, “Western” science has failed to formulate a vision of truth based on revelation; rather, it relies on the rational and secular principles as handed down by the pagan Greeks. The result is the desacralization of knowledge (cf., Nasr, Qadir). Islam, in contrast, presents a sacred worldview and it is the job of “Islamic science” to ascertain this. Proponents of this approach argue that there is such a thing as Islamic science and that it does not subscribe to the theory of evolution. Accordingly, whenever science threatens religion (e.g., evolution), the former must ultimately give way to the latter. Such a dichotomy between “Western” and “Islamic” science is, as should be clear from this entry, based on essentialism and ignores the fact that for much of its history Islamic science was, for all intents and purposes, Western science. The third and final trajectory seems to be the most mainstream; namely, the thousands of Muslim scientists throughout the globe who engage in the ongoing discovery of scientific principles by means of careful and controlled observation.

An image of a fourteenth-century yellow copper astrolabe appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Astrology; Astronomy; Education; Falsafa; Ghazali, al-; Ibn `Arabi; Ibn Khaldun; Ibn Sina; Ikhwan al-Safa; Law; Modernity; Qur’an.

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Aaron Hughes

SECULARISM, ISLAMIC

Islamic secularism is a movement seeking to limit the scope of religious authority, parallel to similar movements in other faith traditions. The limitation may be ideological, as in secularist movements to remove religious authority from state institutions or from social relations; or it may be experiential, as in the encroachment by consumerism and mass media on activities previously regulated by religious authority. Ideological secularism arose in the nineteenth century, when atheists such as Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzada (1812–1878) rejected Islam as inherently incompatible with modern ideals of progress. In the twentieth century, ideological secularism gained adherents among devout progressives as well. Major statements were drafted by Muhammad Husayn Na’ini (1860–1936), who warned against “religious despotism”; ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), who argued for a separation of religious and political authority; and Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939), who called for the “secularization” of worldly matters so as to leave the divine to God.

A generation of military leaders in the middle of the twentieth century, beginning with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938), forcibly secularized many Muslim societies, subjugating religious authority to increasingly intrusive lay
supervision and stripping it of institutions it previously monopolized, such as courts and schools. At the same time, experiential secularism spread in the daily practices of Muslims. For example, alcohol consumption and interest-based bank accounts increased despite widespread prohibition by Islamic authorities. Nonetheless, secularism remains a taboo concept in many Muslim communities, where it is associated with atheism and Western cultural imperialism.

See also Modernism; Modernity; Secularization.

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Charles Kurzman

SECULARIZATION

It is often said that secularization is intimately related to the process by which the Christian West split religion from politics. The origins of this process are traced to Christ’s oft-quoted words: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.” Muslims, in contrast, have fused religion and politics in an attempt to maintain their unique cultural identity worldwide. This approach has endured a checkered history: a period of decline and external domination followed by a recent reassertion of civilizational vigor. Muslim leaders and ruling elites have been preoccupied with the exact nature of state and nation-building, the absorption of social change, and the adjustment to, or backlash against, the processes of secularization by which property, power, and prestige are passed from religious to lay control. Today, the term secularization refers to the overall process by which religious institutions have been deprived of their economic, political, and social influence.

It is important to realize, however, that the great achievements of the West in the economic, scientific, and technological realms, culminating in what is known as globalization, have spread the secular life throughout the world. The opportunities generated by enhanced higher education and mass communications have had profound impact on both women and men of the Muslim world, fostering an awareness of and a debate over new religious rethinking, public life, civil society, religious and ideological tolerance, and individual rights and responsibilities. To small but growing numbers of Muslims, human rights are the expression of the process of secularization.

The secularization process has also led to a religious revivalist backlash in both the Christian and Muslim worlds.

In the Western tradition, religious revivalist movements did not necessarily conflict with secular orientations. In the Muslim world, contrary to the expectations of the first generation of modernization theorists, there has been an upsurge in antisecular movements even in those societies long exposed to modernization (for example, Turkey). Muslim experts have argued that modernization does not have to result in secularization and that modernization is a universal concept over which no single civilization or culture has monopoly. The premise that Muslim countries will inevitably grow more secular as they are exposed to Western notions of rationality and progress is not axiomatic. The secularization process has failed to permeate all aspects of life in the Muslim world; instead, reaction to it has become a major contributor to the social and political resurgence of Islam. While a small group of leaders has adopted a Western secular worldview, the vast majority of Muslims have not adopted secular perspectives.

Islam has not experienced a reformation analogous to that of Protestantism in Western Christianity. Islamic movements have sought to purify Islam of worldly and heretical accretions by reinforcing Islamic authority over society and law. In Western Europe, the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century led to secularization and decreased religious influence. Muslims, instead, gave allegiance to the umma, the community of the faithful as defined by common adherence to faith rather than by political or ethnic boundaries. The notion of the nation-state did not take shape in Muslim thought until the late nineteenth century. Whereas in Europe the secularization process was gradual and proceeded in tandem with socioeconomic growth, in the Muslim world it was treated as an externally imposed blueprint reflecting European imperial interests. While in the Muslim world secularization preceded religious reformation, in the European case it resulted more or less from such reformation.

To understand the secularization process in the Muslim world, it is important to examine the extent to which religious institutions and norms are pervasive in all areas of life. In the majority of Muslim societies, there is not a distinct separation between religion and other aspects of people’s lives. Islam is both din wa dunya (religion and the world). The basic conflict here is not necessarily between religion and the world, as was the case in Christian experience; rather, it is between the forces of tradition and the forces of modernity.

In the Muslim world, secularism resulted entirely from European contact and influence. Many Middle Eastern countries adopted secular legislation, inspired mostly by European models, on a wide range of civil and criminal matters. These laws are now the target of the Islamists’ attack. While conceding the value of Western technology, Islamists question those values and practices associated with modernization, including materialism, consumerism, individualism, and moral laxity.
Contemporary reformists in the Muslim world vehemently resist any institutionalized control by religion over human life, arguing that such dominance fosters absolutist tendencies, destroys the existing intellectual life, and promotes less tolerant and antidemocratic forms of social and political control.

Since the 1970s, as a result of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the key question has become, if the struggle between Islamic reformists and Islamic conservatives is legal or political. Arguably the struggle between the two is both political and legal. Both reformists and conservatives have governed most Muslim countries since they gained independence from Western colonial rule. Emphasizing the separation of religion and politics, these leaders extensively secularized their legal and educational systems. Some nationalists, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Turkey, 1881–1938), Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (Egypt, 1918–1970), and both Reza Shah (Iran, 1878–1944) and Mohammad Reza Shah (Iran, 1919–1980), adopted aggressive secularization methods and programs; others, such as Anwar al-Sadat (Egypt, 1918–1980) and Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto (Pakistan, 1928–1979), manipulated Islamic symbols and pursued a more subtle and circumstantial approach to secularization.

A variety of governments—including monarchies, military dictatorships, and liberal authoritarian regimes—ruled Egypt for most of the twentieth century. They faced occasional challenges and threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations. In both Iran and Turkey, the imposition of a secular state from the top has backfired, resulting in the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and by the brief takeover of political power by an Islamist prime minister in Turkey in 1996. In Algeria, nationalist rule since independence in 1962 has resulted in a bifurcated society like Egypt’s. A secular society and culture for the urban bourgeoisie and intellectuals exist alongside an Islamic culture in the countryside and the urban slums. The abrogation of the 1992 electoral process, which prevented Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Party or FIS) from controlling parliament, has plunged Algeria into a civil war. Secularism is now violently challenged by Islamists.

Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, that country’s leaders have faced different forces vying with each other for political power. In Muslim countries where Islamists have ruled (e.g., Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan), they have failed to find long-term solutions to many contemporary ills. In Afghanistan, the Wahhabist Taliban regime immersed the country in a civil war as well as in a foreign war as a result of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Recent trends throughout the Muslim world point to the emergence of an intense debate over reforming Islam. Women in the Muslim world are beginning to demand greater freedom and to question the restrictive status that cultural traditions have imposed on them. Some Muslim leaders, such as the Tunisian Shaykh Rachid al-Ghannouchi, have demanded an Islamic constitution and resistance to “Westernization.” Others, such as ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush, an Iranian political philosopher, have called for an inward-looking approach to consider the Muslims free and responsible individuals, capable of using their independent judgments. Sorush’s views are capable of revolutionizing Muslim theology and mass religiosity. Neither the lay modernism of the ruling elites nor the rejectionist populism of traditional leaders has been able to offer a sustainable course for the future of the Islamic world. Sorush’s synthesis may stand as a viable alternative. The Muslim world has increasingly become the site of an emerging cultural conflict over “who” controls the process of social change as well as over “whose interests” are really served by change or resistance to it.

See also Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: Iran.

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Mahmood Monshipouri

SELJUQ See Sultanates: Seljuk

SHAFI’I, AL- (C. 767–820)

Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, the jurisprudent, was probably born in ‘Asqalan (Ashkelon) in Palestine. He was a pure Arab on both sides, and on his father’s side he was a third cousin, six times removed, to the Prophet. He grew up in Mecca and northern Arabia and became renowned for his
archery and Arabic as well as law. He is said to have studied under Malik ibn Anas in Medina for as long as ten years and later debated with al-Shaybani in Baghdad. He emigrated to Old Cairo about six years before his death there. Accounts vary as to how he died: of an illness; from the after-effects of a beating at the hands of aggrieved adherents of the Malikite school, one of whom he had denounced to the governor for insulting him in the course of a debate; or from a beating by adherents of the Mu'tazili theology.

Writers of the later Shafi’i school distinguish between Shafi’i’s early teaching (al-qadim), in Iraq, and his later (al-jadid), in Egypt. Nine or ten short works on jurisprudence are extant, as many as half of which may be early; otherwise, the early teaching is lost except for scattered quotations. The later works that survive are the Risala (Epistle), an exposition of how to infer ordinances from the evidence of revelation; the Umm (Guidance), a large, systematic collection of ordinances; and the rest of the short works. Two large works sometimes published in his name, a substantial collection of hadith and a collection of ordinances from the Qur’an, are later extracts from known works. Other works (statements of his creed, comments on asceticism) are likely pseudonymous.

At the level of theory (usul al-fiqh), medieval Muslim commentators credit Shafi’i with reconciling the two great early approaches to discerning the law, namely hadith and ra’y, traditionalism and rationalism. The traditionalists proposed to base Islamic law entirely on what had been transmitted from the earliest generations, especially hadith reports of what the Prophet had said and done. The rationalists allowed more play to reason and sometimes, when it came to revelation, argued for reliance on the Qur’an to the exclusion of hadith. With the traditionalists, on the one hand, Shafi’i’s Risala argues for reliance on revelation before reason and for hadith as a necessary complement to the Qur’an. On the other hand, with the rationalists, it proposes a sophisticated system of manipulating the revealed texts to justify the law.

One of Shafi’i’s greatest accomplishments was to systematize analogical reasoning. According to Shafi’i, the jurisprudent looks for a strictly defined condition common to known and unknown cases, concerning which there is a certain ruling from elsewhere in Qur’an or hadith. So, for example, the Qur’an expressly forbids grape wine; the reason (ma’na in Shafi’i’s exposition, ‘illa in the later tradition of usul al-fiqh) is that it intoxicates (not, say, that it is red or imported from Byzantine territory); date wine also intoxicates; therefore, date wine also is forbidden.

Later writers in the Shafi’i tradition argued expressly that the law had basically four sources, meaning four sorts of evidence by which the jurisprudent discerned God’s will: Qur’an, hadith, consensus, and analogy. However, Lowry has shown that the Risala itself ultimately recognizes only two sources, Qur’an and hadith. For Shafi’i, analogy is just a means toward understanding the application of Qur’an and hadith. His concept of consensus is fairly undeveloped. However, as made explicit by later tradition, consensus does not invent new ordinances but rather rests on data from the Qur’an and hadith lost to later generations but known to the Companions of the Prophet, who could scarcely have agreed unanimously without the hardest evidence.

Among modern writers, Schacht stresses an argument Shafi’i made expressly in two of the short works: that local custom, hadith from experts of the previous centuries, and common sense are always outweighed by hadith from the Prophet. (The Risala assumes without discussion that only hadith from the Prophet have weight.) Calder (1983) finds that the Risala legitimizes disagreement among jurisprudents by distinguishing between simple questions whose answers all Muslims know and abstruse questions only experts can address and whose answers even they can know only probably, not certainly. Adherents of all schools from the tenth century onwards legitimated disagreement in roughly the same way, although it is hard to say to what extent Shafi’i’s arguments were what caused the theory to spread. Hallaq argues that just because it sought a middle course between traditionalism and rationalism, well in advance of majority opinion, the Risala attracted little attention until the tenth century.

The Umm as we know it manifestly includes some interpolations by later authors. Calder (1993) proposes that the Risala and the Umm (and implicitly the other extant works of Shafi’i as well) are primarily the work of later disciples writing in Shafi’i’s name. Among other things, Calder argues that these works appeal to prophetic hadith (as opposed to the opinions of earlier jurisprudents) in the fashion of other works from the early tenth century, not from the early ninth. Calder’s opinion has not commanded wide assent, but the question of attribution remains open.

A Shafi’i school of law was constituted when, first, Shafi’i’s doctrine had been collected and organized and, second, a regular procedure had been developed for training and certifying new Shafi’i jurisprudents. The two came together with Ibn Surayj (863–918) in Baghdad. He trained his advanced students with the Mukhtasar (Epitome) of al-Muzani, Shafi’i’s most important Egyptian disciple. The other surviving schools of law formed similarly over the course of the tenth century. The Shafi’i school is distinguished by the acuity of its juridical reasoning, so that writing about the theory of Islamic law was long dominated by Shafi’i jurists, although doubtless their preponderance will appear to diminish as more and more non-Shafi’i works are studied. Outside North Africa, the Shafi’i and Hanafi schools for centuries almost divided the Islamic world between them. At the end of the Middle Ages, however, the Hanafi school was favored by Turkish rulers from the Ottoman Empire to the Mogul, so the Shafi’i school is now predominant only on the edges of the Islamic world, as in Indonesia, Yemen, and East Africa.
SHAH  See Monarchy.

See also Law; Madhhab.

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Christopher Melchert

SHAL'TUTT, MAHMUD (1893–1963)

Mahmud Shaltut was an Egyptian religious scholar, jurist, and reformer of al-Azhar, the renowned center of Islamic learning in Cairo. Born in a farming village of lower Egypt, Shaltut distinguished himself as a student in the principal religious institute of Alexandria and later at al-Azhar. He became an instructor of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) at al-Azhar in 1927. The following year, the reform-minded Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi was appointed shaykh al-Azhar (rector), and Shaltut immediately emerged as one of his ardent supporters. When conservative opposition forced al-Maraghi out of office the following year, Shaltut continued pressing for reform. Because of his opposition, he was dismissed from al-Azhar in 1931. Upon al-Maraghi’s reappointment as rector in 1935, he returned as a senior official in the faculty of Islamic law. Following service in numerous committees and conferences inside and outside of al-Azhar, Shaltut was appointed shaykh al-Azhar in 1958. During his tenure, Shaltut oversaw a modernization of the school’s curriculum in theology and law, and the addition of new faculties, including medicine. His influence, however, was undermined when the Nasser government imposed direct state control over al-Azhar in 1961. The progressive bent to Shaltut’s thought is best exemplified in his condemnation of Islamic sectarianism and his appointment of scholars of Shi‘ite fiqh at al-Azhar. But on social issues such as polygyny and birth control, he adopted more conservative positions that were at odds with government reform programs.

See also Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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Sobail H. Hashmi

SHĀRĪ‘A

Often translated as “Islamic law” the shari‘a is better understood as the path of correct conduct that God has revealed through his messengers, particularly the prophet Muhammad. The earliest sources indicate its meaning as a “way of belief,” either Muslim or non-Muslim, and it was used to translate the word Torāb into Arabic. Jurists tend to prefer the term fiqh (understanding) in their books on jurisprudence, leaving shari‘a as a general term. Intention (niyya) to fulfill one’s duty to God is often as important as the act itself, and every action should be conceived as worshipping God.

This focus on God extended to a medieval institutionalization of the shari‘a that limited human authority. Even today, there is no central authority for matters of Islamic law in Sunni Islam (some Shi‘ites have developed authority structures), and Muslims may seek advice from a number of different authorities (muftis) before making up their mind. Further, actions are assigned one of five “shari‘a values” (ahkāms); between required and forbidden are: recommended, indifferent, and disapproved. These valuations have led some to describe shari‘a as ethics rather than as law. Arguably, postcolonial legal institutions have utterly changed the Muslim’s relationship to shari‘a, both by codifying the law and by replacing shari‘a courts.

Shari‘a in Western discourse has come to signify Islam as moribund or authoritarian, perhaps reflecting Christian presumptions of a distinction between law and gospel. Rhetorical use is also found among Muslim intellectuals, some of whom urge a “return” to shari‘a focusing primarily on issues of public dress and ritual conduct, but also invoking the idea of the shari‘a as a total way of life.

See also Law.

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Shari‘at-Shangalaji, Reza-Qoli


Jonathan E. Brockopp

**SHARI‘ATI, ‘ALI (1933–1977)**

Born in 1933 in the province of Khorasan, northeast of Iran, ‘Ali Shari‘ati died in 1977 in London of natural causes. His intellectual disposition was formed in early adulthood through his involvement with the Center for the Propagation of Islamic Truths, an educational and advocacy institute founded by his father, and later with the movement God-Worshiping Socialists. Both organizations advocated a reformist Islam, the goal of which was to liberate religion from its “regressive” and “passive” outlook and to promote social justice. Shari‘ati never received any traditional seminarian education. He earned a bachelor’s degree in French from Mashad University in 1958 and received his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1963. His residence in Paris in the early 1960s and his exposure to African anticolonial movements and their French intellectual advocates proved to be significant in the development of his Islamic worldview.

Shari‘ati formulated an Islamic *Weltanschauung* in his most celebrated book *Islam-shenasi* (Islamology), published in 1969. He identified a dynamic and progressive “true Islam” of Imam ‘Ali (Alavid Shi‘ism) and distinguished it from the petrified institutionalized Islam of the clergy (Safavid Islam). Through a revisionist genealogy of Islamic concepts and ideas, he articulated a philosophy of history and social change that he believed would appeal to young modern Iranian intellectuals. He conceived his Islamic *Weltanschauung* as a counter hegemonic ideology against the “trinity of oppression”—the economic power of capitalism, the coercive political power of monarchy, and the cultural dominance of the Safavid Islam. Although Shari‘ati came to be known as the ideologue of the Iranian revolution par excellence, his ideas remained marginal to the state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam in postrevolutionary Iran.

*See also Reform: Iran.*

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Bebrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi

**SHARIF**

The word *sharif* is derived from the Arabic root “to be noble, hightborn.” *Sharif* is an honorific term that has a variety of meanings in Muslim usage, and the word is related in meaning to *sayyid.* *Ashraf* (the plural form of *sharif*), like *sadat* (or *sada,* the plural form of *sayyid*), are subject to special rules in Islamic law. One meaning, that of a descendant of the Prophet, is perhaps the most common, and specifically it often indicates descent through the line of al-Hasan, the Prophet’s grandson. Muslim genealogists differ in their definition of *sharif* (as they do over *sayyid*). Some define *sharif* in a broad manner (including, for example, descendants of the Prophet’s cousins); others are stricter, limiting the term to descendants of Muhammad through Hasan, the older son of the Prophet’s daughter (Fatima) and her husband, ‘Ali. The two extremes only roughly correspond to the Sunni or Shi‘ite proclivities. For example, *ashraf* are prohibited from receiving the alms (*zakat*), though in Shi‘ite law they are compensated by being the sole recipient of the one-fifth tax (*khums*). Some hadith portray the *ashraf* as guaranteed a place in heaven, and others exhort the community to show them respect and honor. Some commentators have argued that these stipulations are not nullified, even if the individual is a sinner. The governor of Mecca (who was always a descendant of the Prophet) was known as *al-sharif* during the Ottoman period.

*See also Sayyid.*

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**SHARI‘AT-SHANGALAJI, REZA-QOLI (1890–1943)**

A reformist Iranian theologian during the secularizing reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, Reza-Qoli Shari‘at-Shangalaji was considered a heretic by his religious peers for his attempts to modernize and reform Islam in Iran. He supported Twelve Shi‘ism: namely, the existence of free will in human beings, the infallibility of the imam, and the idea that the twelfth, or current, imam is hidden from the world and will emerge again. However, he also advocated the use of scientific thought in Islam and the pursuit of social justice, and may have been an admirer of Wahhabism, which was hostile to Shi‘ism. His main suggestion, to use *ijtihad* (discourse) for the purposes of reform in order to get rid of *taqlid* (conservatism), was rejected as too secular by the religious leaders of the Iranian ulema, who were conservative and already felt under attack by Reza Shah’s own secularizing and authoritarian reforms. After Reza Shah’s fall from power, they reestablished control and reinstated strict Islamic law in Iran. Shangalaji’s reformist thought was subsequently
declared heretical and ignored, particularly under the current, fundamentalist regime, which advocates traditional interpretations of Muslim law and opposes reform. Since his death, Shangalaji’s ideas have fallen into obscurity.

See also Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlewi; Reform: Iran; Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver).

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SHAYKH AL-ISLAM

Before the rise to power of the Ottomans and Safavids, shaykh al-Islam (pl. shuyukh al-Islam) was, in general, an honorific title given to the leading scholar (or at times, spiritual Sufi master) in a particular locality. During the Ottoman and Safavid dynasties, it evolved into an official administrative position. The shaykh al-Islam was responsible for government control of education (through the madrasa system) and law (through the courts), and therefore, for the purposes of legitimacy, had to be a legally trained and well-respected scholar. His fatwa (opinion), though technically nonbinding on a judge (qadi), held the force of government policy. In the Ottoman Empire, the great shaykh al-Islam Ebuz-Su‘ud (Ar. Abu l-Su‘ud, d. 1574) acted, not only as a powerful influence over the sultan in terms of policy, but also enforced the primacy of Hanafi legal doctrine within the empire. Ottoman shuyukh al-Islam were known as the “Mufti” of the empire, and while others were able to give fatwas, it was their legal opinions that (at least officially) were authoritative. Within the Safavid Empire, shuyukh al-Islam such as Mohammad Baqer Sabzawari (d. 1679) and Mohammad Baqer Majlesi (d. 1699) were renowned as scholars rather than policy makers, though they too clearly had official responsibilities which included presiding over the coronation ceremony of a new shah. The shuyukh al-Islam formed a network of government-appointed figures in Safavid Iran, and functioned as a means of enforcing a legal unity over a diverse and often fractious population.

The post of shaykh al-Islam survived in both the Ottoman Empire and Iran into the nineteenth century, though with a reduced significance. The Afshar, Zand, and Qajar dynasties of Iran certainly appointed shuyukh al-Islam, though these were rarely major figures within the religious establishment. In Iran, the post seems to have died out in the late nineteenth century. The shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul continued to be appointed, though there too the post was rarely held by renowned or dynamic scholars. It was abolished, as were all the trappings of the Ottoman caliphate, in 1924.

See also Empires: Ottoman; Empires: Safavid and Qajar.

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SHAYKHIYYA

Shaykhiyya was a nineteenth-century Iranian, mystical, sectarian movement within Shi‘ism that was inspired by Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa‘i, an eighteenth-century cleric who originally came from the Arabian peninsula. It was more popular with the common people, who found it more accessible and vital than its rival Shi‘ite schools, Usulism and Akhbarism. It emphasized gaining gnostic knowledge through the love of God, in addition to the dry, legalistic study of the Qur’an and hadiths and rigid traditionalism advocated by the other two schools. Shaykhiyya espoused the concept that the twelfth imam (descendant of the prophet Muhammad) of Shi‘ite Islam had gone into hiding from humankind and remains in “occultation” until he returns shortly before the end of the world. The “Fourth Principle” of Shaykhiyya (rokn-e rahi) envisaged a “perfect Shi‘a,” the only person on Earth who could become aware (through mystical intuition) of the Hidden Imam while he was in occultation. Shaykh Ahmad did not claim this role for himself, but the followers of his chief successor, Sayyid Kazim Rashti, believed that Rashti was the perfect Shi‘a of his time. Rashti formed much of the basic organization of Shaykhiyya as a school of thought.

Shaykh Ahmad (1753–1826), one of the last great Muslim philosophers before the influx of European thought, was a gentle man of paradox who enjoyed both the patronage of the court of the Qajar Shah in Tehran and the love of the masses, yet refused an official position for fear that he might lose touch with the common people. Originally from Bahrain, he spent the last twenty years of his life in Iran. He considered himself an orthodox Shi‘ite who was hostile to Sufism, yet inspired a movement that incorporated many elements of Sufi thought. Shaykh Ahmad emphasized the necessity for a religious leader to combine mystical revelation with traditional jurisprudence. His philosophy, influenced by visions of the prophet Muhammad, numerology, rigorous study of Muslim law, and the religious thought of his native Bahrain, inspired the movement that bore his name after his death. The movement was influenced heavily by its founder’s fascination with myth and gnostic thought (irfan). Though Ahmad was a mystic, and held many beliefs similar to the Sufis’, he attacked them as anti-Shi‘ite Sunnis with pantheistic tendencies and criticized them for claiming authority that only the

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imams should have, though the ultimate authority belonged to the prophet Muhammad. After Ahmad's death, his followers used the Sufi ideal of the Perfect Person to formulate the concept of the Perfect Shi'a. This person could be used as an authority because he had received mystical knowledge from God, in addition to his study of Muslim law. In a way, Shaykh-iyya later became a form of Sufism untouched by Sunni influence, eventually inspiring Babi and Baha’ism. The Perfect Shi’a did not take precedence, however, over the imams, who were exalted to a higher degree than in the past. This reflected the chaos in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Shi’ism, caused by external forces, and which created an increased need for tradition and a central authority to follow. Instead, Shaykh-iyya, like its founder, attempted to strike a balance between the dry legalism of pure jurisprudence and the uncontrolled (in their eyes) individualistic esotericism of the Sufis, though it did not always succeed. Two branches of Shaykh-iyya have survived in Tabriz and Kerman. The activities of the Shaykhis of Kerman were suppressed under the Islamic Republic of Iran.

See also Shi’a: Early; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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SHI’A

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Farhad Daftary
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Robert Gleave

EARLY
The Shi’a were originally the “partisans” of ‘Ali, cousin of Muhammad’s cousin and husband of the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima. Today, however, the label designates a number of distinct groups that have arisen over the course of Islamic history and which are united by a belief that the leader (caliph or imam) of the Muslim community (umma) should be a member of the Prophet’s family (ahl al-bayt). The Shi’a include the Twelvers, second largest of all the Muslim sects (the largest being the Sunni). Other Shi’a groups include the Zaydis, Khoja Isma’ils, and Bohra Isma’ils, who taken together, represent more than ten percent of the world Muslim population.

The First Fitna
The Shi’a first formed an identifiable movement in Islamic history during the First Civil War (fitna), which tore the Muslim community apart between 656 and 661 C.E. According to Shi’i doctrine, ‘Ali was meant to assume leadership of the community upon the Prophet’s death in 632. Tradition holds that the Prophet designated his cousin as heir in a speech made at Ghadir Khumm on the way back from Muhammad’s farewell pilgrimage, made shortly before his death. However, the jealousy and ambition of the Prophet’s other principal Companions (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman) prevented him from assuming that post. Abu Bakr was the first, serving as leader from 632 to 634. He was followed by ‘Umar (634–644), and finally by ‘Uthman (644–656).

‘Uthman’s enemies accused him of complicity in ‘Uthman’s assassination, because he showed little interest in pursuing the conspirators and in fact had close ties with some of them, including his step-son Muhammad b. Abu Bakr. Protest against ‘Ali sparked a major war, pitting ‘Ali’s supporters, who were centered in the garrison town of Kufa, in Iraq, against opposition forces based in Basra and Syria. In 656, ‘Ali’s forces met those of ‘A’isha and her co-generals, Talha and al-Zubayr, just outside Basra, in what came to be known as the Battle of the Camel, because ‘A’isha joined the fray in an armored palanquin mounted on her camel, ‘Askar.

‘Ali’s forces were victorious. Talhah and al-Zubayr were killed, and ‘A’isha was captured and returned to Medina in shame. The tide turned against ‘Ali the following year, however, with the battle of Siffin in the Syrian desert. ‘Ali lost this battle after his deputy bungled arbitration with the agent of Mu’awiya, the governor of Damascus. A large group of ‘Ali’s supporters, angered that he had submitted to arbitration, left his cause. Known as the Kharijii “deserters,” they became bitter enemies of ‘Ali.

‘Ali retreated to Kufa, but rallied sufficiently to defeat a Khariji army at Nahrawan in 658. In 661, ‘Ali fell to the blows of a Khariji assassin in Kufa. ‘Ali’s supporters recognized his eldest son Hasan as their leader, but Hasan soon entered into a truce with Mu’awiya and renounced his claim to the Caliphate. Thus, the First Civil War ended.
Shi' i Imams

1. 'Ali (d. 661)
(by Fatima)
2. Hasan (d. 669)
3. Husayn (d. 680)
(by Fatima)
4. 'Ali Zaydi (d. 714)
(Zayn al-'Abidin)
(by Hanafi woman)
5. Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 731)
Muhammad b. al-Hanifiyya (d. 700)
6. Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765)
Abu Hashim (d. 716)
7. Muhammad al-Mahdi (d. 775)
Muhammad (d. 740)

The Abbasid Caliphs

The Fatimid Caliphs

The Qarmatians

The "Twelver" or Imami Shi'a

**Shi’a Under the Umayyads**

The Muslim community was united under one regime, for Mu’awiya became caliph of the entire community by default. The capital was moved to Damascus, and when Mu’awiya designated his son Yazid as heir, the Umayyad dynasty (661–750) was established. Doctrinally, however, the Muslim community remained divided into three main groups, ‘Ali’s supporters (the Shi’a), enemies of ‘Ali who had originally supported him but renounced their allegiance at Siffin (the Kharijijis), and the main body of his opponents, the Umayyads and their supporters.

Throughout Umayyad rule, the Shi’a engaged in periodic uprisings against what they viewed as the illegitimate caliphs, revolting in the name of various members of al-bayt. The most famous of these incidents is the revolt of Husayn, ‘Ali’s second son, upon the death of Mu’awiya and the accession of his son Yazid in the year 680. Husayn was summoned to Kufa to lead a revolt. He set out from Medina with a small contingent, but Umayyad forces halted him in the Iraqi desert, preventing him from reaching his supporters in Kufa. Rather than surrender, Husayn and his followers fought. Most were slaughtered, and Husayn’s head was delivered to Yazid in Damascus. The martyrdom of Husayn and his followers is still retold and re-enacted by the Shi’a on ‘Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram, which is the first month of the Islamic calendar.

Four years after Husayn’s death, a faction among the Kufan Shi’a arose in revolt. This group became known as al-Tawwabun (the penitents), a name that reflected their dedication to the cause of Husayn and their regret they had failed to come to his aid. In 686, Mukhtar al-Thaqafi led an initially successful revolt in the name of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya, a son of ‘Ali, holding Kufa in 686–687. In 740, Zayd, a grandson of Husayn, led a new revolt in southern Iraq, but was defeated and killed. ‘Abd Allah b. Mu’awiya, a great-grandson of Muhammad’s cousin Ja’far, led yet another insurrection (744–747).

**Shi’a and the Abbasids**

The Abbasid revolution that toppled the Umayyads in 750 began, in part, as a Shi’a movement, adopting the slogan al-rida min al-bayt “the acceptable candidate from the family of the Prophet.” Upon victory, a descendant of the Prophet’s uncle ‘Abbas assumed rule as caliph. In a clear pro-Shi’a move, the new dynasty established their capital in Iraq, first at Wasit, then at Baghdad, which was founded in 761.

The Abbasids, however, soon turned on their Shi’a allies, and eventually took over the Umayyads’ role as illegitimate rulers and the nemesis of Shi’a aspirations. Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, “the Pure Soul,” led a Shi’ite revolt against the Abbasids as early as 762, and the Abbasid period would witness countless more revolts in the name of various descendants of ‘Ali. Attempts at reconciliation were short-lived, the most notable being al-Ma’mun’s appointment of ‘Ali al-Rida, the eighth Imam of the Twelver Shi’a line, as his successor in 816.

**Shi’a and Sunni: A Comparison**

An untenable distinction is often made between the Sunni caliph, seen as a purely political authority, and the Shi’a imam, seen as a religious authority. In the early period, the titles imam and caliph referred, at least potentially, to the same office and authority. The goal behind the Shi’a revolts against the Umayyads and Abbasids was to depose what was considered to be the illegitimate leader of the community and to replace him with a legitimate one. Both for the Shi’a and their opponents, the Shi’ite Imam was always a potential counter-caliph. Whether chosen from the descendants of ‘Ali or from another line, the caliph was held to be both a religious and political authority even by the Sunni, and was called imam as well as sabih badha al-amr (“the one in charge”).

In the first Islamic century, there can hardly have been any other identifiable religious authorities; jurists, theologians, and others did not gain influence until later. An indication of the caliphs’ religious authority is the fact that their decisions often became enshrined in Islamic law. An example of this can be found in the “Conditions of ‘Umar,” restrictions on the abl al-dhimma imposed by the second caliph, ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (or possibly the Umayyad ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz). These “Conditions” provide the basis for many of the laws that govern the status of Jews and Christians in Islam.

Another popular misconception is that Sunnism is the original form of Islam, from which the Shi’a deviated. In the beginning, the opponents of the Shi’a were not Sunnis, properly speaking, but adherents to what might be termed Umayyad Islam. Sunni Islam is a compromise position between Shi’ite and Umayyad Islam, and could only have come into existence some time after the advent of the Abbasids. This may be seen succinctly in the Sunni phrase al-khulafa’ al-rashidun (lit. the “rightly guided caliphs”), which indicates approval of all the first four caliphs. The Umayyads revered the first three caliphs, but ‘Ali was anathema to them. They reportedly instituted a practice of cursing him from the pulpit in Friday prayer. The Shi’a, however, revered ‘Ali but de-tested or disapproved of the first three caliphs. The Sunni approval of all four could only have developed at a much later date, as an attempt to reconcile the two opposing positions.

**Rival Factions within the Shi’a Community**

Conflict over leadership of the Muslim community and over succession among rival Shi’i claimants to the imamate gave rise to theological doctrines and concepts that would remain important throughout Islamic history. In the course of the eighth century the Shi’a developed the doctrines of the imam’s ‘isma, meaning “infallibility” or “divine protection from sin,” and nass, the explicit and divinely sanctioned designation of the imam by his predecessor. The ghulat (extremists) developed more exaggerated forms of reverence for various claimants to the imamate, including beliefs that...
the imam did not die but went into occultation (ghayba) or that he would return (raj’ā) as a messianic figure (mahdi) before the apocalypse. Others claimed that the imam shared in prophetic authority, had status equal to that of the Prophet, possessed divine qualities, or manifested divinity through divine infusion (buhut). Some of these extreme concepts, particularly occultation, would become standard doctrine in the main divisions of the Shi’a in later centuries.

A second set of issues had to do with the status of the Prophet’s Companions. In order to bolster the legitimacy of ‘Ali, the Shi’ites used hadith reports and historical accounts concerning the first three caliphs, ‘Aisha, and many other Companions to impugn their characters, casting them as sinners, incompetent leaders, or outright unbelievers. The Sunnis, used similar accounts to uphold the view that the Companions were all exemplary. The Shi’ite position, while certainly exaggerated over time, readily admits the seriousness of the conflicts that wracked the early Muslim community, while Sunni historiography has often endeavored to cover them up or explain them away.

A seventeenth-century fresco depicting Iman Shab Zaid is represented in the volume two color insert.

See also Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Umayyad; Shi’at: Imami (Twelver); Succession.

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Devin J. Stewart

IMAMI (TWELVER)

The term Ithna ‘Ashari (“Twelver”) or Imami refers to the denomination of Shi’ism to which the majority of Shi’a worldwide adhere. Characteristic of Twelver Shi’ism is recognition of the authority of twelve successive imams (spiritual leaders) who were members or descendants of abl al-bayt (the prophet Muhammad’s immediate family). Their authority is said to have been transmitted over time via the lineage of Muhammad’s daughter Fatima and her husband, ‘Ali. Also characteristic of Twelver Shi’ism is an emotional attachment to abl al-bayt that manifests itself in annual rituals commemorating the battlefield death of the imam Husayn, grandson of Muhammad.

Twelver Shi’ism identifies the first imam as Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib. According to Shi’a tradition, the Prophet, shortly before his own death, publicly announced the selection of ‘Ali as his successor. But ‘Ali was blocked repeatedly from power. He did not contest the election of the first three caliphs, apparently out of a desire to avoid civil war. Finally, ‘Ali did obtain the caliphate and ruled for five years, only to be murdered in 661 C.E.

In Twelver Shi’ism the term imam indicates those members of abl al-bayt who are the true spiritual leaders of the Muslim community regardless of any political recognition or lack thereof extended by the Islamic world at large. After ‘Ali, the imamate passed to his sons, Hasan and Husayn successively.

The martyrdom of the third imam, Husayn, during the second civil war in 680 is the most decisive event in Shi’ite history. At Karbala, near the Euphrates River, he was intercepted and surrounded by forces loyal to the Umayyad caliph, Yazid. During the initial days of the month of Muharram the
imam Husayn and his followers withstood siege by Yazid’s army, which hoped to force the small band to surrender. Husayn chose death instead. On ‘Ashura, the tenth of Muharram, Husayn was killed, his household taken captive. The train of captives, including Husayn’s sister Zaynab and his son ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin, was marched through the desert to Damascus.

Husayn’s death at Karbala marks the beginning of the transformation of Shi’ism from a political movement to a distinctive religious tradition within Islam. His death is viewed by devout Shi’as as a sacrifice that benefits believers. In exchange for the suffering voluntarily undergone by Husayn and the other Karbala martyrs, God has granted them shafa’at (the power of intercession). Intercession is granted especially to those believers who earn savab (religious merit) by mourning Husayn during Muharram.

The centuries following Husayn’s death saw the gradual emergence of distinctive Shi’ite communities, not only in southern Iraq, the site of the imam’s martyrdom, but also in Lebanon, Syria, and parts of South Asia. To this day various localities in India and Pakistan commemorate Husayn’s death with an annual “Horse of Karbala” procession. Mourners parade a riderless stallion caparisoned to represent Zuljenah, the horse ridden by Husayn at Karbala. The horse’s appearance acts as a stimulus to rituals of lamentation, the performance of which earns participants savab.

Twelver Shi’as recognize as the fifth imam Muhammad al-Baqir (d. c. 735), the son of the fourth imam, ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin. Like his father, al-Baqir avoided confrontation with the reigning caliphate. He promulgated the doctrine of nass (“designation”): guided by God, each imam designates the person who is to be his successor as spiritual leader of the Muslim community. Thus the imamate is not a matter of human choice or self-assertion. This doctrine countered the activities of al-Baqir’s half-brother Zayd b. ‘Ali, who attracted the support of militants impatient with al-Baqir’s political passivity. Zayd led an uprising against the reigning Umayyad government in Kufa and was killed there in the fighting in 740.

The political engagement characteristic of Zaydi Shi’ism was countered by Ja’far al-Sadiq (d. 765), the sixth imam in the Twelver tradition. Like his father al-Baqir, he espoused an accommodationist attitude toward the caliphal authorities. Also like his father, he advocated the doctrine of nass, thereby delegitimizing rival claimants to leadership of the Shi’ite community. Some Muslim scholars trace to his imamate the doctrine of taqiyya (“dissimulation”), which permits Shi’as threatened with persecution to conceal their denominational identity as followers of the imams. These teachings fostered in the Imami community a political quietism that furthered their survival as a religious minority under the Sunni caliphs.

Ja’far al-Sadiq was also renowned as a scholar of law (for this reason the body of legal lore in Twelver Shi’ism is referred to as the Ja’fari tradition). Additionally, he is credited with having further defined the qualifications for the imamate in terms of the concept of ‘ilm (knowledge). The imams are said to be the most knowledgeable of all humankind in matters pertaining to religious law, the principles governing conduct in this life and rewards and punishments in the next, and the realm of the unseen. In particular the imams’ knowledge extends to scripture. They understand both the zabir (the external or literal meaning) and the batin (the hidden significance) of the Qur’an. The batin is accessed via ta’wil, an interpretive process that applies allegory and symbolism to the scriptural text.

A turning point came in Shi’ite history with the death of Hasan al-‘Askari, the eleventh imam (d. 874). Skeptics in the Muslim community claimed that Hasan had died without leaving behind a son as leader of the Shi’as. But Imami doctrine asserts that Hasan did in fact have a son, named Abu al-Qasim Muhammad, and it explains the circumstance that Muhammad was unknown to his contemporaries by invoking the ancient concept of ghayba (occultation). To protect the twelfth imam from his persecutors, God concealed the young man from the world at large. The period from 874 to 941 is known as the Lesser Occultation. From concealment this “Hidden Imam” provided guidance to his community through a series of agents, who met with him and conveyed his directives to the world.

The period from 941 to the present day is known as the Greater Occultation. No longer are there agents who confer with the Hidden Imam directly or transmit his instructions to the faithful. Nevertheless he is alive and will return to earth one day as the Mahdi, “the rightly guided by God,” when he will purge the earth of all the injustice that has stained it since the time when ‘Ali, Husayn, and the other members of ahl al-bayt were first denied the political recognition to which they were entitled. For this reason the twelfth imam is called al-Muntazar (“the Awaited One”), for Imami Shi’ite belief looks hopefully to the Mahdi’s return as the inauguration of the Day of Judgment.

Imami folklore includes tales that indicate that the twelfth imam dwells among us, invisibly present but capable of manifesting himself to individuals in moments of need. Iraqi Shi’as in the 1990s who had returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca recounted to this author stories of hajj-sightings. Elderly people who had been knocked to the ground and nearly trampled in the pilgrim-crowds told of how they had been rescued by “a tall youthful man of radiant appearance” who subsequently vanished. Surely, they argued, this had been the Hidden Imam.

The net effect of Twelver belief concerning the Mahdi was to strengthen the accommodationist attitude already prevalent among the Imami Shi’as. Desires for social justice, for radical changes in the worldly order, and for the restoration of the caliphal throne to ahl al-bayt were linked to the
concept of intizar: “expectation,” the passive awaiting of the Mahdi’s return at the end of time.

Twelver theology underwent further elaboration with the creation of the Safavid dynasty in Iran beginning in 1501 under Shah Isma’il. This monarch established Imami Shi’ism as Iran’s state religion. The Safavid clash frequently with the neighboring empire of the Ottoman Turks, whose sultans arrogated to themselves the title of caliph, with its implications of universal Islamic sovereignty. The settlement of the caliphate in Istanbul from the sixteenth century sharpened Sunni-Shi’a tensions as a religious expression of international political rivalries.

Theological developments during the Safavid era (sixteenth-eighteenth centuries) reflected the Iranian clergy’s desire to heighten adherence to Shi’ite communal identity in lands under the shah’s dominion. This is reflected in the writings of the celebrated ‘alim (religious scholar) Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (d. 1698). In a work called Bībar al-anwar (The oceans of lights) he assembled numerous Shi’ite hadiths so as to justify the linkage of popular ritual practices with a distinctively Imami soteriology. For example, in a chapter of the Bībar entitled “The Ways in Which God Informed His Prophets of the Forthcoming Martyrdom of Husayn,” Majlisi emphasized the predestinarian quality of the seventh-century Shi’ite imams by collecting in the Rawdat al-shuhada (The garden of the martyrs), which was written by Husayn Wa’iz al-Kashifī (d. 1504). “Paradise is awarded to anyone,” argues Kashifī, “who weeps for Husayn for the following reason, that every year, when the month of Muharram comes, a multitude of the lovers of the family of the Prophet renews and makes fresh the tragedy of the martyrs.”

“Lovers of the family of the Prophet”: Here Kashifī defines the community of believers not in terms of doctrine but in terms of emotional disposition and ritual activity. His description suggests an important aspect of Imami Shi’ite identity. At the popular level, from the premodern era through the twenty-first century, Twelver Shi’ites tend to define themselves as those Muslims who excel beyond all others in their love for the Prophet’s family and for the Prophet’s descendants, the imams. This affection is expressed annually in the action of matam (displays of grief for the Karbala martyrs).

Safavid-era ulema such as Majlisi developed a predestinarian theology of voluntary suffering, ritual commemoration, and intercession as a reward for mourners. They also campaigned vehemently and sometimes violently against Sufi shaykhs and the tariqat (mystical associations) that were under the direction of the Sufi masters. Twelver ulema condemned Sufism as heterodox out of a recognition that popular devotion to the shaykhs and visits to the tombs of Sufi saints threatened to compete with the forms of piety administered by the clerical hierarchy, namely, devotion to the twelve imams and pilgrimage to shrines associated with the imams.

Persecution of Sufis, however, did not preclude Sufi influence on Imami Shi’ism. Such influence can be seen in the later Safavid era with the flourishing of the “School of Isfahan,” which is associated with Mulla Sadra (d. 1640). The school of Isfahan pursued the study of Hekmat-e elabi (“divine wisdom”), a discipline that combined formal training in Qur’anic studies and related Islamic sciences with rational philosophic inquiry and the cultivation of the direct and unmediated personal experience of divine reality. Hekmat-e elabi traces its origin to Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191), who in works such as Hikmat al-isbraq (The wisdom of illuminationist dawning) envisioned intellectual studies as the propaedeutic to mystical ascension and encounters with the sacred. In the Twelver tradition this intellectual-mystical approach to learning is linked to the term ‘irfan (“gnosis”: the seeking after of experiential and participatory knowledge of the patterns governing the cosmos). The term carries political implications. With the decline of centralized governmental authority in the later Safavid and Qajar eras (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries), the ulema acquired ever more temporal power. A spiritual elitism evolved in which at least some clerics were willing to accord the highest rank to the scholar-cum-mystic: the perfected Gnostic, the theosopher-king. This illuminationist strand in Imami theology culminated in the twentieth century with the founding of Iran’s Islamic Republic under Ruhollah Khomeini.

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The declining power of the Safavid shahs was accompanied by the increasing importance in the public realm of the Usuli form of Shi‘ite jurisprudence. One way to understand Usulism is as a refutation of traditional Imami Shi‘ite attitudes toward governance. Imami theology argued that since the only legitimate government is that administered by the perfect and sinless imam, during the imam’s occultation all forms of earthly government are necessarily imperfect and sinful. Many traditionalist Shi‘as therefore avoided engagement with worldly politics, preferring to await the Hidden Imam’s return as the Mahdi. Usuli jurisprudence, however, granted to qualified ulema the latitude to apply *ijtihad* (scripturally based independent reasoning) to every aspect of life, not only religious, but also social and political. Those scholars whose studies qualified them to exercise *ijtihad* were known as *mujtahids*.

But while elevating the exercise of rational skills among jurisprudents, Usulism restricted religious and intellectual independence among the masses. Usuli clerics insisted that the Shi‘ite laity must select a living *mujtahid* as a *marja‘ al-taqlīd* (“reference point for imitation”), a guide that one follows in legal, moral, and ritual issues. The centralizing and authoritarian tendencies implicit in Usulism were resisted by the more conservative Akhbari school of jurisprudence, which argued that Muslims should direct their *taqlīd* (“imitation” or devout and unquestioning obedience) only to the imam and not to any earthly *mujtahid*. But by the late eighteenth century Usulism was clearly ascendant. Since the nineteenth century certain of the most prominent Usuli *marajis* (plural of *marja‘ al-taqlīd*) have received the title *na‘ib al-imam* (“the Hidden Imam’s deputy”), implying the jurisprudent’s right to govern as the lieutenant of the twelfth imam. In recent times *na‘ib al-imam* was applied most famously to the Ayatollah Khomeini after the success of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Khomeini rationalized the imam’s role in society through his doctrine of *velayet-e fāqīh* (“the rule of the jurisconsult”): In the imam’s absence, government should be in the hands of those Muslims who are most versed in Islamic law.

Preparation for the 1979 revolution involved a reinterpretation of many components of the Imami tradition. In the prerevolutionary Iran of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign, the imam Husayn was typically regarded as a model of patient suffering, whom one lamented during Muharram and to whom one turned for *shafā‘a* (intercession) and personal salvation. Such an image reflected the hierarchic and stratified social relations characteristic of Iran and other traditional Islamic societies. New interpretations in the 1960s and 1970s, however, replaced the image of Husayn-as-savior with Husayn-as-revolutionary exemplar. Such thinking is evident in the writings of ‘Ali Shari‘atī (d. 1977), a Sorbonne-educated intellectual who advocated the transformation of “Black Shi‘ism” (associated with mourning for Husayn and the passive expectation of salvation) into “Red Shi‘ism” (whereby Shari‘atī invoked the color of blood to call for confrontation, revolution, and self-sacrifice in the service of society).

Not only the imam Husayn but also the revered women of *ahl al-bayt* have been subjected to reinterpretation in recent years. An example is Zaynab bt. ‘Ali, Husayn’s sister. Present at Karbala, she was taken prisoner by Yazid’s soldiers and presented to the triumphant caliph in his Damascus court. Despite her powerlessness, she spoke out defiantly and denounced Yazid as a tyrant. Supporters of Khomeini during his struggle against the Pahlavi regime described Zeinab as a model of political activism worthy of imitation by contemporary Shi‘ite women. Writing shortly after the 1979 revolution, Farah Azari, one of the founding members of the Iranian Women’s Solidarity Group, stated, “[I]t was Zeinab who came to the forefront to symbolize the ideal of the modern revolutionary Muslim woman in Iran. Those enigmatic young women clad in a black chador bearing machine guns, aspire to follow Zeinab. It is not inappropriate that they have been sometimes referred to as “the commandos of her holiness Zeinab” (Azari 1983, p. 26).

Since Khomeini’s death in 1989 contemporary Shi‘ite thought in Iran has been characterized by increasing diversity and the emergence of a movement for the reformation of Shi‘ism. Among recent theological developments in Imami Shi‘ism is the advocacy of *taqrib* (“rapprochement”), the easing of religious clashes between Shi‘as and Sunnis. In 1990 Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Sayyed ‘Ali Khamenei, founded the *Majma‘ al-taqrib* (“the rapprochement association”), with the idea of establishing an international league of Sunnis and Shi‘as who would be united as Muslims in the face of perceived opposition from the non-Muslim world at large.

With this goal in mind, Khamenei has taken steps to reform a Shi‘ite practice frequently denounced by Sunnis: the ritual of *zanjiri-matam*, in which mourners employ knives, razors, and chains in acts of self-flagellation to honor Husayn and the Karbala martyrs. In the 1994 Muharram season Khamenei issued a *fatwa* forbidding acts of *matam* performed in public involving the use of weapons to shed one’s own blood. Such attempts to curb “bloody” *matam* have met at most with very limited success. Even before Khamenei’s *fatwa*, in the 1980s an attempt to forbid Muharram self-flagellation had been made by Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, “spiritual mentor” of the militant Lebanese group Hezbollah. But Hezbollah Shi‘as in Beirut disregarded Fadlallah’s prohibition. And in various localities in India and Pakistan, Shi‘a *matam* (lamentation) associations continue to sponsor public *matam*-performances in which many members engage in self-flagellation. When interviewed, these mourners explained their reasons for persisting in this ritual: the wish to honor Husayn and earn religious merit, as well as the desire to assert Shi‘ite communal identity in the presence of neighboring
faith communities, whether Hindu, Buddhist, or Sunni Muslim. The Iranian government’s program of imposing uniformity worldwide in Shi‘ite ritual practice is by no means complete.

One of the most progressive Imami thinkers of the present day is ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush (b. 1945). He offers a postpositivist assessment of modernity’s challenge to revealed religion. While religion itself is divine in origin, Sorush argues, all human knowledge of religion is limited, indeterminate, and necessarily subject to change. No interpretation of Qur’anic scripture can ever be definitive. According to Sorush, every scriptural interpretation, no matter how authoritative the source, is fallible and can offer only an approximation of divine truth. Such indeterminacy should not be viewed with alarm. Rather, this condition is intended by God so as to encourage humans to engage in the ongoing process of ijtihad, whereby they exercise the divine gifts of intellect and independent judgment. Because of the challenge to traditional clerical authority implied by such arguments, Sorush has aroused considerable hostility among members of the governing hierarchy in Iran’s Islamic Republic.

See also Taqiyah; Usuliyah.

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David Pinault

ISMA‘ILI

Isma‘ili Shi‘a represent the second most important Shi‘ite community after the Twelver (Ithna‘ashari) Shi‘a and are scattered in more than twenty-five countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America. The Isma‘ilis have subdivided into a number of factions and groups in the course of their complex history.

The Isma‘ilis recognized a line of imams in the progeny of Isma‘il, son of Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765), hence their designation as Isma‘ili. By the 870s, the Isma‘ilis had organized a revolutionary movement against the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. The aim of this religio-political movement, designated as al-da‘wa al-badiya or the “rightly guiding mission,” was to install the Isma‘ili imam belonging to the prophet Muhammad’s family to a new caliphate ruling over the entire Muslim community. The message of the movement was disseminated by a network of da‘is or missionaries in many parts of the Muslim world.

The early success of the Isma‘ili movement culminated in the foundation of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa in 909. ‘Abdallah al-Mahdi (d. 934) and his successors in the Isma‘ili imamate ruled as Fatimid caliphs over an important state that soon grew into an empire stretching from North Africa to Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The Fatimid period was the “golden age” of Isma‘ilism when Isma‘ili thought and literature attained their summit and Isma‘ilis made important contributions to Islamic civilization, especially after the seat of the Fatimid caliphate was transferred to Cairo, itself founded in 969 by the Fatimids. The early Isma‘ilis developed a distinctive esoteric, gnostic system of religious thought based on a distinction between the exoteric (zabir) and esoteric (katin) aspects of the sacred scriptures as well as religious commandments and prohibitions. They also developed a cyclical view of religious history and a cosmological doctrine. The early doctrines were more fully elaborated in Fatimid times by Isma‘ili da‘is who were also the scholars and authors of their community. Isma‘ili law was codified through the efforts of al-Qadi al-Nu‘man (d. 974), the foremost jurist of the Fatimid period, and the Fatimid Isma‘ilis developed distinctive institutions of learning.

The early Isma‘ili movement had been rent by a schism in 899 when a faction of the community, designated as Qarmati, refused to acknowledge continuity in the Isma‘ili imamate and retained an earlier belief in the Mahdi. The Isma‘ili imam, Muhammad ibn Isma‘il, who was expected to reappear. The Qarmatis, who did not recognize the Fatimid caliphs as their imams, founded a powerful state in Bahrain, eastern Arabia. The Qarmati state collapsed in 1077.

The Fatimid Isma‘ilis themselves experienced a major schism in 1094, on the death of al-Mustansir (1036–1094), the eighth Fatimid caliph and the eighteenth Isma‘ili imam. Al-Mustansir’s succession was disputed by his sons Nizar (d. 1095), the original heir-designate, and al-Musta‘li (1094–1101), who was installed to the Fatimid throne through the machinations of the Fatimid wazir al-Afdal (d. 1121). As a result, the united Isma‘ili da‘wa and community were split into rival Nizari and Musta‘li factions. The da‘wa organization in Cairo as well as the Isma‘ili communities of Yaman and Gujarat, in western India, supported the claims of al-Musta‘li. The Isma‘ilis of Iran and adjacent lands, who were then under the leadership of Hasan Sabbah (d. 1124), upheld Nizar’s right to the Isma‘ili imamate.

On the death of the Fatimid caliph-imam al-Amir (1101–1130), the Musta‘li Isma‘ilis themselves subdivided into Hafizi and Tayyibi branches. The Hafizi Isma‘ilis who recognized al-Hafiz (1130–1149) and the later Fatimid caliphs as their imams disappeared completely after the Fatimid
dynasty was uprooted in 1171 by Saladin, the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty who championed the cause of Sunnism. Tayyibi Isma'ilis established their permanent stronghold in the Yemen. By the end of the sixteenth century, the Tayyibi Isma'ilis split into separate Da'udi and Sulaymani branches over the question of the rightful succession to the twentieth-sixth da'i mutlaq, Da'ud b. 'Ajlabah (1567–1589). By that time, the Tayyibis of India, known locally as Bohras, had greatly outnumbered their Yemeni co-religionists. Da'udi and Sulaymani Tayyibis have followed different lines of da'is. Da'udi Bohras, accounting for the great majority of the Tayyibis, have split into a number of groupings, the largest numbering around 800,000.

Hasan Sabbah's seizure of the mountain fortress of Alamut, in northern Iran, in 1090, marked the effective foundation of what became the Nizari Isma'ili state of Iran and Syria. Thus, Nizaris acquired political prominence under Hasan and his seven successors at Alamut. In 1094, Hasan also founded the independent Nizari da'wat and severed his ties with Fatimid Egypt. The Nizari state was comprised of a network of strongholds and towns in several regions of Iran and Syria, in the midst of the Seljuk sultanate. Hasan's armed revolt against the Seljuk Turks, whose alien rule was detested by the Iranians, did not succeed, nor did the Seljuks succeed in destroying the Nizari fortress communities despite their superior military power. A stalemate, in effect, developed between the Nizaris and their various enemies until their state in Iran was destroyed by the all-conquering Mongols in 1256. The Nizari Isma'ilis continued to struggle against the Mongols, and Saladin, among others, were later subdued by the Mamluks. The Iranian Nizaris elaborated their own teachings and adopted Persian, in preference to Arabic, as their religious language. They also established libraries at Alamut, the headquarters of the Nizari state and da'wat, and other mountain fortresses, also extending their patronage of learning to outside scholars.

The Nizari Isma'ilis survived the destruction of their state. Initially, for about two centuries, they remained disorganized and developed independently in scattered communities, also adopting Sufi guises to safeguard themselves against persecution. During the Anjudan revival in the post-Alamut period of their history, which lasted some two centuries from the middle of the fifteenth century, the Nizari imams emerged at Anjudan, in central Iran, and increasingly established their control over various communities of their followers, also reviving Nizari missionary and literary activities. At the same time, the Nizaris of Iran and adjacent lands retained different taqiyya or precautionary dissimulation practices of disguising themselves under the cloaks of Sufism and Twelver Shi'ism, the official religion of Safavid Iran. The Anjudan revival achieved particular success in Central Asia and South Asia, where large numbers of Hindus were converted in Sind, Gujarat, and elsewhere. The Indian Nizaris became locally known as Khojas and they developed an indigenous tradition, designated as the “Satpanth” or true path. The Nizaris of Badakhshan, now divided between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, have preserved numerous collections of Persian Isma'ili manuscripts. The Nizari Khojas, together with the Tayyibi Bohras, were among the earliest Asian communities to have settled in the nineteenth century in East Africa. In the 1970s and later, many East African Isma'ilis migrated to the West. Under the leadership of their last two imams, Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III (1885–1957), and Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, who in 1957 succeeded his grandfather as their forty-ninth imam, the Nizari Isma'ilis, who number several million, have entered the modern age as a progressive community with high standards of education and well-being.

See also Da'wa; Khojas; Nizari.

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Farhad Daftary

ZAYDI (FIVER)
The branch of Shi'ism known as the Zaydiyya owes its name to the belief in the imamate of Zayd b. 'Ali. Adherents proclaimed Zayd as imam because it was he who raised an army against Ummayad rule in an aborted uprising in 740 C.E. The Zaydis are the inheritors of that element of Shi'ism that emphasizes a willingness to challenge illegitimate political structures as a characteristic of the imam, rather than an esoteric conception of the imam as spiritual guide with a qualitatively different relationship to God than the ordinary believer. The qualities of the imam for Zaydis include a willingness and ability to assume some sort of political power, along with learning (ilm, in the traditional, rather than esoteric sense of the word) and descent from the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, 'Ali. It is not essential that the imam be designated by the previous imam, and there may be times when the world is entirely bereft of an imam since no descendant of 'Ali is qualified to assume the position. For some Zaydis, there may be times when there is more than one imam, each leading Islamic states in different parts of the world (though the long-term aim that these states conjoin is regularly expressed). Indeed this was the case in the tenth century, when Zaydi states existed simultaneously in Yemen and Tabaristan (on the Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea) with separate imams.

The rejection of the special qualities of the imam in Zaydi thought removes one of the elements of Shi'ism viewed as problematic by Sunni authors. This has led to a certain
rapprochement between Zaydis and Sunnis, and the development of a Zaydi theological and legal tradition that intersects with the Sunni tradition more than with that of the Ismā‘īlīs or Imāmis. This rejection of the special qualities of the imam manifests itself in the common Zaydi assertion that ‘Ali, Hasan, and Husayn were designated as imams, but that their designation was hidden (nass khafi), and could only be discovered after investigation. This exempted some of the companions of the Prophet, who had not recognized ‘Ali’s imamate, from blame or censure. Zaydi theologians and historians have also been less eager to criticize the caliphs of Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), ‘Umar (r. 634–644), and ‘Uthman (r. 644–656). The legal system, it is claimed by Zaydi scholars, owes much to Shafi‘ite jurisprudence.

The theological writings of the Zaydiyya show the imprint of the Mu‘tazili school. Al-Qasim b. Ibrahim al-Rassi (d.860), an early imam and supposed founder of the Zaydi legal school, set the tone for later Zaydi exploration of Mu‘tazili themes with his support of standard Mu‘tazili principles such as the unity of God (tawḥīd), the justice of God (‘adl), and the promise and the threat (al-wa‘ā‘id wa-l-wa‘ā‘id). Al-Qasim’s grandson, al-Hadi ila al-Haqq al-Mubin (d. 911), himself a noted theologian, founded the Zaydi state in Yemen, and a close relationship with Mu‘tazilism characterized Yemeni Zaydi discourse thereafter. Other Mu‘tazili principles that permeate Zaydi theological works include a belief in human free will (qadr), a renunciation of anthropomorphism (tasbīb) with regard to God, and the widely cited Mu‘tazili slogan taklīf ma la yutaq. The last of these can be interpreted as meaning that God cannot demand that his subjects (mukāllafūn) perform duties they are incapable of either doing or knowing; to do so would make God unjust. These principles were not, however, incorporated into Zaydi Islam without debate. Perhaps most notable of the dissident groups was the Mutarrifiyya, a Yemeni Zaydi movement that emerged in the eleventh century and was named after its founder Mutarrif b. Shihab (d. 1067). The Mutarrifiyya claimed to be adhering strictly to the teachings of al-Qasim b. Ibrahim in rejecting certain elements of Basran Mu‘tazilism in support of some of the conclusions of the Mu‘tazili school of Baghdad. In Zaydi Tabaristan, the state founded by a descendant of Zayd, al-Hasan b. Zayd (d. 888), there was also much theological and legal debate, particularly under the imamate of al-Nasir Hasan al-Utrash in the tenth century. The latter’s legal doctrine was a matter of dispute among the Zaydis both during his life and after his death (in particular his doctrine that three statements of divorce announced by the husband in one session was a valid form of divorce). The intellectual history of the Zaydi school is, then, a history of debate and dispute that at times threatened the unity of the community. When the Zaydi state in Tabaristan collapsed in 1126, however, Yemen became (and remains to the present day) the undisputed home of Zaydi theology and law. The Zaydi imamate in Yemen had grown out of a loose coalition of Yemeni tribes, and the dynamics of tribal loyalty versus imamate authority are a constant theme in the history of the area.

Perhaps the most interesting figure of later Zaydi thought is Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1834), whose learning in both Sunni and Zaydi traditions has earned him the title mujaddid (renewer) of the twelfth hijri century by no less a Sunni authority than Rashid Rida. Though not an imam himself, he was appointed as chief judge of the Zaydi imamate. Shawkani’s exposition of ijtihād, and his refusal to slavishly imitate past legal authority (of either the Zaydi or Sunni schools) brought about a revivification of legal studies, the effect of which was felt well beyond the boundaries of the Zaydi state.

The Zaydi imamate in Yemen continued well into the twentieth century. This was in part due to the charismatic and dynamic imam Yahya Hamid al-Din who fought against the Ottomans (eventually negotiating for them to withdraw from the area) and took the disputed town of Badr from the Saudis. After his death in 1948, the imamate faced a number of challenges and eventually collapsed in 1962 as Yemen experienced a revolution influenced by the thought of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. The republicans who formed the Yemen Arab Republic, and negotiated an abortive union with Egypt, divesting the Hamid al-Din line of the imamate. This brought the end of the most long lasting Shi‘ite state in the Muslim world, and although Zaydi scholars still study and teach in the highlands of Yemen, the legal tradition has become increasingly mixed with Shafi‘ite law, the other major legal tradition in the area.

See also Shafi‘i, al-; Shi‘a: Early; Shi‘a: Imami (Twelver); Shi‘a: Isma‘ili.

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SHIRK

Meaning “association,” the term shirk generally implies assigning partners or equals to God, and is considered to be the paramount sin in Islam. The central doctrine of Islam is tawḥīd (divine unity), which came to mean that God does not need nor have partners to assist Him. By contrast, Muslims base their understanding of shirk on three passages from the Qur’an (34:20–24, 35:40, 46:4), which advise Muslims against...
associating helpers or partners with God. For instance, Sura 34:20–24 establishes the non-duality of God, arguing that evil and good originate in God’s creative act and that evil (the *shaytan*) has no power over creation.

Sura 34:23 has been used by some commentators to suggest that God’s power is so all-encompassing that humans have no free will, and that God has predetermined who will be saved and who will be damned. The Jabriyya (compulsionists, circa eighth-to-ninth century) argued that those who advocated a free will position (the Qadariyya) held, by implication, that humans have abilities over which God has no power, in effect making humans equal to God in certain respects. This view was later modified by al-Ash’ari (d. 935), who held that God creates a range of choices from which humans have the limited ability to choose (kash, literally “to acquire”) at the moment of decision. In this way, God’s ultimate unity is not violated and humans do not associate themselves with God’s creative power.

Some contemporary Islamic revivalists have argued that the Qur’an accuses Christians and Jews of *shirk*, based on Sura 9:30, which states that “the Jews call Ezra a son of God and the Christians call Christ the son of God.” Furthermore, Sura 5:72–73 accuses Christians of associating Jesus with God and contends that “if they do not desist … a painful punishment will come upon them.” Sura 2:105, however, draws a distinction between Christians and Jews, whom it refers to as *abl al-kitab* (people of the book) and the polytheists, whom it calls the *mushrikun* (literally the “ones who associate”). The distinction is based on the idea that while Christians and Jews may be in error, they base their mistake on a corruption of earlier revelation. They, therefore, accept the basic concepts of God’s true religion while interpolating certain ideas that need to be corrected for them to fully follow God’s path. The *mushrikun* reject all revelation and prefer to worship their own gods in preference to the united and all-powerful God (see Sura 23:51–77).

Contemporary Islamic revivalists have also used the concept to justify attacks on non-Muslims, as well as fellow Muslims who reject revivalist ideologies. Many contemporary revivalists base their ideas on the writings of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), who argued that true Islam had been corrupted by pre-Islamic and extra-Islamic ideas that promoted concepts of *shirk* and interwove them with Islamic ritual and theology. According to this view, only through the violent expulsion of *shirk* concepts can true Islam flower as it did during the time of the prophet Muhammad and his Companions and successors.

See also *Allah*; *Arabia*, Pre-*Islam*; *Asnam*; Modern Thought; Political Islam; Qutb, Sayyid.

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R. Kevin Jaques

**SIBA’I, MUSTAFA AL- (1915–1964)**

Mustafa al-Siba’i was the socialist founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers of Syria, a branch of the Egyptian, anticolonialist organization *Ikhwan*. Unlike the original Brotherhood in Egypt, the lesser-known Syrian branch did not openly engage in terrorist activities under Siba’i and was generally regarded as following peaceful means to achieve its goals. Born in Homs, Damascus, in 1915, Siba’i went to Egypt in 1933 to study at the University of Al-Azhar, where he was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1949, he completed his Ph.D. dissertation, entitled “The Position of *Sunna* in Legislation.” Charged with subversion by the British government in 1934 and 1940, he was eventually deported to Palestine. Siba’i questioned the economic and cultural reliance of Muslim states on either the United States or the Soviet Union, feeling that Muslims should assert their independence from Western influences. He advocated social reform based both on Marxist theories and traditional Islamic thought and strongly believed in the idea of universal Muslim solidarity. Siba’i discussed the rights of women under Islamic law in an article published in 1962. A noted author and scholar of *fiqh* and *sunna*, he also edited the journals *Al-Manar*, *Al-Muslimin*, and *Hadarat al-Islam*.

See also *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*.

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Paula Stiles

** SILSILA**

*Silsila*, Arabic for chain, is the word commonly used to describe the spiritual genealogy of Sufi lineages, which in turn are used to legitimize the authority of Sufi shaykhs. It is assumed that both the “heart-to-heart connection” and the spiritual teaching originated with Muhammad, hence the need for a series of spiritual links constituting a “chain” that connects back to the Prophet acting as a “conduit” for divine grace from God. In many respects these sufi genealogical chains resemble hadith *isnads* (chains of hadith transmitters).

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Associated with helpers or partners with God. For instance, Sura 34:20–24 establishes the non-duality of God, arguing that evil and good originate in God’s creative act and that evil (the shaytan) has no power over creation.

Sura 34:23 has been used by some commentators to suggest that God’s power is so all-encompassing that humans have no free will, and that God has predetermined who will be saved and who will be damned. The Jabriyya (compulsionists, circa eighth-to-ninth century) argued that those who advocated a free will position (the Qadariyya) held, by implication, that humans have abilities over which God has no power, in effect making humans equal to God in certain respects. This view was later modified by al-Ash’ari (d. 935), who held that God creates a range of choices from which humans have the limited ability to choose (kash, literally “to acquire”) at the moment of decision. In this way, God’s ultimate unity is not violated and humans do not associate themselves with God’s creative power.

Some contemporary Islamic revivalists have argued that the Qur’an accuses Christians and Jews of *shirk*, based on Sura 9:30, which states that “the Jews call Ezra a son of God and the Christians call Christ the son of God.” Furthermore, Sura 5:72–73 accuses Christians of associating Jesus with God and contends that “if they do not desist … a painful punishment will come upon them.” Sura 2:105, however, draws a distinction between Christians and Jews, whom it refers to as abl al-kitab (people of the book) and the polytheists, whom it calls the mushrikun (literally the “ones who associate”). The distinction is based on the idea that while Christians and Jews may be in error, they base their mistake on a corruption of earlier revelation. They, therefore, accept the basic concepts of God’s true religion while interpolating certain ideas that need to be corrected for them to fully follow God’s path. The mushrikun reject all revelation and prefer to worship their own gods in preference to the united and all-powerful God (see Sura 23:51–77).

Contemporary Islamic revivalists have also used the concept to justify attacks on non-Muslims, as well as fellow Muslims who reject revivalist ideologies. Many contemporary revivalists base their ideas on the writings of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), who argued that true Islam had been corrupted by pre-Islamic and extra-Islamic ideas that promoted concepts of shirk and interwove them with Islamic ritual and theology. According to this view, only through the violent expulsion of shirk concepts can true Islam flower as it did during the time of the prophet Muhammad and his Companions and successors.

See also *Allah*; *Arabia*, Pre-*Islam*; *Asnam*; Modern Thought; Political Islam; Qutb, Sayyid.

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R. Kevin Jaques

**SIBA’I, MUSTAFA AL- (1915–1964)**

Mustafa al-Siba’i was the socialist founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers of Syria, a branch of the Egyptian, anticolonialist organization *Ikhwan*. Unlike the original Brotherhood in Egypt, the lesser-known Syrian branch did not openly engage in terrorist activities under Siba’i and was generally regarded as following peaceful means to achieve its goals. Born in Homs, Damascus, in 1915, Siba’i went to Egypt in 1933 to study at the University of Al-Azhar, where he was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1949, he completed his Ph.D. dissertation, entitled “The Position of *Sunna* in Legislation.” Charged with subversion by the British government in 1934 and 1940, he was eventually deported to Palestine. Siba’i questioned the economic and cultural reliance of Muslim states on either the United States or the Soviet Union, feeling that Muslims should assert their independence from Western influences. He advocated social reform based both on Marxist theories and traditional Islamic thought and strongly believed in the idea of universal Muslim solidarity. Siba’i discussed the rights of women under Islamic law in an article published in 1962. A noted author and scholar of *fiqh* and *sunna*, he also edited the journals *Al-Manar*, *Al-Muslimin*, and *Hadarat al-Islam*.

See also *Ikhwan al-Muslimin*.

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Paula Stiles

**SILSILA**

*Silsila*, Arabic for chain, is the word commonly used to describe the spiritual genealogy of Sufi lineages, which in turn are used to legitimize the authority of Sufi shaykhs. It is assumed that both the “heart-to-heart connection” and the spiritual teaching originated with Muhammad, hence the need for a series of spiritual links constituting a “chain” that connects back to the Prophet acting as a “conduit” for divine grace from God. In many respects these sufi genealogical chains resemble hadith *isnads* (chains of hadith transmitters).
The encompassing principle involved in both isnads and silsilas is the personal encounter between two reliable transmitters. Generally, hadith scholars define this encounter in personal, verbal terms and for Sufis it entails a nonverbal sharing of the heart. This allows Sufi silsilas to have “Uwaysi links,” which involve “supra-temporal” meetings of Sufis in their imaginal forms.

The earliest Sufi silsila traces the spiritual genealogy of Ja’far al-Khuldi (d. 959) back to the Successors. Like hadith isnads, these Sufi chains were “raised” over time to connect with Companions and then to Muhammad. In many Sufi lineages disciples memorize the silsila of the lineage as a litany invoking divine grace or as a contemplation exercise to attract the spirits of deceased shaikhs.

See also Khilafat Movement; Tariqa.

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Arthur F. Buehler

SIRHINDI, SHAYKH AHMAD (1564–1624)

Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi was born in Sirhind, a small town located two hundred kilometers northwest of Delhi. The head of a Sufi lodge as well as a competent religious scholar, he was initiated into three Sufi lineages: the Chishtiyya, the Qadiriyya, and the Suhrawardiyya. The turning point of his life came with a meeting with Muhammad Baqi billah (d. 1603), a Central Asian Naqshbandi shaykh. In three months Sirhindi returned to Sirhind with unconditional permission to transmit the teachings of the Naqshbandi lineage. Three years later Baqi billah died and Sirhindi was recognized by most of Baqi billah’s disciples as the principal successor.

From this point Sirhindi elaborated a new set of Sufi doctrines and disciplines grounded in following the prophetic example (sunna) and Islamic law (shari’ah). More than any other Naqshbandi since Baha’uddin, Sirhindi became the pivotal figure in India who redefined Sufism’s role in society and who integrated Sufi practice into strict juristic notions of shari’a observance. Indeed, after Sirhindi’s death, the Naqshbandiya became renowned as the Naqshbandiya-Mujaddidiyya, named after Sirhindi’s title of “the renewer of the second millennium” (mujaddid alf-e thani). In the twentieth century selective interpretations of Sirhindi’s thoughts have been utilized by Pakistani nationalists to legitimize the creation of Pakistan.

Sirhindi’s notions of Islamic orthopraxy/orthodoxy and reflections on Sufi doctrine are discussed extensively in his *Maktubat* (536 Collected Letters), which have been translated from the original Persian into Arabic, Turkish (Ottoman and modern), and Urdu. Other of his writings include *Mahda’ wa-ma’ad, Makashafat-e ‘ayniyya, Ma’arif laduniya, Shabr-e ruba’iyat-e kbwaja Baqi billah, and Ithbat al-nubahwza.*

See also Falsafa; Ibn ‘Arabi; South Asia, Islam in; Tasawwuf; Wahdat al-Wujud.

SOCIALISM

In the Arab Middle East, socialism (Arabic, ishtirakiyya) as an explicit political-economic ideology had a brief period of prominence in the 1960s. Policies that could be identified as socialist, however, have been much more enduring, even in countries that explicitly reject socialist ideology. If socialism is understood as government control of the major sectors of the economy, combined with a commitment to redistribution of wealth and an assurance of economic security to all citizens, then even the most “capitalist” of the Arab states in the Middle East are to some extent socialist.

Political circumstances drove early moves by Arab states in the post–World War II period to take a more controlling role in their economies. Egyptian and Iraqi military coups in the 1950s were followed by land reform measures aimed at destroying the economic base of the pillars of the old regime, the large landowners. Confiscated lands were mostly redistributed, not kept by the state, but this process brought these governments more directly into the management of the agricultural economy. Symbols of foreign economic control like the Suez Canal in Egypt and the British Petroleum concession in Iraq were nationalized in whole or in part as expressions of political independence and to provide revenue to the new regimes. While populist and nationalistic in nature, such steps were not animated by explicitly socialist blueprints. They did, however, further increase government control of the economy.

The 1960s were the heyday of explicitly socialist policies in the Arab Middle East. In 1961 the United Arab Republic (Egypt) adopted the “Socialist Decrees” of 1961, in one fell swoop nationalizing most large-scale industry, all financial
Arab students occupying the Syrian embassy in London in 1963, the year the Ba’ath party came to power in Syria. The Ba’ath party’s motto is “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.” The Ba’ath party effected wide nationalization measures in Syria and, a few years later, in Iraq.

Institutions, all utilities and transportation concerns, and all foreign trade. Soviet-style “five-year plans” became the blueprint for economic development. In 1962 the Egyptian ruling party was renamed the Arab Socialist Union. In the same year an explicitly socialist party, the National Liberation Front (in French, the FLN), came to power in newly independent Algeria. The new government confiscated the agricultural and industrial assets of the departed French colonists and, rather than redistributing them, turned them into state assets. It subsequently nationalized the French companies that had developed the country’s oil and natural gas reserves. In 1964 the ruling party in Tunisia added the “Socialist” sobriquet to its name as well, and adopted state planning as the way to bring about a socialist transformation of the economy. The Ba’ath party (whose motto is “unity, freedom, and socialism”) came to power in Syria in 1963 and Iraq in 1968, and in each state far-reaching nationalization measures were adopted. An explicitly Marxist regime took power in South Yemen in 1967 after the withdrawal of British colonialism.

The reasons behind this trend of explicit socialism in the 1960s are a mixture of intellectual fashion, foreign policy, and political opportunity. The success of the Soviet model in the 1950s, in rebuilding war-torn Russia into a superpower, was reinforced in the minds of many Arab leaders by the strong support they received from Moscow on foreign policy issues. Both Moscow and Beijing actively pushed the line that opposition to Western colonialism and neo-colonialism required a socialist orientation, and the anticolonial zeitgeist in Asia, Africa, and Latin America bolstered that notion. Undoubtedly many Arab leaders believed that “scientific” planning and state direction of the economy were the shortest path to economic development and social justice. But equally enticing to new and sometimes unsteady Arab regimes was the political power that state control over the economy placed in their hands. The state could provide jobs in its expanding bureaucracy and in state enterprises, subsidize housing and consumer goods, and direct capital toward its favored clients.

The enormous oil price increases of the 1973–1981 period had a mixed and paradoxical effect on the socialist trend in the Arab world. States with little oil, like Egypt and Tunisia, in large measure abandoned the socialist rhetoric of the 1960s in an effort to attract foreign investment and carve out a trading niche in a world where the export-led growth model had supplanted the socialist models of the 1960s. Socialist oil producers, like Algeria and Iraq, had vast new resources at
their disposal to increase their control over their economies. The Libyan regime added the term “socialist” to the official name of the state in 1977. Syria, with a small amount of oil production but an ability to attract aid from other Arab oil producers and from the Soviet Union, made a few gestures in the 1970s toward a more open economy, but basically continued on the socialist economic path.

The Arab monarchies, explicit opponents of socialism on an ideological basis, during this period began to adopt policies that brought their economic profiles much closer to those of their socialist neighbors. In Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states, vast oil revenues allowed the governments to dominate their economies, build huge state bureaucracies, and provide a level of welfare benefits to their citizens far beyond what the socialist states could. Even in Morocco and Jordan, without oil, foreign aid and phosphate sales gave the governments the wherewithal to substantially increase their control over their economies. Differences with the “socialist” economies certainly remained. Much more of the monarchical economies remained in private hands, notably the financial sector. But the trend toward practical economic convergence was clear.

With the falling off of oil prices from the mid-1980s, the last vestiges of official socialist doctrine were for the most part abandoned in the Arab world. Algeria began to invite foreign investment; Iraq privatized (to cronies of the regime) many state assets; even in Syria the official discourse became more favorable to private sector initiatives. But while the rhetoric of the market dominated the Arab world at the turn of the new millennium, in reality the Arab states, whether formerly “socialist” or not, were having a hard time giving up the power that state control over the economy brings. The Arab states lagged far behind East Asian and Latin American states in actual privatizations and in foreign investment, outside of the energy sector. The vocabulary of socialism has disappeared, but its practices hang on, more for political than for ideological and economic reasons.

See also Communism; Modernization, Political: Participation, Political Movements, and Parties.

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F. Gregory Gause III

SOUTH ASIA, ISLAM IN

South Asia is commonly known as the “Indian Subcontinent” or the “Indo-Pak Subcontinent.” Its core is the landmass south of the Himalaya and Hindukush mountain ranges: the Ganges and Indus river plains and the peninsula (now the nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). Included in South Asia are the mountainous regions (Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Tibet) whose societies have been in close contact with the Indus and Ganges plains. Also in the South Asian cultural zone are islands of the Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka, Lakshadweep, Andaman, Nicobar, and the Maldives).

South Asia is a distinctive area with complex relations to other parts of Asia. The world’s highest mountains separate South Asia from China, Central Asian steppes, and the Iranian plateau; yet mountain passes provided conduits for trade, religious and cultural exchange, migration, and invasion. Sea lanes connect South Asia to the “Middle Eastern” lands of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea and to islands of Indonesia and the Malay peninsula. South Asia developed complex agrarian societies, political empires, and highly developed religious systems (from local cults to Brahmanical Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism).

Islam in South Asia

These geographic boundaries and connections shaped the growth of Muslim communities in South Asia, which contains a diversity of Muslim groups. Muslims in South Asia include all major sectarian groups and different legal schools, and speak many regional languages. If the populations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are combined, the South Asian core area has the highest population of Muslims globally.

Early Muslims in South Asia

Commerce, conquest, and conversion led to the growth of Muslim communities in South Asia. Maritime commerce first established a Muslim presence in South Asia. The western coast of South Asia had intimate commercial and political relations with the “Middle East” long before the time of Muhammad (died 632 C.E.). The southwest of Malabar (from Ma‘bar, Arabic for “place of crossing,” now Kerala) housed merchants and settlers from pre-Islamic Arab, Jewish, and Christian communities.

The advent of Islam transformed Arab settlers into Muslim settlers. At first, this may not have dramatically changed their relation with rulers or local populations. Arab merchants married local women and were recognized as a distinct caste with high status. Muslim Arab traders built mosques and acted as overseas commercial agents of local rulers and political advisors. Tamil-speaking Muslims on the southern tip of the peninsula are known as Marakkayar, meaning “sailors” (possibly derived from Arabic Markab or ship).

Arabic literacy raised the status of Muslim Arabs in Malabar, as the Islamic empire in the Middle East and the Iranian plateau established Arabic as the commercial lingua franca in the Indian Ocean basin. Children of Arab merchants and South Asian women were raised Muslim, creating the nucleus for a more indigenous Muslim community; in addition Hindu
In Bhopal, India, Muslims in the streets surrounding the Taj al Masjid mosque offer prayers on the final day of the Tablighi Ijtema religious gathering, in which thousands of Muslims from over forty countries took part. © AFP/Corbis

Rulers appointed children to Arab families to learn techniques of the seafaring trade. According to legend, a Hindu ruler converted to Islam during Muhammad’s lifetime and traveled to Medina, leaving his Hindu descendants to rule by delegation from the disappeared “Muslim king.” This legend provided a mythic explanation of the cooperative relationship between Hindu kings and Arab-Muslim trade communities.

The Conquest of Sindh (711–997 C.E.)

Unlike Malabar, the northwest coast was not hospitable to Arab and Persian merchant settlers. The Hindu communities of Sindh and Gujarat were already engaged in maritime trade; Arab settlements were competition, not complement. As the Islamic community expanded into an empire in the seventh century, it conquered the Sassanid empire and absorbed the Iranian potential to dominate the Indian Ocean basin.

The Umayyad dynasty initiated diplomatic and commercial relations with Sri Lanka and the Indonesian archipelago, coming into conflict with Hindu rulers in Sindh over pirates’ interference in sea routes. Sindi rulers failed to control piracy (or perhaps profited by it). In 711, when Sindi pirates captured a ship bound from Sri Lanka to the Umayyad ruler with royal gifts, the Arab-Islamic empire mounted a naval expedition that conquered Sindh.

The expedition leader, Muhammad ibn Qasim, established the first Arab-Islamic polity in South Asia. Sectarian feuds in Sindh facilitated conquest; Mahayana Buddhists struggled for political supremacy against Brahmanical Hindus, and may have colluded with Arab Muslims in order to displace them. Muhammad ibn Qasim extended dhimmi status to Brahmanical Hindus and Buddhists: the first example in Islamic history of “protected religious community” applied to groups not mentioned in the Qur’an. Despite this, Arab rulers justified their conquest of Sindh with a call for conversion to Islam. There is no evidence of a sustained effort to convert local populations (as in the Umayyad empire as a whole). After conquest, Brahmanical temples functioned and Hindu communities administered revenue collection.

The Arab conquerors founded Mansura as a garrison and the capital city (from approximately 730). Multan became the second Islamic urban center, though it had been a major city and Hindu temple site before the Arab conquest. After the Abbasid empire transferred the caliphal capital to Baghdad, cultural, religious, and scientific contact between South Asians and Muslims in the central Islamic lands increased.

Political strife in the central Islamic lands affected Sindh. As the Fatimids established a revolutionary counter-caliphate at Cairo, Isma’ili missionaries (‘da’is) in Sindh engineered a coup. Sunnis were driven underground and Sindh became a satellite of Fatimid rule. Isma’ili missionaries drew equivalence between Islamic beliefs and those of native populations to facilitate conversion and gain support beyond urban centers. Allah was pictured as equivalent to Brahma, while Adam was an incarnation or avatar of Shiva and ‘Ali was an avatar of Vishnu. Beyond political strategy, this syncretic theology promoted the idea that Hindu theism was compatible with or equivalent to Islam.

The Ghaznavid Sultanate (997–1175 C.E.)

Initial contact between Islam and South Asia came via sea routes, but more sustained contact came through land routes. During the Abbasid period Central Asia, Khurasan, and Afghanistan became important regions of the Islamic empire. When Abbasid rule became weak, Turkic slave-soldiers (mamluks) governing outlying territories asserted independence as sultans, beginning with the sultanate of Ghazna in 962. With its capital of Ghazayn (in Afghanistan), the sultanate bridged the land routes between the Iran plateau and South Asia.

Mahmud of Ghazna ruled this sultanate from 998–1030, creating a Turkic aristocracy with Persian court rituals and strong loyalty to Sunni sectarianism. He expanded westward into Khurasan and eastward into Punjab, establishing Lahore as a frontier garrison town and important center of Islamic scholarship. Mahmud patronized Abu Rayhan al-Biruni, a scholar who authored a study of the religions and sciences of South Asia (Kitab al-Hind).

Mahmud participated in larger political and religious rivalries. He invaded Sindh, opposing the Isma’ili Fatimid presence there. He raided far into the Ganges plain; political
chronicles attribute to him a policy of plundering the wealth of Hindu temples. Historians argue over the extent of his plunder and whether iconoclastic desecration was a religious justification for military campaigns. All agree, however, that plunder funded westward campaigns rather than ruling South Asia beyond Lahore.

Sufi organizations began to move into Ghaznavid-controlled territories and acted as missionaries for Sunni allegiance. Suhrawardi Sufis were active in opposing the Isma’ili presence: These include Baha’uddin Zakariya, who created a devotional center in Multan; Sayyid Jalal Bukhari in Uchhi; and Ali Hujwiri (known as Data Ganj Bakhsh) in Lahore. Sufis continued the Isma’ili effort to convert South Asians to Islam by preaching, teaching, and healing.

The Sultanates of Delhi (1175–1526 C.E.)

Ghaznavid rule allowed further Turkic slave-soldier regimes to invade. In 1175, Mahmud ibn Sam invaded from Afghanistan into Punjab. Unlike the Ghaznavids, he conquered Delhi and set up a lasting administration in the South Asian heartland. This administration, known as the sultanate of Delhi, was ruled by a succession of slave-soldier regimes: Ghuri (1193–1290), Khalji (1290–1320), Tughluq (1320–1398), Sayyid (1414–1450), and Lodi (1451–1526).

Despite rapid dynastic change, these sultans created a stable political structure. In their rhetoric, “Islam” meant the political dominance of the Sunni Turkic and Afghan elite. This rhetoric (preserved in coinage, monumental architecture, and historical chronicles) should not obscure the fact that local Muslim communities were growing outside state control. Hindu kings (rajas) who fought against the Turkic dynasties employed South Asian Muslims as soldiers, just as Hindu soldiers fought with the Turkic armies. Political conflict between Turkic sultans and Hindu rajas was not a clash between two religions or two incompatible civilizations despite claims of colonial-era and contemporary nationalist histories.

The Delhi sultanates introduced new forms of political administration (the iqta’ or jagirdari system), military organization, architecture, coinage, and patronage of literature and music. These last two cultural spheres involved syncretic creativity between Hindus and Muslims. The system of North Indian (Hindustani) classical music was shaped by Muslim innovations through court patronage; Amir Khosrow (died 1325), an innovator in Hindustani music, was involved in Sufism and court life.

The Delhi sultanate expanded across the Ganges plain to Bengal, and southward to Rajasthan and Gujarat, encompassing the Deccan region of peninsular South Asia in 1310 C.E. The Delhi sultans’ profound military success was against Mongol incursions, turning South Asia into a haven for Islamic rule while Iran, Iraq, and Syria were devastated.

Because of this continuity, Muslim artisans, intellectuals, and religious leaders immigrated to South Asia, causing Sufism, Islamic scholarship, and literary and fine arts to flourish. Official structure of the administration included religious leaders: A shaykh al-Islam, who was the most authoritative Islamic scholar in each city or region, presided over qadis, who acted as judges and notaries drawn from the ranks of scholars trained in jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (usul al-din). Although the sultans of Delhi favored the Shafi’i school of law, most South Asian Muslims adhered to the Hanafi school (as did Turkic peoples in Central Asia). Muslims of the southern coasts like Malabar continued to follow the Shafi’i school.

Religious life outside state control was vibrant. Sufis established mosques and hospices (khanaqa or jama’at-khana) in smaller towns as devotional, educational, and charitable centers. Discourses of Sufi masters introduced new intellectual disciplines and scholarly knowledge. The Chishti Sufi, Nizam al-Din Awliya’ (died 1325 C.E.), was one of the first in South Asia to debate religious topics through constant reference to prophetic hadith. Although state officials and Sufi leaders debated issues of religious practice, they were not diametrically opposed. Especially outside the capital, tacit cooperation between qadis and Sufi leaders was the norm.

Regional Islamic Kingdoms (1338–1687 C.E.)

The Delhi sultanate became weak in the mid-fourteenth century; governors asserted independence, creating regional Islamic dynasties. The Ilyas Shahi dynasty built a kingdom in Bengal from 1342 with its capital at Lakhnavati, while the Bahmani dynasty threw off Delhi’s rule in the Deccan in 1347. Thereafter, the Deccan split into five small Islamic states: Golconda, Chandesh, Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, and Berar. In 1401 in Gujarat, the Zafar Shahi dynasty created its local capital at Ahmadabad. These smaller Islamicate dynasties created distinctive regional Islamic societies and literature in local languages beyond Persian.

Regional dynasties justified independence from Delhi by patronizing local Sufi leaders or adopting Shi’ite loyalties. In Gujarat, the Zafar Shahi dynasty built the tomb of Shaykh Ahmad Khattu, after whom they named Ahmadabad. In the Deccan, the Bahmani dynasty built a tomb for the Chishti Shaykh, Muhammad Hassayni Gesu Daraz, at Gulbarga. The Faruqi dynasty of Kandesh named their capital Burhanpur after the Chishti Sufi master, Burhan al-Din Gharib. These Sufi leaders migrated from Delhi as central power of the Delhi sultanate broke down. Some of the Deccani dynasties were Shi’a and fostered cultural and commercial relationships with Iran.

This centrifugal process accelerated when Timur (Tamerlane) invaded South Asia and sacked Delhi in 1389. Timur did not occupy Delhi, but a chieftain of Chaghatai
Turks who claimed descent from Timur did. Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur, a Turkic warlord from the Ferghana Valley (now Tajikistan), invaded South Asia to rebuild his fortune until he could reconquer Ferghana, defeating Ibrahim Lodi, the last ruler of the Delhi sultanate, in 1526.

The Mogul Timurid Empire (1526–1857 C.E.)

Babur died five years after his conquest of Delhi, yet his descendants build the largest and strongest agrarian empire of the early modern world. His son, Humayun (ruled 1530–1556), consolidated Mogul rule against Afghan nobles. Military remnants of the Lodi regime rallied under the leadership of Sher Shah Suri, an Afghan leader in Bihar. Sher Shah Suri defeated Humayun’s armies in 1540, drove the Moguls into exile in Safavid Iran, and reestablished the Delhi sultanate under a new Suri dynasty. The Safavid ruler, Shah Isma’il, supported Humayun who reinvaded South Asia in 1555, defeated the Suri regime, and established Mogul rule. Humayun began conquering regional dynasties in Bengal and Gujarat.


The Mogul empire succeeded because of some unique administrative features. The army and court moved with the emperor on a circuit of urban fortress-cities like Lahore and Agra, and tent-cities in the provinces. This mobility facilitated central rule and tax collection. An elaborate system of promotions in court and military kept administrators dependent on following centralized policy. Assignments for administration and tax collection were routinely rotated, preventing governors from building independent power. From the time of Akbar, the Mogul ruling class absorbed Rajput (Hindu) warlords through promotion and marriage. The Mogul empire was ideologically open to sharing power with Hindu elites and Ithna’ashari (Twelver) Shi’a nobles, diffusing the insistence on Sunni and Turkic supremacy that had sustained the Delhi sultanate.

Religious Life in the Mogul Empire

To manage the multilingual and multireligious court elite, Akbar elevated the emperor into a divinely guided figure (through an eclectic blending of Sufi, Mahdawi, and Shi’ite ideas). Courtiers experimented with a new cult of devotion to the emperor, the Din-e Ilahi or Universal Religion of God. Shahjahan and later emperors discontinued it and restored traditional Islamic titles and symbols. Islamic scholars and Sufis argued that Akbar’s experiment was heretical, but in reality, once Rajput and Shi’ite nobles integrated into court life, the cult was no longer needed.

Chaghatai Turkish was the native tongue of Mogul royal family, but Persian was the language of court chronicles, secular poetry, and Sufi devotional literature. Cooperation and intermarriage between Muslim and Rajput Hindu elites created new syncretic possibilities in literature. Urdu, the language of the army camp, formed with Hindawi grammar absorbing vocabulary from Persian and Turkish and became the common language of the Gangetic plain and a literary language complementing Persian. Sufis innovated in devotional literature in vernacular Indic languages. Shah Hussayn (1539–1599) expanded Sufi poetry in Punjabi. Sayyid Sultan (late sixteenth century) composed the Nabhabansna, a mythic retelling of the prophet Muhammad’s life, in Bengali. Such vernacular literatures bridged the gap between elite Persian poetry and folk traditions, drawing equivalencies between Islamic theological concepts and local Indic images.

Vernacular compositions reveal increasing conversion of local South Asians to Islam. Castes of artisans (like weavers) joined Muslim communities, giving rise to syncretic and iconoclastic religious leaders like Kabir of Banares (1440–1518). While many Sufis advocated the inviolability of the shari’ah, the Mogul era witnessed a rise of Sufis who ignored or disparaged Islamic communal norms. New Sufi communities came to prominence in the Mogul era; the Shattari around Muhammad Ghawth Gwaliori (1501–1562) and the Sabiri-Chishti around ‘Abd al-Qudus Gangohi (died 1537) explored yogic exercises and images that were common to Hindus and Muslims. The Mogul elite cultivated ties to Sufi communities, and some Mogul nobles were outspoken “unifiers” (muwahhid) who believed that Islamic and Hindu theology were compatible rather than contradictory. Prince Dara Shikoh argued the ultimate identity of Hindu and Islamic theological concepts. The Mogul court patronized Persian translations of the Upanishads, Ramayana, and Mahabharata.

In contrast, this relaxation of communal boundaries inspired Muslim reformers who called for a return to the shari’ah. Naqshbandi Sufis, like Baqi Billah (died 1603) and his disciple, Ahmad Sirhindi (1562–1624), tried to influence Mogul nobles. However, reformers came from many communities. In Ahmadabad, ‘Ali Muttaqi (1480–1575) strove to reform Sufism and advocated the centrality of the Prophet’s example. His follower, ‘Abd al-Haq Dihlawi (1551–1642), established a reformist madrasa in Delhi in friendly competition with the Naqshbandis. Even earlier, Sayyid Muhammad Jawnpuri (1443–1505) led a reform movement by declaring himself the Mahdi. The Mahdawi movement was a Sufi-inspired reform movement that conflicted with Sunni elites and led to violent conflicts in Gujarat, where it was especially strong.

Reformers gained popularity under the emperor Aurangzeb. Naqshbandis like Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762) strove to
integrate Sufism with study of the Qur'an, hadith, and Islamic law to strengthen allegiance to shari'ah among South Asia Muslims. He urged Muslims to avoid sectarian extremes and blind adherence to legal schools by reviving independent legal reasoning (ijtihad). Two of his grandsons, 'Abd al-Qadir (d. 1813) and Rafi al-Din (d. 1818), translated the Qur'an into Urdu.

**British Dominance and Muslim Reaction**

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, weaker Mogul rulers could not hold the empire together. Local powers grew in strength: Sikhs in Punjab, Marathas in the Deccan, and Shi'a nobles in Lucknow and Hyderabad. Later Mogul rulers grew so weak that the Safavid emperor, Nadir Shah, sacked Delhi in 1739. The Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali, plundered it again in 1761. Chaos in the Mogul capital facilitated European expansion in South Asia. The British East India Company (EIC) grew from a trading post to a regional military power based at Calcutta. By 1765, the EIC’s governor general had assumed the title of Diwan of Bengal with rights of taxation and fiscal administration. Though a nominal “vassal” of the Mogul emperor, the EIC began military and commercial expansion into Bihar and Orissa. The British acted as mercenaries and political advisors to surrounding Muslim rulers, such as the Nawab of Awadh (Oudh). Orientalist scholars in the EIC, like William Jones and Charles Hamilton, translated Persian and Arabic texts into English. After the “Permanent Settlement” of land-ownership regulations in 1793, the EIC administered Islamic law to Muslims in the territories it controlled, and synthesized Islamic and British legal norms in Anglo-Muhammadan Law.

By 1840, the British controlled most Mogul dominions directly or indirectly. After conquering the Sikh kingdom in 1849, the British integrated the local rulers under their control. When the EIC deposed the Nawab of Oudh in 1856, Muslim and Hindu soldiers in the EIC army revolted in the first Anglo-Indian war (called the Sepoy Mutiny). Rebel soldiers and nobles rallied around the Mogul emperor, Bahadur Shah II. A proclamation issued in his name read, “In this age the people of Hindustan, both Hindus and Muslims, are being ruined under the tyranny and oppression of the infidel and treacherous English. It is therefore the bounded duty of all wealthy people of India to stake their lives and property for the well being of the public.” By 1857, the EIC army reconquered Delhi and executed or exiled the Mogul royal family, and EIC rights were transferred to the British crown.

Some Muslim leaders opposed British expansion and tried to restore Islamic rule militarily. Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (1786–1831), a Sufi leader and soldier, declared South Asia to no longer be Dar al-Islam (realm of Islamic rule). He allied with Wali Allah’s family and was ghayr muqallad (independent in legal and ritual rulings), abandoning conformity with the Hanafi legal school. Organizing his followers into a militia, he waged a struggle (that he called jihad) against the Sikh kingdom, and was killed in 1831. Haji Shari'atullah (1780–1839) organized a similar movement among peasants in Bengal, known as Fara'id (The Obligatory Duties). He declared Bengal to no longer be Dar al-Islam since the British ruled it through landlords. He urged Bengali Muslims to reform and conform more closely to the sunna of Muhammad, which he identified with the Arabian practices of Mecca.

His son politicized the movement, attacking Hindu landlords, resisting British taxation, and subverting Anglo-Muhammadan courts. Many Islamic leaders participated in the 1857 rebellion, like the Sabiri-Chishti leader, Haji 'Imdadullah (1817–1899). Under threat of arrest, he lived in exile in Mecca while guiding disciples in South Asia who founded the Deoband Academy (see below).

Other Islamic leaders did not oppose British colonization after the war of 1857. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University). To the British, he demonstrated the loyalty of Muslim educated classes; with Muslim elites, he urged cooperation with Christians, politically and theologically. Through the journal Tabbedib al-akba' (The refinement of morals), he sought to reconcile rationalism, science, and Islamic theology while promoting the education of Muslim women. More conservative Islamic scholars founded a competing school, Dar al-'Ulam (known as the Deoband Academy), in 1960 to preserve Islamic law and education after the destruction of Mogul patronage.

Political modernists like Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Iqbal (1876–1938) criticized both the Aligarh movement’s acceptance of colonialism and the Deoband movement’s traditionalism. They agitated for cultural revival and political self-rule for Muslims in South Asia through “nationalism” and “Pan-Islamism.” Exemplary of this movement, Amir ‘Ali’s Spirit of Islam presented Islam as a more “liberal” civilizing force than European Christianity. Epic poems of Altaf Husayn Hali (“The ebb and flow of Islam” in 1879) and Iqbal (“Complaint and answer” in 1909) popularized these sentiments in Urdu. Islamic modernists blamed “despotic” Mogul rule, Sufi mysticism, and “effeminate” Persian culture for the political weakness of South Asian Islam.

With the First World War, these sentiments crystallized in an anocolonial movement. South Asian Muslim elites protested when Britain imposed the Treaty of Sevres on Ottoman Turkey in 1920. The Khilafat movement aimed to preserve the authority of the caliph in Turkey, spreading anti-British sentiment and inviting Muslim leaders into Gandhi’s “Non-Cooperation Movement.” The Jam/iyat-e 'Ulama-e Hind (JUH), the Indian Congress of Islamic Scholars, formed to support the Khilafat movement. Students and
faculty withdrew from Aligarh Muslim University and founded a “nationalist” Muslim University, Jami’a Milliya Islamiya.

Islamic anticolonial activity was split between two groups. The first group felt Muslims had to join Hindus, Sikhs, and other South Asians to oppose British domination and create a “secular” and multireligious nation. They can be called “Islamic integrationists” (they have been traditionally labeled “Islamic Nationalists”). These include ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988), a Pashto-speaking educator in the North West Frontier Province who led the nonviolent Khudai Khidmatgar movement (“Servants of God”) and Abul Kalam Azad (known...

The second group felt Muslims should form an exclusive community based on religious identity and communal ethics, and that Muslims could not coexist in an independent nation with a Hindu-majority. They can be called “Islamic exclusivists” (they have traditionally been labeled “Islamic Communalists”). This group included leaders of the Muslim League, a political party organized in 1906 by landholding Muslims to seek concessions from the British. Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah reorganized the League in 1936 to stand provincial elections, rivaling the INC. In 1940 the Muslim League declared that a constitutional government for Independent India was not possible, demanding that Muslim-majority provinces be formed into “autonomous and sovereign” states.

Partition and Independence of India and Pakistan

British policies placed Muslims and Hindus into two separate and irreconcilable “communal” groups. British histories and ethnographies since the eighteenth century portrayed these groups in racial terms as opposites. After 1857, British policy suppressed upper-class Muslim communities while promoting Hindus who embraced colonial education and bureaucracy. The colonial acquiescence to parliamentary representation for South Asians in 1937 raised questions of “proportional representation” and quotas, polarizing communal relations between Muslims and Hindus.

The British administration experimented with partition to organize colonial subjects by communal identity. In 1905, the administration tried to partition Bengal into Eastern “Hindu-majority” and Western “Muslim-majority” portions, sparking riots and resistance. As the anticolonial movement gained momentum after 1917, the British used concern over rights of “minority” communities to stall discussions of impending independence. The Muslim League at first advocated that Muslim-majority provinces become autonomous regions within a federal government of independent India. Later, the League advocated the “two-nation” solution: British India would be partitioned and Muslim-majority provinces would form the separate state of Pakistan.

Despite opposition by the INC and some Islamic leaders, partition became a political reality in 1947. Partition uprooted millions as Sikhs and Hindus fled Muslim-majority areas of the Punjab and Sindh, while Muslims in Hindu-majority areas of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Bengal experienced a similar displacement. Communal riots erupted on both sides, resulting in countless murders, looting, and destruction of property.

Partition did not solve the political complexities of South Asia’s multireligious population. Many Muslims refused or were unable to move to Pakistan, including those loyal to the INC’s “secular” democracy, those more rooted in their local community than in Islamic nationalism, or those without economic resources to move. Muslims remain the largest religious minority in independent India.

In 1947, Pakistan began as one nation with two noncontiguous territories. Its western territory included West Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and North-West Frontier; its eastern territory included East Bengal. The Awami League, a political party stressing language and cultural distinctiveness of Bengali Pakistanis, succeeded in democratic elections in 1970 and pressed for Bengali autonomy. West Pakistan leaders stalled implementation of the election results, leading to a civil war in 1971. The Indian military intervened, allowing former East Pakistan independence as Bangladesh.

Partition created geopolitical crises, such as in Kashmir. The British ruled most of South Asia directly, but ruled many regions indirectly through 570 “princely states.” The largest was Kashmir where a Hindu prince, the Dogra of Kashmir, governed a 75 percent Muslim population. He negotiated for autonomy, but faced an ultimatum to choose between India or Pakistan. A Muslim Kashmiri leader, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abdallah (born 1905), demanded democratic representation, made acute by a Muslim peasants’ insurrection. In reaction, the Dogra declared Kashmir annexed to India without a popular referendum with his majority-Muslim population. The Pakistani government saw this as a betrayal of the principle of partition, while the Indian government saw it as legal annexation of integral territory. Military stalemate created a “line of control,” with Pakistan occupying one-third of Kashmir and India occupying two-thirds, which includes the heavily populated valleys of Srinagar and Jammu. The “line of control” exists up until the present, though both nations claim the entire territory. The United Nations mandated a popular referendum about Indian annexation, but the Indian government has never executed this. Since the 1980s, some Kashmiri Muslims have resisted Indian military occupation through civil disobedience and violence.

Religious Communalism and Radicalism

India built a multireligious and multiethnic democratic state. However, communalist Hindu forces advocate a Hindu India in which Muslims (and other religious minorities) would be excluded from full citizenship. A member of the paramilitary Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) assassinated Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, claiming that he “capitulated” to Muslim concerns. Leaders who sympathized with the RSS ruled Maharashtra, furthering Hindu communal politics. The Bharata Janata Party (BJP) organized a national party combining Hindu communalist ideology (commonly called “Hindutva”), neo-liberal capitalist economics, and opposition to the INC.

To capture power in parliament, the BJP raised a controversy, claiming that the Babri Mosque was built (in the sixteenth century) over the site of a destroyed Hindu temple
at the birthplace of Rama at Ayodya. Calling for destroying the mosque and rebuilding the temple, the BJP came to national power. A coalition of Hindu communalist organizations demolished the Babri Mosque in 1993, leading to communalist riots in Bombay and other urban centers. Hindu communalist militancy (and Hindu middle-class support of it) compromises the promise of democratic citizenship for all religious minorities and threatens the life and welfare of Indian Muslims in particular.

Muslims in South Asia have also formed communalist organizations. The Tablighi Jama’at or “Missionary Party” is a communalist religious movement that is largely apolitical. Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (died 1944) began a missionary movement to properly “Islamize” Indian Muslims, in reaction to Hindu missionary movements, like the Arya Samaj, that viewed them as “lapsed Hindus” who must re-convert (shuddhi) to “Hinduisms.” The movement advocated religious revival and abandoning participation in “secular” projects like modern education and critical inquiry into religious tradition. It has become international, one of the largest Islamic organizations worldwide.

The journalist turned political theologian, Abu l-A’la’ Maududi (died 1979), organized the Jama’at-e Islami as a radical political party to forge Pakistan into an Islamic state. The party has not succeeded in parliamentary elections, but formulates “Islamist” ideology. The Jama’at spread internationally to Bangladesh, Britain, and North America. Along with al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in Egypt, the Jama’at is the oldest and most institutionalized radical political association calling for Islamic revolution in postcolonial nation states. Both the Jama’at-e Islami and Tablighi Jama’at question the legitimacy of the parliamentary democratic governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially since the election of women as prime ministers (Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan and Khalida Zia in Bangladesh).

*A reproduction of a painting captures Mogul emperor Shah Jahan on a peacock throne in the volume two color insert.*

See also South Asian Culture and Islam.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**SOUTH ASIAN CULTURE AND ISLAM**

When the Muslims arrived, South Asia had already cradled two great religions, Buddhism and Hinduism, and was divided into culturally distinct areas by differences in terrain, climate, ethnicity, religion, and social background. Apart from the Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu introduced by...
the Muslims, there were already a vast number of existing languages, all of which cut across religious barriers, and Muslim contributions to the various extant literatures were, and are, substantial. Although there were some cities, society was still predominantly rural and agricultural, and religion played an important role in people’s lives. Even today, many social customs are rooted in ancient Hindu practices, for example the hereditary caste system, which Islam appropriated rather than threw away.

**Islam’s Entry and Early Conversions**

Arab Muslim mercantile interest in western India began in the seventh century, predating the conquest of Sind (in what is now Pakistan) by Muhammad b. Qasim in 712. Qasim executed opposing soldiers, but spared the traders, artisans, and ordinary people, and wrought minimal changes in the social and administrative structures of Sind. He also struck a deal with the Brahmins, the priestly high caste of Hindus, co-opting them as partners in the administration, exempting them from paying the poll tax imposed on non-Muslims and ensuring their right to worship freely. Temples, such as the famous sun-temple in Multan, were important to the early Muslim rulers as a source of revenue, as they could collect the pilgrims’ donations.

As Turks and Afghans after Qasim established small, Muslim-ruled enclaves in the northwest of India, Arab and Persian mercantile communities flourished along the western coast. The merchants were honored and protected by local Rashtrakuta kings (eighth to tenth century), intermarried with lower-caste Hindus, spoke Malayalam, and dressed like the Hindu military caste. However, Muslims and lower castes were excluded from the social life of upper-caste Hindus.

Muslim kings up to the eighteenth century ruled over a vast majority of non-Muslims, largely Hindus, but including Buddhists, Jains, and indigenous tribes. They wisely followed a policy of conquest and reconciliation; conversion was not prioritized because it meant less revenue. The fact that the Muslims of South Asia have remained a minority suggests that the vast majority of Indians did not seek conversion. While the Brahmins resisted change, it was within the lower castes that most conversions took place. Yet the advantages to converts were minimal, because their post-conversion lifestyle did not differ much from that which they practiced as Hindus.

**The Effects of Caste and Culture**

At the partition of India in 1947, following almost two hundred years of British rule, the country was divided along communal lines. At that point Bengal and Punjab, the two foremost agricultural provinces, had the largest number of Muslims. The converts in these areas were from indigenous groups who had never been fully integrated into a strong Hindu social system, and even after conversion had been distanced from the centers of Muslim political power. Caste remained operative in Muslim society in India, where families of foreign extraction (Arabs, Turks, Afghans, and Persians) were considered nobility, lived in cities, and maintained exclusiveness. They spoke first Persian and later Urdu, a new language combining Hindi syntax with Persian and Arabic vocabulary. The seed for a separate state for the Bengalis of East Pakistan was sown when there was a move from the West to impose Urdu as the state language. The cultural divide between the two wings, separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory, and an economic disparity rooted in oppression and exploitation, led to civil war and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

Next in the social hierarchy of Muslim times were upper-caste Hindu converts, such as the Rajputs. After them came the artisans and “clean” castes, with the “unclean” occupational castes occupying the lowest rung. (Caste is still important in arranging marriages.) Local officials learned to speak and dress like the Muslim ruling classes, and gradual inter-marriage with the local population led to Muslim adoption of indigenous food and customs. The Muslim and Hindu aristocrats kept their women secluded behind purdah (curtains) in separate apartments, whereas women of the artisan and cultivating classes had relatively more freedom, probably because of the economic necessity of working with men. Marriage customs and rituals also cut across religions. Although not sanctioned by traditional Muslim law, dowry, a Hindu custom by which the bride’s father must give money to the couple, was widely practiced among Muslims (it remains so, today), and has resulted in much violence against women.

The practices of Islam and Hinduism influenced each other; Muslim mystics (sufis) and holy men (pirs) showed this influence the most. Their mystical doctrines centered around union with God through love. Highly unorthodox, they were nonetheless often revered by Hindus as well, and their tombs became pilgrimage sites for people of all religions, a phenomenon particular to South Asia. In many rural areas such charismatic men took part in clearing forests, introducing agriculture, settling populations, and effecting large-scale conversion.

**Interactions with Folk and Indigenous Religions**

In the fifteenth century Sufism resonated with popular Bhakti devotional movements in Hinduism, whose leaders attacked institutionalized religion, disregarded caste, and taught in the vernacular languages. Kabir (1440–1518) and Nanak (1469–1539), both of Punjab, were two of the most significant contributors to the Bhakti movement, and both assimilated Muslim ideas. They taught devotion and love devoid of ritual framework, and aimed at a readordering of society along egalitarian lines. Their followers are known as the Kabirpanthis and Sikhs, respectively.

Among the Muslims, interesting developments took place within the Nizari branch of the Shi’ite Isma’ili community. Their most successful leader in Sind, Sadr al-Din (fifteenth century), is considered to be the first author of the literary
genre of *Das avatar* (The tenth incarnation), an amazing blend of Islamic and Hindu ideas, in which ‘Ali and the prophet Muhammad are acknowledged as incarnations of the Hindu gods Vishnu and Brahma.

At the popular level there were folk religions of indigenous origin, like the cults of Panch Pir (five holy men) and Satya Pir (the true holy man), in which various beliefs and practices were assimilated. Religious reform movements of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, led by returnees from Mecca, disputed the Indian influences on local Muslims, and aimed to instill in the masses a commitment to “pure” Islam. Descendants of Shah Wali Allah Dehlawi (1703–1762), perhaps the greatest Indian theologian, spearheaded this movement; and the later Deobandis and *Ahl-i hadith* opposed the excessive veneration of saints and tomb worship. Shah Wali Allah translated the Qur’an into Persian that it might be more widely understood, and his grandsons made an Urdu translation. Later, Haji Shari’atullah (1781–1840) of Bengal also made it his mission to correct the Islam of the Bengali peasantry. His movement was known as the Fara’iziyya (Ar. Fara’idiyya), laying emphasis on the *fara’id*, or Muslim religious duties. Bengal had well-developed local religious traditions, including the veneration of local saints, because of a dearth of orthodox Sunni Islamic writings in Bengali.

**Language and the Arts**

At the advent of Muslim rule, Sanskrit was limited to Hindu texts, while Buddhist and Jain texts used Prakrit. The new Indic vernaculars (Hindi, Bengali, Kashmiri, Punjabi, Rajasthani, Marathi, Gujarati, Oriya, Sindhi, and Assamese), which grew out of the Prakrit and the Apabhramsa stages of Sanskrit, received a tremendous boost from the Muslims, who preferred the newer languages over Sanskrit and Prakrit.

Arabic enjoyed prestige as the language of the Qur’an, and was used mostly for religious scholarship, historiography and for translating scientific books on astronomy, medicine, and arithmetic for the West Asian market. Turkish flourished briefly as a literary language under the early Mughal emperors, but was replaced by Persian. Muslims were the most influential writers in the Indic languages of Kashmiri, Sindhi, and Punjabi, and the writing of Indo-Iranian languages Baluchi and Pashto was exclusively done by Muslims. In Bengal, Muslim sultans patronized the translations of Sanskrit classics into Bengali, and Muslims like Syed Sultan (sixteenth century), Dawlat Qazi, and Alaol (seventeenth century) were well-known writers in Bengali.

In the heartland of northern India, Amir Khosrow (1253–1325) mainly composed poetry in Persian, but also wrote in the Awadhi dialect of Hindi. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Muslim contribution to mystic (both Sufi and Bhakti) poetry in several dialects and languages was considerable. The so called “Indian style” of Persian poetry peaked during the reign of the Moguls (Fayzi, ‘Urfi, Naziri, Zuhuri, Kalim); the greatest exponent being ‘Abdul Qadir Bedil (b. 1644) of Uzbek descent. Well acquainted with Indian religions and philosophy, and influenced by Sufis, he was skeptical of all dogma. Persian remained the official language of Muslim India until 1835.

Due to the disapproval of dance and theatre by orthodox Muslim scholars, which stemmed from concerns over the portrayal of the human image, performing arts were regarded with extreme caution. Nevertheless, a form of passion play developed, especially in areas of Shi’ite concentration, enacting the tragedy of Karbala when Husayn’s (the Prophet’s grandson) family was killed in battle. In spite of the orthodoxy, Kathak dancing, born of a marriage of Hindu and Muslim cultures and enacting the love story of Radha and Krishna, flourished in the Mughal courts in the seventeenth century. *Ghazals*, short lyrical poems in Urdu set to music; *Marsiya*, songs on the tragedy of Karbala; and *qawwals*, songs celebrating the life of the Prophet or a Sufi saint, became popular during this period, and remain so today.

In India, the most dramatic impact of the Muslims was on the visual arts. Because of the orthodox Muslim aversion to the representation of living beings, non-figural art, such as calligraphy, and vegetal and geometric designs in both architecture and painting are preferred. Once settled, Muslim sultans started commissioning religious and secular manuscripts in the various Persian Islamic styles, replacing palm leaf with paper. Thus, the Indo-Persian style of painting developed, reflecting Indian styles as well as individual rulers’ tastes. The *Nimat-nama* (Book of recipes) was done in this style for the Sultan of Malwa in the sixteenth century. It can be seen today in the India Office Library in London.

Two Persian masters, Mir Sayyid ‘Ali and Khwaja ‘Abd al-Samad, founded the Mughal School of painting in the sixteenth century. The atelier, composed of mostly Hindu artists, illustrated both Persian and Indian histories and romances; for example the *Dastan-e Amir Hamza* (Stories of Amir Hamza), part of which is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. The compositions, fine line, and architectural detailing were Persian influences, while the vigorous movement and bold color were indigenous. Contemporary with the Mughal school was the Rajput style, the subject matter of which was almost exclusively Hindu. The interplay between these two artistic styles depended on the contact between the Mughal and Rajput rulers—political, cultural, and marital, or simply the movement of artists from the Mughal court. These traditional styles of painting were revived in the early twentieth century by the stalwarts of the Bengal School, who wished to make Indian artists aware of their own heritage.

**Architectural Influences**

In architecture, the Indian temple, with its sculpture-encrusted walls and ceilings and dark interior housing an image of a deity, with entry restricted to the Brahmin priest, radically differed from the mosque of the Muslims, which was open,
large enough for congregational prayer, and contained no imagery. Yet the new Muslim architecture became eclectic, capitalizing on the ancient Indian traditions, and introducing new forms brought from West Asia; for example, the voussoired arch (composed of wedge-shaped constituent pieces). Muslim building activity passed through three stages. The first was short and violent, when the new rulers politically appropriated temples by destroying them. In the second, material from destroyed sites was used to build mosques and tombs. Finally, once they settled, Muslims prepared their own building materials for individual structures, and used salvaged material only rarely.

As in painting, provincial architectural styles developed in the independent sultanates as the rulers assimilated the local culture. Elegance of style depended on indigenous traditions, terrain, climate, and available materials. This accounts for the enormous difference between the brick and terracotta mosques of Bengal (Mosque at Bagha, 1523), the wooden mosques with spires in Kashmir (Friday Mosque, Srinagar, 1385, 1402, and 1674), and the stone-built mosques of Gujarat, the interiors of which have marked temple features (Ahmed Shah’s Mosque, Ahmedabad, 1411).

The Mogul style, which started in the imperial capitals of Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpur Sikri in the sixteenth century, and which is marked by the spectacular architecture of Humayun’s tomb, Delhi (1571), the Jami Mosque of Fatehpur Sikri (1574), and the Tajmahal, Agra (1643), diffused to the provinces as they increased. The universal Mogul style can be recognized everywhere, but there were special features in every provincial context that were rooted in the vernacular tradition. For example, in Bengal, where there was no marble, the brick surface was plastered, lime coated, and polished to a gleam.

Although European styles took over during British rule, the Mogul style resurfaced again in the late nineteenth century, when the Indo-Saracenic style became popular for the official British buildings. It was an architecture of facades, with a traditionally Indian exterior favoring the Mogul arch and dome masking a European interior. Examples of this style include the Law Courts in Madras, built between 1888 and 1892. This linkage to the Mughals and to India’s past was useful to the British in establishing legitimacy for their rule.

See also Hinduism and Islam; South Asia, Islam in; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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Perween Hasan

SOUTHEAST ASIA, ISLAM IN

Island Southeast Asia, that is, the Malay world, has one of the heaviest concentrations of Muslim peoples on earth. This “Muslim archipelago” encompasses Malaysia (around 55% of 22 million people are Muslim), Indonesia (87% of 200 million), Brunei (68% of 330,700), and the Philippines, where Muslims are concentrated in the western and central parts of the Mindanao island and the Sulu archipelago (4 to 7% of 74 million).

The Era of Islamization

Islam was first brought to the “lands below the winds” around the eighth century by Arab Muslim traders. Not until the thirteenth century did the process of society-wide Islamization start with the kingdom of Aceh in northern Sumatra, situated at what used to be Indonesia’s gateway to India and the Middle East. In the next one hundred years, local communities of Muslims sprang up in port towns.

Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century Islamic kingdoms replaced the Hindu-Buddhist states and Islam spread rapidly throughout the Malay world due to intense commercial activity. Muslim merchants, religious scholars, and mystics, West Indians from Gujarat and Malabar, and Arabs from Hadramaut carried the message of Islam with them along the main trade routes. Islamic sultanates encroached on the power of the Hindu-Buddhist empires. The most formidable one of Majapahit on Java collapsed in 1525 and was replaced by the Muslim dynasty of Mataram. Islam was both a religion and an ideology of rule. The prevailing model was “raja-centered”. When local rulers (rajas, later sultans) embraced Islam, their subjects followed, accepting
them as worldly and spiritual leaders. Islam provided the theocratic and political base for the Islamic sultanates of the Malayan peninsula, Sumatra, Java, the southern Philippines, and Borneo. The flourishing commerce led to cultural innovation comparable to Europe’s Renaissance while Islam created a sense of shared identity among the peoples living throughout the archipelago.

The Islam received was pluralistic and mostly tolerant of other religious traditions. Cultural influences from the Hindu-Buddhist era were tolerated or incorporated into Islamic rituals. In certain pockets of the area (the north and northeast coasts of Java) a legalistic Islamic tradition prevailed. Existing religious traditions facilitated the reception of mystical Sufi practices. Seeking unity with God through meditation was part of Hindu-Buddhist religious beliefs. Inspired by the works of the great Islamic scholar al-Ghazali, a tradition of Islamic learning emerged that combined fiqh (jurisprudence), kalam (philosophy), and Sufism.

The Era of Colonialism

Island Southeast Asia was the major source of spices and other natural resources that Europeans sought to control. In 1511 the commercial empire of Melaka fell to the Portuguese. In the 1570s, Spain began colonizing the Philippines with the three Muslim principalities of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan. The Dutch started trade missions to Indonesia’s spice islands in the seventeenth century, gradually colonizing Indonesia. By 1841, British rule started in Malaysia while Brunei became a British protectorate (1888).

Initially, European colonization changed the outward-looking, vibrant profile of Islam during the age of commerce into an inward-looking conservatism. Islam became regulated by colonial rules, bureaucratized, and suppressed. The Dutch tried to deny Indonesian Islam by ignoring its deep roots in society, stressing local traditions and European law instead. Local custom (adat, Ar. ‘adat) was made the basis of laws for the indigenous population. Personal matters normally regulated by the Islamic shari’a, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and almsgiving, were under the jurisdiction of adat laws. Recourse to Islamic law was only allowed when the rules overlapped the adat.

The British curtailed the political role of Malay sultans but allowed them a degree of authority as heads of religion in their states. They misrepresented Islam by incorporating within it local traditions yet left the application of Islamic law to the sultans.

By the 1570s, Spanish incursions halted the Islamization process in the islands of the Philippines. The colonizers called the Muslims in the Philippines Moros (because they had the same religion as the Moors of Spain). For over four centuries the Moros tried to defend their Islamic identity in the “Moro Wars” against the colonial forces of Spain and the United States. Moros could not identify themselves with the majority of Christian Filipinos but failed to be excluded from the Philippine state when it gained independence in 1946.

During the colonial era, Sunni Islam of the Shafi’ite school continued to grow in Southeast Asia. Rural Islamic boarding schools called pesantren became the heart of orthodox Islam in Indonesia where students studied religious subjects combined with mystical practices.

Contact between the area and the heartlands of Islam in the Middle East grew after the Suez canal opened in 1869. The growing number of pilgrims making the Hajj to Mecca led to deepened Islamic learning and a growing tendency toward Islamic orthodoxy. Teachers of Islam and Arabic studied for years with shaykhs (sheikhs) in Mecca and upon return contributed to the reform of Sufism and orthodox Islam.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Islam became a rallying banner to resist colonialism. Mild successes of Christian missions caused a decline of confidence in Islamic authorities. Resistance arose among reform-seeking Muslims and among the ulama who led the traditional pesantren. The first Islamic reform movements started in the nineteenth century in Sumatra. Reformist ideas were brought to Indonesia by religious teachers returning from the hajj and via journals published in Singapore and Egypt. Reformists urged Muslims to return to a simple lifestyle, renew the moral basis of Islam, return to the original scripture, and purify Islam from unlawful innovations. Inspired by the teachings of the famous Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammad ‘Abdulh, they advocated an accommodation with modern thought and technology. In 1912, Indonesian reformers strengthened their movement by creating Muhammadiyah. This social-religious organization aimed at purifying Islam from indigenous and Sufi practices. It built schools that combined an Islamic and secular curriculum for the majority of Muslims who did not have access to the Dutch school systems. The movement was unique in its concern for women who were trained as preachers for women. The traditionalist Muslims based at the pesantren furthered Muslim piety through activities in the mosques and by bringing local village rituals in conformity with Islam. In 1926, these ulama grouped together in the Nahdlatul Ulama movement (NU).

In Malaysia, the reform movement drew educated, urban Muslims who gathered around journalistic enterprises. A student of Muhammad ‘Abdulh founded the periodical al-Iman in 1906 to spread the reformist message. Hindered by the British colonial regime and opposed by traditionalists and Malay secular elites, reformism in Malaysia remained less diverse and socially effective than its counterpart in Indonesia.

The Era of Independence

Indonesia. Upon gaining independence, the newly formed nation-states had to redefine the position of Islam in their
governments. Indonesia chose a nonconfessional government over an Islamic state in order to unite some six thousand inhabited islands that hold a variety of cultures and religions. The founding fathers promoted the state ideology of Pancasila, the concept of unity in plurality—one God worshiped in separate ways by Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists. Muslim aspirations to an Islamic state regularly led to uprisings in Sumatra, West Java, and Sulawesi. The Suharto regime (1966–1998) curbed the political power of Islam. The state established a ministry of religion to monitor religious matters such as the hajj, religious education, and the judicial administration. In 1973 the government tried to introduce a marriage bill that would give precedence to civil authority in cases of marriage and divorce, rather than to the religious Muslim courts. The bill was modified when Muslim leaders protested vigorously.

Leading intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid advocated focusing on a “cultural” Islam as opposed to a “political” Islam. The goal was Muslim renewal—spiritual, intellectual, and economic. This led to a strong revival of Indonesian Islam during the 1980s, and the Suharto government realized that Islam was becoming a force to reckon with. Non-Muslims started to worry when in 1990 the government established the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association (ICMI) to promote Islamization of state and society.

Differences of opinions among Indonesian Muslims still run along the spectrum of reformist Muhammadiyah and traditionalist NU. Reformists wish to purify Islam from all indigenous culture. They consider Islamic scripture to be complete and self-sufficient, and support the use of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and personal study. At the conservative end of the reformist spectrum are those who are against religious pluralism and who lobby for an Islamic state. After independence the Masyumi political party represented reformist aspirations in the national government of President Sukarno (1945–1965). One of their concerns was the growing communist movement. They were banned after rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi demanding Islamization of the state. When political aspirations were denied to all Muslims, in 1967, theologically conservative ex-Masyumi reformists formed Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), an organization for Muslim proselytization.

NU is the umbrella for Muslims tolerant of local culture that does not interfere with Islamic teachings. They stress the study of *fiqh* because it espouses the views of generations of scholars starting from the prophet Muhammad. They only exercise *ijtihad* in the context of this historic body of teachings, preferring *taqlid*, following traditional opinions. The political aspirations of its ulema were represented by the NU party until the Suharto government forced all Islamic parties to unite into one government-supervised Islamic party, the
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In Bangkok, Thai Muslim women attend a prayer for peace one week before the start of Ramadan. GETTY IMAGES

Partei Persatuan Pembangunan (Party for Unity and Development, or PPP). When the Suharto government demanded that all mass organizations affirm Pancasila as their ideology, the NU dropped its political aspirations and focused on religious, social, and economic development instead. This shift away from politics has resulted in increased piety among Indonesian Muslims and a steady strengthening of a democratic-minded civil society.

After Suharto stepped down in May 1998, the structure that repressed religion and society collapsed. Political parties representing Muslims of various affiliations were set up, religious organizations were free to have Islam as their sole constitution, and Muslims are fully represented in the democratically elected Parliament. Freedom of religion also led to the emergence of extreme groups such as Lashkar Jihad in 2000 that called for holy war against the Christian population in the Malaccan islands.

Malaysia and Brunei. In 1946, conservative, nationalist Malaysians aspiring for independence formed the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO). In 1955 the Pan-Malayyan Islamic Party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) registered to press the establishment of an Islamic state in British Malaysia. When in 1957 Malaysia became independent, UMNO was committed to a secularist vision of the new nation. Challenged by PAS, UMNO became more committed to Islam as Malaysia’s religion. After the 1969 clashes with the Chinese population, “Malayness” came to be defined in terms of the three pillars: Muslim religion (agama), Malay language, or bahasa (not English, Chinese, or Indian), and the government of the sultans (raja). The Malay rulers of each state serve as guardians of Islamic religion and Malay custom. The constitution requires Malaysians (55% of the population) to be Muslim. Islam and Malayness are identified with political dominance. Islam is coordinated through the state, rather than through independent socio-religious organizations as is the case in Indonesia. Being Malay permits access to affirmative action programs that are part of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was created to allow Malaysians to compete with the wealthy Chinese population. The goal is to transform Malaysia into an industrialized nation by the year 2020.

During the 1970s the revivalist Dakwah (Ar. da’wa) movement emerged among urban, middle-class youth organizations that faced the influences of modernization and globalization. It reiterated the reformist themes, seeking to implement Islam as a holistic way of life in society through religious renewal. It made Islam the main pillar of society and challenged the state led by prime minister Mahathir Mohamed to adopt its own Islamization strategy to “out-Islamicize” the opposition. The result was the Islamization of government bodies, the arts, the press, and institutes for learning. The Malay population became more devoutly Islamic. PAS continued its demands for an Islamic state and managed to implement shari’ah in the state of Kelantan. Through the new ethnic definition, increased Islamization, and economic benefit, the Malay community has been transformed in what is called the “new Malay.”

In Brunei Islam is the national religion. The wealthy country is ruled by an Islamic monarchy, the original raja-centered model. The sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah (r. 1968–), is head of the faith and responsible for upholding the Islamic way of life. One of the main issues in Brunei public religious life is the disagreement between those who advocate a theocratic Islamic state, and those who are secularly oriented.

Philippines. Philippine Muslims, the Moros, live in the only Christian-dominated country in Southeast Asia. Moros do not identify themselves as Filipinos and have been marginalized within the institution of the nation-state. Since the 1950s Moro Islam has witnessed a revival in Islamic piety. Moro Muslims have received assistance to build mosques and educate religious leaders from other Muslim countries. Marginalization and the increasing influx of Christian Filipino immigrants into the Muslim regions gave rise to armed secession movements. The most popularly supported of these movements is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Its actions caused the Filipino government to implement affirmative action programs for the benefit of the Moros such as building religious schools, and scholarships for Moro students. The administration of Corazon Aquino (1986–1992) granted autonomy to four provinces in Mindinao. Armed struggle continues in the twenty-first century with groups such as the extremist Abu Sayyaf pressing its claim for independence.

See also Muhammadiyya (Muhammadiyah); Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): Reform: South Asia; Southeast Asian Culture and Islam.

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Nelly van Doorn-Harder

SOUTHEAST ASIAN CULTURE AND ISLAM

The rich tradition of Islam in Southeast Asia is characterized by a variety of local practices and beliefs. Unifying this colorful spectrum are the basic precepts of Islam, the Malay language, and sets of shared cultural characteristics, many of which are shaped by pre-Islamic cultural systems. Concepts of power and spirituality, respect for ancestors, belief in spirits, and the local understanding of gender relations owe much to the pre-Islamic beliefs. Key concepts of pre-Islamic ethics are fused with Islamic ethical teachings. Southeast Asians stress concepts such as the maintenance of social and religious harmony (rukun), respect toward those whose position in society demands it, and sincerity in one’s actions (ikhlas).

Islam, however, is not just a veneer painted over Hindu-Buddhist notions. Islam became vibrant by accommodating core elements of the traditions present in the area at the time of Islamization through patterns of interpenetration and local variation. Over time, acceptance was increasingly measured against the scale of compatibility with Islamic teachings. How far Islam should coincide with Arab culture became a recurrent topic of debate.

When considering elements of culture and Islam in the region, the past and the present, the local and the global, intersect. There are many stages of commitment to normative Islam in local expressions of Islam. Nowadays, local cultures are also changing rapidly under the influence of modernization and globalization. With increasingly higher levels of education and knowledge of Western and Arab culture transmitted via the modern media, rituals held sacred for centuries can fade within one generation. Reformists altogether condemn indigenous rituals deemed inconsistent with Islam. “Purifying the faith” has been their rallying cry since the beginning of the twentieth century. Traditionalist Muslims incorporated local rituals, purging them of beliefs or practices forbidden by Islam. This entry discusses some of the main ideas that have governed religious rituals practiced by indigenous Southeast Asian Muslims, and the debates and interpretations generated by these practices.

Hierarchy and Power

Pre-Islamic understandings of hierarchy and power shape many cultural practices. In many places the king was the defender of the faithful and the mystical anchor of the religious community. Power is considered a quality that can be obtained through inheritance or by divine favor. Many became Muslim when the king accepted Islam. The king, and later the sultan, protected this power by performing ceremonies and rituals and by possessing certain artifacts that were said to be laden with mystical power, such as the kris, a dagger that was a symbol of manhood, honor, and ethnic identity. Religious and worldly power are preferably combined with various mystical powers (kasekten). Power is stratified according to rank and generation: elders are higher than juniors, and aristocrats are higher than commoners. Peoples (and spirits) live in a more or less clearly defined hierarchical structure. This hierarchy is expressed during important festivities. Before
marriage the bride and groom will ask forgiveness for wrongs done against the parents. During the 'Id al-Fitri feast that completes Ramadan, Indonesians honor those ranking above them in a ritual called *balal bi-balal* when they visit them, in the family, the neighborhood, or their work, to show respect, seek reconciliation, and preserve or restore harmonious relations.

Some sultans, for example on Java, still organize large traditional celebrations such as the Sekaten and the Gerebeg. The Sekaten is a month-long fair held prior to the Mawlid al-Nabi (Prophet’s birthday), one of the most popular feasts in Southeast Asia. This festivity used to be the prime tool of conversion to Islam: Peasants coming from the surrounding villages were moved to pronounce the shahada, thus nominally converting to Islam. The Gerebeg is a parade between the sultan’s palace and a nearby mosque where a mount of fruits laden with blessings from the sultan’s palace is divided among the people.

A variety of specialists from the earlier traditions (many of them called *dukun*) became incorporated in Islam. Among them are healers, spirit mediums, shamans, specialists in certain agricultural rituals, and midwives. They combine Islamic and customary or *adat* ceremonies, using incense, offerings to spirits, and prayers. They preserve their spiritual power by fasting, ascetic practices, and communication with guardian spirits. Many consider the spirits to be unacceptable to Islam. Their prayers contain Islamic elements and start with the invocation of *Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim* (In the name of God, the Compassionate, the most Merciful). Shadow-play puppeteers (*dalang*) belong to these specialists. They preserve one of the most popular art forms in Southeast Asia, the *wayang* plays, performing the Javanese versions of Indian epics of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. To many these plays convey the picture of a proper social and spiritual order. *Dalangs* are of high moral character and spiritual potency. Part of their potency is the word; their voice expresses the realm of the inner or mystical world. Traditions were invented to defend some of these practices by crediting early Muslim saints with creating them. Indonesians believe that nine holy men, *wali songo*, converted its population. The first *wali songo*, Sunan Kalijaga, is said to have invented the shadow plays.

**Slametan/Kenduri: Meals of Blessing**

A meal called *slametan* on Java and *kenduri* in other parts of Indonesia and Malaysia is a meal of blessing that forms the central rite of popular religion. The purpose for holding a *slametan* is to obtain *slamet*: well-being, safety, social and spiritual harmony. The meal is held for a variety of events ranging from pregnancy and birth, circumcision, marriage, life crises and death, and occasions such as starting a long trip, finishing a house, or to resolve a dispute. *Slametan* are subject to a wide range of interpretations. Some believe they please the spirits of deceased ancestors (*roh*), or local spirits (*jinn*) who are sometimes given special dishes called *sajen* (offerings). Foods served at the meal have ritual meanings and are presented in symbolic arrangements of four, seven, or forty-four. Some believe that the use of incense facilitates communication with ancestral spirits. Prayers said during the *slametan* are a mix of Arabic and local language. When held in orthodox Muslim families, only Qur’anic verses are used and the participants refrain from speech or symbolic acts that refer to spirits. Many Islamic feast days and life-cycle rituals are celebrated with a *slametan*. The framework for interpreting the *slametan* depends on the Islamic or indigenous orientation of the participants.

**Ancestors and Caring for the Dead**

Many in Southeast Asia consider death a transition. In order to help the deceased on their way in the afterlife special *slametan* (called *redekbah* for the Arabic *sadaga*, alms) are held at certain intervals after death: on the first, third, seventh, fortieth, and one hundredth day, followed by one year, two years, and a thousand days. Combined with the meal are recitations from the Qur’an in the forms of praise, prayers, *dbikr* or *tahlil* (repetitions of “there is no god but God”), and requests for forgiveness. The foods, in combination with the prayers, help to ask the deceased for forgiveness for outstanding offenses and create merit transferable to the dead that will aid the spirit’s passage from the world of the living to the afterlife.

Remembering the dead prior to important events is crucial. Often people gather at the graves for prayer and cleaning. Especially at the beginning and end of Ramadan, people will visit the graves in masses to include those who passed on in the spiritual and physical purification during the month of fasting.

**Spiritual Authority**

The Islamic equivalent of the charismatic person endowed with spiritual potency are the Muslim saints (*wali*) who are remembered and honored by traditionalist Muslims. In this same tradition the *kiyais*, leaders of Islamic boarding schools called *pesantren*, are considered links in a chain of sacred knowledge that reaches back to the prophet Muhammad. They are not only religious, but also social and political leaders. Spiritual and physical power are linked together when students are trained in fasting, meditation (*dbikr*), and martial arts (*pencak silat*). Developing *ikblas*, an inner attitude of resignation that moves a person to do good deeds for the sake of good and not for self-promotion, is part of this training.

Academic study in the *pesantren* concentrates on Qur’an, Arabic, and *fiqh* (jurisprudence). Part of the curriculum used to be, and in some places still is, the practice of mysticism (*tasawwuf*) and asceticism. Some *pesantren* became centers for mystical orders (*tarekat* from Ar., *tariqa*). Mysticism here was
The Masjid Raya, in the city of Medan in North Sumatra, was built in 1906 by Sultan Makmum al-Rasyid. Adapting elements of Andalusian Moorish architecture, the mosque and the nearby Maimoon Palace are part of the legacy of the Deli Sultan, that was founded in 1630. © Stephen G. Donaldson

closely connected to legal Islamic learning. Certain Sufi groups in Malaysia practice meditation combined with trance dancers. Some practice special veneration for their leaders. At times Messianic figures gain followings in their quest for a just and prosperous society.

Similar to the Sufi shaykh, a kiyai passes his charisma and position on to the son who is deemed most fit. After a spiritually potent kiyai has passed away, his students will visit his grave once a week in order to bring the “gift” of praise (tablilan), and Qur’an recitation. The popular practice of visiting graves of saints (ziyara) to perform rituals of prayer, praise, and meditation is shaped by the idea that their exemplary religious life brings some persons closer to God after death than others, which qualifies them to become intermediates for the living. Graves are found all over Lara; the most powerful of these are those of the wali songo. Some graves are believed potent enough that visiting them a certain number of times is considered equal to performing the hajj to Mecca. Graves shape a sacred landscape filled with male and female saints, teachers, kings, and princes. Reformist and legalistically minded Muslims have long vehemently opposed ziyara. In Malaysia, the reformist Dakwah movement has reduced the practice of ziyara, especially in urban areas, although local villagers continue to perform cherished rituals.

Speech

Recitation of Arabic verses from the Qur’an is considered a powerful medium for healing, protection, to have a wish fulfilled, or to gain power. The words by themselves are purifying and uplifting. Many do not necessarily understand their meaning. When in 1998 Indonesia fell into a massive economic crisis with ensuing social unrest, mass prayers during dhikr meetings called istighosah were held all over the country to strengthen and heal the nation. Those who learn the Qur’an by heart are obliged to guard the text the rest of their life. Forgetting will be their gravest sin. During the month of Ramadan, the use of holy words is intensified through tarawih prayers at night and nightly readings of the entire Qur’an, or nightly recitation of one-thirtieth of the Qur’an. Beliefs in the power of speech are inspired by the Sufi intellectual tradition that identifies material reality as emanating from God. This means that powerful speech can change this reality. Words from the Qur’an are believed to have healing qualities when used in amulets or mantras. In Malaysia, shamans use Islamic stories, images, and texts to
heal sickness caused by spirit possession. Spirits are identified as the *jinān* that are mentioned in the Qurʾān. Imbalance or impurity within the body also causes disease that can be healed by the pronunciation of formula.

**Literature**

Apart from Qurʾānic texts, a large body of Islam-inspired writings, poetry, and prose developed in the Malay language. The writings that reacted to Islamic mysticism became some of the richest in the world. The most famous are the seventeenth-century works of Hamzah Pansuri, Nuruddin ar-Raniri, and Samsuddin al-Sumatrani. Hamzah Pansuri created a form of written poetry called *syair* that became a major vehicle for Sufi poetry and that has inspired Malay poetry up to the present period. Ar-Raniri defended orthodox mysticism using the works of al-Ghazali. Tales (*bikayat*) about the Prophet and his Companions became a popular genre of writing. Poems and tales are meant to be sung and recited. Students in *pesantren* still chant the *Barzanji* (poetic eulogy) several times a week in honor of the prophet Muhammad.

Local genres of semi-Islamic literature are the chronicles (*babad*) that were composed in the courts of the early sultans to establish their Islamic legitimacy. Certain Javanese *babad* describe the sultan as a saint who has the power to fly.

After independence an Islamic literature developed that espouses Islamic values. Especially in Malaysia, edifying novels became popular. Contemporary Indonesian writings by writers like Emha Ainun Nadjib explore the relationship between the individual and God. Young activists have started to use the novel as a medium to teach concepts such as human rights to students in the *pesantren* and other Islamic schools.

**Women**

Especially in Indonesia, women share the power of the word. Many women have memorized the Qurʾān to become a *bajidha* and go on to become finalists in the national Qurʾān reciting contests. In the past, international competition was not possible since contestants from other Muslim countries were only men. Nowadays women are allowed to compete in certain Muslim countries. Women also teach in the *pesantren* and make up more than half of the judges in Islamic *Syarīʿa* (Ar. *shariʿa*) courts.

**Islam and *Adat***

Southeast Asian societies have developed local legal codes or practices called *adat*. This code existed and in many places still exists alongside the *Syarīʿa*. *Adat* complemented the Islamic law in many matters of tradition and custom. The two law systems collide regularly in evaluating the same problems: how to divide an estate, what position to assign to women. In general, *adat* allowed women a position equal to that of men. Orthodox Muslims took offense to these rules, for example, in the division of an estate where *adat* grants the woman a share equal to that of her male relatives. *Syarīʿa* law applies the Islamic rule that gives only half a man’s share. Through the activities of orthodox and Reformist Muslims, the tendency now is to stress *Syarīʿa* rather than *adat*.

An image of a puppeteer at work appears in the volume two color insert.

See also ‘Ada; *Ibadat*; Southeast Asia, Islam in.

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*Nelly van Doorn-Harder*

**SUCCESSION**

The issue of succession—the assumption by a person of political or other institutional authority previously possessed by another—entered Islam with the death of the prophet Muhammad and has been a subject of continuous debate ever since. Simply put, Sunni Muslims believe that the Prophet’s religious authority died with him, that his political authority passed to a succession of caliphs initially selected on the basis of consensus and merit, and that the institution of the caliphate rapidly declined into hereditary monarchy and ultimately military usurpation. Shi’ites believe that both the Prophet’s religious and political authority remained united in a hereditary line of imams, that his dying wishes were subverted and suppressed by Sunnis, and that the caliphal succession has never been legitimate. Recently, scholars have increasingly...
questioned the traditional Muslim view of both the theory and the practice of caliphal succession. Some have argued that the historical record is obscure on even the most crucial points, and that in any case what can be gleaned from it suggests that divine absolutism, primogeniture, and forcible seizure of power were present from the beginning. Others have stressed the contributions of pre-Islamic Middle Eastern political traditions—particularly that of Persian/Zoroastrian divine absolutism—to the development of Islamic political theory. Whatever the exact course of events, it is clear that “the classical theory of the caliphate” as formulated by al-Mawardi (d. 1058) was the culmination of an ongoing process of interaction between the Islamic religious and political establishments. Subsequently, Muslim thinkers who strove to preserve an Islamic component in political succession were forced to increasingly distressing compromises by such cataclysms as the Mongol destruction of the Baghdad caliphate, the advent of secular dynastic rule in most Muslim lands, and the increasing intervention in Middle Eastern politics by European imperialism. After the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War, most governments in Muslim lands adopted modern secular principles of political legitimacy, although by the end of the twentieth century, popular support for the reinstatement of Islamic principles and practices of political succession was increasing.

**Etymology of Khalifa**

The original significance of the Arabic verb for “to succeed,” *kb-l-f—* from which is derived the word for caliph (*khalifa*)—is irretrievably buried beneath ancient and imperceptible layers of usage. It occurs in Akkadian meaning “to slip into or put on [especially clothes]” and in Hebrew meaning “to succeed, replace or pass away.” Dictionaries of early South Arabic give one occurrence of the word *khalifā* with the quasi-political meaning of “viceroy” in a fourth-century South Arabic inscription, but also give meanings as diverse as “suit of clothes,” “gate of a city,” and—happily confirming a popular conception about Arabic etymology—“pregnant camel.” It is a sign of the ambiguity of the meaning of the word that, although in both Arabic and Hebrew the first form of the root commonly denotes succession in time, place, or function, it has come in the former to be applied to the thing succeeding and in the latter to the thing succeeded. Lane’s *Arabic-English Lexicon* gives the primary meaning of the verb *kbālfa* as “he came after, followed, succeeded, or remained after, another, or another that had perished and died.” Of the 127 instances of the root *kb-l-f* in the Qur’an, most have specialized meanings related only distantly to the first form meaning of “to come behind or after.” As demonstrated by al-Qadi, the array of meanings encompassed by *kb-l-f* and its derivatives is closely paralleled by the array of meanings encompassed by *bd-l*, which can mean both “to exchange” and “to be exchanged” and is used by the Qur’an in contexts closely analogous to those in which it uses *kb-l-f*. The near identity of these two roots is echoed today in the use by modern Arabic and Hebrew of *badla* and *khalifat*, respectively, to denote “suit”—that is, change of clothes.

**The Term “Khalifa” in the Qur’an**

The etymological significance of the word *khalifā* in the Qur’an is less obscure than its pre-Qur’anic usage because the Qur’an has been an object of philological exegesis since very early after its appearance. The two plural forms *kbūlātā* and *kbūlāt* if occur seven times between them in the Qur’an, and in all cases are said by commentators to denote tribes or peoples who, despite the warnings of their apostles, disobeyed God’s will and were consequently wiped off the face of the earth by Him. Most commentators similarly treat the two occurrences of the singular *khalifā* as referring to the classic Qur’anic theme of a succession of peoples governing the earth, rather than the succession of individual rulers governing peoples. However, a handful of interpretations of *Qur’an* 2:30—“When your Lord said to the angels: I am about to put a successor (khalifā) on the earth, they said: Will You place on it one who will do harm on it and will shed blood ...”—interpret the word *khalifā* as a reference to Adam as an individual rather than the Children of Adam as a collective. The scarcity and lateness of commentators who ascribe to the word *khalifā* the connotation of an individual person with a political office have suggested to some scholars that the connection between the Qur’an’s term *khalifā* and the office of caliphate was not made “before the end of the Umayyad period or the early decades of Abbasid rule” (al-Qadi, “The Term Khalifā”). To others it implied that the idea of a connection was in the air but played down by early commentators “anxious to avoid approving the Umayyad caliphs’ use of the verse about Adam to enhance their own dignity” (Watt 1971, p. 567).

**Umayyad Succession**

The role of religion in the Umayyads’ justification of their succession to the caliphate has itself undergone substantial revision by scholars—a revision that parallels revisionist views of the progress of both empire and theocracy in the early Islamic state generally. The Umayyads’ use of the title *khalifat Allab*—“Caliph of God” (denoting a direct connection to the Divine) as opposed to “Caliph of the Apostle of God” (denoting succession to Muhammad as political leader of the *ummma*)—belie the conventional picture of the entire Umayyad period as an interval of secular kingship between the perfect theocracy of the Rashidun and the less perfect theocracy of the Abbasids. ‘Umar II’s reprise of Abu Bakr’s humble declaration that “I am not *khalifat Allab*” was the exception rather than the rule. The sources abound in evidence of a concerted effort by Umayyad court poets and scribes to augment the initial Umayyad claim to the caliphate as avengers of the blood of ‘Uthman with the claim that they had been installed in their position by God. Crone and Hinds rely heavily on this court poetry to reverse the traditional view of the emergence of divine absolutism in Islam. They argue that the
Theocratic Shi’ite-type conception of the imamate was the original one and that from the very first, caliphs aspired to as much, if not more, religious authority than the Prophet. It can be plausibly argued either that the interpretation of the title khalifat Allah by the Umayyads constituted “the first formulated ‘theory’ of the caliphate in Islamic history” (al-Qadi, “The Religious Foundation of Late Umayyad Ideology and Practice”) or that the Umayyads “had still not decided to transfer the concept of ‘Caliph of God’ from the sphere of court flattery and rhetorical salutation into the sphere of law” (Barthold).

**Hadiths About Caliphal Succession**

It is against this background of political and theological ferment that hadith statements about caliphal succession attributed to the Prophet must be evaluated. In contrast to the dearth of explicit statements in the Qur’an about legitimate political succession, hadith literature has many explicit references to the caliphate as a political office. Many of these hadiths use the terms imam or emir rather than khalifah in some or all variants, leaving open the possibility that they might have been initially uttered by the Prophet in reference to following the leader of the communal prayer and obeying the commanders of early military expedition, and were later reinterpreted—willfully or not, and with or without substitution of the word khalifah—as allusions to a political institution that did not exist prior to the Prophet’s death. Those hadiths which refer unambiguously to the caliphate reflect debates about the political succession in Islam going on among early Muslim intellectuals who wrote down the record of the Prophet’s utterances and the history of the early exemplary Rashidun (rightly guided) caliphate centuries after the fact. A vast majority of approved hadiths about caliphal succession fall into the quietist Mujahite category rather than the radical Kharjite activist or Qadari category.

The question of whether the caliph’s full title was properly khalifat Rasul Allah, (“the successor of the Apostle of God”),

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'Abd al-Hamid (1842–1918) was the sultan of Turkey from 1876 to 1909. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman sultan 'Abd al-Hamid tried to counter national separatism among Muslim ethnic minorities in the Empire by pushing the idea that the Ottoman sultans were legitimate successors to the caliphate on the basis of dubious claim that the last descendant of the Abbasid caliphs in Mamluk, Cairo, had transferred the caliphate to Selim III upon his conquest of Egypt in 1517. © BAIN COLL/CORBIS
with the connotation of succeeding the Prophet in his tempo-
ral function as defender of the faith, or khalifat Allah (“the
successor of God”), with the connotation of being appointed
by and having a direct connection with God Himself, was also
a much-vaunted and obscure issue of early Islamic political
discourse. The uneasiness of Sunni orthodoxy with the latter
title and its accompanying conception of the caliph as posses-
sor of the type of divine charisma claimed for the Shi’ite
imams is reflected by the widely circulated stories about the
first caliph Abu Bakr’s insistence on being called khalifat Rasul
Allah rather than khalifat Allah. The second caliph ‘Umar
rejected both khalifat Allah as applying only to King David
and khalifat Rasul Allah as applying only to Abu Bakr and
decided that the correct title was “Caliph of the Caliph of
the Apostle of God.” In view of the potential of this title for
cumbersome recursiveness, ‘Umar opted for amir al-mu’minin
(“Commander of the Faithful”), a title that continued to have
a rarified status even after the title khalifa became debased in
the late Middle Ages through widespread usage by many
different rulers of widely varying power and piety.

Caliphal Succession Under the Abbasids
As is attested to by the survival of hadith expressing some of
their views in the standard Sunni collections, aspects of the
Khariji, Qadari, and Murji’ite approaches all fell within the
boundaries of what later became the Sunni discourse on the
legitimacy of caliphal succession. But it was slogans borrowed
from ‘Alid groups later consigned by the heresiologists to the
moderate but nonetheless heretical fringes of Shi’ism that
swept the Abbasids into office. The Abbasids borrowed three
planks from the ‘Alid platform. First of all, they claimed the
right to caliphal succession as members of the house of
Muhammad (ahl al-bayt) by virtue of their eponymous ancestor’s
having been the uncle of the Prophet. Secondly, they
claimed to be the beneficiaries of nass—designation by virtue
of the father of the first Abbasid caliph’s having had the imami
charisma transferred to him by the son of Muhammad b. al-
Hanafiyya, the reluctant figurehead of the revolt of al-Mukhtar
which had first put both the mawali constituency and their
‘Alid ideology on the Islamic political map. Thirdly, they
claimed to be rightful caliphs by virtue of being the members
of the family of Muhammad (al-Muhammad) most capable of
achieving power. The first two of these claims were shaky to
say the least. While it is true that in terms of genealogy al-
‘Abbas was on the right side of the ‘Abd Manaf family tree
relative to Umayya, he had not even converted to Islam
during Muhammad’s lifetime, and it was certainly not the
relative of the Prophet whom the ‘Alids had in mind when
they chanted the slogan “most pleasing of the house of
Muhammad.” The alleged transfer of imami charisma to the
father of al-Saffah by the son of Ibn al-Hanafiyya had all the
plausibility of the Donation of Constantine employed a half
century later to justify papal dominion in Western Europe.
The third justification of the Abbasid succession—that the
Abbasids were the members of the family of the Prophet most
capable of achieving power—was rendered unassailable by
the successful result of the Abbasid revolution.

The early Abbasid era, in addition to being the golden age
of the Baghdad caliphate, was also the period during which the
embryonic Sunni Islam defined its approach to legitimate
caliphal succession—frequently in opposition to the vision of
the reigning caliph. The view favored by the caliphs is
represented by the Risala fi al-Sababa of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ (d.
756), which advises the caliph al-Mansur (r. 754–775) to aspire
to be something like the high priest of Islam and act as
the final arbiter on points of Islamic law. The view favored by
the “proto-Sunni” ulama was represented by the qadi (judge)
Abu Yusuf, who in his Kitab al-Kharaj advises the caliph
Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) to subordinate his will to the
stricture of the book and the sunna like any other Muslim.
The issue was decided by the outcome of the mubah, or
“Islamic Inquisition” (833–847), during which Ahmad b.
Hanbal’s (d. 855) heroic opposition to the caliphal govern-
ment’s efforts to enforce adherence to the Mu’tazilite doc-
trine of the createdness of the Qur’an upheld the ascendance
of the book and the sunna over the will of the caliph of the
day. This triumph of the emerging Sunni approach to caliphal
legitimacy resulted in the dispersal of religious authority
away from a central governing body and toward multiple
schools of law and a decentralized clerical authority. In
retrospect, this separation between Islam and the state in-
sured that Islam would avoid the fate of Zoroastrianism, the
official religion of Iraq-based, Middle East-wide, divine-
absolutist Sassanian Empire to which the Abbasid caliph was
successor, and develop into a supranational world religion
that was able to survive the demise of the first Islamic state.

The Classical Theory of the Caliphate
It is one of the oft-noted paradoxes of Islamic intellectual
history that the theory of caliphal succession was explicitly
formulated just at the time when the institution of the
caliphate was declining into political insignificance. But it is
precisely in weakness that political institutions are in need of
theoretical bolstering. The fullest expression of the classical
theory of the caliphate was articulated by al-Mawardi (d.
1058), whose Akhbar al-sultaniyya (Rules of sovereign power)
defines the relationship between the caliph’s spiritual and
temporal duties, noting that the “imamate is established for
the succession of prophecy in the preservation of the religion
din) and the administration of the world (dunya).”

The necessity of the caliphate as a collective religious duty
(jari‘ kifaya) upon the Islamic community is demonstrated
through such shari‘a evidence as hadiths enjoining obedience
to the imams, the ijma‘ (consensus) of the community about
establishing an imam. Traces of the polemic against Shi’ism
that conditioned the formulation of the embryonic theories
of caliphal succession of al-Mawardi’s predecessors—for ex-
ample, the Ash’arite theologians al-Baqillani (d. 1013) and al-
Baghdadi (d. 1037)—surface only rarely in al-Mawardi’s
Succession

As the caliphate progressively declined into powerlessness and caliphal succession eventually became the plaything of the sultan of the moment, al-Mawardi’s successors were forced into a progressively more realistic accommodation with historical actuality. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), for example, adds to election and investiture by the preceding calipha a third mode of succession: investiture by a man of power (rajul abi sharaka). As he reluctantly concedes: “Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the possessor of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the caliph.” (Al-Ghazali, Ihya’ ‘ulam al-din)

Succession after the Caliphate

After the Mongol conquests obliterated the Baghdad caliphate, the terms in which men of religion evaluated the legitimacy of political succession diverged still further from al-Mawardi’s “classical” theory. Two different approaches to a world without a caliph are represented by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and al-Taftazani (d. 1389). Ibn Taymiyya’s theory of the caliphate can best be characterized as a revival of Kharijite positions. He abandons the Quraysh lineage requirement, the imamate of the less qualified, and even the necessity of the caliphal position. Ibn Taymiyya seems to regard excessive stress on the importance of even the Sunni imamate as a Shi’ite-like heresy and is as antipathetic to Sunni consensus as to imam charisma as a religious principle of legitimate political succession. For Ibn Taymiyya, good Islamic government is any state in which emirs and ulema collaborate in the interests of Islam.

Al-Taftazani is far less sanguine about the removal of the caliphate from the political legitimacy equation, and is far less ready than Ibn Taymiyya to accept the political fragmentation of the Middle Period (c. 1000–1500) as a permanent feature of the Islamic world. Al-Taftazani’s views on the caliphate were referred to frequently by proponents of the revival of the caliphate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His Sharh was used as a textbook at al-Azhar, and both his Maturidi rationalism and his frequent references to the salaf al-salik (“upright predecessors”) appealed to the reformist Salafi movement of the nineteenth century that touted original Islam as the true religion of reason and enlightenment. By contrast, the favoritism toward Hanafism and eventual revival of caliphal universalism by the Ottoman sultans banished Ibn Taymiyya’s Hanbali puritanism to the margins, where it became associated with groups on the religious fringe, such as the Wahhabis. However, after the failure of the caliphal revival efforts of the 1920s, Ibn Taymiyya’s tactical retreat to “Islamism-in-one-country” got a second look from groups like the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) that worked for Islamic renewal from the ground up instead of from the top down.

In the meantime, in addition to eradicating the Baghdad caliphate, the Mongols also brought to the Islamic world a theory of dynastic succession in which God chose the ruler of the world directly, without the agency of the umma, and demonstrated His choice not through the consensus of scholars but through the outcome of military struggles. This made the subject of legitimate political succession less a matter for prescription by men of religion and more a matter for description by historians. The most prominent of these was Ibn Khaldun, “the world’s first sociologist,” who viewed the succession of political sovereignty as driven by ‘asabiyya—or the ruling dynasty’s group cohesion. Indeed, he interprets the restriction by previous theorists of the caliphate to the house of Quraysh not as deriving from hadith text but rather as from the fact that Quraysh was in possession of the ‘asabiyya of the moment during the period of Islamic origins. Although Ibn Khaldun is more of a historian than a religious scholar, his views on the relationship of religion to political succession were often quoted by later ulama because of his general prestige. In particular, his portrayal of the Quraysh lineage requirement as a practical rather than doctrinal consideration was much cited by proponents of non-Quraysh candidates for the caliphate.

Dynastic succession displaced caliphal legitimacy as a political principle in the Islamic world from the Mongols through the period of the early modern Timurid, Safavid, and Ottoman empires. Toward the end of the nineteenth century
the Ottoman sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II tried to counter national separatism among Muslim ethnic minorities in the empire by pushing the idea that the Ottoman sultans were legitimate successors to the caliphate on the basis of a dubious claim that the last descendant of the Abbasid caliphs in Mamluk Cairo had transferred the caliphate to Selim III upon his conquest of Egypt in 1517. Immediately following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, several efforts to revive the caliphate as a governing body of the world Muslim community garnered support among Islamic liberals and pan-Islamists. By then it was too late, however, European hegemony having imposed on the Middle East principles of political succession that had neither religious roots nor cultural resonance in the Islamic world. By the end of the twentieth century this had provoked an Islamist reaction whose vision of political legitimacy has far more in common with historically marginal fringe Islamic political movements than with traditional mainstream views of caliphal succession.

See also Abu Bakr; Caliphate; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Umayyad; Islam and Other Religions; Tasawwuf; 'Umar.

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Mark Wegner

**SUFISM** See *Tasawwuf*

**SUHRAWARDI, AL-** (C. 1154–1191)

Shihab al-Din Yahya b. Amirak Suhrawardi was a philosopher and mystic whose Neoplatonic “Illuminationist” school was a major influence on later Islamic philosophy, especially in Iran and India. Suhrawardi was born and educated in northwestern Iran and as a young man was an adherent of the Peripatetic philosophy of Avicenna. His mystical experiences and a famous dream of Aristotle convinced him of the inadequacy of this philosophy and made him a Platonist. The key elements in his new system were a reliance on intuition as a basic tool of philosophy, the closely related theory of knowledge later called knowledge by presence, and an insistence on the reality of the Platonic Forms conceived as immaterial intelligences. The most important statement of his mature doctrine was his book *Hikmat al-Ishraq* (*The philosophy of illumination*), in which he attacked certain Peripatetic doctrines and expounded his system in the form of a metaphysics of light.

Though Suhrawardi wrote his major works in Arabic, he also wrote in Persian. His short philosophical allegories, written in a simple and elegant style, are still considered masterpieces of early Persian prose.

In 1183 he attracted the attention of the young al-Malik al-Zahir, the governor of Aleppo, and for a time enjoyed an ascendancy over the prince that aroused the jealousy of religious scholars and alarmed the prince’s father, the great Saladin, who was facing the threat of the Third Crusade. It seems likely that Saladin was alarmed by the political implications of Suhrawardi’s philosophy, which called for a mystical philosopher-king and which resembled the view of the Ismailis, whom Saladin had suppressed in Egypt and Syria. Suhrawardi was put to death at Saladin’s orders, probably in 1191.

Though Suhrawardi’s philosophy has always been influential in the Islamic East, it was almost unknown in the West until it was popularized by the French Orientalist Henry Corbin, who interpreted Suhrawardi as an Iranian “theosopher” committed to the revival of ancient Iranian thought. Though Corbin’s view remains influential, it has...
been challenged by those who view Suhrawardi as a Neoplatonist whose project was primarily philosophical.

See also Falsafa; Ishraqi School; Tasawwuf.

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SUKAYNA (671–737)

Sukayna was the nickname (laqab) of the granddaughter of Fatima (the daughter of the Prophet) and ‘Ali bin Abi Talib. Her full name is variously given as Umayma (according to al-Kalbi) or Amina (according to al-Ishabani) bint Husayn. Her mother was al-Rabab bint Imri al-Qays al-Kalbiyya, a poet, whose father was the reputed military leader of the Kalb.

Having lost both her father and husband (‘Abdallah b. al-Hazan b. Abi Talib) at Karbala, Sukayna moved to Medina, where she acquired a taste for intellectual matters from her mother. In 686 C.E., she married Mus'ab b. al-Zubayr (d. 691 C.E.), who was killed fighting for his brother, ‘Abdallah, the acknowledged caliph in Medina and Iraq. Then, after a couple of marriages which ended in divorce, she finally wed Zayd b. ‘Umar, the grandson of ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan. She died as his widow at the age of sixty-seven.

A member of the abl al-bayt (family of the Prophet), Sukayna nevertheless had the reputation of a barza, a woman who is never veiled, entertains men at home, and is recognized for her judgment and sound reasoning. Her bold integrity was expressed politically in her opposition to the Umayyads, and socially, in her marriage contracts, wherein she insisted on her freedom from marital control and demanded the monogamy of her intended husband. Though it was to a hairstyle—al-turra al-Sukayniyya—that she gave her name, Sukayna was, importantly, a lover of the arts: According to Abu Zinad (d. 757), Jarir (d. 728) and Farazdaq (d. 727) were two famous poets whose skills she encouraged, and Ibn Surayj (d. 744), one of the great singers of the Hijazi School, considered himself her protege, and set many of her verses to music.

See also Ahl al-Bayt; Law.

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See Monarchy

SULTANATES

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AYYUBID

The Ayyubids were the family dynasty of Saladin (Salah al-Din), the famous Kurdish Muslim hero of the Crusades. The dynasty is normally dated from Saladin’s career onward (c. 1169), but is named after Saladin’s father, Ayyub. In their heyday, the Ayyubids ruled Egypt, Syria, Palestine, the Jazira (a region to the north of Baghdad and extending into Syria), and Yemen. Their rule may be divided into three major phases: Saladin’s career, his prominent successors, and the dynasty’s decline.

Ayyub and his brother Shirkuh came from Dwin in Armenia and served the Turkish warlords Zengi and his son, Nur al-Din. Saladin’s two great predecessors in the Muslim “Counter-Crusade.” Saladin accompanied Shirkuh on three expeditions to Egypt in the 1160s. After Shirkuh’s death in 1169, Saladin took control in Egypt in the name of Nur al-Din and reestablished Sunni Islam there. However, a rift began to develop between Saladin and his master, Nur al-Din. This
rift was prevented from developing into open warfare only by the death of the latter in 1174. That same year Saladin sent his brother Turanshah to conquer Yemen.

Much of Saladin’s first decade as an independent ruler, from about 1174 to 1184, was devoted to subjugating his Muslim opponents and creating a secure power base in Egypt and Syria for himself and his family. In 1187 he achieved a decisive victory against the Crusaders at the battle of Hattin and reconquered Jerusalem. The Third Crusade, launched in response to this loss, ended in 1192 in truce and stalemate. Saladin died the following year. Despite his undoubted successes, he nonetheless failed to rid the Levant of the Crusaders.

Saladin did not envisage the development of a centralized state. He bequeathed a divided empire among his relations, giving his sons the three principalities centered on Damascus, Aleppo, and Cairo. In the ensuing power struggle, Saladin’s brother, al-‘Adil, a seasoned politician, rather than Saladin’s sons, emerged triumphant by 1202 and reorganized Saladin’s inheritance in favor of his own sons. This kind of inter-clan struggle was deep-rooted. Yet, despite the fragmented nature of the Ayyubid confederation, three rulers, al-‘Adil (1202–1218), al-Kamil (1218–1238), and al-‘Ali Ayyub (1240–1249), managed to exercise overarching control. The succession of rulers in Aleppo remained among Saladin’s direct descendants. Other principalities were set up in Transjordan and Mesopotamia. Two of these, and Mesopotamia, survived beyond the year 1250.

In 1218, the Fifth Crusade arrived in Egypt but made little impact. That year al-‘Adil died and was succeeded by his son, al-Kamil, who in the treaty of Jaffa (February 1229) gave Jerusalem back to Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Germany. However, al-Kamil retained a Muslim enclave in Jerusalem, including the Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock, and a corridor from Jerusalem to the coast. The pious on both sides were horrified at this diplomatic maneuver.

The death of al-Kamil in 1238 ushered in a turbulent period. His son, al-‘Ali Ayyub, emerged as the new sultan with the help of the Khwarazmians, displaced troops from Central Asia who had fled the approaching the Mongols. In 1244 the Khwarazmians sacked Jerusalem, to widespread condemnation. The Ayyubid dynasty was terminated in 1250 in a coup instigated by the sultan’s own slave troops, the Mamluks, who raised one of their number to the rank of sultan. At the same time a new crusade, launched against Egypt under the French king Louis IX, was defeated by the Mamluks.

The unique focus of jihad during Saladin’s time was the reconquest of Jerusalem. This goal had faded by the thirteenth century. With the Crusaders, the Ayyubids often practiced détente and they were criticized, even in their own time, for their lukewarm prosecution of jihad. During the Ayyubid period the remaining Crusader states became fully integrated as local Levantine polities. The Ayyubids made treaties and truces with them and sometimes, as at al-Harbiyya (1244), fought alongside them against fellow Muslims. Trade was important for the Ayyubids. They were afraid of further crusades being launched from Europe, which would disrupt their lucrative arrangements with the Italian maritime states.

Despite their religious reverence for Jerusalem, the Ayyubid dynasty never chose it as a capital, preferring Cairo or Damascus. During the Fifth Crusade in 1219, al-Mu’azzam, who, like other Ayyubids, had beautified the Holy City, dismantled its fortifications lest it should fall into Crusader hands again. This action, justified as sorrowful necessity by al-Mu’azzam, provoked widespread condemnation among the local Muslim population. Worse was to come when al-Kamil, plagued by inter-familial strife, and anxious to deflect another crusade, ceded Jerusalem to Frederick II. The Holy City remained a pawn on the Levantine chessboard, coming back under the control of the Ayyubids in 1239 and then handed back to the Crusaders five years later, then being sacked in 1244 by the Khwarazmians and returning to Muslim control.

In other respects, the Ayyubids were keen to prove their Sunni credentials, building religious monuments in Jerusalem, Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere and choosing grandiose jihad titulature on their correspondence, coins, and monumental inscriptions. They founded no less than sixty-three religious colleges in Damascus alone (the Ayyubids were Shaﬁʿis or Hanafis). They welcomed Sufis, for whom they founded cloisters (khanqabs).

The Ayyubids’s relationship with the Baghdad caliphate was complex. Like earlier military dynasties that had usurped power, the Ayyubids sought legitimization from the caliph in Baghdad. Caliphal ambassadors mediated in inter-Ayyubid disputes, and the caliph al-Nasir (d. 1225) created around himself a network of spiritual alliances with Muslim rulers, including the Ayyubids. Such symbolic links did not remove mutual suspicion, however. Both sides feared each other’s expansionist aims and denied each other military support.

Saladin inherited eastern governmental traditions brought to Syria by the Seljuks. In Egypt continuity also existed between Fatimid and Ayyubid practice, especially in taxation. This process is mirrored in the career of Qadi al-Fadil, a Sunni Muslim who had served the Fatimid government in Baghdad. Caliphal ambassadors mediated in inter-Ayyubid disputes, and the caliph al-Nasir (d. 1225) created around himself a network of spiritual alliances with Muslim rulers, including the Ayyubids. Such symbolic links did not remove mutual suspicion, however. Both sides feared each other’s expansionist aims and denied each other military support.

Armed with the revenues of Egypt, Saladin built up a strong army which included his own contingents (ashkars) as well as iqtad holders, vassals, and auxiliary forces. The Ayyubid armies were composed of Kurds and Turks, with the latter predominating. The recruitment of slave soldiers (mamluks),
always a feature of Ayyubid military policy, intensified under al-‘Ali Ayyub. This able ruler began to centralize his administration in Cairo, thus foreshadowing the policies of the Ayyubids’s successors, the Mamluks.

Apart from Saladin’s brief attempt to build a navy, the Ayyubids were not interested in fighting the Crusaders at sea. They did not construct castles in the Crusader manner, preferring instead to build or strengthen city fortifications and erect citadels, as in Cairo and Aleppo. The fragmented nature of Ayyubid power led to a proliferation of small courts based on individual cities, such as Cairo and Damascus. Here the Ayyubid princes patronized the arts. Some, such as al-Amijad Bahramshah and Abul-Fida of Hama, were themselves men of letters; others (Saladin, al-‘Adil, and al-Kamil) were exceptionally able rulers.

Two key characteristics of Ayyubid policy were already evident in Saladin’s time: the promotion of Sunni Islam and the need to rule a united Syro-Egyptian polity. Saladin had acquired great prestige by abolishing the two hundred-year-old Ishma’ili Shi’ite caliphate of Cairo. The key Ayyubid
principalities were Cairo and Damascus; when these were united under one ruler, equilibrium and stability prevailed.

It is important to view the Ayyubids not only in relation to the Crusaders but also within their wider Islamic context, where they had to contend with other neighboring states. Among these were the powerful Anatolian Seljuks, the Artuqids and the Zengids in the Jazira, and the Caucasian Christian kingdoms. Traditionally, the Ayyubids have been cast as opportunistic, self-serving politicians, but their survival depended on local Levantine solidarity. In times of crisis or external aggression the Ayyubids would ally with their close neighbors, whoever they were, to defend their territory.

See also Cairo; Caliphate; Crusades; Education; Saladin; Sultanates: Delhi; Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Sultanates: Mamluk; Sultanates: Modern; Sultanates: Seljuk.

Carole Hillenbrand

DELHI

The Ghorian prince Shahab al-Din (who assumed the title of Mu’izz al-Din Muhammad on becoming the sultan in 1202) conquered extensive territories in North India up to Bengal during the years 1175 to 1206. His Turkish slave Qutb al-Din Aibak became an independent ruler following his death in 1206. Aibak was succeeded by his slave Ilutmish (1211–1236), who, after having established himself at Delhi, received diploma of investiture as the “Sultan of India” from the Abbasid caliph. The Delhi sultanate thus formed was ruled over by the Turkish slaves down to 1290; by Ilutmish’s descendants until 1266, and by Ghiyas al-Din Balban (1266–1286) and his offspring subsequently. Later, during the period 1290 to 1412, it was ruled over successively by two non-Turkish dynasties, the Khaljis (1290–1320) and Tughlaqs (1320–1412). The sultanate underwent great expansion during the reign of ‘Ala’ al-Din Khalji (1296–1316), under whom Gujarat was annexed, and the southern states down to Tamil Nadu were subjugated. By the time of Muhammad Tughlaq (1325–1351), all the major South Indian states had been annexed. However, before his death a large number of provinces had seceded, forming independent principalities such as the Bahmanis in the Deccan. Timur’s invasion in 1398 weakened the sultanate irretrievably; thenceforth it ceased to be a pan-Indian entity.

Shahab al-Din’s original principality, Ghor, comprised the Afghan province of the same name located in the zone more exposed to Iranian culture. It was organized on a clan and family basis; the royal office was confined to the Shansbani clan while the military commanders (pabatwanan) were of the Kharmil and Salar clans. The troopers were recruited from among the inhabitants of Ghor and those of the lowlands (garmsir) in the Hilmand valley. After the occupation of Ghazni by the Ghorians in 1173 and 1174, the Ghaznavide tradition of governance identified with a corps of Turkish slaves and a system of temporary land assignments (iqta’) was incorporated in the Ghorian state structure. These institutions combined with Ghaurian control over the sources of horse supply, and their greater expertise in mounted archery and use of crossbows may explain the sweep and rapidity of their conquests in India. The Delhi sultanate’s success in checking the Mongols had much to do with the efficacy of its military organization identified with the iqta’ system. ‘Ala-al-Din Khalji’s measures of price control and assessment of a land-tax by measurement (wa’fa-e birwa) also greatly enlarged the sultanate’s fiscal resources.

Structure of Delhi Sultanate

During the thirteenth century, the sultans’ nobility consisted of two main segments: the Persian-speaking Tajiks and the Turkish slaves. The latter were more influential; many of the high military positions and assignments were held by Turkish nobles of slave origin known as the forty (chabalgani). Ballan’s reign witnessed the eclipse of the forty. There emerged a new set of nobles many of whom, like Khaljis, were not necessarily of Turkish origin. There was also a perceptible tendency toward accommodating within the ruling elite Indian and Mongol converts to Islam as well as some of the Hindu warrior elements (rawats) having a long tradition of military service. Ziya Barani’s perception of the rise of the “low born” appears to be a reflection of this tendency, which became quite strong during Muhammad Tughlaq’s reign (1325–1351).

Once they received land tax at the rate of one-half of the produce, the sultans did not disturb the rights of the non-Muslims on the lands they tilled. Down to Firoz Shah Tughlaq’s accession (1351), no attempt was made to impose jizya—a tax on the person rather than on the land, usually on non-Muslims—on any section of the non-Muslims, though the land tax itself was often called khiraj-o-jizya. Again, the Hindu chiefs (rays and ranas) were left in possession of their principalities in lieu of annual tribute; some of them were even recruited as the officers of the sultan’s government. Similarly, the village headmen (khuts and muqaddams) were incorporated into the machinery of revenue collection. ‘Ala-al-Din Khalji is reported to have prevented them from shifting the burden of their share of land tax to the ordinary peasants.

Economic and Cultural Impact

The state patronage in the Delhi sultanate was distributed among deserving members of the Islamic elite by the head of the ecclesiastical affairs (sadr al-sudur), who also acted as chief judge (qadi-e mumalik). He enforced the orthodox law through a network of local courts.

The establishment of Delhi sultanate coincided with the coming to India of new skills and crafts such as the manufacture of paper, the arcuate technique in buildings, and the spinning wheel. The sultanate was marked by an urban revival and commercial expansion. Both Delhi and Daulatabad (in the south) were exceptionally large cities by the standards of the time.
The sultanate gave rise not only to a large Muslim population but also to the implantation of a culture revolving round the Persian language. As the noted poet Amir Khosrow (d.1325) showed, the Muslim stream began to merge with the traditional Indian to create a genuinely composite culture. This was reflected in the realm of architecture where the two merged, to create not only the Qutb Minar at Delhi, but a number of other splendid monuments as well. The Sufic schools interacted with the Yogic, and played their part in bringing about the later monotheistic movements of Kabir and Nanak.

See also Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Sultanates: Mamluk; Sultanates: Seljuk.

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Iqtidar Alam Khan

GHAZNAVID
The Ghaznavids were a Turkish slave-soldier dynasty (mamluk or ghulam) who ruled a sultanate that rose to dominance in eastern Iran, central Afghanistan, and modern-day Pakistan during the eleventh and twelfth centuries C.E. Though on the periphery of the Muslim world at the time, this sultanate was to play a major role in the formation of Persian literature and the opening of India for Muslim control. Motives aside, the Ghaznavids were great patrons of arts and literature, and their courts were magnets for a large number of poets, artists, and scholars. The Persian national epic, the Shah-nameh, was dedicated by Firdawsi (940–1025) to Sultan Mahmud (r. 998–1030). Even more than the Samanid dynasty that preceded them, the Ghaznavids brought a huge realm under the control of a single dynasty that made Persian the primary language of communication, both officially, as the language of the chancery, and artistically, as the preferred language of panegyrics addressed to the sultans. Moreover, Iranians would start writing their histories now in Persian, a move of momentous cultural significance. Arabic continued to enjoy the primary position as the language of science, and religion, yet Persian now stood on its own and soon would come to replace Arabic in most fields.

The founder of the dynasty was Sebuktigin (r. 977–997), a Turkish commander in the semi-independent city of Ghazna. Though part of the Samanid state, Ghazna was governed by army generals who ten years earlier had rebelled against the central authority. Sebuktigin managed to consolidate his rule in Afghanistan and was able to defeat the Hindushahis princes, wresting from them the Kabul river basin and the Panjab plains. Meanwhile, the Samanid emirs, under severe pressure from Turkish invaders from the inner Asian Steppes, had to turn to Sebuktigin and his son Mahmud, who was already the commander of the Samanid army. Having saved the Samanids, Mahmud came to inherit most of their domains, bringing their rule to an end.

Through a life of continuous military campaigning, Mahmud (r. 998–1030) built a vast empire; by the time of his death he had united eastern Iran and the southern parts of the Oxus River, Khwarazm, northern Iran, Afghanistan, and northern India. The army that conquered this realm was made up of professional Turkish slave-soldiers who were bought and trained for the purpose of fighting. Its core was the ghulam-e saray, an elite palace guard. Alongside this core was a wider force of Turkish slave-soldiers. The Ghaznavids, in turn, employed other auxiliary soldiers, such as Iranians, Arabs, and Hindus. In its campaigns in India, the Ghaznavid army was augmented by ghazis, or volunteer Muslim paramilitary groups. In many respects, the story of the Ghaznavids prefigures the story of the Ottoman Empire: each at the periphery of the Muslim world, each made up of a Turkish core, and both staunchly orthodox in their ideology.

This expanding military sultanate was, however, in the long run impossible to maintain. It would be dealt a crushing defeat soon after it reached its zenith. Mahmud, busy campaigning in India, where looting Buddhist monasteries had become a very profitable enterprise, failed to realize the danger posed by the advancing Seljuq Turkish tribes. His son Mas’ud (r. 1030–1041) was no match to the challenge when the moment arrived. The battle of Dandanqan (1040) in Khorasan was so decisive that the Ghaznavid Sultan, having been forced to abandon all of the northern parts of his empire, was even contemplating deserting Ghazna. This being a military empire, the soldiers soon killed their discredited sultan.

The battle of Dandanqan signaled a turning point in the history of the Ghaznavids. Mawud (r. 1041–1048), the new sultan, would work on consolidating what was left of the empire, which meant an expansion toward the Indian subcontinent. First Ghazna and then Lahore would be made the capital cities of what was now the first important Indian Muslim sultanate. Less is known about the remaining one hundred and fifty years of the dynasty than is known about the earlier phase, since far fewer sources are preserved, but this should not skew a present-day assessment of the historical significance of the later Ghaznavids. By turning their energy to northern India, they made possible the Islamization and conquest of large parts of India by later Muslim invaders. Their courts remained centers of literary and cultural activity, producing such important works as the Persian translation of the classic in statecraft, Kalila va Dimna, and the poetry of Mas’ud Sa’d Salman. In 1186 the Ghorids brought this dynasty to an end.
The Ghaznavids were fortunate to be immortalized by the adoration and admiration that was showered on Mahmud and later sultans by poets, ulema, and ideologues. Their rise to power would become exemplary in the mirror-of-princes literature. Moreover, Mahmud and his page Ayaz would become the ideal lovers for the Sufis, who sang of their love in their poetry. Some modern Indian Muslims would revive the memory of Mahmud as a Muslim Indian hero.

See also Persian Language and Literature; Sultanates: Seljuk.

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Walid A. Saleb

MAMLUK
The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria (1250–1517) had its origins in the recruitment of military slaves (Arabic mamluk, literally “owned”) by the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, al-Malik al-Salih (d. 1249). By this time, military slavery was a well-established institution in the Islamic world. Young males from outside the Islamic world would be purchased as slaves, transported to the city of the purchaser, converted to Islam, and trained in the techniques of war. Upon reaching adulthood and usual manumission, they would form—it was hoped—a loyal military force, without ties to the local population. In the turbulent period after al-Salih’s death (during a Crusader invasion of Egypt), al-Salih’s Mamluks murdered his son and heir Turanshah. Over the ensuing decade they took steps to rule in their own name. By the time these Mamluks defeated the invading Mongols at ‘Ayn Jalut in Palestine in 1260, they controlled the Nile valley and much of the Syro-Palestinian littoral. Under the early sultans, most notably Baybars (1260–1277) and Qalawun (1279–1290), the Mamluks eventually eliminated the last of the Crusader states and kept the Mongol Il-Khans at bay. The Mamluk regime remained a major regional power until it was conquered by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1517.

The Mamluk Sultanate is commonly divided into two periods. The contemporary sources base this division on the ethnicity of the leading Mamluks. During the first period, which ended in 1382, the majority of the sultans were Turks from the Kipchak steppe. During the second period (1382–1517), most of the sultans were ethnic Circassians. The utility of this division is limited. Moreover, the labels Bahri and Burji, frequently applied to the same twofold periodization, are of later invention and should be avoided as they do not hold up to scrutiny.

The Mamluks of al-Salih established a ruling system in which only Mamluks were supposed to participate. The sultan was to be a primus inter pares, atop a hierarchy of graduated ranks and responsibilities. As both the sultan and leading Mamluk emirs would purchase Mamluks of their own, the jockeying for power and influence among the resulting factions was often quite intense and complex. A typical Mamluk career might begin in the ranks, and then progress through the grades of Emir of ten (number of Mamluks in his retinue), Emir of forty, and Emir of one hundred. In addition to these promotions, a Mamluk might receive positions in the military-political administration, from posts as governors of small towns or larger cities to commander of the army or even vice sultan. Salaries for the lower ranks would consist of cash payments. As his rank increased, a Mamluk would count on receiving an iqta’, or right of revenue, from agricultural districts of varying size and wealth. Cadastral surveys were carried out early in the Mamluk sultanate to aid in the process of revenue inventory and iqta’ distribution.

As freeborn Muslims, the sons of Mamluks were excluded from the system. This was the ideal. In actuality, upon reaching the sultanate many Mamluks attempted to pass the office on to their sons. While we thus see apparent “dynasties” of sultans from the same lineage—the most famous being that descended from al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad ibn Qalawun (third reign, 1309–1340)—most of these sultans were in fact puppets, controlled by the senior Mamluk emirs who were maneuvering to take the throne themselves. Many of the sons of Mamluks, known collectively as awlad al-nas (“sons of the people,” that is, of those who matter), pursued careers in other endeavors.

Fueled by the agricultural richness of Egypt and sitting astride the lucrative trade routes linking the Mediterranean region to the Indian Ocean and points east, the cities of the Mamluk sultanate were centers of commerce, art, and learning. The Mamluk sultans recognized and supported all four Sunni schools of law, and appointed (and demoted) chief qadis (judges) at their discretion. The patronage of leading Mamluks resulted in the construction of many mosques, madrasas, Sufi khangas (hospice), and other structures. Mamluk financial support for the building and upkeep of these institutions was often codified in endowment deeds (waqfs). These would typically provide for the salaries of the clerics who taught there and the religious functionaries who staffed the buildings, underwrite the living expenses of students, and support other charitable activities. One repercussion of this active religio-educational environment was the production of a large number of written works in many genres. Today those same texts provide a wealth of primary source material for scholars interested in Mamluk history, culture, and society.

See also Sultanates: Delhi; Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Sultanates: Seljuk.
Sultanates

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Battle of Cairo, 1798. Murad Bey’s Mamluk army lost control of Egypt to the French, led by Napoleon Bonaparte. © HISTORICAL PICTURE ARCHIVE/CORBIS

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MODERN

Sultan is a Near-Eastern term that connotes a variant form of Muslim governors emerging out of the Ottoman, Umayyad, and Abbasid practices of ruleship, power, and authority over Muslim societies. Sultanate implies a Muslim polity precluding the caliphal states. The Islamic political doctrine lays emphasis on the umma, whose internal organization was secured and defined by a common acceptance of and submission to the shari‘a and the temporary head of the community, the caliph or the sultan, who are religious leaders, representatives of the communities, and sometimes referred to as the successors of the Prophet, (khalifat rasul Allah), or commanders of the faithful (amir al-mu‘minin), but subordinate to the law.

Muslims believe in the divine origins of government. Authority emanates from God and the shari‘a established the principles or roots of religion (asul al-din). Islamic law is immutable. The Islamic political theory assumes absence of legislative powers by humans and the state, but the state and rulers are expected to carry out the law. To disobey a law is to infringe on a rule of the social order. As such, it is an act of religious disobedience, a sin (fisq), involving a religious penalty. Consequently, the Islamic theory of government views man as khalifat rasul Allah and produced idealistic forms of government based on lineage illustrative of Max Weber’s sultanism, which refers to Middle Eastern Muslim rulers who dominate their society through the establishment and development of administrations and military forces as purely personal instruments of the sultans. Sultanates are, therefore,
geographical and political units that characterize Muslim power embodied in patronage, nepotism and cronyism. Nevertheless, not all regimes headed by a sultan were in fact “sultanism” in Weber’s definition. Other scholarship refutes this view especially in the case of the Ottoman Empire, which had a political system that was much more bureaucratic, based on objective rules rather than being rapacious and despotic. Ottoman historian Halil Inalcik applied sultanism based on objective rules rather than being rapacious and despotic. Sultanates are modern, but are nevertheless characterized by the weakness of their legal legitimacy.

Nineteenth to twenty-first century sultanates in Islamic communities are construed as polities based on personal rulership, where loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by embodying an ideology, or charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and rewards to collaborators. Sultans exercise power at their own discretion and are unencumbered by rules, usually subverting bureaucratic administration by arbitrary personal decrees. Those who administer sultanates are chosen by the ruler, and may include family members, friends, or individuals who submit themselves to the ruler. Some sultanates are modern, but are nevertheless characterized by the weakness of their legal legitimacy.

Twenty-first-century examples of Muslim sultanates include the sultanate of Oman located on the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. Ruled on Ibadhi principles by the Al-Busaidi dynasty, the Ibadhis initially believed that the umma had priority over the ruler and could function without the superior authority because people could themselves apply the shari’ah. The Yarubi dynasty changed this with succession based on preference for members of current ruling families over claims of outsiders. The sultanate emerged in 1791 when Ahmad b. Sa’id al-Busa’idi seized control of Muscat from his brother Imam Said b. Ahmad and informally recognized a single ruling family, assuming the title of sayyid or sultan.

In 1840, Sayyid Sa’id b. Sultan b. Sa’id al-Busa’idi (1791–1856) acceded to the throne after the death of his father, Sayyid Sultan b. Ahmad. He moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar and established the sultanate of Zanzibar, which ruled the towns and settlements along the eastern coast of Africa through the nineteenth century. From the close of the seventeenth century, Zanzibar and its territories formed part of the Oman sultanate, then a powerful maritime regime. Sayyid Sa’id’s death in 1856 led to a succession dispute between his sons and division of the sultanate between the Muscat branch and the African dominions. European influences weakened the sultanate of Zanzibar, which became a British protectorate in 1890. In 1898 the minor Sayyid ‘Ali II ruled under a British regent.

During the late nineteenth century, the sultanate of Zanzibar experienced severe racial tensions between the predominantly African population, Arab landowners, and Indian trading interests, which eventually escalated into open conflict. Reforms followed thereafter, including preparations to terminate the British protectorate when the sultanate became an independent constitutional monarchy. In 1964, the African populations revolted against Sultan Jamshid b. ‘Abdullah (b. 1929) and led Zanzibar to join mainland Tanganyika to form the Republic of Tanzania, thus ending one of Africa’s Muslim sultanates. While Sultan Jamshid was deposed the Oman branch has continued with Sultan Qaboos b. Sa’id (b. 1940) as the head. Other petty sultanates in the eastern coast of Africa include the Pate sultanate founded by Nabhani Arabs around 1205. Around 1858 former rulers of Pate founded the sultanate of Witu, which became a German protectorate in 1885 and a British protectorate in 1890.

The Sokoto sultanate is a West African Islamic empire established by a Fulani cleric named ‘Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817). By 1812 his jihads had conquered most Hausa states of northern Nigeria. As the territory of the sultanate extended, it was divided in 1817 into the emirate of Gwandu and the sultanate of Sokoto, each being overlord to a number of tributary emirates. The sultan of Sokoto remained overlord of the empire. Dan Fodio was succeeded by his son Muhammad Bello (1781–1837). In 1885 the empire was conquered by the British but the sultans survived through indirect rule. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries subjects of the sultanate held important portfolios in Nigeria including the first premier of Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, and Shehu Shagari (b. 1925), the first executive president of Nigeria (1979–1983). In 2002, the sultan of Sokoto was Muhammad Maccibo ibn Abubakar (b. 1948).

The sultanate of Brunei is located on the northern coast of the island of Borneo, in eastern Asia. Its people are Malay with Chinese and Indian minorities and a variety of indigenous communities such as the Dayaks, Iban, and Kelabit. Chinese annals of the sixth and seventh centuries indicate early Islamic influences, as evidenced by Jawi, a script derived from Arabic that had been in use as the written language before 1370. The late fourteenth century saw a widespread conversion to Islam in Brunei as Sultan Muhammad Shah, formerly Awang Alak Betatar, embraced Islam and became the first Muslim ruler around 1371. Islam spread rapidly when Sharif ‘Ali from Ta’if, a descendant of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn, became sultan (Seri Sultan Berkat) succeeding his father-in-law, Sultan Ahmad. From the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries Brunei was a powerful state ruling over the northern part of Borneo and the adjacent chain of islands. Its power declined when it became a British protectorate in 1888 and a British dependency in 1905. In 1959, Sultan ‘Umar ‘Ali Saifuddin III, who had nominal authority, promulgated the first constitution. In 1963 Brunei declined to join the Federation of Malaysia. In October 1967, Sultan ‘Umar ‘Ali Saifuddin Sa’adul Khairee Waddin abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Sultan Haji Hassanal
Bolkiah Mu’izzidin Waddaulah (b. 1946), who was coronated in August 1968. In 1979, a treaty was signed with the British, and Brunei became an independent sovereign state in January 1984. In 1991 Sultan Bolkiah introduced an ideology called Malay Muslim Monarchy that represented the monarchy as a defender of Islam.

See also Caliphate; Monarchy; Succession.

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Hasan Mwakimako

SELUJK
The Seljuk Sultanate was the first empire built by a Turkish nomadic tribe from Central Asia. In 1040, the Seljuks, who belonged to the Oghuz Turks, decisively defeated the Ghaznavid Sultan Mas’ud under the leadership of two brothers, Tughril Beg and Chagi Beg. They went on to establish an empire in Iran that soon extended to Mesopotamia, where Tughril captured Baghdad in 1055 and assumed the titles of sultan and shahanshah (shah of shahs). His nephew and successor, Alp Arslan (1063–1072), defeated and captured the Byzantine emperor in the battle of Manzikert (Malazgird) and opened Anatolia to Turkish migration. His son, Malekshah (1072–1092), completed the conquest of Syria in 1084. The empire thus extended from the Oxus to the Mediterranean. It is known as the empire of the Great Seljuks, and remained unified for some half a century.

The architect of this unity was Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092), the great wazir of Alp Arslan and Malekshah. Nizam al-Mulk unified the centralized administrative systems of the Ghaznavids in eastern Iran and the Buyids in western Iran and Iraq. In the western regions, he took over the system of land assignments in exchange for military and administrative service known as iqta’. In the east, where the conquering armies had been recruited among the Turks, large land-grants were made to the members of the Seljuk family as appanages, which, before long, were also referred to as iqta’.

Nizam al-Mulk also built an extensive network of colleges (madrasas) throughout the empire. These became known as the Nizamiyyas after him, and were devoted to the teaching of orthodox traditions, law, and theology. He appointed many of the professors himself, including the great Muslim thinker, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who taught at the Nizamiyya college of Baghdad for a number of years. The Seljuk sultans and the women of the ruling household endowed similar colleges throughout the empire. The aim of Nizam al-Mulk’s educational reform, which was somewhat controversially referred to as “the Sunni restoration,” was to curb the influence of revolutionary Isma’ili Shi’ism, which emanated from the Fatimid Empire in Egypt, the fortresses in northern Iranian mountains and the Isma’ili clandestine cells in the cities.

There can, however, be no doubt about the long-term impact of the colleges on the pattern of learning and subsequent development of Sunni Islam. Isma’ili militants assassinated both Nizam al-Mulk and Malekshah in the same year, 1092, which marked the end the unified empire. The Seljuks remained in power, and the sons and grandsons of Nizam al-Mulk remained prominent among their wazirs.

The disintegration of the Seljuk Empire did not result from revolutionary Isma’ili Shi’ism, but rather from the Turkish tribal practice of dividing the kingdom as the patrium of the ruler among his male heirs. In other words, the Seljuks, like the Timurids and a number of other Turko-Mongol dynasties, failed to solve the problem of succession without the division of the empire, and in the twelfth century the territory had become fragmented into a large number of principalities. Malekshah’s sons fought among themselves. One of them, Sultan Sanjar (1097–1157), became a powerful ruler in the East, but the disintegration of the empire elsewhere set in irreversibly. This fragmentation was facilitated by the practice of granting large iqta’s, which alienated provinces from central control, and even more by another Turkish institution: rule by the atabeg, who was the tutor of a minor prince, but who would often marry his ward’s mother.

Important Atabeg dynasties came into being in Azerbaijan, Syria, northern Mesopotamia, and Fars, while different branches of the Seljuks ruled in Kerman and in Anatolia. Many of the Atabeg dynasties survived the death of the last mainline Seljuk sultan, Tughril III, in 1194. The courts of these local dynasties became centers of culture, and continued to support new institutions of Islamic learning, the madrasas, through endowments. The kingdom of the Seljuk of Rum (Anatolia) flourished in the thirteenth century, after the Mongol invasion, when their court received a large


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Hasan Mwakimako
number of learned refugees, such as the great poet and mystic, Jalaludin Rumi (d. 1273), and his father, who fled from Iran to escape the advance of the Mongols.

The women of the Seljuk ruling house were very powerful, owing to the continuation of the Turkish nomadic custom. They were active in courtly politics, and acted as patrons of religion and learning. Many of them had their own wazirs even under the Great Seljuk sultans. Their power increased further as queen mothers under the atabeg system after the fragmentation of the Seljuk territories, and a few of them ruled in their own right after the death of their husbands, as did Zahida Khatun, who ruled Fars in southern Iran for over twenty years in the mid-twelfth century.

See also Sultanates: Ghaznavid; Nizam al-Mulk.

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Said Amir Arjomand

SUNNA

Sunna refers, in common usage, to the normative example of the prophet Muhammad, as recorded in traditions (hadith) about his speech, his actions, his acquiescence to the words and actions of others, and his personal characteristics. This close identification of sunna with Muhammad, and with authentic hadith reports originating with the Companions of the Prophet, has prevailed since the ninth century. Earlier sources, however, reflect a more flexible use of the term.

The noun “sunna” (pl. sunan) is related to the Arabic verb sunna and refers to a normative practice ordained or instituted by a specific person. The argument that sunna refers more generally to group norms or tribal customs is based on a false etymology, which takes sunna to refer to a smooth or well-worn track, implying in a social context the established or “well-trodden” custom of a tribe or group. In fact the ancient Arab idea of sunna is necessarily associated with a particular person responsible for establishing that sunna. “Every people has a sunna,” according to a celebrated Arab poet, “and a progenitor of that sunna.” Such sunna can be good or bad.
The same poet boasts that his ancestors left nothing bad in the way of sunna, and early Muslim traditions warn against following the bad sunna of the pre-Islamic Arabs.

Bad sunna is also a concern of the Qur’an, where the word appears in two contrasting expressions: sunnat al-awalim, the sunna of the ancients, which incurs the judgment of God; and sunnat Allah, the sunna of God, according to which He metes out judgment. The Qur’an thus contrasts ancestral norms to the norms of God, according to which the ancestral sunna will be judged. The Qur’an never explicitly associates sunna with Muhammad, although the notion may be considered implicit in the repeated Qur’anic command to obey God and His Prophet.

**Early Muslim Uses of the Term**

It was natural, given Muhammad’s prominence and the Qur’anic command to obey him, that early Muslims began to consider the Prophet a source of sunna. Ideas about prophetic sunna among the earliest Muslims differed significantly from later usage, however. First, the association of sunna with Muhammad was not exclusive. The first four caliphs in particular, and the Companions of the Prophet in general, were also sources for sunna. The caliph ‘Umar, for instance, asserted his freedom with regard to the appointment of a successor on the basis of conflicting precedents: Muhammad did not appoint a successor, whereas Abu Bakr did. Hence, for ‘Umar, either course of action was sunna. Similarly, ‘Ali reports that Muhammad and Abu Bakr both applied forty lashes as a penalty for drinking wine, while ‘Umar applied eighty. In the words of the tradition, “All this is sunna.”

For those who circulated such traditions, Muhammad’s sunna was one sunna among many, and in principle held no higher status than the sunna of Abu Bakr or ‘Umar. This association of sunna with prominent leaders other than the Prophet continued among Shi’ite Muslims, for whom the Shi’ite imams became sources of sunna. The second difference between early understandings of sunna and those that came later was that, in early Muslim usage, sunna was not yet closely identified with hadith. Early theological treatises and historical reports show a clear dissociation of the two ideas. Sunna was often invoked as a general principle of justice or right conduct, without any reference to specific hadith reports. Even more significantly, some of the earliest Muslim legal writings are virtually hadith free. Malik b. Anas (d. 795), author of the *Muwatta*, the earliest extant manual of Islamic law, appeals to sunna but treats the existing practice of the Muslims of Medina as a more reliable source of that sunna than hadith.

During the lifetime of the great jurist Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 820) these early, flexible ideas of sunna still persisted, but they were under challenge. In his polemical writings Shafi’i records a contest to define sunna involving three parties: speculative theologians, the abl al-kalam, who distrusted hadith reports and argued that to follow the prophetic sunna simply meant to follow the Qur’an; scholars of Islamic law, the abl al-ra’y, who acknowledged the authority of prophetic sunna in theory, but resisted its exclusive identification with hadith and relied on other sources as well; and traditionists, the asbab al-hadith, represented by al-Shafi’i, who argued that sunna could only be known from reliable hadith reports traced back to the Companions of the Prophet.

**Sunna as Revelation**

The traditionist argument championed by al-Shafi’i ultimately won the day, a triumph reflected in the elevation of sunna to the status of revelation (wahy). According to one hadith report that reflects the traditionist point of view, “Gabriel used to descend to the Prophet with sunna just as he descended with the Qur’an.” This and many similar traditions reflect the early, pre-dogmatic form of a doctrine that would later be spelled out explicitly: that the Qur’an represents recited revelation (wahy matla) whereas sunna is unrevealed revelation (wahy ghayr matla). The two manifestations of revelation differ in form and function—the words of the Qur’an are themselves of divine provenance and the Qur’an is recited in ritual worship—but the Qur’an and sunna do not differ in substance. Both are revealed by God and are equally authoritative sources of guidance. This doctrine bears a striking similarity to the doctrine in rabbinic Judaism of a dual Torah, one part written, one part orally transmitted by the rabbis, but both originating with Moses at Mount Sinai. The authority of sunna was further reinforced by the doctrine of ‘ism—-the assertion that, as Prophet, Muhammad was protected by God from error.

In practice the relation of the Qur’an to sunna came to be expressed in the maxim, “the Qur’an has more need of the sunna than the sunna has of the Qur’an.” As al-Shafi’i argued, the Qur’an gives general commands, whereas the sunna specifies the exact intent and application of those commands. Without sunna, Muslims would know, for example, that they should perform ritual worship, salat, but they would be in the dark about precisely when, how, or how often to do so. Moreover, the sunna provides the historical context essential for interpretation of the Qur’an by means of the “occasions of revelation,” or asbab al-nuzul.

The dependence of Qur’an on sunna, and the primacy of the latter, is further illustrated in discussions of abrogation (naskh). Most legal scholars agreed that prophetic sunna had in certain cases abrogated, that is, replaced, earlier revelations, whether in the Qur’an or in a prior sunna. “There is no dispute,” writes the great medieval theologian al-Ghazali (d. 1111), “that the Prophet did not abrogate the Qur’an on his own initiative. He did it in response to inspiration. God does the actual abrogating, operating through the medium of his Prophet.” Information about which commands abrogate and which are abrogated can only be known, of course, by means of sunna.
Sunna and Hadith

The primacy and authority of sunna as a form of revelation, as the authoritative commentary on the Qur'an and as an independent source of guidance, was thus established in principle. In practice, however, knowledge of sunna required sifting authentic traditions from the voluminous, diverse, and forgery-ridden mass of hadith reports. The chief tool for this sifting was examination of the *isnad*, a hadith report's formal chain of transmission. Hadith specialists evaluated the *isnad* on two criteria: the reliability of the individuals who transmitted the tradition, and continuity within the chain of transmission.

When those alleged to have transmitted a tradition met the highest standards of character, memory, and reliability, and when each transmitter could be shown to have been in sufficient proximity with the next to have plausibly passed on the report, then the tradition could be considered sound (*sahih*). Traditions judged less reliable were classified as fair (*hasan*), weak (*da'if*), or fabricated (*mawdu'ayn*). A huge literature grew up around this process, including massive biographical dictionaries, collections of hadith, and manuals of hadith criticism. The process of sifting hadith culminated in the tenth century with the compilation of the great collections of *sahih* hadith, especially the six "canonical" collections, the most celebrated of which are those of Muhammad b. Isma'il al-Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim b. al-Hajjaj (d. 874). From the tenth century onward, the canonical collections of hadith, especially the collections of Bukhari and Muslim, became virtually synonymous with sunna, exerting a profound and pervasive impact on Islamic culture.

The Influence of Sunna on Islamic Law and Piety

The triumph of hadith had an especially deep impact on the theory and method of Islamic law. The traditionalist thesis exerted extraordinary pressure to document every legal opinion with generous citations of hadith, hence the tendency for hadith reports to proliferate and for chains of transmission to grow backwards. The impact of hadith on the actual content of the law was mitigated, however, in a variety of ways. Acceptance of a hadith report as embodying authentic sunna did not necessarily assure its legal application. Jurists commonly distinguished, for example, between the personal habits and preferences of the Prophet (*al-sunna al-`adiyya*) and actions related to his Prophetic mission (*sunnat al-bidaa*). The former gave rise, at best, to recommended actions, while the latter were legally binding. This distinction is reflected in a tradition that recounts an occasion on which Muhammad gave bad advice to some date farmers. When confronted with the unfortunate results he replied, "I am only human. If I command something related to religion, then obey, but if I order you to do something on the basis of my own opinion, then I am only a human being." Among the schools of Islamic law, only the Zahiris, who were extreme literalists, insisted that the sunna in its entirety was legally applicable.

From the perspective of Muslim piety, however, the sunna of the Prophet as reflected in authenticated hadith reports was to be imitated in all its particulars. Thus al-Ghazali instructs Muslims that "the key to joy is following the sunna and imitating the Prophet in all his comings and goings, words and deeds, extending to his manner of eating, rising, sleeping, and speaking." The term sunna also came to be used more generally in any claim to represent the authentic and original practice of the Muslim community. The opposite of sunna in this sense is *bid'a*, or innovation. Thus Sunni Muslims distinguished themselves from Shi`ites and claimed to represent the authentic legacy of the Prophet by adopting the label *ahl al-sunna wa' l-jama'a*, people of the sunna and of the community. It is also in this sense that reformist Muslims have from time to time called for a revival of the sunna as remedy for the ills of their time. Such appeals have been especially associated with scholars of the Hanbali school of law, most notably the school’s founder, Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855), and its most celebrated medieval jurist, Taymiyya (d. 1328), whose intellectual legacy has continued to modern times.

Modern Controversies

A call to revive the sunna (*ibya' al-sunna*) became a particular focus of eighteenth-century reformers like Shah Wali Allah of India and Muhammad al-Shawkani of Yemen, who appealed to sunna to critique existing religious practices and received legal doctrine. This pattern of sunna-based reform continued in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially among certain Indian Muslims who called themselves the *Abl-e Hadith* (people of the hadith) as well as among the *salafi* reformers of Egypt and Syria. At the same time that these reformers were emphasizing the centrality of sunna as a means of reviving Islam, however, others began to challenge its authority for the same purpose.

Modern challenges to the authority of sunna have had two points of focus. First, a number of Muslims have argued that the hadith reports from which sunna is derived are unreliable. Nineteenth-century modernists Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) of India and Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905) of Egypt were among the first to openly express doubts about the reliability of hadith, partly under the influence of European hadith criticism. Beginning in the twentieth century some Muslims, most notably Mahmud Abu Rayya and Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (d. 1985), came to reject hadith altogether, arguing that oral transmission, rampant forgery, and the late recording of hadith reports in writing make it impossible to sort authentic hadith from the mass of forgeries. Second, some Muslims have argued that even if the details of Muhammad’s life could be known with certainty, not all of his words and deeds are meant to be followed. Secularists, like Chiragh `Ali (1844–1895) and ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), argued that Muhammad’s authority was limited to spiritual matters only. A small number of Qur’an-only Muslims, the so-called *Abl-e Qur’an* (people of the Qur’an) of Pakistan as well as individual...
scholars like Parwez, contend that Muhammad's only legacy is the Qur'an. Even some revivalist Muslims, notably Abu I-A'la Maududi (1903–1979), a fierce defender of sunna in theory, limit the scope of sunna by distinguishing between Muhammad's actions as an ordinary man and his actions as a Prophet.

These challenges to sunna have provoked vigorous polemics in defense of its authority from conservative scholars. Consequently sunna has become the single most important focus of controversy in modern Muslim discussions of religious authority.

See also Bid'ah; Hadith; Law; Modern Thought; Muhammad; Qur'an; Religious Institutions.

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Daniel W. Brown

SUNNI See Shi’a; Succession; Sunna

SUUYUTI, AL- (1445–1505)

Al-Suyuti was an Egyptian scholar best known for his prolific writings on prophetic tradition (hadith), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), Qur’anic studies, Arabic language, and related subjects. The son of a minor religious scholar, he was trained in the Sunni religious disciplines, and held several endowed academic positions in Cairo. Convinced that he alone was truly learned in an age of scholarly decline, he compiled a series of works intended to preserve the fundamentals of classical Sunni scholarship for posterity. His sense of his own superiority and his quickness to denigrate others’ abilities provoked his colleagues, and he was embroiled in numerous scholarly disputes. His claims to be qualified to give independent legal opinions (ijtihad) and to be the reviver of Islamic knowledge at the beginning of the sixteenth century were highly controversial. Al-Suyuti’s relationship with the Mamluk sultans who ruled Egypt was also an uneasy one, since he firmly believed that the religious scholars (ulema), as guardians of God’s law, should be the supreme authorities in the state. Toward the end of his life, frustrated and disheartened, al-Suyuti relinquished his public posts and sought consolations in mysticism (tasawwuf). He continued to write, leaving at his death over 550 books and treatises on a wide range of subjects. Several works are still in use as valuable references. Some modern scholars have dismissed him as a mere compiler, a judgment that underrates his scholarly contributions, especially in the fields of jurisprudence, prophetic tradition, and Arabic language.

See also Arabic Language; Hadith; Ijtihad; Tasawwuf.

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E. M. Sartain

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TABARI, AL- (839–923)

Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari was an important jurisprudent, Qur’an commentator, and historian (in descending order among tenth-century Muslims; in ascending order among modern scholars). Born in Amul, Tabaristan (by the Caspian Sea), Tabari memorized the Qur’an at eight and left home to study under more distant masters at twelve. He finally settled in Baghdad, always mainly supported by remittances from his landowning family in Tabaristan.

In theology, he advocated the moderate Sunni tendency, accepting such tenets as the uncreatedness of the Qur’an (against the Mu’tazila, among others) and recognition of ‘Ali as fourth caliph and fourth-best Companion (against the Shi’a) but arguing rationally in their defense. Likewise, he inferred the law chiefly from the prophetic sunna but gave reason considerable freedom to manipulate the revealed texts. Extremist Sunnis were sufficiently offended to blockade his house near the end of his life.

Tabari’s jurisprudential works were massive, and during the tenth century, a Jariri school of law vied with the Shafi’i, Hanafi, and other schools for the attention of Sunni Muslims; however, the Jariri school then died out, and most of the works are now lost. His massive Qur’an commentary was the first to deal systematically with every verse in succession. Tabari quotes many alternative interpretations from past authorities but he normally gives his own preference at the end, often appealing to grammar to establish the meaning. The author’s voice is most faintly heard in his world history, likewise a succession of quotations; however, the grand scheme that emerges agrees with what else is known of Tabari’s theology.

See also Historical Writing; Qur’an.

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Christopher Melchert

TABLIGHI JAMA’AT

The Tablighi Jama’at (“the society for inviting or conveying”) may be the most widespread movement of Islamic da’wa (“call,” “proselytism”) in the world today. Annual congregations held in Tablighi centers in Raiwind (Pakistan) and Tungi (Bangladesh) are said to include perhaps two million participants each. Dewsbury (U.K.) serves as a center for Islamic education and tabligh activity in Europe. Its annual meeting attracts several thousand participants, as do annual meetings held in North America. Overall leadership is based at the Banglewali Masjid at Nizam al-Din in New Delhi, India, where the movement began.

The 1920s were a period of violent religious competition in northern India, spurred by the beginnings of mass politics. Muslims in Mewat, southwest of Delhi, were a particular target of Hindu “reconversion” movements. Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944), the movement’s founder, first encountered humble Mewati laborers in Delhi. He quickly realized the limitations of mere schooling in influencing them, and instead initiated a method of practical learning, encouraging even the uneducated to remove themselves from their environment and preach to others. Tabligh, he argued, was incumbent not only on the learned but on every Muslim.

The movement requires no bureaucracy and no paid staff. It depends on small groups or cells (jama’ats) of perhaps ten men, financing themselves, going out door-to-door and speaking in mosques. Participants ideally volunteer one day a week, one three-day period a month, one forty-day period a year, and one four-month tour at least once in a lifetime. Women
do tabligh within their own circles and gather regularly for instruction with other women; they accompany a traveling jama’at only if it includes one of their male relatives. Tablighis follow and teach “Six Points”: the attestation of faith (kalima), canonical prayer (salat), knowledge and ritual remembrance of Allah (Cilm o zikr), respect toward all Muslims (ikram-e Muslim), sincerity (ikhlas-e niyayat), and volunteering time for tabligh (tafriig-e wazq). Writings by Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya Kandhlawi (1897–1992), based on hadith and known as the Tablighi nisab (The tabligh curriculum) or Faza’il-e a’mal (The merits of practice), serve as the movement’s vade mecum. Mutual consultation (masbwarah) is a fundamental principle in allocating responsibilities and making decisions.

Partition spurred new centers in Pakistan and served as a fillip to the movement in places like Mewat, which saw virulent anti-Muslim devastation. Maulana Muhammad Yusuf (1917–1965), who succeeded his father as emir of the movement in 1944, toured actively throughout the subcontinent. The Jama’at’s activities increasingly spread to Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.

During Maulana In’amul Hasan’s leadership (1965–1995) worldwide activity increased dramatically, dependent in part on the growth of an Indo-Pakistani diaspora. This continued under the leadership of the council, which succeeded him. The movement more recently has taken root among North African immigrants to France and Belgium, as well as among Southeast Asian Muslims. Followers of the “Barelwi” school, who see Tablighis as Deobandis, as well as modernists, and state-oriented Islamist parties like the Jama’at-e Islami, who reject Tablighi withdrawal from social and political activism, are their primary opponents. These latter critics deplore the narrowness of Tabligh teachings. The Tablighi Jama’at’s stance has, however, allowed it to operate without government suspicion across many countries.

See also South Asia, Islam in; Traditionalism.

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Barbara D. Metcalf

TAFSIR

Tafsir refers to Qur’anic exegesis. Tafsir claims to “clarify” the divine word, which serves to make the text “speak” to current social, moral, legal, doctrinal, and political conditions. Through their interpretive strategies, exegetes have struggled to make the Qur’anic text more accessible to believers, and more applicable to changing environments.

Origins

The emergence of the word tafsir as both a process and a literary genre is unclear. The word tafsir appears only once in the Qur’an (25:33), suggesting that no formal science of interpretation was established early in the Islamic tradition. Traditionally, tafsir can be traced back to Muhammad. However, within hadith collections, only a small amount of tafsir is ascribed to the Prophet; much of the early exegesis is attributed to one of his companions, ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abbas. During the first three centuries of Islam, the words ta’wil and tafsir were used interchangeably to mean “interpretation of the Qur’an,” and many authors employed either one of these terms (or none at all) to describe their exegetical enterprises. For example, Ibn Ishaq (d. 768), in his biography of the Prophet (Sirat rasul Allah), surrounds his citations of scripture with contextual detail, which serves to explain many vague, ahistorical Qur’anic passages; however, his activity was never formalized or labeled as tafsir. Other early exegetical works focus on explicating legal issues or theological rhetoric, such as Muqatil ibn Sulayman’s (d. 804) Tafsir khams mi’a aya min al-Qur’an, and Ibn Qutayba’s (d. 889) ‘Ta’wil mushkil al-Qur’an (respectively), but again, each author uses a different term to describe his activities. After the tenth century, a gradual distinction was drawn between ta’wil, which came to refer to exegesis based upon reason or personal opinion, and tafsir, which relied on hadith reports going back to Muhammad and his early companions. Throughout history, individual tafsir works emphasize either opinion or tradition, but sometimes rely on both.

With the rapid expansion of Islam, problems arose in non-Arabic speaking communities with regard to the Qur’an and its translation and interpretation, which called for more formalized exegetical commentary that extended beyond the words of Muhammad or his companions. During the time of the successors, schools of tafsir evolved within distinct geographical regions: Mecca, Medina, and Iraq, along with their corresponding exegetical “specialists” (mufassirun). The justification for the development of tafsir schools rests on Qur’an 3:5–6, which lays out two categories of Qur’anic verses: clear (mubkamat) and unclear (mutashabihat). The role of the exegete (mufassir) is to reiterate what is already “clear” and to clarify what is “unclear.” Much debate arose concerning what passages fell into either of these categories, as well as to what extent finite human reason could be relied upon to make such determinations. The resolution of this debate served to shape tafsir works (and continues to do so) on into the twenty-first century.

Typology

Generally, tafsir works emphasized four types of issues that required systematized interpretive efforts: linguistic, juristic,
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historical, and theological. Linguistic efforts focus on the meaning of a word, where to put in punctuation and pauses, the case endings of words, or the rhetorical presentation of information: Why are entire sentences or phrases repeated again and again? A juristic accent stresses what is to be taken as the general or specific application of a command, or what verses were to be abrogated by others. Questions of abrogation (naskhb) rely heavily on those tafsir that deal specifically with the occasions of the revelation (asbab al-nazal), that is, those tafsir that embed ahistoric Qur'anic passages within a progressive timeline. Without the exegetical efforts that contextualize specific Qur'anic passages, the legal tradition, in particular the theory of abrogation, would have no firm basis from which to operate. Theologically oriented tafsir engage such problems as predestination versus free will, the nature of God, or the infallibility of the prophets. Many tafsir works revolve around a single issue; others are composite in nature.

Tafsir studies can be divided roughly into six groups based on discrete literary and methodological features: classical, mystical, sensual, Shi'ite, modern, and fundamentalist. Classical tafsir emerges with full force in the fourth century of Islam, typified by the work of Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari (d. 923), whose Jami' al-bayan 'an ta'wil ay al-Qur'an (The collection of the explanation of the interpretation of the Qur'an) presents a seemingly objective collection of hadith reports that originated with the Prophet and his Companions. Other classical exegetes include Mahmud ibn 'Umar al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), who looked to Arabic poetry as a valuable source for his linguistic and literary interpretation of the Qur'an. His work engages both the rhetorical and theological aspects of Qur'anic exegesis. Fakhr al-Din Razi (d. 1210) surveys a whole range of debates in his commentary, in particular the differences between the Ash'ari and the Mu'tazili theologians. The Mu'tazalis, for example, argued that irrational passages could be interpreted to make sense through metaphorical (ta'wil) interpretation. Other exegetes defend the legal views of one school of law or another in their works, such as Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1200), who supports the Hanbali tradition, or Abu ' Abdallah al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), who backs the Malikis. In these examples, commentaries further a variety of theological, legal, or political agendas through formal explication of Qur'anic passages.

Mystical (Sufi) tafsir favors allegorical interpretation of scripture. Sufi exegetes suggest there are two possible readings of the Qur'an: the literal (zabir), and the allegorical (batin). They are most interested in allegorical readings, which are often counter growing orthodox interpretations. Generally, Sufis are concerned with establishing an intimate relationship with the divine, and look to those Qur'anic verses that reveal his hidden nature in gnostic fashion. These inner meanings of scripture are accessible only to those who grasp it through intuitive knowledge (gnoasis), rather than the intellect (grammatical, rhetorical, legal, and discursive interpretation). Sufi exegesis privileges seemingly random verses in the Qur'an rather than presenting a symbolic reading of the entire work. Oftentimes Sufi interpretations extract a single sentence from the Qur'an, give it an allegorical reading, and then use that reading to decipher a whole pattern of nontextual symbols through which the inner nature of God is revealed. The relationship between the sign and the signified is not always apparent to the non-Sufi reader, who may expect a more systematized set of interpretative strategies. For example, Qur'anic references to Muhammad's "night journey" (al-isra'), a journey that is taken quite literally by classical exegetes, is treated metaphorically by Sufis, who cast it as a model for one's ascent along the Sufi path that requires a stripping away of the self so only the divine remains. Sufis understand the anthropomorphic statement in the Qur'an about God seating himself upon his throne (7:54) to mean God metaphorically setting himself over the heart of Muhammad. Some of the well-known collections of Sufi tafsir include Sahl ibn ' Abdallah al-Tustari's (d. 986) Tafsir al-Tustari (Exegesis of al-Tustari) and Muhyi al-Din ibn al-'Arabi's (d. 1240) Tafsir Ibn al-'Arabi (Exegesis of Ibn al-'Arabi).

Sufis further interpret the Qur'an through their emphasis on the recitation of certain Qur'anic passages (dhikr), and their calligraphic art. Generally, Qur'anic recitation makes a written text a living text (for Sufis and non-Sufis). The words themselves do not lie static on the page, but rather resound in everyday existence, collapsing ordinary time into sacred time: the moment when God first uttered his revelation to the Prophet; when mystics directly encounter their God. And, just as the mystic finds hidden meanings within the written word, so too does he see the calligraphic form of particular words allowing for deeper reflection upon the dual meanings of their shapes and sounds. The calligraphic form of "Muhammad" or " Husayn" allows one to reflect not just on the word that signifies the person, but on the person's true qualities and intimate relationship with the divine. These oral and visual forms of tafsir serve to extend the written document into the realm of direct sensual experience.

Shi'ite tafsir rose in parallel with its Sunni counterparts. Shi'ites are primarily concerned with establishing a line of divinely ordained, infallible leaders (imams) who stem from the Prophet's family, starting with 'Ali, who was the first in a series of twelve. Shi'ites, like Sufis, rely heavily on the distinction between literal and allegorical readings of the Qur'an to support their understanding that the concept of the imam (along with the necessity of blood descent for true leaders of the Islamic community) is rooted in and validated by the Qur'an. For example, the cryptic Qur'anic statement that likens a good word to a good tree (14:24) is understood by Shi'ites to refer specifically to the Prophet and his family. Contrarily, a corrupt word likened to a corrupt tree (14:26) points to the immoral Umayyads, whom Shi'ites view as
usurpers of their rightful leadership. As is the case with Sufis, the connection between the sign and the signified is not readily apparent to those who do not accept Shi‘ite theology. In their interpretive efforts, the Shi‘a move beyond symbolic interpretations to favor textual variants of the Qur’an that validate their imamate doctrine, including one reference where Sunnis read “umma” (community), and Shi‘a read “‘imama” (imami leaders). Some of the major Shi‘ite tafsir include Abu Jafar al-Tusi’s (d. 1067) al-Tibyan fi tafsir al-Qur’an (The explanation in interpretation of the Qur’an), and Abu al-Tabarsi’s (d. 1153) Majma‘ al-bayan li-‘ulum al-Qur’an (The collection of the explanation of the sciences of the Qur’an).

Modern tafsir refers to twentieth-century interpretation. The aim of modern tafsir is to understand the Qur’an in light of reason, rather than tradition; to strip the Qur’an of any traces of superstition or legend; and to use the Qur’an as a source to justify its own claims. Generally, modern exegetes try to make the text more readily accessible to the common person who faces the challenges of modernity in a post-colonial environment where past tradition no longer seems applicable to current concerns. Modern tafsir works differ from classical works in that they no longer focus on issues of grammar, rhetoric, law, or theology, but privilege more modern issues. Modernists like Ayoub argue that such polygamous relationships cause harm to wives and children. Modernist exegetes discard tradition in favor of his own personal charisma, which ultimately gives him the authority to “interpret the Qur’an by the Qur’an.”

In each type of tafsir, the Qur’an is made eternally pliable to offer numerous interpretative solutions to Muslims as they confront changing political, economic, doctrinal, moral, and scientific conditions.

See also Calligraphy; Law; Muhammad; Qur’an.

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Kathryn Kueny
TAHAMASP I, SHAH (1514–1576)

Tahmasp I, born on 22 February 1514, was the eldest son of Shah Isma'il. He succeeded his father to the throne in 1524 and ruled Iran until his death on 14 May 1576. His fifty-two-year reign was marked by religious consolidation and battles with rival Uzbeks and Ottomans.

Tahmasp came to power at age ten, at which time Qizilbash (Turkoman tribesmen) forces took control of Iran for the first decade of his rule. The Qizilbash were not united, however, and the situation deteriorated into civil war in 1526. By 1533, Tahmasp reasserted his sovereignty, having executed the main Qizilbash chief who was effectively ruling the country. By this time, rival Ottomans and Uzbeks had taken advantage of Iran’s weak position, gaining territory from the Safavids. Nevertheless, the Safavids held on, fighting numerous defensive wars on two fronts. As a result of the Ottoman threat to the capital city of Tabriz, Tahmasp moved the capital to the city of Qazvin in 1555.

Tahmasp’s reign witnessed a flowering of the arts, in particular the arts of the book, best exemplified by a magnificent Shah-nameh (Book of kings), commissioned in 1522 and containing some 250 outstanding miniature paintings. Tahmasp was a man of great piety, and his long reign was of great importance for the spread and consolidation of Twelver Shi’ism in Iran.

See also Empires: Safavid and Qajar.

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Sholeh A. Quinn

TAJdid

Tajdid is the Arabic term for “renewal.” In formal Muslim discussions, this term refers to conscious efforts to bring about the renewal of religious faith and practice, emphasizing strict adherence to the prescriptions of the Qur’an and the precedents of the prophet Muhammad. The foundation for this usage is a widely accepted tradition in which Muhammad is reported to have said, “God will send to this umma [the Muslim community] at the head of each century those who will renew its faith for it.” Persons engaged in this activity of renewal are called mujaddids.

Although there have been disagreements over the details, and over which Muslim leaders were deserving of the title of mujaddid, the basic understanding of the importance of renewal has been remarkably constant throughout Islamic history. In the course of the history of the human community of Muslims, Muslims recognize that the actual faith and practice of the people sometimes departed from the ideal defined by the Qur’an and the model of the Prophet. Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad is the final Messenger of God so that in those times when Muslims have not lived up to the Islamic ideal, the community does not need a new prophet, it needs renewal. This mode of response to historical change is most important among Sunni Muslims. Within the Shi’ite traditions, there is greater emphasis on messianic styles of religious resurgence, with an important theme being the coming of the anticipated Mahdi, or rightly-guided leader whose appearance will be part of the events leading to the final establishment of God’s rule of justice.

The approaches of leaders of renewal have usually emphasized certain common themes. The first was the call for the return to the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). This often involved condemnation of practices that were identified as illegitimate innovations and departures from the Islamic ideal. This was not a simple conservative perspective since it involved a rejection of at least some aspects of existing conditions. As a result, a common second element in movements of renewal is the call for exercising informed independent judgment (ijtihad) and a rejection of the practice of simply following the judgments and interpretations of previous teachers (taqlid). The debates between the advocates of the two positions, ijtihad and taqlid, form a major part of the intellectual history of movements of renewal in Islamic history.

A number of major figures in Islamic history are usually identified as having been mujaddids in their era. Among the most important of these are Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111 C.E.), a teacher who brought together mystical and legal dimensions of Islamic faith, Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1327), a scholar whose ideas inspired later puritanical movements of renewal, and Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (d. 1763), whose teachings on socio-moral reconstruction provide foundations for most major modern Islamic movements in South Asia. A special figure in the line of renewers is Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), who was called the “Mujaddid of the Second Millennium” because he lived at the end of the first thousand years of the Islamic era. Sirhindi was a leader of a reform-oriented Sufi brotherhood, the Naqshbandiyya, in India. His branch of that order became known as the Mujaddidi. It later played important roles in activist reform in Central Asia and the Middle East and organized resistance to European expansion in areas like the Caucasus.
In the modern period, concepts and movements of *tajdid* take many different forms. Many movements have their intellectual origins in the teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), who joined with a chief in central Arabia, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), to create a political system and movement of puritanical renewal. In its strictness and uncompromising approach to what it defined as innovations, the Wahhabi movement came to be seen as the prototypical militant style of Islamic renewal. By the late twentieth century, even militant movements that had no direct connections with the actual Wahhabi tradition came to be called "Wahhabi."

Modern movements that emphasized the importance of the intellectual dimensions of renewal through *ijtihad* became important by the late nineteenth century. A leading personality in this was the Egyptian scholar Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), who served as Grand Mufti of Egypt. 'Abduh emphasized the compatibility of reason and revelation in Islam. *Al-Manar*, the journal reflecting his teachings, was read by intellectuals throughout the Muslim world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Other conscious movements of intellectual renewal developed in the Russian Empire under Isma'il Gasprinskii, in India with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and elsewhere.

Throughout the twentieth century, the movements of rationalist renewal continued. However, they were overshadowed by Muslim movements advocating broader programs of social and political Islamization. The Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, and the Jama’at-e Islami, established in South Asia by Abu l’A’la’ Maududi (d. 1979) in 1941, became the most visible examples of modern-style renewal movements. These movements presented programs for creating Islamic states and societies in the modern world. Although for a time they were overshadowed by secular nationalist and radical leftist movements, by the 1980s the movements of Islamic resurgence were the most visible opposition movements in many countries, and often they set the agenda for the Islamization of political discourse throughout the Muslim world. Intellectuals within these movements, like Hasan al-Turabi, who led the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan for most of the final third of the twentieth century, wrote about the necessity for *tajdid* in rethinking all of the fundamentals of political, social, and legal structures in the Muslim world.

By the late twentieth century, many of the more visible militant Muslim groups, like al-Qa’ida, were concentrating on issues of power and jihad rather than *ijtihad*. The broad tradition of renewal in Islam continued in new forms, among the militants and also among scholars who continued the process of reexamining the sources in order to present ways of having renewed Islamic life in the contemporary world.

*See also* Ijtihad; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: South Asia; Taqlid.

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*John O. Voll*

**TALIBAN**

The word *taliban* derives from the Persian plural form of the Arabic word *talib*, meaning “seeker” or “student.” As a general term, *taliban*, or its Arabic equivalents *tullab* or *talaba*, alludes to students from madrasas (religious schools) dedicated to theological studies of Islam. After 1994, however, Da Afghanistan da Talibano Islami Tahrik (The Afghan Islamic Movement of Taliban), or “Taliban,” was known internationally as the name chosen by a *mujahidin* splinter group that eventually dominated the civil war in Afghanistan.

The rise of the Taliban as a military force is debated. Their supporters maintained that the movement surfaced in Kandahar to enforce public safety and order in reaction to the looting and harassment of the local population by other *mujahidin* groups. Their opponents viewed the Taliban as a creation of Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence (ISI) in order to gain indirect control of Afghanistan and unhindered access to Central Asia.

In any case, the Taliban, with direct Pakistani military and diplomatic support and financial backing from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), emerged as the dominant military force that gradually came to rule about 85 percent of Afghanistan by 1999 (the remainder of the country was controlled by an anti-Taliban alliance under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Mas’ud). Comprised of former *mujahidin* belonging mostly to the Pashtun ethnic majority, the group first emerged in Kandahar in 1994. The original leaders and members claimed to be students from religious schools run by Pakistan’s Jam’iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam (JUI).

The Taliban gained international notice on 3 November 1994, when the group freed a convoy of Pakistani trucks commandeered by a local Afghan *mujahidin* group. Two days later, the Taliban captured Kandahar, and in September 1995, the western city of Herat. The Taliban seized the capital, Kabul, on 27 September 1996, ousting the ruling *mujahidin* government of President Burhan al-Din Rabbani.

Initially, the Taliban claimed that its goal was to rid the country from factionalism and the rule of warlords. However, on 3 April 1996, Mulla Muhammad ‘Omar Mujahid proclaimed himself Emir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), thus becoming the Emir (ruler) of Afghanistan. Taking
A young girl peers out among a group of Afghan women wearing the Burqa covering at a Red Cross distribution center in Kabul in 1996, when the ruling Taliban forced women to cover themselves completely in public, and banned women from schools and workplaces. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

advantage of inter-Uzbek rivalries in northern Afghanistan, in May 1997, the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif, the last significant Afghan city not under its control. This victory brought the Taliban recognition from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Although defeated in a subsequent battle, with heavy losses to their ranks (including some 250 Pakistani casualties), the Taliban recaptured Mazar-i-Sharif and then seized the Hazarah stronghold of Bamiyan in 1998 and 1999. This consolidation of power changed the internal structure of the Taliban movement from loose pockets of fighters led by a consultative council in which Mulla ‘Omar was primus inter pares, into an theocratic regime increasingly ruled with secrecy and terror as a means of control, with no leader accessible to the people. As rulers, the Taliban sought the creation of what the movement believed to be pure Islamic rule according to the shari’ah (Islamic law).

From its appearance on the Afghan political scene until its capture of Kabul, the Taliban were viewed by some sectors of the Afghan population as a means of restoring order. This view was also shared by certain foreign powers, including the United States, which tacitly welcomed the Taliban capture of Kabul. However, while securing the territories under its control, the Taliban proved to be yet another destabilizing group of warriors whose methods included ethnically targeted mass murder of unarmed civilians (in the northern and central parts of Afghanistan) as well as the total blockade of food supplies (to the Bamiyan region). What triggered international condemnation of the Taliban, though, was their maltreatment of women, who were banned from attending schools, holding jobs, venturing outside of their homes unless accompanied by a male relative, and being treated by male physicians. The Taliban also placed restrictions on foreign female aid workers helping Afghan women.

Signs of the Taliban’s eventual international isolation began to show in 1998. With pressure from women’s rights groups, the absence of international investment, and the Taliban’s double-dealings with rival pipeline projects, the U.S. oil company Unocal pulled out of a major business deal that would have facilitated the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan, a project planned by Unocal and a Saudi company, Delta Oil.

In August 1998, in retaliation for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa by affiliates of Usama bin Ladin and the Taliban’s refusal to surrender him, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and spearheaded an international effort to isolate the Taliban through unilateral and U.N. sanctions.

In addition, the Taliban’s drug production and trafficking activities brought international scorn. In 2001 the United Nations acknowledged Taliban efforts to reduce the production of narcotics, the first such recognition since their assumption of power in 1994. However, these efforts did not gain the movement much international sympathy, as its radicalization intensified. In March 2001, Mulla ‘Omar ordered the destruction of all idols in the country, including two 1,500-year-old colossal Buddha statues in Bamiyan. Two months later, in a decree that brought international outrage, the Taliban ordered all non-Muslim Afghans to wear distinctive yellow patches.

The policies of the Taliban affecting women and religious minorities, its destruction of ancient Buddha statues, and the banning of music, television, photography, and traditional Afghan games such as kite flying were carried out under an innovative form of the shari’ah, combining Pashtun tribal codes and a radical form of Islamic teaching propagated by some of the graduates of the Dar al-‘Ulam (House of Sciences) madrasa in Deoband, India, who later became members of JIU and other radical Islamic movements in Pakistan. The presence of radical Arabs encamped in Afghanistan led by Usama bin Ladin also galvanized this development. While some Taliban members genuinely believed their rule was based in Islam, others appeared to use Islam as a justification for absolute “divine” power. The policies of the Taliban have given birth to the term “Talibanization,” referring to this new form of radical Islam.

The 11 September 2001 suicide bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were immediately attributed to Usama bin
Ladin. Because the group of Arab and other Muslim fighters he headed, known as al-Qa’ida, had operated in Afghanistan with the knowledge and protection of the Taliban government, a U.S.-led war of retaliation led to the destruction of the Taliban government and the routing of al-Qa’ida forces from Afghanistan. In early December 2001, the leaders of both the Taliban and al-Qa’ida escaped and fled into the mountains of eastern Afghanistan or into Pakistan.

As of early Spring 2003, the Taliban had begun regrouping and instigating frequent, low-level attacks against Afghan and U.S.-led anti-terror coalition forces in the south and southeastern regions of Afghanistan, along the border with Pakistan. Many Taliban members were believed to be sheltered in the southwestern region of Pakistan and assisted by sympathetic individuals and groups there. The whereabouts of top Taliban leaders, including Mulla ‘Omar, remained unknown. However propaganda distributed by the group in Afghanistan claimed that he continued to lead the Taliban.

See also Mojahidin; Qa’ida, al-; Political Islam.

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Amin Tarzi
Kimberly McCloud

TANZIMAT

The Tanzimat (meaning reorganization, reordering) was a reform period in the Ottoman Empire lasting from 1839 to 1871. Its aims were modernization, centralization, increasing revenue, and forestalling fragmentation and conquest. Its main agents were the influential grand wazirs Mustafa Resit Pasa (1800–1858) and his protégés, Fuat (1815–1869) and ‘Ali (1815–1871). Sultan Mahmud II’s 1826 destruction of the old janissary military corps, which resisted change and deposed those who advocated change, and the introduction of Western-language education paved the way for these reforms.

The 1839 Imperial Rescript (Hatt-i Serif) of Gülhane guaranteed security and equal justice to all subjects, regardless of religion. He also proposed reforms in taxation and military conscription and created a lawmaking body. A new class of modern-educated men staffed a reorganized bureaucracy and military, and standardized provincial government and taxes. The Crimean War (1853–1856) interrupted progress, but at its end a new reform rescript (Hatt-i Husayn, 1856) reiterated and expanded earlier reforms. Councils of State, Justice, Education, and Reform were established at various points in time, charged with the task of overseeing the process. Provincial councils were also established, including representatives of different religious and social groups.

Tax reforms were insufficient to prevent bankruptcy (1876), but communications and education gradually improved, and a new lawcode (Mecelle) was prepared, which codified Islamic law in the Western style. Reforms were stringently applied, leading to complaints of tyranny. The Young Ottomans proposed a constitutional government, but were suppressed by the absolute monarchy of ‘Abd al-Hamid II. Technical modernization continued, but political liberalization was postponed until the twentieth century.

See also Empires: Ottoman; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Young Turks.

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Linda T. Darling

TAQIYYA

Often translated as “dissimulation,” the word taqiyya is etymologically linked to piety and devotion. In Twelver Shi’ite thought it has come to refer to the tactic employed by the imams (and recommended to the Shi’ites) of hiding one’s beliefs when faced with oppression. Normally, a Muslim is expected to declare his belief, so to deny it is a grave sin (kabira). However, according to tradition, the Shi’ite imams were faced with oppression from the Sunni majority, and in order to preserve the well-being of both their followers and themselves, they dissimulated. Outwardly they would conform to Sunni belief and practice; inwardly they would remain Shi’ite. When the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur embarked on a campaign against the supporters of the sixth imam, Ja’far, the imam is said to have encouraged the Shi’a to dissimulate in order to save themselves. The doctrine was based upon a certain interpretation of the Qur’anic verse 16:106, where the wrath of God is said to await the apostate “except those who are compelled while their hearts are firm in faith.” This exceptional clause is interpreted in Shi’ite Qur’anic commentaries as referring to “those who are forced to practice taqiyya.”

Taqiyya, within the Shi’ite tradition, can be seen as a balance to shabada—the willingness to expose oneself to
danger in the cause of truth. While Imam Ja’far recommended *taqiyya*, the example of Imam Husayn seems to encourage self-sacrifice in the face of oppression. Shi’ite theologians and jurists have debated long and hard about when one should be willing to face martyrdom, and when one may resort to *taqiyya*. There has not emerged a unanimous orthodox position or teaching on this point, though the factors to be considered include the magnitude of the evil perpetrated by the oppressor and the estimated risk to oneself, one’s family, and the community of believers. The different tactics have been employed at different times in Shi’ite history. The Shi’a in the Ottoman empire, living under Sunni rule, were encouraged by some Shi’ite ulema to perform *taqiyya*. At the beginning of the revolutionary movement in modern Iran, on the other hand, martyrdom was seen as a virtue, and *taqiyya* was discouraged by some ulema.

In Shi’ite law, *taqiyya* was employed as an explanation of why at times the reports from the imams contradict each other. The occurrence of contradictions was explained by designating one of the reports (hadiths or *khabar*) as being generated by *taqiyya*.” While for most jurists and hadith scholars, reports were evaluated on the basis of the chain of authorities, *taqiyya* served as an alternative means of rejecting a report as inauthentic (or rather, as an inauthentic source of law). This, in turn, gave rise to extensive debates about how to recognize a *taqiyya* report, and whether one receives punishment in the hereafter if one follows one, and thereby transgresses the law. Among the means of recognizing a *taqiyya* report was a direct comparison with Sunni doctrine. If one of the contradictory reports agreed with Sunni doctrine, then it was clearly a *taqiyya* report. The imam was obviously agreeing with the Sunnis to avoid persecution of himself or his community.

See also Shi’a: Imami (Twelver).

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Robert Gleave

TAQLID

The term *taqlid* refers to the “following” or “imitation” of a legal expert by a nonexpert. In Sunni Muslim law, in both its classical and modern manifestations, *taqlid* is generally viewed negatively. *Taqlid* is the activity that the legally unaccomplished (called *muqallid* or *‘ammi*) are forced to perform. As they have no legal qualifications, they must merely obey the interpretation of the law put forward by the *mujtahid*. *Taqlid* in the Sunni tradition was, however, not always used with negative connotations. The theory of *ijtihad* developed within the Sunni tradition, with grades of *ijtihad* from absolute *ijtihad* (*ijtihad mutlaq*) to *ijtihad* within the school (al-*ijtihad fi’l-*madhhab*). A more sophisticated theory of *taqlid* accompanied these developments. A scholar might be viewed as *muqallid* to the founding imam of the *madhhab* (since a jurist would not normally claim that his *ijtihad* was superior to that of the imam), but was a *mujtahid* with regard to jurists of lesser rank within the school. *Taqlid* was, therefore, a recognition of the importance of the *madhhab* tradition as both a legal identity and as setting the broad parameters within which a jurist might operate.

Within the Imam Shi’ite tradition, such a nuanced definition of *taqlid* did not, on the whole, emerge. The Imamis had no founding imam whose *ijtihad* had to be viewed as superior, because the imams in Twelver Shi’ism were sinless (*ma’sum*). The imams did not need to perform *ijtihad* to find a ruling, since they were granted a complete knowledge of the law by God. *Taqlid* to anyone other than the imam does not form a feature of early Shi’ite jurisprudence. However, as Shi’ite jurists realized that the *ghayba* was to be a prolonged absence of the imam, a theory of *ijtihad* did emerge in embryonic form in the work of al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277), and was fully developed in the writings of his pupil, al-’Allama al-Hilli (d. 1325). The result was an acceptance that an ordinary Shi’ite Muslim was forced to perform *taqlid* to a *mujtahid*. For the believer, with no access to the imam himself, the rulings of the *mujtahid* were all that was necessary to obey the law. In effect, *taqlid* of the *mujtahid*, even when the *mujtahid*’s rulings were mistaken, was sufficient to guarantee full obedience to the law of God.

This theory was one of the ideological foundations of the authority of the scholarly class in Shi’ism, and led, in part, to a heightened respect for the ulema in Shi’ite communities in comparison with that found in the Sunni world. *Mujtahids* gained authority and prestige by the number of *muqallids* they attracted. Since the ulema were, for much of Shi’ite history, unaligned with any governmental structure, the *mujtahids* were, in effect, building up an independent power base. This power base of *muqallids* could be (and was) used to mobilize opposition to government measures in the largely Shi’ite country of Iran. Indeed, the theory of *taqlid* enabled a number of *mujtahids* to call for the opposition to the shah, which eventually led to the Iranian revolution of 1979.

See also *Ijtihad; Madhhab; Marja’ al-Taqlid; Muhtasib; Shi’a: Imami (Twelver)*.

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Tariqa


Robert Gleave

**TARIQA**

*Tariqa* is an Arabic term for the spiritual path, especially in the sense of a method of spiritual practice, often embodied in a social organization and tradition known as a Sufi order.

*Tariqa* has the etymological sense of way or path, and along with its near twin, *tariq*, it is used as a generic term for the way or path to God in the mystical writings of the Sufis. Despite the existence of numerous different traditions of Sufi practice and organization, it is common for Sufi teachers to point out that there is only one spiritual path that encompasses all of these different variations. At the same time, it is frequently asserted that there are as many paths to God as there are human souls. It is difficult to translate this kind of spiritual ideal into any definitive enumeration of Sufi orders as sociological entities.

**Early History**

The early Sufi movement as it developed in the first centuries of the Muslim era was characterized by informal association of like-minded individuals. But as Sufi communities gradually coalesced, Sufi leaders increasingly were associated with residential hospices (Ar., *ribat* or *zawiya*; Pers., *khanka*), an institution first developed in Iran by a puritanical religious movement known as the Karramiyya. The followers of Abu Ishaq al-Kazaruni (d. 1033) established their own hospices in southern Persia and in coastal trading towns of the Indian Ocean. Abu Sa‘id ibn Abu ‘l-Khayr (d. 1049) established a center for Sufis in eastern Iran, with codes of conduct for the guidance of novices. Newly arrived Muslim rulers such as the Seljuk Turks found it attractive to sponsor the construction and upkeep of such hospices, along with academies (madrasas) for the teaching of the Islamic religious sciences. These hospices typically were places dedicated to prayer, study of the Qur’an, meditation, and communal meals, where travelers and the needy were welcome. Sufi masters would impart instruction and advice to their students and to visitors.

Some hospices like the Sa‘id al-Su‘ada‘ in Cairo (founded by Saladin in 1173) depended entirely on royal patronage. Other hospices had a broad clientele among the artisan classes, from which many of the Sufi masters came. The hospice of Ruzbihan Baqli (d. 1209) was built in Shiraz in 1165 by stonemasons among his followers. Yet the need of political leaders for religious legitimation put pressure on the new Sufi institutions to become part of the state patronage apparatus, typically through accepting endowment with land-tax income. Thus by 1281, the Mongol rulers of Iran set up an endowment for the previously independent hospice established by Ruzbihan, in this way linking its fortunes with the state. In India, the residences of Sufi masters of the Chishti order were typically one large room where everyone lived and pursued their discipline, unlike the multiple private cells of hospices in Syria and Iran. These “meeting houses” (*jama‘at khanas*) tended to be supported, at least initially, by voluntary donations rather than fixed land income. In Turkey the hospices were known as *tekkes*. Because of hospitality regulations that required feeding and lodging guests for a limited time, the Sufi hospices became centers where members of different levels of society interacted with the Sufi master.

It was only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that a significant number of outstanding Sufi masters lent their names to groups constituting individual spiritual methods or “ways” (*tariqas*). It was also common to characterize each way as a “chain” (*silsila*), with masters and disciples constituting the links. Names of Sufi orders ending in the Arabic feminine form (-iya), such as Naqshbandiya, are short hand for “the Naqshbandi way or chain” (*al-tariqa al-Naqshbandiya*, *al-silsila al-Naqshbandiya*). These chains were plotted backward in time to end ultimately with the prophet Muhammad as the final human figure; some chains are duly depicted as continuing with the angel Gabriel and God as the ultimate sources. Nearly all of these chains reach Muhammad via his son-in-law and cousin ‘Ali. A notable exception is the Naqshbandi order, which reaches the Prophet via Abu Bakr instead (although the Naqshbandi lineage includes other early Shi‘ite imams). A complication in the notion of the chain as a historical lineage results from the phenomenon of transhistorical or Uwaysi initiation (named after Uways al-Qarani, a contemporary disciple of the prophet Muhammad in spite of never having met him). On this basis, many Sufis have been initiated by eminent saints of the past or by the immortal prophet al-Khird (Per., Khizr), and this transcendental relationship also falls into the category of a Sufi order. Another challenge to our understanding of Sufi institutions is the presence of deliberately deviant wanderers such as the Qalandars, who criticized the established Sufi orders even as they adopted the charismatic roles of Sufi teachers.

While it is convenient to refer to these organizations as “orders,” with an implicit analogy to the monastic orders of Christianity (Franciscans, Dominicans, etc.), the comparison is inexact. Sufi orders are much less centrally organized than their Christian counterparts, and they have a more fluid hierarchical structure, which is formulated in terms of different types of initiations. Complicating the situation is the phenomenon of multiple initiation, observable at least since the fourteenth century, through which individual Sufis could receive instruction in the methods of various orders while maintaining a primary allegiance to only one. Sufi orders are...
Early tariqas (Sufi brotherhoods) and their founders

- al-Junayd, d. 910
- 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), Baghdad; Qadiriyya
- Yusuf al-Hamadani (d. 1140), Transoxania
- Ahmad b. al-Rifa'i (d. 1182), Iraq; Rifa'iyya
- Abas al-Gilani (d. 1166); Herat; Qadiriyya
- Ahmad al-Ghazali (d. 1126)
- Ahmad al-Rifa'i (d. 1182), Iraq; Rifa'iyya
- Baha al-Din Naqshbandi (d. 1389); Naqshbandiyya
- Najm al-Din Kubra (d. 1221) Kubrawiyya
- Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273); Mevleviyya
- Mu'in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236), Ajmer; Chishtiyya
- Sa'id al-Yasawi (d. 1166)
- Abu 'l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258) Shadiliyya
- Abu l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258)
- Ahmad al-Badawi (d. 1276), Egypt; Badawiyya
- 'Abd al-Khaliq Ghujdawani (d. 1220)
- Ahmad al-Yasawi (d. 1166) Yasaviyya; infl. on Turkish Sufism
- Ahmad al-Badawi (d. 1276), Egypt; Badawiyya
- Abu 'l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258) Shadiliyya
- Ahmad b. al-Rifa'i (d. 1182), Iraq; Rifa'iyya
- Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1338)
- Abu-Hafs 'Umar al-Suhrawardi (d. 1234) Suhrawardiyya
- 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), Baghdad; Qadiriyya
- Ahmad b. al-Rifa'i (d. 1182), Iraq; Rifa'iyya
- Ahmad al-Yasawi (d. 1166)
- Baha al-Din Naqshbandi (d. 1389); Naqshbandiyya
- Najm al-Din Kubra (d. 1221) Kubrawiyya
- Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273); Mevleviyya
- Mu'in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236), Ajmer; Chishtiyya

Genealogy and origins from 600 until 1200.


not inherently driven by competing and exclusive ideologies, although competition in the sociopolitical arena is certainly not unknown. The majority of Sufi orders have a Sunni orientation, although Shi’ite orders exist as well, particularly in Iran, but Sufis have been associated with all of the major Islamic legal schools. Although it is commonly asserted that the Sufi orders played an important role in spreading Islam on a popular level, there is little historical evidence that premodern Sufi leaders took any interest in seeking the conversion of non-Muslims.

The major social impact of the Sufi orders in terms of religion was to popularize the spiritual practices of the Sufis on a mass scale. The interior orientation of the informal movement of early Sufism became available to a much wider public through participation in shrine rituals, the circulation of hagiographies, and the dispensing of various degrees of instruction in dhikr recitation and meditation. Elaborate initiation rituals developed, in which the master’s presentation of articles such as a dervish cloak, hat, or staff would signify the disciple’s entrance into the order; special procedures governed the initiation of women disciples, though masters were typically male. A frequent feature of initiation was the requirement that the disciple copy out by hand the genealogical “tree” of the order, which would link the disciple to the entire chain of masters going back to the Prophet.

The tombs of many Sufi saints were usually erected at or near their homes. Under Islamic law, the ownership and maintenance of these tombs fell to family members, who may or may not have had spiritual qualifications. In subsequent generations, the devotion of many pilgrims thus created a class of hereditary custodians who were in charge of the finances and operations of the tomb-shrines, which could be combined with a functioning hospice where the teachings of a Sufi order took place, or with other institutions such as mosques or madrasas. Increasingly, however, the Sufi tomb came to be an independent institution, in some cases functioning as the center of massive pilgrimage at the annual festival of the saint; these festivals were variously termed the
saint’s birthday (mawlid) in the Mediterranean region, or “wedding” (‘urd) in Iran and India, in the latter case symbolically celebrating the death anniversary as the “wedding” of the saint’s soul with God. The tombs of especially popular saints eventually were surrounded with royal burial grounds, where kings and members of the nobility would erect their own tombs, to acquire a borrowed holiness or to benefit in the afterlife from the pious exercises of pilgrims to the nearby saints. Examples of this kind of necropolis include the Sufi shrines of Khuldabad and Gubarga in the Indian Deccan, Tatta in Pakistan, and the various graveyards of Cairo. Since many founders and important figures of the Sufi orders are buried in such shrines, the history of the orders cannot be separated from the phenomenon of pilgrimage to these tombs.

Periodization of Pre-Modern Sufi Orders

The standard view of the history of Sufi orders advanced by Trimingham suggests that the Sufi tariqa orders enjoyed their “golden age” in the thirteenth century. Trimingham viewed the institutionalization of Sufi orders in the fifteenth century, in the form of organizations (ta’ifas), as a “decline” from original spirituality into sterile ritual and vulgarization. This Orientalist perspective on the Sufi orders, with its background in the Protestant rejection of Catholic tradition and ritual, unfortunately does not adequately represent the later history of Sufism. While the existing scholarly literature on Sufism largely focuses on what is often called its “classical” phase, the ramification of Sufi orders in Muslim countries in the later so-called period of decline was extensive, and the literary and social impact of these more recent developments remains largely unexplored. The “golden age” view of Sufism is also shared by modern Muslim reformists and fundamentalists, who are extremely critical of modern and contemporary Sufism, although they may concede that long-dead Sufi masters of the past were pious Muslims. As Carl Ernst and Bruce Lawrence have argued, however, neither of these ideological views of Sufi history does justice to the self-conscious efforts of later Sufi teachers to give life to Sufi teachings in their own time.

Some of the Sufi orders, such as the Qadiriyya (named after ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilami, d. 1166), are spread throughout Islamic lands from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Others are more regional in scope, like the Shadhiliyya in North Africa (named after Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Shadhili, d. 1258), or the Chishtiyya in South Asia (named after Mu‘in al-Din Chishti, d. 1236). Particular orders are known for distinctive practices, such as the loud dhikr recitation of the Rifa’iyya, in contrast to the silent dhikr favored by the Naqshbandiyya. Some orders, including the Chishtiyya and the Mevleviyya (the latter being known to Europeans as the “whirling dervishes”), have integrated music and even dance into their practice, while other orders resolutely shun these activities as distractions to spiritual training. Sometimes Sufi leaders, such as the early Chishti masters, tried to keep political power at arm’s length, and they advised their followers to refuse offers of land endowment. Some Sufi masters would demonstrate their disdain of the world by refusing to entertain rulers or visit them at court.

On the other hand, certain orders have a history of close association with political power, the Suhrawardyya and the Naqshbandyya in India and Iran felt it was important to influence rulers in the proper religious direction, and the Bektashyya had strong links to the elite Ottoman troops known as the janissaries. The Safawiyaa, once a moderate Sunni order based at Ardebil, became widespread among Turkish tribes on the Persian-Ottoman frontier, and it emerged with a strongly Shi’ite and messianic character to become the basis for the Safavid empire that ruled Iran from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century. During the period of nineteenth-century colonialism, when much of the Islamic world fell under European domination, Sufi institutions played varied roles. Hereditary custodians of Sufi shrines in places like the Indian Punjab were treated as important local landlords by colonial officials, and they became further entrenched as political leaders due to British patronage; ironically, the cooperation of these Sufi leaders became essential in later independence movements directed against British control. Similarly, the Senegalese order known as the Muridiyya became heavily involved in peanut farming as a result of being favored by French colonial authorities, and they have emerged in the postcolonial order as a prominent social and religious institution. With the overthrow of traditional elites by European conquest, Sufi orders in some regions remained the only surviving Islamic social structures, and they furnished the principal leadership for anticolonial struggles in places such as Algeria (‘Abd al-Qadir), Libya (the Sanusiyya), the Caucasus (Shaykh Shamil), and China. French administrators in North Africa viewed Sufi orders with suspicion, and colonial scholars produced studies of the Sufi orders designed to predict their possible resistance to or cooperation with official policies.

Post-Colonial Era

In the postcolonial period, Sufi orders and institutions have an ambiguous political role, which is inevitably determined in relation to the nation-state. Governments in many Muslim countries have inherited the centralized bureaucratic organization of their colonial predecessors, which sometimes themselves go back to precolonial bureaucracies. In countries like Egypt and Pakistan, efforts have been made to subject the orders and shrines to governmental control. Nonetheless, many of the largest and liveliest Sufi organizations, such as the Burhaniyya in Egypt, flourish without official recognition. Officials frequently appear at Sufi festivals and attempt to direct popular reverence for saints into legitimation of their regimes, and governments also attempt to control the large amount of donations attracted to the shrines. State sponsorship of Sufi festivals also aims to enroll support against fundamentalist groups critical of the government, and to redirect reverence for saints in a nationalist direction.
Contemporary fundamentalist movements attack Sufism with a virulence sometimes even more intense than that which is reserved for anti-Western diatribes. Reformers frequently denounce pilgrimage to Sufi tombs as an idolatry that treats humans on the level of God, and they reject the notion that saints are able to intercede with God on behalf of ordinary believers. Sufi orders have been illegal in Turkey since the 1920s, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk secularized the Turkish state. The public performance of the Sufi rituals such as the “whirling dervish” dance of the Mevleviyya, and the dhikr of the Istanbul Qadiriyya, is tolerated only as a cultural activity, which is exported abroad through touring companies and sound recordings; the tomb of the great Sufi poet Jalaluddin Rumi (1207–1273), which many visitors treat as a shrine, is officially regarded as a museum. This reformist critique of Sufi practice has been internalized in some Sufi circles, such as the Sabiri Chishti tradition associated with the Deoband academy in India; leaders of this group, such as Ashraf ’Ali Thanvi (1863–1943), have been highly critical of traditional Sufi practices such as listening to music and visiting the tombs of saints. Certain Ottoman thinkers from Sufi backgrounds (Bediuzzaman Sa’id Nursi [1876–1960], Ken’an Rifai [1867–1950]) rejected life in the hospice and insisted on living in the world, and they interpreted Sufi theorists like Ibn al-’Arabi (1165–1240) and Rumi in terms of modern thought and science. Modernist secular thinkers and Muslim countries have also been critical of Sufism, but for different reasons. To authors like Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1933) in South Asia and Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946) in Iran, institutional Sufism was the source of fatalism, passivity, and civilizational decline. Sufi advocates such as the Barewli school in South Asia, and the Naqshbandis led by Shaykh Hisham Kabbani (b. 1945), have responded to these reformist critiques with polemics and apologetics of their own, defending Sufi practices as authentic and even necessary according to Islamic principles. In response to the modernist critique, Sufi theorists have asserted that science ultimately seeks what Sufism alone can offer, and they have adopted the language of psychology and modern technology.

Sufi activities are not publicly tolerated in Saudi Arabia and Iran, since Sufi leaders and tomb cults would constitute an unacceptable alternative spiritual authority to the dominant religious orthodoxy in either case. Still, it is remarkable that the founders of certain fundamentalist movements, such as Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Abu l-’Ala’ Maududi (1903–1979) of the Jama’at-e Islami in India, were exposed to Sufi orders in their youth, and they seem to have adopted certain organizational techniques and leadership styles from Sufism; the main difference is that these movements substitute political ideology for Sufi spirituality, in order to become mass parties in the modern political arena. Another movement that has branched off from Sufism in a hostile fashion is the pietistic Tablighi Jama’at, founded in India and with immense followings in many Muslim countries; although it derives from a branch of the Chishtiyya and still respects the early Sufi saints, this movement considers contemporary Sufi practice to be illegitimate and attempts to dissuade people from pursuing it.

Contemporary Orders

In recent years, Sufi orders have extended their reach into Europe and the Americas, and today branches of orders from India, Iran, Africa, and Turkey are actively attracting adherents in major urban centers in many Western countries. Some orders have also expanded into other Asian and African countries where they were never previously found. Certain groups derived from Sufi orders, such as the International Association of Sufism derived from the teachings of Hazrat Inayat Khan (1882–1927), have only tenuous associations with Islam; they present Sufism as a mystical universal religion that may be pursued through dancing and chanting, without requiring the practice of ritual prayer or other duties of Islamic law. Other groups have more explicit relations with Islamic tradition, including even insistence on the clothing and customs of the order’s country of origin. Sufism is taking on some aspects of modern American and European culture, such as joint participation of men and women in contexts where gender separation was the norm in many premodern Muslim societies; several American Sufi groups even have female leaders, something quite rare in the traditional societies where Sufism has flourished. At the same time, Sufism in Europe and America strives to preserve some of the distinctive rituals and institutions of traditional Sufism—the tomb of Sri Lankan Sufi master Bawa Muhaiyuddin near Philadelphia has already become a place of pilgrimage.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Sufism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been the publicizing of a previously esoteric system of teaching through modern communications media. Today, Sufi orders and shrines produce a continual stream of publications aimed at a variety of followers from the ordinary devotee to the scholar. Evidence suggests that Sufi orders, along with governments, were among the first users of print in Muslim countries in the nineteenth century. Not only traditional treatises on Sufi metaphysics and practice, but also new genres like periodicals and novels, became vehicles for the expression of Sufi thought in multiple languages. Other technologies, such as the audio cassette (especially for music), and now the Internet, have been extremely effective in disseminating Sufi ideas and culture to broad audiences. In short, the Sufi orders have employed the technologies and ideologies of modernity even as they have been forced to respond to them.

See also Dhikr; Khirqah; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Tasawwuf.

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Tasawwuf


Carl W. Ernst

TASAWWUF

Tasawwuf is an Arabic term for the process of realizing ethical and spiritual ideals; meaning literally “becoming a Sufi,” tasawwuf is generally translated as Sufism.

The etymologies for the term Sufi are various. The primary obvious meaning of the term comes from suf, “wool,” the traditional ascetic garment of prophets and saints in the Near East. The term has also been connected to saf, “purity,” or safwa, “the chosen ones,” emphasizing the psychological dimension of purifying the heart and the role of divine grace in choosing the saintly. Another etymology links Sufi with safi, a bench, referring to a group of poor Muslims contemporaneous with the prophet Muhammad, known as the People of the Bench, signifying a community of shared poverty. The ideal qualities evoked by these derivations are the key to the concept of tasawwuf as formulated by authors of the tenth century, such as Sulami (d. 1021). While acknowledging that that the term Sufi was not current at the time of the Prophet, Sufi theorists maintained that this specialization in spirituality arose in parallel with other disciplines such as Islamic law and Qur’anic exegesis. But the heart of Sufism, they maintained, lay in the ideal qualities of the prophet Muhammad and his association with his followers. Definitions of Sufism described ethical and spiritual goals and functions, and many other terms described particular spiritual qualities and functions, such as poverty (faqir, darvish), knowledge (‘alim, ‘arif), mastery (shaykh, pir), and so on.

Orientalist scholarship introduced the term Sufism to European languages at the end of the eighteenth century. Prior to that time, European travelers had brought back accounts of exotic religious behavior by Oriental dervishes and the miscellaneous Indian ascetics called fakirs, who were considered important only when their social organization posed a problem for European colonialism. The discovery of Persian Sufi poetry, filled with references to love and wine, allowed Europeans to imagine Sufis as freethinking mystics who had little to do with Islam. The “-ism” formation of the word (originally “Sufi-ism”) reveals that “Sufism” was a part of the Enlightenment catalog of ideologies and belief systems, and frequently it was equated with private mysticism, pantheism, and the doctrine that humanity can become divine. Scholars such as Sir William Jones (d. 1794) and Sir John Malcolm (d. 1833) advanced the thesis that Sufism derived from Hindu yoga, Greek philosophy, or Buddhism. This concept of the non-Islamic character of Sufism has been widely accepted in Euro-American scholarship ever since, despite (or perhaps because of) its disconnection with the Islamic tradition, in which tasawwuf and its social implementations have played a central role. Thus, in terms of its origin, the introduction of the term Sufism into European languages may be regarded as a classic example of Orientalist misinformation, insofar as Sufism was regarded primarily as a radical intellectual doctrine at variance with what was thought of as the sterile monotheism of Islam. Nevertheless, as a word firmly ingrained in the vocabulary of modernity, Sufism can usefully serve as an outsider’s term for a wide range of social, cultural, political, and religious phenomena associated with Sufis, including popular practices and movements that might be in tension with normative definitions of Sufism.

Origins and Early History

The Qur’an itself may be taken as a major source of Sufism. The experience of revelation that descended upon the prophet Muhammad left its mark in numerous passages testifying to the creative power of God and to the cosmic horizons of spiritual experience. God in the Qur’an is described both in
terms of overwhelming transcendence and immanent presence. In particular, the ascension (mi'raj) of the prophet Muhammad to Paradise, as elaborated upon from brief references in the Qur'an (17:1–2, 53:1–18), provided a template for the movement of the soul toward an encounter with the Creator. While it was commonly accepted that the Prophet’s ascension was accomplished in the body, for Sufis this opened up the possibility of an internal spiritual ascension. The notion of special knowledge available to particularly favored servants of God, particularly as illustrated in the story of Moses and al-Khdir (18:60–82), provided a model for the relationship between inner knowledge of the soul and outward knowledge of the law. Another major theme adopted by Sufis was the primordial covenant (7:172) between God and humanity, which established the relationship with God that the Sufi disciplines sought to preserve and restore. A broad range of Qur’anic terms for the different faculties of the soul and the emotions furnished a basis for a highly complex mystical psychology.

The earliest figures claimed by the Sufi movement include the prophet Muhammad and his chief companions; their oaths of allegiance to Muhammad became the model for the master-disciple relationship in Sufism. Muhammad’s meditation in a cave on Mount Hira outside Mecca was seen as the basis for Sufi practices of seclusion and retreat. In an extension of the authority of the Prophet as enshrined in hadith accounts, Sufis regarded the model of the Prophet as the basis for spiritual experience as well as legal and ethical norms. While there is debate about the authenticity of much of the classical hadith corpus, many hadith sayings favored by Sufis describe the cosmic authority of Muhammad as the first being created by God, and in many other ways these sayings establish the possibility of imitating divine qualities. Veneration of the prophet Muhammad, both for his own qualities and in his role as intercessor for all humanity, became the keynot of Sufi piety as it diffused through Muslim society on a popular basis.

Among the early successors to the Prophet, the later Sufi movement singled out as forerunners ascetics like al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), who was renowned for preaching the vanity of this world and warning of punishment in the next. By the end of the eighth century, small groups of like-minded individuals, particularly in northeastern Iran and in Iraq, had begun to formulate a vocabulary of interior spiritual experience, based in good part on the Qur’an and the emerging Islamic religious sciences. Intensive and protracted prayer (including not only the five obligatory ritual prayers daily, but also five supererogatory or “extra credit” prayers) and meditation on the meanings of the Qur’an were notable features of early Sufi practice. The sometimes stark asceticism of early Sufis, with its rejection of the corrupt world, came to be tempered by the quest to find God through love. This emphasis on an intimate and even passionate relationship with God is associated particularly with the outstanding early woman Sufi, Rabia’ of Basra (d. 801). Other early Sufis contributed to the development of an extensive psychological analysis of spiritual states, as a natural result of prolonged meditative retreats. Socially speaking, many of the early Sufis came from lower-class artisan and craftsman origins. Their piety often included deliberate critique of the excesses of wealth and power generated by the rapid conquests of the early Arab empire. Major early figures in the Sufi movement included Dhu al-Nun of Egypt (d. 859), the ecstatic Abu Yazid al-Bistami in Iran (d. 874), the early metaphysician al-Hakim al-Tirmidhi (d. 910) in Nishapur, and the sober psychologist and legal scholar Junayd of Baghdad (d. 910).

Although religious criticism of Sufi practices and doctrines started to occur as early as the late ninth century, it is particularly in the case of al-Hallaj (executed in 922) that tensions between Sufism and the legal establishment became apparent. Although the trial of al-Hallaj was a confusing mix of politics and crypto-Shi‘ism, in hagiographical sources it became mythologized as a confrontation between radical mysticism and conservative Islamic law. Sufi writers adapted to this crisis by insisting upon adherence to the norms and disciplines of Islamic religious scholarship, while at the same time cultivating an esoteric language and style appropriate to the discussion of subtle interior experiences. Early Sufi writers such as Sarraj (d. 988), Ansari (d. 1089), and Qushayri (d. 1072) emphasized Sufism as the “knowledge of realities,” inseparable from yet far beyond the knowledge of Islamic law and scripture. Many of these writers also declared their loyalties to established legal schools or the Ash‘ari school of theology.

The institutional spread of Sufism was accomplished through the “ways” or Sufi orders, which increasingly from the eleventh century offered the prospect of spiritual community organized around charismatic teachers whose authority derived from a lineage going back to the prophet Muhammad himself. Under the patronage of dynasties like the Seljuks, who also supported religious academies in their quest for legitimacy, Sufi lodges eventually spread throughout the Middle East, South and Central Asia, North Africa and Spain, and southeastern Europe. While dedicated membership in Sufi orders remained confined to an elite, mass participation in the reverence for saints at their tombs has been a typical feature in Muslim societies until today.

**Major Figures and Doctrines**

The central role of Sufism in premodern Muslim societies is perhaps best typified by the intellectual career of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111). Having become the foremost theologian at the Nizamiyya academy in Baghdad at a very youthful age, he underwent a spiritual crisis chronicled in his autobiographical Deliverance from Error. Systematically questioning everything, he interrogated the four chief intellectual options...
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available in his day: dialectical theology, Greco-Arabic philosophy as interpreted by Ibn Sina, Isma’ili esotericism, and Sufism. He regarded theology as a severely limited discipline, and philosophy as tainted by metaphysical arrogance, while the Isma’ilis were dismissed as authoritarians with a fallacious understanding of religion and morality. This left the Sufis as the only custodians of knowledge that transcends the limits of reason; Ghazali’s conclusion was that Sufism, properly understood, was the surest guide to the spiritual ideals deriving from the Qur’an and the Prophet. While Ghazali programmatically separated Sufism from theology, philosophy, and Shi’ism, in fact the subsequent history of Sufism could not be separated from these three streams of Islamic thought. Ghazali assumed that Sufis would be based in an authentic tradition of Islamic law, and it was in fact normal for Sufis to profess whichever school of law was current in their region (Hanafi in South and Central Asia and the Ottoman lands, Shafi’i in Persia and the eastern Mediterranean, Maliki in North Africa and Spain, and Hanbali sporadically in Khurasan and Egypt). Ghazali’s massive synthesis, Giving Life to the Sciences of Religion, connected basic Islamic ritual and religious texts and practices with the interiorization of Sufi piety in a way that was accessible to Muslim intellectuals trained in the madrasa legal tradition. The intellectual integration of Sufism with the Islamic religious sciences typified many Muslim societies up to the age of European colonialism. In other writings, Ghazali was also critical of antinomian tendencies and unconventional practices found in Sufi circles. These deliberately nonconformist trends were also inevitably a part of the Sufi ambience.

The pervasive role of Sufism is demonstrated by countless biographical works in Arabic, Persian, and other languages, recounting the virtues and exemplary religious lives of the Sufi saints. Many of these biographical traditions about Sufis are also enmeshed in the history of Islamic religious scholarship and dynastic political history. Although it is difficult to select a handful of representative figures out of the innumerable possibilities, it would be impossible to leave out the great Andalusian Sufi, Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240). Perhaps more than any other, Ibn ‘Arabi illustrated the fusion of ethical and psychological mysticism with powerful metaphorical analysis, all in the context of Islamic law and the Qur’an. His teachings on human perfection, the manifestation of divine attributes in creation, the divine names, imagination, and the nature of existence were expressed through a series of difficult but extremely popular Arabic writings, including the voluminous encyclopedia The Meccan Openings, and the succinct treatise on prophecy and mysticism, Bezeels of Wisdom. The latter work has attracted over one hundred commentaries, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, in countries ranging from the Balkans to South Asia. Ibn ‘Arabi also elaborated upon the doctrine of sahih, which in Islamic contexts derives from authority and intimacy conferred by God rather than from sanctity as recognized in official Christian doctrines of sahihhood. In particular, Ibn al-‘Arabi described in detail the invisible hierarchy of saints who control the destiny of the world; he also expressed, sometimes in enigmatic code, his own role as one of the chief figures of this hierarchy.

Although polemical opponents as well as modern scholars have criticized Ibn al-‘Arabi for identifying God with creation and nullifying Islamic law, works of recent scholars like Michel Chodkiewicz and William Chittick have demonstrated both Ibn al-‘Arabi’s metaphysical complexity and his strong engagement with the shari’a. The phrase most commonly used to describe the teachings of Ibn al-‘Arabi, “oneness of existence” (wabdat al-wujud), never occurs in his writings; it vastly oversimplifies his doctrines, which are better described as demonstrating the dialectical tension between the different modes of existence in terms of divine attributes. Nevertheless, there have been many critiques directed at Ibn al-‘Arabi over the centuries, accusing him of flagrant heresy. Ironically, the best-known of his critics, the Hanbali legal scholar and controversialist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), was himself a Sufi and a member of the Qadiri order.

Another major Sufi figure was the great Persian poet Jalaluddin Rumi (d. 1273). Trained as a theologian with a Sufi background, Rumi unleashed his spiritual talent after encountering the enigmatic dervish Shams-i Tabriz. His collection of lyrical poems, named after Shamsh, is the largest body of such poetry by any Persian poet of the last millennium. His great poetic epic, Masnavi-ye ma’navi (Spiritual couplets), is a vast repository of Sufi teaching through stories and images. The Sufi order established by his descendants in Anatolia, known as the Mevleviyya, have become famous to foreign observers as the “whirling dervishes,” due to their characteristic turning meditative dance. Rumi’s writings, which have been immensely popular from Southeast Europe to India, portrayed divine beauty and mercy through unforgettable and vivid imagery, easily memorized and popularized in musical performance. Today Rumi’s poetry enjoys a new vogue in English translation by American poets Robert Bly and Coleman Barks.

Despite Ghazali’s earlier objections to philosophy, Sufi teachings in their metaphysical form overlapped with both the terminology and the doctrines of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy as interpreted in the Arabic tradition. Although Sufis aimed at a knowledge that transcended intellect, it was inevitable that philosophical categories would be used to put Sufism into cosmological and metaphysical perspective. Figures such as Shihab al-Din Yahya al-Suhrawardi (executed in 1191) combined a critical revision of the metaphysics, logic, and psychology of Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037) with an identification of being as light. His “Illuminationist” (isbraqi) philosophy, expressed both in logical treatises and in Platonic fables in Arabic and Persian, drew upon Sufi mystical experience as an important source of knowledge. Although
Men in Oman participate in a Sufi dhikr performance where they repeat the name of God and his attributes or engage in a call and response in praise of God and the prophet Muhammad. The beating of the drums, the swaying body movements, and the repetition of the chants can lead to trances or states of ecstasy among Sufis. HULTON ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES

Ibn al-`Arabi was not a philosopher, and Suhrawardi was not really a Sufi, the shared quest for understanding the relationship between God and the world allowed Sufism and philosophy both to play roles in the intellectual tradition of later Muslim societies.

Likewise, although Ghazali had made clear his objections to Shi’ism in its Isma’ili form, it is also apparent that Sufism cannot be separated from Shi’ism either. The recognition of the Shi’ite imams as spiritual leaders possessing authority and intimacy with God (\(\text{walaya}\)) is closely related to the rise of the spiritual master and the concept of sainthood in early Sufism. Sufi lineages either include ‘Ali or some of the later imams in their spiritual genealogies, and the imams of Twelver Shi’ism are deeply revered in Sufi circles. While the majority of Sufi scholars have been affiliated with Sunni legal schools, some Sufi orders (Nis’atallah, Khaksar) have had a Twelver Shi’ite orientation. Certainly there have been Shi’ite theologians who have rejected the claims of Sunni saints, and the Safavid dynasty suppressed organized Sufism in Iran after seizing power in the early sixteenth century and making Shi’ism the state religion. As a result, formal Sufi orders in Iran have had a precarious existence or even gone underground under threat from militant Shi’ism. Nevertheless, philosophical Sufism (\(\text{i\'rfan}\)) has remained an important aspect of the advanced curriculum in Iran. Philosophers of the Safavid period, such as Mulla Sadra (d. 1640), drew upon...
Ibn Sina, Ibn al-`Arabi, Suhrawardi, as well as Sufi and Shi`ite themes.

Ranging further afield, Sufi theorists in India and China to some extent adopted aspects of those cultures. Sufis in India were aware of yogic practices, including breath control and other psychophysical techniques. Knowledge of hatha yoga was disseminated through a single text known as The Pearl of Nectar (Amtrakunda), which was translated into Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu with a heavy dose of Islamizing tendencies. Sufi masters of the Chishti and Shattari orders adopted certain yogic meditations into their repertoires through this channel. Similarly, when the Chinese Sufi Wang Daiyu (d. 1658) translated Persian Sufi works by Jami and others into classical Chinese, he employed a neo-Confucian vocabulary and cosmology that made the works virtually indistinguishable from the productions of Chinese literati.

Alongside these main currents of Sufi thought, one can also distinguish a kind of anti-structure in a series of movements that were deliberately unconventional. Psychologically the mood was set in the concept of self-blame (malama), which called for incurring shame before the public as a discipline for the ego. While the early self-blamers among the Sufis were not supposed to infringe on religiously forbidden territory, the dropout dervishes of the Qalandar movements (including Abdals, Haydaris, Malangs, and Madaris) rejected institutional Sufism as a betrayal of independent spirituality. Shunning respectability, maintaining a bizarre appearance, and indulging in intoxicants, these eccentrics led civil disturbances in Delhi and even organized peasant rebellions against Ottoman rulers. They still may be seen on the fringes of Muslim societies as a kind of spiritual underground.

Practices
Aside from the obligatory daily prayers and supererogatory ones, the most important Sufi practice is undoubtedly the recollection of God (dhikr) by recitation of Arabic names of God as found in the Qur`an. This recitation, which could be either silent or spoken aloud, typically drew from lists of ninety-nine names of God (it being understood that the one-hundredth name was “the greatest name” of God, known only to the elect). As with the supererogatory prayers, dhikr aimed at interiorizing the Qur`an and its contents, in order to obtain closeness to God. As meditations, these practices aimed to empty the heart of anything but God and to begin to establish the qualities of the divine in the human being. Treatises like The Key to Salvation by Ibn `Ata` Allah of Alexandria (d. 1309) described in detail the psychological and existential results to be obtained from multiple repetitions of particular names of God. The parallelism between repetition of the divine names and Islamic theology is significant; in Ash`ari theology, the divine names are the attributes of God, and are the faculties through which the divine essence interacts with the created world. Recitation of the divine names thus reinforced the Islamic cosmology of Sufism. The mystical psychology that accompanied these practices articulated different levels of the heart and soul, which are further differentiated in terms of multiple spiritual states (ahwal) and stations (maqamat) that have been charted out in varying degrees of detail.

While dhikr recitation may originally have been restricted to adepts undertaking retreat from the world, as a kind of group chanting this practice can also be accessible to people on a broad popular scale. Simple chanting of phrases like “there is no god but God” (la ilaha illa allah) did not only express the fundamental negation and affirmation of Islamic theology, but also made it possible for a wider public to adopt the practices of Sufism. One of the advantages of dhikr was that it could be practiced by anyone, regardless of age, sex, or ritual purity, at any time. Under the direction of a master, Sufi disciples typically are instructed to recite dhikr formulas selected in accordance with the needs of the individual, based on the different qualities of particular divine names.

The tombs of Sufi leaders, especially those associated with major orders, played an important role in the public development of Sufism. On a popular level, these tombs were commonly connected to lodges or hospices maintaining open kitchens where all visitors were welcome. Major festivals were held not only for standard Islamic holidays but also in particular for dates honoring the prophet Muhammad and the Sufi saints. While the birthday of the Prophet was a popular observance in many places, the death-anniversary of the saint was also a focus of attention. The practice of pilgrimage (ziyara) to the tombs of saints was generally considered to be beneficial, but was especially valued at the anniversary of the moment when the saint was joined with God; all this assumes the saint’s ability to intercede with God on behalf of pilgrims. At major shrines like `Aqsa in Egypt, or Ajmer in India, hundreds of thousands of pilgrims may congregate for days at the annual festival, with many distinctive local rituals and performances. Over the past two centuries, with the rise of the Wahhabis in Arabia and kindred Salafi reform movements elsewhere, there has been extensive criticism of pilgrimage to tombs and the notion of saintly intercession, all of which is considered to be sheer idolatry. Although in Saudi Arabia the tomb of practically every Sufi saint and family member of the Prophet has been destroyed, elsewhere pilgrimage to saints’ tombs continues to be popular.

Other widely encountered forms of Sufi practice are music and poetry, which take on different regional forms in accordance with local traditions. Although conservative Islamic legal tradition has been wary of musical instruments as innovations not present during the time of the Prophet, the rich and sophisticated musical traditions of Iran, India, Andalusia, and Turkey have furnished irresistible and highly developed forms for the communication of Sufi teachings,
particularly when combined with poetry. Sufis in fact speak mostly of “listening” (sama‘), emphasizing the spiritual role of the listener far more than that of the musical performer, and the focus is upon the words of poems that may or may not be accompanied by musical instruments. Early Sufi poetry in Arabic and Persian is frequently indistinguishable in form and content from secular love and wine poetry emanating from the courts. The difference is that Sufi listeners would refer libertine images and daring expressions to the passionate relationship with God or the Sufi master. Leading Sufi poets like the Egyptian Ibn al-Farid (d. 1235) made mystical verse into an art form of great density and subtlety; for centuries, pilgrims to his shrine recited his poems at his annual festival. In Persian, multiple genres ranging from the quatrains (ruba‘i) to the lyric (ghazal) and the ode (qasida), along with the epic couplet (masnawi), were cultivated by poets in Sufi lodges as well as by court poets with Sufi leanings. Particularly famous poets in Persian include Rumi, ‘Attar (d. 1220), Hafiz (d. 1389), and Jami (d. 1492).

Poetic literature developed in many regional languages, sometimes using language and themes derived from Arabic and Persian models, but frequently employing rhyme, meter, and subject matter of local origin. The Indian subcontinent offered many local languages to Sufi poets, who freely explored the resources of Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Tamil, and Kashmiri. Writers like the Chishti poet Muhammad Jayasi (d. 1542) used Hindu figures from Rajput epics to convey Sufi themes. Turkish became a vehicle both in the simple verse of Yunus Emre (d. 1321) and in the sophisticated Ottoman poetry of figures like Shaykh Ghalib (d. 1799). Other major languages employed by Sufi include Malay, Swahili, Berber, and Hausa.

**Contemporary Manifestations and Situation**

The changes wrought by European colonial expansion in Asia and Africa, and by globalization in the postcolonial period, have had major effects on Muslim societies. The overthrow of local elites by foreign invaders removed traditional sources of patronage for Sufi orders and shrines. Under the suspicious eyes of European colonial administrators, hereditary administrators of Sufi shrines in India became integrated into landholding classes, while the extended networks of Sufi orders furnished some of the only centers of resistance against European military aggression, as in the Caucasus, North Africa, and Central Asia. Sufi responses to colonialism thus ranged from accommodation to confrontation. As with traditional religious scholars, so too for Sufis it was necessary to come to terms with new roles dictated by the technological and ideological transformations of modernity.

One of the first notable features of modern capitalism and technology introduced into Muslim countries by colonial regimes in the nineteenth century was Arabic script printing, whether in movable type or lithography. Printing, along with the expansion of literacy by colonial regimes, not only facilitated the workings of administration for the government, but also permitted the dissemination of formal religious knowledge among Muslims on a scale never before attempted. On one hand, the replacement of manuscript culture with identical printed books doubtless encouraged the scriptural authoritarianism that arose with Salafi reform movements. On the other hand, Sufi orders, with their large guaranteed markets, were major patrons of printing. The spread of previously esoteric Sufi texts to a broad reading public amounted to a publication of the secret. Postcolonial governments, modern universities, and academic societies also sponsored the printing of books related to Sufism. Parallel with the printing phenomenon is the rise of audio recordings of Sufi music distributed on global scale, initially for ethnomusicological audiences, but more recently for popular world music and fusion recordings. Major recording artists with Sufi connections include Pakistani singer Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (1948–1997) and Senegalese musician Youssou N’Dour (b. 1959).

As Sufism became publicized on global scale, likewise major ideological shifts occurred in Muslim countries, through which the term Islam increasingly became a symbol of anticolonial identity. Salafi reform movements, often described as fundamentalist, opposed Sufism as a non-Islamic innovation based on idolatrous worship of saints. Just as European Orientalists detached Sufism from Islam, now Muslim fundamentalists came to the same conclusion. Sufism has now become a position to be defended or criticized in terms of ideological constructions of Islam. In the most recent forms of representation of Sufism, Internet advertising paradigms and polemics have become the norm. Transnational Sufi movements, with the help of technically educated members in Europe, North America, or South Africa, maintain websites both for informing the public and for maintaining connections for a virtual community. Some Sufi websites also engage in extensive polemics against fundamentalists, who are often dismissed with labels such as Najdi (Wahhabi).

Through encounters with colonial missionaries and through migration to Europe and America, Sufis have become engaged with non-Islamic religious traditions in various ways. Some Sufi teachers, such as Hazrat Inayat Khan (d. 1927), decided to present Sufism to Europeans and Americans as a universal mystical teaching with no essential connection to Islam. The traditional Sufi emphasis on universality provided a conceptual basis for this ecumenism, although non-Muslim membership in Sufi orders had been decidedly rare prior to the twentieth century. Now there are significant numbers of self-professed Sufis in Europe and America who do not consider themselves Muslims. At the same time, other Sufi movements from Iran, Turkey, and West Africa include varying degrees of emphasis on Islamic identity and traditional custom. The relationship between Sufism and Islam is
thus debated and contested both in its traditional homelands and in its new locations.

Another recent shift of emphasis in Sufism concerns women’s public participation in Sufi activities and what may be called feminist interpretations of Sufism. American women are now trained to perform the Mevlevi turning dance in public ceremonies, and to take on the role of ḥayka or female spiritual leader. While such prominence of women was not unknown in traditional Muslim societies, global changes in the roles of women are bringing women to the fore in Sufi organizations to a remarkable extent, in countries like Turkey and Pakistan as well as in America and Europe.

As with religious matters everywhere, Sufism in the end is governed by the state. The dervish orders in Turkey were outlawed by decree of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1925 as part of official secularism, and the revival of the Mevlevi “whirling dervish” performance was permitted only on condition that it be a nonreligious activity, destined especially for foreign tourists. Sufi groups in Iran keep a very low profile under the watchful eyes of the Islamic regime. Sufism in the former Soviet republics, like most other religious activities, was practically extinguished under Soviet rule, although some informal networks survived. The Sufi-oriented Darul Arqam movement in Malaysia was banned in 1994 for its political activities. A Lebanese Sufi group of African origin, the Abbash movement, promotes a program of religious pluralism and peace within the framework of the secular state. Government bureaucracies closely control Sufi shrines in Egypt and Pakistan, both because of the extensive revenue gathered at the shrines and to monitor the large crowds that attend.

Despite the vicissitudes of foreign invasion, the collapse of traditional social structures, the imposition of European education and culture, and the rise of the secular nation-state, Sufism in many different local forms persists and survives both among illiterate members of the lower class and among urban elites. Whether defended in traditional languages as part of classical Islamic culture or attacked as a non-Islamic heresy, Sufism still forms part of the symbolic capital of majority Muslim countries. As a form of religious practice spread to Europe and America by transnational migration and through the global marketplace, Sufism is seen both as an eclectic form of New Age spirituality and as the mystical essence of Islam. The globalizing fortunes of Sufism over the past two centuries are one more indication why it is no longer possible to speak meaningfully of a separate Muslim world.

See also Arabic Literature; Ashʿarites, Ashʿaira; Basri, Hasan al-; Ghazali, al-; Hallaj, al-; Ibn ‘Arabi; Ibn Sina; Ibn Taymiyya; Jāmiʿ; Mādrasa; Muhammad; Mulla Sadra; Rabiʿa of Basra; Persian Language and Literature; Pilgrimage: Ziyara; Rumi, Jalāluddin; Shiʿa: Imami (Twelver); Suhrawardi, al-; Tariqa; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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Carl W. Ernst
TA‘ZIYA (TA‘ZIYEH)

Ta‘ziya is an Islamic Shi‘ite ritual performed mainly in Iran. The Arabic term ta‘ziya (Pers., Ta‘ziyeh) means to mourn or to offer one’s condolences for a death. It is also sometimes called ta‘ziya kbani, or shabih kbani. The term ta‘ziya has been used primarily in Iran to refer to a Shi‘ite religious ritual consisting of a theatrical re-enactment of the tragic seventh-century Battle of Karbala. This historic battle was fought between the followers of prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn and the troops of the second Umayyad caliph Yazid. While ta‘ziya performance rituals have been mostly restricted to Iran, the Shi‘a of South Asia and Iraq use the term ta‘ziya to refer to a model or replica of Husayn’s tomb, which they use in their ritual processions, after which they are ritually discarded.

The Battle of Karbala

Accounts of the Battle of Karbala can be summarized as follows. In the year 680 c.e., Husayn, who was also the third imam of the Shi‘a, was killed in the desert of southern Iraq along with over seventy of his family and close friends by troops loyal to the caliph Yazid. The women and children were taken prisoner and paraded in various cities, adding to the humiliation, but also providing opportunities for these women, particularly Husayn’s sister Zaynab, to speak out publicly against Yazid. Yazid is portrayed by the Shi‘a as notoriously corrupt, immoral, and oppressive. Hence, Husayn’s rebellion and subsequent martyrdom is understood by the Shi‘a as an epic struggle between good and evil. For the Shi‘a this event has served as a vindication of the Shi‘ite cause in the face of Sunni criticism, as well as constituting the central event in their understanding of human history.

Historical Development

Following the battle itself, popular elegies of the martyrs were composed. However, the earliest reliable account of the performance of public mourning rituals was recorded in 963 c.e. during the reign of Mu‘izz al-Dawla, the Buyid ruler of southern Iran and Iraq. When the Safavid dynasty came to power in Iran a new type of ritual called rawza-khani emerged, consisting mainly of a ritual sermon recounting and mourning the tragedy of Karbala. This ritual was based on texts like Husayn Va‘ez Kashfi’s 1502 composition entitled Rawzat al-shubada‘ (The garden of martyrs). Kashfi’s text was a synthesis of a long line of historical accounts of Karbala by religious scholars.

By the time the Qajar dynasty took power in Iran in 1796, the rawza-khani ritual had evolved into the much more elaborate ritual called shabih-khani or ta‘ziya. The ta‘ziya, an elaborate theatrical performance of the Karbala story based on the same narratives used in the rawza-khani, involved a large cast of professional and amateur actors, a director, a staging area, costumes, and props.

Qajar Patronage

The heyday of ta‘ziya was the Qajar era (1796–1925). The most elaborate example of Qajar patronage of ta‘ziya was the Takiya Dawlat, which was built in Tehran in 1873 by the order of the Iranian monarch Naser al-Din Shah. This takiya was built on a very grand scale. Nevertheless, it was in most ways a typical takiya. It consisted of a large circular amphitheater with several entrances surrounding a large open area; a tent was used as a roof. Its primary purpose was to provide a staging area for the most elaborate ta‘ziya performances. Lady Sheil, a European traveler, resident in Tehran in 1856, gives a brief account of the ta‘ziya performance in the Takiya Dawlat in 1856, concluding, “It is a sight in no small degree curious to witness an assemblage of several thousand persons plunged in deep sorrow, giving vent to their sorrow” (p. 127).

Modern Trends

Following the fall of the Qajar dynasty in the early twentieth century, the ta‘ziya slowly declined until it was mostly abandoned in the large cities in the 1930s and 1940s. However, ta‘ziyas have continued to exist in Iran on a smaller scale throughout the twentieth century, especially in traditional sectors. There were two reasons for this relative decline. The first Pahlavi king, Reza Shah, outlawed the ta‘ziya. More importantly, as Iranian society changed modernized elites became less interested in sponsoring such traditional ritual events. Scholars of literature and drama as well as government agencies attempted to preserve this theatrical tradition in the 1970s, and again in the 1980s and 1990s. However, unlike the Qajar period, which was the heyday of the ta‘ziya ritual, the dominant public rituals since the 1930s have been the Muharram processions, and various forms of the rawza kbani.

See also Hosayniyya; Rawza-Khani; Taqiyya.

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Kamran Aghaie

TERRORISM

Terrorism is one of today’s most contested terms. It is widely used polemically to delegitimate both state-sponsored violence as well as counter-state insurgencies. Although there is
as yet no scholarly consensus in defining and theorizing about the subject, there is some agreement that terrorism involves the threat and actual use of violence against civilians to bring about political, social, and economic change. During the late twentieth century, political elites, state intelligence agencies, the establishment media, and an array of experts (qualified and unqualified) began to use the term to describe the militant tactics of various movements and organizations, none more than those connected with Islam. The subject is considerably more complicated, however.

Origins and Meanings of the Term
The origin of the word “terror” in Latin-derived languages is the French terreur, which assumed its modern meaning in the context of the French Revolution. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1789, the new government established its laws and its authority through a “reign of terror,” which inspired in the population a constant fear of arrest and execution. In this context, terrorism was understood as fear created by the state, or government rule through the specter of violence. This definition also applies to the totalitarian states of the twentieth century. More contemporarily, however, terrorism has become synonymous with violence perpetrated by non-state actors.

In Arabic, the term īrahāb is commonly used today as the equivalent for “terrorism,” its meanings largely affected by the use of the latter term in Western languages, particularly English and French. Īrahāb, derived from ārhaba (“to frighten,” “to strike with fear,” or “to terrify”), never appears in the Qur’an, though its imperfect verbal form occurs once. The Qur’an states, “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to terrify (yurribuhun) thereby the enemies of God, your enemies, and others whom you do not know, but God knows” (8:60). The historical context for this command is that of the early battles of Muhammad and his followers against their Meccan enemies; it has had limited use subsequently in the context of discourses on jihad. Other variations of the same root appearing in the Qur’an refer to humanity’s awe of God, particularly as an appellation for Christian monks (rubāhin). Since the 1980s, Īrahāb has been widely used in Arabic political rhetoric to condemn Israel’s use of military force. Egyptian political elites and government-controlled media usually use the term to describe violence committed by anti-state Islamist groups.

More Recent Usages
After the Second World War, movements countering colonialism and imperialism grew in strength and influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the Middle East (for example, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, and Iran), nationalist and Islamic movements engaged in active and, at times, violent opposition to Western powers and the emergent client regimes they supported. Then, as now, the means of resistance differed within and among the many groups at work, regardless of whether or not this resistance was articulated in terms of national struggle and liberation, as with many early resistance movements, or in religious terms through the concept of jihad, a concept that acquired greater salience in the 1970s. At that time, revisionist formulations of classical Islamic jihad doctrine by Islamist ideologues such as Abu l-A’la’ al-Maududi (1903–1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1903–1966) were adapted by radical Islamic groups to legitimate the use of violence, first against agents of secular, pro-Western nation-states, and subsequently against civilian populations.

Groups as diverse as the European anarchists, Viet Cong, Irish Republican Army, Nicaraguan Sandinistas, and Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress have been branded with the terrorist label. In Middle Eastern contexts, terrorism has been used generically to characterize incidents of violence such as the attacks by Jewish guerillas against the British during the Mandate Period; the 1972 killings of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich at the hands of Palestinian Liberation Organization gunmen; violence committed by agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran at home and abroad since 1979; the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat by the Jihad group in 1981; the 1983 bombing of a United States Marine barracks in Beirut and the kidnappings of westerners in Lebanon; the Islamist insurgency against the Algerian government since the mid-1990s; and attacks against Israeli forces and civilians. While anti-Soviet Muslim combatants in Afghanistan received moral, economic, and military support from the United States from 1979 to 1988 as “freedom fighters” (a loose translation of mujāhidīn), spin-off organizations such as al-Qā‘ida and the Taliban have come to epitomize what many now call terrorism.

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the administration of George W. Bush placed the war against terrorism, known officially as Operation Enduring Freedom, at the top of its foreign and domestic political agendas. This new anti-terrorism policy led to large-scale military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as implementation of stringent security measures in the United States, including mass deportations, detentions, and curtailment of the civil rights of immigrants and visitors to the country—especially those coming from the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and who may be Muslims.

The way in which the international community—including Western and Arab states—interpreted these events has had a profound effect on how terrorism is identified today. The incidents described above reflect many different contexts and many different kinds of violence. What links them analytically is that various actors have described each as terrorist activity. When attempting to identify terrorism,
however, the term’s broad use offers little guidance in describing or understanding a particular situation.

**Defining Terrorism Today**

How we define “terrorism” creates the intellectual framework that delimits the explanations available to us in working to understand an event or series of events. Most states, and much of the international community, now define terrorism as the use of force by non-state actors, a definition that focuses analytic attention on the violence of resistance at the expense of attention to violence perpetrated by the state. The analytic and conceptual shift in the meaning of terrorism in the last decades of the twentieth century has had important consequences. Rather than focusing on the causes that lead to violent resistance, discussions of terrorism are often limited to questions about the legitimate use of force to eliminate it.

Brought into greater relief, the modern meaning of terrorism comes out of the use of violence to justify and preserve a regime of law, relations of power, or, more broadly, a way of life. While all states use violence to protect the authority of the law and the state itself, those using violence to resist state authority do so in order to undermine that authority. Both kinds of violence aim at a similar end: creating and maintaining a system that orders the world. In fact, when seen in a broader context, state terror and non-state terror legitimize each other, marginalizing alternatives to that violence.

Defining terrorism in terms of “essential meanings” of Islam—or of any religious tradition—provides little help in understanding how violence functions. Violence is not particular to a specific religion, or to religion in general, or to a particular kind of socio-political organization, though it is indelibly part of both. The term “terrorism” used to describe any and all violent activity unsanctioned by a sovereign state or by international authority is insufficient to arrive at a nuanced understanding of events. As a result, the term “terrorism” should be limited to a heuristic role, and should not be used as an explanatory tool in analyzing specific incidents of violence or patterns of violence.

*See also* bin Ladin, Usama; Conflict and Violence; Hamas; Intifada; Qa’ida, al-; Taliban.

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Juan Eduardo Campo
Caleb Elfenbein

**THAQAFI, MUKHTAR AL-**

*(C. 622–687)*

Mukhtar b. Abi ‘Ubayd al-Thaqafi took over Kufa (in Iraq) for a year and a half during the Second Civil War (*fitna*, set off by the murder of Husayn in 680), as the Zubayrids and Marwanids struggled for control of the empire in succession to the Sufyanid branch of the Umayyad caliphs. Mukhtar initially supported the Zubayrids but later, in 685, he deposed their governor of Kufa in the name of Muḥammad b. al-Hanafīyya (d. 700), son of ʿAlī by a concubine of the Hanāfī tribe. When Mukhtar sent an armed force to Medina, the Zubayrids released Muḥammad b. al-Hanafīyya, who, however, declined to join Mukhtar in Kufa. In 686, he defeated a Marwanid army from Syria, but soon after, the Zubayrids of Basra defeated his army and beleaguered him in the citadel of Kufa. After perhaps six months, Mukhtar was killed in battle. Four years later, the Zubayrids themselves were driven out of Iraq by the Marwanids, who refounded the Umayyad dynasty on the principle of vigorous direction from Syria.

Mukhtar’s history is difficult to make out because of the vagaries of transmission between his time and that of our sources in the ninth century. The difficulty is further aggravated because numerous politico-religious factions have had an interest in dissociating themselves from him. It does seem, however, that non-Arab converts were prominent among his soldiers and that some elements of his program were taken up by later radical Shi’ites, including the early Abbasids, while other elements, such as the concept of a *mabdi*, or a reformer who appears at the end of time, attracted later Sunnis. The distinctive religious tinge of Mukhtar’s reign, although now difficult to identify with certainty, helped provoke the Marwanids to Islamize their administration.

*See also* Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya; Shi‘a: Early; Succession.

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Christopher Melchert
TINMBUKTU

During the early medieval period, Timbuktu was a seasonal camp of Berber nomadic tribes as they took their livestock to the Niger River during the dry season. It became a semi-permanent settlement in the twelfth century. By the fifteenth century, the settlement had become one of the most famous intellectual and commercial cities of the African continent. Salt and gold were among the precious products sought after in Timbuktu. Merchants and scholars from North Africa visited or settled in there during the second half of the fourteenth century. A number of universities were established in Timbuktu from the fifteenth century onwards. Notable among them are the following: Sankore, which was established by Sanhaja Berbers; Djingerey Bey; and the Oratory of Sidi Yahya. Their course offerings included the study of the Qur'an, the hadith, law, theology, rhetoric, logic, prosody, and Arabic grammar. The universities of Timbuktu maintained close contact with other universities in North Africa and Egypt. They offered the same topics and recognized each other's degrees.

The two major sources of the political history of the medieval Western Sudan are the Ta'rikh al-Sudan (History of the Black people) and the Ta'rikh al-Fattash (History of the researcher ) were written by Timbuktu scholars: 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'di and Mahmud Ka'ti, respectively. During the 1990s, the al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation published catalogues of thousands of manuscripts in Arabic or Ajami located in the libraries and private collections of Timbuktu. These manuscripts include scholarly works and other documents, providing crucial information on the religious, social, economic, and political history of the region.

See also Africa, Islam in; Kunti, Mukhtar al-

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TOUBA

The city of Touba is located in the region of Diourbel in Senegal, West Africa. It is the second largest city in Senegal and (in 2001) had approximately one quarter of a million inhabitants. The city was established in 1887 by Ahmad Bamba, the founder of the Muridiyya (Mouride) brotherhood (tariqa), as the headquarters for his new brotherhood. According to tradition, the location was revealed to him by the angel Gabriel while he was seated praying. The French, fearful of an uprising against their regime, did not permit Ahmad Bamba to live in Touba but he continued to see it as a holy site and the center of his brotherhood. Succeeding caliphs would either live in Touba or have a principal home there.

Before his death in 1927 Ahmad Bamba began the construction of the great mosque in Touba, which is today the largest mosque in Senegal. The founder’s mausoleum is in Touba as are several religious and Arabic schools, libraries, historical sites, and tombs of other Muridiyya leaders. The city is home to the annual Muridiyya festival, the Magal. The date of the Magal marks the exile of Ahmad Bamba to Gabon, symbolizing his suffering and resistance to the French colonial authorities. Hundreds of thousands of disciples make the pilgrimage every year to pray at the founder’s tomb and to celebrate their religion. Especially during the immediate pre-and post-independence periods, when Muridiyya caliphs played a large role in the political process of Senegal, Touba was a major seat of political as well as religious power.

See also Africa, Islam in; Bamba, Ahmad; Tariqa.

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Lucy Creevey

TRADITIONALISM

The term traditionalism is commonly used to describe the early Islamic movement that coalesced around the ideas of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) during the mihna (inquisition, c. 833–847). Traditionalism indicates the loose configuration of scholars who rejected the rationalist interpretation of Islamic
theology proposed by the Mu'tazili school of thought. Traditionalists were also known as the Hashwiyah (promoters of farce) by their rationalist opponents who argued that there was little scholarly depth to traditionalist ideas. Central to traditionalism was the rejection of the doctrine of the created Qur'an, which held, contrary to traditionalist views, that the Qur'an was not eternal and was revealed ad hoc in response to specific crises in the life of the prophet Muhammad. Traditionalism, however, should not be confused with the term “traditionists,” which more narrowly describes scholars engaged in the development and promotion of hadith literature as a major component of Islamic theology and law (the muhaddithun). While it is true that most traditionalists were traditionists (i.e., proponents of hadith), not all muhaddithun agreed with the anti-rationalist tendency of the group that came to embrace Ibn Hanbal. In contemporary discussions of Islam, the term traditionalism has come to refer to Islamic revivalists (so-called fundamentalists) due to their links to Ibn Hanbal through the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). However, modern traditionalism has little similarity to the ideas that gave rise to anti-rationalist groups in early Islam. Contemporary traditionalism is loosely based on the idea that all individuals have the faculties of reason necessary, when combined with piety and a reading knowledge of Arabic, to discern on their own the will of God, an idea that would have been anathema to Ibn Hanbal and early traditionalist thought.

See also Hadith; Ibn Hanbal; Ibn Taymiyya; Mihna.

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R. Kevin Jaques

TRANSLATION

Scholars working under the sponsorship of Muslim patrons undertook the translation of works on Greek philosophy and scientific learning and transmitted them to the West. An early and particularly fertile center for translation was Jundi-Shapur in Khuzistan, southeast of Baghdad. There the Bukhtishu', a family of physicians at the court of the caliph, became energetic translators of Greek works on medical matters. Hunayn ibn Ishaq (808–873), based in Baghdad, translated the medical as well as ethical and philosophical works of Galen, which were preserved in Arabic long after the originals were lost. Arabic translations preserved the works of other Greek writers, such as Euclid, Rufus of Ephesus, Nicolaus of Damascus, Porphyry, and Proclus. Hunayn bequeathed his translation legacy to his son, Ishaq ibn Hunayn (d. 910). Hunayn and his school created a genuine home in the Arabic language for a rich repertoire of new ideas and concepts. Most of the major translators were Christian, with the possible exception of a Jewish scholar named Marsajawayh, who translated from the Syriac, and Thabit b. Qurrah (c. 834–901), a Sabian from Harran.

Translation was almost entirely devoted to scientific, medical, and philosophical works. Philosophical texts were paraphrased and included commentaries for Arabic students. Simplified adaptations of the works of Plato and Aristotle were known in Arabic. Another area of great intellectual interest was Neo-Platonism, particularly the works of the Egyptian Plotinus (c. 200–269 C.E.), and of his disciple Porphyry (233–301).

Yet it would be wrong to overemphasize the impact of Greek ideas on Islam’s religious life and culture. Only a small circle of educated elites was shaped by the influence of Greek intellectual ideas. The Qur’an survived the critical Greek encounter to endure as the great devotional and missionary text of the religion, conveying the sounds and tones of the original sacred Arabic of Scripture to multitudes of adherents down the centuries and scattered well beyond the Arab heartlands.

Mission and Translation

In the course of its worldwide expansion and cross-cultural transmission, Islam has maintained a remarkable consistency in promoting the nontranslatable status of the Qur’an. That may account in part for the relative unity of faith and practice among Muslims who are otherwise characterized by an extraordinary diversity of race, language, culture, and social status. Without an institutional central authority to enforce doctrine and to adjudicate the affairs of believers, Islam has nevertheless continued to enjoy a degree of solidarity that is belied by its organizational decentralization. It happens that only a minority of the world’s one billion Muslims is Arab in language and culture, yet for all Muslims the Holy Qur’an in the original Arabic is divine oracle. Rather than impede the spread of Islam, this fact has been the basis of the appeal of the religion in societies even beyond the Arab heartland. The language of scripture has been a major force in establishing boundaries and shaping identity for new communities in Islam.

The Qur’an bears witness to its own unique and manifest status as Arabic speech (12: 1–3; 16: 105; 41: 41–42), a celestial discourse designed for repeated recitation “whereat shiver the skins of those who fear their Lord; then their skins and their hearts soften to the remembrance of God” (39: 23). The Qur’an as the “essence of divine speech” is sublime and wise guidance for the faithful, and is preserved in its Arabicness with God as such (43: 3).
The transmission of Islam has been accompanied by adaptations in local practice and understanding, and, accordingly, the Qur’an has been appropriated to reflect new situations, whether as divine oracle, rule book, breviary, vade mecum, periaipt, or as universal template. There being no rival versions of the Qur’an, Muslims possess in their scripture a single and unvarying standard of faith and devotion, and a tangible symbol of the oneness of the umma (community of believers). Through Islam’s worldwide expansion the Arabic of scripture became, according to H. A. R. Gibb, “a world language and the common literary medium of all Muslim peoples” (1974, p. 37).

Although proficiency in the language of Scripture is the preserve of a small circle of specialists, nevertheless the task of learning the holy book by rote memorization is the sacred duty of all Muslims, scholar and sundry alike, because only that way may Muslims observe the obligatory five daily periods of worship known as salat. Even though there are translations of the Qur’an, they are invalid for salat for which the sacred Arabic has been instituted as a prerequisite, a rule that gives translations no canonical merit in the central religious rites.

A potent connection exists between the Arabic script and Islam’s sacrosanct view of language. One tradition speaks of the human face as God’s image, of language as the mark of humanity, and the twenty-eight letters of the Arabic script as containing the essence of that contained in language: the mysteries of God, humanity, and eternity. Echoes of such reverence for the sacred Arabic can be found in mosque calligraphy composed of Qur’anic verses and the names of God, the Prophet, the shahada (profession of faith), and the early caliphs. Calligraphic art has spread widely, and with it an iconographic reverence for the sacred script. Muslim devotions involve rhythmic chanting (tartil) of the Qur’an.

The widespread iconographic reverence for the language and script of the Qur’an led travelers in the far regions of the Islamic world to comment on the prominence given to study of the Qur’an and to its use in canonical worship. Thus did Ibn Battuta recount how Muslim Africans were punctilious in mosque attendance and zealous in learning the Qur’an, testifying that parents “put their children in chains if they show any backwardness in memorizing it, and they are not set free until they have it by heart.” Dr. Edward Wilmot Blyden (1832–1912), a pan-African visionary of West Indian origin, made a close study of Islam and Muslim life, noting that even at the margins of the Muslim world the untranslated Qur’an held a particularly high position. He said he saw evidence of the Holy Book exerting a powerful influence on nonliterate populations, providing a ground of unity for the disparate tribes and a sentiment of loyalty that promoted a sense of common identity. The words of the sacred book, he testified, were held in the greatest reverence and esteem. Although for many Muslim Africans the words of the Arabic Qur’an were little understood, they possessed still great beauty and music, a subtle and indefinable charm “incomprehensible to those not acquainted with the language in which the Koran was written.”

**Translation, Reform, and Revolution**

The tradition of orthopraxy that a uniform Qur’an promoted, and that was important where caliphal authority was weak or unknown, was difficult to maintain among acephalous Muslim populations such as existed in North Africa. For more than three centuries after the introduction of Islam, the Berbers remained poorly instructed in the faith and remained, therefore, susceptible to splitting and heresy. To remedy such defects, the Almoravid movement, launched in 1056, sought to assemble the dispersed Berber tribes under Islamic rule in forms that were frankly outlandish: the Qur’an and the sunna, for example, were discounted as too demanding for the simple and ignorant, their place now taken by a culture of strict discipline on the masses and unquestioning obedience to the leader. Religious illiteracy became even more conspicuous from the high expectations raised by Almoravid power.

The illiteracy aggravated the moral delinquency belonging with the fictitious nature of power, and that finally provoked a reaction. An idea had been growing steadily that it was necessary to extend to the Berber tribesmen the unifying dividends that the Ash‘arite revolution had achieved in the eastern provinces of the caliphate. By making use of reason to defend revelation, Ash‘arism repositioned Muslim intellectual life after its encounter with Greek ideas by stressing God’s omnipotence (qadar) and by rejecting the naturalist inferences of anthropomorphism (tajsim).

Transferred to North Africa, these Ash‘arite ideas would have a major impact on religion, state, and society. In the circumstances of political fragmentation and religious syncretism that characterized North Africa in the eleventh century, a movement of reaction and revolution erupted to channel pent up forces through a political outlet under a charismatic leader. This leader was Ibn Tumart (d. 1150), founder of the militant Almohad (al-muwahhidun) counter-revolution against the lackadasical Almoravids.

Ibn Tumart assumed power and had the Qur’an translated into his native Berber; he ordered the call to prayers (adhan) to be given in Berber; the Friday sermon (khutba) likewise was delivered in his mother tongue; and he required the clerics, the ulema, to know and function in that language. He arranged for his own theological writings to be circulated in Berber as well as Arabic. Such translation activity stimulated sentiments of local nationalism, though it conflicted with Ibn Tumart’s own aims of integrating Berber Islam into the unified Ash‘arite and Ghazalian tradition that he so much admired. Undertaking his ambitious translation enterprise as a facet of the changes he wished to see introduced in Muslim North Africa, Ibn Tumart ended by producing a variation so
colorful and so rare as to amount to a serious rupture with Qur’an and sunna.

The nationalist impulse of language reform and religious renewal converged again much later, during the Ottoman Empire. By the late nineteenth century this linguistic nationalism was gaining a foothold within and without. Students from the empire returned from their studies in European universities with a heightened sense of national identity. Works on Turkish language and grammar, some of the result of European Orientalist scholarship, were coming into general circulation. Works in European languages, particularly French, were translated into Turkish. Hungarian and Polish refugees, many of whom converted to Islam, wrote in French and Turkish. Russian Turks brought a strong sense of national identity, infusing the Turkish language with a sense of historical destiny. These impulses coalesced into the Turkish Society, founded in Istanbul in 1908. The society was dedicated to objectives that were scholarly as well as cultural, including the advancement of language and literature. As part of its aggressive program of secularization, the new political authorities set about reforming religious life and practice. In 1929 Arabic and Persian were abolished as subjects of instruction in schools to facilitate the teaching and spread of Turkish. A reorganization of religious schools and mosques was undertaken, with the requirement that the language of worship be Turkish, and that all prayers and sermons be in the national language, and not Arabic. Measures were adopted to translate the Qur’an and the hadith into Turkish, with money voted for the scheme in 1932. In that year for the first time the adhan resounded from minarets in Turkish.

Beginning in 1928 with the adoption of a new Latin alphabet to replace Arabic, a vigorous, if at times overenthusiastic, language reform program was undertaken. The Turkish language was purged of its Arabic and Persian borrowings and grammatical features to bring it closer to national aspirations. Although some of the excesses of this linguistic purge were later reversed, the language reforms achieved the goal of closing a crucial gap between written and spoken Turkish, giving birth to a new sense of national identity. The attempts to carry the translation efforts into the mosque failed because of clerical opposition. A similar fate befell attempts in India to translate the Qur’an and the hadith into Turkish, with money voted for the scheme in 1932. In that year for the first time the adhan resounded from minarets in Turkish.

**Translation and Cross-Cultural Consolidation**

These large-scale national reforms aimed at shifting people’s devotion to the sacred script and language to the enduring influence of the Qur’an on the habits and customs of Muslim peoples. Yet a different impulse has worked in translation to fashion in people a sense of identity and to provide boundary markers. This is the case, for example, with Swahili in East Africa and Hausa and Fulfulde in West Africa. Swahili verse and prose literature have functioned to impress on the fabric of popular life images of Islam drawn from the Arabic classics: accounts of the Prophet in popular praise songs; studies of the origins of the Islamic state; stories of the caliphs and the Prophet’s companions; devotional literature tied to the religious calendar; exegetical works expounding the Qur’an; and manuals designed for exchange and study in shops, markets, and private homes. Swahili has thus worked in favor of Islam’s penetration into coastal and transient populations of East Africa.

Hausa verse and prose have had a comparable effect on the Hausa people of Nigeria and beyond. Early in the nineteenth century an era of revolution and reform produced an environment conducive to the large-scale use of written Hausa in Arabic script. That in turn inspired a corresponding pan-Islamic sensibility among scholars. Writers in Hausa appealed to the Arabic classics, including the literature produced during the Abbasid caliphate, to reform local practice and to implement the religious canon. The reformers drew upon the Qur’an, the hadith, the history, and the legal and biographical traditions to create structures and institutions in their part of the Muslim world, and the gains they made became a permanent part of the life of the people.

For its part, Fulfulde enjoyed a long and distinguished role as the language of instruction, catechism, and exegesis in Qur’an school and beyond. The educational syllabus was based on a four-stage process: introducing the Arabic alphabet (jhungog), writing (windugog), Scriptural exegesis in Fulfulde (furugol), and higher studies (fennu; Ar., ‘ilm awfaq). Religious catechism was conducted in Fulfulde. All this linguistic activity laced Fulbe national feeling with a heightened sense of Islamic exceptionalism. Beginning with the reforms of Karamokho Alfa of Futa Jallon in 1727, and ‘Uthman dan Fodio of northern Nigeria in 1804, the Fulbe became energetic sponsors of reform in West African Islam and the self-acclaimed defenders of Sunni orthodoxy. Under Fulbe hegemony, the language issue acquired a central status: the accommodationists among the local Muslim clerics were decried as ‘ulama’ al-su’, the “venal clerics,” and charged with allowing scriptural standards to slip and political corruption to spread. Literacy in Arabic, however limited, became a criterion of reform and renewal. Such limited literacy represented precious intellectual capital in marginal Muslim societies, and the Fulbe reformers deployed it to great effect. Literate clerics, accordingly, became the vanguard of change in state and society.

It is not the case, however, that all literate clerics adopted the path of militancy from their privileged position as masters of Arabic. An outstanding example are the Jakhanke Muslim clerics of Senegambia who, as a matter of principle, have, from medieval times, rejected jihad as well as political cooperation, and have instead adopted the methods of peaceful persuasion in their role as educational specialists. They have
Travel and Travelers

Travel has been a part of the Islamic culture from the beginning. The obligation of every Muslim, once in a lifetime, to make the pilgrimage, or hajj, to Mecca and Medina was an early and significant reason for much of the travel.

Before air transport the greater the distance one needed to travel on the hajj the more the journey tended to become a grand study tour of the greater mosques and madrasas of the Muslim heartland. It was an opportunity for the traveler to acquire knowledge.

The expansion of Islam beyond its early borders meant that such a pilgrimage invariably required long-distance travel. The conversion of the local population to Islam necessitated travel for both new converts and for those proselytizing. This expansion resulted not only from war, but also through commerce as traveling merchants established trading posts farther away from Islam’s original center.

The most fundamental values of Islam have tended to encourage a high degree of social mobility and to free movement of individuals from one city and region to another. Travel was promoted through Islamic culture and put great emphasis on egalitarian behavior in social relations based on the ideal of a community allegiance to one God.

Travel was made easy by the dynamics of social life centered on an egalitarian, contractual, and relatively free play of relations among individuals striving to conform to Islamic moral standards. Wherever an individual traveled, pursued a career, or bought and sold goods, the same social and moral dictates of Islam largely applied. The language common to early Islam, Arabic, ensured another unifying characteristic.

The pattern of travel and migration of adherents to Islam all but ensured a persistent dispersion of architects, writers, craftsmen, legal scholars, scribes, Sufi divines, and theologians outward from the older centers of Islam to the new frontiers of Muslim activity.

The members of the cultural elite maintained during traveling a close tie with the greater cities of the central part of the Islamic lands. They created, thereby, not only a scattering of literate and skilled Muslims across several continents, but an integrated, growing, self-replenishing network of cultural communication.

A great interest in knowledge and learning has been a common thread of Islam from its earliest days. Travel solely in search of knowledge has been an integral part of the intellectual life of the Islamic world. The scholarly class was an extraordinarily mobile group, who circulated incessantly from one city and country to another, studying with renowned professors, leading diplomatic missions, and taking up posts in mosques and government chanceries.

Scholars from the more remote part of the Islamic world traveled to the countries considered central to Islam in search of civilized models, higher knowledge, and learned companionship.

The need for travel and interest in it created an equal need for knowledge of geography and navigation both on land and sea. As a consequence the ribla, or book of travels, emerged. The genre recounted for the reader the journey to Mecca with information and entertainment of religious sites on the route.

TRAVEL AND TRAVELERS

See also Arabic Language; Ibn Battuta; Persian Language and Literature; Qur’an; Science, Islam and.

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Lamin Sanneh
A copy of a Catalan map showing North Africa appears in the volume two color insert.

See also Biruni, al-; Ibn Battuta; Ibn Khaldun; Pilgrimage: Hajj.

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Thyge C. Bro

TRIBE

The English word tribe is an ambivalent term that is used indiscriminately to refer to a wide variety of social groupings that range from small, preliterate, and relatively isolated communities in the Amazon jungles of South America to large, powerful confederacies whose chiefs are members of the national political elite such as the case of the Bakhtiyari of southwest Iran. In what follows, the concepts of “tribe” and “tribalism” are discussed in the specific context of the Middle East.

The Arabic term for tribe is *qabila* (pl. *qaba’il*). The word *qabila* is mentioned in the Qur’an: “O mankind: we have created you from a male and a female and made you into peoples and tribes [qaba’il] that you may know each other” (49:13). In its most common usage, *qabila* refers to a named group of people who share an ideology of common descent in the male line, claim a common geographical territory, and are politically united under the leadership of a chief, called a *shaykh* in Arabic, or *khān* in Persian and Turkish. As such, the concept of “tribe” and “tribalism” is used to simultaneously indicate a personal and group identity, a form of social organization, and a distinct political structure.

As a source of personal and group identity, tribal affiliation can be analogous to ethnicity albeit on a more limited scale; it confers a distinct identity on its members, binding them together in a distinct moral code expressed most commonly in the idiom of honor, courage, and personal autonomy. Tribal identity, based on ties of kinship (real or fictitious), is further reinforced by the common practice of close endogamy that favors the marriage of a man to his father’s brother’s daughter. Among Arabic speakers, intratribal bonds and group cohesion are expressed in the idiom of *‘asabīyya*, or group solidarity, based on blood ties and common descent.

Tribal systems of sociopolitical organization are also based on the ideology of common descent from a founding ancestor; some pastoral nomads, like the Bedouins of the Arabian and Syrian deserts, keep elaborate genealogies that serve to organize the different segments of the tribe in a network of mutual rights and responsibilities. Typically, the smallest tribal segment is the household made up of one or more patrilineally related families; a number of such households make up the next ascending segment, or lineage. Among the Bedouins, this level of organization is known as *fakhd*; members of a *fakhd* or lineage usually lay claim to a common grazing territory, brand their herds with the same symbol, and are collectively liable to pay blood money in the case of a murder committed by one of their members. A number of related lineages are grouped into the next all-encompassing level of the tribe, or *qabila*; in some parts of the Arabic-speaking Middle East, this level is also referred to as *‘asibira*. The tribe is thus the largest named unit of incorporation constructed on a genealogical framework. While today tribes serve mainly as reference groups for related lineages, in the past they played an important role in the political life of the region. Each tribe united behind a paramount chief who acted as a military commander in intertribal warfare. Tribal members typically share a strong sense of common heritage that goes beyond that of common descent. They tend to speak one dialect, dress in a distinctive style, and have their own customs and traditions.

Tribes have a long and complicated history in the Middle East; unlike the case for other parts of the world, tribes did not disappear with the formation of nation-states in the region. In fact, the historical coexistence of state and tribe lends a unique texture to Middle Eastern human geography. Beginning with the Islamic conquest in the seventh century (itself carried out by Arab tribal forces) tribes and tribal confederacies have played a key role in the creation and disintegration of several Islamic imperial dynasties such as the Abbasids, the Ottomans, and the Qajars. Equally significant were the many tribes who managed to maintain their autonomy in defiance of state rule. This was the case with the Bedouin tribes of Arabia, the Kurds of the Zagros mountains, and the large tribal federacies of Iran like the Bakhtiyari and the Qashqa’i.

In the mountain and desert areas of Kurdistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iran, tribally organized confederacies managed to escape the reach of the state and maintain their independence well into the twentieth century. Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the arrival of European colonial powers in the region, the role of tribes in the newly formed nation-states assumed a new significance. In their effort to stem anticolonial and nationalist movements in the region, colonial powers encouraged tribal separatism by promoting tribal identities and reinforcing the authority of tribal leaders. This policy of “divide and rule” came to an end after the Second World War, which marked the end of colonialism in the region. Seeking to promote national unity, the policy of the newly independent governments aimed at integrating the tribes into the nation-state. In cases of pastoral nomadic tribes such
as the Bedouins of Arabia and the Qashqa’i of Iran, this took the form of forced sedentarization, taxation, and conscription into the national army.

Today all over the Middle East, tribes have ceased to be important political units capable of challenging the power of the central governments. Tribal leaders have been generally co-opted or were absorbed into the national elite. But while their political role has been generally undermined, tribes and tribalism remain an important component of Middle Eastern cultural landscape. Supplanted by nationalist and Islamist ideologies, tribalism as an ideology has not disappeared. Tribal identity and tribal ties continue to be an important source for self-reference and social organization for many people in the region.

See also ‘Asabiyya; Bedouin; Ethnicity.

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Amal Rassam

TURABI, HASAN AL- (1932– )

Hasan al-Turabi is a Sudanese political leader and Islamist intellectual. Al-Turabi’s family was well known and had a recognized tradition of piety. Al-Turabi’s father was one of the first Sudanese to be trained as a judge in the British system of administering Islamic law in Sudan, and Hasan received a traditional Islamic education from his father along with his modern education in the government-supported system. In secondary school and then at the University of Khartoum, al-Turabi became active in the small, Islamically oriented student groups. He studied in London and received a doctorate from the Sorbonne. He returned to Sudan in 1964, in time to be a visible participant in the October Revolution that overthrew the military regime of Ibrahim ‘Aboud.

In the second period of civilian parliamentary politics in Sudan (1964–1969), al-Turabi led the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (established in the 1950s) into an important place in Sudanese politics. It was not a mass party but was well organized among students and professionals, and was able to give prominence in Sudanese politics to issues of Islamic identity. The Brotherhood continued this role in changing political contexts. Al-Turabi’s Brotherhood was the core of the Islamic Charter Front in the 1960s, and then became part of the opposition to the military regime established by Ja’far al-Numayri in 1969. In the late 1970s, al-Turabi participated in the national reconciliation process and became a significant force in the Islamization policies initiated by Numayri. Although al-Turabi did not have a direct role in drafting “the September Laws” of 1983 that imposed a version of Islamic law on Sudan, he and his group gained prominence in the new context. When Numayri was overthrown in 1985, al-Turabi reorganized the Brotherhood as the National Islamic Front (NIF), which emerged as the third largest party in the new parliamentary system. NIF was able to prevent the repeal of the September Laws and kept Islamic issues in the forefront of the Sudanese political agenda.

Al-Turabi’s role was transformed in 1989, when a military coup led by Hasan ‘Umar Bashir established an Islamist-style military regime in which al-Turabi was the ideological mentor. Throughout the 1990s, the Bashir-Turabi alliance attempted to create a new political system. The regime engaged in severe violations of human rights and the civil war between the central government and the southern region intensified as a result of military intransigence and the NIF’s agenda of Islamizing the whole country. In 1998 and 1999, Bashir relieved al-Turabi of all official posts and al-Turabi became a marginal force in Sudanese politics.

During the 1970s and 1980s, al-Turabi’s ideas became widely known in the Muslim world. He called for significant renewal of the whole structure of Islamic legal thought and developed important concepts of Islamic democracy. His writings on the importance of gender equality in Islam were controversial but gained him a reputation as an Islamic liberal activist. However, the failures of the NIF regime in the 1990s and its excesses in blocking human rights reforms meant that al-Turabi’s international visibility and reputation declined by the end of the twentieth century.

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TUSI, MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HASAN (SHAYKH AL-TA’IFA) (995–1067)

Muhammad b. Hasan al-Tusi (d. 1067), who was given the honorific “Shaykh of the sect” (shaykh al-ta’ifa), was an important Imami Shi’ite thinker of the early period. He hailed from Tus in Khorasan, but made his name in Baghdad. His work represents both of the two main trends in early
Twelver Shi‘ism: rationalism and hadith study. His commentary on the Qur’an (tafsir), al-Tibyan, exemplifies this trend as both styles of argumentation are employed to explain the meaning of each Qur’anic verse. His hadith works, the most famous being al-Tahdhib and al-Istibsar, are more than mere collections, but are also detailed expositions of the legal employment of the traditions of the imams. His work in law proper was similarly sophisticated, particularly his ‘Uddat al-usul (a work in the principles of jurisprudence) and al-Mabsut (one of his many works of law). Tusi also wrote theological works, in which arguments in the Mu‘tazilite style were used alongside more text-based justification for the imamate. His activities in bibliography and biography enabled the discipline of biography (‘ilm al-rijal) to develop into a sophisticated science in Twelver Shi‘ism. His prolific output as a scholar can, in part, be explained by the criticism of the Twelver tradition by Sunni intellectuals—that they lacked a sufficient corpus of respectable writings. Tusi’s response was to compile and collate works of great importance.

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Robert Gleave

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**TUSI, NASIR AL-DIN (1201–1274)**

Nasir al-Din Tusi, Abu Ja‘far Muhammad b. Muhammad b. al-Hasan, was a Shi‘ite philosopher, theologian, astronomer, mathematician, and political advisor. Tusi was born in Tus, in northeastern Iran, and died in Baghdad, in present-day Iraq. A man of astounding intellectual breadth, he witnessed the transfer of power in the Islamic world to the Mongols. Beginning his career as a court astronomer to the Isma‘ili governor Nasir al-Din Abi Mansur at Sertakht, he continued to work for the Isma‘ilis at various Iranian fortresses, including Qhistan, until he transferred to the Isma‘ili castle at Alamut, where he remained until joining the Mongol Hulagu’s entourage as a political advisor in 1247. Subsequent to the Mongol victory over Baghdad (1257), he was encouraged by Hulagu to found an observatory at Maragha in Azerbaijan, equipped with the best instruments, some constructed for the first time. His courtly duties included supervision of waqf estates, a position that he retained under the Mongol leader Aqa, until Tusi’s death in 1274. Two critical issues concerning his religious persuasion and political stance remain the subject of scholarly and ideological debate: one, whether he was an Isma‘ili Shi‘ite by choice or by employment; and two, whether his involvement in the fall of Alamut and Baghdad, respectively, entailed treachery or prudence. G. M. Wickens, for instance, in his introduction to *The Nasirean Ethics* holds the view that Tusi’s alignment with the Mongols “made possible the continuance in new and flourishing forms of Islamic learning, law and civilization,” a point that underscores Tusi’s political acumen under difficult circumstances. Although over one hundred books are attributed to Tusi, only a handful have survived. Apart from his many scientific works, his noteworthy texts include the *Hall mushkilat al-Isharat*, a commentary on Ibn Sina’s *al-Isharat* as well as a refutation of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s *Muhassal*; an ethical treatise titled the *Akhlaq-e Nasiri*, which evinces the influence of Ibn Miskawaih; the Isma‘ili-inspired works *Tasawwurat* (also known as *Rawdat al-taslim*) and the autobiographical *Sayr wa Suluk*; the Twelver-Shi‘ite *kalam* or theological works *Tajrid al-‘aynaqa’id* and *Qawa’il al-‘aynAqa’id*; and a mystical work titled * Awsaf al-Ashraf*. An original and innovative thinker, his works continue to merit attention.

See also *Falsafa; Khojas.*

Zayn R. Kassam
ULEMA

Literally “those who have knowledge” or “those who know” (singular ‘ālim, plural ‘ulama’). The term is most widely used to refer to the scholarly class of Muslim societies, whose main occupation is the study of the texts that make up the Islamic Tradition (religious sciences such as Qur’an, hadith, Qur’anic commentary, jurisprudence, and theology, but also the applied sciences such as medicine, biology, astronomy, and mathematics). Members of the ulema class have also been called upon to act as advisors to rulers, or as qadis (judges) implementing the law (shari’ah) within Muslim societies. The authority of the ulema class in defining right doctrine and right practice within Islam has been immense in Muslim history.

In the early period (7th–9th centuries C.E.), a separate class of scholars concerned with the elaboration of knowledge (‘ilm) took some time to develop. Most historians date the emergence of a scholarly class to the early years of the Umayyad period, when Islamic doctrine was much debated. Debates concerning the constituent elements of faith (iman), or predestination (qadr), as well as the transmission of hadith (from the Prophet or other notable figures) and legal doctrine (fiqh) were the principal intellectual concerns of the emerging scholarly class. Many of the ulema also, it appears, participated in the opposition movements to the Umayyad caliphate. Some viewed them as deviating from true Islam in their leadership of the Muslim empire, and wished to put forward a more sophisticated religio-intellectual criticism of the Umayyads. It was, however, in the Abbasid period that the ulema began to gain both political influence and popular respect, as Abbasid caliphs and their wazirs sponsored institutional schools in which scholars could develop the intellectual foundations of Islam. It was early in this period that the ulema, with the support of some caliphs, became interested in the Greek tradition of philosophy and science, and works in languages other than Arabic began to be translated. These translations mark the beginnings of the incorporation of the applied sciences into the curriculum of learning, to complement the religious sciences, in which the ulema were already considered expert.

Once established, the ulema class became a fundamental element of Muslim societies. The expansion of the Muslim world, incorporating many different cultures and traditions, did not obviate the need for a scholarly class whose primary functions were to maintain the intellectual tradition and provide religious and scientific guidance to the population. Their fortunes waxed and waned depending on the receptivity of the dynasties to religious influence, but the vast majority of Muslim societies, both past and present, have included a class of scholars, usually given the generic name ulema.

The authority of the ulema in matters of doctrine and law has been definitive. The ulema themselves, though, have been divided on many issues, and hence should not be viewed as a unified group with common aims and intentions. An example of this division can be seen in the famous Inquisition, (mihna) from 829 onwards, when one group of scholars (the Mu’tazilis) persuaded the Abbasid caliph to persecute (and declare as heretics) scholars who did not adhere to the doctrine of “the created Qur’an.”

The authority and respect demanded by the ulema has usually been justified on the simple basis of a practical division of labor. Not all members of society have the time, the skills, or the inclination to dedicate their lives to the study necessary to determine right doctrine and practice. Hence, it is argued, a class of society that dedicates itself to this task should be instituted, and since these matters affect each individual’s fate (both in this world and in the afterlife), the guidance of this class is of paramount importance. In the area of legal matters, this attitude was enshrined in the theory of taqlid, whereby the Muslim community is divided between scholars and those who follow the rulings of the scholars (typically called the muqallids).
Apart from this practical justification for the ulema’s authority, scholars also turned to the Qur’an. Q. 4:59 states “Obey God, the Prophet and those in authority amongst you.” Many Sunni scholars argued that “those in authority” probably refers to the ulema (some also included the political rulers in the category). Similarly, Q. 16:43: “Ask the people of remembrance if you do not know” was interpreted by Sunni scholars as exhorting the people to submit in matters of knowledge to the ulema. There were also convenient hadiths, traced back to the prophet Muhammad, which could be used to establish the ulema’s status. For example, the well-known words attributed to the Prophet, “The ulema are the inheritors of the Prophets,” was interpreted as implying that in religious authority, the ulema were given the responsibility of announcing the message of Islam to the community.

Although there were many scholars whose individual charismatic power is well attested, their authority was ultimately based on learning. The ulema deserved this respect, not because of lineage, or familial connections, or even because of individual piety and religiosity. Rather, the ulema were due respect because of the knowledge they had undergone a particular type of training and education that elevated their understanding of religious matters above the ordinary populace. It was on this basis that the institution of the ulema became an indispensable part of Muslim culture.

In Muslim history, however, the respect due to the ulema did not translate into political power. Most scholars who wrote on the relationship between political power and religious authority accepted that the ulema were advisors who aided the ruler in the maintenance of the religion. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), for example, argued that the sultan should “exercise coercive power and have authority because the sultan is the representative of God,” whereas the ulema were appointed by the sultan and given the responsibility of enacting the law. This theory of the dependence of the ulema upon the ruler for their practical authority in society reflected the relationship of the Sunni ulema with political power in historical terms. During the Ottoman Empire the ulema became an increasingly structured class of society, headed by the mufti, who advised the sultan on both religious and political issues, headed the judiciary, and controlled the religious education system in the empire. The situation was not dissimilar in the Indian Mogul Empire.

Al-Ghazali’s influential formulation of the sultan-ulema relationship can be informatively contrasted with the views of Shi’ite groups. Some Shi’ite groups, particularly the Isma’i’ils in the medieval period, saw religious authority and political power conjoined in an individual, who was given the title imam. The need for a class of religious scholars who advised the imam was reduced, since the imam was, himself, blessed in a mystical manner with knowledge of doctrinal and legal matters. Twelver Shi’ites also placed an imam at the apex of the ideal political system, but believed that the imam had gone into hiding (ghayba). Since there was no ideal political leader other than this missing imam, Twelver Shi’ites were greatly concerned with the issue of community authority. A theory of “delegation” (niyaba) was therefore needed. The Twelver Shi’ites recognized a succession of Twelve Imams after the death of the Prophet. Only the first of these, Imam ‘Ali, had succeeded in gaining political power, and the last of these had gone into hiding. Reports from a number of these Twelve Imams were interpreted to indicate that the imams had delegated leadership of the community to the ulema in the absence of the Imam.

In works of fiqh, one sees a gradual expansion of the ulema’s role in areas that, in early Twelver Shi’ism, were seen as the prerogative of the Imam. This position faced a serious challenge when the Safavid mystical order came to power in Iran in 1501. The first Safavid Shah, Isma’il, declared Twelver Shi’ism to be the state religion. Jurists either devised means whereby the shah might be considered a legitimate ruler, despite the absence of the true ruler (the imam) or they rejected association with the Safavids and maintained the ultimate authority of the ulema.

The debate over the role of the ulema in the life of the Muslim community has become more acute in the modern period. In Twelver Shi’ism, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini argued that the ulema should rule the Muslim community until the return of the Hidden Imam, a theory he had the opportunity to put into practice following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. In the modern Sunni Muslim world, on the other hand, one can recognize a variety of trends. Many Sunni Muslim governments have used members of the ulema to brand their government as religious in a manner reminiscent of the medieval period. In the revivalist movements, however, one sees a reaction against the ulema, who often are characterized as obscurantist and pedantic, worrying about matters of religious technicalities, rather than the more important issues of preserving Muslim identity in the face of non-Muslim imperialism. The popularist commentaries on the Qur’an of, for example, Sayyid Qutb or Abu I’A’la’ Maududi, represent a rejection of the ulemas and an exhortation to “the people” to approach the divine text without the encumbrance of the scholarly tradition of learning.

This rejection of the ulema’s authority in matters of religion is likely to increase as literacy and the availability of foundational texts of Islam become more widespread in the Muslim world. In some Muslim countries, however, one sees the re-emergence of the ulema as active political agents, working for change. Two examples of this are Saudi Arabia and Morocco. In the recent past, Saudi ulema have challenged the concentration of power in the person of the king and his royal family. Attempts continue to be made to diffuse this power to a larger body, within which the ulema would
play a larger role. In Morocco, legal scholars such as Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Fasi have been at the forefront of the modernization of Islamic law. Al-Fasi and others are responsible for the production of an intellectual movement in which the shari'a is considered more responsive to the needs of a society changing under the influence of new technology and science. The ulema have, then, at different times been loathed and loved by the political establishment. However, their participation in the institutions of power remains an essential component of any Muslim political system wishing to call itself “Islamic.”

See also Knowledge; Law; Madrasa; Qadi (Kadi, Kazi); Shari'a; Shi'a: Imami (Twelver); Shi'a: Isma'ili; Succession.

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‘UMAR (C. 581–644)

‘Umar b. al-Khattab al-'Adawi al-Qurashi, an early Meccan companion of the prophet Muhammad, became the Prophet’s second successor and is usually viewed as having done much to establish the foundations of the caliphal state. At first opposed to Islam, ‘Umar embraced it circa 615 in a reversal cherished and dramatized by tradition. Like Abu Bakr, with whom he was closely associated, ‘Umar married a daughter of the Prophet in 625. Because of his strong personality, a motif frequently noted in the sources, he gained considerable influence. At the death of the Prophet in 632, he helped Abu Bakr to be elected as successor, and Abu Bakr in turn appointed ‘Umar to succeed him two years later.

On taking office, ‘Umar placed the new caliphal state on firmer footing. He assumed the new title of Commander of the Believers (amir al-mu'minin), thus making clear his superior authority. He continued the campaign started by Abu Bakr to expand the caliphate outside of Arabia. Under his rule, Syria (636), Iraq (637), Egypt (639–642), and western Iran (641–643) all came under Muslim rule, a transformation that greatly altered the nature of the state. Internally, he organized the state over a much larger area, founded new cities, and distributed offices more widely among the various Arabian tribes, thereby moving away from Abu Bakr’s favoritism for the Quraysh.

See also Caliphate; Law; Succession.

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Khalid Yahya Blankinship

UMAYYID See Empires: Umayyad; Mu'awiya

UMMA

The term *umma* is an Arabic word. It was used sixty-two times in the Qur’an, in both the Meccan and Medinan periods. Its most common meaning is that of a group of people or a community, and it also refers to a religious community or a group of people who follow God’s guidance. Most usages of *umma* in the Qur’an, however, are not related to the community of prophet Muhammad.

The concept of a community of believers (*umma*) took shape during the Prophet’s lifetime, first in Mecca then in Medina. In Mecca, the small group of the Prophet’s followers shared certain common beliefs, values, and practices associated with the new religion, Islam, and gradually came to be differentiated from the rest of the Meccans. Meccan families were split; some followed the traditional religion of Mecca (paganism) while others followed the new religion. Religious affiliation became more important than family relationship or tribal membership. When the Prophet and his small group of followers fled Mecca to Medina, they formed, with the Muslims of Medina, a distinct community (*umma*) as opposed to, for instance, the Jewish community there. By the time of the Prophet’s death in 632 C.E., his followers, known as “believers” or Muslims, had a distinct identity. The early struggle of this community with non-Muslims, either in the general Arab rebellion (632–633) against Muslim rule from Medina, or, after that, with the Byzantine and Sassanid empires in the wars of conquest, led to a sharper view of what the Muslim *umma* was; that is, it was based on belief in one...
Although some scholars have attempted to identify umma with ethnicity, the understanding of umma in the Prophet's time, and particularly in the post-prophetic period, became divorced from ethnic identity but remained firmly bound to the religious identity of Islam. In early Islam, this religious umma coincided with the political umma: Muslims united under one ruler during the periods of the Prophet, the Rashidun caliphs, the Umayyads, and the early Abbasids. However, this united political body became fragmented by the emergence of a series of separate political communities among Muslims from the beginning of the ninth century onward. Despite this, the concept of umma as a common brotherhood of all Muslims based on the two key ideas of shared beliefs and equality has remained an ideal to which Muslims generally aspire.

In the twentieth century, nationalism became an important force in Muslim lands, following on the history of fragmentation. In the same period, and despite debate as to its "islamicity," the nation-state model was adopted by Muslims, particularly after the abolition of the last, but at the time largely symbolic, Ottoman caliphate in 1924. There remains, however, significant unease among some Muslims as to where their primary loyalty lies: with the nation-state or with Islam, particularly where the objectives of the two do not necessarily agree. What is emerging is a view that the nation-state is a political reality that is here to stay but that effort must be made to ensure that Muslim nation-states as well as minorities across the globe are brought closer to each other within the framework of the religious umma. Instances of this are the creation of supra-national institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Conference and its subsidiaries, formed to promote political and economic cooperation. More importantly, the concept and ideal of umma are strengthened by common teachings and by religious institutions such as pilgrimage (hajj), an annual gathering of Muslims in Mecca. While these may bring the Muslim nations closer together, there are also divisive forces at work, represented in ideological, ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences.

See also Ibadat; Modern Thought.

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Abdullab Saeed

UMM KULTHUM (1904?–1975)

An accomplished and famous Egyptian singer, Umm Kulthum’s career extended over fifty years. Born to a poor village family in the Egyptian delta, Umm Kulthum learned to sing Muslim devotional songs by imitating her father, the imam of the village mosque who sang for local occasions. She began to perform with her father, who dressed her as a boy to avoid the opprobrium of presenting his daughter on public stages.

In the early 1920s, the family moved to Cairo to work in the lucrative world of performance and recording. At first Umm Kulthum appeared markedly rural and lower class compared to the more sophisticated actresses and singers of the day. However, her strong voice attracted the attention of poet Ahmad Rami who wrote lyrics for her and taught her poetry. She adjusted her appearance and repertory and, by the late 1920s, commanded a busy schedule in major venues and one of the best recording contracts in the Middle East.

Between 1935 and 1946, she made six musical films. As the Egyptian economy worsened in the 1930s and the problems of imperialist European domination persisted, Umm Kulthum altered her repertory from escapist, romantic lyrics, to the terse, localized colloquial poetry of Bayram al-Tunisi set to music by Zakariya Ahmad. With this, she rooted her performance in the sounds and meanings of local Egyptian words and music. With Islamism growing as an alternative to Westernization in the 1940s, she sang complicated religious and political qasid (sing, qasida, a centuries-old sophisticated poetic genre) by Ahmad Shawqi set to music by Riyad al-Sunbati.

In the 1950s, she recorded numerous songs in support of the ‘Abd al-Nasser government and became linked with Egypt’s charismatic president as an ambassador of Egyptian culture. In 1964, she joined forces with long-time rival Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, producing ten new songs marked by ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s characteristic “modernity” and the historically Arab performance style of Umm Kulthum.

After the Egyptian defeat in the war with Israel in 1967, Umm Kulthum toured the Arab world giving concerts to raise funds to replenish the Egyptian treasury. She became a near-mythical figure, drawing together Egyptians and Arabs from different social classes and regions. Her legacy springs from her compelling renditions of fine poetry, her musical skill, and her uncanny ability to connect with her audience.

See also Music.

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United States, Islam in

Many scholars believe that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States. While debates continue about how many Muslims actually live in the country—estimates range from 2 to 8 million persons—there is no dispute over the fact that, due both to conversion and immigration, the number is on the rise. In addition, over twelve hundred mosques now operate across the United States in small towns, suburban locations, and inner cities. American Muslims are like a microcosm of the Islamic world; they are diverse by race, class, ethnicity, linguistic group, and national origin. African Americans, perhaps the largest racial or ethnic group of Muslims in America, may account for 25 to 40 percent of the total population. South Asian Muslims, who trace their roots to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, represent approximately 30 percent. The third largest ethnic group of Muslims in the United States traces its roots to the Arab world, including countries in both the Middle East and North Africa. This group may total approximately 25 percent of all Muslims in the United States. The United States is also home to thousands of Turkish, Iranian, Central Asian, Southeast Asian (especially Malaysian and Indonesian), southeastern European (especially Bosnian), West African, and white and Latino American Muslims.

In addition to possessing great racial and ethnic diversity, Muslims in the United States can be characterized as a religiously diverse population as well. Muslims in the United States engage in a wide array of Islamic practices and adhere to differing schools of Islamic thought and interpretation. The vast majority of Muslims, including African Americans, identify themselves as Sunni, those who follow the sunna, or practice of Islam was widespread among slaves in North America, depending on what times and places are being considered. The number of Muslim slaves in the Americas may have increased even more during the early 1800s, after the West African Muslim leader ʿUthman dan Fadio (c. 1754–1817) successfully waged a campaign to Islamize much of the region. Though the importation of foreign slaves to the United States was officially banned in 1808, many U.S. residents violated the law, continuing to import slaves, including Muslims.

Despite the documented presence of Muslim slaves in the United States, however, there is little direct evidence that the practice of Islam was widespread among slaves in North America. In many cases, slave owners attempted to control slaves more easily by separating families and others who shared ethnic and linguistic ties. Though this assault did not translate into the elimination of African culture, including Islam, it did often lead to the recasting of certain customs, beliefs, and practices into different and often synthetic cultural forms. Some slaves adapted certain Muslim traditions, like facing toward Mecca in prayer, to their practice of Christianity. A few others, like the famous ʿUmar ibn Sayyid (1770–1864), a North Carolina slave who was literate in Arabic, eventually relinquished key elements of their Muslim identities, publicly converting to Christianity. Tellingly, the Muslims about whom the most is known generally lived in parts of the American South that had relatively large, isolated slave communities—places like the Sea Islands of Georgia where African Islamic traditions stood a better chance of being preserved and passed on.

Thus, by the end of the Civil War, there seem to have been very few practicing Muslims in the United States. Beginning in the 1870s, however, large numbers of Muslims once again came to the shores of the New World. From 1875 until the First World War, and then again from the 1920s until the Second World War, tens of thousands of Muslims from the Ottoman Empire, especially Arabs from greater Syria, traveled to the United States seeking economic opportunity. These Muslims made their homes in places as far flung as Quincy, Massachusetts, and Cedar Rapids, Iowa, whose Muslim community eventually established the Mother Mosque of North America, one of the oldest continuously operating Muslim communities in the United States. By 1920, hundreds of Muslims from both Anatolia and the Balkans had also created their own chapter of the Red Crescent (the Muslim equivalent of the Red Cross) in Detroit, Michigan, and had obtained a cemetery where fellow Muslims could be buried according to Islamic law. Many of these Muslims became peddlers, grocers, and unskilled laborers. Some eventually found jobs as farmers and factory workers, especially in the burgeoning automobile industry in Detroit. These Muslims also practiced various forms of Islam. They not only identified themselves as Sunnis and Shi’a, but also as Druze, a

**History**

From the 1600s until the abolition of legal slavery in 1865, West African Muslims were brought as slaves to the British North American colonies and later the United States. Perhaps 10 percent or more of all slaves in the Americas were Muslim, depending on what times and places are being considered. The number of Muslim slaves in the Americas may have increased even more during the early 1800s, after the West African Muslim leader ʿUthman dan Fadio (c. 1754–1817) successfully waged a campaign to Islamize much of the region. Though the importation of foreign slaves to the United States was officially banned in 1808, many U.S. residents violated the law, continuing to import slaves, including Muslims.

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In New York City, a Muslim street vendor observes the daily prayer ritual. GETTY IMAGES

Syrian and Lebanese group that had long ago separated from the Shi’a; as Bektashi Sufis, a community made up mainly of Albanians; and as Mevlevis, the so-called whirling dervishes.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the number of Muslims in the United States also grew as hundreds, if not thousands, of African Americans converted, or as some African-American Muslims would put it, reverted to Islam. These conversions occurred in the context of the Great Migration, the movement of over a million and a half persons from the rural South to the more industrialized, urban North throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Attempting to escape racism and economic oppression, black migrants often worked and lived near immigrant Muslims who were also in search of new opportunities in cities like Detroit; St. Louis, Missouri; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Newark, New Jersey; and Chicago, Illinois. African Americans became part of a dynamic cultural milieu, where people from every part of the globe were coming in contact with each other, confronting each other’s differences and exchanging both goods and ideas.

This period also witnessed one of the first serious Muslim attempts to convert Americans to Islam. The Ahmadiyya movement, considered heretical by many other Muslims, was the first Muslim group to mass-distribute English translations of the Qur’an, hoping to make the holy book more accessible to those who could not read it in Arabic. Beginning in the 1920s, they also published the *Muslim Sunrise*, a newspaper that contained information about the movement and the rudimentary practices of Sunni Islam, especially daily prayer, almsgiving, and fasting during the month of Ramadan. The Ahmadiyya focused many of their missionary efforts on African Americans. The head missionary, Muhammad Sadiq, promoted Islam as a religion of freedom and equality, often criticizing white Christianity’s links with slavery and the destruction of African culture. This was an attractive message and hundreds of African Americans, like P. Nathaniel Johnson of St. Louis, Missouri, converted to Islam. By the mid-1920s, Johnson had become Shaykh Ahmad Din and was leading a multiracial community of Ahmadiyya Muslims in the Gateway City.

African Americans also formed their own Islamic groups during the 1920s and 1930s. Some of these groups, like the Moorish Science Temple, merely adopted certain Islamic names and symbols to create new African-American Islamic traditions. While many scholars have dated the origins of this movement to 1913, the Federal Bureau of Investigation believed that it began sometime in the 1920s, probably in Chicago, Illinois. Adapting certain Islamic symbols from the black Shriners (an African American fraternal organization that stressed racial cooperation and self-improvement), movement founder Noble Drew Ali (1886–1929) taught that American blacks were actually members of the Moorish nation whose original religion was Islam. His *Holly Koran of the Moorish Science Temple* (1927), a sacred text that had no direct
connection to the Qur’an revealed to Muhammad in the seventh century C.E., stressed the importance of morality, industry, and group solidarity, and promised that the practice of Moorish Science was the key to both earthly and divine salvation for persons of African descent.

Some other groups established by African-American Muslims, however, embraced more traditional Islamic practices, placing greater emphasis on the five pillars of Islam and on the Qur’an. Among these communities, many of which can trace their origins to the 1930s, were the First Cleveland Mosque, led by African-American convert Wali Akram (d. 1994); the Adenu Allah Universal Arabic Association in Buffalo, New York; and Jabul Arabiyya, a Muslim communal farm also located in upstate New York. Most historians have tended to ignore these Sunni African-American Muslim groups, largely because their scholarly gaze has focused on the more controversial Nation of Islam.

In the early 1930s, W. D. Fard, a mysterious immigrant peddler probably of Turkish or Iranian origin, founded the Nation of Islam in the Detroit metropolitan area. By 1934, he had disappeared, leaving Elijah Poole (1897–1975), an African-American migrant from Georgia, to continue his legacy. Poole, who had since become Elijah Muhammad, echoed the claims of Noble Drew Ali, arguing that Islam was the original religion of the “Blackman.” He said that Fard was God in the flesh and that he, Elijah Muhammad, was God’s Messenger, sent to resurrect black people from the dead—a teaching that violated many of the most basic tenets of Sunni Islamic traditions. An advocate of black separatism, Elijah Muhammad also emphasized black economic and political independence from whites, the building of moral character, and the practice of his unique Islam as solutions to the social and economic challenges facing black America. It was not until after the Second World War, however, that his teachings garnered national attention, due largely to the successful missionary work of the articulate, fiery, and handsome Malcolm X (1925–1965), who had become a follower of Elijah Muhammad while in prison.

During the postwar period, the face of American Islam was also transformed by a new wave of Muslim immigration from overseas. These Muslims included Palestinians who had become refugees after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and Egyptian citizens who had been dispossessed after Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s revolution in 1952. Sometimes, they made contact with older generations of Muslim immigrants, who by this time were beginning to organize national networks like the Federation of Islamic Associations in the United States and Canada, a group of more than twenty mosques that began operations in 1952. Other times, however, these new immigrants challenged what they saw as the unhealthy assimilation of Muslims into American culture. The most active critics of such behavior were often foreign students in American universities. They had arrived from newly independent countries in Africa and Asia where Islamic activists arose to challenge political regimes that stressed nationalist and socialist rather than Islamic identities. In 1963, some of these students formed the Muslim Student Association, which would eventually become one of the largest Muslim organizations in the United States.

In fact, it is clear that by the 1960s, a global Islamic revival was underway, and Islam in the United States was deeply affected by it. Many Islamic revivalists stressed the universality of Islam, arguing that Muslims should reject divisions along lines of race, language, or nationality and work toward more unity in the Muslim umma, or worldwide community of believers. The revival, which also called for a return to strict interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, attracted African American Muslims, as well. In places like the Islamic Mission to America in Brooklyn, New York, for example, one could find a multiethnic and multiracial crowd of Muslims engaging the ideas of Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), whose writings were being circulated all over the globe. During the same period, some African American Muslim revivalists, like members of the Darul Islam movement, intentionally separated themselves from mainstream society, hoping to recalibrate the rhythms of their lives in accordance with Islamic law. Others, like Malcolm X, embraced Sunni religious practices, but insisted on the need to struggle simultaneously for black political liberation.

In the meantime, more and more Muslim immigrants were making their homes in the United States. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed a new immigration law, inviting large numbers of non-Europeans, including Asians and Africans, to join the American nation. Many of the Muslim immigrants were professionals with South Asian roots and became successful doctors, engineers, and academicians in cities and towns throughout the United States. Others were from Africa, Europe, other parts of Asia, and even Central and South America; they represented over sixty different countries in all. Like Muslim immigrants before them, they subscribed to a variety of Islamic practices. Among just the Shi’ite immigrants, for example, there were many Twelvers (the largest group of Shi’ite Muslims in the world) and Isma’ilis, a smaller community that is itself divided into subgroups.

Sufism, the mystical branch of Islam, also grew during this period. While there had been Sufis in the United States for some time, a larger number of white Americans began to join various Sufi groups or to follow various Sufi masters in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of these Sufi converts did not call themselves Muslims and did not practice the five pillars of Islam. Others, however, insisted on adherence to foundational Islamic practices. By the beginning of the new millennium, Sufi Islam in the United States was a multiethnic and cross-class phenomenon. And American Muslims were members of a number of different Sufi groups, including the
The post-1965 period of American Islamic history was also shaped by important transformations in African-American Islam. The number of independent African-American Muslim groups continued to increase as did the number of individual converts—especially in prisons, where Muslim individuals and groups, of all ethnic and religious stripes, reached out to male inmates. But perhaps the most important event of this period was the death of Elijah Muhammad in 1975. After inheriting the leadership of the Nation of Islam, Wallace D. Muhammad (b. 1933, a.k.a. Warith Deen Muhammad), one of Elijah’s sons, dramatically altered the religious nature of the movement. Rejecting the most controversial elements of his father’s teachings, including those about the divinity of W. D. Fard and the inherent evil of the white race, Wallace D. Muhammad (now known as W. D. Mohammed) emphasized the importance of Sunni Islamic practices, including daily prayer, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and fasting during Ramadan. He even changed the name of the organization from the Nation of Islam to the World Community of al-Islam in the West, and eventually, the American Muslim Mission. Though thousands of members followed the leader through what he called the “Second Resurrection,” Minister Louis Farrakhan (b. 1933) criticized these deviations from Elijah Muhammad’s teachings. By the late 1970s, he had reconstituted a version of the old Nation of Islam, which he still leads as of the time of this writing.

**Discrimination and Prejudice**

From the beginning of Islamic history in North America, Muslims have lived in an environment often dominated by curiosity, suspicion, fear, and even hatred of Islam and Muslims. Anti-Muslim prejudice has several roots, including a thousand-year-old European Christian bias against Islam and nineteenth-century American racism and xenophobia. In the last half of the twentieth century, however, these prejudices have been amplified by several events, many of which involve the foreign policy of the U.S. government. During the cold war against the Soviet Union, for example, the United States generally sided with Israel in its disputes with Soviet-backed Arab Muslim neighbors, prompting many Americans to believe that Arabs and Muslims were the “enemy.” During the 1973 oil embargo of the United States by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations, who were protesting U.S. military support of Israel, many Americans became resentful of Arabs and Muslims more generally. Political cartoonists regularly drew racist images of the stupid, but dangerous, “Arab shaykhs” who controlled the world’s oil supplies. In 1979, American-Islamic relations were further strained when revolutionaries overthrew the U.S.-backed shah of Iran and then held dozens of Americans hostage for over a year. Direct American military involvement in the Lebanese Civil War (1982), the Persian Gulf War (1991), and the War in Iraq (2003) only added to these tensions.

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, some Americans began to question the deeply embedded prejudices against Muslims in American culture. Americans of many faiths offered support to their Muslim neighbors, visited a mosque for the first time, and attended large interfaith prayer services. Many understood that though the terrorists may have been Muslim, they did not act on behalf of Islam. Other Americans, however, continued to argue that Islam itself was a threat. Muslims faced discrimination on airplanes and in employment. And in some instances, Muslim property and Muslim persons were physically attacked. In addition, negative portrayals of Muslims continued to appear in the popular media and in books written by a few academic critics. Muslim organizations in the United States responded quickly to the events of 11 September 2001 by unequivocally condemning the attacks, offering support for victims, increasing their outreach efforts, and working to protect Muslims in the United States against any further backlash.

**Gender**

Of all issues discussed in the American media regarding Muslims, gender is one of the most popular. The status of women in Islam is a symbol of particular importance for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, often used as a poetic stand-in for larger arguments about society, politics, economics, and religion. Muslim women in the United States face a variety of challenges, including discrimination from several sources: non-Muslims who regard them as the “oppressed women of Islam”; male family members and religious leaders who act in sexist ways; and a society that has not delivered on its promises of equality of economic and educational opportunity to women in general, especially women of color.

American Muslim women themselves disagree about how to face these challenges, but virtually no practicing Muslim woman would argue that Islam is an inherently sexist religion. Echoing what other conservative Americans would call “family values,” some Muslim women maintain that the Qur’an directs men and women to operate in separate spheres—the man in the public world of the workplace and the woman in the private world of the home. Men and women are equal, they say, but they are also fundamentally different. Others, like African American Muslim and Qur’anic scholar Amina Wadud (b. 1952), argue that while there may be differences between men and women, women’s roles should not be
restricted to the private sphere. The Qur’an guarantees equality between the sexes, Wadud argues, and it does not prescribe one right way of being a man or a woman.

Regarding the controversial issue of the *hijab*, or the headscarf, some Muslim women claim that wearing the veil is unnecessary and that modesty of the heart is what matters. Some cover their heads only when making their prayers. Some say that they would like to cover, but are afraid of the discrimination that they would face from non-Muslims. Still others consistently cover whenever outside their homes or in the presence of men who are not relatives. Likewise, Muslim women disagree over the issue of polygyny. Some argue that having up to four wives is a Qur’anic right given to men, as long as these wives are treated equally; others say the practice was meant to be temporary or that the Qur’an itself virtually bans polygyny when it warns against treating one’s wives unjustly (4:3).

Several factors influence Muslims’ views of gender, including their ethnic, racial, class, linguistic, and generational identities. Children of first-generation immigrants, for example, sometimes challenge what they regard as the sexist views of their parents and grandparents. In so doing, they often make a distinction between the patriarchal culture of the old country and what they say is the true, egalitarian Islam of the Qur’an and the hadith. On the contrary, some female converts to Islam, including white Christian women who marry Muslim men, defend what they identify as the traditional relationship between husbands and wives in Islam, arguing that Islam is liberating precisely because it elevates their status as wives and mothers.

**Islamic Organizations**

There are dozens of political, religious, economic, and cultural organizations that focus on issues of interest to Muslims in the United States. The largest is the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), an umbrella organization formed by members of the Muslim Student Association in 1982. Over three hundred mosques are associated with ISNA, whose headquarters are located in Plainfield, Indiana. The organization holds a popular annual conference during the first
weekend in September in which Muslims network, discuss concerns of the day, and even meet future mates. In addition, it publishes the magazine *Islamic Horizons*, offers workshops on Islam for teachers, and maintains an active website. Perhaps the second largest Muslim organization in the country is the American Society of Muslims (ASM), a loose configuration of predominantly African American mosques that recognize W. D. Mohammed as their leader. Publisher of the *Muslim Journal*, the ASM also offers an annual conference, oversees the broadcast of Imam Mohammed over the radio, and encourages followers to attend his many public addresses, which often draw thousands of listeners.

Many smaller Muslim organizations focus their energies on more specific concerns. For example, the Council for American-Islamic Relations defends the civil rights of Muslims, educates other Americans about Islam, and encourages Muslim participation in national politics. The Association of Muslim Social Scientists helps Muslim professionals, educators, and academics develop and share Islamic perspectives on contemporary issues. And the Fiqh Council of North America, a group of Muslim legal scholars, regularly offers counsel to Muslim individuals and local communities regarding everything from business contracts to haircuts. New groups continue to be formed every day—one recent example is al-Fatiha, an organization that offers support to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Muslims.

**Education and Outreach**

There are probably more than two hundred full-time Islamic schools for children in the United States, and most mosques offer some sort of weekend school for both children and adults. The full-time schools are located mainly in cities and suburbs with large Muslim populations. Most of them offer primary education programs. Their curricula include state-mandated subjects like reading and math in addition to Islamic studies and Arabic classes. Perhaps one-quarter of these, called Sister Clara Muhammad Schools, are associated with the community of W. D. Mohammed. Originally part of Elijah Muhammad’s Nation of Islam, these now-Sunni Islamic African American schools are named in honor of the wife of Elijah Muhammad, who played a key role in the Nation of Islam’s survival during the early years of the movement. Located mainly in inner cities, these schools offer an alternative to African American parents, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who view their public schools as troubled, if not failing.

Many Muslim parents argue that the public school system has too many drawbacks, including the dangers of drugs, dating, and an unhealthy consumerist culture. They hope that Islamic schools will help their children develop Islamic values and behaviors. Interestingly, what is defined as “Islamic” is itself a subject of debate within Muslim schools. While some schools attempt to enforce gender segregation among their students, others actively defend the practice of encouraging responsible interaction among boys and girls, not only during class but also during social activities. In addition, some Muslim parents fear that the creation of Islamic schools will only make the integration of Muslims into mainstream American culture more difficult. Muslim children have been known to argue that their absence from the public schools is a missed opportunity to explain their Islamic religious convictions to their non-Muslim classmates.

Most mosques in the United States also engage in a number of outreach activities. Members share their faith experiences with non-Muslims, visit a school or church to talk about Islam, contact the media, and welcome visitors to the mosque. Though their activities have gone largely unnoticed by major media outlets, many Muslim leaders have also played prominent roles in interfaith dialogue in the United States. W. D. Mohammed, for example, has become well known among some Roman Catholics for his work with the Focolare movement. Maher Hathout (b. 1936), a leader of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in southern California, has held interfaith dialogues with both Jewish and Christian leaders. And Imam Elahi of the Islamic House of Wisdom in Dearborn, Michigan, has even organized an interfaith celebration of Thanksgiving Day.

**Leadership**

It is often said that there is no pope in Islam. Indeed, since the death of the prophet Muhammad, Muslims have never agreed on one central authority in religious or secular matters. In the United States, Islamic leadership is arguably even more fluid, due to the diversity of American Muslim communities, their relatively short history in North America, and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. Furthermore, there are many different kinds of Muslim religious leaders in the United States, including Sufi masters, Muslim academics and educators, Islamic legal advisers, the heads of various Muslim organizations and movements, and the imams or presidents of local mosques.

In many parts of the Islamic world, an imam is simply a male who leads the communal prayers on Friday. In the United States, however, an imam can play several different roles in the community. In most African American mosques, the imam operates in both spiritual and administrative capacities, like many Protestant ministers. In predominantly immigrant mosques, however, the imam is more likely to be a spiritual leader who answers to an executive committee or board of directors that is composed of men and women from the local community. Furthermore, many mosque leaders, whether called president or imam, work on a volunteer or part-time basis, requiring them to seek employment outside the mosque. While most of them have completed studies at the college level or above, less than half have any kind of formal Islamic education. Muslim women are generally barred
from serving as imams, although some do become mosque presidents—for instance, when rifle fire pierced the stain-glassed windows of her Toledo, Ohio, mosque after 11 September 2001, Chereffe Kadri led two thousand people, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in prayer as they literally joined hands around the building, asking for God’s protection.

**Muslim Identity**

Muslims in the United States constantly debate the issue of identity, engaging the question of what it means to be a Muslim from a number of different angles. One of these is the relationship between Muslims and the state. For decades, some Muslims have proudly embraced their identity as American citizens, even patriots. Others, however, have sought to distance themselves from American culture and especially American foreign policy. During the Gulf War, for example, W. D. Mohammed supported the coalition against Iraq, arguing that it was desirable, from an Islamic point of view, to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait; but Minister Louis Farrakhan joined some prominent Sunni Muslim figures in denouncing the presence of American troops on Islamic lands.

There have been similar divisions in the attempt to find an answer to the question of how Muslims should function in a non-Islam country, a nation that sometimes seems quite hostile to Muslims themselves. Should Muslims run for political office? Should they serve in the military? How much should Muslims interact with non-Muslims and in what capacities? The need for answers only increased in the wake of 11 September 2001 and the war in Iraq as many American Muslims attempted to show support for America while simultaneously questioning American foreign policy toward various Muslim countries. Some Muslim organizations in the United States, like the Tablígh Jama’at, worry that Muslims will become corrupted by participating more fully in American culture, which they see as un-Islamic. Similarly, Hizb Tahrir, or the Liberation Party, argues that the United States is dar al-kufr (the realm of disbelief), advising Muslims to work for the reconstitution of the Islamic caliphate, which was abolished in 1924 by Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Most Muslim groups, however, advocate full participation in American public life. These include both the Islamic Society of North America and W. D. Mohammed’s Muslim American Society in addition to the American Muslim Council and the Council for American-Islamic Relations.

Muslims in the United States also continue to debate the place of racial and ethnic difference within their own communities. Most Muslims, including African American Muslims, affirm the idea that Islam is a creed or way of life universally applicable to all, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, class, or any other sociological category. Most also espouse Islamic notions of racial equality and categorically denounce racism. Many African American Muslims argue, however, that the reality of racial divisions in American Islam contradicts these ideals. They complain that immigrants often take condescending attitudes toward them, especially in deciding who gets to determine what the “real” Islam is. There are also serious linguistic, ethnic, class, and religious differences among Muslim immigrants themselves. These differences often come to the fore when immigrants form cultural centers along linguistic lines, separating themselves into groups, respectively, of Urdu, Persian, or Arabic speakers. Some Muslims defend such activity by arguing that the Qur’ān encourages ethnic and racial diversity (49:13). Some African American Muslims also assert that cultural autonomy and a sense of racial pride are especially important in their struggles for black liberation. But other groups, like the Islamic Center of Southern California (ICSC), work actively to create interethnic and interracial American Muslim communities, often linking the future growth of American Islam to the diminution of racial divisions among American Muslims.

There is, in the end, little unity over the question of Islamic identity and many other issues of concern to Muslims in the United States. Such disagreements, while sometimes seen as problematic by Muslims themselves, reflect the diversity of American Islam. That diversity—the many faces and voices and manifestations of Islam in the United States—is an inextricable part of its growth.

*See also* Farrakhan, Louis; Gender; Islamic Society of North America; Malcolm X; Muhammad, Elijah; Muhammad, Warith Deen; Muslim Student Association of North America; Nation of Islam.

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Throughout the twentieth century Urdu successfully retained this role as an Islamic language while also developing as the medium of a modern secular literature much influenced by English. As an administrative and educational language, however, Urdu has progressively lost ground to modern standard Hindi, the rival Sanskritized language promoted as a replacement for Urdu by Hindu nationalists. Since independence from British rule in 1947, Urdu has thus increasingly become marginalized in its Indian homeland and identified with Pakistan. Although spoken there as a mother tongue only by Muslim immigrants from India and their descendants, Urdu is the official language of Pakistan, where languages like Punjabi, Sindhi, or Pashto have limited regional status only. As such, Urdu has been carried by the Pakistani diaspora to many other parts of the world, including the Middle East, Europe, and North America.

Classical Urdu Poetry

Persian poetry was for many centuries one of the major arts to be cultivated across the eastern Islamic world. The patronage of the great Mughal emperors encouraged a further development of Persian poetry in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century India by both immigrant and native-born poets. While their works were formally cast in the long-established traditional poetic genres, some novelty of expression came from their development of the new baroque manner called the “Indian style” (sabk-e hindi).

The eighteenth-century switch from Persian to Urdu as the preferred language of courtly poetry in northern India had been linguistically foreshadowed by the preclassical Urdu poetry produced in the southern Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan. But the living tradition of classical Urdu poetry is identified with the period when the empire had collapsed under the twin pressures of external invasions and internal struggles into several successor states, notably the court of the Navvab-Vazirs of Avadh in Lucknow and that of the politically shadowy later Mughals in Delhi, both of which were maintained as puppet kingdoms by the British until the mid-nineteenth century.

The carefully cultivated conscious rivalry between the “schools” of Delhi and Lucknow now seems less significant than the common features of classical Urdu poetry, which is both the direct heir to the immense artistic heritage of Persian poetry (itself now linguistically inaccessible to most South Asian Muslims) and the chief vehicle for the public and private literary expression of an elite society facing major political and cultural challenges. Most of the poetic genres are of the well-known Persian types, and are similarly based on rhyming verses composed in the usual Persian meters, typically ending with the incorporation of the poet’s pen name (takhallus) in the final signature verse. By far the most popular genre is the ghazal, the ubiquitous short lyric whose cultivated formal rhetoric readily allows its expressions of private feeling to achieve widespread public outreach through
An Afghan refugee child writes in Urdu in a school in Pakistan. While Urdu was used widely as a written prose language under British colonial rule on the Indian subcontinent, its usage has decreased in India and it is now much more identified with Pakistan. AP/Wide World Photos

recitation and musical performance as well as written dissemination. The two great classical masters of the Urdu ghazal are generally acknowledged to be the very prolific Mir Taqi Mir (c.1722–1810), who is known for the poignancy of his direct expression of the sufferings of love, and the Delhi poet Ghalib (1797–1869), whose slim collection (divan) of ghazals is an iconic masterpiece combining refinement of sentiment with the ironic intellectualism of the “Indian style.”

Of the longer public genres of Persian poetry, the narrative masnavi was more successfully cultivated in Urdu during its pre-classical phase in the Deccan. Although Mir himself wrote a number of striking short masnavis on contemporary romantic subjects, it is his versatile and innovative contemporary Sauda (1713–1781) whose poetry addresses the greatest variety of public themes, using the formal ode (qasida) as well as various strophic forms to compose not only elaborately rhetorical eulogies and satires but also a number of striking elegies on the cultural and political devastation of Delhi in the mid-eighteenth century. In the qasida Sauda is later matched only by Zauq (1790–1854), the great rival of Ghalib for the favor of Bahadur Shah II Zafar (1775–1862), the last Mogul “emperor” whose sad fate at the hands of the British has helped to assure a special status for his own elegiac ghazals.

While the Lucknow poets are in general considered less notable for their thematic range than for their cultivation of a formal Persianizing elegance, the Shi’a allegiance of the rulers of the Avadh kingdom encouraged the magnificent flowering of the strophic marsiyya, the innovative Urdu genre that deployed the full resources of the “Indian style” for the elegiac celebration of the sufferings of Karbala celebrated in the annual rituals of Muharram, and whose two great masters are Anis (1801–1874) and Dahir (1803–1875).

Modern Urdu Literature
While the transition from the classical to the modern period can be sharply marked by the annexation of Avadh by the British in 1856 and the destruction of much of Delhi that followed their ruthless suppression of the Great Revolt of 1857, there was also naturally much overlap between the two. Under the patronage of other Indian Muslim rulers, some poets were able to continue working in the classical style, like Ghalib’s younger relative Dagh (1831–1905) who perfected a mastery of the light ghazal designed for singing by courtesan artistes.

On the other hand, many of the developments most characteristic of later nineteenth-century Urdu literature such as the increasing importance of prose and of explicitly
Islamic writing had already begun before 1857, not least because of the emergence of an Urdu publishing industry based on the lithographic reproduction of professionally calligraphed texts. It was through this means that a wider public was found, for instance, for such early masterpieces of Urdu prose as Ghalib’s elegantly informal letters.

It was, however, after the cultural watershed of 1857, when the Muslims of India had to confront the reality of the definitive loss of their political power, that the new trends associated with the early modernity of the colonial period became firmly established. Some writers of the later nineteenth century were provoked into formulating new styles of literary response to the acute sense of cultural loss caused by the political changes of the period. Two of the most notable of these were Muhammad Husain Azad (1834–1910), whose Ab-e hayat (1881) is a pioneering history of Urdu poetry lovingly reconstructed around his revered master Zaqu, and the maverick Muhammad Hadi Rusva (1858–1931), whose Umrao jan ada (1899) remains the most appealing of Urdu novels with its wonderful evocation of the life of a courtesan in the old Lucknow.

For other writers of the period, new kinds of Islamic ideology were as important as the new genres opened up by the example of English, which now increasingly came to supplant Persian as the model for Urdu prose styles and genres. This was particularly the case with the talented group of writers associated with the Aligarh movement inspired by the modernist interpretation of Islam promulgated by the great reformer Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1818–1898), himself a vigorous and prolific exponent of a forcefully stripped-down Urdu prose style. The leading poet of the Aligarh movement was Altaf Husain Hali (1837–1914), whose long Musaddas of 1879 (revised in 1886) is the greatest poem of the period. Inspired by what he had read of Wordsworth’s poetic ideals, Hali used a quite new style, that he called “natural poetry” and that consciously dispensed with most of the failings of contemporary Islam in India. In prose, a similarly reformist message is conveyed with greater stylistic subtlety, if smaller artistic impact, in the moralistic novels of Nazir Ahmad (1836–1912).

Poetry, however, continued to be the favored medium of expression among the next generation of Urdu writers, which is dominated by Muhammad Iqbal (1879–1938). It was Iqbal’s achievement to combine his own uplifting call for a Muslim renaissance, looking to contemporary European philosophy as well as to an individual reinterpretation of certain Sufi ideas, with a hugely powerful poetic voice that drew anew upon the full resources of a rich Persian vocabulary to reinvigorate Urdu poetic diction after the successful challenge of Hali’s “natural poetry” had undermined the appeal of traditional styles. A grandiloquent master both of the philosophical ghazal and of the new kind of thematic poem (called nazm in Urdu), Iqbal is rightly remembered in South Asia for his Urdu poetry rather than the longer Persian masnavis on which his international reputation tends to be based. Although Iqbal continues to be the object of an inflated official cult in Pakistan as the ideological founder of the nation, his power directly to inspire, whether as a thinker or as a poet, has long been supplanted by the numerous writers of very different types who have subsequently flourished in Urdu.

As an Islamic ideologue, the most influential Urdu prose writer of the later twentieth century was certainly Sayyid Abu l-‘Ala’ Maududi (1903–1979), the founder of the Jama’at-e Islami, while the Urdu poetry of the post-Iqbalian period came quickly to be dominated by Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911–1984), whose combination of an idealistic socialism with a unique ability to intermingle the style of English romantic poetry with graceful references of Ghalib has ensured his continuing ability to inspire new generations of poetic followers in the ghazal and the nazm.

Modern Urdu narrative prose is less ambiguously based on the example of English genres and styles. While a few novelists, notably Qurratulain Haidar (b. 1928) and ‘Abdullah Husain (b. 1936), have been able to establish serious reputations on the basis of major works, it is the short story that has generally proved to be the most successful genre. Following on the earlier example of the Urdu-Hindi writer Prem Chand (1880–1936), whose short fiction was inspired by Gandhian ideals, the new school of self-proclaimed Progressive Writers that emerged in the 1930s (and with which Faiz was associated) looked rather to socialist realism. By far the most successful of these short-story writers was Sa‘adat Hasan Manto (1912–1955), some of whose most memorable stories were inspired by the tragedies of the Partition of 1947, and his overall achievement in the genre has yet to be fully matched by later writers in Pakistan. But several memorable collections of short stories, variously combining genuinely modernist formal experimentation with troubled articulations of a modern Pakistani Muslim cultural identity, have been produced by such leading exponents as the emigre Intizar Husain (b. 1933) with his continual reflections on the loss of an Indian Shi‘i cultural heritage, or Mazhar ul Islam (b. 1949) with his attempts to integrate the local Sufi heritage embodied in the regional languages of Pakistan with a bleakly romantic individualism.

See also Pakistan, Islamic Republic of; South Asia, Islam in; South Asian Culture and Islam.

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The term “usuliyya” applies to those who adhere to the principles in law that, in Twelver Shi‘ism, came specifically to mean the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). The notion of principles was first imbued with the theological doctrines of the Mu‘tazila in the works of al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022) and his students, al-Sharif al-Murtada (d. 1044) and al-Shaykh al-Tusi (d. 1067), who exposed the imami conception of usul al-fiqh. However, the methodology for extrapolating legal norms (abkam) from the sources had not yet been thoroughly incorporated into jurisprudence to the extent seen in later periods. The ulama of the tenth and eleventh centuries viewed themselves more as rational-theological jurists rather than as followers of the Usuli tradition.

After Tusi, Shi‘ite jurisprudence stagnated for a century and a half, during which Sunni law flourished more creatively. Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), an Andalusian of the Zahiriite school, presented an unusual combination of theology, linguistics, logic, and epistemology in his al-Ihkam. He defends logic and reasoning on the grounds that all thinking, even “the tradition,” should be verified by reason. A contemporary of Ibn Hazm was Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 1085) who combined a strong Ash‘arite tendency with a certain measure of logic and rationalist epistemology in the introduction to his usul work al-Barban.

One of Juwayni’s students, Abu Hamid Ghazali (d. 1111), gave a new structure to Islamic legal methodology that inspired Shi‘ite Usulis. In al-Mustasfa, he proposed a horizontal scope for usul al-fiqh which differed from the hierarchical classification of the sources of legal knowledge as initiated by al-Shafi‘i. Ghazali’s approach to usul al-fiqh impressed such subsequent Sunni legal authors as Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (d. 1233) and Ibn al-Hajib (d. 1248). These scholars focused on the method of drawing out legal norms rather than on the categorization of the legal sources, as pre-Ghazali authors had done. Amidi dedicated a chapter to syllogism under the title of istidlal (evidentiary proof; 1967, 104–120), including his brief epistemo-theological introductory remarks whose elaboration he presented in another work Akbar al-anwar. Amidi defined istidlal in its specific sense, as syllogistic reasoning which is not necessarily based on the four classical Islamic legal sources.

The Shi‘ite school of Hilla, which flourished in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, did not disregard the rationalist Usuli achievements of its Sunni counterparts. This school historically begins with Ibn Idris al-Hilli (d. 1202) who, benefiting from the growing rationalist tendency among the Twelvers, made a more detailed exposition of Shi‘ite jurisprudence in his al-Sara‘ir. In refuting the traditionalists, Ibn Idris negates the validity of isolate traditions, and explicitly identifies the human rational faculty (‘aql) as the fourth source of law in deducing legal norms.

The Usuli doctrinal movement truly began with al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (d. 1277), who was the first to open a chapter of ijtibad and qiyas (analogy) in Shi‘ite jurisprudence. Like Ghazali, Muhaqqiq defines ijtibad in such a way that, by making a distinction between the speculative component (zann) on the one hand, and qiyas and unrestricted reasoning on the other, ijtibad is legitimized on the basis of valid zann. He challenges Mufid on the question of qiyas by claiming that the ratio legis (‘illa) in certain kinds of qiyas are discernible and may be applied to new cases under the pretext of tanqih al-minut (scrutiny of criterion). It is noteworthy that the initiation of ijtibad is regarded as the major source of dynamism in Shi‘ite law since the thirteenth century, when the claim of “closure of the gate of ijtibad” began to circulate in the Sunni milieu. Moreover, Muhaqqiq tried to redefine the Shi‘ite conception of ‘aql by restricting it to three applications: (i) verbal inferences such as the tone (labn) of religious discourse, (ii) what is implied in God’s address (fakra al-kbitah), and (iii) the reason for the address (dalil al-kbitah). Only the second is considered to be referring to the human conception of good and evil.

Muhaqqiq’s nephew, al-‘Allama al-Hilli (d. 1327), advanced this Usuli position by not only upholding ijtibad, but also by distinguishing the status of the mujtahid as a necessary office for Shi‘ism. From the vantage point of knowledge of jurisprudence, he divided the community into two groups: mujtahids and their followers. In his Tahdhib, ‘Allama legitimized two kinds of qiyas: i) al-mansus al-‘illa in which the legs ratio is designated in the Qur’an and Sunna, and ii) al-bakm fil-Far’ aqwa, wherein the minor case has more applicability to law than its premise.

By the middle of the Safavid era (the seventeenth century), the Usuli trend suffered a temporary setback due to the Akhbari (traditionalist) resurgence that seriously challenged the Usuli way of resorting to qiyas and ijtibad instead of relying on the imams’ traditions. The founder of the neo-traditionalist trend was Mulla Muhammad Amin Astarabadi.
(d. 1626), who had been educated by Usuli masters. Astarabadi succeeded in turning Akhbarism into a legal school with distinct methods of jurisprudence. Among his formulas was the principle of “customary certainty” (al-yaqin al-’adi or al-qat’ al-’adi), which proposed that the Shi’ites should content themselves with “the general certainty” (al-qat’ al-ijmali) that the contents of imams’ traditions convey to them. According to Astarabadi, these traditions are compiled in the four canonical collections of Shi’ite traditions as well as other early Shi’ite compilations.

The Usuli methodology found a new momentum in the Shi’ite seminaries during the second half of eighteenth century, when the leading Akhbari-oriented jurist of the shrine cities of the ‘Atabat, Shaykh Yusuf al-Bahrani (d. 1772), incorporated the key elements of Usuli principles, including the ijtihad, in his comprehensive work on Shi’ite law, al-’Hadis al-Nadira’. Bahrani, moreover, allowed his Usuli opponent Baqir al-Bihbihani (d. 1791) to flourish in the ‘Atabat by encouraging his own students to attend Bihbihani’s lectures, and still more, by assigning Bihbihani to lead the funeral prayer at his death.

Bahrani’s goal, which was to reduce the differences between the two parties, was viewed as having been defeated by later Usulis, since they awarded Bihbihani victory over the Akhbars. Enjoying his family connections and ability to support his students, Bihbihani succeeded in re-establishing Usulism in the shrine cities. However, he wrote more polemical treatises such as Risalat al-ijtihad wal-akbar, rather than works on Usuli legal methodology. Despite Bahrani’s aspiration, the Usuli-Akhbari conflict continued, and eventually climaxed into personal refutations and even bloody clashes between supporters of the two groups during the nineteenth century.

The re-establishment of the Usuli position not only increased the authority of the ulama, but also placed the doctrine of ijtihad and taqlid at the heart of the Shi’ite juristic structure upon which the subsequent institution of marja’ al-taqlid had to be built. The juridical office of marja’ al-taqlid appeared as an independent institution when the Usuli ulama of the ‘Atabat began to acknowledge the superiority of one or several senior mujtahids in expounding legal opinions, and in some cases in pronouncing final and binding verdicts.

The institution was manifested more completely when Shaykh Muhammad Hasan Isfahani was singled out as the sole supreme mujtahid in Najaf in 1846, and he formally took charge of paying the stipends of the students of the other seminaries in the shrine cities of the ‘Atabat. In view of the considerable socio-political roles performed in the modern period by this institution and by the ulema in general, it is suggested that the consolidation of the independent Shi’ite “hierocracy” resulted in a duality within the structure of authority during the Qajar reign in Iran.

Another consequence of Usuli dominance was the reformulation of the doctrine of juristic mandate (velayat-e faqih) with a methodical argumentation. The idea of the juristic mandate still contained at its heart the concept of the imam as deputy, but it came to include as well an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of qualified jurists to succeed the all-embracing authority of the imam, due to the work of an Usuli jurist of the Qajar court, Molla Ahmad Naraqi. The executive force of this doctrine is taqlid or the unquestioned mass following.

Concurrent with the increase of the mujtahid’s social prestige, the Usuli legal methodology reached another peak with Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), who shifted the emphasis of the contents of usul al-fiqh from the semantics of the Qur’an and traditions to what he termed “the rational practical principles” (al-usul al-’amaliyya). Ansari defended the use of syllogism in legal methodology, and he applied it in parts of his work. Ansari rejected the application of “juristic mandate” beyond religious matters, but he advocated the necessity of a mujtahid for approbation of Muslim actions. Ansari’s discourses were compiled and circulated among Shi’a in the form of the juridical manual (risala-ye ‘amaliyya) that were issued by the supreme exemplar of the community.

The notion of unquestioned following taqlid was further corroborated by Sayyed Mohammad Kazem Yazdi (d. 1919), who maintained that the actions of Muslims would be void without emulating a mujtahid. Yazdi set the problem of taqlid as the opening issue of Shi’ite law. The last bolster of taqlid, in its Usuli context, was made by Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989). He claimed that the object of taqlid was not limited to sheer “following,” but was intended to mean complete obedience to the qualified jurist’s commands.

The centrality of taqlid in some of the Usuli works should not be taken to mean that the Usulism of the contemporary era was actually reduced to taqlid and its corollary ijtihad to enhance the mandate of jurists; but rather that several genuine attempts were made to present the Shi’ite Usuliyas in its best methodical form. The most successful work in this vein belongs to Shaykh Mohammad Reza Mozaffar (d. 1963), who dedicated half of his book to discussions of “rational entailments” and “the practical principles.” He expounded the Shi’ite conceptions of “independent rational inducements” (al-mustiqillat al-’aqliyya), rational proofs, and the presumption of continuity of the past.

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UTHMAN DAN FODIO (1754–1817)

UTHMAN DAN FODIO was a religious scholar and the founder of the Islamic empire of Sokoto in present-day northern Nigeria.

UTHMAN dan Fodio was born in Maratta in the Hausa kingdom of Gobir. He studied the Qur’an with his father, and other Islamic sciences such as fiqh and hadith with a number of scholars of the region. Through Shaykh Jibril b. Umar he was initiated into the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood. After completing his education in circa 1774, he started to teach and preach in Gobir. His preaching brought him into a conflict with the political establishment in Gobir that, although claiming to be Muslim, was still committed to a policy of accommodation with respect to the non-Muslim majority of the population. In 1804, this conflict led to a military confrontation between the jama’a (community) of Uthman dan Fodio and the King of Gobir. In the subsequent jihad the jama’a of Uthman dan Fodio was able not only to defeat the King of Gobir in 1808, but also to conquer almost all other Hausa states and to establish an empire that was ruled by religious scholars and defined as an Islamic state, the so-called “Sokoto caliphate.” Uthman dan Fodio became emir al-mu’minin (the title “commander of the faithful” taken by the second caliph, Umar) of this empire and was able to exert great influence on neighboring jihad movements, in particular those in Bornu (from 1808) and Masina (1818). Dan Fodio was also author of more than one hundred scholarly works that were to influence decisively the intellectual, religious, and political development of Islam in the Sokoto empire as well as other parts of West Africa such as the Masina imamate. His most influential works are probably those he wrote to legitimize the jihad, on the necessity of hijra (emigrating to establish a Muslim community), on reviving the sunna and quelling innovation, and on the distinction between Muslim rule and the rule by nonbelievers.

See also Africa, Islam in; Caliphate; Kano.

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Rizwi Faizer

UTHMAN IBN AFFAN (R. 644–656)

UTHMAN b. Affan, a wealthy merchant of the Qurayshi tribe who was noted for his elegant dress, supported Muhammad when he first began preaching in Mecca. He converted to Islam and married Muhammad’s daughter Ruqayya, with whom he emigrated to Abyssinia. Soon after they rejoined the Muslims in Medina, Ruqayya died during the Battle of Badr and Muhammad gave him Umm Kulthum, another of his daughters, in marriage.

On the death of Umar b. al-Khattab, Uthman was elected the third caliph by a council of six, including Uthman, Ali, and ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Awf. Noticeably, the Ansar (the Medinan companions of the Prophet), had no representation in the council, a detail which helped Uthman defeat ‘Ali.

Uthman is credited with establishing the canonical version of the Qur’an during his caliphate. He handed the pages of Qur’an, left by Umar in the care of his daughter Hafsa (a widow of the Prophet), to Zayd b. Thabit (one of the scribes of the Prophet), and ordered him to compile it in the dialect of the Quraysh. Three other Quraysh were selected to help Zayd in this effort. Finally, a copy was deposited in all the administrative centers of the caliphate, and the destruction of all other Qur’ans ordered.

Uthman was resented for appointing his irresponsible relatives as governors of Kufa, Basra, and Egypt. Dissension came to a head when the rebels, having been promised reforms, intercepted a message, supposedly from ‘Uthman to the governor of Egypt, ordering their execution. They promptly returned to ‘Uthman’s home and despite ‘Uthman’s denial, killed him. This event is known as Yawm al-Dar.

See also Caliphate; Fitna; Khutba; Religious Institutions; Shi’a: Early; Succession.

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The word for veiling, hijab, is derived from the root h-j-b. Its verbal form hajaba means to veil, to seclude, to screen. The complex phenomenon of hijab is generally translated into the English as veil with its correlate seclusion.

The term hijab or veil is not used in the Qur’an to refer to an article of clothing for women or men, rather it refers to a spatial curtain that divides or provides privacy. The Qur’an instructs the male believers (Muslims) that when they ask of anything from the wives of the prophet Muhammad to do so from behind a hijab, a curtain that creates a visual barrier between the two sexes (33:53). The observance of this hijab is the responsibility of the men and not the wives of the Prophet.

In later Muslim societies this instruction specific to the wives of the Prophet was generalized, leading to the segregation of Muslim men and women not related to each other through family ties. It created a social and political division between public male space and private female space with the effect of a political, social, economic, and psychological disenfranchisement of the women. The gender-segregated space has also provided an intimate homosocial context conducive to deep bonds between members of the same gender and inimical to bonds and commitments across genders, including heterosexual relations.

Although the term for dress or garment in the Qur’an is libas, hijab has come to mean the headgear and outer garment of Muslim women. Libas is used both literally to refer to physical/material dress and adornments and figuratively as a covering of human shortcomings and vulnerabilities. (16:14; 35:12; 18:31; 44:53; 22:23; 35:33).

In the Qur’an the righteousness or taqwa of libas is modesty. It is the correct balance between the function of libas as protection and as ornamentation. Modesty concerns both men’s and women’s gaze, gait, garments, and genitalia. The specific articles and aspects of clothing that are mentioned with regard to women only are jilbab, a loose outer clothing or cloak, and khimar or scarf. When in the company of men, women are asked to raise their khimar (scarves) over the necklines of their shirts (24:31). When in public women are asked to draw their jilbab (cloaks) over them so they may be identified as respectable women and not be harmed (33:59). These Qur’ic verses do not mention any parts of the women’s body. No body parts of either men or women are mentioned in the modesty verses except the genitalia, which are to be guarded (24:30–31). Guidelines for covering of the entire body except for the hands, the feet, and the face, are found in texts of fiqh and hadith that are developed later.

Early in the twentieth century the tradition of veiling among Muslim women created controversy. Different ideologies and attitudes, whether in Western countries or on the part of Muslims influenced by the West, challenged the practice. Regimes in a few Muslim countries have legislated the veil on or off Muslim women. In most Muslim countries where Muslim women have the freedom of choice, some, especially in the modern urban centers, have discontinued the practice of veiling. Some of those who had discarded the veil have returned to it. But this modern return to the hijab actually gives many women access to public spaces and jobs instead of excluding them. For many Muslim women, due to a complex of personal belief, social reinforcement, and public self-image, the use of the hijab is an integral part of their being in the world and an outward expression of their inward faith that dictates modesty and chastity.

Beginning with the twentieth century, Western perceptions also underwent change with regard to the image of the veiled Muslim woman. Originally perceived as being submissive or oppressed, some Muslim women are now being viewed as being an embodied threat to Western culture. The custom of Muslim women to publicly cover themselves with garments that completely hide their body and hair creates a
mystique regarding the wearer and challenges Western modernity and feminism.

Western perceptions of a stereotypical harem with trapped, seductively veiled women were played out in the erotic imagery of early twentieth-century films and paintings.

This misrepresentation of Islam persisted until the sudden decolonization of French Algeria. The dramatic events of the Algerian war (1954–1962) marked a turning point in Western perceptions of Islamic women when heavily veiled Muslim female militiants utilized their garments for the concealment of weapons. The use of veiling by Muslim women now had politically sinister connotations of danger, fanaticism, and terrorism. In the West veiled Muslim women now may be seen both as oppressed and dangerous.

In the case of the woman who veils her face, gaze-reversal is implied; instead of being scrutinized herself she is free to gaze upon men without their knowledge, a perception that thus may cause another degree of discomfort.

Any analysis of appearance must be viewed within the totality of the social environment. The Western analysis of its gaze on Muslim women is not capable of representing the reality of the lived experience for each individual woman. The Western and modern Muslim view of Islam and of women has changed over the last hundred years or so. Whether the hijab liberates or oppresses or is simply a part of one’s everyday clothing is not an issue that can be easily answered because of the complexity of each individual situation.

See also Clothing; Gender; Harem; Law; Purdah.

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Ghazala Anwar
Liz McKay

VELAYAT-E FAQIH

Velayat-e faqih (Ar., wilayat al-faqih), literally “the authority of the jurist,” refers to a development in the Imami Shi‘ite theory of scholarly authority. The term velayat in Shi‘ism was normally associated with devotion to, and obedience of, the imams, and consequently was a defining aspect of Shi‘ism generally. Imami Shi‘ite jurists, over time, developed a theory whereby the obedience due to the imams, particularly in matters of law, was channeled through the jurists (sing. faqih, pl. fiqabiya), who acted as representatives of the imam during the occultation (ghayba). Until the nineteenth century, this was phrased in terms of a general delegation (Per., niyabat-e ‘amma, Ar., niyab ‘amma) of the jurists. In the early nineteenth century, the scholar Ahmad al-Naraqi (d. 1829) was probably the first to describe this obedience in terms of velayat-e, signifying a further expansion of the authority of the jurists during the ghayba.

The velayat of the jurist (velayat-e faqih) was not, at first, viewed as entirely replacing the political and legal role of the imam by Imami jurists, and there were jurists (such as Murtada al-Ansari [d. 1864]) who viewed the idea of velayat-e faqih with some suspicion. The concept remained undeveloped in legal works, though the idea of the legal authority of the jurist was developed in other areas. This all changed with the work of the Iranian scholar Ruhollah Khomeini. In his lectures, he proposed a political theory in which a faqih took on political leadership, replacing existing forms of government with Islamic government. The jurist who was to rule was conceived not as the most learned (a‘lam), but as one who had the political skills to gain (and maintain) power. If a faqih was able to do this, Khomeini argued, all other jurists were duty-bound to support his rule. This theory Khomeini termed velayat-e faqih, thereby making a link between his political ideas and Imami traditional jurisprudence.

At first, Khomeini’s ideas were debated on a theoretical level. However, in 1979 Khomeini was propelled into power on a wave of public opposition to the rule of the shah. On his return to Iran from exile, Khomeini set about putting his political theory into practice. In the referendum of March 1979, the Iranian population voted for the establishment of an Islamic republic. In October 1979, a constitution was adopted that included the famous article 5, stating that during the occultation “the wilaya and leadership of the umma devolve upon the just and pious faqih.” This faqih was Khomeini. The principle of velayat-e faqih was, then, enshrined in the constitution which theoretically gave the faqih power, though, in a concession to democratic principles, the faqih was to share power with the (popularly elected) president and parliament (majlis). After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the constitution was amended in order that his chosen successor, ‘Ali Khamanei, might take over this position. Since then there have been vigorous (and, as yet, unresolved) debates in Iran over the relative jurisdictions of the faqih, the president, and the majlis.

See also Hukuma al-Islamiyya, al- (Islamic Government); Shi‘a: Imam (Twelver).
The central Islamic tenet of tawhid, the essential oneness and unity of God, contributes to a self-conception and representation of Islam as a universal and singular religious tradition. The idea of singularity is reinforced by the shahada, or witness (“There is no god but God. Muhammad is the Messenger of God”), and shared ritual practice obligatory for all Muslims (i'hadat) in Arabic, often called the Five Pillars in English. This ideology of singularity is based upon the authority of the Qur’an and hadith. The fact that one can hear nearly identical Arabic recitation of the Qur’an in New Delhi, Jakarta, and Detroit, that South Asian, African, Arab, and Indonesian Muslims perform similar ablution rituals before they attend Friday prayers together in London or New Delhi, or that pilgrims from all over the globe gather at Mecca for the hajj are visible manifestations of a tradition shared across geographic and social boundaries of difference.

Muslims, however, live in particular cultures, locales, and geographies that influence their practice and create local knowledge and variation. Knowledge and practice particular to a locality can be identified as vernacular Islam. In linguistics, the vernacular is associated with the language or dialect spoken in a particular geographic location; it is the common everyday language of ordinary people in a given locality. The vernacular may be juxtaposed to a language that is shared across geographic boundaries or locales. A. K. Ramanujan has distinguished, in the Indian context, the vernacular regional language as the mother tongue in contrast to the pan-Indian, literary language of Sanskrit, which he calls the father tongue. For Islam, Arabic is the father tongue that is known, at least for Qur’anic recitation purposes, across the globe; but Muslims speak numerous languages and dialects in everyday interactions, sermons, and rituals.

Scholars of Islam have distinguished many local practices, confined to specific cultural contexts, from pan-regional (universal) Muslim practice and belief by calling the former elements of “folk Islam” or “popular Islam.” If “folk” is used simply to refer to practices that are local or nontextual, the term is an accurate descriptor. However, in both lay and academic usage, the term often connotes a hierarchy of practice and belief in which “folk Islam” is at the low end. Frequently, educated Muslims who have been exposed to Muslim practice in multiple cultural and geographic contexts, and are keenly aware of an ideal of a “universal” Islam that may be seemingly threatened by this diversity, refer to these practices as cultural rather than religious and therefore not “real” Islam. The term “vernacular Islam” is less value-laden than “folk Islam” and more easily inclusive of both textual and nontextual traditions. To understand Islam in practice, scholars need to pay attention to the various levels of interaction between vernacular and universal practices.

The practice of Islam may take regional shape and vernacular expression on multiple levels. For example, in some regions, women are not allowed to pray in the mosque (Pakistan, India, Morocco, for example), while in other countries (the Arab world, Malaysia, the United States, Canada, England), women do pray in the mosque, although each mosque varies in the architectural design for the separation of men and women in prayer. Another tangible regional/cultural, vernacular expression of Islam is found in the levels and style of women’s head coverings and the meanings and historical and political motivations for these. Prior to the revolution in 1979, many Iranian women adopted the veil (chador) to protest the rule of the shah; veiling was both a religious and political act. Since the revolution, women have been forced to veil and are under the surveillance of religious police. In the secular state of Turkey, where Muslims are nevertheless a majority, women are forbidden to wear head coverings in government buildings; in the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia, where the Wahhabi tradition that interprets Islamic law very literally is dominant, women are not permitted to go out in public without veiling and all public buildings and work spaces are gender segregated. In other contexts, the practice of female veiling may become more prevalent as the influence of “Islamization” becomes greater, such as in Egypt, where, for example, Bedouin women have begun to adopt a “standard” style of veiling as they become more educated in state-supported schools (Abu-Lughod).

The vernacular expression of Islam also varies according to whether or not the culture is one of immigrants. For example, the diversity of ethnicities represented in many American mosques affects worshippers’ experience and practices, which differ significantly from those of Muslims living in more ethnically homogeneous cultures. Muslims living in multiethnic communities often begin to draw distinctions between culture and religion. Those practices limited to specific regional contexts may be labeled as culture, or as religious practice interpreted through and influenced by culture. An example of such practices is the wedding ritual of decorating the bride. While many Indian and Pakistani Muslims may say that the ritual application of turmeric paste on the new bride’s skin is a Muslim practice, it is not prescribed in the Qur’an or hadith and non-Asian Muslims do not practice this ritual. There are other practices, such as the sacrifice of an animal at the Feast of the Sacrifice, which are mandated in the Qur’an, but whose implementation may be
interpreted differently in various cultural contexts. One reason for vernacular expressions of a shared sacrificial practice may be something as “secular” as governmental public health regulations, which in American cities may differ significantly from cities in the Philippines, India, or Indonesia.

**Veneration of Saints**

References to “folk Islam” are most often associated with specific kinds of vernacular practices—in particular, visitations (ziyarat) to the graves of local holy men or saints and associated performance and healing traditions. In Morocco the cult of saints is called maraboutism. The majority of these saints are Sufi teachers, guides, or masters (pir, shaykh), who may be part of a lineage of authority within specific Sufi orders (tariqa), or they may be independent of an order. These saints are “friends of God” (awliya’ Allab) who embody particular spiritual powers (barakat) that may result in their ability to perform miracles. Many Muslims believe that even after death, the barakat of the saint is accessible, and miracles may be performed at his grave site; for believers, the saint is still alive and close to God and may serve as an intermediary between worshiper and God. Women may visit the grave to ask for fertility, for the health of a child, or resolution of a marriage negotiation; men may ask for business success or success in an exam. Others visit the grave for general well-being, without a specific request, or simply to honor the saint, who may be one’s teacher, teacher’s teacher, or founder of the Sufi lineage to which one belongs. The presence of these shrines sacralizes the land itself; they are local or regional, vernacular sites of power. In many Muslim cultures, the annual death anniversary of the saint is celebrated in grand fashion at his tomb, with large processions of pilgrims carrying flags, musicians, and new cloth grave coverings that are gifted by the pilgrims. The anniversary is called an ‘urs (literally, wedding), as the saint is not considered to have died, but to have simply left his worldly body and joined God. Dreams are a common idiom through which Sufi saints, both living and dead, communicate to their disciples.

Most Muslims worshipping at a saint’s grave site (called dargah in South Asia; Ar. qabr) would draw a clear distinction between honoring a saint and asking for his intervention and performance of miracles, and worshiping the saint, which would be shirk (idolatry or blasphemy through ascription of partners to God). However, because the practice of worship at the tomb of a saint can be so easily misconstrued as worship of the saint (making offerings of flowers, incense, elaborately decorated cloths, etc. at the grave, and taking back some of these offerings as embodiments of the barakat of the saint), many Muslim modernists and fundamentalists label this practice as superstition, a cultural practice adopted from other religious traditions rather than from Islam itself, or outright shirk. Even if the critics of saint veneration accept that the saint is not being worshiped, they may critique the practice as placing an unnecessary intermediary between God and the worshiper.

The controversy over the veneration of saints and worship at their tombs takes different forms and magnitude depending on local religious, cultural, and political circumstances and contexts. For example, according to Katherine Ewing, in Pakistan (where Muslims are a majority, living under a Muslim state) certain movements (Ahl-e Hadith, Ahmadiyya, Jama’at-e Islami) have attempted to eliminate saint veneration and practices around the institution of the pir; and public discourse is filled with debate about what is the correct practice of Islam. Similarly, John Bowen describes a vigorous debate in Indonesia over what constitutes proper Islamic practice, including whether or not rituals of farming, healing, and casting spells are acceptable. In India, while educated Muslims may denounce veneration of the pir, the level of public debate over these practices is much less vigorous than it appears to be in Muslim states such as Indonesia and Pakistan. Furthermore, many educated Muslims who criticize such “folk” practices as visiting the shrine of a saint to ask for miraculous intervention, may themselves access such practices when their own family members are ill, infertile, or otherwise in distress. These practices are not limited to rural contexts or nonliterate participants.

**Religious Healing**

Veneration of saints and local pilgrimage to their shrines are often associated with religious healing traditions that address illnesses caused by intervention by spiritual forces (including evil eyes, jinn, spirits of the dead, and ghosts) into the physical human world. Many pirs are both teachers and healers. Their healing practices are based on the assumption that illnesses or troubles caused by spiritual forces must be counteracted by spiritual force. One method of diagnosis of a patient’s problem is called, in Urdu, abjad ka phal kholna (literally, opening the mystery of the numbers). According to these Sufi traditions, every Arabic letter is associated with a particular numerical value. The numerical value of the letters in the patient’s name is determined by the healer and then that of the patient’s mother. These are added, along with the numerical value of the lunar day of the month. The total is divided by three or four (the four directions or the three worlds) until a single digit remains, which determines what kind of force is causing the illness. Other diagnostic rituals may include “reading” the ways in which a lemon shrivels over time, dreaming by the pir, visions obtained through trance, or reflection in a surface of oil and kohl. The most common prescription against spiritual forces that have caused illness is the written word of God; that is, amulets, on which are written the various names of God, his angels, and Qur’anic verses, are given to patients to wear as protection, to dip in water to drink, to burn, bury, or hang from a doorsill. The physical manifestation of the very word of God is inherently powerful; it may call back a lost child, deflect a neighbor’s or spouse’s argumentative words, soothe a child’s high fever, or serve as a literal shield against the evil eye. Pilgrimages to shrines of saints and given periods of time to be spent there may also be prescribed by the pir.
See also Arabic Language; Persian Language and Literature; Urdu Language, Literature, and Poetry.

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VIZIER See Wazir
WAHDAT AL-WUJUD

Wahdat al-wujud, which means “oneness of being” or “unity of existence,” is a controversial expression closely associated with the name of Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1240), even though he did not employ it in his writings. It seems to have been ascribed to him for the first time in the polemics of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). Through modern times, critics, defenders, and Western scholars have offered widely different interpretations of its meaning; in “Rûmî and Wahdat al-wujûd” (1994), William Chittick has analyzed seven of these.

Taken individually, the two words are among the most discussed in Sufism, philosophy, and kalâm (theology). Wabda or “oneness” is asserted in tawhid, the first principle of Islamic faith. Wujud—being or existence—is taken by many authors as the preferred designation for God’s very reality. All Muslims agree that God’s very reality is one. Controversy arises because the word wujud is also employed for the “existence” of things and the world. According to critics, wabdat al-wujud allows for no distinction between the existence of God and that of the world. Defenders point out that Ibn al-‘Arabi and his followers offer a subtle metaphysics following the line of the Ash’arite formula: “The attributes are neither God nor other than God.” God’s “signs” (ayât) and “traces” (āthâr)—the creatures—are neither the same as God nor different from him, because God must be understood as both absent and present, both transcendent and immanent. Understood correctly, wabdat al-wujud elucidates the delicate balance that needs to be maintained between these two perspectives.

See also Falsafa; Ibn al-‘Arabi; Sirhindi, Shaykh Ahmad; Tasawwuf.

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WILLIAM C. CHITICK

WAHHABIYYA

The Wahhabiyya is a conservative reform movement launched in eighteenth-century Arabia by Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). It provided the ideological basis for the military conquest of the Arabian peninsula that had been undertaken by the Sa‘ud family, first in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and then again in the early twentieth century. Wahhabism is the creed upon which the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded, and it has influenced Islamic movements worldwide.

Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab began to preach a puritanical form of Islam during the 1740s in the small settlements of the Najd, the arid province of north central Arabia. His basic teachings are found in a small treatise titled Kitâb al-tawbîd (Book of unity), and from it his followers took the name Muwahiddin (Unitarians). His Muslim opponents, along with Westerners, initially used the term “Wahhabiyya” and its anglicized form, “Wahhabism,” as derogatory references to what was depicted as a fanatical sectarian movement. To this day, the term is often used pejoratively by critics of the movement.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab wanted to restore the pristine Islam of the Qur’an and the Prophet by cleansing it of all innovations (bi‘âda) that challenged strict monotheism. Foremost among these was the cult of saints, which had developed over the centuries among both Sunnis and Shi‘ites. Such popular practices as pilgrimages to the tombs of saints, beseeching the dead for intercession with God, asking blessings upon saints following the ritual prayer, and the construction of domed
mausoleums for pious personalities were strongly condemned as shirk, or associating divinity to beings other than God.

Among the “innovations” condemned by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was the centuries-long heritage of jurisprudence (fiqh) that coalesced into four Sunni schools of law and the many schools of Shi‘ism. The Wahhabiyya considered themselves the true Sunnis and acknowledged their affinity to the Hanbali legal tradition. Yet they rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur’an and the hadith, even that of Ibn Hanbal (780–855) and his students. Consequently, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, along with other Muslim reformers of the eighteenth century, such as Shah Wali Allah (1703–1762) in India, was one of the most important proponents of independent legal judgment (ijtihad) of his time. His ijtihad, however, was of a very conservative type, aimed at enforcing a literal reading of the Qur’an and hadith, especially in such matters as the punishment for adultery, theft, drunkenness, and failure to follow religious obligations like daily prayers and fasting during Ramadan.

Having been expelled from the first two towns in which he preached, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab settled around 1744 in Dir‘iyya, an oasis controlled by Muhammad b. Sa‘ud (r. 1746–1765). The religious teacher and tribal chieftain concluded a pact by which Ibn Sa‘ud pledged to give military support for the propagation and enforcement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings. The alliance was cemented by Ibn Sa‘ud’s marriage to the daughter of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the beginning of frequent intermarriage between the two families that continues to the present. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons would also participate actively alongside the Sa‘ud family in the military expansion of the movement.

By 1747, Ibn Sa‘ud was at war with the neighboring ruler of Riyadh, a conflict that would continue for nearly thirty years. Conquest of territory was followed by the establishment of a fort and mosque, where Wahhabi preachers and judges were settled to propagate Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings. Control over the entire Najd was achieved by 1780 under the leadership of Muhammad b. Sa‘ud’s son, ‘Abd al–‘Aziz.

Following the death of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in 1792, the movement advanced east toward the Persian Gulf and north into Iraq. In 1802, Wahhabi tribesmen sacked the Shi‘ite shrine city of Karbala, severely damaging a number of religious buildings, including the gold-domed tomb of the Prophet’s grandson, Husayn. To avenge this destruction, a Shi‘ite from Karbala, who had infiltrated the Wahhabi camp as a convert, killed ‘Abd al–‘Aziz in November 1803.

Under Sa‘ud, ‘Abd al–‘Aziz’s son and successor, the Wahhabis advanced upon the Hijaz. In 1803, they entered Mecca after the city was abandoned by its Ottoman garrison, and quickly moved to purge the sanctuary of the Ka‘ba of any offending ornamentation. Medina was not taken until the following year, when a Wahhabi force marched into the city and proceeded to level the gravestones of those members of the Prophet’s family and companions who are buried in the cemetery adjacent to the Prophet’s tomb.

By 1811, the Wahhabi domain extended over much of the Arabian Peninsula and north into Syria. The movement was checked only when the Ottoman sultan authorized the governor of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali (c. 1769–1849), to crush it. The Turco-Egyptian forces succeeded in taking Medina in 1812 and Mecca the following year. In the Najd, however, Wahhabi forces fought fiercely until the death of Sa‘ud in May 1814. Sa‘ud’s successor, ‘Abdallah, tried to negotiate a settlement with Muhammad ‘Ali, but in September 1818 was forced to surrender the capital of Dir‘iyya and was later executed in Istanbul.

The Wahhabi state was restored in the new capital of Riyadh under Turki, a cousin of Sa‘ud’s, following the departure of Egyptian troops from the Najd in 1822. By the time of
Turki’s death in 1834, most of the tribes in northeastern Arabia acknowledged Wahhabi rule. A power struggle within Wahhabism began after Turki’s death, when the Rashid clan of Ha’il began increasingly to challenge Sa’udi control. In 1891, Muhammad b. Rashid (r. 1872–1897) won a decisive victory over the Sa’udis and occupied Riyadh as the head of the Sa’ud family, ‘Abd al-Rahman (r. 1889–1902), fled to Kuwait.

The Sa’ud clan, now led by the young son of ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1880–1953), reclaimed control of Riyadh in 1902. In 1912 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz founded the first of the agricultural colonies known as dar al-bijra (abode of migration). These colonies would produce the Ikhan, a group of devoted Wahhabi loyalists who were prepared to fight for the Sa’ud family at short notice. The Wahhabi expansion in Arabia was curtailed under British pressures during the First World War, but immediately afterward ‘Abd al-‘Aziz began to advance beyond the Najd. The Hijaz was conquered by the end of 1925.

Wahhabi doctrines have governed much of the legal and cultural life of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia since its founding in 1932, even though followers of Wahhabism may be a minority within the country. A Supreme Council of Ulema advises and oversees the government on the application of Islamic law (shari’ah), which from the period of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab has been based largely on Hanbali jurisprudence. While legal reform has taken place in certain areas—slavery and concubinage were officially outlawed in 1962, for example—the ulema have resisted reform in such fields as personal, economic, and penal law. The courts enforce a largely unwritten legal code that permits capital punishment for murder, rape, drug smuggling and adultery, amputation of the hands for theft, and flogging for drunkenness. The mutawwa’in, a sort of religious police officially charged with “commanding the right and forbidding the wrong,” enforce Wahhabi societal mores, including “modest dress” for both sexes and a ban on public displays by Muslims or non-Muslims of heterodox religious beliefs.

The rapid modernization of Saudi society has often led to clashes between the Sa’udi family and clerical establishment and the most zealous Wahhabi loyalists. The first major crisis came in the late 1920s, when ‘Abd al-‘Aziz crushed his own Ikhan militias when they revolted against some of his modernization efforts. Later, dissident ulema challenged the government over such matters as the introduction of radios, television, and automobiles into the country. Social reforms involving greater rights for women have provoked particularly severe reactions. The opening up of higher education to women in the 1970s led to riots in some cities; and at the start of the twenty-first century, women were still unable to drive their own automobiles, despite domestic pressure to lift this ban. In 1992, more than one hundred scholars circulated a petition criticizing the government for, among other things, not adhering strictly to shari’ah and for wasting billions of dollars of the country’s wealth. By 2003, the presence of American military bases in the kingdom had become the major source of conflict between Wahhabi activists and the royal family. Although the government has not taken any concerted steps to shut down or curb private Wahhabi organizations, it has jailed or exiled a number of dissident scholars and activists.

Saudi Arabia’s tremendous oil wealth has made possible the dissemination of Wahhabi ideas and influence throughout the world, through religious propaganda and financial assistance to mosques and schools. During the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, many wealthy Saudis financed charities that educated and cared for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The religious schools (madrasas) where poor Afghan boys were educated produced the foot soldiers for the Taliban, who seized control of much of Afghanistan during the 1990s and established a state grounded in Wahhabi doctrine. One wealthy Saudi, Usama bin Ladin, personally directed the recruitment, training, and fighting of Arabs coming to Afghanistan to wage jihad against Soviet occupiers. This was the basis for the terrorist organization that developed in the 1990s into al-Qaeda. Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf emirates are allegedly funding other militant and terrorist organizations in such diverse parts of the Muslim world as Algeria, Sudan, Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines.

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WAJIB AL-WUJUD

The concept of wajib al-wujud (necessary existence) is the most central aspect of Ibn Sina’s (980–1037) philosophy and the one on which his cosmology rests. In subsequent Islamic thought, wajib al-wujud is synonymous with “God.”

Ibn Sina distinguishes between the necessary, the possible, and the impossible. The necessary is that whose nonexistence is impossible. The possible is that whose existence or nonexistence is not impossible. The impossible is that whose existence is impossible. Thus, the necessary existence of a thing always belongs to that thing. This necessity of existence...
is manifest either through the thing itself or through something else. A thing whose existence is necessary through itself cannot be necessary through something else. The converse is true. A thing whose necessity of existence is through something else cannot be necessary through itself. The name of the latter type is “possible in itself, necessary through another.”

What is possible in itself may not exist. But if it exists, it does so through an external cause that necessitates its existence. Since the chain of causes cannot be infinite, it must stop with a thing whose existence is necessary through that thing itself and not through another.

This first cause must be necessary in all respects. For if it had an aspect that was possible in itself, then there would be need for something prior to it that could bring it into existence, and so on.

Based on the fact that the first or uncaused cause is necessary in all respects, Ibn Sina argues in ways beyond this brief discussion, that, among other things, the first cause is also as follows. One, that is, nothing can share in it. Thus, it cannot have any differentiating characteristic (as rationality is for humanity), species (as humanity is for animality), or genus (as animality is for humanity). Therefore, it is indivisible in discourse and, hence, indefinable. For a definition is a discourse divided into genus, species, and difference.

Wajib al-wujud, also called, among other things, the first, the first mover, the first manager, the principle of all, the creator and Allah, is a desired intellect that knows itself and knows other things in a universal manner inasmuch as it is their principle.

Ibn Sina’s concept of wajib al-wujud had a great influence on later Islamic and Christian thought (see, for example, the third Way of the five Thomistic proofs of God’s existence). See also Falsafa; Ibn Sina.

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**WAQF**

The common textbook definition of *waqf* (pl. *awqaf*) as a “charitable and religious trust” only partly conveys the much richer history of these institutions. *Awqaf* always had familial and political dimensions along with, as well inseparable from, the purely pious ones. These dedications did provide ways of organizing welfare and piety, but also ways of passing from one generation to the next wealth as well as the social power that wealth insured. Most endowments mixed private and public dimensions.

Shah Wali Allah was the most prominent Muslim intellectual of eighteenth-century India and a prolific writer on a wide range of Islamic topics in Arabic and Persian. The fact that his writings are often characterized by a historical, systematic approach coupled with an attempt to explain and mediate divisive tendencies leads him to be considered a precursor to modernist/liberal Islamic thought.

From an early age his father, Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim, trained him both in Islamic studies and Naqshbandiyya Sufism. In 1731, Wali Allah left India to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he stayed for some fourteen months. His most important and influential work, *Hujjat Allah al-baligha*, in which he aimed to restore the Islamic sciences through the study of the hadith, was composed in Arabic sometime during the decade after his return to India.

After Shah Wali Allah’s death in 1762, his teachings were carried on by his descendants, in particular his sons, Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1823) and Shah Rafi’ al-Din (d. 1818), and his grandson Shah Isma’il Shahid (d. 1831). Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was a noted scholar and teacher with a wide circle of pupils, some of whom are linked directly with the establishment of the Deoband madrasa.

South Asian Muslims with an anti-Sufi, puritan outlook such as the Ahl-e Hadith, and even the followers of Maulana Maududi, find in Shah Wali Allah’s return to the fundamentals of *shari‘a* and political rejection of alien influences a precursor to their own reformist beliefs. Another group of his successors, best exemplified by his closest disciple and cousin, Muhammad ‘Ashiq (1773), seems to have pursued Wali Allah’s mystical inclinations.

See also Deoband; South Asia, Islam in; Tasawwuf.

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Marcia Hermansen

**WAQF**

The common textbook definition of *waqf* (pl. *awqaf*) as a “charitable and religious trust” only partly conveys the much richer history of these institutions. *Awqaf* always had familial and political dimensions along with, as well inseparable from, the purely pious ones. These dedications did provide ways of organizing welfare and piety, but also ways of passing from one generation to the next wealth as well as the social power that wealth insured. Most endowments mixed private and public dimensions.
In technical terms, a *waqf* depends on the “stopping” (one basic meaning of the Arabic root verb, *waqafa*) of some piece of property. An owner surrenders his/her rights of possession to God. The house or field or garden so dedicated should never again pass to a human owner—unless replaced with something of equal value. The person making the dedication (the *waqifa*) retains two important powers. He can distribute the income of the *waqf* in any way that does not violate Islamic sensibilities (a *waqf* to support a tavern would be bad); therefore, donors as well as their near relations can receive the income from such a trust. Also, the dedicator appoints a trustee (*mutawalli*) who administers the income of the *waqf*. Donors are free to appoint as *mutawallis* themselves, their children, and grandchildren.

Although permanent, in theory, the historical record shows that most *awqaf* were fragile. The earliest engraved announcement of a *waqf* so far discovered emerged from a heap of rubble in Palestine. As the economic, social, and political needs of people whose livelihoods depended on endowments changed over time, succeeding generations inevitably altered the terms of the trusts until they ceased to resemble their founders’ dictates concerning the disposition of real property and its income. For example, in postcaliphal states such as Mamluk Egypt, rulers sometimes seized endowments established by their predecessors and set about recreating them to suit a different understanding of their own epoch’s religio-political needs. Colonial regimes and the nationalist states that succeeded them followed the practice of “Islamic” states by renewing and reconstituting endowments.

Muslim endowments acquired a kind of dual status in almost every region of the Dar al-Islam. On the one hand, their status according to scholars of *shari‘i‘fiqb* (the terms badly translated as Islamic law) was a constant source of debate although they generally agreed that *awqaf* should be permanent. On the other hand, the institutions themselves continually evolved to suit the economic, social, as well as political circumstances of particular times and places. Of the four *madhabib* of the contemporary Muslim world, the Hanifite seems to have the most elaborate doctrines concerning endowments.

In a brilliant study of the shrine (Mazhar-e Sharif) of Hazrat ‘Ali in what is now Afghanistan, Robert McChesney has traced a series of *awqaf* over a period of four hundred years. Custodians (*mutawallis*) were the central figures in Mazhar-e Sharif’s *waqf* complex. A few families managed to pass the guardians’ office along a direct line of descent. Such continuity merely deepened a particular group’s commitment to the Mazhar. Custodians of ‘Ali’s shrine concentrated on the management of a vast irrigation project watering the fields dedicated to this holy place. McChesney shows that over time the valuable canals fell into disrepair. The total amount of land under cultivation declined. Even so, the value of the produce from the shrine’s lands remained considerable.

Managing relations with the power holders attracted by that wealth was a second task falling to the overseers. In this case, describing the history of a particular *waqf* gives insights into the ways that political organizations shift. At Mazhar-e Sharif, shrewd management brought a relatively smooth transition from the period of Uzbek domination to the era of Pushtun ascendency marked by the creation of Afghanistan.

Several important studies by Carl Petry are founded on information provided by the *awqaf* connected to the Mamluks of Egypt and their families. Sultans and great emirs founded mosques and theological seminaries (*madrasas*). Since their sons were not likely to inherit any political power, endowments provided the only economic future the dependents of Mamluks could have. Therefore, women featured prominently in the *awqaf* of Mamluk Egypt.

The history of Mamluk women and their *awqaf* find analogies in the rest of the Muslim world. Women founded and managed many of their own endowments. Females in the early modern Dar al Islam probably had more economic and social power than they possessed in more recent times.

Mamluks had a peculiar place in medieval Egypt. They were of foreign birth. They were Central Asians or from the Caucasus Mountains: Turks, Circassians, and the occasional Mongol. As martial artists, they differed in almost all social ways from the Arabic-speaking peasants of the Nile basin. Their status as warrior-slaves was not inheritable. Therefore, many high-ranking Mamluks planned the economic and social futures of their families, especially that of their womenfolk, with *awqaf*. Their wives and offspring could receive stipends guaranteed by endowments’ incomes. Egyptian religious scholars (ulema) also figured in the Mamluk way of *waqf* making. As educated members of the Arabic-speaking majority, ulama were often go-betweens representing the rulers to their subjects. Scholars were, therefore, a favorite choice when appointing custodians.

Other studies of single places in periods of transition can yield insights into the political as well as the social operations of *awqaf*. Miriam Hoexter’s study of the endowments managed by ulama of Algiers city in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries establishes a model for analytical social dimensions of endowments. Most of the trusts in her study were actually founded, under the Hanifi rite, in the interests of the donors’ own families. But the urban population of Algiers suffered from violence that had both internal and external origins. When creating a *waqf*, the poor of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were often the residual beneficiaries of the income. The scholars of Algiers city honestly managed those endowments. Almost every year for nearly a century, they managed to forward a tidy sum in coin to poor Algerians living out their lives in Mecca or Medina.

Colonial regimes often thought of themselves as preserving and reforming Muslim institutions. Gregory Kozlowski
describes some of the ways in which colonial governors in India not only changed the character of specific endowed establishments, but shaped all subsequent views, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, concerning the legal status of awqaf. Because imperial regimes shaped the characters of the independent states that succeeded them, attitudes that were colonial in origin have exerted some power on the present day Muslim nation-states. In particular, colonial and post-colonial regimes tended to suppress any awqaf primarily dedicated to the founders’ families. The second trend was to have a state-controlled bureaucracy administer all public dedications. Government-controlled endowments were sometimes the core of one or another officially endorsed versions of Islam.

In the years since 1950, old trends of the history of endowments have continued. Particular institutions are still fragile and depend upon watchful managers. Circumstances of the moment still shape Muslim philanthropy. HAMAS began its life as a charitable trust for Palestinians. Much of its work continues to be feeding the poor or tending to the sick and wounded. New kinds of awqaf that have a global focus have emerged as a proselytizing tool for Saudis and Iranians. Others with a less confrontational approach dedicate themselves to such noble tasks as preserving Islam’s architectural heritage. Though their institutional shape may alter, awqaf will be a feature of Muslim life in the years to come.

See also Economy and Economic Institutions; HAMAS; Law.

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Gregory C. Kozlowski

WAZIFA

A waṣīfa, or pension, refers to a payment made to members of the religious institution in Iran. The term was employed by Persian and Arab writers with a variety of meanings including task, duty, and office. But the term had a special meaning exclusive to the administrative system of Iran, which differs from the other Muslim administrative systems. The multiple meanings of waṣīfa explain why information on it is found in such a diversity of sources.

Apart from the allusions to waṣīfa that are found in chronicles and biographical dictionaries, information on its meaning as a pension for the members of the religious institution in Iran is found in Safavid administration sources.

Waṣīfa was a state stipend given to deserving individuals or institutions, invariably religious in nature. In principle the stipend was attached to a function. For example, in late Safavid times in Iran, all leading members of the religious establishment received a waṣīfa, which was paid out of the state treasury or royal endowments. Another kind of waṣīfa was paid to Armenian religious leaders from the income of the Armenian Christian churches.

After the fall of the Safavid state, the payment of the waṣīfa by the state was discontinued. When the Qajar dynasty came to power in Iran, the state paid greater attention to religious leaders, and resumed the payment of the waṣīfa to them.

See also Political Organization.

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Mansur Sefatgol

WAZIR

In medieval Muslim society, the wāzir (Per., vazir) was the prime minister who administered the central government for the caliph. The term wāzir occurs in the Qur’an once (25:35), where it has the meaning of “helper”—a meaning that is loosely applied to political assistants in the early Umayyad period (661–750). The Islamic office of wāzir developed in the early Abbasid Age (750–1258), probably during the reign of Caliph al-Mahdi (775–785). Historians believe the office evolved out of the administrative functions of the chief scribal secretary (katib) whose duties, functions, and authority were well established under the Byzantine and Sassanian governments that fell in part or in total, respectively, to Muslim rule in the seventh century. Thus, some of the earliest figures to serve in this important and powerful post in Baghdad and other capitals of government established by the Abbasid caliphs were chief secretaries trained under non-Muslim governments who converted to Islam and continued to apply their skills under the new Muslim rulers.

A famous line of early wāzirs came from the Barmakid family, originally affiliated with a Buddhist temple in Balkh (Bactria) in Central Asia. A patriarch of the Barmakid family,
Khalid ibn Barmak, joined the Abbasid revolution against the Umayyad caliphate in the mid-eighth century, and he and his son and descendants served as wazirs to Abbasid caliphs for the next few decades. The main duty of the wazir was to run the government for the caliph on a day-to-day basis. As the complexity and size of the central government grew in the eighth century and thereafter, so did the duties and executive power of the wazir. Included among these duties was supervision over several subdivisions of administrative government (sing. wizara), such as the military, treasury, and post. The actual power of the wazir began to diminish in the late ninth century, when military warlords in Central Asia (many of whom accepted Islam) seized control of the Islamic lands beyond Baghdad and its immediate surroundings in Iraq. In later times the term wazir came also to mean an advisor to a ruler.

See also Caliphate; Empires: Abbasid; Empires: Umayyad.

Richard C. Martin

WEST, CONCEPT OF IN ISLAM

Muslim awareness of the region called “the West” reflects the changing historical nature of the West itself over the centuries. In the early centuries of Islamic history, Muslims knew of the existence of lands and peoples north of the Mediterranean, but they were identified primarily in ethnic and geographical terms and described as primitive. By the time of the Crusades (the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), the most common term used by Muslims for Western Europeans was al-ifranj or “Franks.” This term implied a Christian and foreign identity and a relatively barbarian lifestyle.

In the early modern era there was a growing awareness of European societies. However, there was not a single generic cultural concept—like “the West”—that Muslims regularly used for European societies, although there was recognition that Europeans (often still “Franks”) were Christians and therefore unbelievers. Until the nineteenth century, whatever identifying labels were used, Muslim conceptualizations of the West involved a sense of peoples and regions that were ignorant infidels and inferior to the civilization of Islam.

The situation changed dramatically in the nineteenth century. As European states expanded control over much of the Muslim world, Muslims’ visions of the West were filtered through the lens of experiencing European imperialism. The West became identified with modernity. Muslim reformers sought European advisors and models as a part of their efforts to modernize society. There was recognition of the greater material prosperity of European societies and of the stronger military power of European states when compared with Muslim societies.

By the late nineteenth century there was a growing conceptualization of Western Europe as an entity. Earlier Muslim reformers had worked simply to adopt European techniques and ideas within their own societies but by late in the century, some Muslim intellectuals, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), began to argue that Muslim thought and societies could be modernized without having to become culturally European and that there were distinctive differences between Christian-based European civilization and Muslim civilization. As this conceptualization developed, many Muslims began to define “the West” as a materialist civilization, as distinguished from the spiritually strong “Eastern” civilizations like Islam.

During the first half of the twentieth century, for many Muslims, the West became the model for reform and material development. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s vision of transformation of Turkey during the 1920s, for example, was explicitly based on a concept of the West as a model. These concepts of the West tended to be liberal in mode but by the middle of the twentieth century the West also became a source for radical programs of societal transformation. Although radical Arab socialist movements like the Ba’ath in Syria made some symbolic gestures to Muslim identity, their programs of socialist revolution involved concepts of the West that reflected Marxist and other Western radical ideologies.

By the 1960s, many Muslims began to have new concepts of the West. Influenced by major crises of Western civilization like the two world wars and the Great Depression, Western self-criticism, and Muslims’ own sense of self-assertion following the decline of Western imperialism, many Muslims were more willing to be critical of the Western model, even in terms of material dimensions of life. The fixation with copying Western models was seen as weakening Muslim society, and an influential Iranian intellectual, Jalal Al-i Ahmad, called it the disease of being intoxicated by the West (gharbzadeghi). New movements of Islamic resurgence began to be explicitly anti-Western in both political and cultural terms, while arguing that modern Western technology and science were still important for Muslims. This new type of position was already clearly articulated in the mid-1960s by the Egyptian militant ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (executed in 1966), in his book Milestones. Just as the concept of the success of the West was an important part of the logic of Muslim modernizing reformers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the concept of the failure of the West was an important part of the ideological logic of the late twentieth-century Islamic resurgence.

Late in the twentieth century a new concept of the West developed among some Muslims. As Muslim minority communities became significant parts of Western societies, European and U.S. Muslims began to identify themselves as authentically “Western” as well as Muslim. Scholars like
Tariq Ramadan argued forcefully for the effective existence of a legitimate “European Islam.” At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new concept of the West as a location for truly Islamic life was emerging along with the more traditional concepts of the West as somehow being in opposition to, and completely different from, Islam.

See also Crusades; European Culture and Islam; Islam and Other Religions.

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John O. Voll

WOMEN, PUBLIC ROLES OF

There are religious and historical considerations concerning the inclusion of Muslim women in the public sphere. The Qur’an addresses women as individuals who are responsible for their moral individuality. It states that no individual, regardless of sex, will be forced to bear hardship beyond his or her capacity (2:233, 2:286); that each person is responsible for his/her own account (6:164, 40:17, 20:15); and that any good deed returns to the one who performs it (2:272).

Qur’anic Examples

The Qur’an further associates the call for women’s individual piety with communal participation in public good, as indicated in verse 33:53. This verse invites human beings to display their individual and communal virtues for the public good. It also establishes a common obligation for both men and women to endow themselves with the ethical qualities, such as chastity, truthfulness, and patience, which work at both personal and communal levels.

Whereas the Qur’an provides the general principles governing a women’s participation in public life, concrete examples of how they actually participated can also be found in the early history of Islamic civilization. Muslim women in early Islam had numerous public roles in such different fields as the economy, education, religion, and the military. For example, Khadija b. Khuwaylid (d. 619), the Prophet’s first wife, was renowned among the Quraysh for her business acumen.

During wartime, Muslim women participated in the military. Muhammad used to bring his wives to the battlefields. ‘A’isha b. Abu Bakr (d. 678) accompanied the Prophet to the wars and learned many military skills, such as initiating pre-war negotiations between combatants, conducting, and ending wars. It should come as no surprise that Muhammad’s contemporaries and companions entrusted her military ability to restore justice and the communal good. At the Battle of the Camel, in 656, she led a force of 13,000 soldiers against the caliph ‘Ali (d. 661) after he failed to punish the murderer of ‘Uthman (d. 656). Muslim history is replete with the tales of many other Muslim women warriors, such as Husayba (of the Battle of Uhud, in 625), Um’m Umarra (of the Battle of ‘Uqbara, in 634), al-Khansa (of the Battle of Qadisiyya, in 636), and Hind bint ‘Uthba and Huwayra (of the Battle of Yarmuk, in 637).

Women have also played important roles in the field of religious knowledge. ‘A’isha was one of the most authoritative sources in the transmission of the prophetic tradition. Hafsa, another Prophet’s wife, preserved the original collection of the Qur’an. And Fatima, the Prophet’s youngest daughter, played an equally important role in the transmission of the Prophetic tradition within the eminent Shi’ite circles.

Medieval Times

Religious scholarship and outstanding personal devotion in life allowed these and other early Muslim women to insert themselves into the male-dominated public sphere. Rabia al-‘Adawiyya (d. 801) was famous for her mystical pursuits. Sayyida Nafisa (d. 824), a female descendant of the Prophet, was respected for her piety and knowledge. Al-Qushayri’s wife, the daughter of his master Abu ‘Ali al-Daqqaq, was renowned for her transmission of hadith as well as for her piety.

In the medieval period, Muslim women achieved less public participation. Compared to the previous generations, only a few Muslim women were well known for transmitting prophetic traditions. Among them were Khadija bint Muhammad (d. 1389), Bay Khatun (d. 1391), and Khadija bint ‘Ali (d. 1468). Women’s participation also became less and less visible as their roles were subject to the general codification of Islamic law. The jurists generally agreed that the most honorable roles for women were those of wife, mother, and capable household manager. Less valued but acceptable was the role of religious teacher. The most inappropriate role for women, however, was generally held to be that of a judge or a head of the state. Nonetheless, jurists’ opinions varied greatly on female leadership, and Abu Hanifa (d. 767) and Ibn Jarir al-Tabari believed that women could be appointed judges.
The legal assertion of a gender-based division of societal roles excluded women from much of the public sphere, resulting in their seclusion within the private sphere. This exclusion coincided with the misogynistic assumption that women’s participation in public life invites evil and creates social disorder for society, largely because of the temptation they pose to men.

Modern Movements
The influx of modernity to the Muslim world has changed the faith of many Muslim women. Opportunities for Muslim women to receive education and get involved in nation building have multiplied. By early 1900, women had become more socially and politically active. Egyptian women, such as Huda Sha’rawi (1879–1947) and Malak Hifni Nassef (1886–1918), were among the first generation of Muslim women to promote education for women and discuss the possibility that aspects of Western life might be appropriate. The call for educating women was heard as far away as Indonesia. There, men’s political activist groups were quickly joined by women’s organizations, which provided collaboration and support. For instance, the Muhammadiya (“Way of Muhammad,” founded in 1912) had a women’s counterpart in the A’isjah (“way of ‘A’isha,” founded in 1917). Similarly, the women’s counterpart to the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union, 1923) was the Persatuan Islam Istri (1936), and women supporting the male-only Nahdlatul Ulama (“Rise of Religious Scholars,” 1926) formed the N.U. Muslimat (1946).

The trend toward globalization presents ever-greater opportunities for Muslim women to engage in public life. More women find that public participation provides them with an avenue for self-expression and an opportunity to become affluent, whereas others are driven into the public sphere by necessity. Muslim women have availed themselves of the opportunity to contribute to the public good in a variety of ways, such as religious teachers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, farmers, laborers, and politicians. Some Muslim women have become the heads of Muslim states, for example Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan (prime minister, 1988–1990 and 1993–1996), Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia (elected president in 2001), Shaykh Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh (elected prime minister in 1996), and Tansu Ciller of Turkey (prime minister, 1993–1995).

Although women have achieved important advances in the public sphere, the idealization of the proper Muslim woman as a mother and a wife has never died. Islamists, both male and female, continue to disseminate this idea in order to counter ideas of women’s roles that they see as having been imported from the West. Zaynab al-Ghazali (b. 1918), the founder of Islamic Women’s Association, set forth a critique against women who modeled themselves on the Western ways of life and images, even taking to task her own early mentor, Huda Sha’rawi.

Embedded in Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world is the ideal image of a veiled wife and mother as the pillar of social order and family. Some such movements praise women’s roles as mothers and wives, but still permit them to engage in public life if need drives them to do so; others confine women to their own households, denying them more public roles, as in the case of the Taliban.

See also Feminism; Gender; Law.

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Etin Anwar
YAHYA BIN ʿABDALLAH RAMIYA  
(1856–1931)

Yahya bin ʿAbdallah Ramiya was born named Mundu, in eastern Congo, in 1856. He became a house slave of Shaykh ʿAmr bin Sulayman al-Lemki (d. 1901) at the age of eight, embraced Islam, and became a successful merchant, plantation owner, Sufi shaykh, and colonial administrator. Owing to the endogamous nature of the Ibad sect to which Ramiya’s master adhered, he became a Sunni. His religious studies began at the age of thirty, and he completed the Qur’an under Sharif ʿAbdallah bin ʿAlawi al-Jamal al-Layl around 1889. He continued studying jurisprudence (fiqh), mysticism (tasawwuf), exegesis (tafsir), theology (tawhid), and logic (mantiq) under Shaykh Abu Bakr bin Taha al-Jabri, matriculating around 1900.

In 1911, Shaykh Ramiya received an Ijaza (certificate of instruction) from Shaykh Muhammad bin Husayn al-Lughani, became a khalifa of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, and was selected the shaykh of Bagamoyo after the death in 1910 of his master, Shaykh Muhammad Maʿaruf bin Shaykh Ahmad bin Abu Bakr. Shaykh Ramiya established the Maulid in Bagamoyo, to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday. This ritual became the most popular Muslim celebration on mainland Tanganyika during the colonial period, equaled by that held at the Riyadha Mosque in Lamu. In 1916, he was appointed Lizzali (district governor) of Bagamoyo, making this former slave an influential personality throughout East Africa. He died on May 1931 and was succeeded both materially and spiritually by his son, Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya.

See also Africa, Islam in; Tariqa.

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Hasan Mwakimako

YOUNG OTTOMANS

A movement committed to constitutional reform in the Ottoman Empire, the Young Ottomans were influential between 1860 and 1876. After 1865 they were the leading critics of the Ottoman state. They used the press to create public opinion and introduced political concepts such as nationalism, patriotism, and parliamentarianism into the Ottoman debates. They developed the first constitutionalist ideology in the Ottoman Empire. Civil and official leaders of the society embraced them.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire gradually fell behind the emerging West. Discovery of America altered the economics of gold. Europe slowly became a bigger gold holder while the Ottoman Empire began to lose its buying power. This was reflected in its tax policies that made its subjects uncomfortable and later rebellious. As Europe grew richer, it entered an era of technological development that was reflected in its military and especially in its fleet power. European colonialism took off when the Ottoman Empire became less comfortable with its institutions of government. The growth of Europe, inevitably, happened at the expense of the only non-European imperial power. Ottomans slowly lost their control of trade routes, and gave privileges to European traders in order to be able to keep them in their markets. Borrowing from the European bankers to keep the state intact was a short-term solution, which hastened the bankruptcy of the Ottomans. Modernization became an issue as the need for a better military power to fight the Europeans rose during the eighteenth century, and the entire nineteenth century was an
attempt to reach an Eastern style social-military-modernity. This shaped the politics of the Middle East to the date.

After losing many of its social estates in the eighteenth century, the empire started to reform itself. At the beginning of the nineteenth century these reforms were intensified, and after 1839, with the proclamation of the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane (The Rescript of the Rose Chamber), the period of Tanzimat (Reformation) started. Hatt-i Şerif recognized equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, promised security of life, and administrative, educational, and economic reforms. Another document, the Hatt-i Hümayun (The Imperial Edict) of 1856, reasserted the equal rights of non-Muslims and Muslim Ottoman subjects alike. This edict also triggered some negative responses among Muslims. In 1859, the so-called Kuleli Conspiracy took place when a religious leader led a riot to which young officers and clerics also gave support. Evidently, the Tanzimat generated political and cultural conflicts for it changed the millet (protected religious communities) structures. Secular, ethnic, and nationalist ideals began to mobilize Ottoman subjects, first non-Muslims, then Muslims.

The Young Ottomans represented the first sound Muslim intellectual response to the Tanzimat. It was initiated by İbrahim Şinasi (1824–1871), a young Ottoman bureaucrat, and a protege of Mustafa Reşit Paşa, director of the Army Arsenal (Tophane). Şinasi entered the Arsenal and rose within the bureaucracy. He was sent to Europe by Reşit for further education. In Paris he attended the literary soirées of Ernest Renan and Lamartine. In 1855, he was a leading Tanzimat bureaucrat but his high profile threatened some of his colleagues. As a result of internal conflicts, he was never allowed to hold a significant position. He was especially disliked by ‘Ali Paşa, the grand wazir. After 1860, Şinasi became involved in literature. He started his own paper Tasvir-i efkar (Description of Ideas, 1861–1870), which later became the news organ of the Young Ottomans. In 1864, he asked for a government post and was refused by ‘Ali Paşa one last time. He went into exile in Paris, leaving Tasvir-i efkar to Namik Kemal (1840–1888), a member of his circle.

The intellectuals who became associated with Şinasi and his paper were critics of the government. They accused ‘Ali and Fuat Paşas of using Tanzimat to establish the autocratic rule of elite bureaucrats, of undermining Islam and Ottoman culture, and of not defending the empire against the influences of the Western powers. In 1865, six men formed a secret group called the Patriotic Alliance, to criticize ‘Ali Paşa and act against him. Most of these men were former employees of the Translation Bureau of the Porte, and were thus exposed to international developments. They shared a common knowledge of European civilization and concern over the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Their names were Mehmet Bey, Nuri Bey, Reşat Bey, Namik Kemal, Ayatollah Bey, and Refik Bey.

As the alliance grew, three intellectuals became its leading figures: Namik Kemal, Ziya Paşa (1825–1880), and ‘Ali Suavi. Under their guidance the Young Ottomans used Tasvir-i efkar to communicate their ideas. Eventually, they were censored and in 1867 Kemal and Ziya had to escape to Europe. They continued to communicate their work through foreign post offices that were outside the scope of official Ottoman censorship. In Europe, the Young Ottomans formed an opposition movement, based in London and Paris. An Ottoman-Egyptian prince, Mustafa Fazıl, who tried to use the movement to pressure the Ottoman government for his own ends, sponsored them. Mustafa Fazıl had also helped İbrahim Şinasi, in 1861, with the establishment of Tasvir-i efkar.

Later ‘Ali Suavi also went to exile. Suavi represented the more Islamic reaction to the Tanzimat and it was essentially after his arrival that the Young Ottomans became aware of their differences. Kemal and Ziya’s understanding of parliament and democracy had little resemblance to ‘Ali’s conception of these institutions. Their newspaper, called Hurriyet (Freedom), was closed due to the conflicts among the leaders of the movement. In 1870, most of the Young Ottomans returned to the Ottoman Empire and continued to express their ideas. They were subjected to further censorship and exile.

Although the Young Ottomans were liberals, they were often conservative in their criticism of Tanzimat leaders like ‘Ali Paşa. They believed the reforms undermined Muslim and Ottoman identity. They admired European nations and parliamentary systems, but they argued that the Ottoman Empire was different from the European countries. They accepted that the subjects of the empire were heterogeneous, varying in race, religion, and language. For the future of the Ottoman state, they argued, it was necessary to implement a constitution, a parliament, and Ottomanism, an ideology that combined Ottoman culture and Islam with modern nationalism. In their view a parliament would provide a political forum where these differences could be consolidated and government policies developed. Participation in such a system would generate a feeling of belonging and emphasize the concept of vatan (fatherland). Some of the Young Ottomans argued that the entire millet system had to be abolished in order to allow a full expression of Ottomanism.

Ironically, ‘Ali Paşa and Fuat Paşa were modernizers too. They belonged to the same generation of reformists as the Young Ottomans but they believed that reforms had to be achieved through a strong, centralized state. In their view, representative government would delay modernization and undermine the power of the state.

In part, it was the Young Ottomans who inspired the civilian and military officials who dethroned Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876. In the same year, the first constitution and the first parliament were introduced in the Ottoman Empire, under Sultan Abd al-Hamid II (Ar., ‘Abd al-Hamid II). These developments can also be attributed to the influences of the
Young Ottomans, who saw to it that the first constitution of the empire emphasized Ottomanism as its ideological basis.

Among the leaders of the Young Ottomans, Namik Kemal proved to be the most influential. Later generations, and especially the Young Turks who emerged after 1889, embraced his image and his fervent patriotism.

See also Pan-Islam; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa.

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Murat C. Mengüç

YOUNG TURKS

Young Turks is the term generally applied to the opposition to the Ottoman sultan Abdulhamit II’s rule (Ar., ‘Abd al-Hamid, 1876–1908). Although the foundations of the movement can be traced back to 1889, it only became politically active prior to the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Its members at the time forced the reinstatement of the constitution and the parliament after thirty years of autocracy. Between 1908 and 1918 it was the Young Turks who governed the Ottoman Empire.

The Young Turks belonged to the generation following that of the Young Ottomans, whose legacy was the constitutional era inaugurated in December 1876. But when in February 1878 Sultan Abdulhamit II dissolved the parliament and embarked on absolute rule, an opposition slowly began to form underground. In 1889 a group of students from the imperial Medical School formed an alliance called the Association for the Union of Ottomans. By 1895 they had changed their name to the Committee for Union and Progress (CPU). The CPU was mostly active in Europe and Egypt. Its members came from diverse backgrounds, ethnically and professionally. Due to Abdulhamit’s autocratic rule, many educated Turks, Greeks, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, and Armenians came to support the idea of Ottomanism, a nineteenthcentury ideology that combined Ottoman culture and Islam with modern nationalism. In 1902 the First Congress of Ottoman Liberals was held in Paris where the opposition to the sultan came into the open.

In 1906 some military officers and government officials formed another group called the Ottoman Freedom Society, in Salonika. They joined the CUP in 1907 and because of their reputation for action these men became the ruling faction. From then on the new coalition was named the Committee for Progress and Union (CPU). In the same year, between 27 and 29 December, the Second Congress of Ottoman Liberals met in Paris and resolved to topple Abdulhamit II from power.

By the spring of 1908 those CPU members who had served in the Ottoman army in Macedonia began to act more openly. They reacted to Abdulhamit’s efforts to discipline and spy on their activities by assassinating inspectors and others loyal to the sultan. In July, Adjunct Major Ahmed Niyazi Bey and later Enver Bey renounced their loyalty to the sultan and took their troops into the mountains to engage in guerilla activity. Later, the special military commander sent to take control of the Macedonian army was assassinated by a CUP member. The CPU further pressured the sultan with a series of telegrams threatening to occupy the capital if the constitution were not reinstated. In July 1908, Abdulhamit felt obliged to reinstitute the 1876 constitution, inaugurating the second constitutional era, also known as the Young Turks’ revolution.

The event was celebrated by every ethnic group that stood to acquire greater security. Yet when the parliament began meeting, the division among the Young Turks’s supporters became clear. Two major factions were identified: unionists CPU and the liberals. The unionists favored a strong centralized state to achieve modernization and progress. The liberals wanted a decentralized and autonomous polity benefiting non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups. The multireligious and multinational population of the empire eventually forced the Young Turks to adopt a middle way, which has been called Ottomanism. Meanwhile, Turkist and Islamist thinkers were still involved in the government.

In April 1909 an insurrection led by an Islamist organization made it clear that Muslim influences were strong among the unionists. But in 1912 a military coup brought the liberals into power. Meanwhile the demographics of the empire were changing: the Ottoman army had suffered repeated defeats in the Balkans, and during its last withdrawal from 1911 to 1913, the empire lost almost all of its remaining European lands and one-quarter of its population. The unionists took advantage of the political turmoil and in January 1913 took over the government once and for all. By June, they had eliminated the liberal opposition.

Throughout World War I, with the deportation and ethnic cleansing of Armenians and the arrival of Turkish people from the Balkans and Caucasus, the empire population became increasingly Muslim-Turkish and Arab. The unionists started to rely more on religion. Their pan-Islamism was often aimed at appeasing Arab constituencies who were displeased with the empire.
In the prewar period, both the Turkish and the Arab nationalists were intent on forming a solid nationalist ideology. Under the CPU, official and popular sentiment started to embrace Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocagi), founded after March 1912, was a side organization of the CPU whose original duty was to advocate Islamism and Ottomanism. But they were also trying to convince Turkish people that the only way for the empire to survive was to embrace Turkish nationalism. The Turkish Hearth was also responsible for propagating the use of Turkish instead of other languages. Under CPU pressure, government officials increased the use of Turkish in government administration, and as the religious schools and courts came under state control, Turkish started to predominate. The immigrating Caucasian and eastern European Turks participated in these developments, and a project to unite all the Turks, or all the Turanian people, began.

After 1914 the notion of Arab independence emerged, along with the possibility of the Ottoman Empire’s fall and the inevitability of subsequent foreign hegemony. Many such ideas were current in Beirut, Damascus, and Basra, where the independence movements in the Balkans had already been noted and the Young Turks had been active. Triggered by an alliance between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and the British, in 1916, the Arab Revolt started the separation of Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire.

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire proved incapable of fighting on a scale equal to the European forces. The end of the war in 1918 also signaled the end of the Young Turks era. After the ensuing war for independence, the new Turkish republic was formed, owing much of its social infrastructure to the Young Turks. Although under the CPU the state ideology remained Ottomanist and Islamist, the emergence of non-Turkish Muslim nationalist movements among the Balkan and Arab populations strongly influenced Turkish intellectuals and statesmen. The major intellectual development of the Young Turks era was Turkish nationalism. The secular ideas of Young Turks leaders like Ziya Gökalp found popular support long after the CPU.

Youth Movements

Youth typically refers to the ages fifteen to twenty-four or eleven to twenty-nine. Analysts view youths as intellectually idealistic, psychologically impatient, practically inexperienced, socially liberal, and politically radical. Since they often lack a socially defined position in society, they tend to demand more far-reaching changes in society than their elders. Youth movements also bear these characteristics.

Although youth movements are modern phenomena, youths’ collective involvement in politics is not new to the Middle Eastern societies. The futuwwa brotherhoods in medieval periods consisted of semireligious, voluntary, urban, youth organizations engaged in acts of chivalry (jawwār-mardi) protecting the less fortunate, supporting public causes, and at times acting in parallel with official security forces. Though not always viewed positively or engaged in benevolent acts, the futuwwa groups represent early forms of collective action by youths in Muslim societies. These youth organizations imposed strict ethical standards on their members and required strong group loyalty.

Youth movements in the Middle East emerge in the context of politics or popular culture. Youths express themselves through sports, music, and dress. Because most Middle Eastern states are undemocratic, officials have considered the rise of independent social movements a threat to political stability. Any issue that captures youths’ attention, even if nonpolitical in nature, takes on a political character, and state officials respond accordingly, exerting control and resorting to repression.

The region’s youth movements are usually connected to broader changes under way in society, especially political and cultural developments. Influenced by such developments, these movements in turn intensify the broader changes. For instance, in 1908, drawing young members of the military, a liberal opposition movement known as the Young Turks forced the Ottoman sultan, ‘Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1909), to restore the constitution and parliament that he had suspended in 1878. Youths were also energetic partners in most anticolonial struggles. In Iran, young people, especially university students, were an important force in the push to nationalize the oil industry in the early 1950s. Nowhere have youths’ struggles been more intense and persistent as in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, where they have borne the burden of two major uprisings, the Intifada (1987–1988) and Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2002). Youths also fought most

See also Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Revolution: Modern; Young Ottomans.

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Murat C. Mengüç

YOUTH MOVEMENTS

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Although youth movements are modern phenomena, youths’ collective involvement in politics is not new to the Middle Eastern societies. The futuwwa brotherhoods in medieval periods consisted of semireligious, voluntary, urban, youth organizations engaged in acts of chivalry (jawwār-mardi) protecting the less fortunate, supporting public causes, and at times acting in parallel with official security forces. Though not always viewed positively or engaged in benevolent acts, the futuwwa groups represent early forms of collective action by youths in Muslim societies. These youth organizations imposed strict ethical standards on their members and required strong group loyalty.

Youth movements in the Middle East emerge in the context of politics or popular culture. Youths express themselves through sports, music, and dress. Because most Middle Eastern states are undemocratic, officials have considered the rise of independent social movements a threat to political stability. Any issue that captures youths’ attention, even if nonpolitical in nature, takes on a political character, and state officials respond accordingly, exerting control and resorting to repression.

The region’s youth movements are usually connected to broader changes under way in society, especially political and cultural developments. Influenced by such developments, these movements in turn intensify the broader changes. For instance, in 1908, drawing young members of the military, a liberal opposition movement known as the Young Turks forced the Ottoman sultan, ‘Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876–1909), to restore the constitution and parliament that he had suspended in 1878. Youths were also energetic partners in most anticolonial struggles. In Iran, young people, especially university students, were an important force in the push to nationalize the oil industry in the early 1950s. Nowhere have youths’ struggles been more intense and persistent as in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, where they have borne the burden of two major uprisings, the Intifada (1987–1988) and Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2002). Youths also fought most
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fervently during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) and in the war that resulted in the withdrawal of the Israeli military from south Lebanon in May 2000. In the 1970s and 1980s, both leftist and Islamic associations grew in countries as far apart as Egypt and Pakistan, polarizing university campuses.

Having little stake in the status quo, young people join opposition groups hoping to create an “ideal society.” Both governments and their oppositions exploit youth’s abundant idealism and impassioned activism. Because oral traditions are prevalent in Muslim societies, religious and political leaders use their speaking skills to establish credibility, cultivate charisma, and recruit and mobilize followers, particularly youths. In the late 1950 Egypt, Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s (1918–1970) powerful lectures drew youth support for his policy of Arab unity. During the 1970s, ‘Ali Shari’ati’s (1933–1977) oratory won over Iranian youths to his radical Islamic ideology. In the 1980s and 1990s, ‘Abd al-Karim Sorush’s (b. 1945), threats of language has similarly appealed to Iranian youths in the Islamic Republic, who sympathize with his liberal Islamic ideology. Often, religious leaders attract youths to their political causes through mosques or underground networks, as the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), founded in 1928, and the Iranian Fedaiyan-e Islam, created in 1945, have shown.

In societies marked by limited upward political and economic mobility, student movements enable youths to crack the system and open up spaces for participation in the politics. Many nationalist leaders began their political socialization in student organizations. Realizing this fact, governments also try to recruit students to their administrations. In the early 1970s, the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlevi (1919–1980), undermined the growing power of the Confederation of the Iranian Students in the United States and Europe by luring its leaders to lucrative government posts. The Saudi and Kuwaiti governments have likewise co-opted their young opposition and with greater success than the shah.

The correlation between the emergence of youth movements and economic decline is not strong in the Middle East. Since most youth movements are sociocultural and political, they have arisen during both economic prosperity and decline. In the 1970s, a guerilla movement emerged in Iran as the oil export boom brought new wealth. During the mid-1990s, proreform students formed a movement, reacting to the last decade’s political developments rather than to poor economic conditions. The relationship between youth movements and the Iranian state has been discontinuous. When in late 1940s, Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880–1967), then elected prime minister, launched a campaign to end the British control of the Iranian oil industry, students backed both his stance as well as his antimonarchy efforts. However, once the CIA-supported coup ended Mosaddeq’s government in 1953, restoring the monarchy, the student movement opposed the shah’s rule by using both violent and nonviolent tactics.

In the political arena, the locus of Middle Eastern youth movements is often universities. Where allowed, political organizations and parties establish subsidiaries in universities for recruitment and mobilization. Where outlawed, opposition groups still operate on campuses underground for political agitation and recruitment. In the absence of serious political parties in many societies, student movements become the principal advocates of ideological and political trends in society and a vanguard of change. In the 1980s and 1990s, a host of sociological variables has contributed to the rising expectations among the youth and created fertile grounds for youth activism. In 1998, 40 percent of the Middle Eastern population was under fifteen years old, as opposed to one-fifth for the developed world. The general decline in oil prices around the world, coupled with increasing population, has led to economic decline in the Middle East. Unemployment, aggravated by the increase in the rate of rural-urban migration and urbanization, has led to disenchantment among the youth making further demands for education, social freedom, jobs, housing, and resources for establishing a family. These factors have delivered frustrated youth to extremist ideologies, especially Islamic fundamentalism. The 1990s has witnessed massive recruitment among the youth by Islamic radicals like HAMAS in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Jama’a Islamiyya in Egypt, the Mobilization (Basij) Forces in Iran, and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan.

The most interesting demographic change has been a sharp increase in the number of young women in Middle Eastern universities outnumbering men in a number of fields. In the second decade of the revolution in Iran, more females studied in various fields, despite official restrictions. In Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, the governments encouraged female participation in most aspects of social and political life. Among the Persian Gulf countries, Kuwait, Yemen, and Oman have developed policies promoting female education and social participation, but except in Kuwait, success has been generally slow and limited.

The dominant features of student movements in the region are radicalism, intellectual idealism, anti-authoritarianism, anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and nationalism. The scope of these movements is national and the respective state apparatus are their targets of attack. Iran’s student movement exemplifies these characteristics the best. A close look at this movement will demonstrate the dynamics and diversity of the student movement in the region.

The Student Movement in Iran

Before mass protests erupted against the Pahlevi regime in 1978, the Iranian student movement splintered into Islamic, liberal, and Marxist factions. The secular or non-Islamic associations, the strongest and largest groups, had ties to the guerrilla movement operating outside of universities. The Muslim associations comprised a small segment of the student movement and had loose contacts with Ayatollah Ruhollah
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Khomeini (1902–1989) and the Freedom Movement of Iran. All these associations cooperated to topple the regime. During the shah’s final years, students initiated the process that culminated in revolution. Student poetry readings, lecture series, and political forums were catalysts in a chain of events that crippled the old regime. In 1977, when demonstrations against the shah became widespread, the student associations recruited many members, organized numerous rallies in major cities, and became supporters of Khomeini’s call for the shah’s departure.

Once the revolution succeeded, students expanded their activities, joined revolutionary forces, and occupied numerous properties belonging to the fleeing former officials. By the time Khomeini returned to Iran, student associations had established de facto headquarters for their respective groups in universities. Faced with the tasks of institution and state building, the clerics considered student demands as obstacles to the consolidation of their power, using the Muslim Student Organization as an instrument to challenge its secular counterparts.

On 4 November 1979, after an earlier attempt by the Marxist organization, the Iranian Fedaiyan Organization, a Muslim student group engaged in the boldest and most consequential act in the history of student activism in Iran: the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the holding of American diplomats as hostages for 444 days. Khomeini endorsed the takeover, capitalizing on this event to undermine opposition to his new theocracy. In 1980, the secular student organizations were effectively outlawed and their members physically attacked by the religious vigilantes. Muslim student associations identified and helped to arrest non-Islamic students, sabotaging their political and cultural activities. This was the first time ever that elements of the Iranian student movement turned against each other. Later, Khomeini ordered universities closed until purged of un-Islamic elements and the grounds laid for their Islamization. He created the Council for Cultural Revolution to review faculty and students’ activities as well as university programs. Many activist students and faculty members were fired or arrested for their affiliations with political groups.

When universities reopened two years later, leftist, nationalist, secular, and opposition students and professors were gone, with new Islamic and ideological criteria defined for admission and recruitment. Female students were barred from studying certain disciplines. In addition to meeting educational criteria, students had to show commitment to Islamic values and have an untainted moral history. Until Khomeini’s death in 1989, these restrictions remained in force, although students and the faculty had devised mechanisms of resistance.

In the 1980s, numerous Muslim associations were formed at colleges. New admission quotas for war veterans and the armed forces’ families enabled these associations to grow. These associations encouraged student participation in government rallies, reported on antigovernment activities and faculty criticisms of the state ideology, and implemented state gender policies by monitoring male-female interactions on campus. In short, the student movement, formerly an active, independent, creative, and antiestablishment force, was transformed into a watchdog of the state, alienating most students who feared religious vigilantism and spying by the government. These associations lost their appeal among students who felt increasingly apathetic and disenchanted. Although these associations’ members were closely affiliated with the regime and some occupied government positions, conservatives still suspected some students whose nonconformity and radical outlook they found troubling. Conservative religious organizations established parallel Islamic student associations in the universities to discourage unfavorable and unpredictable activities by others.

Sociological and political factors during the revolution’s second decade inspired another momentous rise in student and youth activism. According to the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of the Youth, of 60,055,488 total population in 1997, 40.4 percent, or 24,248,768, were eleven to twenty-nine years old—a 37.3 percent increase since 1987 and more than 104.7 percent growth since 1977. With the doubling of the population between 1978 and 1996, the number of institutions of higher education increased as well. Alienation, disillusion, and frustration among youths intensified. Islamic vigilantes constantly interfered in youths’ and women’s lives, compelling them to obey strict religious codes of behavior.

After 1988, Iran’s clerical establishment split into two major factions. With the decline of the Islamic leftists’ fortunes during the 1989 to 1996 period, the student organizations lost their influence within the government. Many of its influential members began careers in political journalism. Radical individuals who had served in high-ranking positions during Khomeini’s rule were isolated and pushed to the background. President Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997 breathed new life into the student movement. An unprecedented coalition of dissatisfied youths and women, politically isolated supporters of the Islamic left, and other segments of the public voted for Khatami. A new chapter in student activism had begun.

New student organizations emerged, and activists challenged the conservative faction’s authority within the Islamic Republic. Reacting to broad support for Khatami in universities, the conservatives introduced measures to depoliticize students and asserted more control over their organizations. All these measures failed, ironically reinvigorating student activism. As the conservatives blocked Khatami’s reformist policies, students marched in his support. As student demonstrations against the judiciary and the conservative faction multiplied, one of the protests, on 8 July 1999, led to a deadly
attack on a student dormitory in Tehran by Islamic vigilantes and the police. This attack provoked three days of student uprisings in Tehran and several other cities in that month.

After these uprisings, the government cracked down on the students, leaving them alienated, agitated, and restless as they looked for any opportunity to express their frustrations. Protests spilled over from the universities to the soccer fields, cinemas, and music concerts. Disturbances in various cities following the loss of an international soccer game by the national soccer team in 2001 highlighted widespread discontent with the status quo. In November 2002, students started a series of mass protests at a death sentence passed against Hashem Aghajari, a reformist university professor, for alleged blasphemous remarks about clerics in Iran. In early June 2003, students began a new round of protests in commemoration of an attack on a student dormitory on 9 July 1999. Most of these irregular and spontaneous protests have lacked a clearly articulated political agenda. The government’s systematic efforts to weaken the student movement have led youths to become more spontaneous and momentum-driven. Most protests have begun as friendly gatherings rather than as a result of any organization or planning. In fact, the ruling clerics have successfully crushed these protests, despite their persistence, because the students lack organization, goals, and leadership. At the end of February 2003, the students’ Office for Consolidating Unity finally expressed its disillusionment with President Khatami by withdrawing its support for the reformist camp in the local elections. A number of student organizations have emerged since, demanding an end to theocracy and the establishment of a secular government based on the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Conclusion
During the 1990s, youths in the Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran, have shown a strong desire for Western cultural icons, music, and arts, as they reject the imposition of undemocratic, traditional, and strict policies on their lives. Part of this desire for more freedom is due to the limitations imposed by the states. However, part of it is a demonstration effect: The communications revolution and globalization of local regional economies have stimulated youth’s attraction to a material lifestyle as well as to the cultural norms and political freedoms typically identified with Western societies. Government authorities have resorted to various means to
limit these demands: In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, state-sponsored programs are designed to respond to the youths’ demands by creating synthetic opportunities where nonoffensive and nonpolitical forums are created for releasing youthful energy. While sport has been a successful means for this purpose, cultural and social programs have had little success in tempering these energies. The Iranian government has often resorted to moral campaigns against vice, publicly arresting and flogging violators, thus furthering youth’s anger against the government. Interestingly, the appeal of the West contradicts the rejection of the same culture during the Iranian revolution two decades ago. Coupled with the sociological factors discussed earlier, these developments will surely give a new impetus to student activism in the years to come.

See also Futuwwa; HAMAS; Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Muslim Student Association of North America; Qa’ida, al-.

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Ali Akbar Mahdi

YUSUF ALI, ‘ABDULLAH (1872–1953)

Author of the most widely read English translation of the Qur’an, ‘Abdullah Yusuf Ali presents a unique figure in Islamic modernism at the turn of the twentieth century. Yusuf Ali was the son of a police officer of Gujarati parentage. With communal Muslim schooling in Bombay, he looked beyond his Bohra Shi’ite origins and was extremely concerned about the fate of Muslims in British India and beyond. But he was very successful in achieving the highest rank in British schooling. He earned a scholarship at Cambridge, and after graduation won a place in India’s civil service. Yusuf Ali honored these two traditions, British and Muslim Indian, with equal vigor. For his devotion to the British cause in the First World War, he was awarded the title of Commander of the British Empire. He was called upon to represent loyal British Muslims against pan-Islamic tendencies in India. Yet, he was still respected by Muslims like Muhammad Iqbal, who called upon him to head a Muslim school.

Yusuf Ali, however, was more than an anglophile and communal Muslim. His translation of the Qur’an represents the kernel of his ideas on Islam, mysticism, and progress. In addition, he wrote a number of pamphlets and articles on Islamic issues in which he took a critical stance on both Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Sir Muhammad Iqbal. His was a vision of Islam that stood on an equal footing with other religions, just as he viewed Indian Muslims on an equal footing with the family of nations.

In the closing years of the twentieth century, Muslims revisited the legacy of Yusuf Ali’s widely read translation. Perturbed by the modernist and mystical tendencies in his translation, Islamist groups have tried to expurgate his commentary of so-called unorthodox leanings.

See also Qur’an; Translation.

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Abdulkader Tayob
ZAND, KARIM KHAN
(c. 1705–1779)

Karim Khan Zand was the ruler of western Iran from 1751 until 1779. A chieftain of the minor tribe of the Zand, of the Lakk branch of the Lors, Karim Khan led his contingent from the debacle of Nader Shah’s army in 1747 back to their inner-Zagros mountain ranges. In alliance with ‘Ali Mardan Khan of the Bakhtiyari, he established a puppet Safavid shah in Isfahan and consolidated the southwest under their rule. In 1751 he overthrew ‘Ali Mardan, and subsequently defeated several other contestants for regional power among Afghan, Afshar, and Qajar leaders. By 1765 he had emerged as de facto ruler of the whole of Iran except Khorasan, with his capital at Shiraz.

Karim did not assume the title of shah, even when the putative Safavid king predeceased him, but ruled as vakil al-ra’aya, “people’s representative” (the term for a traditional local ombudsman). He encouraged internal and foreign trade, granting the East India Company a base at Bushire, and rebuilt Shiraz (many of his fine buildings are still standing). A nominal Shi’ite, he practiced religious toleration, and did not actively seek the endorsement of the ulama. In 1776, after a year’s siege, he captured the port of Basra in Ottoman Iraq, but his death in 1779 brought a withdrawal.

The Vakil, as he is affectionately known, has left a reputation as a strong but humane and unassuming ruler who restored a measure of peace and prosperity to Iran. His successors were by contrast cruel, rapacious, and unpopular, excepting the last, Lotf ‘Ali Khan (1789–1794), and soon succumbed to the rising power of the Qajars.

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John R. Perry

ZANZIBAR, SA’IDI SULTANATE OF

The Omani dynasty of Zanzibar, under the able leadership of Sayyid Sa’id bin Sultan (1791–1856), inaugurated a new era in the commercial life of East Africa. Zanzibar had steadfastly remained loyal to Omani rule whether under the Yarubi dynasty, which had driven the Portuguese out of East Africa by the end of the seventeenth century, or under the Yarubi successors, the Busaidi dynasty, which came to power by the 1740s. Sayyid Sa’id was able to assert his sovereignty over much of the East African coastal strip but not over the Mazrui of Mombasa (his major competitor) who held out until 1837. He eventually moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar by the 1830s. The sultan was a master of intrigues and was able to deal with potential rivals such as Kimweri, the Kilindi ruler of Usambara, by disbursing gifts to Kimweri’s officials, who were urged not to lose sight of the sultan’s interests.

Major changes took place in East Africa after the arrival of Sayyid Sa’id. In fact, East Africa experienced what can be termed as a commercial revival, brought about by expansion in trading activities, new agricultural ventures (introduction of clove plantations), reforms in currency and customs administration, and encouragement of people with trading skills, such as Indians and Omani merchants, to settle in Zanzibar. The expansion in the coastal economy confirmed Zanzibar’s privileged position as the hub of the international trade with its control of coastal ports through which products such as ivory and slaves filtered from the interior. The sultan’s aggressive economic policies encouraged the trading
caravans to venture into the interior of East Africa, and wherever the Arab and Swahili traders went Islam went with them. This is how Islam gained a foothold in the interior of East Africa along the trading routes as far as Buganda, where contact was made with the King of Buganda.

The nineteenth century also witnessed the growth of Islamic higher education in the whole coastal region. This growth was due primarily to the Omani presence and, in particular, the Zanzibar sultanate, which contributed to literacy and to the intellectual life of the community. Written texts became more readily available and this led to greater knowledge and adherence to the written orthodox tradition, which was stimulated by the Sa’idi sultanate. Religious scholars from Arabia—mainly from Hadramaut and Oman, the Comoros, and the Benadir coast—began to arrive in the coastal towns and especially in Zanzibar, which emerged as the leading center of Islamic learning in East Africa. Later some of the leading scholars in East Africa (such as Sayyid Smait and Abdalla Bakathir) traveled to the Middle East where they supplemented their education. Moreover, the Zanzibar sultans employed religious scholars, of both Shafi’i and Ibadhi rites, as Muslim judges. Nevertheless, Omani Ibadhi influence was very superficial on the mainland. In fact, not only did the Ibadhis as a community lose Arabic as their first language (many had African mothers), but in addition some of the leading Ibadhi families ended up following Shafi’i rites.

See also Africa, Islam in; Mazrui.

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Abdin Chande

ZAR

Zar refers to a type of spirits, the afflictions such spirits may cause, and the rituals aimed at preventing or curing these afflictions. It is one of the most widely distributed “cults of afflictions” in Africa and the Middle East. Its diffusion owes much to the slave trade and to the migration of people associated with the pilgrimage to Mecca. Zar spirits and zar practices are found throughout eastern North Africa and in areas of East Africa and the Middle East, including Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, Somalia, Arabia, Iran, and Israel. The zar cult has also influenced other possession practices in East and West Africa. Little is known of the cult’s origins, but its presence has been documented in the Sudan since the mid-nineteenth century and in Ethiopia since at least the eighteenth century. Etymologically, most scholars consider the term zar to derive, not from Arabic, but from Persian or, more plausibly, from Amharic.

Popularly, however, the word is believed to originate from zara, “he visited,” an Arabic word that was later corrupted. The geographic distribution of the word zar has led researchers to consider the many cults of spirit possession in northeast Africa as part of a single, historically connected phenomenon. While zar practices exhibit considerable variations from place to place, it is nonetheless possible to identify some shared characteristics of the spirit-host relation. Involvement with the zar generally follows a period of illness, during which all medical options have been exhausted. Eventually, the sufferer is diagnosed as being afflicted by a spirit. Treatment involves initiation into the zar cult during a propitiatory ceremony in which the initiate will ideally enter a trance, allowing the spirit to possess her or his body so as to affirm its identity and reveal its requirements. Once initiated, devotees must continuously negotiate the terms of their relationships with the possessing spirits. They express their commitment to intrusive zar by attending ceremonies, making offerings, and fulfilling ritual, moral, and social requirements. Getting well thus becomes a lifelong exercise, much of which is part of daily experience rather than being restricted to dramatic ritual.
In many areas, the *zar* cult has retained pre-Islamic or pre-Christian features. It has strongly been influenced by these two religions, and has influenced them, in turn. The complex and creative ways that *zar* has simultaneously competed with, adapted to, and borrowed from Islam or Christianity often means that spirit devotees see no incompatibility between their commitment to the *zar* and their identities as Christian or Muslims. To them, possession is part of a wider religious enterprise.

Not everyone agrees with this assessment, however. Some see *zar* as being antithetical to Islam or Christianity. Such divisions often follow gender lines. Thus, for northern Sudanese women, *zar* falls squarely within the purview of Islam, whereas their male counterparts find that relinquishing control of one's body to a possessing spirit is simply sinful and un-Islamic. Despite such condemnations, *zar* has continued to thrive in both rural and urban areas; in the latter it often provides supportive social networks for newcomers.

Men may criticize their wives' practices of assuaging the spirits, but they rarely interfere when their womenfolk stage a propitiatory ceremony. While they may want nothing to do with *zar*, men implicitly acknowledge the spirits' role in the preservation of fertility and prosperity. Though in some areas, men can become initiated, it is women whom *zar* most afflict, mainly with infertility. The preponderance of women has traditionally been explained as a strategy of redress for marginalized or powerless individuals in male-centered cultures. From this perspective, *zar* is nothing but a means to bring public attention to one's plight and achieve momentary power.

More recent interpretations have pointed to the multiple ways in which *zar* participants distill the lessons of history, reflect upon their subordinate status, and assess the relevance of cultural values by conjuring up images of amoral, foreign, and powerful spirits. Far from constituting a refuge from oppressive reality, *zar* is seen as a cultural resource that transcends the context of illness and is drawn upon by people to make sense of certain problems and experiences of everyday life.

*See also* African Culture and Islam; Miracles.

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Adeline Masquelier

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**ZAYTUNA**

Zaytuna, an important mosque and cultural institution in the city of Tunis, was founded in 732 C.E. Zaytuna (in Arabic, “the Olive Tree”) mosque became an organized Islamic university in the twelfth century and thereafter was considered one of the most important centers of Islamic scholarship and instruction in North Africa, together with Al-Azhar in Cairo and Al-Qarawiyyin in Fez. Qur’anic exegesis, Arabic grammar, and Islamic law (*shari‘a*) were the main subjects offered at Zaytuna. Among the many historical figures who taught at Zaytuna were Muhammad Ibn ‘Arafa, one of the greatest scholars of Islam’s Maliki school, and the famous historian Ibn Khaldun.

Zaytuna suffered from the Spanish entry in Tunis in 1534, following which the mosque and library were pillaged. But under the Ottoman rule it recovered some of its prestige, and in 1842 its programs and teaching methods were institutionalized. After the establishment of the French Protectorate (1881), Zaytuna reformed its traditional programs to include a more modern and scientific system of instruction. In the beginning of the twentieth century it bred a generation of Islamic reformist thinkers and played an important role for Tunisian and Algerian nationalist movements.

After the independence of Tunisia (1956), Zaytuna became part of the state university and its library was integrated within the National Library of Tunis.

*See also* Education; Law.

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Claudia Gazzini

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**ZIYARA**

*See Pilgrimage: Ziyara*
The syllable stress is indicated by italics. A doubled vowel such as in the word “ke-taab” indicates that the vowel should be said twice as long as a vowel in English.

‘Abd (Ar., a’bd):
“Servant.” Used with one of the names of God, such as ‘Abd Allah “Servant of God” or ‘Abd al-Rahim, “Servant of the Compassionate One” or ‘Abduh, “His servant.” ‘Abd also means “slave,” comparable to ghulam (Per.) or mamluk (Ar.)

Abu (Ar., a’booo):
“Father.” Used in the construct “Abu + son’s name,” such as “Abu Husayn,” to mean the father of Husayn. Often, it is the kunya or the name by which a person is known. Abu can also mean “the place of,” such as Abu Dhabi (the place of the gazelle) or “the one that has.” “Abu” can also be written as Aha or Abi, as in ‘Ali b. Abi Talib.

Adhan (Ar., a’dhaan):
“Call to prayer.” The early Muslim community in Medina is said to have debated how to summon their worshippers; Muhammad suggested the human voice. Thus, most mosques have their own muezzin, trained in the art of recitation, who calls worshippers to prayer five times a day.

Ahl al-kitab (Ar., ahl al-ka’tub):
“People of the Book.” Mentioned in the Qur’an, this phrase literally refers to religious communities who have a written scripture (the book), and specifically refers to Jews, Christians, and Sabians (Q. 5:72 “Those who believe [in the Qur’an] those who follow the Jewish [Scriptures] and the Sabians and the Christians any who believe in Allah and the Last Day and work righteousness, on them shall be no fear nor shall they grieve.”) Later Muslim rulers extended the interpretation of ahl al-kitab to include Zoroastrians, Hindus, Mandaeans, and Buddhists, among others. As such, ahl al-kitab have a specific protected status and freedom of religion within Muslim society, which the “pagan” Arabs did not enjoy.

Amir al-Muminin (Ar., a’meer al-mu’min-in):
“Commander of the Faithful.” This title was adopted by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second leader of the Muslim community after the death of Muhammad, and was used by subsequent caliphs, heads of states, and sultans to signify their religiosity and religious authority.

Ansar (Ar., an-sa’r):
“The helpers”, a designation referring to the people of Medina who aided Muhammad following the hijra (emigration) from Mecca to Medina.
Glossary

Aya (Ar., a’-ya pl., Ayat a’-yaat):
A verse in the Qur’an; a sign.

Ayatollah (a’-ya’t-ul-lah):
A Shi’ite theologian who has completed the following: 14 subjects of elementary study, independent study, and qualifications of a mujtahid (practitioner of independent legal reasoning) through oral examination. An ayatollah must also have attained a reputation amongst his peers, students and laymen in knowledge and piety.

Baraka (Ar., ba’-ra’-ka’):
Blessings of God.

Bid’a (Ar., bid-a’):
“Innovation.” A point of view or interpretation used in Islamic law or practice, but which is not present in the Sunna of the Prophet, and is therefore unacceptable to “traditionalists” who rely on the traditions (hadith) of Muhammad.

Bint (Ar., bint):
“Daughter.” Used to designate the father-daughter relationship, such as Fatima bint Muhammad, and abbreviated in English as “bt.”

Caliph:
“Successor.” A title used by Muslim rulers to indicate their connection to Muhammad’s leadership over the Muslim community. The title did not indicate, however, any sort of connection with the divine or spiritual supremacy.

Companions:
Most Sunni scholars believe that all those who converted to Islam during Muhammad’s lifetime and who had contact with him are to be considered among his “Companions” with an ensuing righteous status. They are the primary transmitters of hadith, and it is to these people that the contemporary Salafiyya movements look for guidance. Because of the contentious relationships among some of this first generation of Muslims, Shi’a scholars are more selective in terms of who they consider a Companion.

Da’wa (Ar., da’-wa’):
“Call.” The missionary aspect of Islam in which Muslims encourage non-practicing Muslims to practice again (or practice according to a particular ideological view) and encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islam.

Dhikr (Ar., dhikr):
“Remembrance.” An individual or collective ritual, usually involving chanting, where participants invoke the names and attributes of God. Dhikr is a central element in Sufi practice and spirituality.

Dhimmi (Ar., dhim-mee):
Protected groups of non-Muslims living under Muslim rule, primarily People of the Book (asl al-kitab). Dhimmis were required to pay a tax (jizya) and were not allowed to serve in the army, although many rose to prominence as scholars, government advisors and officers, and physicians. Both dhimmis status and the jiziyah tax do not exist in contemporary nation-states.

Dhu’l-Hijja (Ar., dhu-l-hij-jah):
The twelfth month of the Islamic calendar and the month in which the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, takes place.

Emir/Amir (Ar., Per., a’-meer):
A prince, ruler or commander, but early usage also included a military commander.

Faqih (Ar., fa’-keeh):
A jurist, thus one who would be an expert in shari’a, especially fiqh.

Al-Fatiha (Ar., al-fa-tee-ha’):
The opening chapter of the Qur’an, consisting of seven ayat (verses). This chapter is said in prayers as well as at significant times, such as marriage.

Fatwa (Ar., fat-wa’):
“Legal opinion.” Issued by a mufti or some other recognized and qualified scholar, a fatwa is a legal or advisory opinion in answer to a specific question or a broader issue facing the community.

Fiqh (Ar., fik):
“Jurisprudence.” The science of studying the shari’a.

Fitna (Ar., fit-na’):
First used to describe the violent factional dissension that took place in the early Islamic community, it denotes Muslims fighting Muslims, and as such signals the end of Muslim unity, and the domination of chaos and irreligiosity. Fitna is also used to describe temptations that test believers’ religious commitments.

Futuhat (Ar., fu-tuh-ha’):
The conquest of territory by Muslim armies.

Hadith (Ar., ha-deeth, pl., ahadith a-ha-deeth):
The utterances, opinions, or rulings of the prophet Muhammad. According to the methods through which they have been collected and verified in the three centuries following his death, two elements are essential to a reliable hadith: a continuous, verifiable ina’d (chain of transmitters), and a correspondence (or absence of contradiction) to the Qur’an. The Hadith, along with the Sunna and the Qur’an are the main sources for Islamic law. Sunnis and Shi’ites share many abadith, but have different ina’ds.

Hajj (Ar., haj):
The pilgrimage rite to Mecca, one of the essential requirement of being a Muslim. Muslims come from all over the world to participate once a year in the Hajj, commemorating Abraham’s building of the Ka’bah and the difficult experiences of Hagar and Isma’il. The Hajj is required of Muslims once in their lifetime, but only if physically and financially able to do so—they cannot leave behind debts, and they must have paid the zakat on the resources they use to go on Hajj. After a person completes the pilgrimage, a man is called a Hajj or Hajji and a woman is called a Hajja.
Halal (Ar., ha-laal):
Permitted according to Islamic law. The use of the word also signifies a slaughtering technique that sanctifies meat for Muslims.

Hanafi (Ar., ha-na-fee):
One of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, named after Abu Hanifa (699–767).

Hanbali (Ar., han-baal-lee):
One of the four Sunni schools of Islamic law, named after Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855)

Haram (Ar., ha-raam):
Forbidden in Islamic law, such as the consumption of pork and alcohol are haram.

Haram (ha-raam):
A holy place, a sanctuary. Mecca is referred to as Masjid al-Haram and the al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem is the location of the Dome of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa.

Hijra (Ar., hij-ra):
“Emigration.” This term refers to the journey of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. and marks the beginning of the Muslim (lunar) calendar, known by the same name, abbreviated as A.H. (Arabic Hijra or Hegira)

Hizb (Ar., hizb):
A political party or movement, as in Hizb Allah (Party of God) in Lebanon.

Ibadat (Ar., e-ba-daat):
Devotional acts of worship.

Ibadis (Ibadiyya) (Ar., e-ba-de-yah):
See Khawarij.

Ibn (Ar., i-bin):
“Son.” Used in the construct of names to indicate the son-father relationship, thus Ibn Hasan is the “son of Hasan”. Often it is the name by which people are known, their kunya, although it does not necessarily reflect their father’s name, such as Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd. In Arabic, when “ibn” occurs between names it is pronounced or written as “bin,” as in ‘Ali bin Abi Talib. “Ibn” is oftentimes abbreviated in English as “b.” as in ‘Ali b. Abi Talib.

’Id al-Adha (Ar., eed-ul-a’d-hah):
“Feast of Sacrifice.” This celebration marks the end of the hajj (pilgrimage) when pilgrims sacrifice an animal as part of their hajj ritual, and which Muslims also do all over the world (and donate a portion of it to the poor). It falls on the 10th of the month of Dhul-Hijja, and is also called al-’Id al-Kabir (the big Feast) or Bayram.

’Id al-Fitr (Ar., eed-ul-fit-r):
“Feast of Fast-breaking.” This occasion marks the end of the month of Ramadan, the month of fasting. Special ’Id prayers are offered in the morning, and children and adults often get new clothes. Also called al-’Id al-Saghir (the smaller Feast).

Ijma’ (Ar., i-jma’):
“Scholarly consensus,” and one of the main methods for developing and interpreting Islamic law.

Ijtihad (Ar., ij-ti-haad):
“Independent legal judgement.” The interpretation of law based on individual reasoning.

’Ilm (Ar., ilm, pl. ‘Ulum, u-lum):
In religious terms, ‘ilm means knowledge and also gives us the word “ulema” (religious scholars) meaning those who are knowledgeable. In both the historical and contemporary Muslim world, ‘ilm also means “science.”

’Ilm al-Rijal (Ar., ilm-ul-rijaal):
The study of the people who transmitted the hadith (sayings and practices of Muhammad) and who are mentioned in the isnads (chains of transmission). Biographies of these early Muslims are the topic of many books and provides material for judging the soundness or believability of each hadith.

Imam (Ar., Per., ee-maan):
Among Sunnis, an imam is a legal scholar or the prayer leader in a mosque. Among Shi‘ite communities, an imam is an infallible guide to the community, descended from the family of the Prophet. The ‘Twelver Shi‘ites believe that there were twelve imams, the last one of which went into occultation (hiding) and will return one day as the mahdi.

Imami (Ar., ee-maam-ee):
Twelver Shi‘ites or Imamai Shi‘ites. See Shi‘ites.

Iman (Ar., ee-maan):
“Faith.”

Islam (Ar., Is-la-m):
The religion of Islam. Someone who follows Islam is a Muslim, which means that he or she believes that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God. The word Islam, meaning “surrender” comes from the Arabic root (s-l-m) which denotes wholeness, peace, and safety, suggesting that these are the qualities one achieves through surrendering oneself to God.

Isma’ili (Ar., is-ma-e-lee):
Shi‘ites who disagreed with the main body of Shi‘a over the identity of the seventh Imam. The Isma‘ilis followed Ja‘far al-Sadiq’s eldest son Isma‘il, while the majority (called the Imamis or Twelvers) followed his younger son Musa al-Kazim. Because of the split over the identity of the Seventh Imam, the Isma‘ilis are also called Seveners, and the Agha Khan is the current head of the Nizari sect of the Isma‘ilis.

Isra’ (Ar., is-ra’):
Muhammad’s Night Journey (al-Isra’ wal-Mi’raj); see mi’raj.

Jahiliyya (Ar., ja-hi-lee-yah):
“Time of Ignorance.” The Arabic and Muslim way of referring to pre-Islamic history in the Arabian peninsula.

Jami’ (Ar., jaa-mi):
A congregational mosque for Friday prayers, as opposed to a masjid or a musalla. Jamis are usually quite large in order to
hold the entire population who will pray and listen to the khitab or sermon of an imam.

Jihad (Ar., ji- had): “Struggle.” Over time, the concept of a “jihad” has developed to include both the greater jihad, or the struggle by the individual to be a righteous Muslim, and the lesser jihad, or the struggle to fight oppression and defend the Muslim community. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Asia and Africa witnessed reform movements that embarked on jihads to reform the Muslim communities and to fight colonial rule. More recently, certain groups have interpreted the concept of jihad to mean to fight non-Muslims.

Jinn (or jinni) (Ar., jin): Invisible, supernatural creatures, mentioned in the Qur’an, and who can be good or bad.

Jum’a (Ar., joo-ma’): “Friday.” The word also is used to describe the Jum’a mosque of a particular city (see Jami’). or salat al-jum’a (Friday prayers).

Ka’ba (Ar., ka’ba): The name of the sacred, cube-shaped building located in the Haram in Mecca. The Black Stone is set in a silver frame in one of the lower corners and the whole building is covered by an embroidered cloth (kiswa). Muslims pray towards the Ka’ba and circumambulate it during hajj. Muslims believe that the Ka’ba was constructed by Abraham and Isma’il (see Q.2: 127–129).

Kalam (Ar., ka-laam): “Theology.”

Karbala (ka’r-ba-la’a): The burial site of Husayn bin ‘Ali, the grandson of Muhammad, located in southern Iraq, south of Baghdad, and a popular place of pilgrimage for Shi’ites.

Khawarij (Kharajites) (Ar., kha-waa-rij): An early sect of Islam that advocated a strict and puritanical interpretation of religious dogma. They believed that any Muslim was qualified to lead the community (in antithesis to Shi’a beliefs), but also held that mortal sins had the effect of making a Muslim into a non-believer and deserving of death. A group of Kharijites murdered ‘Ali, thereby inadvertently facilitating the rise to power of the Umayyads, who suppressed them. Although largely wiped out, a major branch of the Kharijite movement, the Ibadiyya, continue to exist today in Oman and east Africa.

Al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun (The Rightly-guided Caliphs, Ar., al-khu-la’fa’ ar-raa-ash-shi-doon): Sunni Muslims call the first four Caliphs who led the Muslim community the Rightly-guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali. After these men, who were selected by the community, rule was taken over by the Umayyad dynasty who assumed hereditary rule. Shi’a and Ibadis do not use the term “al-khulafa’ al-rashidun.”

Khitba (Ar., khut-ba’): The sermon during Friday prayers that is often delivered by an imam.

Kunya (kun-ya’): Another name by which a person is known, which is often the more commonly used and well-known than the person’s given name. In many cases the kunya will be the “Father of,” “Son of,” “Mother of,” or “Daughter of” construction. For example, the 11th century Persian scientist Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn ibn Abdallah ibn Sina is referred to only as Ibn Sina and the ninth century writer Abu ‘Uthman Anr b. Bahr al-Fuqaymi al-Basri is known as al-Jahiz (the bug-eyed).

Madhhab (Ar., madh-hab, pl., madh-hahib): A school of thought in traditional Islamic scholarship, such as in law and theology. Among Sunni Muslims, four schools of law are recognized, named after the eminent scholars whose juridical works they were based on: Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi’. The Shi’ites follow the Ja’fari school, named after the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq, along with the ijihad of living scholars of eminence.

Madrasa (Ar., ma-dra-sa): “School.” Historically a madrasa refers to a Sunni Muslim college where shari’a and other Islamic sciences were taught, while currently a madrasa refers to any school, religious or secular, private or public.

Maliki (Ar., maal-lik-ee): One of the four Sunni schools of law, named after Malik Ibn Anas (715–795).

Masjid (Ar., mas-jid, pl., Masajid): Mosque.

Maulid (Mawlid) (Ar., maw-lijid): A yearly birthday celebration for the prophet Muhammad or a famous saint, common in Egypt and North Africa.

Mi’raj (Ar., mi-raj): Part of the al-Isra wal-Mi’raj, Muhammad’s night journey (Q. 17:1) that took him to the seven heavens.

Mihrab (Ar., mihr-ahb): The recessed arched niche in the mosque indicating direction of prayer towards Mecca. It is often highly decorated.

Minaret: The tower or raised section of a mosque from where the muezzin gives the call to prayer. Historically, these towers have staircases inside so that the muezzin could climb the stairs and issue the call to prayer from a balcony. Today, most calls to prayer are broadcast from loudspeakers attached to the minaret.

Muezzin (Moo-az-zin, Ar., mu-adh-dhin): The person who gives the call to prayer (adhan). Men or boys are chosen for this position for a variety of reasons, among them because of the quality of their voice; as an honor to that person for their service; or as a means of employment.

Mufti (Ar., muft-tee): Chief Islamic jurist and a scholar who can issue fatwas or legal opinions.
Muhajirun (Ar., mu-haa-ji-roon):
The Muslims who immigrated to Medina with Muhammad in 622 c.r., and who were helped by the Ansar, the Medinans who aided them and became part of the fledgling Muslim community.

Mujtahid (Ar., muj-ta-ah-hid):
A religious scholar who practices independent legal judgement and reasoning (ijtihad) to form a legal opinion.

Muslim (Ar., mus-lim):
A follower of Islam.

Nabi (Ar., na-bee):
A prophet of God. In Islam, this includes the prophets from the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as Moses, Abraham, Jesus, among many others.

PBUH: See S.A.W.

Qadi (Ar., ka-dee):
A judge whose responsibilities are in the areas of religious law.

Qibla (Ar., kib-la):
The direction of prayer, i.e., the direction of Mecca. The direction is often marked in a mosque by a mihrab, which traditionally takes the shape of an arched niche in the qibla wall.

Qiyas (Ar., kee-yas):
Analogical reasoning used in Islamic law.

Qur'an (also written as Koran) (Ar., ku-ra'no):
The Muslim Holy Book. Muslims consider the Qur'an to be the divine revelation of God to humankind and the basis for living a right and just life as a Muslim. As the word of God, it is untranslatable and is only the Qur'an in the language of revelation (Arabic). Muslims recite portions of the Qur'an in their prayers. The Qur'an consists of suras (chapters) which are arranged by length; therefore, the Qur'an does not follow a narrative or chronological order.

Ramadan (Ar., ra-ma-da'no):
The lunar month in which Muslims fast from food, drink, smoking, sex, and gossip (among other things) from sunrise until sunset. It falls on the ninth month of the Muslim lunar calendar, and ends with the ‘Id al-Fitr.

Rasul (Ar., ra-su'l):
A messenger of God.

S.A.W. (Sa-lallah wa-saHam):
“Prayers and peace of God be upon him.” Muslim invocation after writing or mentioning the name of Muhammad. Also rendered in English as PBUH (Peace be upon Him).

Sahaba (Ar., sa-ha'ba):
See Companions.

Shafi'i (Ar., sha-fi-ee):
One of the four schools of Sunni law, named after the Imam al-Shafi’i (d. 820).

Shahada (Ar., sha-ha-da):
“Profession of faith.” The shahada is the major pillar of Muslim doctrine and must be said with intention in order to become a Muslim: “There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.”

Shari'a (Ar., sha-re-ee-

Shi'ite (she-ite):
Derived from their name, shi’t ‘Ali, or “the party of ‘Ali”, the Shi’a are one of the major groups of Muslims; the other being Sunni. The Shi’ite believe that rule of the community (led by an Imam) should be through ‘Ali and the descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima who was married to ‘Ali. They split into smaller divisions, over disagreements about the inheritance of the office of imam (see Isma'il). Today they make up about 15% of the Muslim population.
and predominate or have significant minorities in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and other Arabian Gulf states.

**Sufism (Ar., Tasawwuf):**
An understanding of Islam that emphasizes mystical or spiritual practice. A Sufi is a practitioner of Sufism, and different groups or *tariqas* (“paths”) have different relationships with orthodox practices, varying in time and place. Traditionally, Sufi orders have been run by a *shaykh* (Ar.) or a *pir* (Per.), whom students (*murids*) follow closely. Also associated historically with Sufism are *khansas*, *zawiyas*, and *ribats*, residences and centers of spiritual practice.

**Sunna (Ar., sun-na):**
The practices, actions, and behavior of the prophet Muhammad. These are stories about him recorded by his companions and family in the same style as the hadith. The Sunna, along with the Hadith and Qur’an, comprise the main sources of Islamic law. “Sunna” is also a legal term used to describe a Muslim practice that is recommended (but not required), as in it is sunna to hold a celebratory feast (*walima*) for a wedding.

**Sunni (Ar., sun-nee):**
The largest group of Muslim adherents, the Sunni emphasize the Sunna (actions of Muhammad), the hadith (sayings of the Prophet) and the Qur’an. Through these sources they have developed four schools of law (*madhhab*). They are the largest percentage of Muslims, making up approximately 85 percent of worshippers today.

**Sura (Ar., soo-ra):**
A chapter of the Qur’an. Each chapter is referred to by a number (114 total), and by a name, as in Surat al-Qamr (the Sura of the Moon) or Surat Maryam (the Sura of Mary), and contains any number of *ayat* (verses), ranging from 3 to 286.

**Tafsir (Ar., taf-seer):**
Interpretation of the Qur’an.

**Tahara (Ar., ta-ha-ra):**
“Purification,” and can also refer to circumcision.

**Tariqa (ta-ree-ka):**
“Path or way.” A term used in Sufi practices, to refer to a spiritual path or a specific discipline of Sufi thought following a particular master.

**Ta’ziyah (Per., zee-ya) (Ar., ta’ziya):**
Performances conducted among the Shi’ites commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn ibn ‘Ali at Karbala.

**Zuhd (Ar., zuhd):**
Asceticism, a Sufi practice.

**Ulema (u’-la’-ma’ Ar., sing. ‘Alim, pl., ‘Ulama’):**
A scholar or learned person in the Islamic sciences, such as *fiqh* and shari’a.

**Umma (Ar., um-ma):**
The community of Muslim believers.

**‘Umra (Ar., um-ra):**
A visit to Mecca outside of the hajj period, and thought of as a “lesser pilgrimage.”

**Wali (wa-a-lee):**
“A friend of God.” The term is used by Shi’ites to describe ‘Ali. Sunnis also use the term when talking about Muslim holy men and women who they believe have intercessional powers with God, a popular practice and condemned by the orthodoxy.

**Waqf (Ar., wa’kf):**
An endowment from which revenues from a particular property or business are allotted for a specific public service or building, often set up by an individual or his or her family. Many medieval mosques, madrasahs, hospitals and other buildings had endowments associated with them that provided their running expenses, salaries, etc., and the practice continues to this day.

**Wazir/Vizir/Vizier (Ar., wa’-zeer, Per., va’-zeer):**
The advisor to a ruler, and usually a person with great power.

**Wudu (Ar., wu-doo):**
“Ablutions.” Before prayer, Muslims must complete ablutions, cleaning their hands, feet, face, ears, mouth, and nose (in a prescribed process). Being in a state of *wudu* can carry over from prayer to prayer if nothing takes place to break the state of cleanliness, such as going to the bathroom, passing gas, or sexual relations, among other things. Following sexual relations, menstruation, and childbirth, believers must perform *ghusul*, which requires the whole body to be cleaned.

**Zakat (Ar., za-kaat):**
“Tithe or alms.” Another of the five pillars required of Muslims, *zakat* is a tithe that is to be paid each year by all Muslim adults in the amount of 2.5% of their income and wealth. Shi’ites also pay a *khums* or one-fifth on all excess wealth.

**Ziyara (Ar., Per., zee-ya-ra):**
Visits to a holy shrine, particular tombs of *walis* and holy people.

**Zuhd (Ar., zuhd):**
Asceticism, a Sufi practice.
Appendix

Genealogies
Umayyad Caliphs
Tribe of Qaraysh (5th–8th centuries, c.e.)
Early Tariquas (Sufi brotherhoods) and their Founders
Isma‘ili Imams
Shi‘a Imams

Timelines
Islam in Central and East Asia 600–2003 C.E.
Islam in Europe and Africa 600–2003 C.E.
Islam in South and Southeast Asia 700–2003 C.E.
Islam in Southwest Asia 570–2003 C.E.
Life of Muhammad 570–632 C.E.
**Genealogies**

**Umayyad Caliphs**

- **Umayyah**
  - Harb
    - Abu-Sufyan (c. 565–653; Meccan chief)
      - Yazid (Gov. of Syria, 639)
        - 2. **Mu‘awiya I** r. 661–680 (Gov. of Syria, 639–661)
          - Umm-Habibah = **Muhammad the Prophet** (d. 632)
            - 3. **Yazid I** r. 680–683
              - 4. **Mu‘awiya II** r. 683 (figurehead)
                - Umm-Kulthum and Ruqayyah = 1. **Uthman** r. 644–656
          - 5. **Marwan I** r. 683–685 (chief aide to ‘Uthman, 644–656; never generally recognized as caliph)
            - 6. **‘Abd-al-Malik** r. 685–705 (generally recognized from 692)
              - ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz (Gov. of Egypt)
            - 7. **al-Walid I** r. 705–715
              - 8. **Sulayman** r. 715–717
                - 9. **‘Umar II** r. 717–720
                  - ‘Abd-al-Rahman I (emir at Córdova; ancestor of the Spanish caliphs)
            - 10. **Yazid II** r. 720–724
            - 11. **Hisham** r. 724–743
              - Mu‘awiya
                - 12. **al-Walid II** r. 743–744
      - 13. **Yazid III** r. 744
      - 14. **Ibrahim** r. 744
      - 15. **Marwan II** r. 744–750

Claimants to the caliphate or caliphs are set in bold type, and are sequentially numbered.

The Tribe of Quraysh (5th–8th centuries, C.E.)

Qusayy (founder of Quraysh)

‘Abd-Manaf

Hashim (clan)

‘Abd al-Muttalib

Muttalib (clan associated with Hashim)

‘Abd-Shams (clan)

Nawfal (clan)

Abu Talib

Abu Lahab

‘Abdallah—Amina

‘Abbas

Hamza

Abu Ṭālib

‘Abd Allah—Aamina

‘Abbas

Hamza

Abu Ṭālib

‘Abd Allah—Amina

‘Abbas

Hamza

Abu Ṭālib

‘Abd Allah—Amina

‘Abbas

Hamza

Abu Ṭālib

‘Abd Allah—Amina

‘Abbas

Hamza

Abu ʿAs

Harb

Al-Prophet Muhammad = Khadjah b. Khawilid

‘Abdallah

‘Affan al-Hakam

Abu Sufyan = Hind

Jaʿfar al-Tayyar

‘Ali = Fatima

Zaynab

Umm-Gulthom and Ruqayyah = ʿUthman

Marwan

Muʿawiya

Hasan

Husayn

ʿAbd al-Malik

Yazid

People influential in Muhammad’s life, or who later became influential figures, are set in boldfaced type. Most of the men in the genealogy had sons not mentioned here due to space considerations.

Early tariqas (Sufi brotherhoods) and their founders

- al-Junayd, d. 910
- Ahmad al-Ghazali (d. 1126)
- Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1234)
- Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273)
- Mu‘in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236)

- ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), Baghdad; Qadiriyya
- ‘Abd al-Gahir al-Suhrawardi (d. 1168)
- Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1338)

- ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Ansari (d. 1089), Herat
- Ahmad b. al-Rifa‘i (d. 1182), Iraq; Rifa‘iyya
- Ahmad al-Yasavi (d. 1166), Transoxania; infl. on Turkish Sufism
- Ahmad al-Badawi (d. 1276), Egypt; Badawiyya

- Yusuf al-Hamadani (d. 1140), "khwajagan," Transoxania
- Abu-Hafs ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi (d. 1234)
- Abu ‘l-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1235; Chishtiyya

- ‘Abd al-Khaliq Ghujdawani (d. 1220)
- Ahmad al-Badawi (d. 1276), Egypt; Badawiyya
- Baha’ al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389; Naqshbandiyya
- Hajji Bektash (d. c. 1338; Bektashiyya

Assassins

Hasan al-Sabbah (da'i) (d. 1124)
Buzurg Ummid (d. 1138)
Muhammad (d. 1162)
Hasan II (d. 1166)
Muhammad II (d. 1210)
Hasan III (d. 1221)
Muhammad III (d. 1255)
Khwurshah, surrendered 1256

Number of successors uncertain

Nizar

Muhammad

al-Hafiz (d. 1149)

al-Zafir (d. 1154)
al-Za'id (d. 1160)
al-Adid (d. 1171)

al-Musta'li (d. 1101)
al-Amir (d. 1130)
al-Tayyib (disappeared 1130)

modern Nizari imams

Fatimids

‘Ubaydallah al-Mahdi (d. 934)
al-Qa'im (d. 946)
al-Mansur (d. 953)
al-Mu'izz (d. 975)
al-'Azz (d. 996)
al-Hakim (d. 1021)
al-Zahir (d. 1036)
al-Mustansir (d. 1094)

Muhammad al-Mahdi and Concealed Imams

Ubaydallah al-Mahdi (d. 934)
al-Qa'im (d. 946)
al-Mansur (d. 953)
al-Mu'izz (d. 975)
al-'Azz (d. 996)
al-Hakim (d. 1021)
al-Zahir (d. 1036)
al-Mustansir (d. 1094)

Isma'ili Imams

‘Ali (d. 661)
Hasan (d. 669)
Husayn (d. 680)
Zayn al-'Abidin (d. 714)
Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 731)
Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765)
Isma'il (d. 760)
Muhammad al-Mahdi and Concealed Imams

Hasan (d. 669)
Hasan al-Sabbah (da'i) (d. 1124)
Buzurg Ummid (d. 1138)
Muhammad (d. 1162)
Hasan II (d. 1166)
Muhammad II (d. 1210)
Hasan III (d. 1221)
Muhammad III (d. 1255)
Khwurshah, surrendered 1256

modern Nizari imams

Genealogies

Islam and the Muslim World

Shi'i Imams

1. 'Ali (d. 661)
2. Hasan (d. 669)
3. Husayn (d. 680)
4. 'Ali (Zayn al-'Abidin) (d. 714)
5. Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 731)
6. Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765)
7. Isma'il (d. 769)
8. 'Ali al-Rida (d. 818)
9. Muhammad al-Mahdi (d. 835)
10. 'Ali al-Hadi (d. 858)
11. Hasan al-'Askari (d. 874)
12. Muhammad al-Mahdi

The Qarmatians

Muhammad al-Mahdi

The Fatimid Caliphs

The 'Twelver' or Imami Shi'a


Shi'a imam lineage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>618</td>
<td>Tang begin to unite China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>664</td>
<td>Arab conquest of Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>671</td>
<td>Arab armies cross Oxus (Amu Carya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>681</td>
<td>Arabs cross into Transoxania and spend winter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>683</td>
<td>Civil war in Khurasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>689</td>
<td>Eastern Turks invade Transoxania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>691</td>
<td>Umayyad rule restored in Khurasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705</td>
<td>Qutayba ibn Muslim marches into Khurasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>711</td>
<td>Eastern Turks conquer western Central Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>712</td>
<td>Arabs conquer Khwarizm; Eastern Turks take Samarkand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>713</td>
<td>Qutayba ibn Muslim reaches Ferghana; first mosque built in Bukhara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>725</td>
<td>Restoration of Balkh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>729</td>
<td>Muslim rule restored in Bukhara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>733</td>
<td>Famine in Khurasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>737</td>
<td>Death of the Khan in Tukharistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>739</td>
<td>Fall of the Western Turkish empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>741</td>
<td>Sogdians restored to their native land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>742</td>
<td>Congregational mosque built in Balkh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>745</td>
<td>Foundation of Uighur Empire in Central Asia (Chinese Turkestan, to 840).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>747</td>
<td>Abu Muslim arrives in Khurasan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>748</td>
<td>Chinese destroy Suyab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751</td>
<td>Defeat of Tang Chinese by Arab forces at battle of Talas River; end of Arab advances in Central Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>752</td>
<td>Prince of Ushrusana sends embassy to China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>753</td>
<td>Walls and defensive towers constructed at Samarkand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>763</td>
<td>Tang China is invaded by Tibetans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>766</td>
<td>Qarluqs occupy Suyab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>783</td>
<td>Defensive walls constructed near Bukhara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>792</td>
<td>Qarluqs expelled from Ferghana.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
794
Subjugation of Ushrusana; new congregational mosque built in Bukhara.

806
Raf’i’ bin Layth revolts in Samarkand.

816
Famine in Khurasan.

819
Founding of Samanid dynasty in Khurasan and Transoxania (to 1005).

820
The Tughuzghuz take Ushrusana.

830
Tahirids proclaim independence at Khurasan.

867
Founding of Saffarid dynasty in east Persia (to 1495).

868
The Diamond Sutra, world’s oldest surviving printed work.

907
End of the Tang dynasty in China, Arab disruption of trans-Asian trade.

916
Foundation of Khitan Empire.

947
Khitans invade northern China, establishing Lao dynasty at Beijing.

962
Foundation of Afghan Ghaznavid dynasty.

970
Paper money introduced in China.

979
Song dynasty unites China.

992
Establishment of Qarakhanid dynasty in Transoxania (to 1211).

1020
Firdowsi’s *Shahnameh*—Book of Kings, Persia’s national epic.

1038
Beginning of Seliuk dynasty, the first major Turkish Muslim empire (to 1194).

c. 1040
Seliuk Turks conquer Afghanistan and East Persia.

c. 1045
Movable type printing invented in China.

1077
Seliuk governors in Oxus region establish separate state of Khwarizm Shah (to 1231).

1090
Shi’a Ismaelis (of Alamut, Assassins) emerge as major force in North Persia (to 1256).

1123
Rubaiyat (quatrain) of Omar Khayyam; also his *Algebra*, for which he is more celebrated in his homeland, Persia.

1188
Nizami’s *Layla and Majnun*, a Persian recasting of perennially popular pre-Islamic love story in verse.

1206
Mongols united by Temujin, proclaimed Genghis Khan; The Great Yasa, law code of the Mongols promulgated by Genghis Khan; Mongols begin conquest of Central Asia.

1211
Mongols begin conquest of northern (Jin) China.

1219
Mongol invasion of Khwarizm Empire.

1227
Death of Genghis Khan.

1229
Ogodai elected Great Khan.

1231
Mongols reconquer resurgent Empire of the Khwarizm Shah.

1233
Mongols take Jin capital, Kaifeng.

1235
Walled city built at Karakorum as fixed Mongol capital.

1237
Start of Mongol conquest of Russia.

1253–1255
William of Rubruck crosses Asia to Karakorum.

1256
Il-Khanate established in Persia, successor state to Mongols (to 1353); Hulegu crosses Oxus.

1258
Sa’di’s *Gulistan*, major popular classic of Persian literature.

1259
Great Khan Mongke dies.

1264
Kublai defeats rival for title of Great Khan, ending civil war.

1265
Death of Hulegu.

1271–1295
Marco Polo travels throughout Asia, returning by ship through Persian Gulf.

1274
First Mongol attempt to invade Japan defeated.
1275
Marco Polo reaches Kublai Khan’s summer palace at Shangdu (Xanadu).

1279
Foundation of Yuan dynasty, Yuan take over Southern Song.

1281
Second failed Mongol invasion of Japan.

1292
Marco Polo given task of escorting Mongol princess to Hormuz.

1294
Death of Kublai Khan.

1295
Conversion of the Il-Khan Ghazan to Islam.

1320
Outbreak of plague in Yunnan province.

1320–1330
Mongol armies help spread plague throughout China.

1330
Plague reaches northeastern China.

1335
Rebellions against Mongol rule in China.

1335
Mongol wazir Ghiyath al-Din in Tabriz commissions an illustrated Shahnameh, a fine example of a Persian illuminated manuscript (called the Demotte Shahnameh).

1346
Plague reaches coast of Black Sea.

1368
Establishment of the Ming dynasty.

1379
Timur marches on Urgench.

1395
Sack of New Sarai, capital of Golden Horde.

1405
Beginning of Ming admiral Zheng He’s seven voyages to Indian Ocean (to 1433).

1405
The Rigistan, Samarkand, built by Timur and one of the glories of his capital; End of Ming campaign against Mongols.

c. 1433
Construction of ocean-going junks banned by Ming.

1439
Poggio Bracciolini records Asian journeys of Niccolo Conti.

1443
Great Library at Herat, Persia founded.

1499
Rise to power of Safavids in Persia.

1500
Shaybanid dynasty, of Mongol descent, assumes control of Transoxania (to 1598).

1501
Accession of Shah Isma’il I; beginning of Safavid dynasty in Persia (to 1732).

1534–1535
Safavid war with Ottomans, who capture Tabriz and Baghdad.

1533–1555
Safavid war with Ottomans.

1557
Foundation of Portuguese colony at Macao.

1578–1590
Safavid war with Ottomans.

1581
Yermak begins Russian conquest of Siberia.

1598
Anthony and Robert Sherley travel to Persia, where they meet Shah ‘Abbas.

1603
Foundation of Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan.

1627
Herbert’s travels in Persia.

1636
Manchus establish Qing imperial rule at Mukden.

1644
Qing forces enter Beijing.

1689
Treaty of Nerchinsk agrees Russian and Chinese spheres of influence in East Asia.

1722–1736
Subjugation of Afghans by Persia.

1730–1734
Suppression of Khazaks by Russia.

1736
Nadir Shah becomes Shah of Persia.

1747
Foundation of Afghanistan by Ahmad Khan Abdali.

1751
Tibet, Dzungaria, Turkestan, and the Tarim Basin overrun by Qing Chinese.
1758–1759
Qing campaigns against Kalmyks.

1786
Start of Qajar dynasty in Persia.

1839–1842
Afghans under Dost Muhammad defeat British in First Afghan War.

1840–1842
Opium War, British attacks force trading concessions from China.

1850s
Widespread Muslim rebellions against Qing rule in China.

1855–1873
Jihad of Yunnan Muslims, ends 1873.

1863–1873
Northwest uprising in Uighur domains of Qing empire, largest Muslim jihad in East Asia.

1864
Establishment of Russian control in Kalmykia (Semipalatinsk).

1868–1870
Suppression of Muslim states of Bukhara and Samarkand by Russia.

1878–1879
Second Afghan War, British attempt to invade Afghanistan, which is coming under Russian influence.

1909
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British Petroleum) founded in Iran.

1911
Qing dynasty overthrown by Sun Yat Sen’s nationalists and Republic of China declared.

1925
Reza Shah deposes last Qajar shah and is proclaimed ruler of Iran. He introduces Western-style reforms.

1945
Atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki force Japanese surrender in World War II.

1945
(August) U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan.

1945
(August) Atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

1945
(September) Japanese surrender.

1945
Stalin begins transfer of ethnic-minority peoples to labor camps in Siberia.

1946–1949
Chinese Civil War between Nationalists and Communists.

1955
Afghan government supports movement for separation of Pakhtunistan from Pakistan.

1962
Land reform in Iran reduces power and influence of religious establishment.

1973
Rebellion in Afghanistan.

1979
Islamic revolution in Iran, deposition of shah, proclamation of Islamic republic.

1979
Deposition of monarchy in Afghanistan, Soviet invasion and civil war.

1989
Crushing of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing.

1989
Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

1990–1891
Collapse of U.S.S.R. creation of Central Asian republics; Islamic revival throughout region.

1995
Taliban militia reignites Afghan civil war.

1996
Taliban forces capture Kabul.

2001
Saudia millionaire Usama bin Ladin identified as mastermind behind al-Qa’ida attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September; U.S. demands his extradition from Afghanistan.

2001
U.S.-led coalition declares “war on terrorism,” coalition forces attack and overthrow Taliban regime in Afghanistan in response to al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks.

2001
Reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami is relected with 77.4 percent of the votes, running on an Islamic democracy platform against hard-liners and conservative clerics.

2002
Chechen independence movement continues attacks on Russia; seizes theater with 700 hostages.

2002
Afghani Loya Jerga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state; he selects an administration to serve until 2004.
2003
Thousands fill the Iranian streets in wide scale anti-government protests of political and economic conditions.

ISLAM IN EUROPE AND AFRICA 600–2003 C.E.

624
Visigoths expel last Byzantine garrisons from southern Iberia.

626
Constantinople besieged by Sassanids, Avars, and Slavs.

635–642
Conquest of Egypt by Arabs.

642
Foundation of Fustat (Egypt) and Great Mosque by ‘Amr ibn al-‘As.

647
Arab invasion of Tripolitania.

663
Byzantine Emperor Constans II invades Italy and sacks Rome.

669
Arab conquest of North Africa extended beyond Tripoli to the West.

670
Annexation of Tunisia, founding of the city of Kayrawan.

680
Arab armies reach Atlantic at Morocco.

711
Invasion of Iberian Peninsula by Tariq, conquest of Visigothic kingdom (by 714).

712
Muslim capture of Toledo.

714
South and Central Spain effectively under Muslim control.

718
Christian victory at battle of Covadonga temporarily halts Muslim advance in Iberian Peninsula.

732
Arab armies halted at Poitiers, France.

755
Revived Umayyad dynasty established at Cordoba by ‘Abd al-Rahman (to 1031).

785
Foundation of Great Mosque at Cordoba, extended in four phases (832–848, 929–961, 961–976, 987).

789
Idrisids establish power in Northwest Africa (Morocco, to 926).

790
Beginnings of Viking raids on western Europe.

800
Start of Aghlabid dynasty in Tunis.

c. 800
Emergence of trading towns such as Manda and Kilwa on East African coast.

800
Charlemagne crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III in Rome.

827
Crete and Sicily attacked by Aghlabids.

830
Foundation of Great Mosque at Kayrawan.

839
Swedes travel through Russia to Constantinople, opening of river trade from Baltic to Black Sea.

844
Vikings attack Seville.

847
Muslim raiders burn outskirts of Rome.

862
Novgorod founded by Rurik the Viking.

863
Saints Cyril and Methodius sent as Orthodox Christian missionaries to Moravia.

868
Ahmad Ibn Tulun founds the Tulunid dynasty in Egypt (to 905), control spreads to Syria.

876
Building of mosque of Ibn Tulun, Cairo, based on Great Mosque at Samarra.

884
Kiev becomes capital of new Russian state.

896
Magyars start to settle in Danube basin.

899–905
‘Abbasid campaign against Egypt.

c. 900
Arab dhows (sailing ships) begin to ply the coastal routes of East Africa, as far south as Sofala.

c. 900
First sighting of Greenland by Viking seamen.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>905</td>
<td>‘Abbasids take over Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>910</td>
<td>Shi‘ite Fatimids expel Aghlabids from Tunis, extend power to Egypt and Syria and claim caliphate (to 1171).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>936</td>
<td>Cordoba palace complex of Madiniat al-Zahra begun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>969</td>
<td>Fatimids conquer Egypt, founded city of Cairo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>970</td>
<td>Al-Azhar University established in Cairo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>972</td>
<td>Zirid dynasty, of Berber origin, rule Tunisia and E Algeria, based at Kayrawan (to 1148).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>976–1009</td>
<td>Decline of Arab power in Iberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>992</td>
<td>Ghana captures Berber town of Awdaghost, gaining control of southern portion of trans-Saharan trade route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1000</td>
<td>Arab merchants begin to set up trading states in Ethiopian Highlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1015</td>
<td>Hammadids, offshoot of Zirids, rule East Algeria (to 1152).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1025</td>
<td>Death of great Byzantine emperor, Basil II (the Bulgar Slayer).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1031</td>
<td>Beginning of Christian reconquest (Reconquista) of Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1041</td>
<td>Zirids of Ifriqiya gain independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1048</td>
<td>Fatimids lose control of Ifriqiya (Tunisia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1050</td>
<td>King of Takrur converts to Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1054</td>
<td>Final schism between Roman and Orthodox churches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1071</td>
<td>Completion of St. Mark’s basilica, focus of public religious life in Venice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1076</td>
<td>Ghana falls to Almoravids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1076</td>
<td>King of Ghana converts to Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1085</td>
<td>Christian forces under Alfonso VI of Leon take Toledo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1086</td>
<td>Almoravids enter Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1091</td>
<td>Completion of Norman conquest of Sicily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1094</td>
<td>Christian warlord El Cid takes Valencia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1095</td>
<td>Byzantine empire appeals for aid to pope, who preaches in France to raise support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1110</td>
<td>Onset of serious desiccation of Sahel region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1126</td>
<td>Birth of Muslim philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rushd) in Cordoba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1128</td>
<td>Almohad religious revival order starts takeover of Almoravid dominions in North Africa and Iberia (1130–1269).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1132</td>
<td>Palatine Chapel at Palermo, unique blend of Romanesque, Byzantine, and Islamic architectural elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1136</td>
<td>Independence of Russian state of Novgorod.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1137</td>
<td>Union of Aragon and Catalonia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1147</td>
<td>Almohads established in Morocco and southern Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1147</td>
<td>Second Crusade; Lisbon taken from Moors; Holy Roman Emperor Conrad defeated by Turks at Dorylaeum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1154</td>
<td>Building of Chartres Cathedral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1169</td>
<td>Shi‘ite Fatimid dynasty in Egypt suppressed by Saladin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1171</td>
<td>Founding of Ayyubid sultanate in Egypt (to 1260).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1172</td>
<td>Great Mosque at Seville, intended to be the largest in the world, and the Giralda, a great square minaret.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1174</td>
<td>Saladin becomes Ayyubid sultan of Egypt and Syria (to 1193).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1184</td>
<td>Completion of citadel at Cairo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1189
Start of Third Crusade.

1189
Succession of Richard I the Lionheart.

1194
Emperor Henry VI crowned King of Sicily.

1196
Marinids take control of Morocco (to 1485).

1200
Emergence of Hausa city-states, which come to dominate sub-Saharan trade.

1200
Rise of Mali in West Africa.

1204
Fourth Crusade never reaches Holy Land; Crusaders sack Constantinople; Venetian gains in Adriatic and Peloponnese.

1208
Crusade against Cathars, or Albigensians, in southern France.

1212
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, decisive defeat of Almohads by Christians in Iberia.

1226
Creation of the Golden Horde, Mongol state in southern Russia (to 1502).

1228
Start of collapse of Almohad Empire in North Africa.

1228
Hafsid dynasty established at Tunis (to 1574).

1230
Establishment of Nasrid kingdom of Granada Muslim stronghold in southern Spain (to 1492).

1230
Establishment of the Mali Empire.

1236
Christian reconquest of Cordoba.

1241
Mongols invade Poland and Hungary.

1248
Christian reconquest of Seville.

1250–1254
First of Louis IX’s crusades; Invasion of Egypt ends in defeat at Mansura; Louis captured and ransomed.

1250
Building of stone mosques in Swahili city-states.

1250
Mali Empire at its greatest extent.

1261
Michael Palaeologus recaptures Constantinople and restores Byzantine Empire.

1269
Marinids inflict final defeat on Almohads in Morocco.

1270
Death of Louis IX outside walls of Tunis.

1273
Foundation of Alhambra Palace at Granada.

1282
French driven from Sicily, which passes to Aragon.

1306–1310
Hospitallers conquer Rhodes, which becomes their base.

1312
Knights Templar Order accused of heresy and suppressed by Pope.

1324
Pilgrimage to Mecca by Mansa Musa of Mali.

1325
Ibn Battuta’s first pilgrimage to Mecca.

1331
Ibn Battuta’s voyage to the Swahili cities of East Africa.

1347
Marinids take Tunis.

1348–1350
Black Death reaches Europe and North Africa.

1352
Ibn Battuta’s travels to the Mali Empire.

1354
First Ottoman conquests in Southeast Europe at Gallipoli, Ottomans advance into Europe.

1366
Capture of Edirne (Adrianople) by Ottomans.

1378
Beginning of Great Schism in Catholic church (to 1417).

1381
Peasants’ Revolt in England.

1389
Battle of Kosovo, Ottomans gain control of Balkans.

1393
Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria.

1396
Bayazid defeats crusader army at Nicopolis.

1415
Portuguese capture Ceuta in Morocco.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1430</td>
<td>Sultans of Kilwa begin grand building program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1442</td>
<td>Al-Maqrizi writes detailed topographical survey of Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1453</td>
<td>Constantinople falls to Ottoman sultan Mehmed II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1459</td>
<td>Annexation of Serbia by Ottomans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1464</td>
<td>Beginning of Songay expansion under Sunni Ali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, union of Castile and Aragon (1479).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1480</td>
<td>Muscovy throws off Mongol yoke.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1484</td>
<td>Ottoman Turks capture Akkerman at mouth of Dniester.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1492</td>
<td>Columbus, in search of Asia, reaches Caribbean.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1492</td>
<td>Muslim Granada falls to Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1494</td>
<td>Treaty of Tordesillas divides western hemisphere between Spain and Portugal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1502</td>
<td>First slaves taken to the New World.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1505</td>
<td>First Portuguese trading posts in East Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1511</td>
<td>Sa’dian dynasty comes to power in Morocco (to 1659).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517</td>
<td>Ottomans conquer Mamluks in Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1519</td>
<td>Charles V elected Holy Roman Emperor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1519–1522</td>
<td>Magellan begins and del Cano completes first global circumnavigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1521</td>
<td>Sulayman takes Belgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1521</td>
<td>Siege of Rhodes under Knights of St. John by Ottomans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1526</td>
<td>Battle of Mohacs, Ottoman invasion of Hungary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1529</td>
<td>Ahmad Gran leads jihad against Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1529</td>
<td>Unsuccessful Turkish siege of Vienna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1538</td>
<td>Holy League against the Turks formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1540</td>
<td>Portuguese come to the aid of Ethiopia against Ahmad Gran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1543</td>
<td>Death of Ahmad Gran, shot by a Portuguese musketeer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>Songhay destroys Mali Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>Negotiated peace acknowledges Ottoman control of most of Hungary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562</td>
<td>After inconclusive skirmishes, Ottomans gain Transylvania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565</td>
<td>Ottoman siege of Malta fails.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1571</td>
<td>Ottomans take Cyprus from Venetians, at battle of Lepanto Ottoman navy defeated by united Christian fleet off Greek coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>Moroccans crush invading Portuguese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>Union of Spanish and Portuguese crowns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>English defeat Spanish Armada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>Moroccans destroy Songhay Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1618</td>
<td>Thirty Years War in Europe (to 1648).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1660</td>
<td>Collapse of Mali Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>Turkish advance on Vienna turned back at battle of St. Gotthard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>Peter the Great becomes czar of Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>Siege of Vienna ends in Ottoman defeat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1698</td>
<td>Arabs from Oman capture Mombasa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1699</td>
<td>Peace of Karlowitz confirms Austrian conquests from Ottomans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1701
Start of Asante’s rise to prominence.

1705
Foundation of Husaynid dynasty in Tunis, which rules until 1957.

1716–1718
Further Austrian victories, including capture of Belgrade from Ottomans.

1729
Portuguese leave East Africa following attacks from Oman.

1730
Revival of Bomu Empire in central Africa.

1757
Muhammad III becomes Sultan of Morocco.

1768
War between Russia and the Ottomans.

1776
Abd al-Qadir leads Muslims in jihad along the Senegal River.

1798
Occupation of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte, defeat of Egyptians at battle of the Pyramids, Battle of the Nile, British fleet defeats French.

1804
Fulani leader, ‘Uthman dan Fodio declares jihad and conquers Hausa city-states.

1804
Muhammad ‘Ali becomes Viceroy of Egypt.

1804
Napoleon proclaimed Emperor of France.

1807
Hausa kings replaced by Fulani emirs.

1816
Inspired by ‘Uthman dan Fodio, Amadu Lobbo launches jihad in Masina.

1820
Egyptians invade Sudan.

1820
‘Uthman dan Fodio establishes Sokoto Fulani Kingdom.

1821–1833
Greek War of Independence from Ottomans.

1830
French invasion of Algeria, Algiers occupied.

1840
Ottoman Empire under threat from Egypt, saved by British and Austrian intervention.

1852
‘Umar Tal conquers the Senegal valley.

1853
Russians defeat Turkish navy at Sinop.

1854–1856
Crimean War, French and British support Ottoman Turks against Russia.

1861
‘Umar Tal’s forces conquer Segu.

1861
Abolition of serfdom in Russia.

1863
Al-Hajj ‘Umar Tal clashes with French in Senegal Valley and creates a Muslim empire, invades Timbuktu.

1864
‘Umar Tal is killed attempting to suppress Fulani rebellion.

1869
Opening of Suez Canal.

1877–1878
Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro at war with Turkey.

1878
Treaty of San Stefano negotiated by Russia and Turkey.

1878
Berlin Congress independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania from Ottomans.

1881
Tunisia occupied by French.

1882
Revolt in Egypt, occupation by British.

1882
Beginning of major Jewish emigration from Russian Empire.

1884
Berlin Conference on Africa; Samory Toure proclaims his Islamic theocracy in West Africa.

1885
Bulgaria granted Eastern Rumelia.

1887
Bulgaria independent of Ottoman empire.

1893
French conquer Dahomey.

1904
French create federation of French West Africa.

1908
Bulgaria declares full independence.

1908
Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed by Austro-Hungarian Empire.
1911
Libya occupied by Italy.

1912
Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro form Balkan League, First Balkan War.

1912–1913
Balkan Wars. Ottomans lose most of their remaining European lands.

1914
Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo precipitates start of World War I (to 1918).

1914 (Oct)
Turkey closes Dardanelles.

1915
Gallipoli landings Establishment of Salonican front.

1917
U.S. declares war on Central Powers, Bolshevik revolution in Russia.

1918
End of World War I.

1919
Treaty of Versailles creates a new European order.

1920

1920
Inauguration of League of Nations.

1922
U.S.S.R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is formed.

1929
Wall Street Crash.

1939
(September) Invasion of Poland by Germany and Soviet Union, outbreak of World War II.

1941
Germans and Italians advance into Egypt.

1942
British defeat Germans at El Alamein.

1942
Plans for Final Solution agreed at Wansee.

1945
(May) Germany surrenders.

1945
Yalta Conference, origins of Cold War.

1949
Formation of NATO.

1954
Algerian uprising against French rule.

1960
Fifteen African countries gain independence.

1963
Foundation of Organization of African Unity (OAU).

1974
Revised Yugoslav constitution grants Kosovo autonomy.

1981
President Sadat of Egypt assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists.

1983
Islamic law imposed in Sudan.

1986
U.S. bombs Libya in retaliation for terrorist attacks.

1987
Famine in Ethiopia.

1989
Fundamentalists seize power in Sudan.

1989–1990
Collapse of Communism in Europe.

1991
Islamic Salvation Front poised to win Algerian general election, army cancels second round of voting.

1991
Start of civil war in Yugoslavia.

1991
Unsuccessful coup attempt in U.S.S.R., disintegration of Soviet Union.

1991
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia declare independence from Yugoslavia.

1992
Civil war in Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1994
Russian troops invade Chechnya.

1995
Peace agreement (Dayton Accord) ends the Bosnian war, U.N. troops remain.

1998

1998
Slobodan Milosevic sends troops into areas controlled by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
1999
Kosovo Peace talks collapse NATO begins bombing campaign.

2000
Milosevic forced to step down.

2001
Milosevic arrested to face charges of war crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo.

2003
European reluctance to support attack on Iraq; only Britain and Spain support the United States.

Turkish parliament votes against the use of its soil for U.S. attacks on Iraq, despite the offer of $26 billion in aid and loan guarantees.

(March 19) United States launches massive air attack on Iraq; U.S., British and Australian troops enter Iraq.

Enormous anti-war protests rock Europe reaching as high as 750,000 in London.

Liberian government and rebels sign a peace deal; outside forces enter the country to maintain stability and protect civilians.


ISLAM IN SOUTH & SOUTHEAST ASIA 700–2003 C.E.

711–712
Arab conquest of Sind introduces Islam to South Asia.

c. 750
Muslim merchants establish Islam in Kerala, southwest India.

c. 800
Arab ships sailing as far as China.

977
Founding of Ghaznavid dynasty in North India (to 1186).

997
Mahmud of Ghazni extends rule into northwest India.

c. 1025
Conquest of Punjab by Ghaznavids.

1030
Tower of Victory built by Mahmud of Ghazni, Muslim conqueror of North India.

1186
Raids by Muhammad al-Ghur herald decline of Ghaznavid dynasty, and of Buddhism, in North India.

1191–1193
Afghan Ghurids defeat Raiputs and seize Delhi and much of North India.

c. 1200
Muslim Sufi saint, Mu'in al-Din Chishti, founds first Sufi order in North Indian subcontinent.

1206
Breakaway Mamluk (Slave) dynasty, under Aibak, establishes Delhi Sultanate.

1258
First Mongol expedition to Annam.

c. 1280
Mongol invasions of Southeast Asia destroy Pagan and eclipse Dai Viet.

1283
Expeditions against Annam and Champa.

1287
Mongol expedition to Pagan.

1288
Kublai Khan abandons attempt to subdue Annam and Champa.

1293
Failed Mongol invasion of Java.

1295
Conversion of Sultan of Achin (Sumatra) to Islam, which spreads over much of the East Indies.

1320
Muhammad ibn Tughluq succeeds to Sultanate of Delhi.

1334–1341
Ibn Battuta serves as qadi (judge) in Delhi.

1336
Rebellion against Tughluqs marks beginning of Vijayanagara Empire.

1345–1346
Ibn Battuta visits Southeast Asia and China.

1345
Hasan Gangu, governor of Tughluq Deccani domains, revolts and founds Bahmani kingdom.

1398
Timur’s invasion of India, sack of Delhi leads to fall of Tughluq dynasty.

1445
Conversion of Malacca (Malaya) to Islam.

c. 1450
Islam spreads over much of East Indies.

1487–1489
Portuguese Pero de Covilha sails through Red Sea to India.
1498
Vasco da Gama rounds Cape of Good Hope and reaches India.

1502
First published map to show correct general shape of India, by Alberto Cantino.

1507
Portuguese victory over Ottoman and Arab fleet at Diu.

1509–1516
Portuguese voyages to Moluccas, Malacca, and Macao.

1510
Portuguese conquest of Goa; Goa made capital of all Portuguese possessions in Asia.

1511–1512
Portuguese establish base in Malacca and reach Moluccas.

1517
First Portuguese trading mission to China.

1526
Babur conquers Delhi and founds Mogul Empire.

1538
Failure of Ottoman blockade of Portuguese at Diu.

1556
Akbar becomes Mogul emperor (to 1605); reign marked by territorial expansion and cordial Hindu-Muslim relations.

1600
Founding of British East India Company.

1627
Shah Jahan becomes Mogul emperor.

c. 1647
Completion of *Atlas of India* by Sadiq Isfahani.

1653
Completion of Taj Mahal for Shah Jahan's wife.

1658
Aurangzeb becomes Mogul emperor; empire reaches maximum extent during his reign (to 1701).

c. 1660
Gujaratis make earliest known North Indian nautical charts.

1675
Probable commencement of Mogul military mapping.

1707
Death of Aurangzeb heralds decline of Mogul power in North India.

c. 1720
Marathas start to expand over most of India.

1728
Marathas defeat Nizam of Hyderabad and gain supremacy over Deccan with subsequent territorial expansion.

1739
Sack of Delhi by Persians and Afghans under Nadir Shah.

1744–1763
Anglo-French (Camatic) wars, eclipse of French power in South Asia.

1749
Mysore starts to become major power in southern North India.

1757
Expansion of Gurkha (Neiali) domains over much of Himalayas.

1757
Battle of Plassey, British victors, over combined French and Mogul force establishes British power in Bengal.

1761
Defeat by Afghans temporarily ends Maratha hegemony over northern North India.

1761
British destroy French power in North India following seizure of Pondicherry.

1767
Appointment of James Rennell as first Surveyor-General of Bengal, beginning of Survey of India.

1775
First Anglo-Maratha war (to 1782).

1782
Treaty ending first Anglo-Maratha war results in territorial losses for Marathas.

1788
Occupation of Delhi, Maratha territorial apogee, Mogul rulers become puppets of Marathas.

1799
Conquest of Mysore ends challenge to British power in southern North India.

1803
Second Anglo-Maratha war leads to British acquisition of Delhi.

1815
Victory in Anglo-Gurkha war extends British possessions into the Himalayas.

1818
Third Anglo-Maratha war ends in Maratha defeat.

1819
Stamford Raffles, of the British East India company, founds Singapore.
1849
British annex Punjab after two Sikh wars.

1857
Last Mogul emperor, the Maratha puppet Bahadur Shah II, dethroned and exiled by British.

1857–1859

1858
(March 22) British retake Lucknow after twenty-day siege.

1859
Timor divided between Netherlands and Portugal.

1873
Dutch attack on Achin sultanate in Sumatra.

1876
Queen Victoria declared Empress of India, and a viceroy appointed as her representative.

1885
Foundation of Indian National Congress.

1904
Partition of Bengal; nationalist agitation in North India.

1906
Foundation of All-India Muslim League.

1918
Indian contribution to World War I earns it membership in League of Nations.

1919
Amritsar massacre leads to surge in North Indian nationalism.

1920
Mahatma Gandhi gains control of Indian National Congress.

1920
Start of civil disobedience campaigns by Gandhi in support of independence struggle.

1926–1927
Rebellion against Dutch rule in Java and Sumatra.

1942
Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, New Guinea, and Singapore seized by Japan.

1942
(February) Surrender of British forces to Japan in Singapore.

1942
(March) Dutch surrender East Indies to Japan.

1945
India becomes U.N. charter member.

1945
Sukarno and Ho Chi Minh declare independence for Indonesia and Vietnam respectively.

1947
India and Pakistan gain independence.

1947
New independent dominions of India (Hindu) and Pakistan (Muslim) are born.

1947

1949
Indonesia gains independence from the Dutch.

1952
First Indian general election won by Congress Party.

1954
Sukarno abrogates union with Dutch and declares unitary state of Indonesia.

1956
Pakistan constituted as Islamic Republic.

1957
Malaya granted independence from Britain, despite ongoing Communist insurrection.

1958
Abortive secessionist uprisings in Baluchistan, Pakistan.

1963
Federation of Malaysia incorporates Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah, along with Malaya.

1965
Second inconclusive Indo-Pakistani war over Jammu and Kashmir.

1965
Failed Marxist coup and military countercoup in Indonesia ends Sukarno regime.

1971
Secession of East Pakistan leads to creation of Bangladesh; Third Indo-Pakistani war as India intervenes.

1975
Indonesia annexes East Timor.

1989–
Revival of violent insurrection against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir.

1998
Economic crisis in Indonesia leads to overthrow of government.

1999
Referendum in East Timor produces overwhelming vote for independence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Attack on North Indian parliament by Muslim terrorists leads to increased tension between North India and Pakistan over Kashmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>East Timor officially declares independence from Indonesia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Indian and Pakistan resume diplomatic, trade, and transportation ties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### ISLAM IN SOUTHWEST ASIA 570–2003 CE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>570</td>
<td>Birth of Muhammad in Mecca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>595</td>
<td>First marriage of Muhammad to Khadija, a merchant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>610</td>
<td>Muhammad receives first revelation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>Arabs invade Mesopotamia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611–626</td>
<td>Sassanid armies capture Jerusalem and overrun Asia Minor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>622</td>
<td>Muhammad’s emigration with followers to Yathrib (Medina), the Hijra, and the start of the Islamic calendar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>622</td>
<td><em>Qibla</em> oriented toward Jerusalem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>624</td>
<td>Muhammad’s rejection of links with Judaism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>629</td>
<td>Muhammad’s pilgrimage to Mecca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>630</td>
<td>Orientation of <em>qibla</em> is altered toward Ka‘ba in Mecca.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>632</td>
<td>Death of Muhammad in Medina, succession of Abu Bakr (to 634), beginning of Arab expansion in Arabian peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>633–637</td>
<td>Muslims conquer Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>634</td>
<td>Caliphate of ‘Umar (to 644), conquest of Palestine and Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>635</td>
<td>Arab armies cross Euphrates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>636</td>
<td>Byzantine army routed by Muslims on Yarmuk River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637</td>
<td>Arab conquest of Mesopotamia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637</td>
<td>Arabs capture Ctesiphon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637</td>
<td>Arabs defeat Persians at al-Qadisiya; Jerusalem seized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638</td>
<td>Foundation of first mosque in Kufa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641</td>
<td>Arabs capture Nineveh and invade Armenia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642</td>
<td>Muslims invade Persia, Sassanid Empire falls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>644</td>
<td>Death of ‘Umar, ‘Uthman appointed caliph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>656</td>
<td>Assassination of ‘Uthman; ‘Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad chosen as the fourth caliph but struggles for control of caliphate (to 661).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660</td>
<td>Mu’awiya proclaimed caliph in Damascus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>661</td>
<td>‘Ali assassinated; beginning of Umayyad Caliphate (to 750).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>Reconstruction of mosque in Kufa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>683</td>
<td>Anti-caliphate movement based in Mecca (to 693).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>687</td>
<td>Building of Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, completed 692.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>693</td>
<td>Burning of the Ka‘ba; anti-caliph executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>707</td>
<td>Great Mosques of Damascus and Medina built, al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>744</td>
<td>Abbasid Caliphate established in Baghdad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>750</td>
<td>Umayyad Caliphate is overthrown in Damascus, succeeded by the Abbasid Dynasty (to 1258).</td>
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<tr>
<td>754</td>
<td>Al-Mansur becomes caliph in Baghdad (to 775).</td>
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<tr>
<td>756</td>
<td>Under Abbasid Caliphate, new interest in seafaring, focused on Persian Gulf routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>762</td>
<td>Abbasid capital moved to Mesopotamia; founding of Baghdad.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
786
Harun al-Rashid becomes caliph; Baghdad becomes center of arts and learning.

809
Death of Harun al-Rashid, start of civil war between al-Amin and al-Ma‘mun (ends 813).

813
Reign of al-Ma‘mun, development of sciences and math in the Arab and Islamic world.

820
Death of al-Shafi'i.

836
Baghdad terrorized by Turkish slave troops. Abbasid Caliph al-Mu‘tasim builds new capital at Samarra.

848
Foundation of Great Mosque at Samarra with monumental spiral minaret.

860
Zaidi Imams rise to power in Yemen; rule intermittently to 1281.

862
Qubba al-Sulaybiya mausoleum, Samarra; first monumental Islamic tomb.

863
Byzantines annihilate Arab forces to stem Muslim advance in Anatolia.

869
Revolt of black slaves in southern Iraq.

892
Capital of Abbasid Caliphate shifts back from Samarra to Baghdad.

894
Shi‘ite Qarmatians establish power base in central Arabia.

932
Shi‘ite Buwayhids (Buyids) establish power base in Persia, Iraq; rule in name of Abbasid Caliphate (to 1082).

935
Final text of Qur’an codified.

936
Turkic troops in pay of Buwayhids take effective control of Abbasid Caliphate.

945
Persian Buwayhids conquer Baghdad but allow caliph to reign as figurehead.

945
Hamdanids establish power base in Syria and Lebanon (to 1004).

950
Death of philosopher al-Farabi.

956
Al-Mas‘udi’s major historical/geographical work The Meadows of Gold.

970
Fatimids establish control of Damascus.

970
Seljuks enter lands of caliphate.

976
Byzantine forces threaten to take Jerusalem.

1005
Al-Sufi’s Geography, (now in St. Petersburg) probably oldest extant illustrated Arabic manuscript.

1009
Destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

1055
Seljuks capture Baghdad, ruling in the name of the Abbasid caliph.

1069
Seljuks take Konya (Iconium).

1071
Seljuks under Alp Arslan defeat Byzantines at Manzikert.

1077
Seljuk province established in Anatolia with capital first at Nicaea and then Konya, dynasty comes to be known as the Seljuks of Rum (to 1307).

1078
Seljuks take Damascus.

1079
Seljuks take Jerusalem.

1084
Fall of Antioch to Seljuks.

1092
Abbasid wazir Nizam al-Mulk murdered by Isma‘ili assassin.

1094
Seljuk dynasty of Syria founded with capital at Aleppo.

1096
First Crusade.

1098
Crusaders take Antioch.

1099
Jerusalem captured by crusaders, Godfrey of Bouillon elected King of Jerusalem.

c. 1118
Crusading order of Knights Templar founded in Jerusalem.
1124
Crusaders capture Tyre.

1127
Zangid dynasty of Seljuk governors control Syria and Mesopotamia to 1222, initiate Muslim counteroffensive against crusaders.

C. 1130
Hospital of St John of Jerusalem (the Hospitallers) becomes military order.

1144
Edessa conquered by Zangi, governor of Mosul.

1148
Crusaders abandon siege of Damascus.

1151
Last Christian stronghold in County of Edessa falls to Nur al-Din.

1163
Iplici Mosque at Konya, probably the first to have a campanile (tower) minaret.

1174
Saladin takes Damascus.

1183
Saladin takes Aleppo.

1187
Saladin defeats crusader armies at Hattin, takes Jerusalem and Acre.

1188
Saladin completes conquest of Latin kingdoms in Levant, Christians reduced to coastal enclaves.

1188
The Mosque at Rabat, like Seville, intended to be the largest in the world.

1190
Frederick I (Barbarossa) drowned in Anatolia on way to Holy Land.

1191–1192
Third Crusade, Richard I of England recovers some of territory taken by Saladin, including Jaffa and Acre, fails to take Jerusalem.

1192
Richard I of England makes treaty with Saladin.

1193
Death of Saladin.

1197
Order of Teutonic Knights established in the Holy Land.

1204

1206
Citadel of Damascus completed.

1225
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II inherits Kingdom of Jerusalem.

1229
Frederick negotiates agreement which wins back control over Jerusalem.

1229
Rasulids control Yemen (to 1454).

1237
Huand Khatun Mosque, mausoleum, madrasa, and baths at Kayser, central Turkey; major complex endowed by Seljuk noblewoman.

1250
Mamluks, military caste from Caucasus, take over Syria, Egypt, and Hejaz (to 1517).

1256–1257
Assassins' stronghold at Alamut falls to Hulegu.

1258
Sack of Baghdad and fall of Abbasid Caliphate, Hulegu founds Il-Khanate.

1260
Hulegu invades Syria; Mongols suffer first major defeat at ‘Ayn Jalut.

1268
Mamluks capture Antioch from crusaders.

1281
Succession of Osman I, beginning of Ottoman dynasty (to 1924) and first phase of expansion.

C. 1302
Last Christian territory in Levant falls to Mamluks.

1314
Rashid al-Din's Jami' al-tawarikh, Persian history of Mongol conquest.

1326
Ottomans capture Byzantine city of Bursa and make it their capital.

1336
Birth of Timur.

1345
Ottomans annex Emirate of Karasi, empire reaches Dardanelles.

1347
Black Death reaches Baghdad and Constantinople.
1370
Beginning of Timur’s conquests, Timurid successors rule his empire to 1506.

1372
*Kitab hayyat al-bayyawan* by al-Damiri, encyclopaedic collection of tales traditions and scientific observations concerning animals.

1378
Foundation of Ak Koyunlu, state based on Turkoman tribesmen in East Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Zagros mountains (to 1508).

c. 1380
Foundation of Janissary corps by Ottomans.

1380
Timur launches series of attacks on Persia.

1384
Herat rebels, Timur suppresses ruling dynasty.

1387
Isfahan rebels, in reprisal, Timur kills 70,000 people, building towers with their skulls.

1388–1391
Timur wages war against Mongol Khanate of the Golden Horde.

1389
Accession of Bayezid I.

1393
Sack of Baghdad by Timur.

1400
Sack of Aleppo and Damascus by Timur.

1401
Sack of Baghdad by Timur.

1402
Ottomans defeated by Timur at Ankara.

1405
Death of Timur.

1406
Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddima*, the first attempt in any language to elucidate the laws governing the rise and fall of civilizations.

1461
Ottomans take Christian city of Trebizond.

1502
Italian Lodovico di Varthema visits Arabia disguised as an Arab.

1512
Accession of Ottoman ruler Selim I.

1514
Selim defeats Safavids at Caldiran.

1516–1517
Ottomans conquer Syria, Egypt, the Hijaz, and Yemen.

1517
Selim I orders construction of Ottoman fleet at Suez, Portuguese attack on Jeddah repulsed.

1520
Sulayman the Magnificent becomes Ottoman sultan (to 1566).

1525
Ottomans defeat Portuguese fleet in Red Sea.

1528
Safavids take Baghdad from Kurdish usurper.

1534
Sulayman retakes Baghdad from Safavids.

1538
Ottomans subjugate Yemen and Aden and occupy port of Basra on Persian Gulf.

1546
Ottomans retake Basra after revolt.

1551–1552
Ottomans fail to oust Portuguese from Hormuz.

1566
Sulayman succeeded by Selim II.

1588
‘Abbas I (the Great) becomes Safavid shah.

1592
Zaydi imans regain control of Yemen, and rule until 1962.

1598
Isfahan becomes imperial Safavid capital.

1603–1619
Safavid war with Ottomans, in first year ‘Abbas recaptures Tabriz.

1604
‘Abbas conquers Erivan, Shirvan, and Kars.

1672
Greatest extent of Ottoman Empire.

c. 1750
Emergence of Wahhabi reform movement in Arabia.

1774
Ottoman decline follows Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca.

1806
Wahhabis take Mecca.

1812
Burckhardt first European to find Petra, ancient capital of Nabataea.
1812
Egyptian forces retake Mecca and Medina.

1814
Burckhardt visits Mecca.

1818
Sadleir is first European to make east-west crossing of Arabian peninsula.

1818
Wahhabi movement suppressed by Egyptian forces.

1839–1861
Sultan ‘Abd al-Majid I makes series of liberal Tanzimat decrees.

1843
Fortunes of Sa’ud family restored by Faisal.

1843
Richard Burton visits Mecca and Medina in Arab disguise.

1843
Doughty’s Arabian journeys.

c. 1880
Birth of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud in Kuwait.

1887
Riyadh taken by Rashidis, who dominate Najd.

1888
Publication of Doughty’s classic Travels in Arabia Deserta.

c. 1900
Baku oil fields in Azerbaijan producing half the world’s oil.

1902
Ibn Sa’ud recaptures Riyadh.

1905
Jewish National Fund established to buy land in Palestine.

1908
Ottoman sultan deposed in Young Turk Revolution.

1914
Ottomans declare jihad, ally with Germany and Austria (Central Powers) against Allies.

1915
About one million Armenians massacred or deported by Turks.

1916
(Feb.) First Turkish attempt to capture Suez.

1916
(Feb.) Russians take Erzurum.

1916
(April) British surrender to Turks at Kut al-Amara in Mesopotamia.

1916–1918
Arab Revolt, Saudi tribes supported by British rise against Turks.

1917
Balfour Declaration declares British support for creation of Jewish state in Palestine; British take Baghdad; British take Jerusalem.

1918
Battle of Megiddo; Collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkish surrender.

1919
Greek forces land at Smyrna; Kemal Pasha breaks away from authority of Istanbul government.

1920
Armenia cedes half its territory to Turkey.

1921
Turkish Nationalist government established in Ankara.

1922
Turks recapture Smyrna.

1923
Foundation of modern Turkey by Kemal Ataturk.

1923
(July) Treaty of Lausanne recognizes Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and eastern Thrace.

1926
Ibn Sa’ud crowns himself King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Najd.

1927
Oil discovered in Iraq.

1932
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia proclaimed.

1933
U.S. company, Standard Oil of California, granted concession in Saudi Arabia.

1936
Arab revolt in Palestine against British occupation and Jewish immigration.

1938
Commercial quantities of oil discovered in Saudi Arabia.

1944
Standard Oil reformed as ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company).

1945
Foundation of Arab League.

1947
U.N. partition of Palestine.
1948
Foundation of state of Israel leads to war, invading Arab armies repulsed in Israel; some 725,000 Palestinians made refugees.

1956
Suez crisis, Israel, France, and Britain invade Egypt; fail to block Egypt’s nationalization of Suez Canal.

1958
Oil strikes in United Arab Emirates.

1961
Foundation of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

1967
Egypt closes Gulf of Aqaba to Israel; Israel defeats Egypt and other Arab nations in Six Day War; Israel occupies Sinai, Gaza, Golan Heights, and the West Bank including Jerusalem.

1973
Arab states fail to defeat Israel in Yom Kippur War.

1973
OPEC restricts flow of oil to world markets, raises price of crude oil by 200%, oil crisis causes inflation and economic slowdown.

1977
Start of Middle East peace process.

1978
Camp David summit between Egypt, Israel, and U.S.

1979
Egypt and Israel sign peace treaty based on Camp David accords.

1979
Islamic revolution in Iran, deposition of shah, proclamation of Islamic republic.

1980
Start of Iran-Iraq War.

1981
Fifty-two American embassy staff held hostage in Tehran since 1979 are freed.

1982
Israel invades Lebanon.

1988
End of Iran-Iraq War.

1990
(August 2) Iraq invades Kuwait, U.N. demands Iraq’s immediate withdrawal.

1990
(August 7) U.S. troops sent to Gulf.

1990
(November 29) U.N. resolution authorizes members to use “all necessary means” against Iraq.

1991
(January) U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal passes, Operation Desert Storm begins with bombing of Iraqi troops and installations.

1991
(February 24) Allied land offensive in Iraq.

1991
(February 28) Ceasefire in war in Iraq.

1993
Oslo Accords between Israel and PLO based on principle of “Land for Peace.”

1993
Islamic countries issue Cairo Declaration to curb fundamentalism.

1995
Israeli-PLO agreement extends Palestinian self-rule within the West Bank.

2000
Ariel Sharon’s visit to Dome of the Rock inflames Israeli-Palestinian violence.

2001
Sharon becomes Israeli premier, violence continues.

2002
(February 17) Saudi Crown Prince ʿAbdallah proposes full Arab normalization with Israel in return for withdrawal to 1967 boundaries.

2002
Iraq allows unconditional return of U.N. weapons inspectors.

2002
Elections in Morocco, dominated by the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). The king appoints a non-party figure, former interior minister Driss Jettou, as Prime Minister.

2002
Parliamentary elections in Bahrain (the first in 30 years, and the first with female enfranchisement) are boycotted by the four main opposition parties, after amendment by Shaykh Hamad for an appointed second chamber. The turn-out is 53 percent with disproportionately low Shi’a representation.

2003
Turkish parliament fails to approve the use of its soil for U.S. attacks on Iraq, despite the offer of $26 billion in aid and loan guarantees.

2003
Yasser Arafat nominates Mahmud Abbas as Prime Minister in Palestine, who is approved by the Palestine Legislative Council.
2003
(March 19) U.S. and British invade Iraq and appoint an interim government.

2003
Bush administration announces the “Roadmap” for “a Permanent Two-State Solution” between the Israelis and the Palestinians.


LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 570–632 C.E.

570 C.E.
Abraha, the Christian king in South Arabia, leads an abortive attack on Mecca, “The Year of the Elephant.” Death of ‘Abdallah, the Prophet’s father. Muhammad’s birth (August 20).

570–575
Muhammad’s nurture by Halima and residence at Banu Sa’id. Persian conquest of Yemen. Expulsion of the Christian Abyssinians.

575–
Persecution of Christians in Yemen by the Jewish King Dhu Nuwas.

575–597
Persian dominion in Yemen.

576
Death of Amina, the Prophet’s mother.

578
Death of the Prophet’s grandfather, ‘Abd al-Muttalib. Guardianship of the Prophet passes to his uncle Abu Talib.

582
Muhammad’s first journey to Syria. Meeting with Bahira, a Christian monk.

586
Muhammad’s employment by Khadija.

595
Muhammad’s second journey to Syria. Muhammad marries Khadija.

605
Muhammad helps rebuild the Ka’ba.

610

613
Muhammad begins publicly preaching Islam. Confrontation with the Meccans.

615
Hamza accepts Islam. First Muslim migration to Abyssinia. ‘Umar becomes a Muslim.

616
General boycott of Banu Hashim. Return of the first emigrants.

617
Second migration of Muslims to Abyssinia.

619
Death of Abu Talib. Death of Khadija. Muhammad seeks tribal protection and preaches Islam in Ta’if.

620
Muhammad’s engagement to ‘A’isha bint Abu Bakr. First converts of Aws and Khazraj from Yathrib.

621
First meeting of al-‘Aqaba. Al-Isra’ and al-Mi’raj (night journey and ascent to heaven).

622
Second meeting of al-‘Aqaba. Attempted assassination of the Prophet by the Meccans. July 16, the Hijra, the Prophet’s migration to Yathrib, henceforth called Medina, from madinat al-nabiyy (the city of the Prophet).

622 C.E.
The Prophet builds a mosque and residence. Establishment of Islamic brotherhood as new social order. The Prophet founds the first Islamic state. The Covenant of Medina. Muhammad marries ‘A’isha. The call to prayer (adhan) is instituted. ‘Abdallah ibn Salam accepts Islam. The Jews attempt to split the Aws-Khazraj coalition.

623
Hamza’s campaign against the Meccans near Yanbu’. Campaign of al-Kharrar.

623

624
Institution of Ka’ba in Mecca as qiblah (direction of prayer). Campaign of Badr (first Muslim victory). Campaign of Banu Qaynuqa’.

624

625
Muhammad’s marriage to Hafsa, widow, daughter of ‘Umar.

625
Campaign of Hamra’ al-Asad. Marriage of ‘Ali to Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. Treachery against Islam at Bi’r Ma’una. Campaign of Banu al-Nadir.

626
Campaign of Uhud; martyrdom of Hamza.
626
First campaign of Dawmat al-Jandal.

627

628

629
First Muslim hajj. Khalid ibn al-Walid and ‘Amr ibn al-‘As become Muslims.

629
Killing of Muslim missionaries at Dhat al-Talh.

630

631
Second Muslim pilgrimage (led by Abu Bakr).

631
The Christian delegation of Najran (Yemen) visits Medina and is incorporated into the Islamic state as a constituent umma in that state. The Year of Deputations: the Arab tribes enter Islam and pledge their loyalty.

632
Death of Muhammad’s son Ibrahim. Last pilgrimage of the Prophet. Completion of the revelation of the Qur’an.

632
Death of the Prophet. The campaign of Mu’ta.

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‘Abbas I (1571–1629), the fifth Safavid Shah, who ruled Iran from 1587 until his death. He regained lands and authority in a period when invasion and tribal unrest had destabilized Iran. ‘Abbas I also made peace with the Ottoman Empire and reformed Iran’s military and financial system.

Angels
A sixteenth-century depiction of the angel Jibril guiding Muhammad to heaven on Buraq (a heavenly winged horse). This is from the Khamsa (Five poems) of Nizami, 1539–1543, and was made for the Safavid ruler Tahmasp I. © Art Resource, NY
Architecture

The courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, also known as the Great Mosque, built between 706 and 714 by the Umayyad dynasty, who used Byzantine mosaic artists to decorate the architectural structures with images of plants, jewelry, and Qur’anic inscriptions. The small structure visible at the lower left is for performing ablutions prior to prayer. © Carmen Redondo/Corbis

Arabia, Pre-Islam

Alabaster stele, first century C.E. from Yemen, depicting camel drivers. The pre-Islamic invention of the north Arabian camel saddle around the beginning of the first millennium allowed for the control and extension of trade by the camel-breeding tribes and their integration into sedentary society. The Art Archive/Collection Antonovich/Dagli Orti
Cartography and Geography
The Mediterranean Sea as depicted in an eleventh-century Arabic geographical manuscript (Kitab al-masalik wa al-mamalik) of al-Istakhri. By the thirteenth century, copies of maps proliferated and circulated all over the Islamic world.  

Bukhara, Khanate and Emirate of
The arched entrance to the Miri-Arab Madrasa, built circa 1536, in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. This structure is decorated with intricate tile mosaic set in floral and calligraphic designs. © Diego Lezama Orezzoli/Corbis
Clothing
Turkish man and woman wearing traditional attire from the Milas region of Turkey, as shown in this 1801 French print. The Turkish mode of dress for both men and women usually involved loose trousers and a shirt topped with various jackets, vests, and long coats: layering was an important element of the aesthetic. Collection of Charlotte Jirousek
Clothing
A Palestinian woman in traditional Arab dress, the thawb, which is based on the tunic, a common garment in the region since the Roman era. It is suitable for desert heat as it provides protection from the sun as well as ventilation.  Cornell Costume and Textile Collection
Conflicts and Violence
A mosque destroyed in the Bosnian war (1992–1995), in the central Bosnian village of Ahmic. In January 2000, after sixteen months of testimony from 158 witnesses, U.N. judges in the Hague, Netherlands, convicted five Bosnian Croat militia-men for participating in a killing spree in Ahmic which left more than one hundred Muslim men, women, and children dead, and every Muslim home burnt to the ground. AP/Wide World Photos

Empires: Mongol and Il-Khanid
A page from Rashid al-Din’s (d. 1318, wazir to Ghazan Khan) Compendium of Chronicles manuscript depicts Mongol leader Genghis Khan and his sons. Although the Mongols battled Islam in the early years of their rise to power, Mongol conquests ultimately spread Islam throughout Central Asia. © Art Resource, NY
European Culture and Islam

Aristotle depicted with students of physical science in the manuscript *The Best Maxims and Most Precious Dictums* by al-Mubashshir, who composed it through 1048 and 1049. The manuscript was translated into Spanish in 1250, although al-Mubashshir’s name was dropped, and from there into Latin, French, Provencal, and English. Until the sixteenth century, Europe was only familiar with the Greek philosophical tradition through the extensive Arabic descriptions, translations, commentaries, and analyses of these works. The Art Archive/Topkapi Museum Istanbul/Dagli Orti

Empires: Safavid and Qajar

A seventeenth-century painting of Shah Tahmasp, a long time leader of the Safavid Empire, receiving the Mogul Emperor Humayun. Shah Tahmasp’s court prioritized culture; illuminated manuscripts produced during his reign are of the highest quality known. © SEF/Art Resource, NY
**Falsafa**

This detail from a fresco by Filipino Lippi (1457–1504) depicts Ibn Sina (980–1037), a Persian mathematician. A major figure in Islamic thought, Ibn Sina was heavily influenced by Aristotle, and in turn influenced the Catholic thinker St. Thomas Aquinas, who in his own work mentioned Ibn Sina over five hundred times. © Scala/Art Resource, NY

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**Ibn Battuta**

Ibn Battuta (1304–1368/69) of Tangier, Morocco, traveled an estimated eighty thousand miles across three continents. It was the longest known overland journey until the steam engine came into existence. XNR Productions/Gale
Marriage
A candid photo from the wedding ceremony of a Muslim couple in Karachi, Pakistan. © Charles Lenars/Corbis

Southeast Asian Culture and Islam
*Wayang*, a traditional shadow play, on a wooden stage in Kota Baharu, Malaysia. In Indonesia, shadow play puppeteers, along with other specialists such as healers, spirit mediums, shamans, and midwives, combine ancient local religious customs with Islamic elements. © Goh Chai Hin/Corbis
**Mi’raj**
A 1583 Turkish painting depicts Muhammad’s vision of Ascension or mi’raj. In most versions of the night journey and ascension narrative, Muhammad is asleep in Mecca, awakened by angels, and borne to Jerusalem by the magical creature Buraq. In Jerusalem, Muhammad prays in the Temple with Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, before being accompanied to heaven by the angel Gabriel (Jibril). *The Art Archive/Turkish and Islamic Art Museum Istanbul/Dagli Orti*

**Miracles**
From the *Fine flower of histories (Zubdat al-Tawarikh)* by Luqman (1583), a depiction of the legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, referred to in the Qur’an (18:9–31) as the Companions of the Cave. The Qur’an states that the young men, having publicly declared their belief and faith in God, hid from persecution in the cave where God put them and their dog to sleep for 309 years. *The Art Archive/Turkish and Islamic Art Museum Istanbul/Dagli Orti*
Pakistan, Islamic Republic of

The Badshahi Mosque (1674) in Lahore, Pakistan. When the British relinquished control of the Indian subcontinent on August 14, 1947, Pakistan (including what is now Bangladesh) achieved independence as a separate homeland for Muslims apart from India's Hindu majority. © Arvind Garg/Corbis

South Asia, Islam in

A late-eighteenth-century depiction of the Mogul Emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666). Shah Jahan ruled from 1628 to 1658 and helped push Mogul rule as far east as Burma. The Art Archive/Victoria and Albert Museum London/Sally Chappell
Pilgrimage: Hajj
On a rocky hill known as the Mountain of Mercy (Jabal al-Rahma), near the holy city of Mecca, approximately two million pilgrims gather at the site of Muhammad’s last sermon fourteen centuries ago. AP/Wide World Photos

Qur’an
Qur’an, with sura headings in Naskhi script. The Qur’an contains 114 suras or chapters, arranged by length, thus the text as a whole does not have a clear narrative pattern. It is also divided into thirty equal parts for reading over the course of a month. The Art Archive/Private Collection/Eileen Tweedy
Qur’an
A man in Chuinguetti, Mauritania, holding an old copy of the Qur’an. Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the divine revelations of God, and it is therefore unalterable and untranslatable. Muslim prayers require worshippers to recite verses of the Qur’an, such as the Fatiha (the opening sura) as well as other chapters. Muslim children learn to recite the short chapters at an early age and are taught their meaning and context from family members and teachers. © Nik Wheeler/Corbis
Science, Islam and

A yellow copper astrolabe from the fourteenth century. This medieval instrument was used to measure the height of stars from the horizon. *The Art Archive/National Museum Damascus Syria/Dagli Orti*

**Medicine**
Anatomical drawing of the body showing the heart, arteries, liver, and intestines from the 1390 *Tashrib-e badan-e insan* (Anatomy of the human body) by Mansur ibn Muhammad ibn Ilyas al-Balkhi. *The Art Archive/British Library*
Shi’a, Early
This Safavid fresco from the seventeenth century depicts Imam Shah Zayd (presumably Zayd b. ‘Ali) preaching during the seventh-century schism within Islam. © SEF/Art Resource, NY

Persian Language and Literature
A Persian manuscript dating from 1650. Though the Arabic language is the most prestigious and commonly used language in Islam, by the tenth century the Persian language re-emerged, after a period of disuse, as suitable for discussion of science, arts, and philosophy. Persian prose literature encompasses a huge number of texts, from serial picaresque adventures to world histories and philosophical and mystical treatises. The Art Archive/Museum of Islamic Art Cairo/Dagli Ortì
Sahara
The Taghit oasis of the Sahara Desert. This oasis exists to the west of the Grand Erg Occidental, the second largest cluster of sand dunes in Algeria. © Jose Fuste Raga/Corbis

Travel and Travelers
Part of a Catalan map of southern Spain and North Africa depicting king Mansa Musi of Mali and a Saharan merchant, by Abraham Cresques, circa 1375. By the time of the Empire of Mali (circa 1200–1400 C.E.), parts of Mali’s ruling class had adopted Islam, although earlier, local religions persisted as well. The Art Archive